The Canadian Military Institution and Administrative Accountability: Not a Natural Match
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THE CANADIAN MILITARY INSTITUTION AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY: NOT A NATURAL MATCH Maj J.H.P.Y. Auger JCSP 41 PCEMI 41 Exercise Solo Flight Exercice Solo Flight Disclaimer Avertissement Opinions expressed remain those of the author and Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs do not represent Department of National Defence or et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces without written permission. canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite. © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as © Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2015. le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2015. CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 41 – PCEMI 41 2014 – 2015 EXERCISE SOLO FLIGHT – EXERCICE SOLO FLIGHT THE CANADIAN MILITARY INSTITUTION AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY: NOT A NATURAL MATCH By Maj J.H.P.Y. Auger “This paper was written by a student “La présente étude a été rédigée par un attending the Canadian Forces College stagiaire du Collège des Forces in fulfilment of one of the requirements canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des of the Course of Studies. The paper is a exigences du cours. L'étude est un scholastic document, and thus contains document qui se rapporte au cours et facts and opinions, which the author contient donc des faits et des opinions alone considered appropriate and que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et correct for the subject. It does not convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas necessarily reflect the policy or the nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion opinion of any agency, including the d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le Government of Canada and the gouvernement du Canada et le ministère Canadian Department of National de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est Defence. This paper may not be défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de released, quoted or copied, except with reproduire cette étude sans la permission the express permission of the Canadian expresse du ministère de la Défense Department of National Defence.” nationale.” Word Count: 4954 Compte de mots : 4954 2 INTRODUCTION The Canadian Forces have always been an anomaly within the Government of Canada in that we’re employees of the government but we’re not part of the Public Service of Canada.1 - General Rick Hillier, Chief of the Defence Staff of the Canadian Armed Forces from 2005-2008 The foundation of public policies and programs is grounded in the core values of society. For Canada, those include good government, as referred to in the Canadian Constitution Act of 1867, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights. Although professions, such as the profession of arms, are by definition largely self-governed, it is critical that they remain aligned with society in order to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the public it serves.2 The so called “Somalia Affair” of 1993 has become a seminal case study on the consequences of such disconnect between Canadian societal and military values. The “Rambo- like” attitude permeating throughout the Canadian Airborne Regiment which resulted in a series of incidents and culminated with the unjustified killing of Somali citizens shocked Canadians. The investigations that followed, including the Somalia Commission of Inquiry as well as a series of advisory groups instigated by the Honourable Douglas Young, appointed as Minister of National Defence in 1996, effectively suspended the self-governing condition of the profession of arms in Canada. It is only through broad reforms and re-education programs that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) re-established its legitimacy as a military institution in the eyes of Canadians during the decade that followed.3 1Rick Hillier, A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War (Toronto: Harper Collins), 422. 2David J Bercuson, "Up from the Ashes: The Re-Professionalization of the Canadian Forces after the Somalia Affair," Canadian Military Journal 9, no. 3 (2009): 35. 3Ibid., 39. 3 On the matter of financial administration and stewardship of public resources, multiple incidents continue to cultivate a climate of mistrust within the bureaucratic apparatus of the government, and more importantly, within the Canadian public.4 In its review of the yearly financial statements of the Department of National Defence (DND), the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) repeatedly criticized the department and the CAF during the last 10 years for being very poor caretakers of the $6.5 billion inventory entrusted in them.5 It also scolded National Defence for “not exercising due diligence in managing the process to replace the CF-18 jets,”6 and declared the acquisition of the medium- to heavy-lift helicopter to be “not fair, open, and transparent.”7 While parallels can be drawn between the suspension of the profession of arms referred to in the previous paragraph and the creation of an independent office to oversee the replacement of the CF18,8 major internal reforms have yet to be initiated to deal with the military’s public administration shortfalls. This paper will demonstrate that institutional factors such as beliefs, values, and organizational structures, impede the ability of the CAF to meet the expectations of its nation with regards to financial and materiel accountability. The research will look into potential explanations for the procedural gaps, discuss consequences and offer recommendations. 4Aaron Plamondon, “Amnesia in Acquisition: The Parallels of the F-35 Procurement and the Sea King Replacement Projects,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 17, no. 3 (2011): 265. 5Government of Canada, Public Account of Canada: Volume 1Summary Report and Consolidated Financial Statements (Ottawa: Government of Canada Publications, 2014), 2-41. 6Office of the Auditor General, Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons (Ottawa: Government of Canada Publications, Spring 2012), 31. 7Office of the Auditor General, Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons (Ottawa: Government of Canada Publications, Fall 2010), 21. 8Public Works and Government Services Canada, “National Fighter Procurement Secretariat (NFPS),” last modified 10 December 2014, http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/stamgp-lamsmp/snac-nfps-eng.html. 4 The first section will introduce an analytical model that will guide the study of relevant aspects of the administrative functions conducted by the CAF. It will explain the three pillars of institutions proposed by W. Richard Scott, an American sociologist, and Emeritus Professor at Stanford University, specialized in institutional theory and organization science; those being regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive pillars. The paper will then proceed with the analysis, looking into each pillar in turn, and include a discussion on the consequences of the lack of cohesion between societal and military values and culture. Recommendations will also be offered to generate discussion towards improvements. THE THREE PILLARS OF INSTITUTIONS Regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive paradigms have long been use by social scientists to explain the functioning of institutions. W. Richard Scott suggests, however, that theoretical precepts from all three systems often define different elements and features of institutions.9 This research will assess how well these three pillars support and legitimize the Canadian military institution, specifically as it relates to administrative accountability. The first viewpoint to be evaluated will be the regulative pillar. It consists in the set of rules, regulations and directives to which the institution is subjected. It also considers the capacity to monitor and sanction activities, as well as whenever necessary, the ability to manipulate rewards and punishments. It is worth noting that, according to Dr. Scott, rules which are rather controversial or ambiguous may be “better conceived as an occasion for sense-making 9W. Richard Scott, Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, Interests, and Identities, 4th ed. (Los Angeles: Sage), 70. 5 and collective interpretation, relying more on cognitive and normative than coercive elements for its effects.”10 The next part will assess the normative pillar. This component of the model focusses on both the values and norms of the institution, defined as follows: - “Values are conceptions of the preferred or the desirable together with the construction of standards to which existing structures or behaviors can be compared and assessed,” and - “Norms specify how things should be done; they define legitimate means to pursue valued ends. Normative systems define goals and objectives but also designate appropriate ways to pursue them.”11 Although some values and norms may be applicable to all members of a given organization; others apply only to selected groups or positions.12 An institution as large and complex as the military comprises many such sub-groups. The comment made above about the importance for regulative systems to be aligned across the organization equally applies in the context of the values and norms. Lastly, the cultural-cognitive pillar considers that “what a creature does is, in large part, a function of the creature’s internal representation of its environment.”13 Furthermore, the author of the model used for the analysis undertaken here states that: “rather than stressing the force of mutually reinforcing obligations,