How to Work in the New Space Security Environment
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PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT WINTER 2011 How to Work in the New Space Security Environment — BY S. PETE WORDEN, JAMES MASON, JAN STUPL, and CREON LEVIT 1 FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS WWW.FAS.ORG PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT WINTER 2011 INTRODUCTION have demonstrated a fundamental prerequi- number of accidental fragmentations re- site for an impact anti-satellite (ASAT) ca- sulting from explosions and collisions. Alto- During the Cold War, space was dominated pability. Only a few have actually performed gether these lead to an impressive increase in by the United States and the Soviet Union. high precision rendezvous or targeted the number of space debris objects (see Fig- Today, more than 40 countries [source: UCS strikes, but having a space launcher brings ure 1). satellite database] operate satellites in orbit. one closer towards the possession of an im- In some popular orbits, simulations If one includes the members of the European pact ASAT weapon. indicate that the number of fragments has Space Agency (ESA), nearly 30 countries Simply testing impact ASAT weapons, reached a density where the new debris pro- have access to space launch vehicles. Exclud- besides having obvious political conse- duced by collisions is exceeding the natural ing ESA, seven countries have repeatedly quences, presents problems for any operators re-entry rate due to atmospheric drag, lead- demonstrated launches, and there are new in the space environment: in orbits above ing to a runaway effect known as the Kessler 1 players on the verge of joining that exclusive about 800 km any generated debris can re- Syndrome. Keep in mind that these orbits club. These include some truly commercial main in orbit for decades or even much became popular because they are useful for entities, but also Iran and North Korea. The longer. Every fragmentation event starts a human endeavors. The increased collision increasing number of players presents a new cosmic game of billiards, spreading debris risk for satellites in these orbits is already and challenging space security environment and endangering assets in other, similar or- noticeable, reducing expected satellite life- 2 that demands new approaches. bits. time by a few percent. For satellites worth Along with achieving a basic strategic In the past, there have been few deliber- billions of dollars this translates into real missile capability, most space faring nations ate fragmentation events, but also a fair money. Figure1: Objects in Earth orbit by object type as cataloged by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network: “Fragmentation debris” include satellite breakup debris and anomalous event debris, “mission-related debris” include all objects dispensed, separated, or released as part of the planned mission. Source: NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, Orbital Debris Quarterly News, Vol. 14, Iss.1 (2010). Major debris events annotated. 2 FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS WWW.FAS.ORG PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT WINTER 2011 large optics. While this does represent a case where distributed sensors cannot (yet) re- place the existing capability, it is also true Space has become more that the improved cadence offered by a swarm of imaging satellites offers value that congested and more dangerous. occasional high resolution does not. To improve resolution, lowering the satellite’s Combine that with times of orbit will help and if satellites are cheap then the reduced lifetime and increased challenging budgets and it is vulnerability is not a problem. In the future, new interferometric imaging technology clear that the old way of flying may allow swarms of small satellites to mimic the performance of large single sys- a few highly capable satellites is tems - synthetic apertures combining multi- ple small-satellites, and/or single light- no longer feasible. weight “photon sieves” might offer a solution.5 Shrinking the satellite’s size and weight In short, space has become more con- is not sufficient alone, and shrinking cost A Paradigm Shift Towards can be even more difficult. Currently, satel- gested and more dangerous. Combine that Small Satellites and with times of challenging budgets and it is lite components are extremely specialized clear that the old way of flying a few highly Distributed Capabilities and risk aversion has bred a cult of only capable, and very expensive satellites is no flying heritage systems. Components are The Cold War’s reconnaissance satellites longer feasible. The risk that one of these rarely flown on real missions unless they represent astonishing technical achieve- critical assets is disabled in a time of need, have been tested and qualified to the n-th ments. Spacecraft like the KH9 Hexagon through hostile or accidental means, is just degree. The use of commercial off-the-shelf were close to the weight and size of a typical too high. The excessive cost and complexity electronic components is nearly unheard of. school bus and provided amazing imaging of these systems also means that systems- This approach is understandable if you capabilities. Modern systems are even more level redundancy is traded for extreme risk build a multi-billion dollar satellite and impressive. However, building up redundant aversion in the engineering cycle, leading to demand the highest quality controls. How- and easily replaceable capabilities based on increased cost. Spares are simply infeasible ever, if the goal is to quickly build large these assets is just not feasible anymore. As in this self-perpetuating cycle. Large launch numbers of something that can survive in more actors enter space, the heroes of the vehicles take months to prepare, and keep- orbit for relatively short time and can easily Cold War have lost their main strength: their ing them on standby for emergencies is just be replaced, then the consumer electronics invulnerability. ASATs vs. multi-billion dollar too costly. industry can show us how to do it. orbital assets is operationally, economically, Nation’s and multi-nation coalition’s Reducing these barriers of entry (i.e. and unsustainably asymmetric. security has become more dependent on cost) will draw commercial and public in- The key is to shift to distributed sys- space infrastructure; the United States most terest from outside the aerospace and de- tems. Instead of building one satellite with of all, as it leads the revolution towards net- fense industries. Similar to the development multiple sensors and communication de- centric warfare. We are facing the dilemma of the Internet and the advances in mobile vices, these sensors and devices can be of depending on an infrastructure that is communications, increasing the number of spread over multiple satellites. Where once increasingly difficult to protect. players often leads to new applications that there was a bus-sized satellite, there will We can mitigate this dilemma if we can nobody has heard of before. Today, the only soon be swarms of smaller, modular, and manage to do three things: 1) leverage re- people able to contemplate new space capa- more agile satellites. If one camera fails, cent advances in consumer electronics to bilities are the incredibly rich. You and I replace the camera satellite. If more com- produce large numbers of small cheap satel- have very little opportunity to come up with munication bandwidth is needed, send up lites which can provide distributed capabili- something cool in space and have the re- another communication module. This ap- ties, 2) provide low-cost, on demand, micro- sources to realize it. Yet in a few days any of proach has been recognized and is boosted launchers to launch these satellites, and 3) us could develop a new “app” for the iPhone by initiatives like the international QB50 implement effective space traffic manage- and potentially make a fortune. Similarly, an project 3 and DARPA’s F-6 project.4 ment (space collision avoidance) systems. app-based space economy might soon be- The resolution of an optical camera is come reality. proportional to its diameter - to get high At the NASA Ames Research Center resolution reconnaissance imagery requires we are building a family of cubists6 based 3 FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS WWW.FAS.ORG PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT WINTER 2011 almost entirely on components that can be ordered online.7 The PhoneSat project is showing the space community that if we emulate what our neighbors in Silicon Val- ley do, we can build highly capable satellites quickly and at a small fraction of the cost. PhoneSat is using 3D printing to rapidly prototype components, a smartphone as a (comparatively very fast) flight computer, simple brushless motors for 3-axis momen- tum wheels, steel tape measure as an an- tenna, magnetorquer coils printed directly onto a PCB, and pick-and-place procedures to rapidly manufacture low cost solar panels. The project is developing the type of space- craft bus that will enable ultra-low cost dis- tributed sensor networks. This approach fulfills the hardware requirements for a dis- tributed, redundant, and easily replaceable infrastructure in space. However, getting NASA is in the business of space ex- heat propellants to much higher temperatures this hardware up there also requires a new ploration and Earth science. Traditionally, than chemical combustion, to propel small approach for launch vehicles and creates a we build big rockets or big satellites that single stage rockets into low Earth orbit.8 In demand for a micro-launch industry. need big rockets. When a big satellite is this case the heavy, complex and expensive launched, much of the rocket’s lifting capac- power source is left on the ground and the Making Low Earth Orbit ity is often left unused. In the near-term this power is beamed to the launcher. Accessible Cheaply and provides an opportunity for very small satel- on Demand lites, particularly Cubesats. These “secon- Living in Congested Space dary payloads” don’t get to dictate their final using Space Traffic Imagine designing a rocket to lift a heavy orbit (nor much else, really), but they do get payload, such as a several ton satellite.