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Elliott Sober Source: Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol Testability Author(s): Elliott Sober Source: Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 73, No. 2 (Nov., 1999), pp. 47-76 Published by: American Philosophical Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3131087 Accessed: 02/09/2008 14:56 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=amphilosophical. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. http://www.jstor.org TESTABILITY ElliottSober, University of Wisconsin Givenas PresidentialAddress to the CentralDivision of the AmericanPhilosophicalAssociation in New Orleans,May 1999. I Thatsome propositionsare testable,while othersare not, was a funda- mentalidea in the philosophicalprogram known as logicalempiricism. That programis now widely thought to be defunct. Quine's (1953) "Two Dogmas of Empiricism"and Hempel's (1950) "Problemsand Changesin the EmpiricistCriterion of Meaning"are among its most notableepitaphs. Yet, as we know fromMark Twain's comment on an obituarythat he once had the pleasureof readingabout himself, the reportof a death can be an exaggeration.The researchprogram that began in Vienna and Berlincontinues, even though many of the spe- cific formulationsthat came out of those circlesare flawedand need to be replaced. Philosophers of science now generally agree that confirmation theoryis a centralsubject. No one reallydoubts the importanceof under- standingwhat it takesfor a statementto be confirmedor disconfirmed by an observation.There also is wide consensusthat the design of ex- perimentsis an importantissue, not just for philosophers,but for sci- entists as well. If a scientist wants to test a proposition,it is important to make sure that the experimentthat is carriedout actuallybears on the propositionin question. Sometimesit is obvious whether this is the case, but at other times, subtle issues need to be sorted out to see whether this is so. The idea that some experiments really do test a proposition,while others do not, is not controversial,nor does it de- serve to be. Matters change when the question of testability is considered. Manyphilosophers of science think that there can be no "criterionof testability."'It isn't just that philosophershave so far failed to figure out what testabilityamounts to; rather,the idea is that there is no such thing. The concept of testability,like the analytic/synthetic distinc- tion, is supposedto be a vestige of a bygone age, whose untenability ? 1999APA. Proceedings and Addresses ofthe APA, 73:2. ISSN 0065-972X pp. 47-76 48 Proceedingsand Addresses of theAPA, 73:2 we celebrate by speakingof "the demise of logical empiricism."The question of what makesa propositiontestable should be rejected,not answered. I think this widely sharedview is not just mistaken;it is peculiar. If it makessense to say thatan experimentdoes or does not test a given hypothesis,why is it suddenlymisguided to ask whether any experi- ment could test the hypothesis?It's as if chemiststook the view that it is perfectly sensible to say that some things have dissolved in water while othersnever did, but that it makesno sense to saythat some things arewater-soluble while othersare not. If a set of observationsprovides a test of a propositionbecause it bears relationR to that proposition, then a propositionis testablewhen it is possible for there to be a set of observationsthat bearsrelation R to the proposition.Testing is to test- ability as dissolvingis to solubility.If we can understandwhat testing is, we also should be able to understandwhat testabilityis. Mydesire to resuscitatethe notionof testabilitydoes not mean that I sympathizewith the testabilitycriterion of meaning. The epistemo- logical notion of testabilityhas nothingmuch to do with the linguistic notion of meaningfulness. The "linguistic turn" in philosophy (Bergmann1964) that logical empiricismhelped initiate was in this instance a turn down a blind alley. We need to recoverthe epistemo- logical insights that the empiricistswere trying to develop by disen- tanglingthem fromthe extraneouslinguistic lingo in which they were expressed. If a string of words has no meaning, then of course it will not express a testableproposition; for that matter,it won't express an untestableproposition, either. However,an untestablestring of words can be perfectlymeaningful. Typically, we judge whether a sentence is testable by graspingwhat it means and then seeing whether the propositionexpressed has the relevantepistemic characteristics.2 One problem that beset the testabilitytheory of meaningwas to decide which conceptof possibilityshould be used in the claimthat all meaningfulsentences must be testable.Does testabilitymean that it is logicallypossible to test a sentence, or that it is nomologicallypossible to do so, or that a test is feasiblegiven currenttechnology? This ques- tion mattersto the testabilitytheory of meaning,but it does not matter at all if we merelywant to recognizetestability as an importantepiste- mologicalconcept. It is no embarrassmentthat the phrase"possible to test"has multipleinterpretations; there is no need to say which is the right one. Perhapssome sentences can be shown to be untestableby purelylogical considerations.Others may be untestableowing just to factsabout laws of nature.Still othersmay fail to be testablefor contin- gent reasons-for example,because the testerswe have in mind have a PresidentialAddresses of the CentralDivision 49 particularspatio-temporal location, or size, or sensory system, or be- cause they lack some pertinent piece of information.Within this cat- egory of contingentlyuntestable statements, we can recognize that a statementmay shift from testable to untestable,or in the opposite di- rection, as our circumstanceschange. Perhapssome statementsabout the Kennedyassassination were testable shortly after the event took place, but becameuntestable subsequently. The passageof time can be an information-destroyingprocess (Sober 1988). Conversely, state- ments that once were untestablecan become testable, as knowledge changesand technologyimproves.3 Testinga hypothesisrequires that it makea predictionthat can be checkedby observation.What, then, is an observation?Just as the idea of there being a criterionof testabilityhas gone out of fashion, so too have manyphilosophers become skepticalabout the concept of obser- vation. The distinction between observationaland theoretical state- ments is supposedto be inherentlyflawed, as is the distinctionbetween observableand unobservableentities. The defects that have been ad- vertised are various-sometimes the distinctionsare said not to exist, at other times they are said to be vague, and at still other times, they are said to lack epistemologicalsignificance. Once again, I think that the negativeverdicts have been exaggerated. Hereis a simplebut importantfact abouthuman beings-we make observationsin orderto learnabout things thatwe do not observe.This is how we learnabout dinosaurs-we look at their fossil remains.This also is how we learn about quarks-we look at the measurementde- vices in our laboratories.The fact that dinosaurs,in a sense, are ob- servableentities, while quarks,in a sense, are not, is irrelevant.The point is thatwe haveactually observed neither. The fact thatwe could see a live dinosaur,if we were at the right place and time, but could not see a quark,no matterwhere we went, does not show that the evi- dence we actuallyhave supportsour beliefs aboutdinosaurs more than it supportsour beliefs about quarks(Churchland 1985). It is the dis- tinction between observedand unobservedthat pertainsto questions aboutstrength of evidence,not the distinctionbetween observableand unobservable(Sober 1993a).4 The epistemologicalsignificance of this point needs to be stated carefully. It isn't that our beliefs are immune from errorwhen they describewhat we observe,but that they are vulnerableto errorwhen they describewhat we do not observe.Our opinions in both categories are fallible. Nor is it true that all our beliefs about the things we ob- serve are betterjustified than all our beliefs aboutthe thingswe do not observe. Rather,the asymmetryis more modest. Supposewe want to 50 Proceedingsand Addresses of theAPA, 73:2 test a dinosaurfossil in orderto makean inferenceabout the dinosaur's diet. Ourinference relies on the existence of a causalchain-fromX to Y toZ. X is the dinosaur'sdiet, Y is the state of the dinosaur'sbones while it was alive, and Z is the presentstate of the fossil. The relation- ship of X to Yto Z is probabilistic.The dinosaur'sdiet
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