Analysis & Commentary : paper / article

title Old and New: Neighbors, Friends and Allies subtitle The New Allies Between the United States and Europe author Barbora Gábelová media Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, Spring 2004 notification To use the entire work or its part, it is necessary to list the source, i.e. the title of the work, name of author/s and institution – Institute for Public Affairs /IVO/, Bratislava, – and the media source where the output was published.

Europe Old and New: Neighbors, Friends and Allies

The New Allies Between the United States and Europe

Although a good portion of European politics in the last decade of the 20th century was shaped by parallel processes of EU and NATO enlargements towards Central and Eastern Europe, the states of this region stepped onto the stage of world politics most significantly during the Iraqi crisis in early 2003 under the name group. In the context of recent quarrels in transatlantic relations and the parallel enlargement of both institutions, it is time to stop and look back. The development “from Washington to Washington” in the period between the two waves of NATO enlargement (1999 – 2004) offers a good framework for explaining particular foreign and security policy priorities and inclinations of the so-called new allies. Moreover, this examination also helps uncover the motives behind the establishment of various regional grouping, including the Vilnius Group. Following the entry of , , , , , , , , Slovakia and into either/both NATO or the EU, foreign and security inclinations of these states will have a significant impact on the future of relationship between the U.S. and Europe, including the speed of progress in building ESDP and CFSP. This is a fact that both the “old” and “new” members must take into account.

The purpose of this study is thus, to answer the following questions: How deep are the roots of regional cooperation of the Vilnius Group countries? What do these countries have in common and what divides them? What factors influence their attitudes in transatlantic affairs?

The have-nots after the Washington summit in 1999

In the aftermath of the Vilnius statement on Iraq published on February 5, 2003 a series of articles in internationally renowned journals described both the Vilnius Group and their joint declaration as an alleged product of the initiative of an influential American lobbyist and activist, former Defense Department official, Bruce Jackson.1 Jackson’s part in the founding of the Vilnius Group was significant, as his recount of the story behind Big Bang enlargement shows: “The summer after the Washington summit in 1999 I started to think what about the countries that did not make it in the first round like Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Lithuania…” Later on, Jackson wrote a paper concerning the next round of enlargement in which he in fact put forward the so-called big-bang option, i.e. taking in as many candidates as possible at once. “I organized a briefing in November 1999 in which I showed the paper to Steve Hadley, deputy national security advisor to the U.S. President and asked him what he thinks about it: “‘You have pretty pictures,’ he said, which meant that he hated it.” Six months

1 See e.g. Fuller, T. “American lobbyist swayed Eastern Europe´s Iraq response”, International Herald Tribune (February 20, 2003).

1 after the meeting Jackson went to the Lithuanian capital Vilnius to present the paper to the leaders of the countries aspiring to NATO membership: “… that is where I presented the big- bang for the first time.”2

The story of a Vilnius group is a story of cooperation among states that shared nothing but a common goal. It is a story about how the idea of Europe whole and free came closer to reality within a five-year period from to and about the discussion about when, how many and which states should join NATO in the next round of enlargement. It is also a story about how the Central and Eastern European countries learned about advantages of regional cooperation against the individual attempts to fulfill one’s own goals. Despite simplification, the road to Prague that these states had to pass is best summarized by five most important top-level summits of the V10 representatives. In retrospect, the development described below might seem as a simple “recipe for membership”, it is necessary to bear in mind that the discussion that preceded the decision about the next round was extremely difficult, complicated and by far not unambiguous. After all, it was not until the summer of 2001, when the then NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and on a different occasion also the U.S. President George W. Bush confirmed that the so-called “zero option” (not inviting any candidates at the Prague summit) was not acceptable anymore. Only then was it certain that there will be any further inviting of new members at all.

The very first meeting of the Vilnius Group took place on May 19, 2000 in the Lithuanian capital Vilnius. Originally it was to be a fourth annual conference on NATO enlargement that was held regularly in Lithuania since 1997. However, since the organizers of the conferences wanted the NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson to attend the event, they in fact planned the date of the conference to the term of his official visit to Vilnius. The Office of Secretary General however conditioned his participation at the meeting by inviting the representatives of all nine official candidate countries mentioned in the Washington Declaration. The Lithuanians originally planned to invite only seven candidates with the best chances to achieve membership in the next round of enlargement – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania – without the remaining two candidates, and Macedonia ( was not an official candidate at that time).3 For this reason, the Vilnius Declaration, written during that meeting was at the end signed by representative of all nine instead of just seven candidate countries.

The document summarized the purpose of their cooperation in three points: 1. confirmation of the obligation to take part in creation of Europe whole and free; 2. readiness to make practical and political steps towards the preparation for the membership and fulfilling the MAP; 3. to press the current NATO members to enlarge the Alliance at the Prague summit in November 2002. Ambasador of the Republic of Lithuania to the United States of America expressed the guiding principles the V 10 cooperation as follows: “The cooperation of Vilnius 10 is based upon political solidarity and individual responsibility to prepare for membership requirements. ‘One for all and all for one’ and ‘The bigger the group of countries ready to join NATO in 2002, the better for the completion of a Europe whole and free’ ”4 After the Prague summit, the V10 also played a decisive role in the lobbying process for securing the

2 Interview with Bruce Jackson, February 18, 2004. 3 The mentioned information is based on the interview with the official advisor to the Slovak government in NATO enlargement, Paige Reffe (February 24, 2004), who at that time cooperated with the Lithuanian government in organizing the mentioned annual conference. 4 Address by Vygaudas Usackas, Ambasador of the Republic of Lithuania to the United States of America at the Seattle Conference on NATO enlargement in the Baltic states on November 29, 2001; www.ltembassyus.org

2 ratification of the enlargement decision in national parliaments of NATO member states.5 The meeting in Vilnius was also attended by a number of journalists. One of them, probably the correspondent of the Washington Post in his article published after the meeting gave the group of states the name “Vilnius Group”.6

Besides the three mentioned reasons, the most important purpose of the group was to avoid any kind of an unseemly “beauty contest” among the applicant countries. This is best illustrated by a story told by Paige Reffe, advisor to the Slovak government on NATO enlargement. In early 2001 he met in Bratislava with the Slovak Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda, Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Kukan and the Minister of Defense Jozef Stank.7 During that meeting, Dzurinda told Reffe that when he was jogging with the then German foreign minister Joshka Fisher and Fisher told him that Slovenia and Slovakia should be invited in the next round of NATO enlargement (the so-called Slo-Slo scenario), suggesting that these two countries should stay out of the Vilnius group as not to get involved with lots of countries which would only drag them down. Dzurinda thus asked Reffe what he thought of the idea if during the approaching official visit to Slovenia, both prime ministers organized a press conference and mentioned the Slo-Slo scenario of enlargement. “I think this is a very bad idea,” Reffe replied. “You are viewed as leaders, as countries that are now on top of the list, you have the responsibility for those who are at the bottom… If you at this point start fighting with each other you will show everyone else that you were just what they thought you were – small and petty and not ready to be a part of the Alliance. So that will not be a smart thing to do.”8 At the end, the official bilateral meeting of the Slovak and Slovenian prime ministers occurred without the propagation of the mentioned scenario.

The second meeting of prime ministers of the Vilnius Group took place on May 10 – 12, 2001 in Bratislava. According to P. Reffe, in Vilnius he was approached by the Slovak foreign minister Eduard Kukan who asked him for cooperation in organizing the next meeting in the Slovak capital. Originally, the second meeting was planned for fall 2000, but due to the ongoing primaries and approaching presidential elections in the United States that would turn the attention of most of foreign policy analyst away from the V10 meeting, the date of the summit was postponed to May 2001. The meeting in Bratislava was crucial for two reasons: 1. Croatia joined the Vilnius Group as its tenth member; 2. Czech President Václav Havel and a renowned American political analyst Zbigniew Brzezinski attended the meeting and both in their speeches called for the accession of three Baltic countries (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia) into the Alliance, by which they overcame a long-standing taboo. Until then the membership of the three Baltic candidates was in a category of undiscussed topics due to ’s negative stance. After both speeches, the membership of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania moved to the center of discussion in Washington and in West European capitals.9 In June 2001, the U.S. President George W. Bush broadened the agenda of enlargement onto the region. In his speech at the University in , President Bush emphasized historical bonds and common values as the basic reasons for the necessity of NATO enlargement “from the Baltic to the Black Sea”.10 Terrorist attack on New York a Washington on September 11, 2001 only confirmed the need for such a broad enlargement.

5 See the official web-page of the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs – http://www.mvp.hr. 6 Interview with Paige Reffe, February 24 2004. 7 According to P. Reffe the meeting took place shortly after Stank assumed command of the Ministry of Defense in January 2, 2001. 8ҏ Interview with Paige Reffe, February 24, 2004. 9 See speech by Stephen F. Larrabee “NATO Enlargement: Pratur and Beyond” on IISS/CEPS European Security Forum (July 9, 2001); www.iiss.org/eusec/larrabee.htm. 10 Socor, V., “V10 Summit Presages “Big Bang” Enlargement of NATO”, speech at The Jamestown Foundation

3 Following Bratislava summit, a series of summits of the Vilnius Group representatives took place at the level of head of states and governments, foreign and defense ministers, and experts. The aim f these summits was to “coordinate policies and lobby for a broad expansion of the Alliance that would include as many of the ten applicant countries as possible. By banding together, the members hoped to have more influence than if they acted alone.”11 Various activities of the group also increased the level of public awareness about the NATO enlargement and demonstrated the readiness of the group’s members to agree on a common goal and to cooperate in achieving it. These activities also helped to “push” the policy and clarify priorities of individual candidate and member states of the Alliance. Each prime minister or president that attended a V10 meeting was expected to deliver a speech on behalf of his country. This expectation thus contributed to the clarification of each country’s goals within and outside its borders. NATO member states, including the U.S. could discuss the issue of next round of enlargement and thus, to define their interests and positions in this matter. Before the May 2001 summit in Bratislava, the then Republican senator and chairman of the Senate Foreign Policy Committee Jesse Helms in his lecture at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) called for the invitation of the three Baltic candidates: “I intend to cooperate with the Bush administration in order to secure the invitation to membership for the Baltic countries... at the planned NATO summit in 2002.”12 It was the first open support of the three Baltic candidates’ membership in NATO from an influential American policy-maker, which helped to overcome one of the last taboos in the discussion on NATO enlargement.13 Following Helms´ speech, other U.S. senators and policy makers expressed their support for Baltic states´ membership, thus shifting these states from the group of “unthinkable” to “probable” member states. As early as June 13, 2001, the Republican Senator Richard G. Lugar called for the membership of the Baltic countries in his speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

The first results of coordinated actions of the applicant countries have started to appear in summer of 2001. The ice started to melt when U.S. president George Bush visited Poland. His address to the students of the Warsaw University on June 15 represented a turning point in U.S. policy towards the next round of enlargement. In this context Bruce Jackson, president of the Project on Transitional Democracies, recalls that during a live broadcast of Bush’s Warsaw speech he had a phone call from the White House by Steve Hadley who told him: “I did not like your briefing (briefing in 1999 about the big-bang enlargement of NATO – author’s note) and when it went forward to the president I did not recommended it but I wanted you to know that big-bang is now the official policy of the president of the U.S.”14 In the mentioned Warsaw speech the U.S. president first signaled the possibility of modification of the previously cautious U.S attitude towards the next round of enlargement. “I believe in NATO membership for all of Europe’s democracies that seek it and are ready to share the responsibilities that NATO brings,” Bush said. He explained that he meant “all of Europe’s new democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between.”15 Later that summer NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson said publicly that the “zero option” is now

(April 2, 2002); www.csees.net/topicnews1_more.php3?nId=3. Speech of the President G. Busha is available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/print/20010615-1.html. 11 Larrabee. S. NATO Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era. (RAND 2003), p. 46. 12 Helms, J., “Towards a Compassionate Conservative Foreign Policy”, speech at the American Enterprise Institute on January 11, 2001; http://expandnato.org/helmsnato.html. 13 Interview with Paige Reffe, February 24, 2004. 14 Interview with Bruce Jackson, February 18, 2004. 15 Kaiser, R., “NATO Ready to adjust 7 Eastern Block Countries”, Washington Post (September 26, 2002).

4 “off the table” for the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO’s next round of enlargement was no longer a question of when, but who.16

The third summit of heads of states and governments took place in October 2001 in the Bulgarian capital .17 Since the meeting took place only three weeks after the September 11th , 2001, its dominant topic was the threat of international terrorism. The presidents of V10 adopted a declaration of solidarity and extended the deepest sympathy of their governments and their nations to the President of the United States and to the American people. “We consider these attacks to be attacks on all of us,” the presidents said. The presidents of Vilnius 10 group emphasized their support in the war against terrorism and reaffirmed their commitment to conduct their foreign and security policies in accordance with the implications of the Washington Treaty including commitments stemming from article 5. During the meeting the Lithuanian president made a speech “Solidarity and Security: New Challenges” (full text on www.president.lt) in which he noted with satisfaction that the process started in Vilnius broadened and strengthened.18 Worries of the candidate states about a negative impact of the terrorist attacks on the next round of NATO enlargement were to a certain extent dispersed by Lord Robertson who ensured the attending representatives that the NATO enlargement is still “in game”, regardless of the events in 9/11.19

Before Sofia, there was a meeting of V10 foreign ministers in Bled, Slovenia where consequences of terrorist attacks against the US were discussed, including their impact on international security and views were exchanged about the perspectives of NATO development and experience obtained over the course of Membership Action Plan (MAP). Lithuanian Foreign Minister Antanas Valionis noted in his speech that the meeting arranged between NATO candidate countries has confirmed the importance of cooperation and unity in strengthening international security. According to the Lithuanian foreign minister, both NATO and EU have to utilize the potential of their allies – countries seeking NATO membership – in their fight against terrorism.20

On the margins of the meeting of Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) on December 7, 2001 in , foreign ministers of V10 countries met with the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. The meeting was called by Powell to thank the applicants for the support they have given the U.S.-led war against terrorism and to discuss recent developments in the Alliance. He ensured them that the U.S. remains a strong advocate of NATO enlargement. “One particular item on the agenda of the 30-minute meeting was NATO’s decision to set up a new body for cooperation with , expected to become operational before May 2002… The Vilnius 10 foreign ministers handed Powell a joint declaration according to which the countries “fully associate” themselves with NATO’s statement on the Alliance’s response to terrorism.”21 The Vilnius 10 declaration condemned the 9/11 attack and claimed that the candidates consider the attack on the United States as an attack on all of them. In the

16 Goldgeier, J., “Not when but who”, NATO Review (May 11, 2002); www.csees.net/topicnews1_more.php3?nId=15. 17 Before and after the meeting in Sofia there were meetings of ministers of foreign affairs of the V 10 countries – on July 2, 2001 in Tallin, Estonia and on October 4, 2001 in Bled, Slovenia. 18 “Presidents of Vilnius 10 Group meet in Sofia”, Newsfile Lithuania (October 1 – 7, 2001); www.urm.lt/data/EF911112625_nf676.html. 19 Interview with Paige Reffe, February 24, 2004. 20 “Foreign Ministers of Vilnius 10 Group Meet in Slovenia”, Newsfile Lithuania (October 1 – 7, 2001); www.urm.lt/data/EF911112625_nf676.html. 21 Lobjakas, A., “Baltics: Powell Meets Foreign Ministers Of Vilnius 10 Group”, RFE/RL (December 7, 2001); www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/12/07122001085739.asp.

5 document, the countries of Vilnius 10 group have stated their commitment to conducting their foreign and security policies in line with principles of NATO’s founding Washington Treaty. Despite the worries that the 9/11 attacks will freeze the process of next round of NATO enlargement, it moved on a faster track. Less than six months after the summit in Sofia, the V10 prime ministers met in on March 25 – 26, 2002.22 The meeting was attended by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who in his speech called for a “robust enlargement.”23 Armitage also assured the candidates that after the summit he will fly to NATO Headquarters in Brussels to inform the European allies about the meeting and to „make sure that there is no doubt in Brussels about the U.S. position towards the largest NATO enlargement possible.“24

As anticipated, the Bucharest summit focused on the Black Sea direction of NATO’s enlargement. With the Baltic states already on a firm track towards membership in the alliance, Romania and Bulgaria looked increasingly likely to also receive invitations at the Prague summit. The new focus on the Black Sea stemmed from four main factors: a) the region’s strategic value to the U.S.-led current and planned antiterrorism operations; b) a growing awareness that the Black Sea region is closely linked with the South Caucasus and the Caspian basin; the whole area’s indivisibility in terms of security; c) vocal support by pivotal NATO allies Turkey and for Bulgaria’s and Romania’s inclusion in NATO, so as to close the gap between the alliance’s Southeastern and Central European tiers; d) American leadership in the campaign against terrorism, NATO enlargement, Caspian Basin energy development have made the Black Sea region into a strategic prize.

Following the Bucharest summit, the International Herald Tribune published a front-page article according to which Bulgaria and Romania gained strategic importance after September 11 and thus, should be invited to join NATO.25 Since then, both South European candidates joined the other five candidates (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia) with high chances to receive the invitation in Prague. One of the motivations behind this shift in opinion was the fact that the five small candidate states (Slovakia, Slovenia and the Balts) would not provide a sufficient reason for the next round of enlargement in military terms due to their limited size and financial and military resources.26 In the meantime, in Bucharest the candidate countries declared their readiness to support the U.S. in the war against terrorism,

22 The meeting of prime ministers was preceded by the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of V10 on March 8, 2002 in , Macedonia. 23 Socor, V., “V10 Summit Presages “Big Bang” Enlargement of NATO”, contribution at The Jamestown Foundation on April 2, 2002; www.csees.net/topicnews1_more.php3?nId=3. More about the strategic importance of Bulgaria and Romania for the U.S. see Beal, C., “Time for NATO to adapt”, Jane´s Defence Weekly (May 25, 2002). 24 Ibid. 25 “And Bulgaria and Romania became strategically more important because we would have to station our troops there. That was a front-page story in Washington Post and International Herald Tribune saying that these countries now became strategically more important in post 9/11 world and they too should be included” (Interview with Paige Reffe, February 24, 2004). See also a report by Romanian Press Agency – Rompre (May 13, 2002). 26 “Not inviting the Baltic Republics would be so obvious a sop to Russian chauvinism that it would be politically unacceptable. Slovenia has met the membership criteria since 1999, if not 1997. And Slovakia would have been included in the first round had it had a different government in the mid-1990s. The problem, however, is that despite the willingness of all these aspirants and especially those in the Baltics to support the Alliance in general and the United States in particular, these countries have limited resources, populations and capabilities… At least one country either of some size or geostrategic location is needed to make this round of enlargement look like a meaningful endeavor from a military point of view. This could open the door to Bulgaria and Romania.” See Goldgeier, J., “Not when but who”, NATO Review (May 11, 2002); www.csees.net/topicnews1_more.php3?nId=15.

6 which provided for a clear signal to Washington. This statement of support was appreciated also by the U.S. foreign minister Colin Powell at the meeting with his counterparts from the V10 countries on May 15, 2002 in Reykjavik during the EAPC meeting.

“The grand finale” in Prague was preceded by the so-called summit of inevitability27 - by that time, all of the candidates in way knew which of them will receive invitations in Prague. The meeting in the Latvian capital on July 6, 2002 under the title “Riga 2002: to Prague” was by many considered as a culmination of the candidate’s rather successful two- year cooperation.28 And the ceremonial character of the meeting only underlined this impression. The event was attended by delegations from NATO member countries and the North European neutral states (defense ministers of and ), delegation of U.S. senators, renowned academics and NGO experts (e.g. prof. Bronislav Geremek, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carl Bildt, Ronald D. Asmus). As many as 300 delegates and 200 media representatives29 were greeted by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the U.S. President G. Bush, who in his video-message claimed that the eastward NATO enlargement is inevitable for securing democracy and stability after the terrorist attacks of 2001.30 In a Declaration signed at the meeting, the V10 countries stated: “We continue to share the view we expressed at the Bucharest summit that stability and security in Europe can be best served by a balanced approach between regional cooperation in Northern Europe and the emerging Southern Dimension of Euro-Atlantic security.”31

The member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at their summit in Prague on November 21 – 22, 2002 decided to invite seven of the ten candidate states (with the exception of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia) to start negotiation to join NATO. As the V10 states mentioned in a declaration signed during the Prague summit: „During the two and a half years since our first meeting in Vilnius, Lithuania we tried to take part in creating free Europe that shares the basic principles of democracy, market and human rights. Our goal was also to act sympathetically when facing new threats for the Euro-Atlantic community. For this reason we have joined the NATO members in their operations from Kosovo to Kabul and we acted as members of the Alliance in the war against terrorism. (...) The process that we started in Vilnius increased mutual trust, solidarity and regional cooperation among our countries and strengthened democracy in Europe. We have accelerated the transformation of our civic societies and learned to cooperate together as allies. We are convinced that the spirit of solidarity and responsibility will play an important role after the summit in Prague in the further expansion of democracy and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We are ready to help Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia in their successful entry into the Euro-Atlantic structures and we will support the reform process in Ukraine, Belarus, Moldavia and in the Caucasus countries and Central Asia.“32

27 This term was introduced by Paige Reffe in an interview on February 24, 2004. 28 See “Intervention of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lavtia at the EAPC Meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland” (May 15, 2002); www.csees.net/topicnews1_more.php3?nId=24. 29 Summit of the NATO Aspirant Countries, July 5 – 6, 2002, Riga, Latvia. A collection of contributions from the conference. (Riga: Ministry of foreign affairs of Latvia 2002); www.rigasummit.lv. 30 “Optimistic NATO candidate countries pledge to keep reforms in track”, (July 7, 2002); www.csees.net/topicnews1_more.php3?nId=52. 31 V10 Summit Meeting „Riga 2002: the Bridge to Prague; ww.csees.net/topicnews1_more.php3?nId=53. 32 „Vyhlásenie najvyšších predstaviteĐov štátov a vlád Albánska, Bulharska, Chrovátska, Estónska, Litvy, Lotyšska, Macedónska, Rumunska, Slovenska a Slovinska pri príležitosti summitu NATO v Prahe 21. novembra 2002“ In: Roþenka zahraniþnej politiky SR 2002. (Bratislava: Slovenský inštitút medzinárodných štúdií 2003).

7 Beyond Prague: Scratches in the Transatlantic Bond

If in the 1990s, the Central and East Europeans mainly talked about NATO enlargement, the West European countries and the U.S. were namely concerned about the future of this organization. Many analysts and politicians worried that the accession of new members will turn NATO into a “paper tiger” (this was, in fact, one of the main arguments of opponents of the enlargement). For instance, skeptical commentators warned that those countries would turn out to be “seven more Belgiums”, i.e. strategically irrelevant, unable to participate effectively in allied operations, freeloaders on defense spending, and afflicted with sanctimonious pacifism.33 Others considered the question of a new mission or raison d´etre of this organization. And as the Prague summit approached, this question was raised much more frequently as has been articulated by one of fathers of the NATO enlargement concept after 1989, Ronald D. Asmus:34 “The big question now is: Once NATO has succeed, or if NATO is now close to succeeding in making Europe essentially whole, free and safe, what is it for? And that is the question that will be front and center at Prague. Prague is not only a summit about NATO enlargement or NATO – Russia. It’s about what is NATO going to become. And the question we all face, including Latvia, as it joins the alliance is, should NATO just remain the manager of peace in a pretty secure and peaceful Europe, or should it think about dealing with the new threats, most of which come from beyond Europe? And I’m of course of the view that it should.”35

And although Prague offered answers to some of the above-mentioned questions, the Iraqi crisis in early 2003 indicated that if the gap between the allies continues to deepen, discussion about the future of the Alliance could lose its meaning. “The world became smaller, we all became Americans. Within days before the attack, aspiring NATO countries of the Vilnius 10 issued a joint communiqué in Brussels morally invoking Article V stating that it was an attack on everyone and volunteered to the U.S. and NATO any help or concrete action needed.”36 As early as September 2001, the candidate countries send a strong signal towards Washington – a signal of solidarity, support and namely of partnership. None of such a demonstration of support raised such turbulent reactions among the allies as the V10 Declaration issued on February 5, 2003: “The United States presented compelling evidence detailing Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs, its active efforts to deceive U.N. inspectors, and its links to international terrorism. Our countries understand the dangers posed by tyranny and the special responsibility of democracies to defend our shared values. The transatlantic community, of which we are a part, must stand together to face the threat posed by the nexus of terrorism and dictators with weapons of mass destruction. Iraq is in material breach of U.N. Security Council Resolutions, including Resolution 1441. We are prepared to contribute to an international coalition to enforce its provisions and the disarmament of Iraq.” Although this statement did not explicitly mention it, it was considered strongly supporting of U.S. policy towards Iraq.37

And it was this declaration, which probably overreached the meaning that its authors assigned it and launched a quite vivid and at times rather emotional discussion about an old and new

33 Socor, V., “Better than Seven Belgiums”, The Wall Street Journal Europe (February 7 – 9, 2003). 34 For a more detailed analysis of NATO enlargement process after 1989 see Asmus, R. Dvere do NATO. (Bratislava: Kalligram 2002). 35 “NATO: Analyst considers role of expanded Alliance”, RFE/RL (July 10, 2002); www.csees.net/topicnews1_more.php3?nId=58. 36 Address by Vygaudas Usackas, Ambasador of the Republic of Lithuania to the United States of America at the Seattle Konference on NATO enlargement in the Baltic states on November 29, 2001; www.ltembassyus.org 37 See e.g. Socor, V., “Better than Seven Belgiums”, The Wall Street Journal Europe (February 7 – 9, 2003).

8 Europe38, about a deepening gap between the U.S. and its European allies and namely about the genuine origin of the Vilnius group. In this context, a number of political analysts and publicists frequently pointed to the fact that the Vilnius group is only a well-thought commercial move by the American lobbyist Bruce Jackson, who has been an adviser to the East European countries for several years. “The idea for a statement first came up at a dinner at the Slovak Embassy in Washington attended by Jackson and ambassadors from most of the ten countries, diplomats say. In a recent interview, Jackson said he was present at the dinner, but he played down his role in helping initiate the text, which was issued February 5. ‘The American influence in all this is vastly exaggerated,’ he said. ‘This was a product of the and really the Latvians. They had the pen on this, and they coordinated the process.’”39 But East European officials involved in the process give Jackson more credit. Kestutis Jankauskas, deputy chief of mission at the Lithuanian Embassy in Washington, said Jackson played a ‘considerable role’ and helped ‘initiate the text’. Richard Mucins, counselor at the Latvian Embassy in Washington, said Jackson suggested the exerpt about shared values.40 And it was the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, organization that he leads, that helped distribute the statement to news agencies.

Moreover, Jackson was frequently described as the initiator of the group’s first meeting, which, in his opinion, is only a partial truth.41 Moreover, the February 5 statement was by many considered a way of helping the applicant countries to secure entry into NATO. “Seven of the ten countries were scheduled to join the Alliance in 2004 but their entry must have been approved by the U.S. Congress. ‘They clearly wanted to do stuff to impress upon the U.S. Senate the freedom-fighting credentials of these new democracies,’ Jackson said.”42 However, these allegations were strongly denied by a number of Central and East European politicians and officials who opposed any suspicion of merely pragmatic motivations behind their support of the U.S.-led war against terrorism and rather emphasized moral and value-oriented reasons. This is best illustrated in the article by Maart Laar, former Estonian prime minister published in The Wall Street Journal Europe in February 2003: “Some Europeans, perhaps Mr. Chirac among them, see an American conspiracy in East European support for the U.S.; others think that new Europeans support Washington because only the U.S. can guarantee their security. Still others see a logical reaction to Franco-German attempts to keep a bigger EU under their control. It’s more complicated than that. These countries bring a different historical perspective to the EU and NATO. …As a result, CEE approach to foreign policy is today based more on values than that of Western Europe. They are more receptive to “moral arguments” on Iraq and a host of other issues and less understanding of “European Realpolitik”. He added that “the new Europe will never turn against old Europe.”43

38 Division between the so-called Old and New Europe was originally put forward by the U.S. foreign affairs minister Donald Rumselfd at the press conference on February 22, 2003: “Nowadays you think about Europe as about and . I don’t, I think that this is the old Europe. If you nowadays look at the whole European NATO, its center of gravity moves to the east. And there are lots of new members… You are right, Germany is a problem, France is a problem… But you see a lot of other countries in Europe which do not side with France or Germany but they side with the United States.” (Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld at the Foreign Press Center on January 22, 2003; http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2003/t01232003_t0122sdfpc.html). 39 Agence France Presse (February 20, 2003). 40 Fuller, T., “American lobbyist swayed Eastern Europe’s Iraq response”, International Herald Tribune (February 20, 2003). 41 Interview with Bruce Jackson, February 18, 2004; see the above mentioned quote from the interview. 42 Fuller, T., “American lobbyist swayed Eastern Europe’s Iraq response”, International Herald Tribune (February 20, 2003). 43 M. Laar: “New Europe won’t keep quiet until all Europe is new”, The Wall Street Journal Europe (February 19, 2003).

9 In response to the mentioned allegations, the Central and East Europeans argued that besides the historical and moral reasons, their support of the U.S. is based on two fundamental reasons. First of all, they consider NATO and the U.S. as the only relevant providers of their hard security guarantees. “There is a feeling that if ever there were any problems in our neck of the woods, perhaps it wouldn’t be the French who would be first there on the front lines. It would be more likely to be the Americans,’ said Imants Liegis, Latvia’s ambassador to NATO in Brussels.” Liegis also pointed out that “Latvians are grateful that during the days of the Soviet Union the United States allowed Baltic countries to maintain embassies in Washington – in defiance of Moscow.44 Secondly, they argued that the European allies do not share a common policy towards many issues, the Iraqi crisis being one of them, which is proved by the fact that eight of them signed a so-called Letter of Eight in support of the U.S. policy.45

On the other hand, the behavior of the Central and East European candidate countries following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 – predominantly their engagement in the war against terrorism and support of the U.S. policy in Iraqi crisis – was one of the key arguments for the next round of NATO enlargement during the ratification process in the U.S. Senate. “This was the time when America really needed to count on its allies, needed to decide where her friends were... If at that point there were any doubts about the enlargement, afterwards there were not any. From the US Senate perspective this was the greatest thing that these countries could have done for the USA to show that they were allies.”46 And this was so even despite the fact that the military performance of the seven candidates so far has been mixed. Although they have actively participated in U.S.-led military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, this level of engagement would probably be financially and militarily unbearable for them in a longer run.47

Vilnius and Visegrad in the year zero

Before the May 2001 V10 summit in Bratislava, the majority of policy analysts thought that the most acceptable scenario of the next round of enlargement, if there would be any in the near future, would be the so-called Slo-Slo version. After Bratislava, the three Baltic countries joined the first two “acceptable” candidates. After the summit in Bucharest in March 2002, the number of probable invitees increased to seven. All this happened in a period of two years. In retrospect, the flow of events from the Washington to Prague NATO summits, or in particular, from the Vilnius to Prague summit of the Vilnius Group resembles a fast ride around nearly all capitals of Central and European candidate countries. In comparison to the first post- NATO enlargement, the member states reached the decision in an almost half the period of time that it took for the countries in the first round, although in 2002 the decision was namely made with respect to military, and strategic criteria in mind rather than moral and political criteria as was the case in 1997.

To what extent was the cooperation of the Vilnius group states only an artificial and rather commercial move directed namely to Washington? How deep are the roots of pro-

44 Fuller, T., “American lobbyist swayed Eastern Europe’s Iraq response”, International Herald Tribune (February 20, 2003). 45 The Letter of Eight was published on January 30, 2003 in Wall Street Journal and other newspapers. It was signed by prime ministers of (A. F. Rasmussen), (S. Berlusconi), (D. Barroso), (J. M. Aznar), Great Britain (T. Blair), Hungary (P. Medgyessy), Poland (L. Miller) and by the president of the Czech republic (V. Havel). 46 Interview with Paige Reffe, February 24, 2004. 47 Larrabee. S. NATO Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era. (RAND 2003), p. 44 – 45.

10 Americanism of Central and East European governments? These are some of the questions that remain. Many members would like to see the cooperation of the Vilnius group continue after Prague. Polish president A. Kwasniewski, for instance, has proposed combining the V4 and V10 into a new regional structure composed of 13 states.48 The aim of his initiative is not to replace either of the organizations but to try to strengthen the voice and influence of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The proposal is also designed to prevent the marginalization of those states not invited to join the Alliance at Prague – especially Ukraine – and help them improve their prospects for eventual membership.49 Despite a number of weaknesses, this proposal shows that the Central Europeans, especially Poland, are beginning to think about “life after Prague”.

To what extent will this one and possibly other proposals be applicable in practice will depend on the ability of the mentioned 13 states to overcome their mutual differences and to build their relationship on what they have in common.50 These countries all share the experience of being on the wrong side of the Wall. The majority of them also share the experience of ethnically, culturally and religiously heterogeneous societies. All of them face the challenges related to economic and political transformation of their societies from centrally planned to market and from one-party states to pluralist democracies.51 They also agree on refusing both neutrality and security guarantees from Russia as alternatives to membership in the Alliance. Moreover, they proclaim themselves a part of the West which is best illustrated in the speech by Vaira Vike-Freiberga, President of Latvia at the fifth Annual Baltic Development Forum Summit in Riga held on October 6, 2003: “Geographically speaking, none of the nations of the so-called New Europe are new to Europe at all. We have always been here, regardless of the fact that for several decades, some of our countries were wiped off the political map of Europe. Our cultural traditions and our languages trace their roots far back into the centuries, just as is the case in the so-called Old Europe.” Finally and most importantly these countries share (shared) common foreign policy goals, i.e. membership in NATO and the EU – all of them with the exception of Slovenia show more pro-American attitudes than some of the current member states. All ten formally support transatlantic relations, continued U.S. engagement in Europe and continued “labor division” between NATO and the EU. All ten consider both the U.S. and NATO as their fundamental hard security guaranties. These states support projects of common European foreign policy and/or defense (ESDP, CFSP) in principle.52 However, they do not want ESDP to lead to a weakening of NATO or the transatlantic link. They regard the U.S. presence in Europe as indispensable for European security and do not want to see it weakened. All of these countries during the Iraqi crisis thus feared that they will be pressured to make a choice between Europe and America. This concern was most acute in Poland, which many European leaders regarded as America’s “Trojan horse” in and warned Warsaw that it should temper its

48 See Kwasniewski’s speech at the summit meeting of the Vilnius Group in Riga, July 5, 2002. 49 The meaning of regional cooperation confirms a fact that ministers of foreign affairs of the three NATO aspirants who did not receive invitations in Prague signed a common declaration on cooperation on March 7, 2003 in Dubrovnik. The text of the declaration is available at www.mvp.hr/eng/1-3-05-multilateralni-05en.htm. 50 Foreign and security priorities of the seven invitees and of the three Central European countries that joined the Alliance in 1999 (Czech republic, Poland, Hungary) are analyzed in detail in Gábelová, B, “Noví spojenci medzi Európou a USA”, In: Samson, I. (ed.) Transatlantické vzĢahy po roku 1989. (Bratislava: Katedra politológie FiF UK, to be published in 2004). 51 They share the position of “states on the periphery”, i.e. states that attempt to apply Western models in their own societies which results in rather hybrid structures while some of the old and Eastern aspects prevail despite the application of Western norms (these are accommodated and modified in the practice). 52 For a detailed discussion of the evolution of Central European attitudes toward ESDP, see Šedivý, J., Dunay, P., Saryusz-Wolski, J. Enlargement and European Defense After September 11. Chaillot Papers No. 53 (: The European Institute for Security Studies, June 2002).

11 pro-American tendencies if it wishes to join the EU.53 Poland’s decision to buy the American F-16 rather than the UK-Swedish Gripen or French-built Mirage particularly angered some European officials, who complained that Poland should have chosen a European manufacturer.54 On the other hand, Hungary and the Czech Republic decided to acquire the JAS-39 Gripen fighter jet, produced by the Anglo-Swedish consortium BAE-Saab, instead of the F-16, made by Lockheed Martin.55 In both cases, the lower unit cost and lucrative offset packages were major factors influencing the decision to choose the Gripen over the F-16.56

On the other hand, there is also a number of features that create differences among these countries. First of all, the security concerns of the various states vary widely, which is likely to make it difficult for the group to achieve consensus regarding priorities. Another problem is the lack of involvement of important Western countries, such as Germany and the Nordics in either V4 or V10. Both groups would be more influential and more effective if these countries were engaged, at least in some projects. Moreover, if on one hand these countries share the experience with heterogeneous societies, on the other hand this common feature creates tensions and complicates “good neighborly relations” (as one of the conditions of membership in the EU and NATO) among them due to minority issues. Other obstacles of deeper cooperation are weak mutual bonds that would go beyond one-goal partnership (namely among the states from different regions, such as the Baltic states and e.g. Bulgaria) although there are exceptions such as the partnership between Poland and Lithuania or between the Czech and Slovak republics. This fact is even further underlined by rather weak economic bonds among these states with the exception of the economic cooperation among the three Baltic countries. Finally, Central and Eastern European countries also differ in their national history in general and the length and quality of their experience with statehood in particular which represent important factors in shaping their individual foreign and security policies. While history matters in CEE region, individual countries have diverse relations with the U.S. and West European countries. For instance, despite a general Atlanticism these states can be divided into three groups based on their foreign policy attitudes: a) pro-Europeans (Hungary, Slovenia); b) Atlantists and Eurosceptics (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Czech Republic) or Trans-Atlantic states with no clear preferences in EU-related issues (Romania, Bulgaria); c) Atlantists and pro-Americans (Poland, Slovakia).57

Small states like Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia are strongly pro Atlanticist, pro-American and strong Euroscepticts. In the longer run they will probably preserve their Atlanticism and in a smaller scale also their pro-U.S. positions depending on the developments within the EU and based on the future U.S. policy towards the Baltic region. On the other hand, Poland and Slovakia are currently the strongest pro-Americans in the region. However, contrary to

53 Erlanger, S., “Poland Pressed to Choose Between Europe and the U.S.”, New York Times (June 4, 2000). 54 The head of Dassault (Mirage) argued that “the European factor should have played a role... There is no justification for choosing American, none at all.” (“Jilting Europe, Poland opts to ‘buy American,’” International Herald Tribune (December 28 – 29, 2002); “Dassault Head Slams Polish Fighter Jet Decision as ‘Scandalous,” Agence France Presse (December 27, 2002). Roman Prodi, President of the European Commission, also attacked the decision, complaining that “it’s displeasing that the day after the EU integration ceremony Poland signs a megacontract for the purchase of American fighters… One cannot entrust his purse to Europe and his security to America.” (Pasek,, B., “Poland Shrugs Off EU Criticism for Signing Deal to Purchase US- made F-16s”, (April, 22, 2003)). 55 Hungary’s decision to lease the Gripen came as a particular surprise because the Orbán government had earlier indicated that it intended to acquire the F-16. For background, see Gorka, S. L., “Central European Lessons in How Not to Be a Good Ally”, Defense News (January 14, 2002). 56 Larrabee. S. NATO Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era. (RAND 2003), p. 46. 57 Of course, these groups are not clearly divided, i.e. some states may belong to two of them depending on their attitudes in particular issues.

12 Poland, the attitude of Slovakia might change in the longer run with the changes in the governing coalition.58 Bulgaria and Romania are the only two states from the group that will not become EU members until 2007 and thus, their attitudes will be shaped by their membership in NATO and namely by their effort to join the EU. For instance, following the publishing of the V10 statement on February 5, 2003, the Romanian foreign minister Mircea Geoana issued his own statement according to which the position of Romania over Iraq is very much similar to the position of the EU. The Vilnius statement however, did not mention any EU position. The next day (February 6, 2003) the Romanian government issued a statement, which began with the words “position of Romania is in accordance with the EU statement”. This illustrates an attempt of Romania to balance between its willingness to be a “good pupil” in relation to the Brussels on one hand and to improve its position as a future NATO member and an Atlanticist on the other.59

In general, the Central and East Europeans are strong Atlanticists. On most security and defense issues, they are likely to side with Britain, Spain, and Italy. Their membership in the EU will strengthen the Atlanticist wing within the EU and make it harder for countries like France to develop the EU as a counterweight to the United States. At the same time, their membership will make it more difficult for the EU to speak with one voice on foreign and defense policy. As far as the future of the V10 is concerned, cooperation among the ten countries will continue only if they find a new goal or content for cooperation. In regards of the fact that seven of the ten countries will face numerous challenges related to the completion of their political and economic transformation and full integration into NATO (five of them will join the EU at the same time) while the remaining three will have to through a similar process only their path will be longer, leading to deepening of differences among the two groups. After all, following the 2002 NATO summit in Prague, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia have formed a new regional platform, the “Adriatic Three” that should facilitate their mutual cooperation on the road to full integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. The only motivation for continued cooperation in the V10 format thus, remains helping the have-nots after the Prague summit in 2002 on their way to the Alliance. Despite of its importance, helping these countries would only provide for a negative self-definition of the grouping which could act as a stumbling block to regional cooperation. Based on the experiences of e.g. the Visegrad Four (V4)60, delineation of a positive political program for the future, even within the and NATO is crucial for the survival of any regional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe. And this is what even the Visegrad Group with a longer period of existence, seeks to find and follow in practice.

58 Strongly pro-American policy of the current government in Slovakia is predominantly shaped by the prime minister’s party, the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU), who controls three crucial posts in foreign policy shaping – the post of prime minister, minister of foreign affairs and minister of defense. Slovak prime minister Mikuláš Dzurinda has summarized the main foreign policy priorities of his country as follows: 1. good neighborly relations; 2. cooperation among the Visegrad countries; 3. Slovakia’s activities as a member of OECD, NATO and the EU; 4. promoting cooperation and stabilization in the Balkans; 5. good relations with the Russian federations namely on the economic level; 6. strategic partnership with the U.S. (Žitný, M., „Premiér Dzurinda: Aj silné USA potrebujú z þasu na þas spojencov, ako je Slovensko“, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (March 23, 2003)). However, in this context it is interesting to ask to what extent was this speech influenced by the fact that it was written by prime minister’s new foreign policy advisor, Milan Ježovica, who has took this office after previously serving as a deputy Ambassador of SR to Washington. Due to the fact that neither other coalition parties nor the opposition parties support such a pro-American policy, it is probable that after the next election this foreign policy orientation might change with a different composition of governing coalition. 59 Gabal, P., „Vyhlásenie V10 sa nie všade stretlo s plným pochopením“, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, (February 6, 2003). For a detailed analysis of the V4 cooperation see Lukáþ, P. “Visegrad Cooperation – Ideas, Developments and Prospects”, Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs (Spring 2001), p. 6 – 23.

13 References

Asmus, R. Dvere do NATO. (Bratislava: Kalligram 2002). Biden, J. jr. “Bigger is Better for the Future of NATO”, LA Times (September 1, 2002). Khol, R. Policies of the Visegrad Countries Towards CFSP/ESDP. Working Paper 3/2003 (Prague: Institute of International Studies 2003). Kovácz, L. “More Europe, More America”, The Washington Times (November 5, 2002). Laar, M. “New Europe won’t keep quiet until all Europe is new”, The Wall Street Journal Europe (February 19, 2003). Lukáþ, P. “Visegrad Cooperation – Ideas, Developments and Prospects”, Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs (Spring 2001). Ondrejcsák, R. “Security Strategies and Visions of the United States, the , France and Germany”, Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs (1/2003). Raus, D. „Pobaltské krajiny podporujú USA proti Iraku – zažili sovietsky teror“, RFE/RL (March 20, 2003). Reiselová, E. „Antiamerikanizmus vs. Antieurópanizmus“, RFE/RL (April 17, 2003). Samson I. “Before Washington and after Prague”; contribution at the workshop „The Post- Prague Progress of NATO candidates“ organized by the Slovak Foreign Policy Association and the Institute for Regional and International Studies (Bratislava, March 2003). Samson, I. „Euroskepticizmus“, Kafka (11/2003). Socor, V. “No point in Limbo: Why make them wait?”, The Washington Journal Europe (November 21, 2002). Summit NATO v Praze 2002. Výsledky, dokumenty a projevy. (: Mezinárodní politologický ústav 2003). Šaradín, P. “Factors Relating to EU Accession: Referendum in the Czech Republic”, Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs (Fall 2003). Šedivý, J. Dilema rozšiĜování NATO. (Prague: Institute of International Relations 2001). Štastný, M. (ed.) Visegrad Countries in an Enlarged Trans-Atlantic Community. (Bratislava: Institute of Public Affairs 2002). Vareikis, E. “Lithuania’s Road to NATO and Problems to be Solved”; contribution at the workshop “The Post-Prague Progress of NATO candidates” organized by the Slovak Foreign Policy Association and the Institute for Regional and International Studies (Bratislava, March 2003). Žitný, M. „Aj silné USA potrebujú z þasu na þas spojencov, ako je Slovensko“, RFE/RL (March 28, 2003).

Selected web-pages http://expandnato.org http://rferl.org (Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty) http://iht.org (International Herald Tribune) http://DefenseNews.com www.ft.com (Financial Times) www.guardian.co.uk (The Guardian) http://english.peopledaily.com.cn (People Daily) http://csees.net (Ministry of foreign affairs of Bulgaria) http://formin.finland.fi (Ministry of foreign affairs of Finland) www.washtimes.com (The Washington Times)

14 www.natosummit.cz www.centraleurope.com www.lockerheedmartin.com (Lockerheed Martin) www.foreign.gov.sk (Ministry of foreign affairs of the Slovak Republic) www.defense.gov.sk (Ministry of defense of Slovak Republic) www.mon.gov.pl. (Ministry of defense of Poland) www.president.lt (Lithuanian president) www.urm.lt (Ministry of foreign affairs of Lithuania) www.sita.sk (Slovak Press Agency SITA) www.ici.ro (Ministry of foreign affairs of Romania) www.vm.ee (Ministry of foreign affairs of Estonia)

15