Loss of Thrust in Both Engines After Encountering a Flock of Birds and Subsequent Ditching on the Hudson River US Airways Flight

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Loss of Thrust in Both Engines After Encountering a Flock of Birds and Subsequent Ditching on the Hudson River US Airways Flight Loss of Thrust in Both Engines After Encountering a Flock of Birds and Subsequent Ditching on the Hudson River US Airways Flight 1549 Airbus A320‐214, N106US Weehawken, New Jersey January 15, 2009 Accident Report NTSB/AAR-10/03 National PB2010-910403 Transportation Safety Board NTSB/AAR-10/03 PB2010-910403 Notation 8082A Adopted May 4, 2010 Aircraft Accident Report Loss of Thrust in Both Engines After Encountering a Flock of Birds and Subsequent Ditching on the Hudson River US Airways Flight 1549 Airbus A320-214, N106US Weehawken, New Jersey January 15, 2009 National Transportation Safety Board 490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20594 National Transportation Safety Board. 2010. Loss of Thrust in Both Engines After Encountering a Flock of Birds and Subsequent Ditching on the Hudson River, US Airways Flight 1549, Airbus A320-214, N106US, Weehawken, New Jersey, January 15, 2009. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-10 /03. Washington, DC. Abstract: This report describes the January 15, 2009, accident involving the ditching of US Airways flight 1549 on the Hudson River about 8.5 miles from LaGuardia Airport, New York City, after an almost complete loss of thrust in both engines following an encounter with a flock of birds. The 150 passengers, including a lap-held child, and 5 crewmembers evacuated the airplane by the forward and overwing exits. One flight attendant and four passengers were seriously injured, and the airplane was substantially damaged. Safety issues discussed in this report include in-flight engine diagnostics, engine bird-ingestion certification testing, emergency and abnormal checklist design, dual-engine failure and ditching training, training on the effects of flight envelope limitations on airplane response to pilot inputs, validation of operational procedures and requirements for airplane ditching certification, and wildlife hazard mitigation. The report also discusses survival-related issues, including passenger brace positions; slide/raft stowage; passenger immersion protection; life line usage; life vest stowage, retrieval, and donning; preflight safety briefings; and passenger education. Safety recommendations concerning these issues are addressed to the Federal Aviation Administration, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the European Aviation Safety Agency. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine, pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recommendations, study transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The NTSB makes public its actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and statistical reviews. Recent publications are available in their entirety on the Internet at <http://www.ntsb.gov>. Other information about available publications also may be obtained from the website or by contacting: National Transportation Safety Board Records Management Division, CIO-40 490 L’Enfant Plaza, SW Washington, DC 20594 (800) 877-6799 or (202) 314-6551 NTSB publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from the National Technical Information Service. To purchase this publication, order report number PB2010-910403 from: National Technical Information Service 5285 Port Royal Road Springfield, Virginia 22161 (800) 553-6847 or (703) 605-6000 The Independent Safety Board Act, as codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 1154(b), precludes the admission into evidence or use of NTSB reports related to an incident or accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. NTSB Aircraft Accident Report Contents Figures .......................................................................................................................................... vii Tables .......................................................................................................................................... viii Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................... ix Executive Summary .....................................................................................................................xv 1. Factual Information ...................................................................................................................1 1.1 History of Flight .........................................................................................................................1 1.2 Injuries to Persons ......................................................................................................................6 1.3 Damage to Airplane ...................................................................................................................6 1.4 Other Damage ............................................................................................................................6 1.5 Personnel Information ................................................................................................................6 1.5.1 The Captain ......................................................................................................................6 1.5.1.1 The Captain’s 72-Hour History .........................................................................7 1.5.2 The First Officer ..............................................................................................................8 1.5.2.1 The First Officer’s 72-Hour History ..................................................................8 1.5.3 The Flight Attendants ......................................................................................................9 1.6 Airplane Information .................................................................................................................9 1.6.1 General Information .........................................................................................................9 1.6.2 Airspeed Displays ..........................................................................................................10 1.6.3 Flight Envelope Protections ...........................................................................................12 1.6.4 Low-Speed or -Energy Warning ....................................................................................12 1.6.5 Electrical and Hydraulic Systems ..................................................................................13 1.6.6 Engines ..........................................................................................................................13 1.6.6.1.1 Requirements at the Time of Certification............................................. 16 1.6.6.1.2 Amendments Made After Certification ................................................. 18 1.6.6.1.3 Postaccident Actions .............................................................................. 20 1.6.7 Airframe Ditching and Emergency Landing Certification Requirements .....................20 1.6.8 US Airways Maintenance Program ...............................................................................23 1.6.8.1 General .............................................................................................................23 1.6.8.2 Engine Maintenance Records ..........................................................................23 1.7 Meteorological Information .....................................................................................................24 1.8 Aids to Navigation ...................................................................................................................24 1.9 Communications ......................................................................................................................24 1.10 Airport Information ................................................................................................................25 1.10.1 FAA Guidance on Airport Wildlife Hazard Management ..........................................25 1.10.2 LGA Wildlife Hazard Management Program ..............................................................26 1.10.3 Air Traffic Control .......................................................................................................26 1.10.3.1 ATC Guidance ...............................................................................................27 1.10.3.2 Traffic Conflict ..............................................................................................28 iii NTSB Aircraft Accident Report 1.10.3.3 Airport Surveillance Radar ............................................................................29 1.11 Flight Recorders .....................................................................................................................29 1.11.1 Cockpit Voice Recorder ..............................................................................................29 1.11.2 Flight Data Recorder ....................................................................................................30 1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information ........................................................................................30 1.12.1 Structural Damage .......................................................................................................30
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