Code Number 77 IR - 1933
INDIVIDUAL RE3KARCH STUDY
'A CrVt?cal Analysis of the Operations of the XVTt French Corps in the Battle of the Ardennes, ?1 and 22 August, I9II4."
Submitted by
The ComniAhd and General Staff Sohool Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Fort Leavonworth, KanR 15 April, 1932
FO» Tho Director Sooond Your Class, The Cormnd and Genorul Staff School, Fort Loavenworth, Kansas
SUBJECTt A Critioal Analysis of tho Oporntiona of tho XVIl Frenoh Corps in ';he Battle of the Ardennes, 21 and 22 Augufi, 191)
I. PAPERS ACCOMPANYING:
I. A Bibliography i'or this study, 21 Maps as follows!
Hap 1 — Genorfil Situation on evening of 21 August 191h. Map 2 -- Situation on evening of 21 August 1911* showing tone of advanoo and routes oi* march for XVII Corps. Kap 3 — Situation about 3i00 PM, 22 August I91I4, 3» Composition Chart of XVII Corps. II. THE STUDY PRBS&'TF*). — A critioal ancJysis of the Operations of the XVII Fronoh Corps In the Kattle of the Ardennes, 21 and 22 August,
1911*. III . HISTORICAL FACTS REUTKG TO THE OBJECT. —
Introduction Early in August I91U the French high command cencontrated the Third and Fourth Armies south of the Ardonnos Forest with a view to striking tho flank and threatening the conmunictitions of the German armios marohing to the vent into Belgium. (l) The Fourth 'rray, composed lately of first line troops, tms oharged with the principal role in the contenplftted
) P«G# 9,10; All, 16; Fur, l9«Sj How, 38
-1. attack. In conformity with the pltm it had advanced by the morning of August 21st to tho general lino Montmody~Mes«incourt—Charleville with covering forces as far north as the Somoy River. (2) (Map 1) Tho XVII Corps, Mnder Gonere.1 Poline, m s fourth in line fron the right an the Fom-th Array; hoads of the main bodies of its two divisions were at Mossinoourt and Pure, with advance guards near Herboumont. (3) (Map 2)
Operations on August 21st, The day oi August' 2l6t was ocoupied in closing up the main bodies of the oorps preparatory to an advance to ths north instead of to tho northeast, &s originally cortemplated. By evtning, after spending most of the day under arms, the bulk of the XVII Corps was assembled in the St. Cecile—-Muno clearing and the woods to the south thereof, while tho XII Corps, jcheloned to its right rear, had leading elements only as far forvaru as the region of Pin—Florenvillej the advance guards of the XI Corps, on tho left, were on the line Bertrix—Palise'il. (U) (Map 2) Keads of tho lid and Colonial Corps, on tho extreme right of the army, had reached the vioinity of Sb. Vincent and Jaraoign. (5) (Map 1)
Fourth Army Orders for August 22d Between 8:0C) and 9t00 PM, on August 21st, the Fourth Army orders for the advance on the 22d reached headquarters of the XVII Corps at oouri;, direoting ir. substance as follow si (6) The Army, supported by the Third Army eoheloned to its right rear, to advance to tho north with corps in eohelon, left leading, the enony to be attaoked wherever met. The XVII Corps, lelieving the advance guards of the XI Corps at Bertrix and Offagne, to march on the line Oohanps—
(2| Pug, 11,12,33,37,^7, Annex 3,/M5i Vail, 267J OS, 359
r \h) Pu*g', 5o!65', AnHex 6*t ?!lil i»iox 3, P.8,9) ^S* 567,368; Vail, 318,319 (6) pUg! 55! A^nek 3, P*12# Ar.nex 6, p.6, GS, 367,368, Vail, 267, Grass, 1*2 •2 Jebonvillo, with divisions abroast, while on tho left the XI Corps wne to reach Maissin, and on the right tho XII Corps ad vnnoed on Recogno and Libramont. The lid aid Colonial Corps, on the extreme right of tho Army, were to roach Le^liso and Neufchateuu respectively. The Cavalry Corps vms to rooonnoiter eneny roovomonts south of tho road Heoogne—Ubin—Beaurains, withdrawing to the loft flank of the XI Corps in oase of oontaot with tho enemy in force. The old advance fuard of tha XVII Corps, now at Herboumont, to take position early on tho 22d noar St. Modard to cover in itially the advance into tho clearine of Heufchateau—Bertrix, remaining there until relievod by leading elements of the XII Crrps*
Infornation of the Siony The Fourth Amy order contained no mention of the enemy situation. (7) Yfhat was known to the Conmnder of tho XVII Corps on the evening of August 21tt, nay be sumr/vrlfed as followst (fi) (Map 1) On the 20th the French aviation had seen lone columns of all arms in the regirn of Cir.ey and traversing tho line Keuf chatet«u--Haot*t{:n°-"?'ou^ft•'!** ln ft nor*v.^r^ Erection. !Io later inforrwitif.r. of tli^so forces had been obtained on account of adverse flying conditions. On the 21st tho Cavalry Corps, while reconnoiterinK tho front of the Arny, had bean in oontaot with portions of two Oorman inf*nt;*y divisions at Nfiufchateau. Thore had been ndnor clashes bottfoon opwosinc cavalry pa trole, for tho most part in front of tho right of tho Amy, on the 20th and ?l«t, Tho rmy lnformAt.lon bullntir. itsaod at liOO PM August 21st
f o f th o "the t>eeur«i .lon »*oCicn Arlov«LonfJwy--^oh has been
(?) (0) c! 5)> ^nn»* 6, p.?i Vail, . .-6,2671 ArCf 388j All, confirmed} the region between tho Meuso and tho Leseo is oo oupiod by tho enemy iriio U intrenched bohind the latter river feeing south."
The general picture of tho enony situation whioh soems to have prevailod in the Fourth Army and in tho XVII Corps wis thai tho Germans were execut inp a largo raovenent to the northwost aoross the front of tho Fourth Airy, thoir flank protected by covering foroes in position along tho Losse; as far as tho zone of advance of tho XVII Corps was concerned, the Germans in force were therefore thought to be something more than a day's inarch to the north of the present location of the Corps. (9) A report from the Cavalry Corps to the Fourth Army, dated noon August 21*^0 tho effect thut Librwnont was strongly occupied snd Luohy forest hold by enery patrols apparently WHS not c?mnunioated to the corps until tho morning of the 22d. (10)
XVII Corps Orders for the Advance on August 2gj General Poline organised his advance In three columns, as follows:
Vll) (KAP 2) Thp right colunn, consisting; o<* tho 66th Krigade (of 3j5d Division) with tvro battalions of divisionril ortJHery (18th K.A»)# under the brigade conmnder, to march by the rord Kerbovinont- Bertrix--Oclienpsi The center colunn, 67th Brigade (of 3hth Division) with cr.e battalion of divisional artillory (23d F.A.), and two battalions o' *-h« corps artillery (57th F.A.) under tho brigade ecrr.ancier, by tho road Cucnon--Elancho Croillej Tho left column, 68th Brigade (of ?lith Mrislcn) with tw battalions of divisional artillory (2jd F.A.) and tyro battalions of tho corps artillery (57th F.A.) and tho divisional oovolry (ono squadron vth Chasseurs) under the divls5on oonnander,
(9) Pi«c» 57,^8# Aixnox 6, p.^6; Kur Albv, by tho rood Kuno—Dohan—Kay* lee Veneurs— Tho 65th iTl^ade, old advenco ,^ard of tho 33d Division, with one battalion of fhe divisional artillery (IGth F.A.) and tho divlcloiml onvnlry (one squadron 9th Chassours) wr.s to toko position by 5iC0 AM an flank guard near St. Modard, under direct com:.and of tho Cor.n.andin£ Goneral 33d Division, General Villene- Jean, It was to ronnin there until relieved by the leoding elo mente of the XII Corps, when tho 65th Brigade was to move on Bor trlx in oorps reserve, the battalion of artillery and tho divi sional caralry rejoining the right oolumn. Command of the right colunn was then to be taker, over by the division coinnander. Tho oorps oavalry (h squadrons of the 9bh Chns,?e'.ir&) wis to crose the line Paliseul—Bcrtrix by 7tCX) AM, reoonnoiterinc tho front of the oorps and sending patrols in the direotion of Oohamps anu Jehonville, (The order oontained no mention of tho region Recogne—Librcnont, thic boinc in the zone of advance of ^.ho XII Corps.) (12) Tho enemy vms to bo attacked wherever mot, To recapitulate, iho corps vms to advance on objectivos 3^ to 35 kil ometers to the north in throe brigade columns, each rcinforead by artillery (of which all with tho corps was 75 ma.) and eaoh under a cocuoander direot ly responsible to the corps commander. (13) Tho left was ooverod by the XI Corps eoheloned to tho frontj the ri^ht was proteotod initially by tho strong flank guard at St. Medard, thereafter this protootion was ap parently to be entrustod to the XII Corps, marohinc echeloned to tho right rear. (IJ4) Tho front of advanoe was to bo reoonnoitered by tho oorps oavalry, and the left oolunn hud divisional oavalry attaohed, bub the right oolunn, marohing on Oohanps, had none initially, as tho ?3<* Divi sional Cavalry formod part of the flank guard. (15) The corps had no aviation. (16)
(12) Pug, Annox £, p.8, Annex V 1>JS (13) Pug, Annox 6, p.7l ''RII, 3&I (llj) Pus, Annox 6, p.^l VnlJ, 32U 1 (I ;) P>»t';, /inr.cx 6, p.8, Annox 3i P«|^ (16) Pug, Annox 1, pJii /mnox 3i P»';3#
-5 Terrain ^Hnps 2 ,'c 3)
Tho portion of tho Ardennos region through which tho XVIIth and ad jacent corps were to advance is chnruoterlzod by rugged, heavily woodeJ areas brokon by clearing whose gonorttl trond is east and west, (17) To the north of the Herbeunont Forest is tho clearing of Bertrix—Palisoul, which is a high plateau constituting tho watershed between tho Sonoy Rivor to the south,and tho Lesee Hiver to the north, the vicinity of Bertrix in particular affording good obsorvntion in all direotions. (18) This plateau is bounded on the north and northoost by tho forests of Pi ret and Uiehy which form a densely wooded crovm partially surrounding ths village oi" Jehonville, (19) Uiohy Forest is extended to the southeast by the Kuguony woods, laensuring li to 5 kilometers fron east to west and 7 to 8 kilometers fron north to south. Tc the north lies the valley of the Losse in which Ochamps, Anloy and Malssin are situated. To tho east is the Reoo<^ne nlesiring, and to the southeast tho corridor fron Keufchateau to Eortrixt (Mf.p 2)
T.ne nain enst and west roads traverse this region largely by vray of the clearings or corridors, the road Recogne--Fny6-l6s-Veneurs constituting a portion of one of the more important highways• In tho woc^di ^octions the roads are narrow and conparHtively few and run genoral'iy north and south with few latorals suitable for maintaining liaison between marohing columns• (20)
In general, the terrain in thr( ^ono of advance was close and diffi cult and particularly unfavorable for movement fron south to north, as the longer axes of the corridors could not bo utilised in that case, (21)
Advance of XVII Corps Although tho corps vmrning orders did not reaoh tho divisions until after midnight on the morning of August 22d, tho flank guard took position
UV) Pug, 15,16; Bur, 1*96; Vail, 237 (IB) Pug, Annox 6, p.l2j Fur, 507 (19) fiig, Annox 6, p,12j ?ur, 507 (80) !MG, 1*1,16, AIUIOX 6, p.28j Air, 1*98,?07 (21) Pug, 161 Bur, U96
-6 at St. Uodard by 15:00 AM and tho throe brigade columns mnrohi'd to tho north a* ordered, a hoa'ty foC prevailing «ritil about ldOO yJA. (22) By about lit00 AV., nenernJ. Joline, then nonr Fnyj los Veneurs, had rooo;ved Infonuition as foHo>v»t (23) A bolated report from a patrol of tho Cavalry Corps to tho effect that three German infantry rogiments, probably the 113th, llijth and 115th, had marched on the morning of August 21st fron Noufchateau to Rocogne,
local inhabitants stated that a column of 7,000 to 8,000 men with ? or 8 batteries was moving this morning from Hocc^no to Libin, thought to be the 115th find 117th German Infantry. The 9th Chasseurs (Corps Cavalry) reported Luohy Forest strongly occupied by enemy daVaJvy, and tho Chasseurs1 patrol sent to reconnoiter Oohamps had therefore boon unable to reach that village. The 9th Chasseurs had dri/«n enony cavalry out of Jehon ville ^nto Firet woods to the north and were now i;«»ar Sart,
XVII Corps Orders at lliCO />^t August 22d Advance guards of the center and left columns were now nearing Jehon ville and Offagne, and their commanders had requested that a halt be made to rest the troops aftor a hard march. General Polino declined to halt with the worris (according to Major Pugens), "the situation donands that we engage immediately" and issued those orders at lliOO AMt (2l\) "The 66th Brigade will maintain oontao* with the XII Corps and continue its march on Oohamps. "The 67th Brigade, passing through Jehonville, will push its advance guard to tho northern edgo of tho woods, maintaining oloso oontact with the 66th Brigade whioh is moving from. Bcrtrix on
Oohamps*
{22) Pu^, Annox 6, p,?,U{ '^3, 39^1 *nrt l\'& (23) Pug, iinncx 6, p« 31,12,131 ';S, 39" (2JJ) Pug, Annex 6, p,lfifl$|l6#8°» ^ ^ 5# P^5l r'S, 390 "Tho 68th »rifc,a:lo will push U s advance (juArd through Sart AS far an tho Pirot woodn and rcoonnoiter Anloy, iuain tRinins contact with tho right column of tho XI Corps, which has Maiscin RE its objootive.
"Tho resorvo Brigade (65th) will move from Bortrix >n Blanche Oreille, where it will receive further *rdors»" At this time, lltOO AM, tho leading elononts or tho XII Corps, on tho right, had roliovcd tho flrnk guard at St. Ked&rd but h^d progressed only as for nc Orgeo and were septirnted fron the rf^M; column of the XVII Corps by 6 to 7 kilometers of wooded torrninj evidenoe thht the 66th Bricatle colmui was in contact with the XII Corps U Inokir^, (?5) Iho Cavalry Corps hnd withdrawn earlier in the morning to tho vioinity of Godinnej no element of the XVII Corps or of the Army hnd reconnoitcrod the Recogne region since the evenJn£ of 21 /u£ust. (26) Tho corps orders of 11*00 AM brought about encounters wi;h tho fiornans by eaoh of tho tliree brigade ooluans, in ",id;Loh eaoh fought in a separate compartment with apparently no effective cooperation frora its neighbors; accounts of these enfiagoraents follow; (27)
Action of the rl^ht opj^jrui. (Map 3) About It00 P\', tho head of tho advance ^ard regiment (20th Infantry) of the 66th Brigade roached the northorn odco of Luohy forer^ in approach formation* (^8) Antioipatinc resistance, t\ " brigade commander had previoiisly ordered tho battaliono of tho 18th Field Artillery to remln at flffrtrix, tho artillery oonmander to reconnoiter for positions noar orossroads I47I and not to raove his batteries into tho vroods. (29) T!\e two leadinc battalions of the 20th Infantry progressed but a short dis tance r.orth of the woods wnen thoy were stoppod by heavy infantry and ar
((25) PUL', .^nox 6, i).l6,.-J5i vail, izht nur, l»
-3 til lory fire from tho direction of Oohonps am* from R email hill about 7000 yards south of tho village. (30) Tho 3d battalion 20th Infantry w\fl thon ordorod tc tho north^utorn od(;e of Luohy vf00dt, to assist in the attack and to oovor tho occupation of a position found thoro for ono ar tillery btUory. (31)
At this time (botv.tjon 2t00 and 2»30 ?il) tho division commander and his chief of artillery arrivod, having eonpletod their duties with tho flank guard at St. Modard, and took over tho direction of tho b&ttlo in Luchy Foro3t, (32)
?'••* 11th Infantry, eooond raiment in tho brigade oolumn, in turn entored thfl forosfc in nuroh formation and it wna followed, due to a mis carriage or misunderstanding of ordorB,>by che 18th P.A, (3>) Attonpt in;; to reverso to cc reot tho error, tho artillrf, oomplrtto-y blocked tho t;arrow road leading from iori.rix t<- ->bunr»s &nd bottlod up tho 66th Brigade, Including moat of its artillery, in tho dense buo'.iy woods. (jli) THiile involvod in tho resultinj* confuaion, about 2i30 PK the column was struck by surprise in ri^ht flank and ro'»r by t-,vo reginonto (80th and 8lat) of tho lcr:ian 21sI Divio.'.on which hftH hoe.n rvirrtl-tinr- on the highway fron
Keoo^ne to Fays les Venours§ (3;;) Tho Germans supported their attack by artillery quickly pat into positions in a olear'a*; astride the road and south of Luohy Forest, where tho batteries oould fire on tho tail of tho >'renoh column. Xho 80th
(30) Put, Annox 6, p.29j rur, 1*99,500 (31) PUG, Annex 6, p.30) Bur, 600 (52) PAZ, Annrtx 6, p.30j as, 397 (35) Pug, Annex 6, p.3Xj r.ur, 5°0 (36) P»6, ^nnox 6, p.3l| Bt«r, ?00| Vail, & (35) Pug, Annex 6> p.32| Bur, 5OO,5O1| OS, 390| Vail, (36) Pug, Annox 6, p.33l Bur, 5«li5O2 (37) PUG, Annox 6, p.3^1 &*$ 5O2»5°3J OS, 397 During tho course of the action detailed above, the XII Corps, on which reliance hn General Poline, nt >'s command poot n*ar Assonois, was informed about 2«00 Fll of the difficulties of his richt column in debouching from Luohy woods. He first orderod the 67th Brigade (center column) to cooperate in the attaok on Oohamps, supporting this by tho divisional artillery and a battalion of the corps artillery with the column, (37) As will bo Boon, by tho tino the order roaohod the 67th Brigade (about 3:50 PM) it was itself engaged toward Anloy and its artillery, due to lack of positions with ob sorvation over the intervening woods, was unable to furnish effeotive fire cr. Ochur.rs. (JjO) The corps cenmandor next ordered the 68th Brigade (left coluiui) to fire with itf artillery on Ochnnps, but duo to ohc long range and again to dif ficulties of obsort'aticn ov»>r several v.ooded erestc, this move was also ineffectual, (hi) Finally Genornl FoJlnu recalled a battalion of the oorps '.rtillery from Jehonvillo for attachment to th^ 65th Eri&ade,whioh had been held at Assonois, and launched tho corps reserve betv.oon h:CO and 5:00 I5!.! in a south east direction to disnngago tho roar of the 66th Brigade, (1(2) Ono regi ment of the reoervo v,nB deployed on b>tb sides of road junction Ij6j whilo tv.A other v,flr. initially held near Assonoir., later prolonglnc the lino tov.nrd liiririx niti counterattacking. (h?) The advancing 68th German In fontry, ably supported by its artillery, swept through in spite of those measures and by 6i00 PM had driven the 6^th Brigade south of the Hertrlx— Asnonois rond, vhonoo it flod in disorder on Herb^nont. (I1I4) (38) Pug, Annex 6. P.35l Vail, 321*1 f«»*i W rna „ XCfJ (39) P»»r,» Annex 6, p.22l ^nnox }, p.li?? t\»r, 50?i &S, 397 (^0) Piig, Annex 6, f&\ Pur, W$\ OS, 3°7 (1,1) Pae. Annex 6, p,19,aO| Pur, 5O3,fO),j OS, 397 (l£) OS, 3^8) HA, ?£>5; lur, 50h (U3) Pv»g, Annex 3, P.fffl fur. 50i» « , 398 (JO) Bur, 5Oi4| Vail, $25; GS, 390 -10. Kflimwhile thf, remnants of the 11th Fronoh Infantry and tho artillery with tho right coluirn had withdrawn through Luchy Woode toward point lt?3; hero a oounteraUeok faiUd und by ?:30 PM the roCiment wo in ful) retreat to the eouth through Aeremont. (1$) After repented attempts to dobouoh from the woods, and finally almost surrounded, what we lift of tho 20th Infantry surrenderedj not more than six guns of tho Divisional Artillery wero saved. (1}6) Action of tho center ocluirm. (Map 3) Tho battle of the neighboring column in Luchy Woods was well under ray v/hen about 2tOO PM tho lending raiment (lljth Infantry) of tho 67th brigade, edvanoing in route colurcn by the road Jfthonville—Anloy, debouc)ied fron Firet woods, Scoincj Gen.win J.nfnntry in naroh near Anloy, >ho rogiir^nt quickly deployod on hill l$5$ ?*<>** which it opened fire. It was soon foroed back to tho north edjgo of t!»o woods, *ilh heavy losers, by infantry and artillery fire from the direction of Anloy. (Jtf) Tvro batieliono of the BJd Infantry, r^ar regiment in the brigade coluwi, joined in lfttor attempts to regain hill i;33 *nd to advance on Anloy, but repeated and costly efforts O7or a period of two hours, all made without »H'.tlJery support, faUcd, tho 'lerr^ns (Il6th Infantry of the 25th I;ivis5on) now occupying hill 135. (U8) Meanv.'hile, the thrfl© battalions of artillery with th* column had been unable to find positions from which to support the attack on Anloy, or on Ochanps Jr. croperr.tion with tho right colimn as ordered. Tho denso Pirat woods afforded no poaitiens, and provor.ted direot observation fron the south thereof. Tho batteries had no facilities for indireot fire, 0 method not yet In use. (ifl) During tho entire aotion, whioh lasted until about 61OO rM3 only one bat Very of the nir.o available firod, and that inoffeoUmlly from a position south of Pir?t woodr. noar O10 Jehonville—Ooharps road. («J0) (6) » 55J , } K (lt6) J'ur, 5OS, C6| r-s, 596| Vail, 3 ?>$ (^l7) Pue, Annox 6, p.21,22» All, 16,061 Vail, 3'^? PuC, Annex (>t p.?2,?3,25l All, l6,l?J «S, }?t JMr! /nn,x C\ p^o,25,?h» F,r, ^ « fS, 3Vx All, 17,19 KM::, .nnor 6, p.?*,2/i| All, hi -n On orderr. of the corps oowondcr, th.. 67th FMf6do withdrov to tho south of Pirot woods n>.out dnr):, after lo«h.t; 8fl of'lcerr. end noro than 1100 mon. (,;>'..) Action cf tho left oolxyn^ (Map 5) Th* 60th Brif,a< inc battalion dobouchod from Pirot woods south of Anloy but vmo immediately stopped by intense small am* ami artillory firo from thf» vicinity of tho villn^e, (53) Vho twe rerodnine battalione cf tho roelraenl tvere thon brought up and doployod on tlic ri^ht and left and tho lino again attempted to advance but W.B thro*vn lack wivh hev/y losses. \^) h**tytcon I4JOO and 5iC0 ITi ono battalion of tho roar regiment (GQth) attacked on tho loft of tho 59tft# and foroed withdra^til of tho enemy ad\An^L\' cloir^me toward Anloy, but tho nernan moMno £,unr. and artillery soon stopped thie momen- During this entire Rcticn, niiich, aocordljit" ^ ^5CT Pugen3, cost the 59th Infantry tnoro than half its effect\vo otrer^th, th*> French infantry was rithout artillery supportj none of the h battalions of 75'c with thg C'lum fir*>c! nn rvec-cunt o'1 ir.fiini*." to fln'\ positione in or south of tho woods afforHn.: the nocestar}1 dlreot observation on .'Jiloy, (56) About 2i5O FH, Oonfiral Polino had bnon requottcd by tho XI Corps to ooopertite in thtit unit's aUack on Knissdn, which VJIO «>Toncly hold by tho erviry, and a li&inon officer from the XI Corps reported to Goner*] Alby, oowtandor of tho 68th Pri^ade ccluitn, with a similar sequent, (f>7) GenoKl Alby, in compliance with orders oC Oenornl Folino, continued hi6 atteck on ;jkley as planned but dirented part of hifi ar^Mtery, ir. the corpr. nrtillery pl^cod under hit coranand, to fire on Ka5.5,r.in. (51) P»,;, ...nnox 0, p.^,?3l r*, 390,5^)1 All, r (52 PuK, A-iiu-x f>, r>.37; >$, 397 (53) Put! 1 -^nex 6, r«!0) "S# 3 ^ '5it) P>»C» 'vnnnr 6, p.lt't r;S, 3(>fl (W) P>»Ki -nnox 6, p.ldj ^-S, 39Bi Vail, 32«5 ValJ f S (56) Rin, nn.3x 6, p.lV0»«l » ^ " '' (?7) PuBl \nnox 6, P,19,«>| f«S, 390 (56) Pun, Annex 6f p.19, A 5 M 5 Tho artillery wu. unable to accomplish this cooporatien on account of laok of obsorvti'lon on Maipsin n B Y of thn e/.^agoncnt on Tho troops of the XV [I Corps, who *•' *nood\,n tho laorninf, of August 22d f'll of enthusiasm for thoir firsl encounter with tho Ccrmns, wai^ by nV.hvfall ir. disorcanJzod rotrout, to thf south after •saffering extrenely heavy losses; effortb oi' Genorhl Polinj to rally his forces wore in vain until after -h«)y had crossed the b'emoy, (6f<) Although the Germans also suffered heavily and di^ not pursue beyonfc Assenoie and ^he Firot w-oods on the 22A, the retreat opened a gup in the Fourth Army front -which there w>re no troops at hand to fill, (65) Con sequently tho corptt oil either flank of tho XVIIth were forced to retire, a movement which, onoo nterted, contlnue-l until tho Meuso waK passed* (66) ANALYSIS Aii») CRlt.ICISlU ifiO of the 66tj\ All sourcer, conoultod i^rco that tho prJrriiry oa-jse o? the diui^ter to the XVII Corpo on -uf.uot P.?JI WIG the failure to prctoot it (59) rut: > Annex 6, p.10,^0} vail, 3»5i ns, 3^ (Co) iv, , Annex o, n .20, .mcx 5, P.'-7l r '3| TO >fn11* (61) ruo , /.-sn-x 6, p (6?) J^u , ..nnry. 6, p (6^) Pu(; , 'IUU.X 6, p (6M r.s, , ..rmox 6, p with the conscquont surpric* and defeat of th* 66th Brigade in tho forest of Luohy. (6?) Thn r.«o"nsity for this flank protection is obviouo. In the first place the echnlonod formation of tho army in the advurco mad* iha right flank o{ eaoh corps particularly vulnerable in view of the knoim general movement of 'cho enemy frcn tho right of the French front toward the north west. (68) Tho nature of tho torrain accentuated the danger as it favored tho Gorman advance by way of the eust and west corridors through the Ardennes forest, while the French in their northward march must cross tho corridors into successive bolts of woods. (69) A flank guard was provided at St. Medard to protect tho debouchment of the XVII Corps into the corridor of Neufchateau; if this was considered necessary, provision to block attack fron the Hacopjne oorrldor while tho corps approaohed the valley of the Lesso was indispensable, on aocount of tho closer proximity *:o the marching columns of 'die Hermans, (70) Full reliance for this protection might reasonably havo been placed on the XII Corps, ra&rohing echeloned to tho right rear, had tho country boen opot and then only in case provision were made for continuous liaison between the adjacent units with a mobile force to cover any intorval which night develop between them. (73) As it was, ts.o least delay in the advanco of the XII 'Jovps, due to difficulties of the march through the Ardennes woods or to interference \>j tho Germans, would expose tho right of the XVII Corps to attack, (72) I'i tho faoe of this very possible contingency, General Polino apparently ffl&de no special arW rgemonts for tho protection of his right, did not ohar&e tho 66th Brigade with this duty, omitted reoonnais3anco of the Reoogne region in instructions to the corps oavalry, and provided initially no cavalry for his right ooluran for use in roconnaissanoo or maintaining iontaot with tho XII Corps, (73) (67) Pug, Annex 0, n.2*M Bur, 506j Vail, J25? 05, (68) Pug, Annex 6, p,3?l Bui, 1J97 (69) Bur, 5O7,508| IMf,; 16 (70) Pug, Annex 6, p.Oj Pur, 5^0 (71) Pug, -\nnex 6, p.5r> (72) Fug, KMTIOX 6, p.6} Vail, 3 ^ (73) Pug, Aimox 6, p.8,9, .'vnnox 5# P«''3 -III Althouch tho 66th 5riCftde ms direoted by tho corps ore ors of 11; 00 AM, August 226, "to imir.ta.in close contact with the XII Corps" in tho advance on OishMips through Luehy forest, the attack *hore was launched when tho leading elements of the XII Corps wore 6 to 7 kilomoters to tho right rear with donso woods intervening. (7h) it i8 probable that General Poline did not know the location of the X7.I Corps at tho tiroo the attaok was ordered. According to Major Pugons ho learned of the delay suffered by tho neighboring unit about 2:25 PM, or at approximately tho time tho Gerntn 21st Division struck the flank of tho right colximn. (75) The XII Corps, according to Kajor Pugens, knew nothing of tho defeat of tho 66th Brigade until evening. (76) Further evidence of tho unooncorn for the safety of tho right flank is seen in tho use made of the Corps Cavalry. As stutod above, its recon naissarce was directed solely to the front of advance of the XVII Corps. At about lit00 AM, wnen information was at hand thtit Luchy woods was occupied by patrols, and Roeogne by the enemy in force, tho Corps Cavalry had abandoned support of its patrol on Ochamps and had gone to drivo the German cavalry from Jehonville, fr» (7k) Pu&» Annex 6t p»15*l& (75) Pu£» Annex 6, p.35 (76) Pug, Annox 6, p#?5 (77) Pug, Aruiox 6, p. 12,13 (76) Put;, ^»oy- 6, p. 16}fc'ur, r'C(7# (79) Vail, 3^3» J*»>"i 503 Lnok of Proper Preparation for Attaok Another outstsnding feature of tMs battle Is the haoto and precipita tion which mnvkod the entry of tho XVII Corps into oonbat. This brought abovt thr rushir.^ into notion of troops who were tired as a result of lone marches, and it restricted opportunity for ooordinntion of tho Infantry of the three columns with each other and with their supporting artillery. (80) Svsoh handioaps wro particularly unfortunate in view of tho difficulties ci" tho terrain. Those domundod special attention to coordination and its absence placed tho French at a great disadvantage as oompared to the Hermans. (81) The latter cave battle in general fron tho olerrin£8 whore they w«re able to utilize tho full power of supporting weapons to prevent egress of the French infantry frora tho woods, while the French at the sane tiir.e recoived no help from their own artillery, (02) Tho Inception of this haste and la ok of proper preparation may bo found in tho instructions issued by tho Fourth Army for the advance. In tho first place, tho maneuverine due to tho change .of direction of march fron northeast to due north resulted in the nain bedies of the Corps being kept muter arras durinr the day of tho 21st, Combined with tho late issue of order* for t ho 22d, which probably necessitated a very early morning general alarm to effect tho reqtdred dispositions, bhis served to cut short the rest of troopc who were to be called upon for a maximum effort. (8J) In tho second place the army ordors carried tho impression that the advance on the 22d was to be a simple march, with possibly combat of ooverinc forces only. (610 The objootivts aligned were 30 to 35 kilonetcrs distant, end tho onomy in force was thought to bo no closer thnr the Losse. (85) According to Major Burne, Corps representatives were told by the Army Chief of Staff, "You aro to impress upon your corps comnanders that thore ia nothing in fVont of thora and i;hat they ircust march boldly forward." (86) Finally, tho army ordors presoribed no dofinite echeno of maneuver or line (80) PuC, Annex 6, p.l£; All, 66,67 (01) }\ip,f . nnox 6, p.? (62) Hut;, UiiiO'/ 6, p.l;j All, 6r; 8?) PUR, nnnox 6, p,6,9J Vail, 3*8,3191 i;s# 3»i (Oil) Puc, /uinox 6, p#?j Kur, Ji9& (05) Pu^;, 65, Annox 6, p»5,6 (86) Bur, 1J98 upon nhioh action by the army as a whole oould be based. The corps wore simply to Qdvanoo "attacking «io oneny wherovor net". Such directions con stitut e a doubtful foundation for orderly development for otnih&h in cewe the Gormuns v;ore encounterod in foroe. (87) This tendency to ruoh her.dlonj; into battlo wig mnnlfontoJ in General Poline'a ordors at 11:00 A.Y on the P2d, when he refused to ullow the tired troops to halt, evidently dooming irmodiate on^u^omont necoosary. (86) Mis orders required tho threo bri^ndo oolunns to pron.3 for«trd, maintnining contnet with o&ch other. Whether this continuation of tho rnftrch war. to briiv: oontact with the onony in force, nn] If ^ upon nhat lino, no ono know. (69) Vhrt enony xvS%rAry had not beftn d^lnitoly locut^d. (<>'>) Xo atlorapl w*3 ritioe to fuel out the 'ierman nir.pof.itions with envall ftovorin£ foro-an .rnllo ruiln bodies an! tho ftrtillpi*y developed for oombut under tholr protection, (91) On tV.e oontrar;/, pructljally ihreo-fourths of ffao total etret.ytn of the corps .vac launched on wlmt amounted to R reconnaissance in force, (92) - s we have scon tiio rec^tl1: wis a series of cont-ly, uncoor dinato'.! rtctionc in wiiicn each brigade fought in n separate ooKpnrtaent, the vrooded torrnln hinderln- Unison irlth itn n^i^hbors and preventln£ support by \]\e artillery, (93) There 7»ao lihtl*» attenpt at JWJ;ouv^r, saooossive battalions b«'.;u Vrou.-ht \\n c.«d e^a/.ed in frontal atinoVts to debouch fron tho north od,-o of tho woals, {l)h) Ono column (67th Brigade) vrao f*till in jnarch colunn vhen contact vf'.th the onony was i\ade. (95) ?ho orderly induct of 'he battle raust havo boon ^rthor hindered by the dis&£cooi:ition of corrnanderr- fron their units, rJono.'al Alby, tho 3hbh Uivi^ion noTwin^or, h-u! r.o dirfc^ authority ovr nnr o^ his brigades (the 67th), alttiowj^h this bri^ado and his 68th J'riG^de, attaokod tovmni the same o\Je.oliwi, nanoly /jiloy. (96) Tho comiander of tho >3d Division spent (37) run, HO 5 h 507,^0 (c5tf) Pujf: Ar.no x (89) ( .^nn^x 6, P.15I All, (90) Pup '•nnex 6, P,1S,1'3 (9D [*.! '* , ^nnox 6, p,i6j ,ai, (^2) , Annex 6, p.15,16 (93) Fuc , x'oinox {>, (9M 1»V^ l»S)| * nil) 'to (95) Pu>' ^1 p.21| All, (96) hat , Annex 0,^1 -17 tho nornJnc of t.ne 2?A wKh tho flank guard rvt St. todard and Joined fcho rl2ht colinu in Luohy forest only aftor tho orW cnont there liad started.(97) Admlttin: thnr. (innoral Poline's Instructions from tho Army impliod a bold advance to tho north against tho supposed marohine flank of tho Oormno, lot us examine th* probiiMe result hud he oxeroisod a bottor appreciation of tho cpooial typo of terrain, and had ooneiderod tho possibility that tho Germans, loarnin£ of tho advance of the French, mlg.it turn toward tho south to meot then, as in fact they did, (90) As haa be/n stated tho general lin* Fertrix—AsBonois—Paliseul constitutes a ridge which dominates tho clearing ftftJ exits of the woods to tho north. (99) \ aving informa tion indioaUnr, the proximity of tho Germans in some force at 11*00 AM, had General Poline covelopod his main bodies and the itnss of artillery upon this ridfje while tho cavalry and infantry covering forces pained con tact with the advnnoin£ Hermans in Luohy and Firet woods, the XVII Corps would have boen plaoed in a rwoh more advantageous position. Had tho Germans then attempted to debouoh from the southern edge of the< woods they could have been net by the fire of the Fronoh artillery while their own would have had difficulty in roplyin^. (3.00) If the French then de cided to resume the advnnco, tlrao would have boon available for methodical preparation of tho comand for the debouchment to the north of tho woods, particularly thfl insuring of artillery support for that oritical operation. According to Colonel Allehaut, positions exist to the southwest and south east of Jehonvlllo whioh afford direct observation in the direotion of Anloy, and a study of the map Indicates that Oohamps could also have boen intordictod from west of Luohy woods. (101) The taking of cuoh precau tions would have enabled the XVII Corps to fifiht on more even terns with tho f,ermans and should at least havo avoided a disastrous defeat. (102) (97) PUG# Armox 6, p.27,26 (98) Bur, 506j Pu^, Annox 6, p.25 (99) H>Gi -^nox 6, p.l2i Bur, ?08 (100) Bur, 508) All, 63,69 (101) All, 68,69 (102) Bur, 'JOS,5095 Pugi 190,1614 -18 Corps Covnandor's Efforts to Influence thn Aotlon Hnvints launched his command into Imttlo without proper development and with inadequate information of tho ororay, (ionoral Poline's lator of- forts to influonco thr» action were evidontly of little value in view of tho rapidity with which events took place. (lOJ) ::© hivo scon ihut };is at tempts to assist the 66th Brigade in biehy Foroct with the center and left columns wcro futile duo to the cncaemftr.t of thn fornor on its own front and the difficulties of obsorvi.tion for the artillery of both. (10U) His uso of tho Ift3t means At hie disposalj the corps ror.erve, was also of little avail. If the reserve had beon dopleyod early on the high ground extending from toad junotion 1|6? to Bertri^,supported by artillery, it could prot-obly have held up tho Cemr.n attack through tho south of Luohy Forest. (105) As it was, the situation of tho 66th Brigade, bottled up in the vfoods, uvus desperate and pronp4. action YME nococcpry to dieenjja^o it, (106) This wac not forthcoming, probably due in part to tho nnocccity of rt^oalliitp; sone of the corps artillery, all of which had been sont for T?tird with the ooluims; vA\en the reserve vrns finally used it was too l&to to tftvo the already dofcited 66th Brigade. (107) Fvrtliemoro, the pleco mcttl naturo of the reserve's employment, rith inadequate nrtJ31ery support, contributed to its slight effect on the ad\-ance of the victorious fltfth nrrxan Infantry and to the rout of the reserve itself. (108) Neoossity for plan of action, A study of thio battle emphasizes the necosr.ity for the cornonder to lay out a definite plan pr'.or to committing his force, then to uso overy roeuns to «;aiTi noro inforn&tion of the eneny on yhich sound and tinoly sub soquent decisions may bo basfid. (109) Particularly in a mooting onc (10?) Pur, 503,r>0l4 (10l) Pup, Annor 6, pJ9»2>»2l»l E^ (105) Eur, 50^4 (106) ft«r, 50ij (10?) '>ur, ^OJij Vail, 325 (106) Bur, 50hj -all, i525J ( ^, 5«» (IO9) Pug, Annex 6, p.36} How, ?9 -19 nent, a* thic «ae, the lack of such a r l fin is liable to result in involving the units in unooordliuxtod oonimt at an unfavorable t5.n* or plf.ee and ono trhioh is imposciblo to control duo to tho rapidity of change in tho sit uation. (110) Yfiici; surprise oocor, Plmyc possible in cpite of pre enutions, if the eowiytnclcr is r:o*. closojy in toueV 7/ith the units in con tact and doft no*. W-.e rrcir.pl action, retrograde movements nay start quickly and ftssurao dangerous proportions, (ill) ?CK CRITICISE It should be borne in mind that tho troops and ptaffs in this battle wrc Pubjcctrd ti. thoir firf.t enoountor vdth nodorn fire action after Mt year*; of potico. Vho povrcr of Tr.odfrn automat!t wenponc r.rd artillery and the futility of pitting unsupported infantry t«(;ainst thorn wero n t fully realised. (112) In addition, oe we have soon, tho French artillery xma hnndicnppftd to the point of impotence by the lack of facilities for in direct fire. Could artillery fire hav« benn placed on Oohair-.pB and Anloy 'during the uttonpt io debouch to the north of th^ woods, tho out'cone of the enj-Kfonent mitfht hu'/e boon muoh move favoruble. (113) Cone i dor'me also tVie severe tec.t or norvpr an*' strrina of participants in their r 'r^t battlo, the ccn-lud of tho eorrsandors and troops in this en gaj-.cnont should be viewed from tho standpoint of 19^4 &nd not in the li^ht of the experience gained in four later years of wr, (ll)i) IV. COKCLUSIONS OK THE AU?HOS. In my opinion the failure of the XVII CorpK on Aucust 226, oan bo traced to tt/o major misconceptions by its cormnnder. The first caused the umtarranted reliance on thft XII Corps for entiro protootion of the richt flank. This Ion to a violation of tho principal of jeo»IJJ^ wit h »*ocrrd Pug, 3,W>, Annex 6, p.?6 () Pun, Annox 6, p.5^,?7 (112) ft,g, <,7, 16? (113) Pup, ivniiPX 6, p.!,3i4t All* 19 (llM 61^ Ml 19 -2c to that flank. Tho experienco of tho XVIT Corps in this particular affords an example of tho fallacy of depending upon tho more supposed loca tion of a supporting unit to accomplish a certain result. It emphasizes tho fact that any support furnished is continent upon tho ei.P1.orMnC unit actually arriving at tho expected position, tOjle to intervene at the proper time* Tho second misconception hud to do with tho location and attitude of tho enony. At tho stert of the advance on tho morning of August 22d, General Polino, in coranon with the eomrjander of the Fourth Amy, apparently held tho view that tho Germans wfro convinuir.c; their general movenent to tho northwest, thoir southern flank protected by covorin^ forces on tho Lesce, more than one day's mnrch to tho north. The day of the 2JM was then to be a simple march with porhaps combat of security forces, But at lliOO AM, Ol -oral Folitie had information which changed tho situation some what. Reports indicated that forces of considerable size had moved into the Kecogne--Ochar>}:s--Anloy corridor and that there was something more there than covorinj; foroes in place alon^ tho Losse. Luchy and Piret roods were held by strong patrols which prevented reconnaissance to tho north. It seers reasonable to presume that tho Frozen could not hopo to ad vance in daylight without it becoming known to Lho Germane, and that a natJtral reaction by thfi Germans would be to turn to the south to meet tho threat. General Polino apparently did not visualize such a contingency, judginc from hie determination to enr.ase inaediately and the nature of his advance. His orders brought on what wo know an a piecemeal attack, of a typo euitablr for vise only when the enony can ^6 taken at B confiicorable disadvcntayG. The fact that hft called it a reconnaissance for tho left colunn and a continuation of tho advance in the oaso of tho rJrM OOIUITJI indicates tho oonnander1* lack of exr«otation ° r sorious rosietance in dobouohinj; fron tho YAJOIIB. It is therefore concluded that in spite of in dications to the contrary, lenerul Polino at lltOO ;M on tho 22d, still hold to his ordinal idea •••hat Iho Cormno wore continuine, thoir -2} to Ih, ™rU«al a,,,, thrt ,. force, on «,.t -U,, This rau00no0,«on as to «: . P ro,W t y and of th. fen... .«,» to have exW0,. do™ to the bri^s, ono of *,,ioh roved He .a™,. „,„.„ H.r™,,,, Mra t w00(ls „„ K»iluro to rnlU, the Wn,n co of ,, rlou. ^ for tho frcnoh I,,fa..try boinc « w ln u n s uppor,.cd ^ on the norM.,vn odeo of th. v^ods. T«6.th.r with . lack of appreciation ir. adv^co of th. difficulties v*lcl, tho v,ooded terrain TO,W offor for th. .tploj^nt of the artillery and for coop.rr.tion b.t.w..n co\umna,it caused th. CTII Corp,', to b. plaood in an .rtr.nely dl8advantaceouE position at th, nonont the enemy was rwt. By fRlllnr to protect hie rlG ht flahk and by b M inC his plane on an oririml mi*conception with roCard to tho enony v^ich he r.ould not RHow Utcr information in his possession to modify, General Poline turned ivhftt ws intends to bo a hold advanco asRinst tho supposed flank of the Hermans into a reckleso maneuver in which his own oonmar.d v«s exposed to disaster. Tho heavy cost of tho defeat in IOSECB and its offect on tho projected of fers ive of t-.ho Fourth Amy hns bc<>r ir.dicntcrl above. Tho dotrinent to the morale of tho troops ur.d their oonfidoriso in coivnanderK nust also have beon serious« In summation, tho following are oonsJ.dored the principal lessons which may bo dorivod from a study of the Operations of the XVII Corps in this battloi 1» Tho co:>wxnicr is r 'Sjonsible for tho security of his own unit and to nocloct this is to oourt disaster. ^* j^^ivia^ion of the ^neny nuei be oHftino_d[ and ut ill tod if tho co?a raander Is to hav« n true picture of the actual situation on which to brro sound piano for tho empltyment of hie unit* 3» iailure to proporly dovolop and prepare a cormAj.d .for combat ao» ry; to a »JcCir.lte plan i» liablr to result In uncoordinated act}on h vzy bo Impossible to cmlrol, Tho ef^oot of. unffivorbblc terrain upon e'-vjport.t.'. o'j bo',v;ror. iriit.5 tr-d -t^nn supvcr'. by tVo nrtillory nur^l } 1IiOX KEYJ (f^Ci » t>* P.1'5) - Ho, 1 Text (below), •rmox 3» Pfu'.e ^. 1, Pugonn, Coivrandant (Major)J "La FataiHe dcs Ardennes", ficole Superieuro do ^uorre, Cours d'Kistoire Militalre, 1928. ce inn nnd parts ono to four inclusive translated by Oroup X I'istorio&l Koeoorch, ZnA Your Clacs, Connand and General Staff School, I950-3I5 ed.Ucd by Lleutfnant Colcnol L.P. J'orsfall, CAC. Annex Ko, 6 "OoJiunps--Anlcyn T 5, l.^nisterc do la Unorre, iltut-Ma^or de l'.-.rnoe, Sen-ice Histortquo: "Los /-ntoos rnjicaJ.sflS dans la •'raTtdo Guerre", Tone 1, Volune 1, Irr.prenierie :.-itionalR, Prtris, 1? 6, Allehaut, Celor.elt "Tni'antry conhat*1, translation frcr. tho Pfonoh, Corc.and and (leneral Staff School, l°30, 7, Burno, llajor A.F.i "reririx", Th« Fichtinf Forces, January Hale and Polcen Lirr.itcd, Lon^ont 8, Howland, C.V.i "A military history of thf> ..'orld :ar", ilon Service Schools frees, 1923. ] ii £ L H h. £ 1 £ £ A « B » B v i n i o ii s "Ln Jafcaillo des Ardoiinos" 2, !'r«\cs - Orncsot, Colonol A.i "Lrv Ouorro on Action, Un Comb&t do Konoontro, I'eurchateou." 3, Arg - /jr^onlievs, Thlorryi ^Jno mifision d'exploration do corps do c&vftlerie, Oporntions du corps do cavalerio proriBoiro Aboiutcau en Polfiquo los l^,19,?0 aoftt, 191);." Jj, Vail - Vallftrche, Colonel H.t "LR fiatiillo dos ^rentiers.'1 5, GS - M^r.istcre do la 'Atorro. Etat-ilajor do l'/.nneo, Service His'coriqudi Los Armees Francaisos dans la Brando iiunrre." 6, All - Allehnut, Colonolt "Infpntry contat." 7, Ewr - Htsrr.o, ;:»iv'or ...F.s "?'ertrlx." 6. How - Howland, C.H.: "A sallitttr;- history of the /forld •aar." • • ' " • • ComnonUlon of XVII CorpB In tho UiUU of 22 Aueush, I91J4 (according to Annox 1 "La Pftttiill* do3 .rdennos' by Kujor Pugenu): ( Infantry ( 65th Brigade ( (9th Infantry 5?d Division ( (11th Infantry General Ville ( 66th Brigade ( meJoan ( (20th Infantry ( 5th Squadron, 9th Chaccours ( ( 18th Fiold Artillery, ( (3 battalions of 75s) ( I (if antry ( 67th XVII Corps ( (83d Infantry ( General Poline (59th Inf&ntry Divisl^on ( 68t8 h Brigadg o ( ( General ( (88th Infant/y ( ( ( 6th Squadron, 9th Chasseurs ( 23d Field Artillery, (3 battalions ( of 75s) 9th Chao.iours (h squadrons), Corps Cavalry 57th Fiold .Lrtillery (U battalionts of 75s)