Chapter Two Internationalization of Japanese Cinema How Japan Was Different from the West and Above Asia Before Globalization
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Chapter Two Internationalization of Japanese Cinema How Japan Was Different from the West and above Asia before Globalization With the end of the war — which to the Japanese of that period really meant the end of a way of life — the coming of the Occupation, the resultant restrictions, and the related difficulties within the industry, one might think that the films of the period would have, at best, merely reflected the confusion of the era. That they reflected something much more is another proof of the often amazing resilience of the Japanese people and of their ability to fashion something uniquely Japanese from the most diverse of foreign ideas. (Anderson and Richie 1982 [1959]: 174) Two days after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, on 10 September 1951, Akira Kurosawa’s Rashomon won the grand prize (Golden Lion) at the Venice Film Festival. This victory came as a big sur- prise to American-occupied Japan (Anderson and Richie 1982 [1959]: 233) and when the news spread Kurosawa became a national hero overnight. This was a key event, which helped to restore national con- fidence among the war-defeated Japanese (Sato 1995b: 233). Rashomon was internationally distributed by RKO, a major Hollywood company, and received an American Academy Award the following year. Most importantly, this event symbolized Japan’s return to the international community, and kick-started a phase of internationalization of Japanese cinema and the Japanese film industry. The international success of Rashomon put Japanese critics under pressure to explain why this film, largely ignored by domestic audi- ences and critics alike, was so highly praised in the West. Donald Richie (1972: 93) states that Japanese critics “decided” that Rashomon’s success was due to its “exoticness” and that it was this that “foreigners” liked Copyright @ 2012. Hong Kong University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 5/17/2019 2:21 AM via UNIV OF ALABAMA AN: 437687 ; Tezuka, Yoshiharu.; Japanese Cinema Goes Global : Filmworkers' Journeys Account: s4594951.main.ehost 26 Japanese Cinema Goes Global to see in Japanese films, though in his analysis he implies that mere reference to “exoticism” is not a satisfactory explanation. Evaluating the artistic merits of Rashomon is not my goal here. Rather, the points I want to make are: firstly, the success of Rashomon not only made Japanese filmmakers/producers very self-conscious about the Western gaze, but also made them increasingly aware of their standing among neighbouring Asian countries. The export potential of Japanese films was dramatically enhanced by Rashomon’s success and it also extended Japan’s sphere of influence within East and Southeast Asia; secondly, it urged notable Japanese filmmakers/producers, such as Masaichi Nagata, the president of Daiei, the company which pro- duced Rashomon, consciously to pursue self-Orientalist strategies. Many writers have pointed out that consciously representing and constructing the self as essential otherness against the West has been the core strategy which has constituted Japanese cultural and national identity in the modern age (e.g., Sakai 1989: 115–6; Ivy 1995: 48; Iwabuchi 2002: 7). For example, Iwabuchi writes that: Japan is represented and represents itself as culturally exclusive, homogeneous and uniquely particularistic through the operation of a strategic binary opposition between two imaginary cultural entities, ‘Japan’ and ‘the West’. This is not to say that ‘Asia’ has no cultural significance in the construction of Japanese national identity. Rather, the complicity between Western Orientalism and Japan’s self-Orientalism effectively works only when the Japanese cultural power in Asia is subsumed under Japan’s cultural sub- ordination to the West; i.e., when Japan’s peculiar position as the only modern, non-Western imperial/colonial power tends to be translated with a great skew towards Japan’s relation with the West. (2001: 203) While Japan’s construction of its national identity through an unam- biguous comparison of itself with ‘the West’ is an historically embed- ded project, Japan’s modern identity has, he cogently argues, always been “imagined in an asymmetrical totalizing triad between ‘Asia’, ‘the West’ and ‘Japan’” (ibid.). In other words, it was this double bind of being “both a centre and a periphery” (Sugimoto 1999: 86) that histori- cally shaped and constituted the Japanese subject position. Copyright @ 2012. Hong Kong University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 5/17/2019 2:21 AM via UNIV OF ALABAMA AN: 437687 ; Tezuka, Yoshiharu.; Japanese Cinema Goes Global : Filmworkers' Journeys Account: s4594951.main.ehost Internationalization of Japanese Cinema 27 Bearing the above in mind, the first task of this chapter is to show how people in the Japanese film industry reacted to defeat in the war and the subsequent American Occupation, and to examine how these experiences shaped their sense of national selfhood and, by exten- sion, their attitudes towards otherness qua cosmopolitan. It is the com- monly accepted view that defeat in the war and the resultant American Occupation was the most radical change the Japanese people had expe- rienced since the opening of the country in the mid-nineteenth century. The shift from pre-war militarism to post-war democracy was no doubt a radical change. However, there remains a crucial question about the residual continuity of the pre-war social structures and mentality in post-war Japan. Did the Occupation really create such a significant his- toric disjuncture as is commonly believed? Was it really “the end of a way of life” as Anderson and Richie suggest in the epigraph to this chapter? I will argue against this common assumption. Although the defeat and the Occupation did, indeed, inscribe an indelible mark on the Japanese psyche, I argue that the industrial structures and the men- tality of the people in the post-war Japanese filmmaking community exhibited a strong sense of continuity from those of the pre-war period. What was radically different for Japan as a result of the Occupation and consequent developments was that the country was inserted into the new symbolic order that was emerging in the context of the cold war: now, Japan was part of the free and democratic “West”. According to Jacques Lacan, human subjectivity is split and any unified iden- tity is illusory: “Because identity depends for its unity on something outside itself, it arises from a ‘lack’, that is a desire for a return to the unity with the mother which was part of early infancy but which can only be illusory … The subject still longs for the unitary self and the oneness with the mother of the imaginary phase, and this longing, this desire, produces a tendency to identify with powerful and significant figures outside itself” (Woodward 1997: 45). Perhaps this Lacanian theory could be applied to a nation and a national identity, and could therefore be deployed to explain how “America” became symbolic of Japan’s constitutive “lack”, in the terms described above. By examining some cases of early Japanese international co- productions in the 1950s, such as Toho’s Madam Butterfly (Carmine Copyright @ 2012. Hong Kong University Press. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 5/17/2019 2:21 AM via UNIV OF ALABAMA AN: 437687 ; Tezuka, Yoshiharu.; Japanese Cinema Goes Global : Filmworkers' Journeys Account: s4594951.main.ehost 28 Japanese Cinema Goes Global Gallone, 1954), it will be seen how the impulse for self-Orientalism was inscribed and made irresistible to this generation of Japanese produc- ers. Rey Chow’s (1995) account of self-Orientalism is useful here. She explains how non-Westerners who have been the objects of the Western gaze return their “to-be-looked-at-ness”, not in passive form, but as a form of self-affirmation. I combine this analysis with a case study of the internationalization strategy used by Masaichi Nagata, the presi- dent of Daiei, who produced Rashomon. It will be seen how the rela- tionships he established with the American and Asian film industries (both in political and psychological terms) reveal how his Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism was inextricably enmeshed within a sense of self- Orientalism directed towards the West, as well as a Japanese Oriental Orientalism directed towards Asia. (Iwabuchi points out that “Japan constructed an Oriental Orientalism against an ‘inferior Asia’” as it was “necessary for Japan to be able to construct its national identity in a modern and West-dominated world order” [2002: 8]). The international success of Rashomon whetted Nagata’s appetite and he sent his filmmakers to learn about the latest filmmaking tech- nologies in the US. He imported the latest colour filmmaking technol- ogies for Jigokumon (The Gate of Hell, Teinosuke Kinugasa, 1953) with the explicit goal of winning prizes, and he succeeded in winning the Grand Prize at the Cannes Film Festival 1954. Jigokumon was then an early example of the conscious hybridization of local media “content” with global technological “forms” and, as such, provided a formula for other internationally successful Asian films in the coming years. I shall also discuss how Nagata and the Japanese film industry in general sought to regain a position of leadership amongst the East and Southeast Asian film industries using their Euro-American success as leverage. I argue that this apparent resurgence of Japanese cultural influence and power in East/Southeast Asia4 was not so much to do with the revival of Japanese imperialism but more to do with the US administration’s integration of Japan into its anti-communist strategy.