Europe Old and New: Neighbors, Friends and Allies
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Analysis & Commentary : paper / article title Europe Old and New: Neighbors, Friends and Allies subtitle The New Allies Between the United States and Europe author Barbora Gábelová media Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, Spring 2004 notification To use the entire work or its part, it is necessary to list the source, i.e. the title of the work, name of author/s and institution – Institute for Public Affairs /IVO/, Bratislava, Slovakia – and the media source where the output was published. Europe Old and New: Neighbors, Friends and Allies The New Allies Between the United States and Europe Although a good portion of European politics in the last decade of the 20th century was shaped by parallel processes of EU and NATO enlargements towards Central and Eastern Europe, the states of this region stepped onto the stage of world politics most significantly during the Iraqi crisis in early 2003 under the name Vilnius group. In the context of recent quarrels in transatlantic relations and the parallel enlargement of both institutions, it is time to stop and look back. The development “from Washington to Washington” in the period between the two waves of NATO enlargement (1999 – 2004) offers a good framework for explaining particular foreign and security policy priorities and inclinations of the so-called new allies. Moreover, this examination also helps uncover the motives behind the establishment of various regional grouping, including the Vilnius Group. Following the entry of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia into either/both NATO or the EU, foreign and security inclinations of these states will have a significant impact on the future of relationship between the U.S. and Europe, including the speed of progress in building ESDP and CFSP. This is a fact that both the “old” and “new” members must take into account. The purpose of this study is thus, to answer the following questions: How deep are the roots of regional cooperation of the Vilnius Group countries? What do these countries have in common and what divides them? What factors influence their attitudes in transatlantic affairs? The have-nots after the Washington summit in 1999 In the aftermath of the Vilnius statement on Iraq published on February 5, 2003 a series of articles in internationally renowned journals described both the Vilnius Group and their joint declaration as an alleged product of the initiative of an influential American lobbyist and activist, former Defense Department official, Bruce Jackson.1 Jackson’s part in the founding of the Vilnius Group was significant, as his recount of the story behind Big Bang enlargement shows: “The summer after the Washington summit in 1999 I started to think what about the countries that did not make it in the first round like Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Lithuania…” Later on, Jackson wrote a paper concerning the next round of enlargement in which he in fact put forward the so-called big-bang option, i.e. taking in as many candidates as possible at once. “I organized a briefing in November 1999 in which I showed the paper to Steve Hadley, deputy national security advisor to the U.S. President and asked him what he thinks about it: “‘You have pretty pictures,’ he said, which meant that he hated it.” Six months 1 See e.g. Fuller, T. “American lobbyist swayed Eastern Europe´s Iraq response”, International Herald Tribune (February 20, 2003). 1 after the meeting Jackson went to the Lithuanian capital Vilnius to present the paper to the leaders of the countries aspiring to NATO membership: “… that is where I presented the big- bang for the first time.”2 The story of a Vilnius group is a story of cooperation among states that shared nothing but a common goal. It is a story about how the idea of Europe whole and free came closer to reality within a five-year period from Madrid to Prague and about the discussion about when, how many and which states should join NATO in the next round of enlargement. It is also a story about how the Central and Eastern European countries learned about advantages of regional cooperation against the individual attempts to fulfill one’s own goals. Despite simplification, the road to Prague that these states had to pass is best summarized by five most important top-level summits of the V10 representatives. In retrospect, the development described below might seem as a simple “recipe for membership”, it is necessary to bear in mind that the discussion that preceded the decision about the next round was extremely difficult, complicated and by far not unambiguous. After all, it was not until the summer of 2001, when the then NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and on a different occasion also the U.S. President George W. Bush confirmed that the so-called “zero option” (not inviting any candidates at the Prague summit) was not acceptable anymore. Only then was it certain that there will be any further inviting of new members at all. The very first meeting of the Vilnius Group took place on May 19, 2000 in the Lithuanian capital Vilnius. Originally it was to be a fourth annual conference on NATO enlargement that was held regularly in Lithuania since 1997. However, since the organizers of the conferences wanted the NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson to attend the event, they in fact planned the date of the conference to the term of his official visit to Vilnius. The Office of Secretary General however conditioned his participation at the meeting by inviting the representatives of all nine official candidate countries mentioned in the Washington Declaration. The Lithuanians originally planned to invite only seven candidates with the best chances to achieve membership in the next round of enlargement – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania – without the remaining two candidates, Albania and Macedonia (Croatia was not an official candidate at that time).3 For this reason, the Vilnius Declaration, written during that meeting was at the end signed by representative of all nine instead of just seven candidate countries. The document summarized the purpose of their cooperation in three points: 1. confirmation of the obligation to take part in creation of Europe whole and free; 2. readiness to make practical and political steps towards the preparation for the membership and fulfilling the MAP; 3. to press the current NATO members to enlarge the Alliance at the Prague summit in November 2002. Ambasador of the Republic of Lithuania to the United States of America expressed the guiding principles the V 10 cooperation as follows: “The cooperation of Vilnius 10 is based upon political solidarity and individual responsibility to prepare for membership requirements. ‘One for all and all for one’ and ‘The bigger the group of countries ready to join NATO in 2002, the better for the completion of a Europe whole and free’ ”4 After the Prague summit, the V10 also played a decisive role in the lobbying process for securing the 2 Interview with Bruce Jackson, February 18, 2004. 3 The mentioned information is based on the interview with the official advisor to the Slovak government in NATO enlargement, Paige Reffe (February 24, 2004), who at that time cooperated with the Lithuanian government in organizing the mentioned annual conference. 4 Address by Vygaudas Usackas, Ambasador of the Republic of Lithuania to the United States of America at the Seattle Conference on NATO enlargement in the Baltic states on November 29, 2001; www.ltembassyus.org 2 ratification of the enlargement decision in national parliaments of NATO member states.5 The meeting in Vilnius was also attended by a number of journalists. One of them, probably the correspondent of the Washington Post in his article published after the meeting gave the group of states the name “Vilnius Group”.6 Besides the three mentioned reasons, the most important purpose of the group was to avoid any kind of an unseemly “beauty contest” among the applicant countries. This is best illustrated by a story told by Paige Reffe, advisor to the Slovak government on NATO enlargement. In early 2001 he met in Bratislava with the Slovak Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda, Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Kukan and the Minister of Defense Jozef Stank.7 During that meeting, Dzurinda told Reffe that when he was jogging with the then German foreign minister Joshka Fisher and Fisher told him that Slovenia and Slovakia should be invited in the next round of NATO enlargement (the so-called Slo-Slo scenario), suggesting that these two countries should stay out of the Vilnius group as not to get involved with lots of countries which would only drag them down. Dzurinda thus asked Reffe what he thought of the idea if during the approaching official visit to Slovenia, both prime ministers organized a press conference and mentioned the Slo-Slo scenario of enlargement. “I think this is a very bad idea,” Reffe replied. “You are viewed as leaders, as countries that are now on top of the list, you have the responsibility for those who are at the bottom… If you at this point start fighting with each other you will show everyone else that you were just what they thought you were – small and petty and not ready to be a part of the Alliance. So that will not be a smart thing to do.”8 At the end, the official bilateral meeting of the Slovak and Slovenian prime ministers occurred without the propagation of the mentioned scenario. The second meeting of prime ministers of the Vilnius Group took place on May 10 – 12, 2001 in Bratislava. According to P.