The Wars That Never Were: American Airpower and Conflict Deterrence in the Twentieth Century Johnathan Adam Rice

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2010 The Wars That Never Were: American Airpower and Conflict Deterrence in the Twentieth Century Johnathan Adam Rice

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COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

THE WARS THAT NEVER WERE:

AMERICAN AIRPOWER AND CONFLICT DETERRENCE IN THE TWENTIETH

CENTURY

JOHNATHAN ADAM RICE

A Thesis submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Degree Awarded: Summer Semester, 2010

The members of the committee approve the thesis of Johnathan Adam Rice defended on June 20, 2010.

______Professor Kristine C. Harper Professor Directing Thesis

______Professor Ronald E. Doel Committee Member

______Professor Jennifer L. Koslow Committee Member

The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members.

ii ACKNOWEDGMENTS

As with most academic endeavors, writing a thesis is above all else a lesson in humility. Though one name appears on the title page, this project was only possible from the feedback, support, and care of many.

Professor Kristine Harper provided endless patience, candor, and wit through countless emails, rough drafts, and impromptu meetings. Professor Ron Doel was equally as pivotal in this endeavor, never failing to remind me that I was, in fact, on the right track (despite my insistence to the contrary). Professor Jennifer Koslow took a chance on me as an undergraduate, teaching me the rigors of graduate study, and coaching my writing in a very important and uncertain time in my academic pursuits. Professors James Jones and Nathan Stoltzfus allowed me to realize my potential for writing. Without their encouragement long before I ever even had a thesis topic, I may have never taken the chance.

To my close friends, you were just as vital. Some of you taught me the importance of fairness, objectivity, and building character. Others reminded me to remain humble and insist that, in spite of my pursuit of a higher education, I remain grounded. Each of you was there to remind me that it is indeed okay to forget about writing and research for just a few hours. All of you never tired of hearing my endless rants about airpower, and though you could not care less about my topic, you never stopped listening. This speaks volumes.

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables ...... v List of Figures ...... vi Abstract ...... vii

1. Introduction ...... 1

2. Short of War: Concepts for Deterrence ...... 11

3. Coercion: A Formula for Effective Deterrence ...... 27

4. Peace through Strength: The Impact of Airlifts and Reconnaissance .... 43

5. Satellite Nation: United States Technology and Deterrence in Space.... 53

6. Conclusion...... 69

REFERENCES ...... 71

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH...... 76

iv LIST OF TABLES

Table 1-1: U.S. Air Force and MOOTWs, 1947 - 1996...... 12

Table 1-2: Examples of Military Activities Short of War...... 18

Table 1-3: The Overlap of Combat and Noncombat Operations...... 19

v LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2-1: The Line Between Deterrence and Compellence ...... 29

Figure 2-2: An Overview of Strategic Attack ...... 33

Figure 3-1: USAF Involvement in MOOTW, 1916-1996...... 44

Figure 5-1: Comparison of US and Soviet Satellites...... 60

vi ABSTRACT

Scholars have often treated the United States’ military’s use of airpower with contempt, focusing on the casualties and destruction of war. But airpower has another function: conflict deterrence. During and after the Cold War, United States airpower actively engaged in what were formally termed Military Operations Other Than War, perpetuating its and its allies’ interests, preventing the spread of Communism, and deterring conflicts. With well-studied coercive strategies, military thinkers were able to pinpoint an adversary’s leadership and remove it with precision-guided munitions while mitigating casualties and preventing conflict escalation. With its fleet of cargo aircraft, the United States was able to deliver food, supplies, and troops to troubled regions in response to crises, thus maintaining stability and preventing bad situations from worsening. By exploiting satellite capabilities, the nation was able to watch its adversary’s actions, ensuring compliance with treaties and regulations. In a number of ways, airpower was used to tamp down potentially hot conflicts even while other airpower resources were engaged in more stereotypical attack modes. Drawing heavily on Air Force and Joint Military doctrines and related primary and secondary sources, this thesis analyzes and assesses how airpower contributes to United States’ interests in ways that have been often overlooked.

vii CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

“For some reason, people have long imagined themselves competent to direct and to criticise air strategy while they have hesitated to involve themselves in the intricacies of the military and naval professions. Thus, there is scope for showing people by careful historical analysis not only that air power is no less complicated than land or sea power, but that, in essential principles, it is the same.” —Melden E. Smith, Jr., 19771

The application of airpower to United States’ interests has sparked contentious discussions. The use of the airplane as a weapon was revolutionary, but also tragic. For all of airpower’s benefits, what remained the focal point of scholarly study was its destructive power.2 This study acknowledges this gap in scholarship, and addresses the influential, coercive, and deterring capabilities of airpower. Comparatively speaking, these critical contributions of the airplane have gathered little attention when compared to aerial bombardment, especially outside of military colleges. Ultimately, this has created a generalization of airpower—specifically, as the United States uses it—as destructive.

This generalization has occurred because airpower is essentially overrated. For decades, it has failed to fulfill the prophecies of airpower theorists such as Army Major General Billy Mitchell (1879 – 1936) and Air Force General Curtis LeMay (1906 – 1990), who advocated using warplanes to totally destroy an adversary, foresaw the capability of the bomber to drop its payload into a barrel from 30,000 feet, and who felt

1 Quoted in Melden E. Smith, Jr., “The Strategic Bombing Debate: The Second World War and Vietnam,” Journal of Contemporary History 12, no. 1 (Jan. 1977): 175-191, 191. 2 For instance, see Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987). The historiographical discussion follows below.

that relentless use of the airplane was the only way to maintain America’s credibility and ensure its place as a world superpower.3

But the airplane did not do those things. Throughout the history of the airplane, and especially by the 1980s, scholars have pointed out airpower’s failures in every war since man learned to fly. In the Great War, bombing was inaccurate and ineffective. 4 Similar problems plagued bombing campaigns in World War II, when total war was waged and city centers became intentional targets, suffering many casualties as bombs rained from above. The creation of nuclear weapons resulted in the single most catastrophic assault on human life in history, when nuclear blasts over Japan wiped out entire cities in seconds. Airpower overcame its bombing accuracy difficulties, but at substantial cost to war’s innocents. Even when airpower was what could be considered “successful,” it came at a cost that arguably negated its benefits. To be sure, echoes of history would remind all of the toll airpower took. Carpet-bombing seen in World War II reappeared in the Korean and Vietnam wars and more civilians suffered from wave after wave of bombers. It took eighty years of technological progress for airpower to achieve objectives prophesied in the past, when the Gulf War became regarded as a textbook example of airpower achievements. Never before had such a decisive victory come so quickly for a dominant air force using extremely precise munitions and overwhelming airpower to defeat an army.5

3 For more on the prophets of airpower, see Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Press University, 1996); Isaac Don Levine, Mitchell, Pioneer of Air Power (New York, NY: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943); Curtis LeMay, Superfortress: The Story of the B-29 and American Air Power (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1988). General Billy Mitchell was an early proponent of aerial bombardment. In particular, he promulgated and heavily tested the use of the military airplane to sink an enemy ship during the interwar years between World Wars I and II. Likewise, General Curtis LeMay, a major advocate for airpower and total war, was known for his controversial strategic bombing campaigns during World War II. 4 For more on airpower during the First World War, see Terrence J. Finnegan, Shooting the Front: Allied Aerial Reconnaissance and Photographic Interpretation on the Western Front— World War I (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, National Defense Intelligence College, 2006). 5 For more on the use of airpower in the Korean and Vietnam wars, see: Conrad C. Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000); Wayne Thompson, To Hanoi and Back: The U.S. Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966- 1973 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000).

Airpower’s harshest critics have focused on its frequent failures and destructive missions. But pointing out the mistakes and transgressions of the past is simple; far more constructive—and often overlooked—would be a discussion of how airpower prevents wars from ever occurring. Summarizing the death and destruction wrought by military airpower over the 20th century is straightforward; the damage is calculable and evident. Analyzing airpower’s successes is more challenging, because while airpower is destructive it is, as a result, also coercive. In my investigation and analysis of the ways in which airpower has prevented conflicts and casualties, I will argue that airpower has evolved to become the most effective weapon of all: the one that never has to be used.

By definition, deterrence is an action designed to discourage another from undertaking an undesirable action. During the Cold War, Air Force aircraft and missiles provided the dominant means of delivering nuclear bombs to targets. Nuclear- and airpower-based deterrence were coupled. As the United States and Soviet Union “deterred” each other for decades, the concept of deterrence seems to have become narrowed down to involve only notions of mutually assured nuclear destruction.6 This oversimplification of deterrence diminishes other means by which enemies may be discouraged from engaging in an undesirable action.

Deterrence transcends the nuclear chess game that played out during the Cold War. The unique psychological impact of the airplane on battlefields, for example, was discussed soon after military forces introduced its use. The British became interested in the use of airpower to police foreign nations and deter rebellions immediately after World War I. The United States would attempt to emulate this interesting, if ill-fated, concept with the failed Project Control in 1950. Project Control was only experimental and never formally attempted, but it indicates the belief and hope that adversaries could be manipulated with airpower alone.7 From an economic standpoint, it makes sense that

6 Norman Friedman, The Fifty-year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000). 7 See James Corum, “The Myth of Air Control: Reassessing the History,” Aerospace Power Journal 34, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 61-77. Project Control was a three-year military investigation into the use of airpower to achieve political gains with minimal commitment of force. It was based on air control tactics employed by the Royal Air Force during the 1920s and 1930s to

nations have taken such interest in the quelling effects of airpower: it is affordable and requires fewer personnel. Boots on the ground can never be completely replaced by airpower. However, the importance of rapid airstrikes, the ability to deliver those boots to the ground and supplies to hostile environments quickly cannot be overstated.

So, how effective has airpower been as a deterrent? How has it played a role in military strategy? Using its Air Force, how has the United States been able to pursue its best interests with little more than an imposing arsenal of aircraft? Few studies on the deterrent effects of airpower—particularly those examining airpower as the sole deterrent—exist. To understand its other contributions as a conflict deterrent, I have examined various case studies—almost exclusively conducted by the RAND Corporation—in addition to still-evolving Air Force military doctrine.8

First, it is important to understand the scholarly criticisms of every wide scale conflict involving the use of airpower since the First World War.

Airpower in Literature

Although its role in the nation’s defense was all but assured following the Second World War, the Air Force still had much to prove in the political arena. Historian Michael Hogan chronicles and assesses this struggle in A Cross of Iron.9 The end of World War II and the dawn of the Cold War presented myriad defense challenges to the nation’s leaders and military planners. On the whole, liberals and conservatives combated in a textbook scenario of partisan bickering. On the left, liberals contended that a standing army and a technologically superior military were the only ways to protect the nation and preserve the spread of democracy. On the right, conservatives insisted that the nation not stray too far from its constitutional principles; that it remind itself that a standing army

squelch insurrection in their various territories. Project Control was eventually shelved after gaining little interest from major military thinkers. 8 RAND is a nonprofit research organization. Since 1948, it has conducted studies on social and economic issues including education, poverty, crime, the environment, and national security. 9 Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

and strong military were some of the very reasons it overthrew Britain during the birth of the nation.

The American shift from isolationism to internationalism, when aircraft and air transportation were shrinking the world and nuclear war was increasingly possible, was an especially trying time in the nation’s history. However, the result was a relatively balanced policy that placed the Air Force at its core, with airpower essentially satisfying both sides of the national security debate. The overarching strategy, as Hogan notes, placed air-atomic deterrence at the forefront. This satisfied several issues. First, a technologically dominant and numerically superior air force served to keep Soviet aggression at bay. Next, by focusing on airpower, the need for a large standing army was reduced, thus lessening costs. This last point was particularly appealing to Republicans and conservative Democrats, whose “enthusiasm for a capital-intensive defense … emphasized airpower over a more costly expansion of the Navy and the Army.”10

While the subject of deterrence is not central to Hogan’s work, which focuses on the creation of a national security state in preparation for total war, it is certainly on the periphery. What is apparent throughout his analysis of Congressional memos and chats between high-ranking political officials is the nation’s growing reliance on the Air Force. But it was a tenuous reliance. The nation knew it needed an “impressive level of preparedness” since “[n]o matter how expensive … preparedness was cheaper than another world war.”11

Historian John Lewis Gaddis also discusses the deterring potential of airpower assets in The Cold War: A New History. Although Gaddis’s book is a concise history of the Cold War, his occasional mentioning of US technology compared to that of the Soviet Union is intriguing and sheds light on its importance. The United States’ high-altitude U-2 spy plane, for example, was crucial for gathering data that revealed Soviet military secrets and, more importantly, their diplomatic lies. Information gathered from these reconnaissance missions revealed the inferiority of Soviet aircraft, the few inter- continental ballistic missiles they possessed, and the amount of time it would take for

10 Hogan, A Cross of Iron, 91. 11 Hogan, A Cross of Iron, 116.

them to retaliate in the event of a nuclear strike. Nuclear deterrence may have rested upon the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), but airpower was crucial in supporting the threat.12 The U-2 alone brought Soviet President Nikita Khrushchev’s Potemkin strategy to its knees; the Iron Curtain had a peephole. As more sophisticated reconnaissance satellites, such as Project Corona, replaced the U-2, US intelligence gathering improved.13 As will be discussed, American satellite technology was pivotal in the Cold War and beyond. Air and space power allowed for an intelligence edge, Gaddis wrote, that

“…contributed to the obsolescence of major wars by diminishing the possibility of surprise … and by eliminating opportunities for concealment in waging them. … Transparency—a by-product of the Cold War strategic arms race—created a wholly new environment that rewarded those who sought to prevent wars and discouraged those who tried to begin them.”14

Knowledge—made possible by assets in air and space—was now the ultimate power.

Hogan and Gaddis discuss airpower as part of a bigger picture. For Hogan, it is politics and the establishment of America as a national security state, and for Gaddis airpower is a critical cog in the machine that was Cold War deterrence. Reflecting on airpower in this way reveals its importance in marginal terms, but skirts around the dark days of indiscriminate bombing, for which the literature is abundant.15

12 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2005), 72- 74. 13 John Cloud, “Science in the Cold War,” Social Studies of Science 31, no. 2 (Apr., 2001): 231- 251. 14 Gaddis, The Cold War, 262-263. 15 For more on the rising role of the Air Force during the early Cold War years, see Ingo Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008). Trauschweizer highlights the backseat taken by the US Army in light of a growing reliance on airpower. Trauschweizer points to the shrinking US Army budget, which was increasingly dwarfed by that of the US Air Force. In addition to fiscal issues, he notes the US Army’s gradual adaptation to airpower, including entering into joint operations with the Air Force. For a more comprehensive look at the establishment of the national security state, see David J. Rothkopf, Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2005); Karl F.

The Rise of American Airpower: The Creation of Armageddon by historian Michael Sherry was one of many books published by the late 1980s that answered pressing questions about the American use of aerial bombardment in World War II. Sherry’s argument stops short of openly criticizing the bombardment, and rests instead on the notion that such destructive and severe uses of aerial bombardment in the Second World War were a result of “the political, cultural, and intellectual environment” of that era.16 Sherry provides thought-provoking insight into racial undercurrents, pointing to racism as justification for heavier bombardment of Japan than Germany. He also points to the nation’s technological fanaticism, manifested so clearly in fleet after fleet of high- tech bombers.

Although a critic of airpower, Sherry’s conclusive assessment of it as a deterrent is nevertheless fair, writing “Deterrence and prestige … dealing as they do with subjective considerations, have offered discouragingly few guidelines by which to determine what is ‘enough.’ At what level of force can any nation be certain that it has dissuaded its enemy from going to war or convinced the enemy of its status?”17 However, he overlooks the less tangible benefits of airpower. With such a sweeping statement, Sherry casts aside the notion that deterrence is worth even considering, thereby relegating airpower to its functions as he has approached them: that of crude, indiscriminate bombing perpetuated due to perceived racial superiority and technological fanaticism.

Tami Davis Biddle—professor of military studies at the U.S. Army War College—takes a similarly critical stance towards airpower in Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare. Biddle argues that, like children with new toys, military strategists were quick to embrace aerial bombardment without restraint or concern for its consequences, often using loose rhetoric as substantial justifications for assaults on civilians.18 So strong was

Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, eds. Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004). 16 Sherry, Creation of Armageddon, xi. 17 Sherry, Creation of Armageddon, 358. 18 Tami D. Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 192-193.

this use of rhetoric amongst, for example, Britain’s leaders, that it would ultimately prove to be “self-deterring.”19

By focusing on airpower’s limited roles within short time periods as a single war or conflict, one risks oversimplification and the creation of an image that indicates few lessons have been learned from experience. As the United States enters its fifth generation of aircraft, to reflect on just the first and second generations discounts airpower’s advances in efficacy, accuracy, and efficiency, and the subsequent concern of so-called collateral damage—the damage done to non-military people and structures. It is this broader approach that military historian Conrad C. Crane takes in Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II. Despite the subtitle, Crane elaborates on postwar lessons learned by airpower strategists as recently as the first Gulf War. Crane reminds readers of the horrors of indiscriminate bombing perpetuated against German and Japanese cities, but he stops short of overt criticism and instead juxtaposes the air force of old with the new air force, ultimately indicating lessons learned from the past.20

Not even the twenty-first century’s use of airpower is without condemnation. In Strategic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial Bombardment, political scientist Beau Grosscup compares the use of aerial bombardment by what he terms collectively “bombing nations” (the U.S., Britain, Israel) with terrorism. He argues that such bombing nations are engaged in “aerial state terrorism” and have been since World War II.21 Grosscup’s book attempts to force readers to rethink the purpose behind Western nations’ uses of airpower. However, his apparent disdain for such uses throughout his book (for example, he repeatedly refers to the United States as “jingoist”) coupled with the use of controversial liberal historian Howard Zinn and linguist and public intellectual Noam Chomsky as sources, greatly undermine this objective.

19 Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality, 69. 20 Conrad C. Crane, Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 156, 158-160. 21 Beau Grosscup, Strategic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial Bombardment (New York, NY: Zed Books, 2006), 185.

Staunch views proposed in Strategic Terror are indicative of the ways in which authors on airpower history have consistently isolated its role to bombardment alone. Civilian casualties are a terrible side effect of aerial bombardment, but by overlooking the other contributions airpower makes to the United States’ endeavors (via airlifts and surveillance, for example), not to mention the ways in which it attempts to mitigate such unintended casualties (via precision, coercion, or otherwise), these authors have downplayed the variety of airpower’s effects and thereby reduce the value of their studies to the history of airpower.

Political scientist Robert Pape, however, has taken a more practical approach in his study of airpower’s possibilities in Bombing to Win. Pape discusses two distinct forms of coercion: punishment, or the bombing of civilians, and denial, the bombing of military targets. He notes the dichotomy of the two strategies, and points out the skewed perspective with which historians have treated the topic:

“Most studies of military coercion have investigated only the punishment of civilians. They have omitted the use of coercive power to deny the target state the military capacity to control the contested territory … Ignoring denial strategies distorts our understanding of important historical cases when military, as well as civilian, targets have been attacked for coercive purposes.”22

As a political scientist, Pape cautions against studying coercion: “[C]oercion is seen as morally repugnant because it usually involves hurting civilians. … [It] has thus come to be viewed as the ‘dark side’ of international relations theory. Will not increased study of military coercion lead to increased use of it?”23 But this overemphasizes the idea that coercion is a method of violence, when in fact it is often a method designed to avoid violence. Pape seems to fear that studying coercion may lead to widespread use of it, as if, were it somehow perfected, nations—specifically the United States—would go about coercing adversaries at will. But this again restricts airpower to its destructive roles.

22 Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 8-9. 23 Pape, Bombing to Win, 3, 330.

Studying coercion is not about opening Pandora’s Box; it is about discovering how to keep it closed.

Pape’s argument also suffers because his views on coercion are limited to discussions of wars and overlook well-established examples of military operations other than war—operations where coercion was used not to just bring a conflict to a close, but to keep it from occurring.

The honeymoon phase of airpower, lasting until about 1945, brought empty promises and high expectations that could never be fulfilled. As the Iron Curtain fell on the world stage and national security became a central issue in American policy, the days of fleets of carpet bombers escorted by fast-moving P-51 Mustang and P-38 Lightning fighter planes were replaced with a more pragmatic use of airpower central to the importance of US interests, but never the once-heralded Holy Grail of war planning. Undoubtedly, criticisms of countless deaths due to indiscriminate bombing are justified. But airpower’s resulting reputation allowed it to function as an effective deterrent. By realizing this potential for harm while capitalizing on its coercive potential, US military planners have been able to curtail violence and conflict.

Focusing so strictly on the use of bombardment restricts the effects of airpower, whose uses far exceed these violent acts. Humanitarian aid, airlifts, and aerial and satellite reconnaissance are also powerful ways to use airpower that contribute to peacekeeping efforts. In short, airpower will not satisfy all a country’s military needs; it alone cannot win wars. But short of some lofty expectations by airpower theorists in the early days of aviation, it never was designed to do so. Chapter 2 reviews the evolution of airpower doctrine and demonstrates how its primary objective evolved shortly after the end of World War II to be that of a deterrent in light of the emerging Cold War. It also addresses the increasingly complicated and complex roles of airpower, most of which involve delivering everything but bombs. Chapter 3 discusses airpower’s reputation and how that reputation makes it a valuable coercion tool. Chapter 4 discusses the role of air and space assets in maintaining stability and peace, and how they have increased in importance. Lastly, Chapter 5 highlights the impact of technology as a deterrent, discussing the importance of that highest strategic ground—space—and the unique

challenges the nation has faced and continues to face in maintaining its very distinct and important edge in space assets.

CHAPTER TWO

SHORT OF WAR: CONCEPTS FOR DETERRENCE

Since the end of World War II, the United States military has regularly engaged in nonlethal operations, which fall under the umbrella term of “Military Operations Other Than War” (MOOTW). These operations were common throughout the Cold War, but have increased significantly since the fall of the Berlin Wall, when the US became the sole superpower and worked closely with the United Nations to maintain peace in regions throughout the world including Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. This increase is reflected both in numerical data (see table 1-1) and doctrinal focus.24

Table 1-1. This table indicates the steady increase in MOOTWs since the 1980s. [From Preparing the U.S. Air Force for Military Operations Other Than War, 8.] 25

24 Carl H. Builder, Theodore W. Karasik, Organizing, Training, and Equipping the Air Force for Crises and Lesser Conflicts (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing, 1995), 1. 25 Alan Vick, et al., Preparing the U.S. Air Force for Military Operations Other Than War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing, 1997), 8.

The natural complexity of operations designed to prevent—or at least reduce— conflict and violence in potential or existing conflicts makes MOOTW especially complicated. As it applies to all Joint Operations—operations that encompass multiple branches of the military simultaneously—MOOTW is too large to review here in its entirety. This chapter will briefly trace the history of US airpower doctrine, especially as it concerns MOOTW and its major concepts, and outline airpower’s role in executing many of them. Compared to the straightforward execution of warfare, MOOTW and its inherent implications of deterrence and peacekeeping are relatively complex. The goal here is to summarize and simplify these factors. Subsequent chapters will put these ideas into context with examples of operations and their successes or failures.

MOOTW is typically discussed in the context of military doctrines and case studies, such as these from the RAND Corporation. Outside of these official documents, the concept has received little scholarly discussion.26 By cross-referencing the broad Joint Operations doctrine with more specific Air Force doctrine and case studies, airpower’s active role in these deterrent and peacekeeping operations becomes more evident.

As USAF Lt. Col. Johnny Jones has noted, doctrine is a reflection of conditions and military considerations of that time.27 Doctrine, while dull, can help scholars discuss and understand military planning of a certain era. This idea is seen in comparing air doctrine of 1941, which viewed airpower as largely destructive, to air doctrine of 1992, which heavily emphasizes airpower’s potential to deter conflict. Thus understanding doctrine is central to historical understanding of military objectives and motivations.

Foundations of Air Doctrine

Almost since the airplane’s inception, military uses of airpower have been heavily debated, hinging on fears of the potential for atrocity. As Michael Sherry and others have noted, there are clear consequences to doctrine suggesting extreme use of might.

26 See Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces As a Political Instrument (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1978). 27 Johnny R. Jones, Development of Air Force Basic Doctrine: 1947-1992 (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 1997), 1.

Although peacekeeping operations have been a key part of airpower missions from 1916 to the present, they received little doctrinal attention until 1990. The change in global power after the Cold War forced the Air Force to modify its views on these operations.

Air doctrine of the Army Air Arm—established during the interwar period of World Wars I and II—is indicative of airpower’s potential for harm. Two wars spanning the globe shaped air policy; the use of fighters and bombers to cripple city centers, destroy enemy capabilities, and control air space was fundamental in its development. The bombardment campaigns during the Second World War against Dresden, Hamburg, Tokyo, and finally the atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, reflect this. As suggested in the Army Field Manual:

[T]he inherent flexibility of air power is its greatest asset. The flexibility makes it possible to employ the whole weight of the available air power against selected areas … such concentrated use of air striking force is a battle winning factor of the first importance.28

Airpower was, quite simply, an offensive weapon. But this thinking was not unanimous among military planners. In 1919, Secretary of War Newton Baker feared the unchecked use of aerial bombardment. In referring to the retaliatory tit-for-tat bombing campaigns of the First World War, he cautioned, “[I]t may be said that the willingness of the enemy casually to slaughter women and children, and to destroy property of no military value or use, demonstrated … the necessity of beating so brutal a foe, and it is most likely that history will record these manifestations of inhumanity as the most powerful aids to recruitment in the nations against which they were made.” Baker was not alone; American mentality reflected similar worries over widescale attacks on other civilized nations. A nation as advanced as the United States must maintain its clear ethical and moral responsibility in the possession of such technological supremacy. While

28 Field Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, 1943 quoted in Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, 1984, A-3. Emphasis added.

airpower doctrine of the interwar periods does not reflect this idea, subsequent doctrine does.29

Notions of conflict deterrence were all but omitted in earlier doctrine. Considering the circumstances under which the United States entered the Second World War, this is not surprising. However a dynamic doctrinal shift followed the creation of the independent Air Force in 1947. The political background under which the USAF was established, as discussed by Michael Hogan in A Cross of Iron, parallels this thinking. US airpower evolved from an offensive powerhouse with a compelling history of marked—if controversial—success into an entity whose primary purpose was to “deter [the] use of military force by hostile nations.”30 Despite numerous doctrinal changes over the last sixty years, this concept has remained in place.

However, it took the end of World War II for US military planners to realize and further emphasize the impact of non-lethal uses of airpower. As Thomas Greer notes in his investigation of the establishment of the Army Air Arm’s doctrine, airpower was “for the immediate future … seen as the primary weapon of destruction in war.”31 Targets of war extended beyond armies on the battlefield; the battlefield now included city centers and residential areas. Destruction was airpower’s central purpose. Cargo and troop transportation, reconnaissance, and other non-violent operations were treated as peripheral—afterthoughts in light of more destructive uses. As one Air Corps instructor stated:

“An air force that is designed for its true objective will not be inadequate to its lesser obligations. It cannot measure up to its real task, however, if it is designed for the transportation of troops, the movement of supplies, participation in battle, or in futile defensive operations.”32

29 Thomas H. Greer, The Development of the Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1985), 14-15. 30 Jones, Development of Air Force Basic Doctrine, 4. 31 Greer, Development of the Air Doctrine, 78. 32 Air Corps Tactical School lecture quoted in Greer, Development of the Air Doctrine, 79.

However, hints of the potential for deterrence were at least observed and noted by leading American planners. As Greer notes, “The effects of airpower not used, but available as a threat, proved even more influential on American thought than the lessons of combat.” Successful German aggression during 1938 is credited in part to its large and imposing air force. Three of the world’s leading powers—England, France, and Russia— all capitulated to Adolf Hitler’s terms, despite having superior economic, military, and naval capabilities. The difference was Germany’s airpower, numbering at well over 3,000 bombers. With the threat of airpower, Germany had imposed what President Franklin D. Roosevelt referred to as, “peace by fear.”33

Doctrine Matures

Doctrinal progression has been a central issue to the Air Force since it became an independent branch in 1947. It has been plagued with problems ranging from poor organization to a lack of clearly stated objectives. Manuals were released in quick succession during the 1950s, but with little change and little indication that Air Force leaders had learned lessons from past wars.34

James A. Mowbray, professor of aerospace doctrine and strategy at Maxwell Air Force Base, has described four “eras” of doctrinal development. The first, 1941-1955, represented a shotgun approach to doctrine. Three manuals were released between 1953 and 1955, each with noticeably fewer changes than the one it superseded. At the least, the doctrine acknowledged the Air Force’s prime role in deterring hostile nations from using force. This was a fundamental concept without much elaboration until the second era, 1955-1978.35 Indeed, Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1 released in 1978 stated, “The primary objective of U.S. national security policy is the deterrence of military actions which are counter to U.S. interests.” The strength of forces necessary to accomplish this was simply

33 Greer, Development of the Air Doctrine, 102-103; Roosevelt quoted in Greer, Development of the Air Doctrine, 103. 34 For more on Air Force doctrine changes over the latter 20th century, see Jones, Development of Air Force Basic Doctrine. 35 Greer, Development of the Air Doctrine, 4; James A. Mowbray, “Air Force Doctrine Problems, 1926-Present,” Airpower Journal 9, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 24-41.

summarized as a “degree of military power which can be expected to deter a potential enemy from attacking the United States or its allies.”36 Though nuclear war was at the heart of much of the doctrine, the manual referred to peripheral objectives of the Air Force in roles pertinent to psychological operations in war.37 These principles would remain in Air Force basic doctrine.

The 1984 edition of AFM 1-1 expanded deterrent objectives, but still fell short of explicit elaboration. It stated the national military objectives of the USAF are to:

• Deter attacks against the United States, our allies, and against vital US interests worldwide, including sources of essential materials, energy, and associated lines of communication. • Prevent an enemy from politically coercing the United States, its allies, and friends. • If deterrence fails, fight at the level of intensity and duration necessary to attain US political objectives.38

The last point is noteworthy as it acknowledges the complexity of these operations and the variety of response with which the military may respond. This concept parallels underlying objectives of MOOTW, which hinge on flexible and appropriate responses.

By the 1990s, publications released alongside doctrine would build further on Air Force doctrinal objectives, especially MOOTW. Air Force Manual 1-1, released in 1992, represents the most comprehensive and elaborate Air Force doctrine to date. The doctrine reflects the end of the Cold War, lessening the importance of nuclear deterrence and instead focusing on supportive roles designed to maintain peace. This fact is reflected in the RAND report on Air Force MOOTW, which stresses the growing role of the USAF in peacekeeping operations since 1990. The USAF participated in 194 MOOTW during the

36 AFM 1-1, 1978 quoted in Greer, Development of the Air Doctrine, 12-13. AFM 1-1 is the primary doctrine document for the Air Force and retains the same title, even though the date changes as new editions are released. 37 Greer, Development of the Air Doctrine, 15. 38 AFM 1-1, 1984, 1-2.

first five years of the post-Cold War period (1991-1995)—nearly double the 100 operations of the last five years of the Cold War (1986-1990).39 More than any past doctrine, the 1992 manual was rooted in historical data, providing context for past successes in what was a history of, until that point, overlooked “sideshows” in airpower’s past.40

Table 1-2. In 1992, the Air Force doctrine detailed their contributions to short-of- war efforts. [From AFM 1-1, vol. 2, 1992, 56.]41

MOOTW Defined

To define MOOTW, it is important to explain what it is not and distinguish these operations from a “hot” war. War consists of sustained and large-scale combat operations intended to achieve national objectives to protect the nation’s and its allies’ best

39 Vick, Preparing the U.S. Air Force, 7-8. 40 Vick, Preparing the U.S. Air Force, iii. The RAND report notes how poorly addressed these operations were until this point. 41 AFM 1-1, vol. 2, 1992, 56.

interests.42 These operations are, ideally, conducted with the objective of keeping casualties and commitment of forces to a minimum. The end goal is to conclude hostile operations with conditions and terms suitable to the U.S.43

MOOTW focus on “deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities,” which may include combat or noncombat situations. These operations may occur in peacetime or during low-intensity conflicts—such as the operations discussed in Chapter 3—and may also overlap with wartime operations. MOOTW conducted during wartime occur peripherally and retain their deterrent qualities even if they occur in a warzone. Thus the doctrine followed in the execution of these operations remains separate, as their objectives are different.44 Table 1-3 examines the relative complications inherent in MOOTW as compared to war.

Table 1-3. This table indicates the complex nature of some MOOTWs, demonstrating how some overlap combat and noncombat operations. [From Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3, Military Operations Other Than War, 2-3.45]

42 Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, I-1. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3, Military Operations Other Than War, October 5, 1996, 6. This is the Air Force perspective of a table found in Joint Publication 3-07, I-2. AFDD 2-3 cautions, “A distinct characteristic of MOOTW is the ever-existing possibility that any type of MOOTW may quickly change from noncombat and vice versa. Therefore, even when a typical combat operation is planned, remember that actual force may not be needed if deterrence works, e.g., protection of shipping. Likewise, in some typical noncombat operations, some level of force may be required if the situation deteriorates.”

The strategic considerations for MOOTW fall under three main objectives:

• Deterrence – Deterrence is defined as a coercive strategy. At its broadest, it involves “the purposive use of overt threats of force to influence another’s strategic choices.” Country A may attempt to convince Country B that a particular action may result in negative consequences for them should they continue.46 The US military plays a role in deterring actions deemed as threatening to it or its allies through a variety of MOOTW including peace enforcement or strikes and raids. These actions are seen as deterring as they indicate a willingness to use force if necessary. Non- combat MOOTW supports deterrence by promoting regional stability via peacekeeping.

• Forward Presence – Forward presence demonstrates commitment to an operation and credibility to allies, promotes stability in a region, and provides crisis response.

• Crisis Response – Like forward presence, crisis response allows US forces to enhance regional stability typically in response to a manmade or natural disaster, or other potential crisis needing emergency support.47

The Joint Publication doctrine—written for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and thus the military as a whole—discussing MOOTW is broad, but at least spells out specific policy designed to avert or deter conflict. The rapid and varied methods by which airpower can respond to such operations makes it an especially critical cornerstone to military operations in executing these operations to their full capability. By examining Air Force Developmental Doctrine (AFDD) in depth, the potential for MOOTW as defined by the Joint Publication will become evident.

46 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004), 26-27. 47 Joint Publication 3-07, I-3 – I-4.

Air Force Doctrine Documents

Air Force Doctrine Documents (AFDDs) serve as supplements to the less specific Air Force Manuals (AFMs). With the release of Joint Publication 3-07 “Joint Doctrine For Military Operations Other Than War,” which addressed MOOTW as it applied to all military branches, the Air Force followed up with AFDD 2-3 “Military Operations Other Than War.” This brief but comprehensive document answered questions posed by Joint Pub 3-07 by discussing specifically how the Air Force had (historically) and could (potentially) fulfill their short-of-war expectations. It also elaborated on their introduction to operations short-of-war presented by AFM 1-1 (1992). In short, AFDD 2-3 provided an Air Force perspective on an otherwise complex military problem by distinguishing its particular response capabilities to and expectations of these operations from other branches of the military. Considering the Air Force’s rapid responsiveness, operations designed to maintain peace and deter conflict were of considerable importance, and their role in such missions was paramount to success.48

AFDD 2-3 discusses sixteen types of MOOTW, seen in table 1-3. Four involve combat, six do not, and six overlap, meaning they may or may not require a distinct use of force. Although the objective of MOOTW is to avoid lethal conflict, circumstances may make violent intervention necessary.49 This section will only discuss operations that are relevant to this study.

Typical Combat Operations:

These four types of operations usually involve a use of force in the traditional sense. Despite the term, however, combat may not necessarily involve violence.

• Enforcement of Sanctions – Referred to as quarantines, these operations include the maintaining of a particular barrier in order to reduce or prevent the incoming or outgoing of certain goods. These quarantines are hard to

48 AFDD 2-3, 5. 49 AFDD 2-3, 6.

maintain from the air, however, as oftentimes the only way to prevent an aircraft from violating such a rule is to destroy it.

• Enforcing Exclusion Zones – Also known as “no-fly zones,” these sanctions are placed to coerce or deter a nation from undertaking a particular action. Air Force air and space assets monitor and maintain such zones via satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or airborne warning and control systems (AWACS).

• Protection of Shipping – Like the above example, air and space assets provide real-time information and imagery in order to protect the safe transportation of goods. An example would include the protection of shipping lanes from piracy.

• Strikes and Raids – Strikes and raids are quick “in-and-out” operations designed to commit forces for as short of time as possible. Airpower is ideal for these attacks due to their responsiveness and survivability. These operations are the most similar to war, but also the least common MOOTW, occurring eight times between 1947 and 1996.50

Typical Noncombat Operations:

Just as combat operations may not involve combat, noncombat operations may escalate to require combat intervention. Regardless, the ultimate objective in these operations is to conduct them in an otherwise calm environment.

• Arms Control Support – Air and space assets play a key role in maintaining arms control and ensuring accordance with, for example, treaties centered on responsible arms distribution by other nations. Aircraft may also escort and monitor authorized transportation of arms between allies.

50 Vick, Preparing the U.S. Air Force, 11.

• Foreign Humanitarian Assistance – Airpower provides again a unique opportunity to respond rapidly with humanitarian assistance, which usually translates into alleviating suffering due to disasters, disease, or hunger. Since 1989, these missions have constituted the majority of Air Force MOOTW response.

• Show of Force – In a show of force, the USAF “uses the physical presence of a credible force to either demonstrate US resolve or to increase visibility of deployed forces [in response to] a specific situation that may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives.” These operations coincide with three primary objectives of airpower: responsiveness, persistence, and flexibility. In essence, simply being there demonstrates capability to respond with actual force. 51

Overlapping Operations:

• Combating Terrorism – Like operations discussed above, air and space assets play a large intelligence-gathering role in combating terrorism, but may also intervene with close-air support, shows of force, air interdiction, or airlifts.

• Ensuring Freedom of Navigation – Similar to “Protection of Shipping,” freedom of navigation involves a more active Air Force role to ensure safe passage and ease of travel along air and sea routes.

• Peace Operations – Peacekeeping operations are of special consideration in MOOTW. First, compared to the other operational types listed here, they are relatively ambiguous in that they may be conducted in ways representing any of the above operational types. A show of force or enforcement of sanctions, for example, can be considered as peacekeeping. Second, peacekeeping operations have increased

51 Vick, Preparing the U.S. Air Force, 15.

dramatically since the end of the Cold War, with airpower playing a crucial, usually non-violent role.52

Doctrinal Conclusions

Although MOOTW have been conducted since the 19th century—and the United States has used military aircraft to carry them out since 1916—these operations received little scholarly attention until the late 20th century. Regardless, history has provided solid context for the efficacy of these operations. Taken together, the peacemaking and peacekeeping potential of airpower is demonstrated through more recent doctrinal intent and—historically— through operational performance. The frequency of MOOTW increased dramatically after the Cold War as the United States became the world’s sole superpower. No longer were threats to US and allied interests centralized to the Soviet Union; they could—and did—stem from regional conflicts.53 The sudden stress on and importance of peacekeeping missions after the Cold War made it necessary to view these operations historically to provide background studies for future operations. Missions that for decades had been treated as largely peripheral and supportive were now at the forefront of Air Force doctrine, a core function in maintaining US and allied interests, in keeping peace, and maintaining stability.

The sudden influence of these operations is indicated in the growth in doctrinal discussion from a few sentences in AFM 1-1 (1984) to several detailed pages in AFM 1-1 (1992). The comprehensive 1992 doctrine supersedes in many ways older doctrine concerning operations short-of-war. In comparison, the 1984 edition of Air Force Manual 1-1 vaguely summarized these operations as “a spectrum of conflicts or crises” described as “a continuum defined primarily by the magnitude of the declared objectives. The scope of the objectives may be limited or total and, therefore, determines the character and dimension of a military operation.”54

52 Vick, Preparing the U.S. Air Force, 19-20. 53 AFDD 2-3, i. 54 AFM 1-1, 1984, 1-2 – 1-3.

As Michael Hogan has noted, the establishment of the Air Force came with the underlying notion of preparedness and deterrence. Air Force doctrine was slow to indicate it could meet this demand, but its gradual progression throughout the Cold War years and beyond clearly remedied this issue, as the Air Force participated in an increasing number of short-of-war operations following the end of the Cold War. Throughout its contentious history, airpower has grown from a manifestation of military might, capable of killing countless civilians and obliterating entire cities, to a cornerstone of conflict deterrence and peacekeeping, all hinging on the same qualities that make it such a dangerous weapon: responsiveness, speed, and flexibility.

MOOTWs are a compelling aspect of military operations as they aim to turn warriors into those who do everything but fight wars. But the distinction between these roles must be made. Indeed, US forces are “an army, not a Salvation Army.” As the role of the US military has shifted from “General Patton to Florence Nightingale,” its ability to maintain its distinct role as a war-fighting entity becomes blurred. The key, then, is to “strike a balance” between fighting and winning the nation’s wars and engaging in operations short of them, designed to prevent them altogether.55

The importance of MOOTWs has increased, and so too has the commitment of the nation’s armed forces to them. This has added undue stress on servicemen and women, and their families. Moreover, as men and women engage in operations short-of- war, their combat readiness becomes dulled as they exercise rules of engagement designed to curtail violence and promote diplomacy. Ironically, operations designed to prevent violence inevitably place the deterring nation’s own military in greater danger.56 Indeed, “[c]ombat readiness dissipates as humanitarian missions rise. Training for food drops and medical supplies differs from training for close air support and tank maneuvers.”57

Heavy engagement in MOOTW hinders perhaps the greatest threat to military operations: public opinion. Again, the US military must be cautious in its engagement in

55 Builder and Karasik, Organizing, Training, and Equipping the Air Force, 17, 23. 56 Builder and Karasik, Organizing, Training, and Equipping the Air Force, 18. 57 Builder and Karasik, Organizing, Training, and Equipping the Air Force, 19.

such operations as public outcry about and low tolerance for casualties can negate the effectiveness of an operation, and, indeed, make the situation it attempted to ease worse instead: “Such murky missions will eventually undermine public support for engaging the military … Worse yet, to cut and run at the first deaths undermines American credibility abroad and encourages the world’s aggressors.”58

The impact of pilot strain in short-of war-operations was seen tragically on April 14, 1994, when an Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft misidentified two United States Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters as Iraqi Mil Mi-24 “Hind” helicopters and instructed a pair of US F-15 fighter aircraft to destroy them. The incident left 26 service members and civilians dead. Pilot fatigue was partially to blame in this short-of-war operation dubbed Operation Provide Comfort. As one of the most overworked and pivotal crews of the Air Force, AWACS crews had typically been deployed more than 200 days a year in each of the five years following the end of the Cold War as a result of the subsequent surge in MOOTWs.59

MOOTWs present unique challenges not seen in wartime. Ultimately, they are indicative of a commitment to casualty avoidance, positive public perception, and conflict deterrence. To satisfy all these demands requires a careful balance. Military planners must use the right operation at the right time while maintaining the United States’ reputation as a powerful nation with the capability to use force, if not necessarily the desire to do so. Meanwhile, it must do so while keeping a positive image of the operations both at home and within the adversary’s own population. Airpower’s distinct and special role in making this coercion possible is the topic of the next chapter.

58 Builder and Karasik, Organizing, Training, and Equipping the Air Force, 28. 59 Builder and Karasik, Organizing, Training, and Equipping the Air Force, 18. “Answers Needed on Iraq,” New York Times, April 16, 1994, 20; Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Jets Over Iraq Attack Own Helicopters in Error,” New York Times, April 15, 1994, 1.

CHAPTER THREE

COERCION: A FORMULA FOR EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE

“It is often argued that ‘face’ is a frivolous asset to preserve, and that it is a sign of immaturity that a government can’t swallow its pride and lose face. … If the question is raised whether this kind of ‘face’ is worth fighting over, the answer is that this kind of face is one of the few things worth fighting over.”

—Thomas C. Schelling60

Coercion—the practice of influencing another party to do something—might seem to be a straightforward concept, but in execution it can be very complicated. It is a concept that, if perfected, is the Holy Grail for military planners. To exercise the perfect amount of force, to practice the right amount of saber rattling, and to strike a balance between bluffing and threat all remain challenges designed to convince an adversary to cease unfavorable actions and thus to induce a favorable outcome. Coercion has been the scholarly subject of international affairs, mathematics, psychology, and history, all to study a concept that can rarely be proven.61 Indeed, one of the greatest challenges of coercion is finding the evidence of its effectiveness. History is replete with examples of nations attempting to coerce other nations, for example, when the Persians tried to coerce

60 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 124. 61 See Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004); Paul K. Davis, Effects-Based Operations: A Grand Challenge for the Analytical Community (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001); Paul C. Stern, et al., eds., Perspectives on Deterrence (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989); Andrew Lambert, The Psychology of Air Power (London: The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1995.)

the Athenians into capitulation.62 However, what is less clear—and harder to prove—is validation from the target-nation as to what explicitly caused or constituted the coercion.

These challenges are beyond this study, which examines the intriguing concept of coercion in the context of conflict avoidance and deterrence, specifically the unique role airpower plays. Research on coercion within various disciplines provides the background, and by tying it to Air Force doctrine and case studies, this examination of airpower and coercion will simplify the concept.63

Defining Coercion

Coercion is defined as “the use of threatened force, including the limited use of actual force to back up the threat, to induce an adversary to behave differently than it otherwise would.”64 This simple definition becomes complicated when broken down into the subcategories of compellence and deterrence. Compellence “involves attempts to reverse an action that has already occurred,” whereas deterrence “involves preventing an action that has not yet materialized from occurring in the first place.”65

62 Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 18. 63 See Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1978). They note the challenges of proving coercion, while highlighting the benefits of studying it anyway: “…we count as incidents only those instances when … the Soviet Union did put pressure on Berlin and the United States did react with discrete military activity. We did not record, nor obviously could we record, those times when Soviet decisionmakers debated, or individually considered, applying pressure to Berlin and then thought better of it, although in terms of reducing the risk of war and stabilizing international politics it is these latter effects of the U.S. military presence that were most beneficial.” (page 12) Emphasis added. 64 Byman, et al., Air Power as a Coercive Instrument (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 1. 65 Byman, et al., Air Power as a Coercive Instrument, 10.

Figure 2-1. – The fine line between compellence and deterrence, using the 1992 Gulf War as an example. [From Air Power as a Coercive Instrument, 12.] 66

A core principle of coercion is, ideally, the avoidance of violence. It is the opposite of traditional brute force war fighting. Indeed, war demonstrates intentional and systematic destruction of an adversary’s war fighting ability. Coercion is anything but that. As Robert Pape suggests in Bombing to Win, to be considered coercion the adversary must still have the potential for violence, but choose not to exercise it.67 Coercion’s true power is perhaps best summarized by professor of foreign affairs and national security Thomas Schelling, in contrasting it with brute force: “Brute force succeeds when it is used, whereas the power to hurt is most successful when held in reserve. It is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply. It is latent violence that can influence someone’s choice.”68

66 Byman, et al., Air Power as a Coercive Instrument, 12. 67 Byman, et al., Air Power as a Coercive Instrument, 13. 68 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), quoted in Byman, et al., Air Power as a Coercive Instrument, 13.

Limits

The formula for coercion seems simple enough: Impose a threat and deter an action. With the clear military advantage that the U.S. has enjoyed since the collapse of the USSR, this should be effortless.69 However, coercion poses intrinsic challenges for the U.S. As distinctively “weak,” U.S. forms of coercion are vulnerable to exploitation by adversaries. These vulnerabilities include:

• preference for multilateralism;

• intolerance for U.S. casualties;

• aversion to enemy civilian suffering;

• reliance on high-technology options; and

• commitment to international norms, such as the Geneva Convention.70

The U.S. desire to avoid casualties to its military personnel and adversary civilians—exacerbated by domestic public disapproval of such deaths—is often exploited by adversaries in the form of counter-coercion. During the North Vietnam bombing campaigns of 1965-68, for example, North Vietnamese leaders used as propaganda claims that damage caused by the U.S. air attacks was the result of intentional targeting of civilian structures. The same propensity toward avoiding collateral damage was commented on by Saddam Hussein before the Gulf War when he remarked, “Yours is a society which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle.”71

69 For more on America’s overwhelming military might since the end of the Cold War, see Eliot Cohen, “The Mystique of U.S. Air Power,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1994): 109-24. 70 Byman and Waxman, “Defeating US Coercion,” Survival 41, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 107-120, 108. 71 As quoted in Byman and Waxman, “Defeating US Coercion,” 115.

Airpower as a Coercive Instrument

As airpower historian Eliot Cohen states, “Air power is an unusually seductive form of military strength … like modern courtship, it appears to offer gratification without commitment.”72 But this analogy is shortsighted; the growing reliance the United States has on airpower and its diplomatic potential means the nation’s relationship with airpower will likely be long-term. And like any lengthy relationship, it is full of as many complications as benefits. As will be seen, some of the same elements that make airpower so effective and reliable are the same components that can hinder its coercive potential.

As noted above, the end of the Cold War brought about an increased reliance on short-of-war, humanitarian, and peacekeeping operations, for which airpower’s role appears more vital than ever. This section will discuss airpower and coercion, their potential, and their complex limits. The roles of airpower and coercion are best understood by distinguishing aggressive coercion (e.g., strategic attacks) from soft coercion (e.g., psychological operations, humanitarian aid).

Airpower’s role as a coercive instrument has been debated since the airplane’s inception as a military machine. Hints of its psychological impact are evident as far back as the Great War, as this passage from All Quiet on the Western Front illustrates:

Battle planes don’t trouble us, but the observation planes we hate like the plague; they put the artillery to us. A few minutes after they appear, shrapnel and high-explosives begin to drop on us. We lose eleven men in one day that way, and five of them stretcher-bearers.73

72 Cohen, “Mystique of U.S. Air Power,” 109. 73 Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1929), 128. For more on the morale impact of reconnaissance aircraft in WWI, see: Harold Porter, Aerial Observation (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1921). A similar modern day example of the same effect is discussed here: Popular Mechanics, “10 Questions and Photos for Smithsonian UAV Curator/Fighter Pilot Dik Daso,” May 6, 2008, http://www.popularmechanics.com/blogs/science_news/4262460.html (accessed September 21, 2009).

In his book Why the Allies Won, World War II historian Richard Overy makes similar observations regarding the bombing campaigns of World War II: “No one enjoyed being bombed. The recollections of its victims are unanimous in expressing feelings of panic, of fear, of dumb resignation.” Regarding some opinions that bombing campaigns had a negligible effect on the war’s outcome, Overy concludes, “There has always seemed something fundamentally implausible about the contention of bombing’s critics that dropping almost 2.5 million tons of bombs on tautly-stretched industrial systems and war-weary urban populations would not seriously weaken them.”74 Overy’s point is not that airpower alone changed the war, but that considering airpower in context as a cog in an otherwise much larger war machine, it played a valuable part. This is a miscalculation used often when evaluating the effectiveness of airpower in any theater or operation, not during just the Second World War. Or more simply, as Eliot Cohen succinctly notes, “Air power may not decide all conflicts or achieve all of a country’s political objectives, but neither can land power.”75

Aggressive Coercion

As discussed above, air strikes are potentially effective and coercive instruments in short- of-war operations. As instruments of coercion, air strikes provide unique opportunities to deter conflicts from occurring or prevent conflicts from escalating. Ideally, strategic attacks circumvent normal paths to achieving objectives by destroying specific targets, thereby forcing (coercing) an enemy to capitulate early. Figure 2.2 demonstrates this complex possibility.

74 Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1995), 132 – 133; Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion, 31. 75 Cohen, “Mystique of U.S. Air Power,” 121.

Figure 2.2 – Strategic attacks, when effective, produce the same results as traditional warfare, but without the costs in casualties and machinery. [From AFDD 2-1.2, Strategic Attack, 8.]76

A central objective to effective execution of strategic attacks hinges on locating and crippling an adversary’s “center of gravity,” which is the “source of power that provides moral strength, freedom of action, or will to act. … [Centers of gravity] are focal points that hold a system or structure together and draw power from a variety of sources and provide purpose and direction to that system.”77 Center of gravity often refers to a “critical vulnerability” which may be geographical, a specific key event, or a particular function.78

Airpower’s role in strategic attacks is therefore critical in assessing and reaching an enemy’s center of gravity. Basic characteristics of air and space power capabilities—

76 Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.2, Strategic Attack, June 12, 2007, 8. 77 AFDD 2-1.2, 20. 78 AFDD 2-1.2, 3.

reconnaissance, responsiveness, flexibility, and the delivery of precise and effective ordinance—allow for far more efficient and rapid access to and destruction of the center of gravity than land- and sea-based assets.79 As technological prowess strengthens and precision increases, disabling a center of gravity becomes a more influential strategy. As Byman and Waxman note, “The increasing precision of air strikes has made them even more attractive … because it has given policy makers some control—or the illusion of control—over the level of pain actually inflicted. … The improved accuracy of modern airpower has allowed policy makers in some cases to keep enemy civilian casualties and collateral damage at relatively low levels by historical standards.”80

Aggressive coercion strikes a balance in what has become a very American “way of war.”81 Reliance on high technology coupled with a low contribution of manpower ultimately alleviates casualties on both sides of the battlefield. Taken together, this mitigation of casualties maintains a relatively positive public perception of conflicts when they occur.82 However, this illusion of control can be a double-edged sword. As adversaries place civilians in harm’s way to use their deaths as propaganda, the coveted precision designed to avoid such innocent casualties may now appear to intentionally target the civilians it aims to avoid.83 With nations sensitive to casualties, there is a potential for negative repercussions. Ironically, by being able to greatly reduce the number of mistakes through precision munitions, the United States is, ultimately, “open to greater criticism when mistakes happen.”84

Other limits to strategic attacks are manifested in the challenges inherent to fighting lesser forces—specifically non-state actors. Guerilla units, for example, may not present a strategic target. Non-state and guerilla actions are usually sporadic and lack the coordination of more organized military units. This makes destruction of a key target

79 AFDD 2-1.2, 11. 80 Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion, 89. 81 As coined by Eliot Cohen in The Mystique of U.S. Air Power. He further defines air warfare as, “distinctively American—high-tech, cheap in lives and (at least in theory) quick. To America’s enemies—past, current and potential—it is the distinctively American form of military intimidation.” (page 120). 82 Byman and Waxman, “Defeating US Coercion,” 109-110. 83 Byman and Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion, 146. 84 Byman and Waxman, “Defeating US Coercion,” 120.

difficult to assess. Moreover, non-state units fight in areas such as mountainous or densely forested regions that pose geographical challenges to airpower precision. This type of adversary’s reliance on low technology, which poses similar challenges to crippling their communications and command structure, exacerbates these issues.85 Occasionally, these localized insurgent forces can combine to form a larger force and conduct a conventional battle against their opposition. On these occasions, airpower can accurately and rapidly strike these forces with substantial effectiveness and destruction. However, “generally speaking, guerrillas and terrorists rarely present lucrative targets for aerial attack.”86

The same technology that gives the U.S. an edge in coercion can also inhibit it. America’s reputation and reliance on airpower is renowned, but while this creates advantages, adversaries may adapt their strategies to take advantage of its weaknesses. Airpower’s potential for wide scale destruction, mixed (read: hindered) with strict, self- imposed rules-of-engagement—the policy by which the military might demonstrate restraint in engaging certain targets—demonstrates reluctance on the part of American forces, which thus mutes its likelihood to coerce.87 With enough knowledge of U.S. history, policy, and doctrine, adversaries will be able to call America’s bluff.

Moreover, such a strong reliance on technology—and possessing such an overwhelming technological advantage—can raise expectations for coercion to unrealistic and even unattainable levels. The natural desire for the U.S. to seek technological solutions can infringe on making the “difficult but necessary choices.”88 As Cohen states, America should be cautious about surrendering or sacrificing this technological edge in the name of diplomacy. Coercion is most effective when fear is a constant. When fear—and thus coercion—fail, brute strength may be the only solution. According to Cohen:

85 Byman and Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion, 91; Byman, et al., Air Power as a Coercive Instrument, 134. 86 James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Terrorists and Insurgents (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 7-8. 87 AFDD 2-1.2, 34; Byman, et al., Air Power as a Coercive Instrument, 138-139. 88 Byman and Waxman, “Defeating US Coercion,” 117.

“The sprinkling of air strikes over an enemy will harden him without hurting him and deprive the United States of an intangible strategic asset. American leaders at the end of this century indeed have been vouchsafed with a military instrument of a potency rarely known in the history of war. But glib talk of revolutionary change obscures the organizational impediments to truly radical change in the conduct of war and, worse, its inherent messiness and brutality.”89

Cohen’s bleak conclusion should not be mistaken as a criticism of America’s relatively lax approach to adversaries via coercion, but instead a grim warning of what may be necessary should coercive techniques continue to prove ineffective.

While Cohen leans toward the more brutal applications of airpower and coercion, they are, conclusively, most effective when used in moderation. If the limits to coercion are any indication—if the U.S. were to over-coerce, flex too much muscle, and build a reputation for bullying—an adversary may feel he has nothing left to lose since he will just be attacked anyway, and continue with his undesired action. Alternatively, if the U.S. continued to threaten the use of force but never followed through, despite an adversary continuing to dip his hand in the proverbial cookie jar, then the undesired behavior will remain uncoerced. The key, then, is to find a balance.90

Soft Coercion

RAND researchers James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson conclude that air and space assets in support and non-combat operations such as reconnaissance, transportation, psychological operations, and communications are where airpower is most effective against non-state actors.91 Two of these operations in particular—airlifts and psychological operations—can play a key role in coercion as well. More passive than the aggressive strategic attacks mentioned above, these operations are inherently non-violent.

89 Cohen, “Mystique of U.S. Air Power,” 124. 90 For more on restraint, see Byman, et al., Air Power as a Coercive Instrument, 138-139. 91 Corum, Airpower in Small Wars, 8.

At the heart of soft coercive strategies is the aversion to adversary suffering. The U.S. is able to demonstrate peaceful intentions and its concern for civilian casualties within an adversary’s territory and airpower is central in relaying that message. Self- imposed restrictions and the desire to avoid unnecessary loss of life can at times hinder the power of U.S. coercion. However, it may also serve to bolster support for the U.S. from within the adversary’s ranks. The U.S. is able to demonstrate this desire through psychological operations, which allow military forces to communicate their intentions, and the delivery of humanitarian aid, which can bring stability to a region.

Psychological operations are designed to encourage foreign attitudes and behaviors to those favorable of and to U.S. objectives. The purpose is to sway the “emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, or individuals.” While an adversary may use propaganda to turn its people against U.S. intervention, psychological operations allow U.S. forces to counter these messages and adversary propaganda, and demonstrate commitment to peace and aversion to unnecessary casualties.92

A considerable part of USAF operations other than war have historically consisted of humanitarian aid. These operations were significant prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, but increased dramatically after the end of the Cold War. Beyond the simple delivery of supplies and food, these missions can play a strategic role in coercion. The Cold War years brought some inherent stability as the world’s two superpowers— struggling to prevent conflicts from escalating—kept their constituents and their conflicts at bay. Thus the collapse of the Soviet Union, in particular, left pockets of instability.93

Humanitarian aid is only effective as a coercive measure when it takes place within the context of alleviating human suffering perpetuated by another, such as a militia warlord. Helping to feed the hungry, care for refugees, or transporting the oppressed back to their homelands can threaten an adversary’s objectives of targeting those individuals the U.S. seeks to protect and aid. The stability that comes as a consequence of these

92 AFDD 2-3, 34. 93 Vick, Preparing the U.S. Air Force, 49-50.

actions is itself coercive, though at times U.S. forces may need to show enough force to allow humanitarian aid to begin.94

In a cliché example of actions speaking louder than words, psychological operations, coupled with tangible humanitarian assistance, allow U.S. forces to refute messages perpetuated by an adversary to its people that may hinder peaceful efforts and objectives. The coercion is not as evident as an immediate assault on an opponent’s command structure, but it is not as violent, either.

Coercive Operations

Coercion is simple in definition, but complicated in execution. For example, humanitarian assistance alone can be sufficient to coerce (see Chapter 4). Other times, operations consisting of airlifts, strategic attacks, and psychological operations all merge to create a complex coercion campaign. The Cold War witnessed perhaps the more careful use of coercion as operations stopped just short of land grabs, invasions, and military assaults.

Coercion functions best as a deterrent to war, as opposed to a tool designed to bring war to a close. Robert Pape discusses the repeated failures of airpower to single- handedly bring about the close of a war in Bombing to Win. In the Korean War, United Nations ground forces—coupled with airpower—were required to bring the war to a close. Despite repeated use, airpower did little to break the morale of Korean civilians, nor did strategic attacks do much to deter adversary action. The limited coercive success in Vietnam was due to luck more than strategic prowess as adversaries shifted strategies that left them susceptible to air attack. Moreover, similar to the Korean War, attacks on the civilian population had negligible coercive effects. Finally, the First Gulf War was brought to a close because airpower’s brutal assault on Saddam Hussein’s forces made it

94 Byman and Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion, 176.

more susceptible to coalition ground forces. But airpower alone did not cause surrender. It was the threat of ground forces, coupled with airpower, which resulted in surrender.95

The Berlin Airlift of 1948-49, perhaps one of the more famous uses of U.S. airpower, was triggered when deteriorating relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union led the USSR to cut off access to the former German capital, which was within the Soviet-controlled region. With roads to the city closed, the only way to supply two million Berliners with supplies was via airlift. From June 1948 to September 1949, U.S. and British forces delivered over 2.3 million tons of food and supplies carried on over 277,000 flights. The U.S. alone delivered 1.78 million tons. Ultimately, the airlift satisfied its chief objective of stemming the Soviet spread throughout Germany, as Soviet forces could no longer sustain the blockade into the city.96 Perhaps more importantly, it demonstrated the ability of airpower to peacefully resolve a potential conflict, coerce an enemy, and feed millions all in an operation that was “was born in peace, lived in peace, and died in a peaceful world.”97 While it is an example of humanitarian aid, the Berlin Airlift is better known for its precedence to deter Soviet aggression through peaceful measures alone. Though other humanitarian aid efforts can indeed have the same effects on a smaller scale, the vast impact this particular airlift had on American Cold War efforts means it is best understood as a coercive mission instead of a humanitarian one.

An example of a combined and aggressive short-of-war effort that prevented further escalation of a crisis was the late-1950s Operation Blue Bat. As the Cold War escalated following the end of the Korean War, the U.S. military recognized the importance of deterring lesser conflicts and crises from expanding into more complex situations. In 1958, Lebanon became a powder keg when Lebanese President Camille

95 Pape, Bombing to Win, 173, 210-211. These observations should not be noted as criticisms, but rather as a realistic approach to the efficacy of airpower. Still, despite Pape’s findings, it should be noted that—especially in the case of the Gulf War—the reduction of ground troop commitment, made possible by airpower, prevented excess casualties. Reduction of casualties, on either side of a conflict, is a chief point to the purpose of this study. 96 Timothy Warnock, ed., Short of War: Major USAF Contingency Operations, 1947-1997 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2000), 7-8. 97 Hollis Limprecht, “Post-War Years Found America Ready for Peace, Prepared for War,” Omaha World-Herald, Sunday, May 26, 1985. Kathleen McLaughlin, “Berlins in West Call Lift Victory,” New York Times, January 16, 1949, 24.

Chamoun found his country in jeopardy as anti-Western Muslim forces sought to overthrow the government. The contemporaneous coup in Iraq furthered Chamoun’s fears. The risk of losing a pro-Western ally in the contentious Middle East was not acceptable to U.S. interests. Airpower allowed for a largely passive intervention that curtailed the crisis, demonstrated U.S. commitment, but prevented an unnecessary commitment of excessive ground forces. 98

On paper, soft coercive tactics such as psychological operations seem ineffective; their results are indeed difficult to calculate. During Operation Blue Bat, for example, two C-130 cargo planes dispersed over one million leaflets to the Lebanese population below. The Lebanese held generally favorable views of U.S. forces and while the dispersal of leaflets could be responsible, far more likely is the actual commitment of forces in the troubled region. Or, perhaps even more likely, the combination of the verbal commitment of aid first delivered through the psychological operation and then supported with action led to the favorable view. Psychological operations were also supported with a very visual show of force, demonstrated by fleets of B-57 bombers flying in formation over Lebanon. Operation Blue Bat was ultimately successful, and although the use of airpower did not alone bring that success—indeed, U.S. Marines on the ground surely demonstrated a U.S. resolve to suppress the uprising—its complex and wide array of supportive operations cannot be overstated in preventing a crisis in Lebanon.99

Just a few years later, the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) would also become an example of successful coercion. In 1959, Fidel Castro rose to power in Cuba. He vowed to establish a Communist regime in the nation and the United States government feared the spread of Soviet influence just ninety miles from its southern coastline. In 1961, U.S. President John F. Kennedy supported a coup attempt by sending approximately 1,500 Cuban exiles into Cuba as part of a covert operation designed to overthrow the Castro regime. Known as the Bay of Pigs invasion, the operation was a complete failure and

98 Warnock, Short of War, 11-20. 99 Ibid.

only served to further exacerbate relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.100

Following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev increased aid to Cuba in the form of military supplies. By late 1962, medium- and long-range ballistic missile sites were under construction on the island nation. U.S. U-2 reconnaissance aircraft flew continuous missions over Cuba, gathering intelligence on Soviet aircraft assembly, missile site construction, and military encampments. Kennedy responded with a naval blockade. Khrushchev ignored the blockade and attempted to continue providing missiles to Cuba. Reconnaissance aircraft tracked these ships. In Florida, bombers prepared for an attack on Cuba should negotiations fail. The standoff ended two weeks later with the gradual withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba followed by America’s own withdrawal of missiles from Turkey a year later.101

Although the U.S. withdrawal of missiles from Turkey was an undesired result of the deal, the influence of airpower in coercing Soviet forces should not be understated. During the crisis, airpower provided substantial intelligence on both military installations in Cuba and Soviet ships attempting to breach the island blockade. As it relates to studies in coercion, the Cuban Missile Crisis is testimony to the potential strength such political pressure can possess when used effectively.102

Conclusions

The extensive limits to coercion should not be misunderstood as overwhelming impediments to its effectiveness. Instead, these limits to coercion should be understood in the context from which they are derived: studies funded by the military. By recognizing coercion’s shortcomings, the U.S. is better able to coerce. This indicates the importance

100 For more on the Bay of Pigs, see Peter Kornbluh, ed., Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba (New York, NY: The New Press, 1998); Grayston L. Lynch, Decision for Disaster: Betrayal at the Bay of Pigs (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, Inc., 1998); James G. Blight and Peter Kornbluh, eds,. Politics of Illusion: The Bay of Pigs Invasion Reexamined (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998). 101 Warnock, Short of War, 33-41. 102 Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion, 10, 54.

the military places on coercion, its costs and benefits, and its implications for avoiding conflict with minimal cost, while perpetuating U.S. interests. In essence, by recognizing the limits to coercion—in other words, its likelihood of being “counter-coerced”—the U.S. is better able to realize how to negate the counter-coercion.

As the cover of The Dynamics of Coercion properly suggests, coercion is best understood as a chess game: two opponents facing off in what at times is a battle of wits, each trying to play to its strengths and predict each other’s moves. The wealth of information on coercion demonstrates U.S. commitment to achieving checkmate more efficiently and effectively than its adversaries. As Byman and Waxman conclude, “By recognizing when airpower is likely to fail and avoiding its use in such circumstances, the USAF will better preserve the credibility of airpower for instances when it can coerce successfully.”103

Ideally, coercion would never have to be used. Though crises and conflicts are inevitable, and may require coercion at some point, the perfect situation does not entail “saber rattling” with aircraft. Delivering peacekeeping forces and supplies via airlifts and monitoring developing situations with satellites to prevent an escalation from ever reaching a contentious point are preferable. Precisely how airpower allows the United States and its allies to do that is the subject of the next chapter.

103 Byman, et al., Air Power as a Coercive Instrument, 139.

CHAPTER FOUR

PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH: THE IMPACT OF AIRLIFTS AND RECONNAISSANCE

U.S. air forces have played a vital role in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions since the end of World War II. These operations subsequently surged following the collapse of the Soviet Union. From simple airlifts to complex satellite reconnaissance, the technologically sophisticated U.S. air and space assets responded rapidly to deliver humanitarian aid, monitor potential crises, and prevent them from escalating. How does the United States use its unique airpower strength to fulfill its peacekeeping mission?

Peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations can only be broadly defined. Indeed, the very nature of humanitarian aid changed after the Cold War. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, many humanitarian missions were often conducted explicitly to prevent Communist expansion. Though the need to prevent such expansion waned following the end of the Cold War, the efforts to maintain peace did not; in fact, they increased. Thus although the nature of the operations themselves remained the same, their purpose changed drastically. The notion that the terms “peacekeeping” and “humanitarian aid” carry with them a hint of altruism complicates their analysis. Of course, this is not the case; no nation offers support to another without at least a modicum of self-interest. This was especially true following the end of the Cold War, when both the Clinton and Bush administrations realized the national security implications inherent in supporting UN peacekeeping efforts.104 Despite inherent complications, airpower is making vital contributions to these increasingly important operations.

104 Victoria Holt and Michael Mackin, “The Origins and Evolution of US Policy Towards Peace Operations,” International Peacekeeping 15 no.1 (Feb. 2008): 18–34, 20-21.

Figure 3.1 – USAF Involvement in Military Operations Other Than War, by Type of Operation, 1916-1996. [From Preparing the U.S. Air Force for Military Operations Other Than War, 9.]105

U.S. contributions to peace operations are based more on technology in the skies than on boots on the ground. As historian Rachel Utley has noted, “The American predilection for seeking swift military outcomes seemed at odds with the UN penchant for negotiation and seeking consensus.”106 With the U.S. contributing a significant amount of intelligence, transport, logistics, and support, and with other nations providing the majority of the ground forces, America did not need to—as former advisor to the George W. Bush campaign John Hillens describes it—”do windows”:

Only one NATO ally has the stealth technology, precision munitions, large aircraft carriers, strategic airlift, satellites, large-scale deployable logistics packages, etc. Yet, at the same time, there are many nations with experienced peacekeepers, paramilitary police, civilian reconstruction experts and the like. Why dull the one true sword by using it along with the other ploughs?107

History supports this rather brutal honesty. For example, peacekeeping operations represent just nine percent of all USAF military operations other than war during 1989 -

105 Vick, Preparing the U.S. Air Force, 9. 106 Rachel E. Utley, ed., Major Powers and Peacekeeping: Perspectives, Priorities and the Challenges of Military Intervention (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004), 17. 107 Ibid.

1996, but consumed 90 percent of the USAF sorties flown in such operations.108 In short, when the USAF participates in these operations, it commits heavily. As Air Force Lt. Col. Brooks Bash notes, there is an ulterior motive to this type of commitment: “the commitment of airpower acts as a political statement that signals a higher level of U.S. commitment to the world community, adds credibility to UN peacekeeping, and has the added benefit of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.”109 Still, as much as the UN needs the United States and its valuable technology, the U.S. needs the UN as its “proxy, its collaborator, and its mantle of legitimacy.”110

Specifically, air and space assets can fill the demands for peacekeeping and humanitarian aid through the following:

• Reconnaissance – Air and space assets are necessary to gather information about unfamiliar regions where peacekeeping forces are attempting to enforce peace.111 This can include monitoring of demilitarized zones and information gathering in the form of maps, field sketches, diagrams, and photographs. Satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles used for such operations are rarely as the disposal of peacekeepers. “The only way for a peacekeeping force to gain access to this kind of [high technology] information is for a great power to make it available.”112 • Transport – The delivery of humanitarian supplies and other goods seems simple in principle. However, the aircraft that bring these goods to the people who need them are often sluggish and not very maneuverable, which exposes them to enemy threats. To carry out transport operations

108 Vick, Preparing the U.S. Air Force, 75. 109 Lt. Col. Brooks Bash, “Airpower and Peacekeeping,” Airpower Journal 9, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 66. 110 Douglas C. Peifer, Stopping Mass Killings in Africa: Genocide, Airpower, and Intervention (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2008), 38. 111 Peacekeeper’s Handbook (New York, NY: Pergamon Press, 1984), 93. 112 Gustav Hagglund quoted in Bash, “Airpower and Peacekeeping,” 6.

safely requires proficient and efficient operations.113 The U.S. is particularly capable of providing aid in this fashion: “… a robust airlift capability can reduce human suffering by rapidly transporting essential medical supplies, food, shelters, water, and other materiel.”114 • Security – If peacekeeping becomes peace enforcement, airpower is able to use rapid response and a show of force to enforce no-fly zones and otherwise coerce adversaries.

As with any military operation, airpower is no panacea. For example, Bash notes several shortcomings of airpower in peacekeeping operations. First, many third world adversaries may see such high technology as intrusive and inhibitive to peacekeeping efforts. Peacemaking oftentimes requires very direct and personal interaction, typically in the form of boots on the ground and with mediators working face-to-face with conflicting parties. Second, U.S. airpower’s reputation and potential for destruction may not bode well with targets of peacekeeping that may not fully grasp the otherwise innocuous presence of such potential for force. Historically, the U.S. has had a penchant for destruction through airpower in wars throughout the twentieth century. Knowing this, conflicting parties may feel uncomfortable with such a strong presence attempting to mitigate their disagreement. Finally, weather and geographic concerns—such as dense forests or mountainous terrain—can impede the monitoring of peacekeeping efforts.115

Airlifts

“Airlift is an exceedingly important function for the Air Force, but it is one of those functions which is so all pervasive that people tend to forget about it.” —Air Force Secretary Hans M. Mark, 1980116

113 For more on the dangers of airlift operations in inhospitable areas, see Lt. Col. John A. Skorupa, Self-Protective Measures to Enhance Airlift Operations in Hostile Environments, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1989). 114 Air Force Doctrine Document 2-6, Air Mobility Operations, 1999, 32. 115 Bash, “Airpower and Peacekeeping,” 2. 116 Robert Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1961-1984 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1989), 623.

Since the Air Force’s inception, U.S. policymakers have readily embraced the importance of tactical airlift. Established under a mantra of “anything, anytime, anywhere,” the ability of transport aircraft to alleviate a potential crisis has been central to airlift doctrine. As the doctrine on air mobility operations notes, “Quick and decisive responses can diffuse crises before they escalate, deter further aggression, or in some cases, defeat an adversary before it can solidify its gains.”117 As RAND analyst and military research specialist Carl Builder argues in The Icarus Syndrome, airpower transcends traditional concepts of force and instead can manifest itself in crucial mobility operations:

Air power must be more than force because the problems of the world must increasingly be addressed by the military with more than force. Many of the crises and conflicts in our shrinking world are no longer highly susceptible to resolution through the projection of force, but—as in protection of the Kurds in the wake of Operation Desert Storm—will require the projection of infrastructures such as security, medical care, communications and transportation.118

The flexibility and responsiveness inherent in airpower can provide a strategic advantage, as well. Prompt response to a crisis can alone be sufficient to prevent conflict escalation. Generally speaking, when U.S. forces respond to a crisis, adversaries must devote resources to respond in kind. The devotion of resources carries with it some level of doubt from the standpoint of the adversary. Conversely, allies in this same region may be emboldened by, again, the sight of a strong ally such as the United States in the area. On both sides of a conflict, then, “the appearance of a powerful force seemingly overnight can have a startling effect.”119 It seems appropriate, then, to refer to the Military Airlift Command (MAC), the organization responsible for airlift operations, as “The Backbone of Deterrence.” Indeed, particularly during years of peacetime, it is the airlift that is quick

117 AFDD 2-6, 1999, 1; Futrell, 1961-1984, 625. 118 Builder, The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the U.S. Air Force, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 262. 119 Lt. Col. Charles E. Miller, Airlift Doctrine (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1988), 427-428; Futrell, 1961-1984, 625.

to respond to potential crises where U.S. interests may be at stake. Ultimately, airlift operations are designed to prevent conflict escalation or bring a prompt close to a war should deterrence fail.120

As noted, these short-of-war operations were crucial during the Cold War years, but peaked sharply following the collapse of the Berlin Wall. The role of airpower discussed earlier in Cold War by John Lewis Gaddis mentions its importance for reconnaissance and deterrence through strength, but underemphasizes the impact humanitarian aid and other airlift operations played in stymieing the spread of Communism. However, this ultimate objective of the Cold War should not undermine the peripheral effects aid brings to these nations. While the individuals in nations ravaged by disaster, civil war, or disease benefit the most, the foreign nation itself also largely benefits from the economic and political stability granted by humanitarian aid in the face of unexpected challenges. Airlifts can strengthen impoverished nations particularly susceptible to enemies. The destruction left behind by natural disasters, allowed to fester, can “sometimes fuel civil unrest, mass migrations, or epidemics … threatening regional peace and security.” Of course, no act is selfless, and this is especially true of humanitarian aid. By delivering aid, the United States can increase trade, access to natural resources, and perhaps most importantly, support international diplomacy. Moreover, the U.S. may often gain privileges of establishing bases—temporary or permanent—in some regions.121

Between 1947 and 1994, the United States conducted 440 humanitarian missions outside its borders. Disaster relief was a major portion of these operations prior to 1989, but humanitarian aid comprised over fifty percent of MOOTW efforts in the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall. 122

120 Skorupa, Self-Protective Measures, 10-11. 121 Daniel L. Haulman, The United States Air Force and Humanitarian Airlift Operations 1947- 1994 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998), 3. 122 Haulman, Humanitarian Airlift Operations, 122, 230, 278, 338, 398, 448. In Latin America there were 110; in Europe, 53; in Africa, 79; in Southwest Asia, 41; in East Asia, 63; and in the Pacific and Australia, 101.

Of mission locations, Africa represents the potential for airpower to do the most good through humanitarian aid based on evidence of outcomes from when the U.S. has responded and when it has not. Throughout the Cold War, Africa was a hotbed for Communist expansion. The nearly endless contention, civil war, and strife throughout the continent left it particularly vulnerable to Soviet takeover. Operations Zaire I and II from May 16 to June 16, 1978, were carried out specifically to thwart such encroachment. The relative stability in Zaire was compromised in May 1978, when a military coup threatened to throw the region out of balance. The situation was further complicated by the presence of 43,000 Cuban troops in 14 neighboring nations ready to settle the region and spread Communist influence in Africa. A vital cobalt and copper mining facility in Zaire, run by 3,000 American and European miners, meant that economic interests were at stake as well. The USAF’s airlift contingencies responded, rushing in troops from France and Belgium along with supplies, cargo, and support vehicles such as fueling trucks. This was an operation which, at the time, only the United States was capable of executing with what was then the largest aircraft in the world, the C-5 Galaxy. Zaire II played a psychological role, replacing European troops with African troops, mitigating Soviet propaganda that this was merely another exercise in white imperialism. These airlifts alone brought the standoff to a close, saving thousands of lives, preventing a civil war and genocide, and deterring a Soviet stronghold in this contentious region and its valuable resources.123

Reconnaissance

As with airlifts, the importance of air and space reconnaissance assets (i.e., satellites) as an effective deterrent was understood early in the Cold War. In particular, loftier Air Force ambitions for controlling space meant a United States approach to “absolute deterrence.”124 While perhaps an overstatement—guerilla units, for example, care little

123 Warnock, Short of War, 115-124. 124 Robert Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1960 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1989), 543.

about an adversary’s penchant for technology—reconnaissance has played a significant role in deterring conflict.

In peacekeeping specifically and conflict deterrence in general, knowledge is power. The ability for reconnaissance to encourage capitulation demonstrates this adage well. For as long as aircraft have taken to the skies over battlefields, the mere existence of reconnaissance operations has disrupted the adversary’s activities. Singular reconnaissance aircraft in World War I, for example, would pinpoint troops hunkered down in trenches and then relay that information to friendly artillery placements, which would respond with a bombardment of shells. Over time, the association of these single aircraft, snapping photographs, followed by the inevitable shelling, would be enough to instill fear. So great was this impact on troop morale that pursuit planes were created to destroy these reconnaissance aircraft. In turn, reconnaissance missions began flying with escort fighter aircraft, and the dogfight was born.125 Eighty years later, this same concept would cause Saddam Hussein’s soldiers to surrender as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) circling overhead would lead to artillery shells from Navy ships just offshore.126

These small-scale examples demonstrate the ability of reconnaissance at the tactical level. However, the more impressive effects are its strategic implications, where the use of spy planes and satellites can alone curtail unfavorable actions. For example, John Lewis Gaddis notes how U.S. spy planes consistently flying overhead in the 1950s frustrated the Soviet Union’s efforts to conceal their nuclear and airpower capabilities. Moreover, the Cuban Missile Crisis discussed in the previous chapter represents a hallmark example of coercion through reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. But these same capabilities of airpower are also significant in times of peace.

With high technology, the U.S. is able to make significant contributions to peacekeeping. Generally, peacekeeping forces do not have the means to gather crucial intelligence necessary to monitor peace. This is critical, as peacekeepers must possess higher technology than the constituents they are mediating. The high cost, high

125 See Harold Porter, Aerial Observation (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1921). 126 Popular Mechanics, “10 Questions and Photos for Smithsonian UAV Curator/Fighter Pilot Dik Daso,” May 6, 2008, http://www.popularmechanics.com/blogs/science_news/4262460.html (accessed September 21, 2009).

sophistication, and high classification of such technology means that major military powers are reluctant to simply hand over such resources. The only way a peacekeeping force can get access to technology such as UAVs or satellites is, ultimately, for a superpower to make it available.127 Such was the case between 1975 and 1980, when the United States offered satellite imagery to peacekeeping efforts in Sinai between Israel and Egypt.128

Conclusions

The ability of airlifts and high-altitude reconnaissance to mitigate conflicts is noteworthy. Though the two methods are inherently different, together they provide a cornerstone for peacekeeping. If airlifts are the “backbone for deterrence,” then satellites are the lifeblood, vital to the execution of operations, the monitoring of situations, and gathering of intelligence. Together, these otherwise polarized notions of air and space power became crucial to national security and conflict deterrence, allowing the delivery of troops and supplies, along with the gathering of intelligence, at a previously impossible rapid pace.

With these benefits in mind, the importance for the United States to maintain its superiority in air and space assets is clear. And while its airlift capabilities are not threatened, the same cannot be said of its satellites. The defense and destruction of satellites in space is a subject rooted in deterrence as developing nations vie for a piece of the ultimate high ground, and the clear advantages this hostile region promises. How the United States has maintained the edge in space is the subject of the next chapter.

127 Gustav Hagglund, “Peace-keeping in a modern war zone,” Survival 32, no. 3 (May-Jun. 1990): 233-240, 235. 128 “Texts of the Treaty and Its Accompanying Documents,” The Washington Post, March 27, 1979, A14.

CHAPTER FIVE

SATELLITE NATION: UNITED STATES TECHNOLOGY AND DETERRENCE IN SPACE

“Imagine now a world without satellite communications, without mobile phone networks, weather forecasting and environmental imaging and you are imagining a world that has not prevented a war in outer space.”

—Patricia Lewis, Director UNIDIR129

Space is the ultimate high ground. Strategically, it provides for example unique reconnaissance, communications, and precision—in the form of guided munitions— advantages unparalleled by conventional forces. As Lt. Col. Mark E. Harter, USAF, notes, space power poses ten distinct advantages:

• Space is the ultimate high ground. • Space is a distinct medium; space forces require space-focused theory, doctrine, and policy. • Space power is a force multiplier for every combatant commander and military service. • Space forces can support all levels of war simultaneously. • Space power leverages a nation’s economic and military centers of gravity. • Space superiority starts with assured access to space. • Controlling space requires eyes, ears, shields, and swords. • Space forces require centralized command and control led by space professionals.

129 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Security in Space: The Next Generation, Conference Report 31 March – April 1, 2008 (United Nations Publications, 2008), vii.

• Space power is a function of a nation’s total space capability (space unity of effort). • National space power reaches its full potential when a nation commits to a separate, independent space force. 130

With these distinct benefits in mind, the importance that the U.S. and its allies place on space assets is worth discussing. Space assets are vital to maintaining peace, ensuring treaty-fulfillment, and preventing conflicts. Maintaining a stronghold in space is becoming a powerful way to deter adversaries from acting in ways not in accord with U.S. interests.

Aside from assisting in peacekeeping missions, space assets in general have become the lifeblood of military operations. However, this dependency on space is a double-edged sword. The more the nation relies on satellites, the more susceptible it is should these assets become targeted. In the context of conflict deterrence, the defense of satellites is tantamount to national security.

In a prepared statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1991, USAF Gen. Donald J. Kutyna commander in chief of the U.S. Space Command highlighted U.S. national security strategy and its three chief objectives: first, to deter hostilities; second, to prevent conflict escalation should deterrence fail; third, to bring such hostilities to as an abrupt end as possible. Each of these objectives is aided significantly by the contribution of space assets: “Effective space capability is clearly a fundamental element of superpower status. It is important enough, broad enough and unique enough to stand alone as a critical element of our nation’s military posture.” Strategically, space assets support defense efforts seen throughout the Cold War, for example, in monitoring nuclear proliferation. Tactically, they provide communications, surveillance, and precision- guidance for munitions, and navigation.131 These basic contributions to U.S. defense efforts seem like common sense, but without them, U.S. objectives in peacekeeping and conflict deterrence would be greatly compromised.

130 Mark E. Harter, “Ten Propositions Regarding Space Power: The Dawn of a Space Force,” Air and Space Power Journal 20, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 64-78, 64. 131 Gen Donald J. Kutyna, “The State Of Space,” Defense Issues 6, no. 14 (1991): 4.

Satellite Defense and the Cold War

The Cold War witnessed the rise of two powerful nations—the United States and the Soviet Union—in their space race. Russia began strong, launching Sputnik promptly on October 4, 1957, but the race culminated with the U.S. landing a man on the moon on June 20, 1969. These victories occurred in the background of a nuclear arms race and strategies revolving around concepts of deterrence.132

Deterrence between the two world superpowers went beyond fears of mutually assured destruction via the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The space race of the era transcended launches of satellites and the military intelligence they allowed; there came with it a technological sideshow of anti-satellite (ASAT) weaponry build-up that remains largely overlooked. ASAT technology during the Cold War deserves special mention as it demonstrates how effective technological prowess can deter conflict, and when this edge is surrendered, can pose threats to U.S. interests and assets. As satellite capability grew— specifically in length of time in orbit, image resolution, and number— it appeared both possible and necessary to destroy these orbiters. Anti-satellite research was undertaken by both the U.S. and USSR. Related methodology, technology, and policy are varied and indicate a shift in diplomatic attitudes, national growth, and an increasing reliance on satellites for national defense.

The Soviet launch of Sputnik in October 1957 was downplayed in the media by the United States government, which claimed the launch “did not come as a surprise.”133 However, its impact had crippling effects on American morale. According to Eisenhower’s science advisor James Killian, “Overnight there developed a widespread fear that the country lay at the mercy of the Russian military machine and that our government and its military arm had abruptly lost the power to defend the mainland itself

132 For more on Mutual Assured Destruction, see Henry D. Sokolski. Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004). 133 “Senators Attack Missile Fund Cut: Satellite Delay Is Attributed to Administration – White House Disclaims ‘Race.’” New York Times, October 6, 1957,1. See also Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

… Confidence in American science, technology, and education suddenly evaporated.”134 Sputnik’s launch represented more than the first satellite in space; it was strong testimony to the Soviet Union’s missile capabilities. Although Sputnik was little more than a harmless transmitter—simply relaying radio signals to Earth—the psychological impact of losing the first leg of the space race was compounded by widespread fear of a Communist-launched spacecraft orbiting above, seen and heard.135

If the U.S. government downplayed Sputnik publicly, a look into its numerous anti-satellite research projects suggests anything but complacency. In late 1958, just over a year after Sputnik, the U.S. began experimenting more heavily with ASAT technology. The first such test, Project Argus, launched and detonated three nuclear devices launched and detonated in low Earth orbit (LEO)—about 100 – 1,240 miles above the surface of the Earth—while their effects and impact on a test satellite were studied. Though not an explicit ASAT test, the concluding results had anti-satellite implications. Indeed, the military took interest in three specific effects generated by a nuclear explosion: high- energy radiation including particles from the explosion; the whirling high-energy electrons, which generated radio noise; and the delayed radiation from fission, which affected signal transmission.136

This marked the beginning of substantial ASAT tests that would span the Cold War period. However, though the technology was clearly feasible, it was not readily embraced, especially by the Eisenhower administration because such transparent and frequent deployment and testing of ASATs had potentially hostile diplomatic implications. To avoid initiating anti-satellite warfare, the administration scaled back tests. As the value of reconnaissance satellites was increasingly substantial by 1960, the ability to monitor the Soviet nuclear build-up was valued more than ASAT. By avoiding the sparking of a satellite war, U.S. reconnaissance satellites were, for the time, safe.137

134 James R. Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977), 57. 135 Ibid; Walter Sullivan, “Course Recorded,” New York Times, October 5, 1957, 1. 136 Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945-1984 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 108. 137 Stares, Militarization of Space, 52-53.

Research into ASATs began again by September 15, 1960, when the military launched Project SAINT (SAtellite INTercept). Drastically scaled-down from the nuclear tests of 1958, Project SAINT called for “placing an inspector vehicle in co-orbit with the target, examining the target with a television camera, and storing the data received for transmission to a readout station in the U.S.” Such a project was valuable not just for intelligence, but provided experience “in space rendezvous operations.”138 In other words, SAINT allowed for practice in the meeting—and in the case of anti-satellite technology, collision—of two objects in space. Not mentioned in this report is the “kill” mechanism proposed during SAINT’s research phases. SAINT vehicles were designed to fly within fifty feet of a target satellite, and arming them with rockets would give military planners on the ground the choice to destroy a monitored satellite. However, this negated the peaceful shift the nation was aiming toward, so its more hostile qualities were canceled. After six years of research and development, SAINT was canceled in favor of more sophisticated and affordable ASATs. Indeed, the greatest criticism of SAINT was the logic behind a satellite interceptor that did little more than monitor other satellites.139 Still, SAINT represented a shift from overly aggressive ASATs—seen in the nuclear tests—to compromise, all within the Eisenhower administration. The reason was simple: to deter Soviet build up of ASATs, America would scale back its own. By the 1960s, the U.S. relied more heavily on satellites than did the Soviets, and thus had more to lose. Any tit-for-tat exchange of satellite destruction would harm the Americans more than the Soviets. On both sides of the conflict, then, ASAT research temporarily ceased.140 This seesawing trend of research into the technology would manifest itself throughout ASAT’s brief, but contentious, history.

138 White House Staff Notes No. 834, September 15, 1960. Declassified Documents Reference System (accessed April 23, 2009). 139 Jack Manno, Arming the Heavens: The Hidden Military Agenda for Space, 1945-1995 (New York, NY: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1984), 89; Stares, 115. 140 Franklin A. Long, et al., eds., Weapons in Space (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1986), 22.

Deterrence Factor

President John F. Kennedy’s administration ushered in a new series of ASAT tests. Intelligence reports released in December 1961 indicated Soviet ASAT tests threatened U.S. interests, which again rekindled aggressive ASAT research in the U.S. Both the Army and Air Force conducted their own ASAT tests, but the superiority of the Air Force’s new Thor rocket gave that branch the edge and allowed it to monopolize future anti-satellite projects.141

Project Thor revealed a substantial growth in the technological capabilities of American airpower at the time. Revealed in the mid-1960s, SPADATS (SPAce Detection and Tracking System) allowed the Air Force to pinpoint and track three different test satellites and detonate close enough to “permit destruction.” Thor was designed to be more cost effective, more efficient, and more aggressive than previous ASATs, such as SAINT. As the Cold War heated up, U.S. military leaders felt “this country is committed to a policy in which space shall be explored and used for the benefit of all … We believe these preparations and any extension of their capability which are considered necessary will go far to reduce the risk that space will ever be used for nuclear warfare.”142

As a ground-based anti-satellite system, however, Thor was inherently crippled; reaction times for such a system could span weeks because it relied on the targeted satellite being within range of the missile and its explosive radius. Furthermore, Thor used nuclear warheads, which were phased out due to the U.S.-Soviet Outer Space Treaty of 1967, by which time the ASAT tensions had gradually eased. With so many issues, the logic behind developing Thor seems flawed. By design, however, it was a “quick-fix” ASAT; evidence of a space arms race and the need for a more aggressive and substantial anti-satellite weapon.143

141 Stares, Militarization of Space, 120. 142 Memorandum to Bill Moyers, Special Assistance to the President, from Joseph Califano, Special Assistant, September 9, 1964. Declassified Documents Reference System (accessed April 24, 2009). 143 Ibid; Stares, Militarization of Space, 127; “A Thor Antisatellite Was Successfully Launched on 5 April 1965,” Declassified Documents Reference System (accessed April 26, 2009).

As early as 1967, satellites were important in U.S. military and intelligence operations. Looking back on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Lyndon Johnson remarked,

“I wouldn’t want to be quoted on this but we’ve spent 35 or 40 billion dollars on the space program. … [T]onight we know how many missiles the enemy has and, it turned out, our guesses were way off. We were doing things we didn’t need to do. We were building things we didn’t need to build. We were harboring fears we didn’t need to harbor. Because of satellites, I know how many missiles the enemy has.”144

By the late 1970s, U.S. reliance on satellites for reconnaissance and communications had grown significantly. The U.S. relationship with satellites was one that would only strengthen over the next thirty years, up to the present. This is evidenced by the longevity of U.S. satellites, which represented a classic case of quality over quantity (see figure 5.1). While the Soviets had to launch satellites over and over again due to repeated failures, U.S. satellites were functional and stayed in orbit significantly longer. Thus with the nation increasingly reliant on satellite technology, the need for a more global, responsive, and immediate anti-satellite system was necessary to protect its space assets and deter Soviet aggression.145

144 Quoted in Curtis Peebles, The Corona Project: America’s First Spy Satellites (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 170. See also: Evert Clark, “Satellite Spying Cited by Johnson,” New York Times, March 17, 1967, 13. This was the first open admittance by the United States of its use and heavy dependence on reconnaissance and spy satellites. 145 Richard Garwin, et al., The Fallacy of Star Wars: Based on Studies Conducted by the Union of Concerned Scientists (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1984), 196-197.

Figure 5.1: This diagram represents U.S. and Soviet satellites launched between 1978 and 1983. Each block represents one satellite and its corresponding length represents its time in orbit since launch. At first glance, the amount of Soviet satellites seems imposing, but later research would suggest this was due to a large number of failed or retrieved satellites, as seen by their brief time in orbit. Clearly, the U.S. had a vested interest in defending the few quality satellites in 146 orbit. [From The Fallacy of Star Wars, 196-197.]

As the U.S. relied more on satellites, more modern anti-satellite technologies were born. Traditionally, ASATs had been ground-based. At best, they could be deployed from naval ships, which added to their flexibility. The U.S. F-15 Strike Eagle fighter plane presented new opportunities that overcame shortcomings of past ASATs by allowing anti-satellite measures to be deployed from almost anywhere, enabling faster response times and greater flexibility. Initiated as part of the President Jimmy Carter administration’s rekindling of the ASAT program, the F-15 ASAT project was part of a “three-pronged” response to the Soviet’s own research into anti-satellite weapons. 147 Almost any F-15 could be converted to carry the weapon and launch from aircraft carriers and/or refuel midflight, which meant its ASAT weapon could be deployed from almost anywhere in the world. Moreover, the ASAT weapon did not attempt to intercept a satellite’s orbit; it was launched straight up leaving little room for error or for target evasion.148

146 Garwin, Fallacy of Star Wars, 196-197. 147 Long, Weapons in Space, 23. The other two prongs of Carter’s plan involved, for the first time, a Defensive Satellite (DSAT) program and—ideally—a negotiations process with the Soviets so that the former two were unnecessary. 148 Long, Weapons in Space, 152-153.

Despite the logistical advantage granted by such a weapon, Congress canceled the project. Knowledge of satellites’ efficacy, not the ability to destroy them, was the strongest deterrent. As the Union of Concerned Scientists noted:

“Using an ASAT to shoot down Soviet satellites would not protect or restore U.S. satellites. … The best ‘deterrent’ to Soviet ASAT attacks is Soviet awareness that U.S. satellite functions are so well diversified and hardened and so well supplemented by non-satellite systems that no attack on satellites could succeed in crippling our overall military capability.”149

ASAT and SDI

The cancellation of the F-15 ASAT program came in the midst of President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which put anti-satellite technology back into consideration. SDI relied on satellites as the ultimate deterrence. Since the United States had superior satellites, amendments over ASAT usage and testing could not be reached throughout talks between the United States and the Soviet Union during the late 1970s and especially the early 1980s under the Reagan administration. The U.S. insisted on testing its new F-15 air-launched ASAT while the Soviets attempted to compromise. The Soviets’ disadvantage here was compounded by its trailing ASAT technology and because most of its satellites were in Low Earth Orbit (LEO; 100 to 1,200 miles above Earth’s surface) and thus more susceptible to an ASAT strike than higher altitude geosynchronous orbit satellites (approximately 22,000 miles above Earth’s surface), which included most U.S. satellites.150

The satellite-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) system that was part of Reagan’s SDI gradually pushed the Soviets into a corner; if SDI worked as designed and the U.S. was practically invulnerable to nuclear strikes via inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the Cold War would be all but over. The USSR thus rekindled its anti- satellite technology research, which had lagged significantly behind that of the U.S. since

149 Garwin, Fallacy of Star Wars, 236. 150 Long, Weapons in Space, 135.

the late 1970s. By the end of the 1980s, they had caught up. According to Franklin Long, “The Soviet ASAT program did not have high priority in the 1970s, but it could now be given top priority as a possible counter to space-based BMD.”151

Fears of the feasibility of Russia’s ASATs were not unfounded. By 1987, military and science journals began discussing the growing feasibility of powerful ASAT technology. Ground-based anti-satellite laser systems were evolving to the point of reality. If harnessed correctly, lasers—with which the Soviets were experimenting — would nullify the safety granted by simply having satellites in higher orbit. But other scholars thought U.S. high-orbit satellites were; writing in Science, associate director for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Michael May argued that, “A high-orbit satellite … could not be damaged from the ground except by lasers with power and optics far beyond what is now available or what will be available operationally in the next 10 years.”152

However, an article in Aviation Week & Space Technology published just a year later claimed instead that, “Soviet anti-satellite lasers are now capable of disrupting U.S. satellites in geosynchronous orbit and could pose a more serious threat to these high- altitude satellites in the next four to five years, according to the head of the U.S. Space Command.” This was alarming for U.S. interests, since “[v]irtually all U.S. military communications and missile early warning satellites, as well as most signal intelligence satellites, are stationed in geosynchronous orbit. Satellites employing electro-optical sensors are particularly vulnerable to lasers.”153

By the late 1980s, Congress once again lifted the ASAT test ban, albeit too late for the revolutionary and impressive F-15-launched weapon with its inherent flexibility and responsiveness. Instead of allowing one military branch to research the next ASAT weapon, Congress decentralized the appropriations. The 1991 budget called for $100

151 Long, Weapons in Space, 270-271. 152 Michael May, “Safeguarding Our Military Space Systems,” Science 232 (Apr. 1986): 336-340. Emphasis added. 153 John D. Morocco, “Soviet Ground Lasers Threaten U.S. Geosynchronous Satellites,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, (Nov. 2, 1987): 26. Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) is the collection of intelligence through communications and electronic signals.

million to the Army for a laser ASAT; $62.8 million to the Air Force on “excimer and oxygen-iodine ASAT lasers,” and an astonishing $218.9 million to the Navy on a new rocket-launched ASAT interceptor—astonishing because both the Navy and the Army had been out of ASAT development for decades. Meanwhile, the U.S. military had its own ASAT laser to test in response to persistent rumors of Soviet tests of its laser: the Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser—or MIRACL.154 If the Soviets were sending a message with their tests of anti-satellite weapons, the U.S. was listening. By March 1989, top Department of Defense officials were convinced that the Soviet anti-satellite system was, “very robust, very capable and on alert … We know that it is more than 50% capable [of destroying a target].”155

Further investment in ASAT technology continued in July 1989, when the Department of Defense (DOD) launched a design competition for a Kinetic Energy Anti- Satellite weapon (KE-ASAT). This reach into the private sector fostered heavy competition to design and build the next ASAT weapon that could carry satellite defense into the twenty-first century. KE-ASAT harnessed the use of kinetic energy to destroy a target satellite with a direct hit by releasing an object that would slam into the satellite. By design, it was coordinated to function with laser-based ASATs, such as MIRACL, as a fail-safe.156

21st Century ASATs

In 2001, incoming Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld warned the Space Commission that

We know from history that every medium—air, land, and sea—has seen conflict. Reality indicates that space will be no different. Given this virtual

154 William Sweet, “Navy and Army Initiate ASAT Programs, With Test Ban Lifted” Physics Today 42, no. 4 (Apr. 1989): 59. By this point, the F-15 launched weapon was deemed too messy for repeated space tests, as its explosive nature left thousands of pieces of debris and space trash. 155 Patricia Gilmartin, “Pentagon Officials Expect to Field ASAT System by Mid or Late 1990s,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 130, no. 12 (Mar. 20, 1989): 266. 156 Patricia Gilmartin, “Defense Dept. to Launch Design Competition For New Antisatellite Weapon for the 1990s,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 131, no. 4 (Jul. 24, 1989): 30.

certainty, the U.S. must develop the means both to deter and to defend against hostile acts in and from space. This will require superior space capabilities.

The U.S. is an attractive candidate for a ‘Space Pearl Harbor.’157

Several years after Rumsfeld’s warning, China tested its first anti-satellite weapon on January 11, 2007, launching an interceptor rocket toward a defunct weather satellite and destroying it within moments. Within hours, 35,000 pieces of debris were orbiting Earth at almost 16,000 miles per hour, thus posing a threat to other satellites and spacecraft. The Chinese test came as a shock to the U.S. Defense Department because China had remained on “the moral high ground” because its budding space program had not yet been tainted by a Cold War-like space (arms) race.158

America’s “response” on February 22, 2008, came with a message. When the American spy satellite U.S. 193 quit responding, its load of unused toxic fuel posed a potential threat should it fall out of orbit and strike an inhabited area. Government officials decided to destroy the out-of-control satellite. On the surface it appears legitimate, however the timing of the event seems convenient, especially considering the operation’s heavy publicity.159 America’s destruction of U.S. 193 did more than just show its military muscle; it also demonstrated a mastery of space operations and, ultimately, responsibility. Indeed, on February 27, 2009, Gen. Kevin Chilton, the chief of the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), reported that, “Every bit of debris created by [the destruction of U.S. 193] has de-orbited.”160 Compared to the tens of thousands of pieces of debris left floating from the Chinese test, the complete incineration of any debris from the U.S. spacecraft made a significant moral point to make.

157 Donald H. Rumsfeld, et al. Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, Washington, DC, January 11, 2001. 158 Carl Hoffman, “Battlefield Space,” Popular Mechanics 184, no. 7 (Jul. 2007): 76-81. 159 Les Doggrell, “The Reconstitution Imperative,” Air & Space Power Journal 22, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 46-52. 160 “Space Security Update #1: March 11, 2009,” Center for Defense Information. www.cdi.org (accessed May 2, 2009); During this meeting, Chilton also reminded press that debris left from China’s satellite destruction a year ago would continue to float for another 80-90 years.

Thus China managed to rekindle the space arms race by destroying one dysfunctional weather satellite. This latest surge is apparent throughout 2008 and into 2009. Recent news includes reports of old enemies and potential new ones attempting missile launches, experimenting with new anti-satellite weapons, and looking into developing satellites. On February 4, 2009, Iran launched its first satellite into orbit. Likewise, North Korea’s repeated attempts to place a satellite into orbit, in violation of United Nations sanctions, culminated on April 5, 2009, with another failed launch. Last, Russia announced on March 5, 2009, that it planned to update its anti-satellite capabilities.161

Conclusions

The frontier of space presents unique diplomatic challenges. The opportunities granted by exploiting and possessing “the ultimate high ground” are bountiful. The United States is in an unenviable position as its adversaries became technologically sophisticated. Ironically, the one device that has propelled the nation decades ahead of so many others is the one thing that, if destroyed, could leave it open and vulnerable. Satellite defense remains an issue of deterrence; having the ability to destroy another nation’s satellites discourages them from destroying America’s. By having the most to gain from its space assets, the U.S. also has the most to lose.

By investigating such an influential aspect of military defense, the role of technology in deterrence becomes evident. Each time that the U.S. gained an advantage in anti-satellite technology, it pulled back. Sometimes, this was done more due to overconfidence in American prowess, than to diplomatic compromises. It remains true that to maintain peace, one must be prepared for war. The same concept holds true for satellites, whose vulnerability can only be protected by possessing weapons that can destroy them. The Soviets capitalized on American complacency in a scenario reminiscent of “The Turtle and the Hare.” There were no ramifications from this lackadaisical approach during the Cold War, but the same cannot be said of the future.

161 Ibid.

One lesson from the story of American anti-satellite weaponry: nations must maintain a technological edge to ensure deterrence and avoid conflict. Ultimately, air and space power are tantamount to this achievement.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

I have argued that the evidence shows that the United States military considers the capability of airpower to prevent, alleviate, and mitigate conflicts is just as, if not more, important as its destructive capabilities. Future scholars of airpower should understand its effectiveness as a deterrent and peacekeeper as well as it its effectiveness to crush the enemy, and thereby balance the sometimes one-sided criticisms of its opponents. The nation’s military strategists are aware of airpower’s particular shortcomings and aim constantly to overcome them, but scholars and journalists are often the first to bring concerns over airpower’s use to public attention and demand that measures be taken to mitigate its adverse effects on civilian populations. Such criticism will enable airpower to improve its effectiveness as a military and diplomatic tool of the state.

As Eliot Cohen suggests, airpower is a very “American way of war” in that it is high-tech, has low manpower costs, and requires little commitment of time, effort, and resources when compared to traditional ground warfare.162 But more than that, airpower is very American because it embodies the nature of the nation’s ability to adapt. Self- correcting, American airpower has been subject to extensive criticism. It has thus grown from a fledgling extension of the Army, delivering bombs seemingly haphazardly, to its own military branch that has drafted and redrafted its doctrine, pursued precision, and studied coercion with an apparent distaste for its past delivery of massive destruction. Airpower embodies a technological prowess, a desire to reduce casualties, and a willingness to commit and respond to the world’s many problems with precision and power, but without boots on the ground that would risk U.S. deaths.163 As the nation and

162 Cohen, “Mystique of U.S. Air Power,” 120. 163 This distinctive U.S. aversion to military and civilian casualties is noted well in Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion: “The U.S. political process creates tight constraints on military threats and operations—constraints that may significantly offset the United States’ vast military superiority over any rival. U.S. adversaries are frequently authoritarian regimes that exercise strong control … and prevent challenges to their authority through a mixture of political suasion

its national security objectives have evolved, airpower has adapted. Now, entire studies are committed to evaluating and analyzing the coercive effects of airlifts, shows of force, and surveillance.

Since the Second World War, U.S. airpower and its uses have changed dramatically. Airpower has proven itself capable of causing fewer casualties. As discussed, however, this can be a double-edged sword. With such high technology often come unrealistic expectations of low casualty rates that even a few civilian casualties may undermine peacemaking efforts. But these occasional incidents, tragic as they may be, should not cloud the overall contributions airpower makes to deterring conflicts and preventing deaths. However, saved lives cannot be calculated; deaths can. When airpower is most effective, it is generally ignored. When casualties occur, the hammer of public opinion falls. But with airpower there are no shades of grey; either it does its job and kills the enemy, or fails its job and kills innocents. The latter has typically gotten the most publicity. The former is expected and goes unremarked. Air Force Majors Jonathan Klaaren and Ronald Mitchell note the distinctive role that nonlethal technology and strategies can play in shaping the media’s typically negative perception: “Public opinion shapes the decisions of America’s leadership regarding armed conflict. … We need to eliminate the notoriety associated with war. If we use nonlethal technology to achieve paralysis, eliminate unintentional killing, and erase signs of visible destruction, then perhaps in some situations we can rid the news of sensationalism. Without a riveting story to tell, the media may be silenced.”164

The evidence of airpower’s efficacy is so compelling and plentiful that to not use it leads to just as many deaths and draws just as much criticism. The horrors of airpower have come full circle. Ironically, for all the egregious destruction of which airpower is capable, it can often be just as responsible for many deaths when aircraft remain on the and repressive tactics. … [P]olitical leaders in the United States contend with domestic political pressures, constitutional and legal restrictions, and media scrutiny, all of which increase the need for U.S. leaders to justify their use of force. Domestic pressures, especially those stemming from sensitivity to U.S. military casualties and to adversary civilian suffering, restrict military options.” (page 130). 164 Major Jonathan W. Klaaren, Major Ronald S. Mitchell, “USAF Nonlethal Technology and Airpower: A Winning Combination for Strategic Paralysis,” Airpower Journal 9 (Special Edition, 1995): 42.

tarmac. A lack of response to the genocide in Rwanda, for example, led to the slaughter of 800,000 people. This was a situation in which well-founded, well-practiced, and well- understood military operations other than war could have been carried out with superb efficiency and with tactics that were known to work well in the region. During Operation Provide Relief in Somalia in 1993, AC-130 gunships circling overhead provided an imposing show-of-force that was sufficient to force cooperation with hostile residents, while military airlifts provided troops and cargo to maintain stability.165 These same aircraft and operations could have been applied to the Rwanda crisis, but they were not.166

Military historians would be remiss in overlooking the incredible contributions airpower has made, and continues to make, on behalf of the nation’s, and more importantly, the world’s interests. To be sure, the history of the U.S. military, and especially airpower, contains many instances of atrocities resulting from bombings. But what begs to be studied and discussed are the contributions airpower has made in its entirety. Discussing only the atrocities paints a very one-sided picture of the history of American airpower.

Future studies in airpower history should consider the complexities and importance of MOOTWs, especially as they have been applied to more recent conflicts. It is noteworthy, for example, that the same military that used airpower to “shock and awe” Iraq in 2003 finds itself using more modest tactics to now win over the hearts and minds of civilians in Afghanistan. Shows of force are excellent examples of coercive tactics. On April 13, 2006, in Iraq, low-flying F-15 fighter jets responded to a situation where a group of U.S. infantrymen were pinned down by gunfire from hostile Iraqi insurgents. The F-15s, circling overhead, descended to an altitude low enough to get noticed, ignited their afterburners, and created substantial noise. The mere presence of the F-15s thus caused the insurgents to flee and saved the U.S. infantry.167

165 Peifer, Stopping Mass Killings in Africa, 42-43. 166 Peifer, Stopping Mass Killings in Africa, 47, 80, 98. 167 Major Ann Peru Knabei, “F-15 ‘show of force’ saves Army ground troops,” Air Combat Command, www.acc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123019062 (accessed Apr. 21, 2010).

Successful missions like these became increasingly common throughout both Iraq and Afghanistan by 2007: “The tactic … has become such a vital tool in the Air Forces [sic] counterinsurgency operations that tactical air controllers preparing for deployment are practicing the technique during stateside training missions...”168 By 2010, shows of force in Afghanistan have merged with Army General Stanley McChrystal’s campaign to win the war in Afghanistan by reducing civilian casualties. In July 2009, for example, non-lethal aerial shows of force were used in one-third of encounters with enemies. By November 2009, that portion was up to 88%. Tactics included low-flying noise-making or dropping bombs into hillsides near a skirmish with the intent to scare, but not to harm.169

Ironically, the same precision-guided technology designed to put a bomb through a bedroom window was now being used not to precisely hit, but to precisely miss. Airpower, it seems, has evolved to have very little to do with “power” at all, but instead, the appearance of it. In the history of airpower, this is an important distinction to make and one that should be closely examined by military historians. It will be interesting to see, for example, the impact that using such short-of-war tactics during wartime has on friendly troops who are ultimately exposed to greater risk by airpower’s true potential being stymied as a result of civilian casualties.170

With the close of the Cold War, U.S. peacekeeping obligations grew at an unprecedented rate. Airpower has allowed the nation to respond to a variety of international needs, heading off conflicts and crises, while serving its national interests. With the next major conflict on the horizon from any number of potential threats, it is more important than ever to understand the impact airpower has played historically in undertaking these tasks.

168 Quoted in “‘Show of Force’ Flights Grow,” Defense Tech, defensetech.org/2007/05/02/show- of-force-flights-grow (accessed Apr. 22, 2010). 169 Nancy A. Youssef, “New US Air Strategy in Afghanistan,” Military.com, www.military.com/news/article/new-us-air-strategy-in-afghanistan.html (accessed Apr. 22, 2010). 170 See Lara M. Dadkah, “Empty Skies Over Afghanistan,” New York Times, Feb. 18, 2010, A.27.

Indeed, to quote Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger,

“We [the U.S.] find ourselves, then, face to face with a modern paradox: The most likely challenge to the peace—the gray area conflicts—are precisely the most difficult challenges to which a democracy must respond. Yet, while the source and nature of today’s challenges are uncertain, our response must be clear and understandable. Unless we are certain that force is essential, we run the risk of inadequate national will to apply the resources needed.” 171

National will is imperative to successful U.S. involvement in international affairs. Fundamental understanding of the use of all military might is crucial not only for those actually engaged in these activities, but to the public at large. Therefore, historians and social scientists who study military operations would be well advised to continue their studies of airpower in all of its guises, and would be wise to disseminate their findings about airpower to all citizens, thus increasing their understanding of airpower’s contributions, and allowing them to generate a more balanced view of the nation’s military endeavors and how they function as part of national security. While it is important to remember airpower at its worst, it is just as crucial to remember when it has functioned at its best, when it has fulfilled its objectives to national security, and when wars that could have been, never were.

171 Quoted in Richard Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1994), 174.

LIST OF REFERENCES

Primary

“A Thor Antisatellite Was Successfully Launched on 5 April 1965.” Declassified Documents Reference System (accessed Apr. 26, 2009).

Builder, Carl H., and Theodore W. Karasik. Organizing, Training, and Equipping the Air Force for Crises and Lesser Conflicts. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing, 1995.

Byman, Daniel L., et al. Air Power as a Coercive Instrument. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing, 1999.

Davis, Paul K. Effects-Based Operations: A Grand Challenge for the Analytical Community. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001.

Greer, Thomas H. The Development of the Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1985.

Killian, James R. Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977.

Knabei, Maj. Ann Peru. “F-15 ‘show of force’ saves Army ground troops.” Air Combat Command. www.acc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123019062 (accessed Apr. 21, 2010).

Memorandum to Bill Moyers, Special Assistance to the President, from Joseph Califano, Special Assistant, September 9, 1964. Declassified Documents Reference System (accessed April 24, 2009).

Miller, Lt. Col. Charles E. Airlift Doctrine. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1988.

Morocco, John D. “Soviet Ground Lasers Threaten U.S. Geosynchronous Satellites.” Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 2, 1987.

Peacekeeper’s Handbook. New York, NY: Pergamon Press, 1984.

Peebles, Curtis. The Corona Project: America’s First Spy Satellites. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997.

Popular Mechanics, “10 Questions and Photos for Smithsonian UAV Curator/Fighter Pilot Dik Daso” May 6, 2008. www.popularmechanics.com/blogs/science_news/4262460.html (accessed August 24, 2009).

Porter, Harold. Aerial Observation. New York, NY: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1921.

Rumsfeld, Donald H., et al. Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization. Washington, DC, January 11, 2001.

“‘Show of Force’ Flights Grow.” Defense Tech. defensetech.org/2007/05/02/show-of- force-flights-grow (accessed Apr. 22, 2010).

Space Security Update #1: March 11, 2009. Center for Defense Information. www.cdi.org (accessed May 2, 2009).

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. Security in Space: The Next Generation, Conference Report 31 March - April 1, 2008. United Nations Publications, 2008.

Vick, Alan, et al. Preparing the U.S. Air Force for Military Operations Other Than War. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing, 1997.

White House Staff Notes No. 834, September 15, 1960. Declassified Documents Reference System (accessed Apr. 23, 2009).

Youssef, Nancy A. “New U.S. Air Strategy in Afghanistan.” Military.com. www.military.com/news/article/new-us-air-strategy-in-afghanistan.html (accessed Apr. 22, 2010).

Newspaper Articles

“Answers Needed on Iraq.” New York Times, Apr. 16, 1994, 20.

Clark, Evert. “Satellite Spying Cited by Johnson.” New York Times, Mar. 17, 1967.

Dadkah, Lara M. “Empty Skies Over Afghanistan.” New York Times, Feb. 18, 2010, A.27.

Gordon, Michael R. “U.S. Jets Over Iraq Attack Own Helicopters in Error.” New York Times, Apr. 15, 1994, 1.

Limprecht, Hollis. “Post-War Years Found America Ready for Peace, Prepared for War.” Omaha World-Herald, May 26, 1985, 3.

McLaughlin, Kathleen. “Berlins in West Call Lift Victory.” New York Times, Jan. 16, 1949, 24.

“Senators Attack Missile Fund Cut: Satellite Delay Is Attributed to Administration - White House Disclaims ‘Race.’” New York Times, Oct. 6, 1957,1.

Journal Articles

Byman, Daniel, and Matthew Waxman. “Defeating U.S. Coercion.” Survival 41, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 107-120.

Gilmartin, Patricia. “Defense Dept. to Launch Design Competition For New Antisatellite Weapon for the 1990s.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 131, no. 4 (Jul. 1989): 30.

---. “Pentagon Officials Expect to Field ASAT System by Mid or Late 1990s.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 130, no. 12 (Mar. 1989): 266.

Hagglund, Gustav. “Peace-keeping in a Modern War Zone.” Survival 32, no. 3 (May – Jun. 1990): 233-240.

Harter, Mark E. “Ten Propositions Regarding Space Power: The Dawn of a Space Force.” Air and Space Power Journal 20, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 64-78.

Hoffman, Carl. “Battlefield Space.” Popular Mechanics 184, no. 7 (Jul. 2007): 76-81.

Holt, Victoria and Michael Mackin. “The Origins and Evolution of U.S. Policy Towards Peace Operations.” International Peacekeeping 15, no.1 (Feb. 2008): 18–34.

Klaaren, Major Jonathan W., and Major Ronald S. Mitchell. “USAF Nonlethal Technology and Airpower: A Winning Combination for Strategic Paralysis.” Airpower Journal 9 (Special Edition, 1995): 42.

Kutyna, Gen. Donald J. “The State Of Space.” Defense Issues 6, no. 14 (1991): 4.

May, Michael. “Safeguarding Our Military Space Systems.” Science 232 (Apr. 1986): 336-340.

Morocco, John D. “Soviet Ground Lasers Threaten U.S. Geosynchronous Satellites,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (Nov. 2, 1987): 26.

Mowbray, James A. “Air Force Doctrine Problems, 1926-Present.” Airpower Journal 9, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 24-41.

Sweet, William. “Navy and Army Initiate ASAT Programs, With Test Ban Lifted.” Physics Today 42, no. 4 (Apr. 1989): 59.

Doctrine

Air Force Manual 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. 1984.

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3. Military Operations Other Than War. October 5, 1996.

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.2. Strategic Attack. June 12, 2007.

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-6. Air Mobility Operations. June 25, 1999.

Drew, Dennis M. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. Air Force Manual, vol. 1. 1992.

Drew, Dennis M. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. Air Force Manual, vol. 2. 1992.

Joint Publication 3-07. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. June 16, 1995.

Secondary

Books

Biddle, Tami D. Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.

Blechman, Barry, and Stephen Kaplan. Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces As a Political Instrument. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1978.

Blight, James G., and Peter Kornbluh, eds. Politics of Illusion: The Bay of Pigs Invasion Reexamined. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

Builder, Carl H. The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the U.S. Air Force. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994.

Byman, Daniel, and Matthew Waxman. The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Corum, James S., and Wray R. Johnson. Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Terrorists and Insurgents. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003.

Crane, Conrad C. American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000.

---. Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993.

Freedman, Lawrence. Deterrence. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004.

Futrell, Robert. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1960. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1989.

Futrell, Robert. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1961-1984. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1989.

Finnegan, Terrence J. Shooting the Front: Allied Aerial Reconnaissance and Photographic Interpretation on the Western Front—World War I. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, National Defense Intelligence College, 2006.

Norman Friedman. The Fifty-year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000.

Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2005.

Garwin, Richard, et al. The Fallacy of Star Wars: Based on Studies Conducted by the Union of Concerned Scientists. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1984.

Grosscup, Beau. Strategic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial Bombardment. New York, NY: Zed Books, 2006.

Haass, Richard. Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1994.

Haulman, Daniel L. The United States Air Force and Humanitarian Airlift Operations 1947-1994. Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998.

Hogan, Michael J. A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Inderfurth, Karl F., and Loch K. Johnson, eds.. Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Jones, Johnny R. Development of Air Force Basic Doctrine: 1947-1992. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 1997.

Kornbluh, Peter, ed., Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba. New York, NY: The New Press, 1998.

Lambert, Andrew. The Psychology of Air Power. London: The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1995.

LeMay, Curtis. Superfortress: The Story of the B-29 and American Air Power. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1988.

Levine, Isaac Don. Mitchell, Pioneer of Air Power. New York, NY: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943.

Long, Franklin A., et al., eds. Weapons in Space. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1986.

Lynch, Grayston L. Decision for Disaster: Betrayal at the Bay of Pigs. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, Inc., 1998.

Manno, Jack. Arming the Heavens: The Hidden Military Agenda for Space, 1945-1995. New York, NY: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1984.

McDougall, Walter A. The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997.

Overy, Richard. Why the Allies Won. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1995.

Pape, Robert. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.

Peebles, Curtis. The Corona Project: America’s First Spy Satellites. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997.

Peifer, Douglas C. Stopping Mass Killings in Africa: Genocide, Airpower, and Intervention. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2008.

Porter, Harold. Aerial Observation. New York, NY: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1921.

Remarque, Erich Maria. All Quiet on the Western Front. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1929.

Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power. New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2005.

Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966.

Sherry, Michael S. The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987.

Skorupa, Lt. Col. John A. Self-Protective Measures to Enhance Airlift Operations in Hostile Environments. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1989.

Sokolski, Henry D. Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004.

Stares, Paul B. The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945-1984. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985.

Stern, Paul C. Perspectives on Deterrence. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Thompson, Wayne. To Hanoi and Back: The U.S. Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966- 1973. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000.

Trauschweizer, Ingo. The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008.

Utley, Rachel E., ed. Major Powers and Peacekeeping: Perspectives, Priorities and the Challenges of Military Intervention. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004.

Warnock, Timothy, ed. Short of War: Major USAF Contingency Operations, 1947-1997. Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2000.

Journal Articles

Bash, Lt. Col. Brooks. “Airpower and Peacekeeping.” Airpower Journal 9, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 66

Cloud, John. “Science in the Cold War.” Social Studies of Science 31, no. 2 (Apr., 2001): 231- 251.

Corum, James S. “The Myth of Air Control: Reassessing the History.” Aerospace Power Journal 34, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 61-77.

Cohen, Eliot. “The Mystique of U.S. Air Power.” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 1 (Jan. – Feb. 1994): 109-24.

Doggrell, Les. “The Reconstitution Imperative.” Air & Space Power Journal 22, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 46-52.

Smith, Melden E., Jr., “The Strategic Bombing Debate: The Second World War and Vietnam.” Journal of Contemporary History 12, no. 1 (Jan. 1977): 175-191.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Adam Rice received his BA in History from Florida State University in 2008, and will receive his MA in Public History in Summer, 2010, with a concentration in War and Society.