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Dieter Henrich's Turn The Problem of Subjectivity: Dieter Henrich’s Turn 189 The Problem of Subjectivity: Dieter Henrich’s Turn Gerhard Preyer The German philosopher Dieter Henrich has worked on the problem of subjectivity since the 1950s.1 In his lecture at the “Kolleg Friedrich Nietzsche der Stiftung Weimarer Klassik” (2003) he has reformulated the problem of subjectivity in the context of a revisionary approach. This is worth emphasiz- ing, since Henrich’s analysis is focused on the limits of the position of subjec- tivity in the world. He calls his turn a revisionary metaphysics because he sees subjectivity not as self-grounded but as part of an All-Einheit (all-unity), thus evoking a motive of Plato’s philosophy.2 In the present article, I will first deal with Henrich’s turn to the question of subjectivity. Secondly, I re-interpret his analysis of conscious self-reference (subjectivity) which starts from the condition of primary self-consciousness as immediate consciousness. Henrich also claims to give an answer to the mind-body problem in the context of the much changed questions of philosophy of mind since the 1950s. Thirdly, I consider Henrich’s view of the body (Leib) as a position in the world which goes along with subjectivity. Fourthly, this leads me to his discussion of the principle of consequence and of free choice as well as to the interplay between subjectiv- ity and practical self-reference considered as self-determination (Selbstbestim- mung) and self-relationship (Selbstverhältnisse).3 Studying the philosophical work of Henrich again I read it, in the current philosophical context, as a contribution to an existenzial phenomenology, given from the subject’s point of view. This is close to Henrich’s claim to connect transcendental philosophy with Existenz-philosophy, yet slightly different.4 I will finally say something about that from the viewpoint of my own system-theoretical background. 1 See, for example, D. Henrich (1970: 257–84), ((1967) 1982: 54–82), ((1975), 1982: 109–130), (2006: 142–155), (2003) 2 Henrich (2007: 23–4, 265–81). 3 Henrich (2007: 85–141). He joins together subjectivity and sittliches Bewusstsein. The trans- lation of sittliches Bewusstsein by moral consciousness is a bit misleading. It may be that sittliches Bewusstsein should be harmonized with that what M. Heidegger has called Sorge. The analysis of the concept of sittliches Bewusstsein would be a particular study. 4 Henrich (2007: 140–141). Henrich’s concept of subjectivity is not well-known in Anglo- phone philosophy of mind. There was a co-operation with R. Chisholm (1992, 133). Ch- isholm has noticed Henrich (1979). The intention of this article is to motivate a reception of his account. On the cooperation with Chisholm and R. Nozik, see, Henrich (2007: 373). 190 Gerhard Preyer Since the 1970s, Wilfrid Sellars’s repudiation of the “myth of the given”, stressing the distinction between explanation and justification, as well as Wil- lard van Orman Quine’s critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction, have been dominating views. Sellars claim was that the distinction between expla- nation and justification undermined that the idea that everything is given to the mind. Quine’s way of keeping a distinction between the conceptual and the empirical in spite of his own critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction, was repudiated by Donald Davidson in his critique of the “the third dogma of empiricism”. This goes along with holism in epistemology and the critique on mental representations.5 In the 1990s the situation was very much changed by Jerry Fodor’s and Ernie Lepore’s critique of holism.6 In the meantime, the flaws of naturalism and externalism were pointed out by several authors.7 None allows for an adequate understanding of first-person authority.8 Since naturalism and externalism provide no satisfying epistemological perspective of the subject’s point of view9, Henrich’s approach to subjectivity becomes of a particular interest for a conception of the mental. 1. Subjectivity as Self-Consciousness Descartes’ philosophy is characterized by reditus in se ipsum, i.e a return upon and into oneself. There is wide agreement among philosophers that the thinker (the speaker, the agent) knows the content of his thoughts and has authority over such knowledge. For Cartesians (i.e. internalists), the content of mind is self-evident and we have to begin with this knowledge in order to have a conception of the world we live in. For Cartesians, self-ascriptions such “I know I will go to the theatre”, “I know I am in pain”, “I know I like swimming”, and the like, are self-ascriptions of simple properties/disposi- tions/abilities. The question is whether self-knowledge is propositional. The Cartesian view is also that mental states are ontologically independent from the physical realm. The turn in the philosophy of mind which led many philosophers away from Cartesianism was the conviction that there is no such thing as a non-spatial mind substance. Yet ontological Cartesianism as 5 Henrich (2007: 370–374) on his relationship to the Anglophone philosophy. On his friend- ship with D. Davidson) Stages of a Friendship, forthcoming. 6 J. Fodor, E. Lepore (1992). 7 On Davidson’s externalism, see, M. C. Amoretti, G. Preyer eds. (2011), T. Burge (2007). 8 See, for example, K. Farkas (2008). See also Preyer, Back to Cartesian Intuition. Internalism, Externalism and the Mental, manuscript. 9 On naturalism Henrich (2007: 169–177, 340–341), on the scientific world-picture: 36–48. The Problem of Subjectivity: Dieter Henrich’s Turn 191 substance-dualism, dualism of res cogitans and res extensa, is thoroughly in- dependent of internalism taken as a view of mind-body relations. The feature of being mental does not depend, ontologically, from a specific non-spatial substance but is rather a mental and epistemic attitude toward these states as conscious states, that is, we have an access to our own mental states in a way it is accessible to no one else. The Cartesian view of first person think- ing according to which the thinker (speaker, agent) has an epistemic access to the content of his own mental states, intentional or not, is not disputed among many philosophers including the externalists ones. Cartesian first- person thinking means that the thinker knows the first-order states which occur directly, without conscious inference, in contrast with the knowledge one can have of mental states from the third-person point of view, which involves inference from utterances and behaviour. For Cartesians, nature of thought is considered from the first-person point of view. Mental features are determined by internal states. The thinker (speaker, agent) knows the content of his own mental states and is authoritative about the knowledge of the content of such states (thought content is narrow content). When I ascribe a mental state to myself, it makes no sense to doubt that I have such mental state: I am acquainted with myself immediately. Therefore the distinction (the boundary) between internal and external is drawn within the operation of our consciousness itself. Henrich goes back to the most basic feature of Descartes philosophy10: the relation as a result of which subjectivity, with its self-certainty, stands for the whole. The self-certainty which is connected with the self is at the same time taken away from the self-certainty and the whole is only present under this condition.11 For Descartes the idea mei ipsius and also the ingenium are caused by god: the idea objectiva spectata innata shows us that we are a res cogitans. Self-consciousness is, against his primary intention, no primary knowledge by reflection. Self-consciousness is valid self-knowledge given by god only. But, if subjectivity does not imply its self-power and its absolute self-transparency (making my-self being accessible, Sich-selbst-Erschlossensein), then the traditional critiques on Cartesianism are not convincing at all, since these critiques make such assumption. This point is of particular relevance because in the tradition of Hegel, Nietzsche, and also Heidegger, subjectiv- ity is interpreted as self-power and absolute self-authorization. This goes along in many cases with a misinterpretation of Descartes’ expression of the 10 Henrich (2007: 25–27). 11 On the problem of Cartesian-knowledge, Preyer, Back to Cartesian Intuition. See also, H. Schnädelbach (1976: 76–77). 192 Gerhard Preyer “maître et possesseur de la nature”.12 Another motive among philosophers is the trivialization of subjectivity, for example, by the use of the index-word “I”.13 The slogan is “The instance of the word “I” is the speaker who uses the word.” But all versions of naturalized epistemology, for example, also David- son’s concept of first-person-authority, are eliminations of subjectivity and trivializations.14 Henrich concludes: the problem of subjectivity (self-consciousness) is that the knowl- edge of myself as a knowledge about myself and the knowledge that I myself know something about me could not be distinguished. Yet at the same time they could be distinguished because there is an immediate consciousness, that is, it is not presented by an object.15 Therefore what I am is not fixed by some properties which determine the knowledge of my-self, such as, for example, my name, where I was born, the colour of my hair etc. I stand to myself in a primary and solitary self-reference, I know. Therefore, I myself as subject is something which is intelligible by itself, independently of any real communication with other people. I redescribe this position of subjectivity thereby that we are captured in our consciousness and the conscious states of so-called human beings as singularities cannot reach themselves directly. But I myself understand myself always as one among an indefinite plurality of others.
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