Survival on the Hudson Inattention to Safety Briefings, Life Vests and Life Lines Increased Risks After US Airways Flight 1549 Touched Down
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CABINSAFETY BY WAYNE ROSENKRANS Survival on the Hudson Inattention to safety briefings, life vests and life lines increased risks after US Airways Flight 1549 touched down. he public’s intuition that “fortuitous” cir- images of people without life vests or life lines cumstances contributed to all occupants standing on the wings, however, contain a less surviving the January 2009 ditching of an obvious message about shared responsibility for Airbus A320 in the Hudson River has been safety aboard aircraft. Rather than dwell on the Tseconded by the final accident report of the U.S. unusually favorable circumstances, the NTSB National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) took the opportunity to redirect the attention on US Airways Flight 1549.1 Now-famous of government, the airline industry and the 24 | FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | AEROSAFETYWORLD | JULY 2010 CABINSAFETY traveling public to the critical survival factors the Hudson River2 rather than attempting to land they do control. at an airport provided the highest probability that For example, noting that “only about 10 pas- the accident would be survivable. … Contribut- sengers [of 150] retrieved life vests themselves ing to the survivability of the accident was the after impact and evacuated with them” and that decision making of the flight crewmembers and only 77 retrieved flotation-type seat cushions, the their crew resource management during the ac- survival factors sections of the report essentially cident sequence; the fortuitous use of an airplane said that crewmembers and passengers disre- that was equipped for an extended-overwater gard at their peril the life-saving knowledge and [EOW]3 flight, including the availability of equipment provided. “The NTSB notes that, after the forward slide/rafts, even though it was not exiting the airplane through the overwing exits, required to be so equipped; the performance of at least nine passengers unintentionally fell into the cabin crewmembers while expediting the the water from the wings,” the report said. evacuation of the airplane; and the proximity of Several explanations were offered by investi- the emergency responders to the accident site gators. “Although the accident flight attendants and their immediate and appropriate response to did not command passengers to don their life the accident,” the report said. vests before the water impact, two passengers The lessons learned reflected the importance realized that they would be landing in water of leaving as little to chance as possible in prepa- and retrieved and donned their life vests before rations to survive an aircraft accident. “The impact, and a third passenger attempted to investigation revealed that the success of this retrieve his life vest but was unable to do so and, ditching mostly resulted from a series of fortu- therefore, abandoned his attempt,” the report said. itous circumstances, including that the ditching “Many passengers reported that their immediate occurred in good visibility conditions on calm concern after the water impact was to evacuate water and was executed by a very experienced as quickly as possible, that they forgot about or flight crew. … “The investigation revealed sever- were unaware that a life vest was under their seat, al areas where safety improvements are needed,” or that they did not want to delay their egress to the report said. get one. Other passengers stated that they wanted The accident airplane was one of 20 EOW- to retrieve their life vest but could not remember equipped A320s — among the airline’s fleet of where it was stowed.” In all, 101 life vests were left 75 A320s. Each of four slide/rafts was rated to stowed under passenger seats. carry 44 people and had an overload capacity of © AP Photo/Alexandre Valerio The accident analysis does not devalue the 55. Also aboard, but not counted toward EOW positive outcomes of the captain’s judgment, the equipment, were two off-wing ramp/slides, one Close proximity cabin crew’s performance or the passengers’ or- at each pair of overwing exits. of personnel and derly behavior, and the report notes, “The NTSB “The accident airplane had the statements, Survival on the Hudson vessels capable concludes that the captain’s decision to ditch on ‘Life Vest Under Your Seat’ and ‘Bottom Cushion of rescuing Flight Usable for Flotation,’ printed on the [overhead] 1549 occupants passenger service units (next to the reading light overcame the switches) above each row of seats,” the report serious threat of cold said. The four life lines were designed to be water immersion. retrieved after ditching from an overhead bin, attached to top corners of door frames on both sides of the airplane fuselage and anchored to a designated point on top of each wing. The importance of these items becomes clear by considering that only two detachable slide/ U.S. National Transportation Safety Board Board Safety Transportation National U.S. courtesy(Photo of passenger 4C) rafts were available for Flight 1549 occupants WWW.FLIGHTSAFETY.ORG | AEROSAFETYWORLD | JULY 2010 | 25 CABINSAFETY — at door 1L and door touchdown at about 1527 local time. The captain 1R — with a combined opened the flight deck door and commanded an capacity to carry 110 evacuation by speaking directly to the forward of the 155 occupants flight attendants and passengers. He observed if the airplane had then that the evacuation already had begun. sunk before they were “The water in the back of the airplane rose rescued. The NTSB quickly, which, in addition to improvised determined that about commands from flight attendant B to ‘go over 64 occupants were res- the seats,’ resulted in numerous passengers cued from these slide/ climbing forward over the seatbacks to reach a rafts, while about 87 usable exit,” the report said. “However, some aft were rescued from the passengers remained in the aisle queue to the wings and off-wing overwing exits. Many of these passengers noted ramp/slides. that, when they arrived at the [overwing] exits, the wings were crowded and people were exiting Survival Scenario slowly. They also reported that the aisle forward Loss of thrust in both of the overwing exits was completely clear and engines prompted that the flight attendants were calling for pas- the captain of Flight sengers to come forward to the slide/rafts.” 1549 to commit to The NTSB estimated the evacuation sequence the ditching as the and timing: The left overwing exits were opened safest course of action by passengers at 1530:58, contrary to the airline’s despite its necessitat- ditching procedures, and the first passenger ing an evacuation in subsequently exited; flight attendant A opened harsh winter tempera- door 1L to its locked-open position against the tures. The flight crew fuselage at 1531:06, and no water entered, but later said that its top this crewmember had to operate the manual priority then was to inflation handle to deploy the slide/raft because touch down with a the automatic system appeared to have failed; “survivable sink rate.” flight attendant C opened door 1R at 1531:11, au- Analysis of the digital tomatically causing full deployment of the slide/ flight data recorder raft at 1531:16; one passenger jumped into the showed that “the water from door 1L at 1531:23 before its slide/raft airplane touched down began to inflate; the slide/raft at door 1L began to on the Hudson River inflate at 1531:26; the first vessel arrived on scene at an airspeed of 125 at 1534:40; and the last vessel departed the scene kt calibrated airspeed after rescuing the last passengers from the left with a pitch angle of off-wing ramp/slide at 1554:43. 9.5 degrees, [a descent Eight of the passengers exited the aircraft, re- Top, one passenger jumped into the 41º F (5º C) rate of 12.5 fps] and a entered the aircraft to obtain one or more life vests, Hudson River from door 1L before the slide/ right roll angle of 0.4 then exited from a different door. Flight attendant raft was deployed manually; bottom, overwing- degree,” the report said. B did not become aware of a serious injury to her exit life line–attachment points were unused, The evacuation left shin until aboard the door 1R slide/raft. and nine passengers fell into the water. began within seconds “A review of passenger exit usage indicated after the airplane’s that, in general, passengers from the forward and rapid deceleration on mid parts of the cabin evacuated through the exit the river’s surface after closest to their seats,” the report said. “However, Board Safety Transportation National U.S. Photos: 26 | FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | AEROSAFETYWORLD | JULY 2010 CABINSAFETY aft-seated passengers indicated that water im- rescue boat. Personnel from New York Waterway mediately entered the aft area of the airplane after (NY WW) also responded to the accident al- impact and that the water rose to the level of their though they were not part of the emergency plan. seat pans within seconds; therefore, they were not “The airplane was ditched on the Hudson able to exit from their closest exits because these River near the NY WW Port Imperial Ferry exits were no longer usable.” Terminal in Weehawken, New Jersey,” the report Several safety equipment irregularities oc- said. “Many NY WW ferries were operating over curred, affecting crew actions and passenger established routes in the local waterway, and behavior. “Flight attendant C … stated that the ferry captains either witnessed the accident door 1R started to close during the evacuation, or were notified about it by the director of ferry intruding about 12 in [30 cm] into the doorway operations. Seven NY WW vessels responded to and impinging on the slide/raft,” the report said. the accident and recovered occupants.” “She stated that she was concerned that the slide/ The first responders considered the winter raft would get punctured, so she assigned an weather conditions a serious risk to survival.