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First Outlineof a Systemof the Philosophyof Nature F.W.J. Schelling Translated andand withwith anan IntroductionIntroduction andand NotesNotes byby Keith R. Peterson AL PHILOSOPHY FirstFirst OutlineOutline ofof aa SystemSystem ofof thethe PhilosophyPhilosophy ofof NatureNature A VOLUME IN THE SUNY SERIES IN CONTEMPORARY CONTINENT A VOLUME FIRST OUTLINE OF A SYSTEM OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE SUNY series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy Dennis J. Schmidt, editor FIRST OUTLINE OF A SYSTEM OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE - F. W. J. Schelling Translated and with an Introduction and Notes by Keith R. Peterson State University of New York Press Published by State University of New York Press, Albany © 2004 State University of New York All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher. For information, address State University of New York Press, 90 State Street, Suite 700, Albany, NY 12207 Production by Judith Block Marketing by Jennifer Giovani and Susan Petrie Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, 1775–1854. [Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie. English] First outline of a system of the philosophy of nature / Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling ; translated and with an introduction and notes by Keith R. Peterson. p. cm. — (SUNY series in contemporary continental philosophy) Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 0-7914-6003-7 (alk. paper) — ISBN 0-7914-6004-5 (pbk : alk. paper) 1. Philosophy of nature. I. Peterson, Keith R. II. Title. III. Series BD581.S2613 2004 2003059028 10987654321 CONTENTS Acknowledgments vii Abbreviations ix Translator’s Introduction xi The Primacy of the Postulate xiii From Postulate to Deduction xviii Transcendental Deductions and The Idea of Nature xxii Logogenesis, Construction, and Potency in the Philosophy of Nature xxvii Conclusion xxxii Works Cited xxxiii Translator’s Note xxxvii Title Page of Schelling 1799 Edition 1 Foreword to Schelling 1799 Edition 3 Outline of the Whole 5 First Division 13 I. The Unconditioned in Nature 13 II. The Original Qualities and Actants in Nature 19 III. Actants and Their Combinations 28 IV. Inhibition and Stages of Development 35 V. Deduction of the Dynamic Series of Stages 53 Second Division 71 First System 73 Second System 74 Third Possible System 78 Conclusions 94 v vi Contents Third Division 105 I. On the Concept of Excitability 106 II. Deduction of Organic Functions from the Concept of Excitability 113 III. The Graduated Series of Stages in Nature 141 Appendix to Chapter III 158 IV. General Theory of the Chemical Process 172 V. The Theater of the Dynamic Organization of the Universe 187 Introduction to the Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, or, On the Concept of Speculative Physics and the Internal Organization of a System of this Science (1799) 193 §1. What we call Philosophy of Nature is a Necessary Science in the System of Knowledge 193 §2. Scientific Character of the Philosophy of Nature 194 §3. Philosophy of Nature is Speculative Physics 195 §4. On the Possibility of Speculative Physics 196 §5. On a System of Speculative Physics in General 199 §6. Internal Organization of the System of Speculative Physics 201 Appendix: Scientific Authors 233 Notes 239 English-German Glossary 249 German-English Glossary 253 Page Concordance 257 Index 261 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS What becomes a consuming and compelling passion for us often starts off with an air of contingency—so the genesis of this translation project. A seminar on German Idealist Philosophy of Nature, directed by David Farrell Krell at DePaul University, supplied the first incitements to this work in an atmosphere conductive to the growth and flourishing of rare ideas and inspi- rations. For this inspiration, along with much encouragement and translation advice, I am indebted to David Krell. Peter Steeves and Will McNeill read a version of the Translator’s Introduction, and I have benefitted from their comments. Daniel J. Selcer was kind enough to read large parts of the manu- script and provided many valuable observations. Iklim and Gordon Viol pro- vided priceless translation advice along the way. I am, of course, solely responsible for all defects that may remain. Finally, I am deeply grateful to Dicle Türkog˘lu for her tireless and determined support, and to Ela Hayal who, while her Dad was involved in the last stages of the work, slept just as much as she should have. vii ABBREVIATIONS AA Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. Werke: Historisch-kritische Ausgabe. Edited by Hans Michael Baumgartner, Wilhelm G. Jacobs, and Her- mann Krings. Stuttgart: Fromann-Holzboog, 1976ff. Cited by series, volume, and page number (e.g., AA I,7 301). SW F. W. J. Schelling, Sämmtliche Werke. Edited by K. F. A. Schelling. 14 vols. Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta’scher Verlag, 1856ff. Cited by volume and page number (e.g., SW III 301). ix TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION Since its critical and programmatic inception in the eighteenth century and acme in the nineteenth, the philosophy of nature (Naturphilosophie) has been defined in part negatively as the critique of mechanistic, materialistic, and deter- ministic science. Such critique was needed primarily because, on the one hand, mechanistic accounts threatened the Enlightenment ideal of free subjects, and on the other hand, because the reductivism of these accounts betrayed the com- plexity of nature. Positively, philosophy of nature focused on dynamical, organic, synthetic, and holistic accounts of the natural world, integrating human beings into that world rather than severing them from it. It becomes clear from an at- tention to recent trends in evolutionary and developmental biology, cosmology, ecology, critical theory, and science studies that many of the critical methods and programmatic aspirations of classical nature philosophy are once more on the rise today. A reevaluation of the philosophy of nature of F. W. J. Schelling (1775–1854) in light of these developments seems no less than obligatory. In addition, the critical apparatus that the philosophy of nature brought to bear on the modern scientific project demanded not merely a theoretical or epistemological shift, but a reformulation of the relation between human be- ings and nature, often entailing novel political or ethical commitments. Early philosophy of nature met opposition in part because its ethical and political in- terests—not just its allegedly wild and “unverifiable” analogizing—were thought to have invalidated its “scientific” claims. Today, however, the tradi- tional alliance between value-neutrality and objectivity, or the relationship be- tween power and knowledge, the practical and theoretical domains, has been definitively shown to be not only theoretically untenable but politically dan- gerous.1 If all knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is always “local” and always conditioned by competing interests, then there can no longer be the same prejudices against the kinds of accounts a philosophy of nature can pro- vide, as a reading of many recent developments in science itself would indicate.2 A revitalized philosophy of nature would perhaps aim to tie together the wide range of disparate pursuits mentioned above, showing their implicitly and explicitly shared assumptions, and in a Schellingian spirit would raise the ques- tions that are so often not even acknowledged by scientific theorists. Schelling’s methodological and ontological insights are indispensable as points of reference xi xii Peterson: Translator’s Introduction for reconsidering a unified view of nature and the genuine philosophical prob- lems involved in rethinking the natural world and humanity’s deep connections with it. It is hoped that this translation of what is possibly Schelling’s most im- portant text in nature philosophy will contribute to a revitalization of the project of a philosophy of nature, and—by providing a wide audience the opportunity to read Schelling himself—at least the prospect of a reevaluation of this important phase both in Schelling’s thought and in the history of philosophy and science. While it may be tempting to explore the litany of excoriating criticisms of the philosophy of nature from Schelling’s own time to the present,3 I will not do so here. I would like to note that the received opinion regarding nature philoso- phy, well articulated by Bernard Cohen, seems no longer to ring true: “It has become a tradition among those who talk glibly about science that the romantic Naturphilosophie of Schelling and his followers represents the lowest degradation of science and that only by completely freeing themselves from that nightmare were modern biology and medical science able to resume their scientific progress. The incident has been used by empiricists as a moral to warn us against speculative philosophy in the natural sciences.” More recently, historians and re- searchers have asked how and to what extent the school of Naturphilosophie had an impact on the history of science, and the same could be asked about its influence on later naturalistically minded, transcendental philosophers.4 Both of these are important questions to be taken up in their own right if the full signif- icance of the philosophy of nature is ever to be acknowledged. Schelling always stood out among his contemporaries—he was accused of being too rational for the Romantics (e.g., Novalis, the Schlegels) and too romantic for the Rationalists (the Kantians, fideists, skeptics, and common- sensists). Schelling’s proteiform work has not received the same attention as that of his two brood mates at the Tübingen seminary—G. W. F. Hegel and Friedrich Hölderlin—and it is evident that both historically and, I would suggest, in prin- ciple, Schelling has no true disciples.
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