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Perception in Aristotle's Ethics Perception in Aristotle's Ethics Author: Sharon Eve Rabinoff Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/3323 This work is posted on eScholarship@BC, Boston College University Libraries. Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2013 Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted. Boston College The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Department of Philosophy PERCEPTION IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS A Dissertation By SHARON EVE RABINOFF Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy December 2013 © Copyright by SHARON EVE RABINOFF 2013 Perception in Aristotle’s Ethics Dissertation by Eve Rabinoff Under the Supervision of Dr. Marina McCoy Abstract The project of this dissertation is to examine the role that perception plays in Aristotle’s ethics. Aristotle is famous for offering what might be called a situational ethics: discerning what one ought to do is not derivable from universal laws, but must be assessed with respect to the particulars that make up the situation in which one must act. Aristotle argues that what virtue calls for is acting and feeling in an appropriate manner, i.e. at the right time, to the right degree, in the right manner, with respect to the right people, and so on (Nicomachean Ethics 1106b21-24). Moreover, because of the situational specificity of right action, one must also have the right character in order to discern what virtue calls for—only the virtuous person sees what is truly good. If one has a faulty character, the particulars will appear in a distorted manner, just as the wine tastes bitter to those who are ill (1113a25-29). It appears that a consequence of the situational specificity of virtuous action is that in order to be virtuous one must see rightly, in a literal sense. Aristotle is consistent in designating perception as the faculty that apprehends the particular (De anima 417b21- 29, Nic. Eth. 1109b23, 1113a1-2, 1126b4, 1142a27, 1143b6, 1147a27, 1147b18). Moreover, if those who are not virtuous cannot discern instances of virtuous action as virtuous (as a person who is ill cannot taste wine as sweet), this means that there is a limit to what the powers of intellect can accomplish with regard to virtuous action, for if virtue were simply a matter of understanding, whether one does or does not have the right character should not matter. Discerning virtuous action, then, seems to be a matter of perception. This consequence, however, carries some difficulties with it. In the first place, it appears to contradict the very definition of virtue as the excellent activity of the rational part of the soul. This suggests that it is not perception, a faculty of the non-rational part of the soul shared with animals, that discerns what is virtuous, but intellect and reason. In the second place, Aristotle conceives of perception as a bodily power in an important way: it is a power that operates through sense organs that are affected (physically) by the objects of sense. But it would be strange to consider goodness (or justice, or temperance, etc.) a physical object capable of affecting the sense organs and producing perception. Aristotle seems to be in a theoretical bind: perception is the faculty that discerns the particulars yet it is seemingly not equipped to discern ethical particulars. There are two ways one might get Aristotle out of this bind: one way is to give perception a merely instrumental role in the discernment of ethical particulars, where it is by the judgment of intellect upon the data provided by perception that one apprehends ethical particulars. If one adopts this strategy, one maintains that it is indeed the rational part of the soul that discerns virtuous action, but risks undermining the situational specificity of such discernment. Insofar as intellect operates with universals, on this strategy virtuous action is determined by subsuming particulars under universal rules, which Aristotle denies. I adopt a second strategy and offer an account of perception such that it is receptive to ethical particulars, by which I mean that human perception is able to apprehend particulars in their significance to virtuous action. Adopting this strategy straightforwardly resolves the second difficulty, but is left with the first, namely, that this appears to make virtue not the excellent activity of the rational part of the soul but of the non-rational, perceptual part of the soul. To avoid this, I offer a shift in perspective and consequently in the uses of ‘rational’ and ‘non-rational.’ Rather than consider perception abstractly, outside of the context of a human soul and a human life, I consider perception as an integrated part of the intellectual soul. This holistic perspective enables me to offer an account of intellectual perception: a way of perceiving that is informed by intellectual accomplishments. For example, reading or hearing speech in one’s native language is a kind of intellectual perception. The words on the page are perceptually intelligible—even when drunk or asleep, when intellect is dormant, one comprehends words. Yet one must learn the language in order for such perceptual comprehension to occur. I argue that human perception generally and ethical perception specifically is similarly intellectually informed perception. This avoids the problem of virtue being discerned by a non-rational capacity because intellectual perception is rational—it is infused, so to speak, with intellect. The non-rational perceptual part of the soul is fully integrated with the intellectual part, so that the soul as whole is rational, rather than a composite of rational and non-rational parts. My argument proceeds in four chapters. In the first chapter, I establish that the perceptual part of the soul enables the perceiver to apprehend concrete particulars in their significance to pursuing goals, that is, as occasions for acting. I argue, first, that concrete particulars, which Aristotle calls incidental perceptibles, are genuine objects of perception, and, second, that the perceptual power of imagination expands the temporal horizons of the presently perceived particular. In the second chapter, I argue that human perception differs from that of non-rational animals by virtue of being a part of an intellectual soul. I first address the internal complexity of the soul, and especially Aristotle’s claim that the parts of the soul are in the soul potentially. I argue that the parts of the soul are functionally incomplete in the sense that their activity is dependent upon the activity of higher parts of the soul. In light of this structure, I argue that human perception (in a well-developed soul) is informed by intellect. However, the human soul is not naturally whole: Aristotle maintains the possibility that intellect is uniquely separable from the rest of the soul. In the third chapter, I argue that this separability of intellect constitutes the psychological ground for ethical development. The task of ethical development is to bring about a harmony of soul that resembles the natural harmony of soul of non-rational creatures. More specifically, the task is to integrate the dictates of perception with the dictates of intellect such that what appears good to one truly is good; it is to develop intellectual perception. I confirm this thesis with an interpretation of the phenomenon of akrasia, lack of self-restraint, as a failure of perception. Finally, I address the manner in which intellect informs perception through an interpretation of the virtue of phronēsis, practical wisdom. I argue that phronēsis is, in part, a state of soul that issues in accurate perception of particulars as occasions for virtue. Specifically, I argue that it is an ethical mean of perception. Aristotle holds that perception is a mean state between terms that govern what can be perceived. For example, sight, which perceives color, is a mean between white and black. I argue that phronēsis is an ethical mean of perception, a state of soul consisting in a balanced proportion of ethical terms supplied by one’s understanding of the good. I conclude with some suggestions about how such intellectual perception may be developed. Table of Contents Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................. iii Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1 Section 1: Aristotelian Motivations: Perception and Intellect ........................................... 1 Section 2: Scholarly Motivations: Perception and Moral Psychology ............................. 7 Section 3: Philosophical Motivations and Promise: Modern and Contemporary Ethics ..................................................................................................................................................... 9 Chapter Summaries ....................................................................................................................... 14 Chapter 1: The Perceptual Part of the Soul .................................................................. 17 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 17 Section 1: The Parts oF the Soul ................................................................................................. 18 Section 2: The Basic Powers oF Perception ..........................................................................
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