A Crvt?Cal Analysis of the Operations of the Xvtt French Corps in the Battle of the Ardennes, ?1 and 22 August, I9II4."

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A Crvt?Cal Analysis of the Operations of the Xvtt French Corps in the Battle of the Ardennes, ?1 and 22 August, I9II4. Code Number 77 IR - 1933 INDIVIDUAL RE3KARCH STUDY 'A CrVt?cal Analysis of the Operations of the XVTt French Corps in the Battle of the Ardennes, ?1 and 22 August, I9II4." Submitted by The ComniAhd and General Staff Sohool Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Fort Leavonworth, KanR 15 April, 1932 FO» Tho Director Sooond Your Class, The Cormnd and Genorul Staff School, Fort Loavenworth, Kansas SUBJECTt A Critioal Analysis of tho Oporntiona of tho XVIl Frenoh Corps in ';he Battle of the Ardennes, 21 and 22 Augufi, 191) I. PAPERS ACCOMPANYING: I. A Bibliography i'or this study, 21 Maps as follows! Hap 1 — Genorfil Situation on evening of 21 August 191h. Map 2 -- Situation on evening of 21 August 1911* showing tone of advanoo and routes oi* march for XVII Corps. Kap 3 — Situation about 3i00 PM, 22 August I91I4, 3» Composition Chart of XVII Corps. II. THE STUDY PRBS&'TF*). — A critioal ancJysis of the Operations of the XVII Fronoh Corps In the Kattle of the Ardennes, 21 and 22 August, 1911*. III . HISTORICAL FACTS REUTKG TO THE OBJECT. — Introduction Early in August I91U the French high command cencontrated the Third and Fourth Armies south of the Ardonnos Forest with a view to striking tho flank and threatening the conmunictitions of the German armios marohing to the vent into Belgium. (l) The Fourth 'rray, composed lately of first line troops, tms oharged with the principal role in the contenplftted ) P«G# 9,10; All, 16; Fur, l9«Sj How, 38 -1. attack. In conformity with the pltm it had advanced by the morning of August 21st to tho general lino Montmody~Mes«incourt—Charleville with covering forces as far north as the Somoy River. (2) (Map 1) Tho XVII Corps, Mnder Gonere.1 Poline, m s fourth in line fron the right an the Fom-th Array; hoads of the main bodies of its two divisions were at Mossinoourt and Pure, with advance guards near Herboumont. (3) (Map 2) Operations on August 21st, The day oi August' 2l6t was ocoupied in closing up the main bodies of the oorps preparatory to an advance to ths north instead of to tho ­ northeast, &s originally cortemplated. By evtning, after spending most of the day under arms, the bulk of the XVII Corps was assembled in the St. Cecile—-Muno clearing and the woods to the south thereof, while tho XII Corps, jcheloned to its right rear, had leading elements only as far forvaru as the region of Pin—Florenvillej the advance guards of the XI Corps, on tho left, were on the line Bertrix—Palise'il. (U) (Map 2) Keads of tho lid and Colonial Corps, on tho extreme right of the army, had reached the vioinity of Sb. Vincent and Jaraoign. (5) (Map 1) Fourth Army Orders for August 22d Between 8:0C) and 9t00 PM, on August 21st, the Fourth Army orders for the advance on the 22d reached headquarters of the XVII Corps at oouri;, direoting ir. substance as follow si (6) The Army, supported by the Third Army eoheloned to its right rear, to advance to tho north with corps in eohelon, left leading, the enony to be attaoked wherever met. The XVII Corps, lelieving the advance guards of the XI Corps at Bertrix and Offagne, to march on the line Oohanps— (2| Pug, 11,12,33,37,^7, Annex 3,/M5i Vail, 267J OS, 359 r \h) Pu*g', 5o!65', AnHex 6*t ?!lil i»iox 3, P.8,9) ^S* 567,368; Vail, 318,319 (6) pUg! 55! A^nek 3, P*12# Ar.nex 6, p.6, GS, 367,368, Vail, 267, Grass, 1*2 •2­ Jebonvillo, with divisions abroast, while on tho left the XI Corps wne to reach Maissin, and on the right tho XII Corps ad­ vnnoed on Recogno and Libramont. The lid aid Colonial Corps, on the extreme right of tho Army, were to roach Le^liso and Neufchateuu respectively. The Cavalry Corps vms to rooonnoiter eneny roovomonts south of tho road Heoogne—Ubin—Beaurains, withdrawing to the loft flank of the XI Corps in oase of oontaot with tho enemy in force. The old advance fuard of tha XVII Corps, now at Herboumont, to take position early on tho 22d noar St. Modard to cover in­ itiall y the advance into tho clearine of Heufchateau—Bertrix, remaining there until relievod by leading elements of the XII Crrps* Infornation of the Siony The Fourth Amy order contained no mention of the enemy situation. (7) Yfhat was known to the Conmnder of tho XVII Corps on the evening of August 21tt, nay be sumr/vrlfed as followst (fi) (Map 1) On the 20th the French aviation had seen lone columns of all arms in the regirn of Cir.ey and traversing tho line Keuf­ chatet«u--Haot*t{:n°-"?'ou^ft•'!** ln ft nor*v.^r^ Erection. !Io later inforrwitif.r. of tli^so forces had been obtained on account of adverse flying conditions. On the 21st tho Cavalry Corps, while reconnoiterinK tho front of the Arny, had bean in oontaot with portions of two Oorman inf*nt;*y divisions at Nfiufchateau. Thore had been ndnor clashes bottfoon opwosinc cavalry pa­ trole, for tho most part in front of tho right of tho Amy, on the 20th and ?l«t, Tho rmy lnformAt.lon bullntir. itsaod at liOO PM August 21st f o f th o "the t>eeur«i .lon »*oCicn Arlov«LonfJwy--^oh has been (?) (0) c! 5)> ^nn»* 6, p.?i Vail, . .-6,2671 ArCf 388j All, confirmed} the region between tho Meuso and tho Leseo is oo­ oupiod by tho enemy iriio U intrenched bohind the latter river feeing south." The general picture of tho enony situation whioh soems to have prevailod in the Fourth Army and in tho XVII Corps wis thai tho Germans were execut­ inp a largo raovenent to the northwost aoross the front of tho Fourth Airy, thoir flank protected by covering foroes in position along tho Losse; as far as tho zone of advance of tho XVII Corps was concerned, the Germans in force were therefore thought to be something more than a day's inarch to the north of the present location of the Corps. (9) A report from the Cavalry Corps to the Fourth Army, dated noon August 21*^0 tho effect thut Librwnont was strongly occupied snd Luohy forest hold by enery patrols apparently WHS not c?mnunioated to the corps until tho morning of the 22d. (10) XVII Corps Orders for the Advance on August 2gj General Poline organised his advance In three columns, as follows: Vll) (KAP 2) Thp right colunn, consisting; o<* tho 66th Krigade (of 3j5d Division) with tvro battalions of divisionril ortJHery (18th K.A»)# under the brigade conmnder, to march by the rord Kerbovinont-­ Bertrix--Oclienpsi The center colunn, 67th Brigade (of 3hth Division) with cr.e battalion of divisional artillory (23d F.A.), and two battalions o' *-h« corps artillery (57th F.A.) under tho brigade ecrr.ancier, by tho road Cucnon--Elancho Croillej Tho left column, 68th Brigade (of ?lith Mrislcn) with t w battalions of divisional artillory (2jd F.A.) and tyro battalions of tho corps artillery (57th F.A.) and tho divisional oovolry (ono squadron vth Chasseurs) under the divls5on oonnander, (9) Pi«c» 57,^8# Aixnox 6, p.^6; Kur Albv, by tho rood Kuno—Dohan—Kay* lee Veneurs— Tho 65th iTl^ade, old advenco ,^ard of tho 33d Division, with one battalion of fhe divisional artillery (IGth F.A.) and tho divlcloiml onvnlry (one squadron 9th Chassours) wr.s to toko position by 5iC0 AM an flank guard near St. Modard, under direct com:.and of tho Cor.n.andin£ Goneral 33d Division, General Villene- Jean, It was to ronnin there until relieved by the leoding elo­ mente of the XII Corps, when tho 65th Brigade was to move on Bor­ trlx in oorps reserve, the battalion of artillery and tho divi­ sional caralry rejoining the right oolumn. Command of the right colunn was then to be taker, over by the division coinnander. Tho oorps oavalry (h squadrons of the 9bh Chns,?e'.ir&) wis to crose the line Paliseul—Bcrtrix by 7tCX) AM, reoonnoiterinc tho front of the oorps and sending patrols in the direotion of Oohamps anu Jehonville, (The order oontained no mention of tho region Recogne—Librcnont, thic boinc in the zone of advance of ^.ho XII Corps.) (12) Tho enemy vms to bo attacked wherever mot, To recapitulate, iho corps vms to advance on objectivos 3^ to 35 kil­ ometers to the north in throe brigade columns, each rcinforead by artillery (of which all with tho corps was 75 ma.) and eaoh under a cocuoander direot­ ly responsible to the corps commander. (13) Tho left was ooverod by the XI Corps eoheloned to tho frontj the ri^ht was proteotod initially by tho strong flank guard at St. Medard, thereafter this protootion was ap­ parently to be entrustod to the XII Corps, marohinc echeloned to tho right rear. (IJ4) Tho front of advanoe was to bo reoonnoitered by tho oorps oavalry, and the left oolunn hud divisional oavalry attaohed, bub the right oolunn, marohing on Oohanps, had none initially, as tho ?3<* Divi­ sional Cavalry formod part of the flank guard. (15) The corps had no aviation. (16) (12) Pug, Annox £, p.8, Annex V 1>JS (13) Pug, Annox 6, p.7l ''RII, 3&I (llj) Pus, Annox 6, p.^l VnlJ, 32U 1 (I ;) P>»t';, /inr.cx 6, p.8, Annox 3i P«|^ (16) Pug, Annox 1, pJii /mnox 3i P»';3# -5­ Terrain ^Hnps 2 ,'c 3) Tho portion of tho Ardennos region through which tho XVIIth and ad­ jacent corps were to advance is chnruoterlzod by rugged, heavily woodeJ areas brokon by clearing whose gonorttl trond is east and west, (17) To the north of the Herbeunont Forest is tho clearing of Bertrix—Palisoul, which is a high plateau constituting tho watershed between tho Sonoy Rivor to the south,and tho Lesee Hiver to the north, the vicinity of Bertrix in particular affording good obsorvntion in all direotions.
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