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RESNICK, Enoch F., 1939- THE COUNCIL OF STATE AND SPANISH AMERICA: 1814— 1820.
The American University, Ph.D., 1970 History, modern
University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan
^ Copyright by
Enoch F, Resnick
1970 THE COUNCIL OF STATE AND SPANISH AMERICA: 1814-1820
by
Enoch F. Resnick
Submitted to the
Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
History
Signatures of Committee:
CfvSTriiian:
UfaA— X.. Dean of the College vJ
Date
1970
The American University Washington, D. C. THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
Jttfi4 1970 PREFACE
This paper attempts to analyze the discussions of the Council of State during the absolutist regime of Ferdinand VII, from 1814 to 1820. More particularly, it examines the debates and the ensuing policy recommendations relating to the independence move ments in Spanish America.
Secretaries with portfolio, ex-officeholders, presidents of the different councils, and personages selected by the king consti tuted the Council of State. The counsellors discussed a wide range of subjects; that these were not limited in scope served to differ entiate them from the discussions of the Council of the Indies, the
Council of War, and other advisory bodies. In addition, the king attended most of the meetings and a scribe kept minutes of the deliberations.
Before presenting their proposals on America to the king, the counsellors considered the national as well as the international implications of their recommendations. Because of possible reper cussions, they recommended that the government pursue a policy which was founded on the formula of an iron hand in a velvet glove. That program, however, failed to stop the progress of the rebellions. The counsellors recognized a need for more drastic measures. Therefore, the government pressed forward with preparations for the expedition to Buenos Aires. iv
This study will endeavor to trace the deliberations of the
Council of State that culminated in the government’s decision to use force to pacify the colonies. It concludes with a discussion of the consequences of the king's ultimate sanction of the proposal to reconquer America.
The chapters will be topical and somewhat chronological. For convenience sake, biographical sketches will appear in an appendix.
The author is indebted to all those who have guided him through the maze of problems encountered in preparing this disser tation. He wishes to thank, among others, in Washington, D.C.:
Dr. Harold E. Davis, Dr. Javier Malag6n-Barcel6, Dr. Manoel Cardozo, and Dr. John J. Finan; in Madrid: don Juan Manzano and don Alfonso
Garcfa Gallo, catedrAticos of the University of Madrid, and don
Ramon Bela, Director of the Fulbright Commission in Spain; in
Barcelona: don Demetrio Ramos, catedrAtico of the University of
Valladolid; in Seville: don Octavio Gil Munilla, don Antonio Muro
0rej6n, the late don Manuel Gimenez FernAndez, catedrAticos of the
University of Seville, and don Miguel Maticorena Estrada of the
Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos ; and in London: Professor
R. A. Humphreys and Dr. John Lynch.
Moreover, the writer is indebted for many courtesies received from the staff of the Public Record Office, and from the personnel and officials of archives in Spain, among them: Rear Admiral Julio Fernando Guillen y Tato, Director of the Museo Naval and the Archivo
Baz4n (Archivo General de Marina); don Federico Navarro, Director of the Archivo de Palacio; don Luis Sinchez Belda, Director of the
Archivo Hist6rico Nacional; don Jose Marfa de la Pefia Camara, former
Director of the Archivo General de Indias, and Dr. Vicenta Cortls
Alonso, a former staff member of the same institution. TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE...... i i i
INTRODUCTION ...... 1
I. THE RESTORATION OF FERDINAND VII AND THE RE-ESTABLISH
MENT OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE (1814-1820) ...... 4
Reassertion of Absolute Authority ...... 4
Organization of Government ...... 10
Re-establishment of the Council of State ...... 12
Purported Role of the Camarilla in Affairs of State . 19
II. CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPEDIENTE ON THE PACIFICATION OF
AMERICA IN THE COUNCIL OF STATE (1816-1818)...... 25
III. CAUSES FOR THE REBELLIONS AS VIEWED IN THE DISCUSSIONS
OF THE COUNCIL OF S T A T E ...... 46
External Causes ...... 46
Internal Causes ...... 50
IV. PROPOSALS OF POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS CONSIDERED
BY THE COUNCIL OF S T A T E ...... 56
Pacific Attempts to End the Rebellions Prior to
Recommendations by the Council of State ...... 56
Vazquez's Proposal to Re-establish the Ministry of the
Indies ...... 61
Amnesty and Pardon for the Rebels in America and for
the Liberals and Spanish Exiles ...... 64 vii
Appointment of Competent Americans and Spaniards to
Civil, Military, and Ecclesiastical Posts ...... 72
Freedom of Manufacture and Cultivation ...... 73
Military Reforms...... 75
An Attempt at Direct Negotiations with the Insurgents 77
V. EVOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL*S VIEWS TOWARD GRANTING THE
COLONIES FREE TRADE WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES ...... 84
The Question of Free Trade in the Council of the
Indies ...... 84
Discussions of the Council of State ...... 96
The Competing Factions ...... 103
The Progressives ...... 104
The Standpatters...... 106
VI. CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSALS TO SEEK EUROPEAN ASSISTANCE . 119
Relations with Continental Europe (1814-1817) .... 119
Hispanic-British Relations ...... 133
Mediation and the Pacification of America in the
Council of State ...... 154
Mediation by England Discussed ...... 155
Mediation by the Powers in Concert...... 158
Ambassadorial Conference at Paris ...... 160
Other negotiations and debates...... 167
Aix-la-Chapelle ...... 171 viii
VII. RECOURSE TO FORCE: CONSIDERATION OF PROBLEMS RELATED TO
THE USE OF MILITARY MEASURES...... 177
Spain’s Financial Straits ...... 177
Problems with the Armed Forces...... 186
VIII. CONSIDERATION OF SPAIN’S ALTERNATIVE TO SOUTH AMERICA'S
INDEPENDENCE: THE EXPEDITION TO THE RIO DE LA PLATA . 198
Hispanic-Portuguese Relations ...... 199
The R{o de la Plata in the SpanishPacification Scheme 214
Organizing the Expedition ...... 220
IX. CONCLUSION...... 234
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 239
APPENDIX ...... 250 INTRODUCTION
When Ferdinand VII returned to Spain in 1814, after six years of exile in Valencey, France, royalist hopes for a victory in
America were encouraging. The government controlled most of the provinces, and the rebels were in retreat.
Lima continued to be the bastion of regal authority in South
America, with the viceroy dispatching troops to subdue the rebels in
Quito, Cuzco, and other insurrectionary areas. In Chile, the patriots, their rsnks split by the struggle between Bernardo
O'Higgins on one side and the Carrera brothers on the other, had relinquished control to the royalists. By the end of 1814, Sim6n
Bolivar had been forced to abandon Venezuela for Jamaica. Only in the old Viceroyalty of La Plata did concerted resistance to Spanish authority appear to exist. But here, too, the insurgents were divided. Under the leadership of Jos£ Gaspar de Francia, Paraguay had declared her independence from both Spain and Buenos Aires.
The Banda Oriental, modern Uruguay, had not followed the lead of
Buenos Aires, but had remained loyal to Spain. Nevertheless, Jos£
Artigas, the gaucho leader, dominated the interior of the captaincy- general, and he fought against both the Spaniards and the Buenos
Aires* patriots. Moreover, in 1813, the portefio armv under General
Manuel Belgrano had been defeated in Upper Peru by the royalist forces commanded by General Joaqufn de la Pezuela, who in 1816 2 became the new Viceroy of Peru. Finally, in the Viceroyalty of New
Spain, effective resistance had ceased.
But tranquility was not restored in the colonies. Outside the urban centers, insurgents continued to harass government forces; and, even in the cities, the patriots had allies.
The Spanish government had been disheartened by the overall situation in the colonies. The officials had hoped that news of the forthcoming restoration of Ferdinand to the throne would mean an end to the rebellions, and that the empire would be reunited. In order to appraise Ferdinand of the state of affairs in Spain and America, the legislators sent two letters to their king, who was on his way to Valencia after leaving France. The note of April 25, 1814, which was signed by five officials of the Cortes, two of whom were
Americans, urged the king to come to Madrid as soon as possible to assume control of the government, and to take the prescribed oath to the recently promulgated Constitution, that "Magna Carta of civil liberty." The signers felt that the restoration and the implemen tation of the new charter, recognized by the various governments of Europe, would guarantee national prosperity and would mean the return to tranquility In America.
The king's return, continued the letter, would signify
"the dawn of peace for those unfortunate people," while the
Constitution would serve as "the bond that links all the parts of 3 this vast Empire." However, any delay, protested the legislators, would merely exacerbate the precarious situation in the colonies, which -were weakening their bonds with the metropolis and suffering needless bloodshed and damage.
Because Ferdinand did not deign to reply, they sent him a second letter, dated April 30, 1814, which restated ideas contained in the first. For example, it mentioned that only the king and the
Constitution could prevent the dismemberment of the empire and restore peace in the colonies.*
The time was propitious to restore harmonious relations with the colonists and to reunite the people in Spain. The legislators felt that a "return to normalcy" was now practicable with the twin props of the king and the Constitution.
^ r l o s Seco Serrano (ed.), Obras de D. Francisco Martfnez de la Rosa [8 vols. ; Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Espattoles (nos. 148-155), 1962J , I, xxxii-xxxiv; VII, 129-131, quoting letters. All translations are those of the author unless otherwise stated. CHAPTER I
THE RESTORATION OF FERDINAND VII AND THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE (1814-1820)
I. REASSERTION OF ABSOLUTE AUTHORITY
When Ferdinand first entered Spain, the constitutional government was uncertain about his reactions to the new charter.
They had not received any reply from the king concerning his future plans, or program for governing the nation. However, it soon became apparent that Ferdinand proposed to disregard the Constitution, which naturally would restrict the authority of a monarch*s divine right. The king was able to choose this course because the constitutional government and the people were divided over the political system. Even the deputies to the Cortes were not united in purpose over this point.
Slowly, but surely, Ferdinand began to sense that he could regain both the throne and his sovereign power. In and around the city of Valencia, on the Mediterranean coast, his supreme authority" was recognized. Near the town of Puzol, Cardinal Luis de Borb6n,
President of the Regency, kissed the king's hand, an act symbolic of deference to royal supremacy. In the Levantine capital, General
Javier Elfo, Captain-general of Valencia, pledged, in the name of his troops, to support Ferdinand; he promised to preserve the throne 5 with the plenitude of the rights with which the king had been endowed.*
With this support, the only obstacle to abolishing the proposed constitutional system appeared to be the deputies to the
Cortes in Madrid. They too were divided, however. In the elections of 1813 to the regular Cortes, the conservative elements had gained a majority. The yellow fever epidemic in CAdiz had served to discourage many of the elected conservative delegates from journeying south. Therefore, the representatives to the special Cortes, which had been convoked during the time of the French invasion and which had promulgated the Constitution, had replaced them. As long as the
Cortes remained in CAdiz, the liberal elements had been able to maintain their advantage. When the assembly moved to Madrid, where 2 the new delegates joined it, the situation became tense.
The schism became evident when sixty-nine conservative deputies signed the ’’Manifesto of the Persians," so named because of the initial paragraphs of the document. Bernardo Mozo y Rosales,
^-Manuel Izquierdo Hernandez, Antecedentes y. comlenzos del reinado de Fernando VII (Madrid: Ediciones Culture Hispaaica, 1963), pp. 726-734; and Maria del Carmen Pintos Vieites, La poliftlca de Fernando VII entre 1814 y. 1820 (Madrid: Rialp, 1958), pp. 70-78.
^Gabriel H. Lovett, Napoleon and the Birth of. Modern Spain (2 vols.; New York: New York University Press, 1965), II, 895n. 6 a conservative deputy, presented it to Ferdinand shortly after the king*s arrival in Valencia.
This declaration enumerated the violations of Spanish laws and customs by the Cortes of G&diz. The document pointed out, for example, that the composition of that assembly had been arbitrary, because delegates from both the insubordinate and loyal colonies were represented. Moreover, there had been a problem in the legis
lative assembly of seating the delegates; both the substitutes and
those duly elected from America sat together in the sessions, as well
as those deputies from the insurgent provinces.
Ferdinand was requested to abrogate the Constitution and to
disavow all the decrees of that illegal Cortes, which had usurped
his royal prerogatives and had exceeded its authority. On the other 3 hand, the signers, which included ten deputies from America,
proposed that the king summon a new assembly, which would be convoked
in accordance with the practice of earlier ones. Until the
meeting, they recommended that Ferdinand be guided in his policies
by laws and decrees which conformed with the time-honored unwritten
■*These were: Antonio Joaquin Plrez (Puebla), Angel Alonso y Pantiga (Yucatan), Jos& Cayetano de Foncerrada (Michoacan), Tadeo Garate (Puno), Pedro Garcia Coronel (Trujillo de Peru), Jose Gavino de Ortega y Salmoa (Trujillo de Peru), Mariano Rodriguez de Olmedo (Charcas), Salvador Samar£(n(New Spain), Francisco L6pez Lisperguer (Buenos Aires), and Bias Ostolaza (Peru). 7 constitution of the nation.^
If Ferdinand needed any encouragement to eradicate the reforms, the "Manifesto," coupled with the popular demonstrations in his honor, provided him with a justification. His spirit bolstered by this support, he felt secure enough to issue a decree in Valencia on May 4, 1814, which abrogated the Charter of 1812, and contained his promise to summon a new Cortes.
Herein, the king traced the history of events in Spain from his departure for France in 1808, until his return in 1814.
Referring to the political turmoil occasioned by his absence,
Ferdinand conceded that the avowed purpose of the special assembly at Cidiz had been to unite the nation against the invader; but, he maintained that this should not have impaired his sovereign rights.
The above notwithstanding, that assembly was illegal ioso facto
because it had been convoked contrary to established practice,
which was by Estates. The insubordination of the delegates had
been compounded by the publication of laws and decrees which had
tended to deprive the king of his legitimate authority. Ferdinand,
consequently, declared that he would neither obey the Constitution
nor the acts of that legislature. In a more positive vein, however,
he pledged to convoke a new Cortes with duly elected delegates from
^Servicio Historico Militar, Madrid, "Colecci6n documental del Fraile" (hereafter cited as Fraile Papers), Vol. 420, pp. 1-55. 8 both Spain and the colonies. The king promised to summon the assembly as soon as law and order had been restored in the empire.^
After the decree in Valencia, acts of repercussions against the liberals were forthcoming. In Madrid, Francisco Egufa, the military governor, arrested outspoken supporters of the Constitution, whose crime tended to be equated with that of lese majesty. The guilty included Spaniards as well as American representatives to
the Cortes of C4diz.® Some, however, were able to flee to England or France.^
Almost two years were to elapse before the prisoners were
brought to trial. During the interval, the Allied powers had
considered making protests to Spain on their behalf. Great Britain was especially active in their defense. Charles Vaughn, the British
charg£ d'affaires in Madrid, kept his government well informed on
the plight of the prisoners. He reported that Pedro Cevallos, the
Spanish First Secretary, had cautioned him against any outside
5Ibid.. Vol. 494, pp. 1-9.
®For example, the Spaniards included Agustln Argiielles, Josl Canaga Arguelles, Francisco Martinez de la Rosa, and Joaquin Lorenzo Villanueva; and, among the Americans, there were Jos£ Marla Gutierrez (New Spain), Ram6n Feltu (Peru), and Jos6 Miguel Ramos Arizpe (New Spain).
^Izquierdo Hernandez, oe^. cit.. pp. 767-771; Pintos Vieites, 2P.. cit.. pp. 166-179; Jos£ Luis Cornelias, Los orimeros pronuncla- mientos en Esoafla. 1814-1820 (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientlficas, 1958), pp. 59-65. 9 interference, no matter how justifiable. The consequences of any such remonstrances would tend to displease the king, who had been persuaded that, in the name of religion, the liberals must be punished. Any meddling, the First Secretary had continued, would merely confirm Ferdinand's suspicions that conspiracies against O his regime had spread to other countries.
While the Allies were contemplating their next move, Ferdinand had decided to deal with the problem of the prisoners. It turned out that the delay in their sentences had resulted from the reluc tance of three tribunals to pass judgment, as there were no specific laws under which to prosecute the accused. In order to expedite matters, the king demanded all records of the trials. But, according to Vaughn, he did not have sufficient time to read the voluminous proceedings. This led the charg£ to believe that the monarch wanted to destroy all the evidence. In the end, Ferdinand, himself, dispensed summary justice, which included banishment from Madrid and imprisonment.^
^Charles Vaughn to Lord Castlereagh, no, 15, September 15, 1815, Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office Records (hereafter cited as FO), 72/176; Vaughn to Castlereagh, Most Secret and Confidential, September 15, 1815, FO 72/176.
^Vaughn to Castlereagh, no. 63, December 18, 1815; no. 64, December 20, 1815, FO 72/177; Miguel Artola, Los oriaenes de 1& Esoafta contemoorfaiea (2 vols.; Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Politicos, 1959), I, 628; Pintos Vieites, sfiU filt.. PP. 174-178. 10
Neither the persecutions nor the vindictive measures drastically affected Ferdinand's popularity among the lower classes.
His arbitrary actions in his dealings with ministers, political prisoners, or other criminals did not excite their resentment.
Vaughn observed that, although some discontent appeared in the upper and middle classes and among the officers of the army about the king's whims and the conditions in the country, the people and common soldiers were apathetic.*'®
All classes in Spain expected, nevertheless, that the restoration would herald better times. Tired from the long struggle
against the French, they were optimistic about the future possi
bilities under their monarch, affectionally called El Deseado
(the Desired One), while in captivity in France.
II. ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT
Ferdinand's initial actions, for example, the dissolution of
the Cortes and the abrogation of the Constitution, might be passed
off as a natural response on his part. After six years in exile, he
had returned to discover his royal prerogatives in jeopardy. The
wave of arrests might have been mere manifestations of his desire to
reassert his authority. However, the people acquiesced, hoping the
^^Vaughn to Castlereagh, no. 31, Most Secret and Confidential, November 15, 1815; no, 43 duplicate, December 18, 1815, FO 72/177; no. 45, May 6, 1816, FO 72/186. 11 measures to be ephemeral.
The king, after the decree in Valencia, May 4, 1814, began to organize his government. He appointed ministers with portfolio: the Duke of San Carlos, Secretary of State; Pedro Macanaz, Secretary of Gracia y Justicia;^ Luis Salazar, who held two posts, Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of Finance; Manuel Freyre, Secretary of
War; and Miguel Lardlz4bal, Secretary of the Colonies (ultramar). which later became the Ministry of the Indies. As will later be seen, neither these nor subsequent appointees had prolonged service in government.
In the following months, the king re-established various advisory councils, for instance, War, Finance, Admiralty,
Inquisition, Royal, and the Indies. The latter was expected to examine developments in America; its members were to pay particular attention to the possible causes for the disorders and to make concrete proposals for ending them. Ferdinand believed that a determined effort on the part of this council would guarantee the unity of the empire and the prosperity of the colonies. 12
By the end of 1814, most of the advisory agencies of the government were in operation. However, the king delayed summoning
**There is no English equivalent for this office. Hereafter it will be cited in the Spanish. 1 2 Fermfn Martin de Balmaseda, Deeretos del Rev Don Fernando VII (hereafter cited as Deeretos) (6 vols. and Appendix; Madrid: Imprenta Real, 1816-1819), I, 107-109. 12 his principal one, the Council of State, until March of the following year,
III. RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE
In the royal decree of March 31, 1815, Ferdinand stated that the Council of State would discuss urgent problems confronting the government. After the counsellors had deliberated and presented their views to him, continued the decree, the king expected to be able to adopt the proper course of action, Ferdinand hoped to resolve these problems, thereby bringing peace, security, and prosperity to the empire. 13
The Ordinance of 1792, enacted by Charles IV, established the procedural rules for the Council of State. It provided that all secretaries were to belong to this advisory group, and that the king would select the other members. The debates in the Council of
State would generally center around an expediente.^ The person presenting the topic for discussion, at the suggestion of the king, would have only a voto consultivo. or an advisory opinion. He had to answer any questions raised by his colleagues. His vote could not be
13Ibid.II, 199-200. 14 As used in this study, an exoedlente will refer to a file of records (a brief) bearing on a particular subject, whether it be the pacification of America, problems related to the economy, naval matters, or the like. 13 counted, however, in the final tally, in which the other members had an equal voice. Only by achieving a substantial majority 15 (gran mavorfa) would the minister be able to pursue his program.
Ferdinand stated, in addition, in his decree of March, 1815, that the Council was to meet weekly, but for urgent matters, special sessions would be summoned. In order to enhance the prestige of the Council, the decree provided that the Infantes, the king’s brother, Don Carlos, and his uncle, Don Antonio, could attend the 16 meetings. In Ferdinand's absence, one of them was to preside.
To further increase the importance of the Council of State, especially its position in relation to the other advisory bodies,
the king promulgated two decrees. The first one, of August 20, 1815, provided that a counsellor of state must outrank all members or preside over, jointly with its president, any council, corporation,
or tribunal which he attended.^
The second decree, issued December 10, 1815, stressed the pre-eminent role of the Council of State in foreign affairs.
Ferdinand stated that precipitate actions by officials had proven
detrimental to the nation. He pointed out that their lack of
*^Jos6 Marfa Cordero Torres, £1. Conseio de Estado (Madrid: Institute de Estudios Politicos, 1944), p.229, citing Realamanto of 1792.
16Pecretos. II, 199-200.
17Ibid.. pp. 577-578. 14 circumspection had resulted in the transfer of Louisiana to France, the opening of Mexico to foreign intruders, and the deposition of the Bourbon dynasty in Parma, These disasters could have been averted, the king insisted, if the ministers responsible had been obligated to consult with the Council of State. In order to avoid
further blunders by officials, he ordered that henceforward, all ministers had to confer with the Council of State before making 18 any treaty or other king of arrangement with another government.
From the above discussion it would appear that in its
legal aspect the supremacy of the Council of State was recognized.
Contemporaries of that period had varied opinions of its effec-
tiveness as a policy-recommending body, however. For example,
Jos£ Pizarro, who had replaced Pedro Cevallos as First Secretary,
wrote in his memoires about his views on the significance of that
advisory council. He felt that their suggestions and deliberations
on urgent matters could be beneficial to a minister. However, he
did have ulterior motives for consulting with the Council. In
addition to benefitting from the discussions, Pizarro wrote that
he intended "to shelter from danger his own responsibility."
These dual objectives outweighed any inconveniences involved in
conferring with the Council of State, one of which, as has been
*®Archivo Historic© Nacional, Madrid, Seccifin Estado (hereafter cited as AHN, Estado), leg. 883. 15
i q seen, was the need for a substantial majority to pursue a program.
Other factors, moreover, tended to obstruct effective action by the counsellors. One was the heterogeneous composition of the
Council of State. Membership, as mentioned earlier, was not limited to ministers with portfolio. Some places were reserved for discharged officials. Other places were reserved for people selected by the king, for example, personal friends; presidents of the various councils, corporations, and tribunals; or whomever he wanted. This policy fostered the feeling among some counsellors that the title of counsellor of state was an honorific one and the position a sinecure. In the ministerial shake-up in January, 1816, for instance,
Luis Salazar lost his position as Secretary of the Navy, Iom£s
Moyano his as Secretary of Gracia y Justlcia, and, for twenty-four hours, Juan Esteban Lozano de Torres held the post of Secretary of
State. The king, however, designated both Moyano and Salazar
"counsellors of state without attendance." When Ferdinand reinstated
Pedro Cevallos as the First Secretary, he granted Lozano the
l^Alvaro Alonso Castrillo (ed.), Memories de Josl Garcia da Leon y. Pizarro. 1770-1835 (hereafter cited as Memories da Pizarro) (2 vols.; Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1953), I, 249, 265. The language used by Pizarro was "asegurar mi propia responsibilidad." I should like to mention that according to usual Spanish practice, his appellation should be Garcfa or Garcfa de Le6n. However, his contemporaries called him Pizarro^and he signed official documents as "Jose Pizarro." 16
20 privilege of being a counsellor of state with full rights. In
December, 1816, Martfn Garay accepted the office of Secretary of
Finance only after he had been promised a "plaza efectiva" (a "per- O 1 roanent seat") on the Council of State.
Discharged officials did not automatically lose the right to participate in discussions. For example, JosA Ibarra and Manuel
LApez Araujo, both former Secretaries of Finance, retained their membership and attended the sessions. This privilege granted
L6pezAraujo prompted JosA VAzquez Figueroa, the Secretary of the
Navy, to use the expression "apetecida plaza" ("coveted office") to describe membership on the Council of State. 22
The aforementioned attitudes of the counsellors of state and the question of the effectiveness of the Council of State
itself were reflected in the correspondence of foreign diplomats
at Madrid, as well. George Erving, the United States' ambassador,
commented in February, 1818, on the inactivity and the myopic
policies of its members. The counsellors were still discussing
the possibility of foreign mediation by the Allied powers in the
^®AHN, Estado, leg. 181; Museo Naval, Madrid, "Meraorias inAditas de JosA VAzquez Figueroa" (hereafter cited as VAzquez Papers), MSS, 432, fols. 11-14.
^ Memorias de Pizarro. I, 211-212; VAzquez Papers, MSS, 432, fols. 20-24.
^VAzquez Papers, MSS, 432, fol. 27. 17
Spanish scheme for the pacification of America. He wrote:
The members of this council for the most part inveterate in the prejudices of former time, are wholly unfit for the direction of state affairs today. There are amongst them those who by system, in the absence of all ^3 patriotism, oppose every ministerial plan however salutary.
In a similar vein, the British ambassador, Sir Henry Wellesley, had written two months earlier to Lord Castlereagh. Wellesley had expressed regrets that Pizarro would not have the final decision on the matter of a scheme to adopt for the pacification of the colonies.
If he did, it would have "remove [d) many of the difficulties in which the affair was now involved owing to the interference of the
Council of State.
The king, himself, was not oblivious to disparaging remarks about his principal advisory council. He received an anonymous and undated memorandum on the subject of governmental reorganization, which is preserved in the archives of the Royal Palace in Madrid.
Among other topics discussed, the author criticized the lack of a qualified council to advise the king on matters of policy. He disapproved of the Council of State because of its inactivity and
23Williara R. Manning (ed.), Diplomatic Correspondence a£. ttis. United States concerning the Independence of ti& L&tin. AwerlSffl Nations (3 vols.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1925), III, 1961.
2^Charles K. Webster (ed.), Britain and. EhS. Independence of l*tin America. 1812-1830: Select D
Notwithstanding the adverse criticism and the feelings in official circles, Ferdinand continued to consult with the Council of
State. He had ordered the counsellors to discuss affairs of paramount importance to the nation, and he continued to attend these sessions.^
With the organs of government in operation, Ferdinand could devote time to existing problems. His immediate advisers and counsellors hoped and expected that their recommendations would be adopted, or at least given careful consideration by the king; but, another factor tended to undermine the optimistic outlook of officials and counsellors. This was the role of an extra-legal governmental body, the camarilla, which influenced affairs of state. As will be seen throughout this study, some members of this "privy council"
^Archivo General de Palacio, Madrid, "Papeles reservados de Fernando VII" (hereafter cited as AGP, PR/), 31, vol. 16, fols. 475- 493. 26 Jos6 Ibarra to Minister of Gracia y Justicia, December 27, 1815, Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Secci6n Indiferente General (hereafter cited as AGI, Ind. Gral.), leg. 1356. 19 were also counsellors of state.
IV. PURPORTED ROLE OF THE CAMARILLA
IN AFFAIRS OF STATE
It is not uncommon for individuals or factions to try to
curry favor with a ruler and to attempt to influence his decisions.
The king's cabinet was cognizant of the external pressure. As we
have seen, Pedro Cevallos had told Charles Vaughn that the king
was surrounded by persons who were suspicious of the monarch’s
feelings toward the liberals; and these "advisers" had succeeded
in convincing him that in the interests of religion, the accused must
be punished. Cevallos had confided to the chargi, that by a con
tinuous system of secret denunciations, these men had so worked
on the king's fears there was little hope of the persecutions 27 ceasing. Even Pizarro and Vazquez considered Ferdinand a pawn in
the hands of unscrupulous men, who tended to disregard the interests 28 of the country for the sake of personal gain.
Government officials and foreign diplomats pointed to the
activities of the camarilla in policy formulation and recommendation.
The "privy council" was purported to include: Dmitri Tatistcheff,
“^Vaughn to Castlereagh, Most Secret and Confidential, Septmeber 15, 1815, FO 72/176.
^ Memories de Pizarro. I, 211; V£zquez Papers, MSS, 432, fols. 27-31. 20 the Russian ambassador; Antonio Ugarte, a porter, but later a fairly successful businessman; the Duke of Infantado, President of the
Royal Council; the Duke of Alag6n, Captain of the Royal Guards;
Pedro Collado, a former water carrier in the province of Colmenar
Viejo; Artieda, the king’s personal servant; Francisco Egufa;
Juan Esteban Lozano de Torres; Guillermo Hualde, the king's confessor, and others. They played conspicuous roles in the frequent minis terial shifts between 1814 and 1820, and influenced the king’s final decision of important matters. Their machinations, contended
Pizarro and Vazquez, often prevented effective action by the govem- 29 ment and tended to stifle any initiative by officials.
The king demonstrated a lack of confidence in his appointees in a number of ways. First, he joined the Holy Alliance in May, 30 1816, without conferring with his Secretary of State. Second,
Ferdinand abolished the Ministry of the Indies without consulting 31 either with the Council of State or any minister. Third, arrange ments for the marriage of Ferdinand and his brother, Don Carlos, with
^^Vlzquez Papers, MSS, 432, fols. 4, 27-31; Memorias de Pizarro. I, 204-205, 211-212, 219, 241, 259-260, 269-286; Cornelias, op.cit.T pp. 39-41; Pintos Vieites, op.cit.. pp. 156-162.
^Memorias de Pizarro. I, 227-228; Carmen LI or ca Vilaplana, "Relaciones diplom^ticas entre Espafia y Rusia desde 1812 hasta 1820," Hlspania. XLX (Madrid, 1950), 736-738.
■**Vaughn to Castlereagh, no. 20, September 24, 1815, FO 72/177. 21 the Portuguese princesses were made without the knowledge of the
Secretary of State, Pedro Cevallos, whose opposition to the
•JO alliances was a contributing factor to his dismissal from office. L
Another instance was that of the negotiations in 1817 with Russia.
The Russian squadron was purchased without referral of the matter to either the Ministers of State, Finance, or Navy.^^
The king's apparent disregard for ministers served to under mine the government. The deleterious effects of the system resulted in vacillation by those in office. Moreover, many qualified candidates refused to accept official appointments out of fear of exposing themselves to public disgrace.^ Some ministers confessed a feeling of despondency about the situation at Court. Martin
Garay told a friend of Wellesley that,
when a measure was proposed by a Minister, it was either dismissed with a harsh negative, or else reserved for the determination of the Camarilla, against the Intrigues Jsicj of which no Minister was secure for a moment.
■^Vfizquez Papers, MSS, 432, fols. 17-19; Memories de Pizarro. I, 219-220; Vaughn to Castlereagh, No. 117, November 12, 1816, FO 72/188.
^ Memorlas de Pizarro. I, 270-272; II, 285-292, citing Vizquez's memoires; Seco Serrano, op. clt.. VII, 350n-351n.
■*^V£zquez Papers, MSS, 432, fols. 30-31; Vaughn to Castlereagh, no. 1, January 27, 1816, FO 72/185.
^Wellesley to Castlereagh, Private and Confidential, May 9, 1817, FO 72/198. 22
Diplomats took advantage of these cabals to communicate with Ferdinand through nonofficial channels. Vaughn complained repeatedly about the activities and influence of Dmitri Tatistcheff, which led Castlereagh to caution his envoy against relying too heavily on opinions expressed privately to the king of Spain by the 36 Russian but not announced publicly by the Czar.
British envoys, nevertheless, employed similar techniques to influence the king in favor of England. Vaughn, for Instance, sent Ferdinand a memorandum on the advantages of strengthening
Anglo-Spanish relations; it was given to the king by a childhood friend, someone in constant attendance. The paper urged Ferdinand to adopt those proposals which would serve to counteract anti-Spanish propaganda in England, Including such measures as abolition of the slave trade, leniency toward opponents of the regime, and broader 37 trading privileges for English merchants.
Vaughn also broached the problem of the rebellious colonies in this document. He insisted that Spain needed England's assistance to end the disturbances in America. By cooperating with
Great Britain, the foremost maritime power, Ferdinand would guarantee
^Castlereagh to Vaughn, draft of dispatch, Most Secret and Confidential, December 20, 1815, FO 72/177.
^Vaughn to Castlereagh, Most Secret and Confidential, November 15, 1815, enclosure, "Memorandum upon the Alliance of Spain and England," FO 72/177. 23 rather than compromise control over his possessions. As an example of this need for an alliance, the memorandum pointed to the proximity of the colonies to the United States and the known territorial ambitions of that government. Contrary to the opinions expressed by Tatistcheff, Vaughn further stated that his government had no designs on the Spanish dominions.
The major bone of contention, argued the envoy, between
Spain and England centered around the introduction of British manufactures into both Spain and the colonies. Conceding a share in the American trade, and, naturally, broader concessions in Spain also, would serve as an incentive for Britain to support Spanish policy in America. Otherwise, the charg£ stated that England would not assist and Ferdinand could not expect to retain control of those colonies, which wouird continue to resent the present trade monopoly exercised by the metropolis. Therefore, Vaughn felt that the benefits which would accrue to Spain from this alliance would over ride any disadvantages, as Britain would assist against foreign 38 aggression both at home and abroad.
In another question of importance to England, one which
Vaughn had mentioned in his memorial to the king--the abolition of the slave trade--the envoy also used Indirect channels to present his case. He attempted to gain support for Britain*s position
“IMS. 24 from both the Duke of Alag6n and the Duke of Infantado, who were expected to pressure Ferdinand. Also through a circuitous route, the envoy was able to communicate with other officials on the same subject, namely Jos£ Ibarra, Don Antonio, the king's 39 uncle, and the Secretaries of both the Navy and Finance.
This was not the last time that attempts were made to in fluence the king's decisions. The reluctance of many ministers to take any step or make a recommendation might be traced to a fear of having it frustrated by the "privy counsellors." Thus, although the king had re-established his principal advisory council, these anxieties persisted. The irregular course of the exoediente on the pacification of America in the Council of State, as will be discussed in the next chapter, reflected this indecisiveness as well as the divisions in government.
^Vaughn to Castlereagh, no. 86, September 5, 1816, FO 72/187 CHAPTER II
CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPEDIENTE ON THE PACIFICATION OF
AMERICA IN THE COUNCIL OF STATE (1816-1818)
Ferdinand's restoration to the throne in 1814 did not in
Itself placate the rebels in America, although it held out that possibility. As noted earlier, the situation in the colonies was not too disadvantageous for Spain. Royal authority, to a greater or lesser extent, had been restored in most of the regions, with only the River Plate area still in open revolt. When the Council of State began to consider the question of the rebellions, chances were good that peace and tranquility would be restored.
Nevertheless, the government soon realized that specific measures for recurring problems would prove ineffectual. There was a need, not only to centralize responsibility for reforms, but also to enact a more comprehensive program to pacify the colonies.
In September, 1816, the king ordered Pedro Cevallos to supervise the formulation of a program for the pacification of
America. Cevallos was then also interim Secretary of Gracia y
Justicia.* Ferdinand made the decision because he felt that priority should be given to those measures which came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Gracia y Justicia. This department
^Cevallos to the Duke of Montemar, September 14, 1816, AGI, Ind. Gral., leg. 13S6. 26 supervised the selection of magistrates and handled any problem of reform in governmental administration both in Spain and in the O colonies.
Nonetheless, the king's attempt to centralize responsibility
for dealing with the rebels in America failed, as evidenced by what happened in the following year. In November, 1817, Ferdinand ordered the Secretary of State to serve as co-ordinator for all 3 matters related to the problem of the pacification of America. Even this resolution had come after an unsuccessful attempt earlier that 4 year to have a special committee take charge of this question.
The reorientation of Ferdinand's policy from 1816 to 1817 had ensued from an urgent need for a comprehensive program for the
colonies. By 1817, the government had come to recognize that the
colonists would not be contented with administrative reforms alone, which had come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Gracia y
Justicia. Now the king was persuaded to accept the idea of mediation by the Allies in order to pacify America. After receiving the
recommendations of the Council of State, Ferdinand realized that
^Decretos. II, 731.
•^Consulta of the Council of the Indies, May 17, 1816, AGI, Seccifin Estado (hereafter cited as AGI, Estado), leg. 88.
^Jaime Delgado, "La pacificacl6n de America en 1818," Miscelanea Americanists. I (Madrid: Conseja Superior de Invest!- gaciones Cientfficas, 1951), 307. 27 such a step would be useless if the other ministries acted without referral to the Secretary of State; it was to be his duty to prepare a comprehensive program for the colonies.^
The Secretary of State, Jos4 Pizarro, had realized as much, nine months before the king had made his decision. He believed that only by means of a comprehensive program would the government be able to pacify America. The records of the Council of State indicate that the counsellors, too, had seen the futility of a desultory policy. They had heard reports about specific problems confronting the different ministries. The counsellors discerned that these dealt with particular regions, for example, reinforce ments to General Pablo Morillo, additional troops for General
Joaquin de la Pezuela, the appointment of Juan Rufz de Apodaca as
Viceroy of New Spain, and similar measures. They had learned, moreover, of the government's unsuccessful attempt in the Banda
Oriental to win over the rebel Jose Artigas, without whose support
Spain, it was believed, would not be able to pacify the Plate area.^
Taking these problems into account, Pizarro, in February,
1817, had informed the counsellors of state of his inclusive plan
^Pizarro to Minister of Finance, November 29, 1817, AGI, Estado, leg. 86.
^AHN, Estado, libro 14d., session, April 3, 1815; lib. 16d, session, March 20, 1816; lib. 21d, session, April 28, 1818. Each of these subjects will be treated in depth in subsequent chapters. 28 for the pacification of the Americas. The expedlente incorporated the recommendations by counsellors, ministers, and government officials. It reached the Council of State three months after
Pizarro1s appointment.^ The Secretary of State had labored painstakingly to collect these different reports. Fears of machin ations by the camarilla seem to be the reason that Pizarro had deferred presentation of his expedients until February. This explanation is substantiated by the fact that after his appointment, the king had informed the Secretary that he had been accused of g being an American sympathizer.
Pizarro had, in fact, been in the colonies from age seven to sixteen, but, if this underserved stigma of Americanist delayed presentation of the exoediente. the First Secretary did not alter his views on the state of affairs in America. He mentioned in his memoires that he felt the colonies had begun to slip from Spain’s control since 1809 and the inflammatory proclamations of the Junta
Central. Shortly thereafter, the Regency had made similar declara tions about the rights and duties of the colonists. After these, the Cortes of Cidiz had demanded that the Americans recognize its authority. By 1817, Pizarro had come to feel that Spain ought to
7 AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, session, February 19, 1S17.
^Memories de Pizarro. I, 262-263; VAzquez Papers, MSS, 432, fols. 64-65. 29
9 salvage what she might from the possibility of their independence.
In spite of what may have been interpreted as his initial reluctance to announce a program. Pizarro seems merely to have waited for the opportune moment to present his recommendations.
The propitious time arrived after the First Secretary received in
February, 1817, the consulta on the pacification of America, which had been prepared by a special committee of the Council of the
Indies. The committee recommended that the government should revise the existing trade regulations and be prepared to grant England mercantile concessions in return for mediating the dispute. More over, the king must correct existing malpractices in colonial administration, appoint competent officials, punish malfeasance, and adopt other measures to retain the loyalty of his subjects. At all times, continued the consulta. the government should Institute 10 the necessary reforms and not merely promise to do so.
With this report in hand and to avoid ambiguity, Pizarro’s expedlente had to be both detailed and somewhat repetitious. A brief statement might conceal the opinions of those instrumental in the final form of the expedlente. Consequently, the First Secretary urged that the full text be distributed to the counsellors.
Fallowing their examination, he suggested that time should be
^Memories de Pizarro. I, 262-263.
^Consulta of Nine Members of the Council of the Indies, February 8, 1817, AGI. Estado, leg. 88. 30 allotted in the Council of State for its consideration.^
Despite Pizarro*s reluctance to distribute an abridged version of his own report, he did circulate two important abstracts.
One was a summary of those recommendations made by various special commissions on the question of the pacification America. Three days after the Pizarro expedlente. the Secretary of the Navy received a resuml of the Council of the Indies' consulta of February 8, 1817.
This one included, in addition to that report, abstracts of memorials presented by Juan Antonio Yandiola, Martfn Garay, and the Count of
Casa Flores. It incorporated, moreover, those suggestions contained in earlier consultas of the Council of the Indies on the means to pacify the colonies. 12 The second was an undated synopsis of Anglo-
Spanish negotiations between 1810 and 1816 on the subject of British 13 mediation in the dispute between Spain and the colonies.
**AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, session, February 19, 1817.
12"Extracto de la Consulta hecha en 8 de corrte por las Juntas creadas de o m de V.M. y reunidas por R* resolucion de 26 de octubre; del acuerdo de la primitiva que en 22 del mismo pas6 el Duque Presidente al Ministro de Estado; de las observaciones y problemas que este propuso a la Junta Gen* , y de los papeles presentado por su orn por D. Juan Antonio Yandiola, Conde de Casa Flores y D. Martin Garay," February 22, 1817, VSzquez Papers, MSS, 442, fols. 57-70.
^"Extracto historico y razonado de la negociacion seguida entre los Gobiernos Espafiol 4 Ingl4s acerca de la mediacion ofrecida pr este para paciflcar las provindiaa insurreccionadas en las Americas Espafiolas (1810-1816),"V4zquez Papers, MSS, 442, fols.27-53. 31
Notwithstanding these aids to the counsellors, the expedlente
fared poorly in the succeeding months. It floated from member to member. Lacking authorization or guidelines from the Council of
State, Pizarro was reluctant to pursue the formulation of an indepen- 14 dent policy toward the colonies. The delay merely frustrated any
Spanish attempt to resolve the problem of the rebellious colonies
without outside interference.*^
Meanwhile, the state of affairs in America worsened for
Spain. By late 1816 and early 1817, the rebels in Venezuela were in
a strong position and the royalist forces were on the defensive.
Also in 1817, Josi de San Martin crossed the Andes and conquered
Chile, thereby increasing the danger of an attack against Peru.
Months passed and the expediente continued to circulate but
not be discussed in the Council of State. As will be shown later,
the counsellors did discuss such important matters as the abolition
of the slave trade and the dispute with the United Stares over a
boundary settlement in North America. Yet, even consideration of
these questions had been prolonged, despite Pizarro*s Insistence of
their relevance to the problem of the pacification of America.
*^AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, session, October 15, 1817; lib. 21d, session, May 6, 1818.
^Pizarro to Secretary of the Navy, n.d., Archlvo Bazin (Archivo General de Marina), El Viso, (hereafter cited as AB), carpeta, 1910. 32
Prior to formal consideration of Pizarro’s recommendations in the Council of State, however. Great Britain, in August, 1817, sent a memorandum to the great powers on the subject of Allied intervention in the dispute between Spain and the colonies. In this
Cabinet Memorandum, Lord Castlereagh, the British Foreign Secretary, announced confidentially to his allies the policy which he had repeatedly stated to Spain. He confided that England was prepared to undertake mediation on behalf of those powers under certain conditions: (1) that Spain sign a treaty abolishing the slave trade;
(2) that Madrid offer the rebels a general amnesty and arrange an armistice; (3) that Ferdinand promise to provide equal opportunity for criollos in government service; (4) that there should be a relaxation and liberalization of trading restrictions with America, which would still permit Spain to enjoy a trade preference over the other nations; and, (5) that the mediation should not involve the actual or implied use of force by the Allies.^
This move by Britain caused Spain to lose the initiative in her endeavor to have the Allies intervene, supporting Madrid’s position in the dispute with the colonies.^ Whereas the Courts of
St. Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, and Paris received official notifi cation in August, 1817, Madrid did not receive it until September,
^Webster, oj>, cit. ,, II, 352-358.
^This question will be treated in detail in Chapter VI. 33
1 Q when she signed a Slave Trade treaty with England, and by which time discussions in the Council of State were well advanced on the
American problem.
The British memorandum should not have caught the Spanish government off guard. Joaqufn Francisco Campuzano, the Spanish charg£ in London, had advised Pizarro of Castlereagh*s Intention to transmit to the Allies a note outlining the British basis for 19 mediation. In an attempt to forestall the British communique to the Allies, Pizarro condensed his original expedlente into twenty-two points and presented it to the king on August 22, 1817.
By this time, he had knowledge of the Czar*s views on the course of action for Spain to pursue in America, and Spain continued to hope that Russia would counterbalance England's preponderant role in international affairs. 20
The memorial of the First Secretary began by stating that
Spain's inability to take decisive steps had been one of the drawbacks in the formulation of a policy for America. He acknowledged the importance of careful reflection on the problem of the rebellion but warned against prolonged discussion, which would tend to reduce the alternatives open to Spain. Between 1810 and 1816, he said,
^Wellesley to Castlereagh, no. 120, Secret and Confidential, September 24, 1817, FO 72/200.
*-Delgado, oj>, clt.. pp. 302-303.
^®See Chapter VI for further discussion of this point. 34 ministers, special juntas, and government officials had not analyzed the problem in its proper perspective, that of the pacification of
America. Pizarro agreed that there should be specific measures for each area, as conditions varied. However, he pointed out that political and economic reforms had to be accompanied by an increased military involvement in the colonies, and if Spain could not muster at least 8,000 to 10,000 men to send to America, she would have to resort to foreign mediation.
The First Secretary insisted on the need for a comprehensive program for the pacification of America. In order to guarantee its success, the measures proposed had to be accompanied by an active and honest administration in the colonies. Pizarro concluded by stating what he considered to be the alternatives open to Spain with regard to the future of the colonies: (1) that of retaining them intact; (2) that of keeping part of them; and, (3) that of retaining a favored position if total separation resulted. 21
Nevertheless, neither the urgency of the subject nor the threat of forthcoming pronouncement by Great Britain prevented
Ferdinand's deferring discussion of the matter. The question of the
"Otra raemoria del Ministro de Estado. 0° JosA Pizarro sobre la pacificacion de las Americas, reducida a veinte y dos puntos sencillos, leida por el mismo al Rey, y luego en el Consejo de Estado, donde fu£ votada y que motivo al fin la resolucion para que se hiciese la expedicion al Rio de la Plata o al Virreinato de Buenos Aires," August 22, 1817, VAzquez Papers, MSS, 435, fols. 341-349. 35 pacification of America did not come before the Council of State until September 10, 1817.22
One can only speculate as to why there should have been any delay from February, 1817, until August, 1817, and thence to Sep tember. Memorials of individual counsellors Indicated that discus sions in the Council of State should have preceded the British memorandum. For instance, the Secretary of the Navy presented his views on the pacification of America in the session of 23 September 24, 1817, but his report had been prepared in June, 1817.
Also, in July, 1817, Pizarro had complained to the Secretary of
Gracia y Justicia that for five months his exoediente had been circulating among the counsellors, but had not been discussed in the Council. The First Secretary had mentioned to Lozano, in addition, that this delay limited the options open to Spain for the pacification of America and also hindered arriving at a suitable arrangement with the United States over the territorial controversy in North America.2^ Pizarro*s arguments stimulated the Secretary of
Gracia y Justicia to draft his memorial in July, but he did not read
22AHN, Estado, leg. 182; lib. 20d, session, September 10, 1817. 23 "Mi dictamen acerca de los medios que deban adoptarse para la pacificacion de las Americas," June 11, 1817, Vizquez Papers, MSS, 433, fols. 295-320.
24pizarro to Minister of Gracia y Justicia, minute, July 27, 1817, AGI, Estado, leg. 86. 25 it in the Council of State until September 17, 1817,
Possibly the king, himself, was to blame for the delay, although Pizarro had affirmed Ferdinand's concern about the o £ expedlente. The monarch had already demonstrated a lack of responsibility in the dispatch of his duties. For instance, when
England and Spain were negotiating a treaty to abolish the slave trade, Vaughn reported that because Ferdinand was on vacation, the
Council of State would not discuss the latest British proposals until the king returned to Madrid, which would not be for some weeks.^
Another possible explanation for the delay casts blame on neither the king nor his ministers, while allowing one to assume that they were anxious to resolve the matter of the pacification of
America. The domestic scene did not permit a practicable solution to the problem. First, the government faced financial difficulties these, as will be examined in another chapter, were to prove insurmountable because the government was bankrupt and could not borrow money abroad. Second, Ferdinand was concerned about the dispute over the Portuguese invasion of the Banda Oriental, which
^Lozano on the Pacification of America, July, n.d., 1817, AGI, Estado, leg. 88; AHN, lib. 20d, session, September 17, 1817.
^Pizarro to Minister of Gracia y Justicia, minute, July 27, 1817, AGI, Estado, leg. 86.
^Vaughn to Castlereagh, no. 61, July 23, 1816, FO 72/186, 37 he had requested the Allies to mediate, even though he continued to contemplate an attack on Portugal. Third, in the year 1817, there were more attempts than in the preceding three years to undermine the regime of Ferdinand VII, These military mutinies were suppressed, but discontent persisted, and the armed forces became a questionable factor in support of government schemes. One of these uprisings had resulted in the ouster of the Secretary of War. 28
The reasons behind the delay, notwithstanding, Pizarro, after presenting his twenty-two point memorandum to the king and in the
Council of State on September 10, 1817, faced rough sailing.
Prolonged deliberation and factional strife within the Council prevented the First Secretary from gaining support for his program.
In general, the counsellors* expositions on the exoediente had not taken into account the ominous overtones of the question, which could be the disintegration of the empire, Pizarro attempted to avoid digressions by the counsellors, frequently interrupting the 29 debates with exclamations of "point of order." As will be analyzed in Chapter Five, the controversy over the extent of free trade to be permitted between the colonies and other nations became the major obstacle to Pizarro's pacification program.
28Comellas, SSL. cit.. pp. 209-288; Memories de Pizarro. I, 217; Wellesley to Castlereagh, no. 82, June 26, 1817, FO 72/198; VAzquez Papers, MSS, 432, fols. 56-62.
29Memorias de Pizarro. I, 263-264; AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, session, October 1, 1817. 38
Weeks passed before Pizarro received any guidelines. Mean while, the First Secretary had informed Wellesley that he had argued in the Council of State of the need to permit the Allied powers to mediate the dispute. In addition, he had elaborated on those concessions which he considered necessary for adoption by
Spain to achieve a reconciliation with the colonies. Some counsellors, complained the First Secretary to the ambassador, had disapproved of foreign mediation, particularly by England, while others had protested against lifting the existing trade restrictions.
A few, moreover, had objected to a general amnesty for the insurgents, alleging the danger involved in granting a pardon to leaders of the rebellion. in Their irresolution so exasperated Pizarro that he some- 31 times regretted his conscientious consultation with the Council.
Friction among the counsellors had prevented their giving the First Secretary specific recommendations. To try and smooth over these differences and to facilitate discussion of what measures to adopt, the counsellors had voted to form a commission. Despite
Pizarro*s pleas of urgency, th# tilted to reach an immediate decision, and the fact that the majority of the counsellors had been prepared to vote on the proposals by the Secretary of State, it was decided to have an a£ hoc committee study the matter further. Its members
3®Wellesley to Castlereagh, no. 131, October 23, 1817; no. 137, November 7, 1817, FO 72/200.
^Memories de Pizarro. I, 265-266. 39 were to arrange systematically the suggestions made by the counsellors in response to Pizarro’s expedlente.
The counsellors had differed, however, on the nature and function of such a commission. The Duke of Veragua, for example, felt that it should be the Junt* of Pacification; this was a committee of a number of counsellors from the Council of the Indies which was subject to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of State and which had been organized for the expressed purpose of dealing with the question of the pacification of America. Pizarro, for his part, had wanted the commission to adjust details for the execution of those propo sitions agreed to by the counsellors of state. Others felt that such a commission would merely facilitate a vote on the proposals of the various counsellors. 32
In their initial attempt to systematize those proposals, the committee, composed of Guillermo Hualde, the Duke of Parque, and Jos6 Ibarra, had surpassed the twenty-two points of Pizarro. At one meeting, the members redacted more than thirty measures from the various memorials which had been presented. Nevertheless, by diligent work, this number was reduced to ten: six classified as direct pacific measures, including amnesty and pardon for the rebels, appointment of criolios to official positions, measures dealing with
^AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, sessions, September 24; October 1; October 8, 1817.
^AHN, Estado, leg. 182. 40 freedom of cultivation and manufacture, some form of mercantile concessions, the use of envoys (comlslonados) to undertake special missions for the king, and an appeal to the Pope to co-operate in the pacification of the colonies; three considered as steps requiring the use of force, such as dispatching an expedition to Buenos Aires and to any other area as turbulent as the Plate region, sending troops to partially insurrectionary areas so as to aid Spanish authorities, and arming ships to protect commerce as well as the coasts against the insurgents; and one classified as an indirect measure, that of pursuing negotiations in order to get foreigners *%/ to co-operate in the pacification of the colonies.
Since eight of these measures will be discussed later in the text under appropriate headings, only two will be considered separately here. These came under the commission's classification of direct pacific action by the government. One, first proposed by the Secretary of Finance, Martfn Garay, concerned the use of special commissioners to meet with the rebel leaders. According to Garay, these plenipotentiaries should conclude satisfactory agreements with the rebels on those problems affecting their role as loyal subjects; for instance, pardons, appointment of Americans to office, freedom to cultivate and manufacture as they desire, guarantees that the residencia would be an effective control on colonial officials, and others. He had hoped that such a procedure would permit a
3&AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, session, October 15, 1817. 41 solution of existing differences and bring about a reconciliation with Spain. Even if they failed in their appointed tasks, the government could call to the attention of the Allies this attempt to settle the conflict peaceably, and then possibly expect foreign support for alternative action. 35
However, the counsellors, in their final vote on the question, felt that the risks were too great. Even if competent men were selected to serve in this capacity, there would be a conflict between the comisionados and the Crown functionaries. If the govern ment, moreover, considered their administrators incompetent, then these should be replaced. Influenced by these misgivings, the 36 counsellors defeated the proposal for special envoys.
The rejection of this proposal, as subsequent events would show, did not mean that the Spanish government in their dealings with the rebels would make no use of Intermediaries. For example, the government later approached Sir C. K. Roche, an Englishman who had fought in the Peninsular campaigns and had spent some time in
South America, to serve as a civil agent. Roche requested permission
from his government to undertake this mission, mentioning that his responsibilities would be "to fulfill certain duties or negotiations
connected with the actual state of affairs in the South American
■*^AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, session, September 17, 1817.
^AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, session, October 18, 1817. 42
Colonies vhich ^Madrid] proposed to confide to me."^
The second proposal considered by the counsellors concerned making an appeal to the Pope to co-operate with Spain in securing the pacification of America. The counsellors concurred with the recommendation by the commission in the Council, which had been influenced by the suggestion made by Jos4 Ibarra in his report on 38 the Pizarro expedlente.
Actually, Madrid had already instituted steps to gain support from the Holy See. In fact, since 1814, Spanish agents in Rome had been actively engaged in trying to have the Pope intercede on behalf of Ferdinand, whose policies were viewed as being in the best interest of religion and the felicity of his subjects in America,
Their diplomacy, first through non-diplomatic channels by Francisco
Bad£n, a naturalized Spaniard living in Rome, and later by Antonio
Vargas Laguna, the Spanish ambassador to the Holy See, bore fruit in the form of the encyclical Etsi Longlssimo. Issued by Pius VII on
January 30, 1816, it was approved by the Council of the Indies on
April 12, 1816, and it was promptly published. 39
3^Sir C, K. Roche to Castlereagh, December 20, 1817, FO 72/208.
3®AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, sessions, September 24, 1817; October 18, 1817,
39Pedro de Leturla, Relaclones entre 1& Sfids. & Hisoanoamerica (3 vols.; Caracas: Sociedad Bolivariana de Venezuela, 1959-1960), II, 97-116; III, 387-427. 43
The Pope's pronouncement urged the clergy in America to strive for the re-establishment of order in those chaotic dominions. Each cleric was to indicate to his parishioners the pernicious conse quences of the rebellions, and to urge them to remain loyal to their legitimate sovereign.4®
In addition to granting the encyclical, the Pope granted
Ferdinand a series of pontifical dispensations. On May 26, 1816,Pius approved the creation of the Order of Isabel the Catholic for loyal 41 Americans. Moreover, after receiving a petition from the Spanish government, which had acted in accord with a recommendation from the / O Council of State, the Pope, on August 23, 1816, and September 17,
1816, granted the king use of one third of certain episcopal revenues, and part of the proceeds from cathedral chapters and monasteries in
Spain, which were to be used to equip the projected expedition to
Buenos Aires. A3 Furthermore, he agreed to appoint criollos to vacant 44 ecclesiastical posts in America.
Aside from these measures and subsequent actions, the counsel lors did not present Pizarro with those concrete recommendations
4®Ibid., II, 110-113, citing encyclical.
41IMd,, H3 42 AHN, Estado, lib. 18d, session, June 6, 1816.
^Leturia, o j j. cit.. II, 113.
^ I b i d ., pp. 89-92. 44 which would have enabled him to rebut the British memorandum. There
fore, the Spanish rebuttal of October 20, 1817, which will be dis
cussed at length in Chapter Six, was couched in general terms; it
did not provide answers to those questions raised in the British
communique.
This indecisiveness on the part of the counsellors served
only to prevent Pizarro from acceding to the wishes of the Allies,
who now supported the British position, and impelled the First
Secretary to reduce his recommendations. He presented the counsel
lors with propositions which would require merely an affirmative
or negative response. Because the counsellors did not discuss
the question until the session of April 28, 1818, Pizarro suggested
that the problem of the pacification of America should be considered
both independently of and connected with the possibility of foreign
mediation. The First Secretary narrowed his proposals to three
decisive measures, one of which was new: (1) that of the expedition
to Buenos Aires; (2) that of an amnesty for the Spanish exiles; and,
(3) that of the participation of foreigners in the trade with
America.^
Despite his feelings that these points had already been the
subject of extensive debates, the First Secretary did not receive
guidelines from the Council until May 22, 1818. Those received
ft5AHN, Estado, lib. 2ld, session, April 28, 1818. 45 related principally to the decision to dispatch the expedition directly to Buenos Aires instead of sending it first to Peru and 46 then having the troops inarch overland to that capital.
The exoediente. in its various forms, had been circulating for over fifteen months. Even in May, 1818, the counsellors had not provided Pizarro with suitable guidelines on those proposals which were essential to his pacification scheme. The alternatives open to the First Secretary continued to be limited. Nevertheless, the counsellors did have precise views about the causes of the rebellions in the colonies.
^ A HN, Estado, lib. 21d, sessions, May 6; May 22, 1818 CHAPTER III
CAUSES FOR THE REBELLIONS AS VIEWED IN THE
DISCUSSIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE
The counsellors of state were aware of the multifarious reasons behind the rebellions. Their views of the disorders reflected a continuing concern about events in that part of the world. Between 1815 and 1818, the counsellors took into account the internal as well as the external factors causing the chaotic situation in the colonies, and they recognized, moreover, that there was a connection between these two.
I. EXTERNAL CAUSES
In March, 1815, Napoleon Bonaparte escaped from Elba, landed in France, and began his march on Paris. The return of the Corsican frightened authorities in Madrid. They feared that Spain might become involved in yet another war while still trying to recover from the previous six year struggle. The government would need assistance to combat the new danger because the country's resources were depleted and the people distracted. In addition to the pos sibility of having to fight Napoleon once more, Spain still had to I contend with the Barbary pirates and the insurgents in America.
*AHN, Estado, lib. lAd, sessions, April 3; May 23, 1815. 47
The Secretary of State informed the counsellors of his views of recent events in France. He insisted that the European nations should present a united front against the Corsican, and that those same treaties and alliances serving as the basis for this effort, should also obligate these nations to support Spain In the fight against the insurgents. Napoleon's subversive activities, now, as before 1814, were not confined to Europe, but extended to America, where his emissaries would once again encourage the colonists to sever their ties with the metropolis. Therefore, reasoned Cevallos, the Allies should act in concert to suppress the rebellions in
America, just as they proposed to combine their forces against the 2 present threat to peace in Europe.
The recent intrigues by Napoleon's agents confirmed Cevallos' fears. They proposed to foment the rebellion in America. The First
Secretary received the disquieting news from Francisco Sarmiento, a colonel who had been stationed in the United States. Sarmiento, presently in Madrid, relayed information about an ostensibly commer cial venture undertaken by Napoleon's emissaries. They had outfitted three ships in Leghorn, one destined to Havana and the others to the
Costa-firme. A legitimate cargo of goods, such as oil, fruits, and wines, he reported, served as camouflage for the subversive 3 literature and inflammatory proclamations which the ships carried.
2AHN, Estado, lib. 14d, session, May 23, 1815.
Francisco Sarmiento to Pedro Cevallos, April 11, 1815, AGI, Secci6n Ministerio de Ultramar (hereafter cited as Ultramar), leg. 756. 48
The agents of Napoleon were not the only culprits. English men, North Americans, Frenchmen, and nationals from other countries
Arrived in Spanish America to instigate the colonists and to join the ranks of the rebels. Indeed, many foreigners played conspicuous roles in the insurgent victories both on land and see.**
Moreover, many Spaniards fled to other European countries or to America, where they worked to overthrow the regime of
Ferdinand VII, both in Spain and the colonies. These exiles had to leave Spain either because of Ferdinand's refusal to grant amnesty to the liberals, or because of their implication in the various abortive military uprisings against the government. They organized relief expeditions to America, and even persuaded foreigners to side with the rebels.^ For example, the embassy in Paris kept Madrid informed about the subversive activities of these exiles.^ From
France, some left for Buenos Aires,^ and others departed for St.
Thomas in the Virgin Islands, where they planned to regroup before
**Mesa la Resumen, July 9, 1817, AB, carpeta 1910; Lozano de Torres to Minister of State, July 25, 1817, AGI, Estado, leg. 86; Francisco Pag6s y Belloc, Aleunas noticlas de las (iltimas negoclaciones acerca da la independencla de la America Esoaftola Continental (Seville: Eulogio de Heras, 1917), pp.6-7.
5AHN, Estado, lib. 21d, session, April 28, 1818; "Exposicion de Don Jose Pizarro al Rey sobre la pacificacion de America," June 9, 1818, in Delgado, oo.clt.. pp. 373-380.
6pag£s y Belloc, ojt. clt.. p.7.
^Manuel de Lardieabal to Secretary of State, no. 220, December 4, 1816, AHN, Estado, leg. 4504. 49
O embarking for the colonies.
Ferdinand also learned of their machinations in England, where 9 they also tried to incite public opinion against his government.
General Renovales was a case in point. Nevertheless, happily for
Spain, this particular general switched over to the loyalist side after receiving a sum of money from Spanish authorities.
Activities of mercenaries, rebel leaders, and Spanish exiles within foreign nations avowedly friendly to Spain presented dif ficulties. If Spain were at war with only the insurgents, she might be able to defeat them, but Madrid also had to contend with those states assisting the rebels. Thees countries professed to be allies-- but they allowed rebels to muster on their shores, and permitted filibustering expeditions to sail for the colonies.**
Commercial objectives motivated many of those governments to condone such activities and even to foment rebellion in America, The wealth of the Americas, the desire to share in the lucrative trade, and Spain’s obstinacy in refusing to revise the Laws of the Indies
Spedro Cevallos to Minister of the Indies, March 9, 1814, AGI, Ultramar, leg. 756.
^AHN, Estado, lib. 16d, session, February 7, 1816.
^AHN, Estado, lib. 21d, session, August 5, 1818; Duke of San Carlos to Marquess of Casa Irujo, Confidential, February 1, 1819, AHN, Estado, leg. 2770. See also Chapter IV, infra.
I1AHN, Estado, lib. 21d, sessions, April 28; May 6, 1818. 50
prompted many nations to allow the disturbances to continue.
Although such acts were in violation of their treaties and agreements
with Madrid, many counsellors felt that the other states' national
self-interest tended to prevail over their legal obligations. 12
II. INTERNAL CAUSES
Repeated protests from Spain should have impelled foreign
governments to enforce existing legislation which banned revolu
tionary activities on their shores. If the Spanish government had
liberalized the Laws of the Indies governing trade, the greed of
foreign merchants might have been appeased. Notwithstanding, Spain
had to clean her own house. The salaries of bureaucrats had to be
raised. Corrupt practices by the civil, military, and ecclesias
tical authorities had to be punished and corrected. Otherwise, as
the Bishop of Puebla stated in a memorial presented in the Council
of State by the former Minister of the Indies, the remaining 13 loyalists in America would defect to the side of the insurgents.
As early as September, 1815, the Council of the Indies had
prepared a report on the corrupt practices by colonial adminis
trators. They based their findings on the testimony of two colonial
officials in New Spain, Manuel Fonnegra and Juan Jos£ Recacho. Both
l^AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, sessions, September 17; September 24, 1817; lib. 21d, sessions, May 6; August 5, 1818.
^AHN, Estado, lib. 16d, session, March 20, 1816. 51 men censured the clergy and other government employees. They pointed out that the principal ringleaders of the rebellion were clergymen; citing as examples Miguel Hidalgo, Josi Marfa Morelos, and Mariano
Matamoros. The officials criticized, moreover, the incompetence of the Viceroy, Felfx Calleja, accusing him of exhorbitant expen ditures and general maladministration. The military leaders also came under their censure for enriching themselves at the expense of loyalty to the Crown. The evidence presented by the two showed that government employees allowed the rebellion to continue because of 1A greed and profits from illegal enterprises.
This situation was not limited to New Spain, where the govern ment believed that effective resistance had ceased. Another consults to the king from the Council of the Indies pointed out that these were common occurrences. Even in the other parts of the empire, the report stated, favortism often prevailed over competence for office.^
In the Council of State, the same problem was being discussed.
The deleterious effects of poor officials was far-reaching. Careless selection merely served the cause of the insurgents in America, and in the metropolis, the Royal Exchequer suffered. The Secretary of
^Exposicitfn de Recacho and Fonnegra,” August 17, 1815, AGI, Ind. Gral., leg. 1356; Consults of the Council of the Indies, September 19, 1815, AGI, Estado, leg. 88.
^Consults of the Council of the Indies, May 17, 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 88. 52
Finance told the counsellors of state that the surfeit of officials and the sale of public offices produced unwholesome results. The appointees usually abused their positions because of inadequate salaries.
Similar criticisms had been mentioned in the Council of State a year earlier by the ex-Minister of the Indies. LardizAbal had informed the counsellors of a report received from the Bishop of
Puebla. That official accused government appointees of corruption and malfeasance, both of which served to prolong the disturbances in
New Spain. He had censured the military commanders, the merchants of
Veracruz, and the Viceroy. Because of the existing state of affairs, the loyalists and general populace were becoming disgruntled with the apathy of authorities in Madrid, and many believed that the king had little interest in their welfare.*7
Later, on September 10, 1817, when Pizarro presented his program on the pacification of America, he too stressed the impor- 18 tance of selecting qualified candidates for office in the colonies.
The memorials by the counsellors on Pizarro*s plan for America also referred to this prevalent practice of favortism. Many con tained remonstrances against the scandalous conduct and lack of
16AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, session, February 19, 1817.
17AHN, Estado, lib. 16d, session, March 20, 1816.
18AHN, Estado, leg.182. 53 principle of those appointees sent to America. Many counsellors felt that the government*s random policy of selection would seem to indicate a lack of interest in the well-being of the colonists. 19
The views of loyalists in America substantiated those voiced by the counsellors of state. From Peru, for example, Mariano
Tramarria informed the king of existing abuses of authority by crown appointees. He censured officials from the Captain-general down to the least significant employee in the departments of justice, war, finance, and police; he also condemned the corrupt practices of both the Viceroy and members of the audiencias. If corrective measures were not adopted immediately, and the author did make concrete suggestions, Tramarria felt that opposition to the govern ment would continue.^0
Another indictment against colonial officials came from New
Spain. The controversial bishop-elect of Michoac&n, Manuel Abad y
Queipo, denounced the mediocrity of government administrators. Unfor tunately, he pointed out, royal government rested not with men chosen for their ability and merit, but with those chosen by virtue of their
9 1 influence at Court.e-L
l^AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, sessions, September 10; September 17; October 1; October 15, 1817.
20**Informe de Don Mariano Tramarria (1816),*' in Anuario dS. Estudios Americanos. Ill (Seville, 1946), 1057-1061.
21wRepresentaci6n de D. Manuel Abad y Queipo, en Valladolid de Michoacan," October 1, 1814, ibid.. pp. 1124-1125. 54
The previously cited causes for the rebellions in America, external as well as internal, appear clearly in diplomatic notes, memorials to the king, and discussions in both the Council of State and the Council of the Indies. Two other contributing factors were not to be verified so easily. One concerned what Pedro Cevallos called a "revolutionary pattern." Unless extirpated, he had argued, revolutions would spread. First, Great Britain had had to fight against the North Americans. Next, France had been ravaged by internal disorders. Eventually, that conflagration spread to the rest of Europe. Although controlled for the moment, no government should expect to remain immune to such convulsions. Therefore, the
Allies had to unite against the enemies of legitimacy any place in the world. 22 As will be shown in Chapter Six, Madrid was later to insist that her contention tended to be confirmed by the 1817 revolution in Pernambuco, Brazil, and she once more would ask the
Allies to act in concert against the insurgents.
The second intangible cause was the desire of the Americans for independence. Even though the degree of revolutionary fervor varied from region to region, some counsellors mentioned that there existed an Inclination by the colonists to sever their ties with the metropolis. Unless something was done to curb this desire and to smother the sparks of rebellion, the idea would be disseminated and
22AHN, Estado, lib. 16d, session, December 13, 1815. 55 the colonies would soon become independent. 23
Even if there was a desire for freedom on the part of the
colonists, perhaps the government could repress it. A concerted
effort to correct existing abuses of authority and to make the necessary economic improvements might provide a modus vlvendl. and
thereby permit the empire to be preserved. With this possibility
in mind, the counsellors turned to the problem of what reforms to
institute. They realized that they would have to take into consider ation the peculiarities of each region and the aspirations of the
inhabitants, while also giving attention to those factors which motivated foreign interest in the rebellions.
2-*AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, sessions, September 24; October 8, 1817; lib. 21d, sessions, April 28; August 5, 1818. CHAPTER IV
PROPOSALS OF POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS
CONSIDERED BY THE COUNCIL OF STATE
Because the government had neither the material, nor the financial, nor the human resources to suppress the rebellions, it proposed to adopt conciliatory measures. Both the counsellors of state and the counsellors of the Indies realized that Spain had to pursue this policy. Moreover, by instituting the necessary political and administrative reforms, they hoped to avoid the necessity of requesting foreign assistance in an internal matter. These counsellors and the government recognized that the alternative would mean a loss of Spanish prerogatives in America.
I. PACIFIC ATTEMPTS TO END THE REBELLIONS PRIOR
TO RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COUNCIL OF STATE
In his desire to avoid sending soldiers, the king tried to win over the rebels by issuing two proclamations in early 1814.
The first, May 24, 1814, spoke of his despondency over the convul
sions in the colonies. He appealed to the colonists in terms of preserving the unity of the empire, and he restated his belief in
the interdependence of the metropolis and the colonies.*
*Decretos. I, 33-36. 57
When the Insurgents rejected his plea, he appealed again two months later. Ferdinand exhorted his vassals to lay down their arms,
forget their differences, and return to his paternal care. The
decree of July 20, 1814, stated that the king had already demon
strated a concern for the welfare of the colonies. It pointed out
that he had relnstltuted the Council of the Indies, re-established
the Ministry of the Indies, selected an American for the Council of
Castile, and appointed two Americans as ministers with portfolio, that 2 of State and the Indies.
To institute the necessary reforms in the colonies, the king recognized the need for exact details about the conditions
there. He ordered colonial officials to select competent persons--
educated, mature, discerning, and gifted with felicity of style--to
write reports on the causes of the disorders. These accounts were
to be exhaustive but unbiased. The writers should try to ascertain
the rebel's resources and discover any arrangements made by them
either with the insurgents of other provinces or with foreign
governments. Moreover, the king wanted the reports to describe the
status of the military and political situation during his absence.
The information would facilitate changes in government policy. Such
reforms, Ferdinand hoped, would eliminate the possibility of
future disturbances, and permit the inhabitants of the empire to
2Ibld.. pp. 128-130. 58
3 live together in peace.
The king’s concern with the problems in America was further evidenced by his instructions to the Council of the Indies. This
Council, as previously noted, was to pay particular attention to events in the colonies. The counsellors set about their task assiduously, as shown by the records of their meetings. They realized that the rebellions had taken on a new character. These were no longer merely bellicose protests, which could have been suppressed by force. The struggle in America, in the opinion of the counsellors of the Indies, had degenerated into a civil war, and 4 the rebels seemed determined to separate from Spain. Because of the new turn of events and the existing conditions in the colonies, some members of the Council of the Indies argued that the use of
force would only aggravate the situation.^
Proposals for reform had to originate in Madrid, insisted the counsellors of the Indies, since revolutionary conditions overseas rendered impossible any objective decision-making by administrators there. Such proposals should be more specific than
the mere promise of better government, which, itself, was an
^Minister of the Indies to Royal Appointees in America, July 31, 1814, AGI, Ultramar, leg. 755.
^Consulta of the Council of the Indies, November 9, 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 88.
^Report of Four Members of the Council of the Indies, July 13, 1815, copy, AGI, estado, leg. 88. 59 admission that the colonists had been maltreated.^
The king followed the advice of the Council of the Indies.
He took steps to retain the loyalty of the colonists. His First
Secretary instructed Andres Villalba, the Spanish chargl d'affaires in Rio de Janeiro, to award twelve crosses of the Royal Order of
Charles III to people displaying extraordinary fervor in support of the Spanish cause.^ In addition, the monarch created the Royal Order of Isabel the Catholic, with its membership to be conferred on soldiers and civilians demonstrating loyalty, patriotism, and valor Q in defense of Ferdinand's prerogatives in America.
The king had to be careful, nevertheless, to adopt only measures uhich would not compromise his prestige. Promises for reforms had to be implemented, for otherwise, the rebels would
interpret the proposal itself as a sign of weakness and despair on the part of the government. Rather than serving as a restraint, such offers, mentioned a consulta of the Council of the Indies, would only 9 incite the insurgents.
^Consults of the Council of the Indies, May 17; Consulta of Consulta of the Council of the Indies, November 9, 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 88.
^Cevallos to Andres Villalba, February 8, 1815, AGI, Estado, leg. 98.
^Decretos. II, 192-195; III, 364-365; Leturia, o j l. cit.. II, 113.
^Consults of the Council of the Indies, May 17, 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 88. 60
In a note on the above consulta. Ferdinand admitted the impor tance of implementing promises.*® However, his advisers cautioned him to be prudent and circumspect, using care to avoid any pacts with the rebels which would compromise his authority. They recom mended that he not jeopardise his royal prerogatives nor expose himself to ridicule by making agreements with the insurgents.**
The counsellors of state were familiar with many of the suggestions made by the Council of the Indies, such as their advice not to make pacts with the rebels or to fail to implement promises of reforms. 12 They, too, urged Madrid to take the initiative to correct abuses in the colonial administration. Some counsellors argued that since the disorders were a purely internal affair, it would be imprudent on the part of the government to seek outside assistance. One counsellor of state, Jos£ Ibarra, seemed to speak for the others when he stated that "a father solves his problems by first attempting to correct them himself and only then seeking help from outsiders."*"*
*®Royal Resolution on the Consulta of the Council of the Indies, May 17, 1816, AGI, Estado, leg, 88.
**Consulta of Nine Members of the Council of the Indies, February 8, 1817, AGI, Estado, leg. 88,
*^AHN, Estado, lib, 20d, sessions, September 24; October 15, 1817.
*-*AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, session, September 24, 1817. 61
From the time of Pizarro1s exoediente. until the full dis cussion of the problem, the counsellors of state had time to consider what reforms to recommend. Their views on the issue indicated an awareness of the steps to take in order to achieve the desired objectives--the pacification of America, and the preservation of the empire.
II. VAZQUEZ’S PROPOSAL TO RE-ESTABLISH
THE MINISTRY OF THE INDIES
As already noted, the king had decided to pay closer attention to affairs in the colonies. He already had mentioned in the decree of July 20, 1814, that the re-establishment of the Ministry of the
Indies would serve to centralize the control of colonial affairs.
Thus, Ferdinand had insisted, his government could be more responsive to the wished of the colonists.^ Later, in November, 1814, he ordered that all official dispatches from the colonies be numbered according to a specific department, (e.g., Finance, War, Gracia y
Justicia, and Police), and sent directly to the Ministry of the
Indies. It was hoped that this procedure would facilitate dis tribution of overseas' correspondence to the proper authorities in
Spain.^
^Decretos. II, 128-130.
15Ibld.. I, 352-353. 62
In spite of all these measures, Ferdinand decided to abolish the Ministry of the Indies on September 18, 1815, The reason given vas that one ministry should handle similar problems in either Spain or America. Both as an aid and as a measure of economy, the king ordered each Minister to select for his department competent officials from the disbanded Ministry of the Indies.^
Ferdinand's action, however, did not meet with the approval of the Council of the Indies. Its members asserted that the govern ment still had to solve the pressing problem of the pacification of
America. The two flscales of the Council, when commenting on the royal order abolishing the Ministry of the Indies, expressed their belief that the regular organs of government could not devote sufficient time to the needs of the Americans. They argued, more over, that the ministers were burdened by normal business, and would be unable to consider the particular problems of the Americas, which required more effort due to the distance separating the colonies from the metropolis. The flscales admitted that even in times of harmonious relations with colonists, it was difficult to entrust one person with the office of Minister of the Indies; but now, the problems of the colonies had taken on added importance.
Therefore, it was argued, the Americas should have their own
16Ibid.. II, 665-666. 63
Minister, and not have their affairs combined with those of the metropolis.^
The king soon learned of the consequences of the decree of
September 18, 1815. Correspondence normally collocated and dis tributed by the Minister of the Indies had been passed to the various departments, such as War, Gracia y Justicia, Finance, and State.
The resulting confusion and even misdirection of materials impelled the Council of the Indies to report to the king that the govern ment's attempt at pacification had been retarded.*®
Despite these ominous reports, Ferdinand refused to retract the decree. He did, however, order each Minister to create a special section to be staffed by experts on the affairs of the
Indies. The specialists were to meet weekly to discuss problems of the colonies, treating them as separate from the business of the metropolis. 19
When the subject of the pacification of America was discussed in the Council of State, the Secretary of the Navy again raised the
^"Report of the Fiscales of Peru and New Spain on the Abolition of the Ministry of the Indies," September 27, 1815, AGI, Ind. Gral., leg. 110.
*®Consulta of the Council of the Indies, November 16, 1815, AGI, Estado, leg. 88.
*^Jos4 Ibarra to Secretary of Gracia y Justicia, December 27, 1815, AGI, Ind. Gral., leg. 1356. 64 question of re-establishing the Ministry of the Indies. By the mere fact of having a special advisory body, the Council of the
Indies, to discuss the problems of the American colonies, VAzquez stated that the government did recognize the special status of those possessions. Moreover, Madrid even enacted special laws for them.
Therefore, re-instituting the Ministry of the Indies, he added in his memorial, would permit uniform legislation, facilitate implemen tation and revision of same, and render the government more respon- sive to the complaints of the colonists. 90
III. AMNESTY AND PARDON FOR THE REBELS IN AMERICA AND
FOR THE LIBERALS AND SPANISH EXILES
By comparison, a solution for the problem of the rebels in the colonies was to prove easier to find than one for the "liberals" and
Spanish exiles. Nevertheless, difficulties arose even with the colonists.
The king had received contradicting reports from the Council •) i of the Indies, which had opposed the use of royal pardons.4,1
Ferdinand, however, followed the advice of the flscales of the
20a HN, Estado, lib. 20d, session, September 24, 1817.
21consulta of the Council of the Indies, May 17, 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 88; "Extracto de la Consulta hecha en 8 de corrt® por las juntas creadas de o m de V. M. . . . ," February 22, 1817, VAzquez Papers, MSS, 442, fols. 57-70. 65
Council of the Indies, In order to retain his self-respect and dignity, he arranged for the royal pardon to coincide with his marriage and that of his brother to the Portuguese princesses in
September, 1816, The pardon would apply to smugglers and those persons guilty of the crime of insurrection before its publication in the overseas' provinces. 22
Records of the memorials presented in the Council of State seem to indicate, however, that these counsellors were divided over the proper course of action to adopt. How might the king grant amnesty to the insurgents without demeaning himself? Should it be general or limited? What consequences might be expected from such an offer? On the other hand, if a pardon was granted, the king should determine the propitious moment; otherwise, the insurgents would consider it a sign of weakness. Either measure, the coun- sellors realized, would require careful consideration. 23
At q meeting of the Council of State on October 15, 1817, counsellors expressed their reservations on the matter. Some felt that it would be useless, citing as an example the negligible results of Morillo's offers to the insurgents. Others believed the measure would be degrading to the king, who, they felt, should offer clemency only after the surrender of the rebels, A few argued,
22pecretos. Ill, 356-358; IV, 15-16.
^A HN, Estado, lib. 20d, sessions, September 10; September 17; September 24; October 15, 1817. 66 moreover, that it should be applied discriminately, and be offered by a foreign power, with Spain merely complying. However, in the final vote, the majority of the counsellors agreed with the recom mendation of the a£ hoc committee, to the effect that the Secretary of State should be empowered to negotiate with the rebels, by using the possibility of a royal pardon and a general amnesty as an incentive. If the First Secretary felt that these measures would prove useful in ending the rebellions, the counsellors authorized him to propose either one of them, provided that the insurgents accepted the sovereignty of the king.^
For Ferdinand and his counsellors, the question of a general amnesty and pardon for the rebels had been resolved somewhat; but to make similar concessions to the Spanish exiles in foreign countries, and to the "liberals" in Spain was a more knotty problem.
When Ferdinand returned to power in 1814, he had attempted to differentiate among those officials who had fled with King Joseph
Bonaparte, those who had served him in an official capacity, and those who had remained in Spain. In the decree of May 30, 1814, the king forbade certain refugees from returning; these included coun sellors and ministers of Joseph, high-ranking officers in his army, and employees such as prefects. If any in the above categories had decided to remain in Spain, they were deported. Those of lower ranks might return but hold no public office. The prohibition against
2^AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, session, October 15, 1817. 67 government service was applied, in addition, to any person who had aided and abetted the French but had not fled. 2*5
Although at a later date, September 29, 1816, the king pardoned selected groups of criminals, he excluded those guilty of lese majesty, counterfeiting, resisting justice, and other specific crimes.2<> The fact of the matter was that most of the Spanish exiles and "liberals" came under one or more of these exceptions. This proved unfortunate, because, as noted earlier, the exiles in foreign lands were active in instigating projects aimed at undermining the regime of Ferdinand VII, both in Spain and in America.
The question of a general amnesty for the exiles and "liberals" took on added significance because of its connection with the attempt to pacify America. Pizarro, as has been mentioned, accused them of inciting rebellion in America and inducing foreign nationals to support the uprisings. Most counsellors concurred with the First
Secretary's argument that, if the king had granted a general amnesty earlier, a subversive force would have been eliminated. 27 Despite their support for a general or quasi-general amnesty for the exiles, the counsellors did not, as was customary, vote on the recommen dation of the First Secretary. Ferdinand was responsible for
25pecretos. I, 49-52.
26Ibld.. Ill, 356-358.
27AHN, Estado, lib. 21d, session, April 28, 1818. 68 squashing any further discussion of the subject. On May 5, 1818, the king sent a scribbled note to the Secretary of the Council of State:
Castafleda. I command that you do not speak in any manner at the Council of State, of granting amnesty to those expat riated from Spain, no matter what the circumstances.28
For Pizarro, the matter was not closed. He appealed once again. In his final recommendations to the king on the means to pacify the colonies, the First Secretary suggested that the king grant a quasi-general amnesty to the exiles, which Ferdinand never did.29
The example of General Mariano Renovales confirmed Pizarro*s belief that the exiles were instrumental in fomenting foreign interest in the rebellion, but that they nevertheless desired to be reincorporated into the Spanish body politic. Renovales, according to his own admission, which was subject to certain falsifications, 30 had fought at the siege of Zaragossa. Instead of rewarding him for his patriotism, the General stated that Ferdinand had placed him under surveillance for having supported the Constitution of 1812.
Royal suspicions, lamented Renovales, had forced him to leave Spain.
These misfortunes had impelled him to work for the independence of
28Ibid.
29"Exposici6n de Don Jos4 Pizarro al Rey sobre la pacificacl6n de America,*' June 9, 1818, in Delgado, . cit. pp. 373-380.
3°Coraellas, op., cit.. pp. 218-219. 69
South America, where he envisioned an asylum for oppressed Europeans.
To put his scheme into operation, he turned to Great Britain and promised to arrange advantageous treaties in America for English merchants with the Americans. 11 1
While in England, he had acquired a reputation for espousing the cause of the insurgents. An article in the Morning Chronicle mentioned his distinguished services for Spain at the time of the
French invasion. It stated, in addition, that the Americans anxiously awaited his assistance in their struggle against the oppressor. 32
The Spanish ambassador in London, the Duke of San Carlos, complained to Castlereagh of Renovales' activities. The Duke accused him of getting Admiral Brown to co-operate in equipping
"a force against Mexico composed of Spanish deserters, French military men, and English half-pay officers."33
By his quick action, the ambassador succeeded, not only in subverting the operation, but, in turning it to Spain's advantage.
Renovales agreed to dismiss the expedition as soon as he arrived in
New Orleans. Once there, according to San Carlos, he would publish
■^Mariano Renovales to Foreign Office, translation, December 4, 1817, FO 72/208.
3^Morning Chronicle. June 29, 1818, AGI, Estado, leg. 89.
33Alfred Hasbrouck, Foreign Legionaries In the Li&SEflLifin of Spanish South America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928), p. 44. 70 a proclamation in support of Ferdinand and give the Spanish Consul the ships and armaments, all this for a reasonable price. Finally,
Renovales would advise the Duke about measures to adopt in order to prevent future expeditions from London to America.3^
Under the proposed agreement, the Spanish government would guarantee the general 25,000 duros to cover the cost of the expedi
tion, the sum to be given as soon as the Consul had certified that
Renovales had fulfilled his promises. In addition, the participants were to receive money commensurate with their rank. San Carlos agreed, moreover, to intercede with the king on behalf of the group, 35 requesting that they be granted a royal pardon for their services.
In the session of August 5, 1818, Pizarro advised the coun
sellors of the unprecedented negotiations, which actually had been
terminated before the First Secretary received information about the
affair. He defended San Carlos' unauthorized action and urged the
counsellors to consider the contract and the pardons as two separate
matters. Although Pizarro felt that the government should approve
the use of funds for subverting the scheme, he insisted the matter
of a pardon be determined by the king.
34AHN, Estado, lib. 21d, session, August 5, 1818.
35Ibld.; Memories de Pizarro. I, 268.
36AHN, Estado, lib. 21d., session, August 5, 1818. 71
Most of the counsellors supported the recommendations of the
First Secretary. They felt that Renovales was performing a service
to his country. Although he had been a criminal, his intentions
seemed to indicate that he had repented, thereby deserving the pardon
of the king. To pardon the Spaniards involved in the plot, the
counsellors reasoned, would merely demonstrate that the king intended
to show them the same leniency that he proposed for those rebels in
America who recognized his sovereignty.
Nevertheless, two counsellors dissented. Both Guillermo
Hualde and Juan Lozano de Torres insisted that it., would be scandalous
to negotiate with criminals. Renovales and his few men, they argued,
should not be trusted because they were malcontents and partisans
of those in opposition to the regime.
In the final vote on the question, the majority of the coun
sellors supported the expenditure of funds, and, following the
suggestion of Pizarro, they left the matter of a pardon to the king, 07 who subsequently granted it. Renovales fulfilled his part of
the contract, which included his making public his promised 38 proclamation.
38"Manifiesto del General D. Mariano de Renovales a sus compafleros de armas y compatriotas," September 10, 1818 (in the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). 72
The government still had more direct measures to adopt to placate the Americans. Many opinions as to the causes of the rebellions reflected a need for government intervention in the political, social, and economic life of the colonies. Their distance from the Metropolis would require closer and more respon sible supervision. It followed that any measures adopted should serve to strengthen the bonds uniting Spain and her possessions.
IV. APPOINTMENT OF COMPETENT AMERICANS AND SPANIARDS
TO CIVIL, MILITARY, AND ECCLESIASTICAL POSTS
The Minister of the Indies, Miguel LardizAbal, had suggested that the government pursue a liberal policy regarding the appoint ment of crlollos to office. He urged that competent Americans be selected for positions in both Spain and the colonies. In the
Metropolis, the minister favored reserving for them two places on each of the councils, chanceries, audlencias. and cathedral 39 churches.
In the Council of State, the question of appointments of crlollos and Spaniards was also discussed. Certain counsellors expressed conflicting views on the number of posts to be reserved
for the crlollos. Martin Garay, for example, suggested that they constitute half the judicatures and ecclesiastical corporations,
^^Miguel Lardizibal to Pedro Cevallos, Reservado, September 4, 1815, AGI, Estado, leg. 88. 73 and that they receive preference in other positions. On the other hand, Jos£ Ibarra recommended that they be given equal consideration with Spaniards for both secular and ecclesiastical posts, thereby 40 avoiding distinctions among inhabitants of the empire.
All suggestions made by the counsellors naturally stressed the importance of selecting competent persons. When they voted on the question of appointments, the counsellors concurred with the recommendation of the ad hoc committee in the Council that secular and ecclesiastical posts be filled either by qualified criolios or Europeans. To avoid misconstruing this accord to infer that
Americans should be given equal consideration for positions in the colonies, Garay, Vazquez, and Pizarro insisted that this referred only to appointments in Spain. This precaution would strengthen the bonds of union. More important, however, these three argued that it would not be politic to permit Americans to control their 41 own affairs.
V. FREEDOM OF MANUFACTURE AND CULTIVATION
Various reports to the king had mentioned the need to grant the colonists the right to freedom of manufacture and cultivation.
However, sone Spaniards were not disposed to permit Americans to
^AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, sessions, September 17; and September 24, 1817.
^AHN, Estado, lib. 20df session, October 15, 1817. 74 acquire any self-sufficiency in these areas. For example, among the recommendations proposed by Juan Antonio Yandiola to pacify the colonies was one that would have permitted the government to 42 prohibit all manufacturing detrimental to the metropolis.
This suggestion was too uncompromising for the Junta of 43 Pacification. Its members tended to favor the proposals made by the Count of Casa Flores. To pacify the colonies, he had argued for a need to revise those Laws of the Indies relating to cultivation, 44 manufacture, and trade.
Meanwhile, the counsellors of state also seemed disposed to recommend measures similar to those of Casa Flores. Any reforms in
the realm of cultivation and manufacture, moreover, would dispel the adverse impressions of Spanish policy created by crlollos and
foreign writers. The counsellors admitted a need to make improve ments, but differed as to the extent of the concession, and as to whether these should be general or specific for each province. They
finally agreed that the colonists should be granted the right to
freedom of cultivation and manufacture as allowed by both the Laws
of the Indies and other royal ordinances. In addition, they
42"Extracto de la Consults hecha en 8 de corrte por las Juntas creadas de orn de V. M. . . , February 22, 1817, Vizquez Papers, MSS, 442, fols. 57-70.
4 3 I M ! . 44Memorial of the Count of Casa Flores, December 3, 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 87. 75 encouraged the government to institute necessary reforms cautiously in these fields.^
It seems, however, that by early 1818, little had been accom plished. In the session of April 28, 1818, Pizarro informed the counsellors of recommendations made by Luis de Onfs, the Spanish ambassador in Washington, to pacify the colonies. One was the removal of all obstacles that tended to stifle colonial development 46 in the fields of agriculture, manufacture, and trade.
VI. MILITARY REFORMS
In the New World, the military played an important role, but its semi-autonomous status posed problems for Spain. Complaints lodged against the officers in New Spain by Spanish officials has already been mentioned. From Madrid, Charles Vaughn reported on the military situation in that Viceroyalty. Although he may have exaggerated somewhat, he stated that Ferdinand paid for an army of no less than 80,000 men but "a want of discipline render (edj that force perfectly inadequate to keeping the country in subjection."^
^AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, sessions, September 17; September 24; October 15, 1817.
^Onfs to Pizarro, January 14, 1818, AHN, Estado, leg. 5643; AHN, Estado, lib. 21d, session, April 28, 1818.
^Vaughn to Castlereagh, no. Ill, November 4, 1816, FO 72/188. 76
In the Viceroyalty of Peru, the government also had its troubles.
Because the soldiers were assimilating with the population, there was a corresponding decrease in loyalty to the Crown, This situation had impelled Francisco Requena, a counsellor of the Indies, who had
spent thirty-one years in America, to advise the king to institute
/ fl a program of troop rotation.
The above conditions in two crucial areas prompted the Minister
of Gracia y Justicia to suggest extensive reforms in the military organization in America, Lozano urged the government to reduce the number of regiments of militia. Vacant posts, moreover, should not be filled, except for those in New Spain and in the Plate area.
Also, to assure a closer connection with the metropolis, he recom mended that the garrisons in the colonies be comprised only of
Europeans; these should be given men and supplies sufficient to meet immediate needs. Similarly, he proposed stationing the majority of the troops in the principal cities. Finally, Lozano
suggested that the garrisons in the provinces by changed annually,
and those in the capitals every two years, providing a scheme to 49 prevent the development of strong ties with the local population.
^®"Requena sobre las Americas," September 6, 1815, AGP, PR/30, vol. 15, fols. 632-637.
*9AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, session, September 17, 1817; Lozano on Pacification of America, July, n.d., 1817, AGI, Estado, leg. 88. 77
VII. AN ATTEMPT AT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS
WITH THE INSURGENTS
Closely related to the question of instituting reforms in
America was the attempt by the Spanish government to negotiate with the rebels. Ferdinand still hoped to settle the dispute amicably and without having to request foreign intervention. By
1815, Spain had not yet pacified the Plate region, so he directed his attention to the insurgents of Buenos Aires.
Meanwhile, the insurgent government at Buenos Aires had ordered Bernardino Rivadavia and Manuel Belgrano to sail for Spain to discuss the situation in the Viceroyalty. The two arrived in London, where they met with Manuel Sarratea. Sarratea had already endeavored unsuccessfully to divide the Spanish royal family by attempting to persuade Charles IV to permit his son, Francisco de
Paula, to be crowned King of the United Provinces.^®
Aware of the presence of the three in London, the Spanish
Minister of the Indies instructed Juan Manuel Gandasegui, Director of the Philippine Company, to watch their activities, and to ascertain their Intentions. Gandasegui was authorized, moreover, to encourage them to come to Spain on safe conduct passes; once in
^°Mario Belgrano, Rivadavia y. sus zest1ones diplomiticas con Esnafia (1814-1820) (Buenos Aires: Editorial Huarpes, 1945), P. 14. 78
Madrid, they could state their recommendations to a government official.51
Besides meeting with the rebel delegates as a group,
Gandasegui had the opportunity to speak privately with Rivadavia.
According to the Director, Rivadavia expressed concern about developments in the Plate area; he feared the possible consequences of involving the Indians in the insurrection, since their actions might expose the people of Buenos Aires to dangers from all sides.
The representative admitted the importance of preventing any native uprising. To eliminate such a possibility, moreover, he desired to begin negotiations immediately to settle existing differences with the government at Madrid. Rivadavia told Gandasegui, in addition, that only he had authority to negotiate with the Spanish government.
Because he was apprehensive of further interference by Great Britain in this matter between the colonists and their monarch, Rivadavia preferred to conduct these discussions in France. 52
After the king abolished the Ministry of the Indies--a fact disturbing to Rivadavia--the Secretary of State took charge of the
^AHN, Estado, lib. 18d, session, June 6, 1816; Belgrano, op. cit.. pp. 12-13. The latter work as well as the one edited by Emilio Ravignani, Com!sion dfi. Bernardino Rivflflajqa flRt& Egpafta y. otras ootenclas de Eurooa. 1814-1820 (2 vols.; Buenos Aires: Instituto de Invest1gadones Histfiricas de la Facultad de Fildsofia y Letras, 1933-1936), contain the complete account of the negotiations with the exception of the discussions in the Council of State.
^2AHN, Estado, lib. 18d, session, June 6, 1816; Belgrano, 2£. cit.. pp. 21-23. 79 affair, while Gandasegui continued to keep Cevallos informed of his talks with the envoy. In order to clarify his position, the delegate from Buenos Aires had informed Gandasegui that he did not intend to make any agreement with the king of Spain. Yet, as
Gandasegui told Cevallos, Rivadavia apparently believed that the common good depended on his country remaining under Spanish suzerainty.« .. 53
In Paris, Rivadavia continued his conferences with the Spanish envoy. He stated that he had been empowered only to congratulate the king on his safe return and to find out Ferdinand's proposals for the future administration of the provinces. Moreover, Gandasegui learned that Belgrano had returned home to apprise the leaders there of the negotiations. Gandasegui also told Cevallos that Rivadavia found conditions conducive to reaching an accord with Spain.
Notwithstanding, if the representative was to follow his instructions to the letter, he could not pursue the matter until he received orders from Buenos Aires. To neutralize the effects of this delay, which he estimated would be between five and six months, Rivadavia was prepared to go to Madrid, provided the king consented. The royal order, he told the Director, should be cloaked in such terms as would fan the hopes of his constituents, and be forceful enough to leave him no recourse but to obey. Rivadavia explained that under
53a h N, Estado, lib. 18d, session, June 6, 1816; Belgrano, op. cit.. pp. 25-26. 80 these conditions, his actions would be above suspicion, and he could avoid any delay.^
Other forces, however, worked to undermine Rivadavia*s plans.
Gandasegui received disconcerting reports from Sarratea, who advised the Director that the government of Buenos Aires had revoked
Rivadavia's powers. This left him, he insisted with sole authority to negotiate with Spain. For his part, Gandasegui decided to send the information to Madrid, but the Director opted to inform Cevallos of his faith in Rivadavia, especially after seeing the latter*s 55 original instructions.
With this, Sarratea was adamant; he appealed to Madrid. For his plan, he employed the Count of Cabarrfis, who was in exile because he had served as Secretary of Finance under King Joseph
Bonaparte. Sarratea gave his envoy the note that he had promised to show Gandasegui. The letter expressed regret at Spain's earlier refusal to seek a rapprochement with the United Provinces under a
British guarantee. Moreover, Spain's martial preparations had forced the recall of the Argentine representatives. The obstinacy of the mother country served to alienate the inhabitants and the government of the United Provinces. Therefore, separation was inevitable. Sarratea left open, however, two points for negotiations:
^^Gandasegui to Cevallos, December 5, 1815, in Ravignani, op. cit.. I, 371-375.
55Belgrano, ga. cit.. pp. 51-68. 81
(1) that of crowning a prince of Spanish royalty; and (2) that of arranging an agreement for a most-favored"nation clause with regard to Spanish commerce and industry.^
Cabarrfis carried out his commission. In Madrid, he gave
Cevallos a copy of Sarratea*s note. At a later meeting, the First
Secretary advised the envoy that the king, notwithstanding his desire for the pacification of the area, had rejected the proposals.
However, Ferdinand would consent to meet with Sarratea, provided he recognize the king's sovereignty. Any future discussions, insisted Cevallos, would require Sarratea*s presence in Madrid,
Cabarrds failed in his mission, since Cevallos would only discuss the problems with Sarratea. Because the envoy was refused another meeting with Cevallos, he wrote the First Secretary to tell him of information received from Sarratea. The letter mentioned that England would permit neither a return to colonial status nor any imposed settlement not acceptable to the people of Buenos Aires.
The bases for negotiations, Cabarrfis reported, must be those proposed by the legitimate representative, Sarratea, but which the 58 king had already rejected.
Aware of the conflicting reports, Cevallos met in May, 1816,
56Ibld.. pp. 77-79.
57Ibid.. pp. 79-84.
58Ibld.. pp. 91-96. 82 with Rivadavia. The First Secretary did not want to jeopardize the talks at their outset by raising questions about the other party’s powers to negotiate. When he did ask, Rivadavia merely replied
that his government had not yet sent him instructions, Cevallos not only questioned him about the delay in receiving his orders, but also about the hostile actions of the rebel navy, which had attacked ships near C£diz and had established a blockade of Callao.
In general, Rivadavia's answers satisfied neither the
counsellors of state nor the government. The envoy explained that his mission had been merely to ascertain Ferdinand's intentions
toward the colonies, and, to recommend that Madrid send observers to investigate existing conditions. His responses to Cevallos'
queries, coupled with the information received from Sarratea,
doomed the project. Cevallos, with the support of the counsellors 59 of state, ordered Rivadavia to leave Spain.
The attempt at a negotiated settlement with the rebels had
failed— but this had taken place in 1816, well before Pizarro's
expedients in the Council of State. The counsellors had reacted
more favorably to a need for political and administrative reforms.
Their proposals, however, were modest, and would not require a
radical departure from established norms. Even by implementing
-*^AHN, Estado, lib. 18d, session, June 6, 1816; Belgrano, o p. cit.. pp. 99-123; Cevallos to Rivadavia, translation, June 21, 1816, FO 72/191. 83 their recommendations, the government would preserve its prerogatives
in the colonies. But how might the counsellors react to a reform which could bring about a decrease in Spanish economic influence
in America, and perhaps cause severe hardship to people in Spain?
With these questions in mind, this study turns to the subject of
granting the colonists the right of free trade with foreign
countries. CHAPTER V
EVOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL'S VIEWS TOWARD GRANTING
THE COLONIES FREE TRADE WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES
No issue gave rise to more heated discussion than this question of free trade for the American colonies. Naturally, the concession would produce consequences in the metropolis. Between
1815 and 1818, the Council of the Indies and the Council of State considered various aspects of the issue: (1) that its adoption was
long overdue; (2) that governmental policy should conform to economic capabilities and to an awareness of those principles guiding the policy-making in other nations; and, (3) that the grant should be used to entice countries to mediate the dispute. As will be
seen here, the counsellors of state rehashed arguments and points
that had been thoroughly thrashed out in the Council of the Indies.
In spite of being acquainted with the various consultas of that
Council, they, nevertheless, were divided on the issue.
I. THE QUESTION OF FREE TRADE IN THE COUNCIL OF THE INDIES
The king continued to receive a number of consultas on the
subject of free trade from his principal advisory body on American
affairs. The counsellors, at various times, insisted that the
pacification of America and the preservation of the empire depended
on granting this concession to the colonists. Spain could not supply
for the total needs of the colonies. This inability, which had 85 persisted for many years, had given rise to a lucrative contraband trade. The economy of the metropolis suffered from this illicit intercourse.*
To add credibility to these observations, the President of the
Council of the Indies, at the request of the Secretary of State, convened a special meeting of seven counsellors in December, 1815.
They scrutinised the implications of granting free trade to the colonists. This committee based its recommendations on a series of questions raised by opponents of the measure: the changed balance of power system in Europe; the inability of Spain to furnish an adequate supply of goods to the colonists; and, the need to pacify
America and preserve the empire.
The counsellors found little difficulty in refuting the contentions of those supporting a restrictive trade policy. These restrictive-trade advocates claimed that the Treaty of Utrecht supported their position. They did favor, nevertheless, indirect trade with the colonists.^ On the first point, the counsellors argued that the existing situation in international politics would require the government to revise the existing laws. The other nations of Europe tended to disregard the mercantile provisions of
^Report of Four Members of the Council of the Indies, July 13, 1815, copy, AGI, Estado, leg. 88.
^‘•Borrador de la Consulta acordada por la la Junta de 3 de diciembre de 1815," February 8, 1817, copy, AGI, Estado, leg. 86. 86 the Treaty of Utrecht because they wanted to find new markets for their goods. The desire for material benefits, according to the committee, vitiated the legal obligations incurred by that agree- ment.„ 3
Regarding support for increased indirect trade with the colonies, the counsellors felt that, contrary to views expressed in its favor, it would also harm both the colonies and the metropolis.
If direct intercourse would damage the economy of the colonies and would result in the loss of precious metals, then the indirect trade would produce similar consequences. Moreover, the counsellors contended that these merchants would have difficulty convincing the colonists that indirect trade would be more profitable, while trying to repudiate their beneficial experiences of direct intercourse with foreigners.^
The atj. hoc committee used these and other arguments to refute the assertions of those favoring a restrictive commercial policy.
The counsellors believed, however, that Spain had to revise existing mercantile legislation. She lacked a powerful navy to enforce those restrictions, and did not have the advanced Industrial techniques
"Contextacifin a las observaciones que segfin Real Orden de 3 de diciembre de 1815, se deben tener presentes acerca del medio de pacificar las Americas propuesto por la Inglaterra," February 8, 1817, copy, AGI, Estado, leg. 86.
^"Borrador de la Consulta acordada por la la junta . . . ," February 8, 1817, copy, AGI, Estado, leg. 86. 87 necessary to compete with the British or even with the French. If
Spain were at the same industrial level as other nations, noted the
counsellors, she could benefit from the present policy--but she was not. Taking all these considerations into account, the committee held that the government should call on experts in matters of tariffs and customhouses to suggest any necessary revisions of the laws.
Furthermore, it was recommended that proposed legislation be
considered in the light of Spain's limitations, the changed European
political scene, past colonial experiences, and, the need to preserve
certain prerogatives for Spaniards.^
Because of the possible repercussions of conceding free trade
to the colonies, the king ordered the Council of the Indies to
examine the issue. It was to recommend revisions of the Laws of
the Indies dealing with trade. He also told the counsellors to
inform the Secretary of State of those measures which "they con
sidered desirable, for the general prosperity, and for restoring
peace and tranquility in America."®
By 1817, the subject had been examined by both the Council of
the Indies and the Junta of Pacification. The counsellors urged the
government to revise the existing mercantile code and suggested
3Ibld.
®Royal Resolution on the Consulta of the Council of the Indies, May 17, 1816; Duke of Montemar to Pedro Cevallos, October 22; Cevallos to Montemar, October 26, 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 88. 88 guidelines. They insisted, however, that qualified personnel arrange specific details such as duties and tariffs.^
Despite the apparent consensus of opinion in the Council of the Indies in 1817, the subject of free trade arose again in July,
1818. The Junta of Pacification (the special ad hoc committee of nine counsellors, which had been formed from members of the Council of the Indies to consider the question of the pacification of
America), restated the importance of granting this concession to the colonies. A new mercantile code could forestall the separation of the colonies, and serve as an inducement for foreign governments to mediate the dispute. Moreover, the privilege of direct foreign intercourse, stressed this consults, would merely legalize the unchecked and lucrative contraband trade. It would, however, eliminate for foreign interlopers the hazards involved in their
< ■ 8 illegal transactions.
The above suggestion to use the concession of free trade as an incentive for the foreigners to mediate had been recommended often by the counsellors of the Indies. It was felt that if Spain had used this privilege earlier in the disorders to get outside assistance, she could possibly have suppressed the revolt in its early stages.
^"Extracto de la Consulta hecha en 8 de corrte por las Juntas creadas de orn de V. M. . . . ," February 22, 1817, Vazquez Papers, MSS, 442, fols. 57-70.
®Consulta of the Junta of Pacification, July 31, 1818, AGI, Estado, leg. 88. 89
Had the government followed a prudent course In 1811, and permitted trade with the colonies, Great Britain, they Insisted, would have 9 aided Spain.
As previously mentioned, the special committee of seven counsellors of the Indies in 1815 had stated, among other things, that the interests of the nation must come before those of the merchants. Even though Great Britain would reap the most benefit from this concession, only that country could aid Spain to pacify the colonies. Other countries, of course, would resent this opportunity for England to increase her power and influence in world politics. However, it was hoped that these nations would appreciate the government*s predicament, the need for Spain to retain the colonies, and the value to Europe of permitting Spain to play a prominent role in international politics. If nations such as France,
Russia, and the Low Countries could help pacify America, Spain, on the other hand, should permit them similar advantages. Then, England would not benefit more than the others. The counsellors were of the belief that Britain would be willing to share the trade with other countries and that Spain could, in turn, make similar concessions to
9 Report of Four Members of the Council of the Indies, July 13, 1815, copy, AGI, Estado, leg. 88; MBorrador de la Consulta acordada por la la Junta . . , February 8, 1817, copy, AGI, Estado, leg.86.
^ ,eContextaci6n a las observaciones que SGgun Real Orden . . . February 8, 1817, copy, AGI, Estado, leg. 86. 90
These counsellors prepared elaborate guidelines for the proposed revision of the existing mercantile code. Their idea was to confine foreign intercourse to selected ports in America, and require foreign governments to enforce the regulations governing the trade. The counsellors then proposed a list of ports, which were to include Havana, Santiago de Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Fuerto
Rico. They affirmed the need to proceed even more cautiously when
considering ports in Central and South America, but advised that the government designate some immediately. The counsellors suggested
that such other ports include the ones opened by the rebels. At a later date, they suggested the privilege be extended to Vera Cruz and Campeche, in New Spain, and possibly to one other which would
supply the Interior Provinces. There should be two ports in
Guatemala, Omoa and Truxillo. Furthermore, they stated that Porto
Bello and Panama already enjoyed it tie. facto. Finally, the coun
sellors felt that the privilege should be eventually granted to Santa
Marta, La Guaira, Valparaiso, Lima, and Guayaquil.**
The counsellors paid careful attention to the question of
import duties. Regarding this point, they suggested that England
should not be charged more than 15%, the estimated cost of their
illegal trade. However, they advised that the king consult with
experts in the area, both on this matter, and on the question of 91 making more specific provisions. Moreover, the counsellors urged the government to use similar concessions to improve comnercial relations with other governments, but not under the same arrangements arrived at for colonial trade. 12
In the years after 1815, these suggestions were repeated.
Many consultas from the Council of the Indies recommended that, to pacify America, the government must open the colonial trade to
foreigners. The counsellors noted that those vested interest groups, both in Spain and in the Indies, should be able to understand Spain
lacked a sizable navy to enforce existing restrictions. For its part, the government had to realize that the present mercantile code encouraged contraband, and thereby reduced the revenue of the Royal
Exchequer. At the very least, the counsellors thought Spain should use the concession to induce Great Britain to mediate; for, without 13 that country's aid, Spain could not pacify the colonies.
As mentioned in an earlier chapter, the counsellors of state,
in February, 1817, had received a summary of the various consultas to
the king. They also received one other report, which perhaps was
the most important. It came from representatives of the consulados
in Spain, who had met in Madrid to discuss the problem of peninsular
^Duke of Montemar to Pedro Cevallos, October 22, 1816; Consults of the Council of the Indies, November 9, 1816; Consults of the Junta of Pacification, July 31, 1818, AGI, Estado, leg. 88. 92 trade. The Council of the Indies, as well as the Secretary of
Finance, had advised the government to defer decision on revising the existing mercantile code until it had considered the recommendation 14 of the consulados.
The representatives of the consulados presented their sug gestions in June, 1817. These stressed what they considered to be the government’s dilemma in the present controversy over a restricted or a liberal trade policy--to permit the colonies free trade and preserve the empire, but cause possible economic hardships to people in Spain; or, to continue the existing policy, and satisfy the merchants, but most likely lose the colonies. In a somewhat objective manner, they examined the alternatives open to the govern ment and the repercussions on Spain of each decision. The report contained their recommendations on the subject.^
They began by examining the reasons behind the government’s decision to open certain colonial ports during the time of the
*^Duke of Montemar to Pedro Cevallos, October 22, 1816, AGI Estado, leg. 88; "Extracto de la Consulta hecha en 8 de corrte por las Juntas creadas de orn de V. M. . . . February 22, 1817, VAzquez Papers, MSS, 442, fols. 57-70.
^"Afio 1817. Memoria sobre el modo que conviene que los extrangeros hagan el comercio en ntras Americas, escrita en 1817, para presentarla a SM por el Ministr0 de Haci**a por la Junta de los diputados de los consulados permanente en Madd en este afio, y formada en el antor por el orden del govierno," VAzquez Papers, MSS, 444, fols. 114-133. 93
Napoleonic invasion. Because Spain had been unable to supply the colonists with the necessary goods, she had granted foreigners the right to trade with the colonies. However, the rebellious provinces had also thrown open their doers to foreign nations. This policy
in the era of Napoleon had been justified by official insistence on
Spain's economic straits; the lack of a merchant marine; the
increased value of the excess American goods in a free market; the advantage of granting the colonists trading privileges similar to those enjoyed by European Spaniards; and the added revenue taken in under the plan by the Royal Exchequer. After adopting these emer gency measures, however, the government had been unable to restore the former system.
The report pointed out that the merchants based their
opposition to a liberal trade policy on the right to retain their privileges; the ruinous effects on the nation's economy; the pro visions of the Laws of the Indies; and the need for the government
to enforce a policy similar to the one adopted by other European nations in relations with their colonies. To buttress their asser
tions, they cited, among other things, Spain's lack of industry
and of a sizable merchant fleet, both of which prevented her from
competing with foreigners for American markets. Therefore, the
representatives stated, the merchants predicted that that loss of
funds would mean the ruination of both the royal navy and the
merchant marine, the decline of domestic Industry, and the flight of 94 capital to foreign lands due to few investment opportunities in
Spain.c . I6
The report showed, moreover, that the European nations also had an interest in supporting the continuation of Spanish domination in America. Undoubtedly, these states desired to increase their trade with the American colonies. But, contrary to belief, unlimited free trade would not benefit Europe. The colonies would first become
independent. Then, there would be the flight of manpower and capital to the newly independent states, because America offered a good climate, fertile soil in abundance, and inexhaustible natural resources. The consequences of American independence would be cata strophic --the economic decline of Europe.
Claiming that they were bearing in mind all possible reper cussions in America, in Spain, and in Europe, the same report out
lined a sixteen point program for permitting indirect foreign trade with the colonies. They suggested, among other things^ that foreign
ships, after proceeding first to Sp&in to register and pay certain
duties and taxes, be allowed to carry goods in their hulls to desig nated ports in America— one port in each province. The program
provided for restrictions on armaments, provisions to insure that the
ships sailed to the designated colonial port, and regulations to
govern storage of goods and the activities of merchants while in 95
Spain, In addition, foreign ships would be prohibited from navi gating between ports in American waters. On their return from
America, only those ships leaving Vera Cruz and stopping first at
Havana should convey specie. Ships carrying only colonial products would be allowed to return to their respective countries after paying the required duties and taxes in America.
In addition to regulations governing the conduct of foreign merchants, the representatives of the consulados urged the government to adopt measures to stimulate national commerce. The incentives suggested here included: discounts and exemptions both in Spain and in America; the reserving of intra-American navigation for
Spaniards; and the removal of all regulations governing the procure ment of building materials for ships. It was hoped that these and other measures would enable Spanish merchants to compete in American markets.
Finally, the representatives of the consulados exhorted the government to grant these privileges to the Spanish merchants, and to revise the tariffs, which should no longer be considered primarily as a measure to raise revenue in order to ameliorate the govern ment's precarious financial position. Otherwise, the government would have to expect relations with America to decrease and the colonies to become independent.^
17 Ibid. 96
In addition to the consultas of the Council of the Indies and the report of the consulados. the government also had to determine what Great Britain's attitude would be toward both free trade and mediation. As will be dealt with in the next chapter, England was to reject all offers of exclusive trading privileges, assuming, of course, that Ferdinand were willing to grant them. England would mediate only under her own terms.
II. DISCUSSIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE
The counsellors of state were acquainted with the preceding opinions and reports by counsellors, officials, and other interested parties, including Great Britain, on the relationship of free trade to the pacification of America. Just as the various consultas of the
Council of the Indies had made repeated references to previous reports, so too did the discussions of the Council of State overlap one another. Three periods are discernable in the debates by the
Council of State on free trade: first, April, 1815, until September,
1817, when Pizarro presented his twenty-two point memorial in the
Council of State; second, September, 1817, until June, 1818, at which time Spain informed the mediating powers of her program for a recon ciliation with America; and, finally, June, 1818, until November,
1819, when Ferdinand rejected any idea of revising the existing mercantile code.
The counsellors, in the first phase, considered three 97 problems. These were: the legal barriers enumerated in the Treaty of Utrecht; the necessity of using free trade as an inducement for mediation--by England alone, or in concert with other European nations--to settle Spain's dispute both with the colonies and with the Portuguese; and the opposition to free trade of mercantile groups in Spain.
As early as May, 1815, Pedro Cevallos raised the issue of the commercial provisions in the Treaty of Utrecht. Since Spain could not suppress the rebellions, he informed the counsellors that these might have to be disregarded. The government needed foreign assistance to pacify America, and to prevent the dissolution of the empire. To attain these objectives, the First Secretary believed that even the monopolists would approve granting trade concessions 18 to foreigners.
Although disinclined to do so, Spain approached Great Britain to mediate. Government officials insisted that the merchant classes
influenced that country's foreign policy. 19 Therefore, the British government tacitly consented to trade with the Spanish colonies in products hitherto classified as contraband. Under more favorable
circumstances, the Spanish government might have been able to enforce
its laws and prevent this illicit trade. However, the situation had
l8AHN, Estado, lib. 14d, session, May 23, 1815.
^AHN, Estado, lib. 14d, session, April 3, 1815. 98 changed both in Spain and in Europe. Spain could no longer exclude 20 foreigners from trading with the colonies.
Acknowledging this de facto trade, the counsellors held that
Spain could derive some advantage if the government were to liber alize its mercantile code, establish customhouses, and duties, and designate certain ports of entry for foreign goods. These measures would weaken Spain's prerogatives in America, undoubtedly, but, at least, the government could improve its hapless situation. Moreover,
England and the other nations would be satisfied, and Madrid would 21 glean some profit from the floursihing contraband trade.
Despite some side references to the evasion of the mercantile code by other nations, the counsellors admitted that the English were the principal culprits. Notwithstanding that fact, the govern ment realized that only with Britain's aid could the Americas be pacified. The former Secretary of State, the Duke of San Carlos, presented a detailed analysis of Spain's dilemma in the Council of
State. England's policies reflected her mercantile interests. Her merchants gauged their activities to the needs of particular regions.
Moreover, he insisted that spain should admit both that English goods already abounded in America, and that Spanish manufacturers could not supply the needs of the Americans. In this context, it was noted
20AHN, Estado, lib. 14d, session, May 23, 1815.
21Ibld. 99 that the colonists had grown accustomed to conveniences and quality merchandise, and that they feared a reunion with Spain would mean returning to the era of deprivations.
The Duke reasoned that the government should woo the British to intervene, pointing out how Spain would profit by such a move.
Just by establishing customhouses, she could bring in some revenue— perhaps more than from the present taxes on the colonies. Moreover, the empire would be preserved. Opening up trade, explained San
Carlos, would serve as an indicator to Americans that the metropolis was considering their best interests. He advised that any treaty liberalizing the colonial trade should designate the ports as well as the goods to be Introduced. 22
Taking into account the aforementioned considerations, the counsellors of state in May, 1815, urged Cevallos to request
England's aid to pacify the colonies. They also authorized him to 23 make trading concessions in exchange for this assistance.
Madrid did approach England, as will be analyzed in the next chapter. In the meantime, however, another problem developed which would have required Spain to grant trade concessions to other countries as well. In September, 1816, Portugal invaded the Banda
Oriental. Madrid decided to ask the Ambassadorial Conference at
22Ibid.
23 Ibid. 100
Paris to mediate the dispute. To gain the assistance of the govern
ments represented, Cevallos proposed offering them trading privileges
in America. The preservation of the empire, argued Cevallos in the
Council of State, should override the objections of vested interest groups in Spain. The First Secretary accused the merchants of having foiled a plan proposed in 1809. Its provisions, he stated, would have added more revenue than anything obtained from the present
A y> restrictive policy.
Cevallos' suggestion of a possible revision in the existing
trade laws brought remarks from a former Finance Secretary, Jos£
Ibarra. He mentioned that the representatives of the consulados were meeting to discuss the subject of peninsular, as well as
colonial trade. Ibarra, who chaired these meetings, reported that
their preliminary conclusions indicated that any liberalization of
the laws would be detrimental to Spain. However, in his opinion,
the pacification and the preservation of the Americas depended on adopting a new mercantile code.‘^
Shortly after this session of the Council of State, the king
received a consulta. dated October 22, 1816, from the Council of the
Indies on the subject of trade. It recommended that Spain grant
Great Britain trading concessions with America in exchange for her
^AHN, Estado, lib. 18d, session, October 16, 1816. 101 promise to mediate the dispute. Ferdinand then ordered the Council of State to discuss the ramif1cations of opening the colonial trade to foreigners. 9 f\
The next time the counsellors broached the subject of free trade was, nevertheless, not until January, 1817, and then they did not hold a detailed discussion on the issue. Rather, they learned of the conflicting views on the matter between the counsellors of the Indies and the representatives of the consulados. The former stressed that the pacification of America depended on granting the privilege of trading directly with foreign countries. The consulados.
Ibarra mentioned in a preliminary report to the Council, insisted that their exclusive rights to engage in colonial commerce did not constitute a monopoly; and, therefore, there was no need to revise existing legislation. 27
Still, nothing happened in the Council of State. The question had been mentioned tangently in different contexts, but not scrutinized by the counsellors. As described in Chapter II, Pizarro presented his expedlente in the Council of State in February, 1817.
From February until September, 1817, when the First Secretary’s revised twenty-two point memorial was discussed, the counsellors did not discuss the issue. Nevertheless, they did have time, as
26Minute on note of Duke of Montemar to Pedro Cevallos, October 22, 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 86.
^AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, session, January 22, 1817. 102 mentioned earlier, to learn of the possible ramifications of any move toward adopting a free trade policy.
Among his other suggestions set forth in September, 1817,
Pizarro proposed various reforms in Spain’s mercantile laws, thus
introducing the second phase of the free-trade question. He recom mended that the colonists be granted trading rights similar to those
in effect for merchants in Spain. If however, the disturbances continued in spite of such concessions to the colonists, he then believed it appropriate that the government seek outside assistance
from a naval power, namely, England. In this context, if Great
Britain guaranteed the success of her intervention, and promised to restrict it to Buenos Aires and Caracas, then, Pizarro felt, 28 Spain should permit her to trade with America.
The First Secretary proceeded to propose what he considered
an enlightened policy--one which would enable Spain to retain at
least those colonies she effectively controlled. He favored
rewarding the loyal provinces in America, and suggested that this
reward might take the form of allowing them to trade directly with
foreign nations from their principal ports. To lessen the supposedly
adverse consequences on the metropolis of opening the colonial trade,
the government could always establish tariffs on imports. He
continued, cautioning that the effects on Spain of such a measure
^®AHN, Estado, leg. 182. 103 were usually exaggerated by merchants and industrialists, and added
that this fact should be taken into account in any new regulation. 29
Following the accepted procedure in the Council of State,
each counsellor expressed his views on the proposals of the First
Secretary. It might be thought that, as they were now familiar with
the various reports on the issue, the counsellors themselves would
recommend some degree of free trade for the colonies. Yet, their
memorials showed that they too had reservations, similar to those
of the counsellors of the Indies, regarding the effects of free
trade.
III. THE COMPETING FACTIONS
The counsellors of state were divided into two groups. The
first, which may be termed the reformers of progressives, comprised
personages such as the Secretaries of State, Finance, and the Navy,
the President of the Council of the Indies, the Infante Don Carlos,
the Marquess of Hormazas, and Anselmo de Rivas. They recognized
that a revolutionary situation existed in the colonies; that the
outlook of the European governments had changed regarding a country's
obligations under the Treaty of Utrecht; and that Spain would have
to grant some degree of free trade in order to pacify America.
29imi. 104
The second group, which may be termed standpatters, included the Secretaries of War, and of Gracia y Justicia, the Dukes of
Infantado, Parque, and San Fernando, Manuel L6pez Araujo, and
Guillermo Hualde. They argued that any concessions would endanger
Spain’s control over the colonies. Moreover, those in this camp
Insisted that the people in the metropolis would suffer hardships by such a move. The standpatters would not believe that their government was powerless to prohibit commercial Intercourse between the colonies and foreign countries. What was more ironical, they refused to admit that Spanish Americans were taking for themselves what Spain refused to concede. The discussion set forth on the following pages will illustrate how, by the end of the second phase, June, 1818, it was to appear that the reformers had been victorious.
The Progressives
The Secretary of Finance analyzed the problem for the govern ment as follows. If colonial ports were thrown open to foreigners, the economy of the metropolis would suffer. If Spain were unable to supply goods at reasonable prices to Americans, however, it would be preferable to relax existing legal restrictions on colonial cultivation and manufacturing. Garay believed that European
Spaniards would agree to make these concessions rather than permit foreign nations to destroy the economy of the colonies, as well as 105 that of the metropolis.
Notwithstanding this, if Spain had to resort to foreign mediation to pacify America, she would have to liberalize the
existing trade policy. To minimize the losses from such a move,
the Finance Minister suggested that the government enact measures
permitting foreigners to engage in an indirect trade with the
colonies. Under the proposed system, the details of which experts would work out, foreign ships would pay duties and special taxes in
Spain, as well as in America. This scheme, Garay insisted, would
benefit Spanish merchants, and, at the same time, permit Americans
to sell their products to the highest bidder. The one proviso was 30 that colonial goods would have to be transported in Spanish ships.
Garay’s suggestions for a revised trade policy received
support from other counsellors. Pedro de Mendinueta, for one,
pointed out that Spain seemed unable to pacify the colonies. It
followed, therefore, that, because of her superior navy, England
should be asked to intervene. Furthermore, the consequences of
such a move could be minimized by a new mercantile code. The
government would then be able to gain needed revenue from the taxes
imposed on the large trade that England already carried on illegally 31 and with impunity.
30AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, session, September 17, 1817.
31Ibld. 106
The Navy Secretary also recommended that the government relax existing restrictions, but, on the other hand, he continued to oppose a policy of unlimited free trade. Foreigners, according to JosS
Vazquez, could trade with America, but only under certain conditions, and only until the government enacted a new law. The trade would be carried out through indirect intercourse with the colonies, and those
foreign goods introduced would be subject to import duties. The taxes Imposed should be sufficient to protect Spain’s commerce, yet
low enough to discourage contraband. VSzquez believed his program would satisfy the colonists and benefit European nations, but not 32 damage Spain.
The Standpatters
The preceding views, however moderate, were not shared by
the standpatters. They refused to make any concessions. Manuel
L6pez Araujo, a former Secretary of Finance, insisted that the
government should not liberalize the mercantile laws at present.
But rather, after pacifying the colonies, Spain should appoint
experts to work out new regulations, which should take into account 33 the provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht.
The Secretaries of War and of Gracia y Justlcia took even
stronger stands against change. They contended that the retention of
^^AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, session, September 24, 1817. 107 the colonies depended on excluding foreigners, who inevitably intro-
«1 / duced subversive ideas.
Lozano de Torres argued vehemently against any degree of free trade. In the first place, he refused to admit that conditions in the colonies warranted any such drastic measures. Its adoption, in his opinion, would sound the death knell of Spanish domination in America. The Laws of the Indies, he believed, were sacrosanct.
These should neither be discarded nor tampered with under any condition, not even under the pretext that they were outmoded.
Moreover, he argued, foreigners would never be satisfied by limited concessions. They would, insisted Lozano, continue to demand more, and, notwithstanding that, illegal trade would increase because speculators would be prepared to take any risk for the purpose of 35 profit.
Lozano went on to explain his estimate of the catastrophic consequences which would accompany the granting of free trade to the colonies. The merchant marine would be ruined, because it could never compete with the advanced techniques employed by such nations as the United States, Denmark, and Sweden. Without a merchant marine, he believed, Spain could not have any naval forces. Thus,
3^AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, sessions, September 17; September 24, 1817.
35AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, session, September 17, 1817; Lozano on the Pacification of America, July, n.d., 1817, AGI, Estado, leg. 88. 108 the colonies would be subject to the mercy of the strongest nation.
In addition, the backwardness of Spanish industry would prevent effective competition in international markets, notwithstanding such exemptions and privileges as would be provided for Spaniards.
On the other hand, the Secretary of Gracia y Justicia defended the trade monopoly practiced by Spain. All inhabitants were obligated to contribute to the prosperity of the empire. People in Spain paid more taxes than those in America. Therefore, the present monopoly merely served as an indirect tax on colonists, he insisted.
Lozano, however, did not oppose reforms under the present system, using judicious tariffs as a base. He favored reducing the added taxes (recargos) on foreign goods reshipped to America in
Spanish hulls. He also proposed allowing these ships to carry as much foreign merchandise as they wished, without being forced to transport Spanish products. In addition, he suggested the taxes be lowered on goods entering Spain from America. It was Lozano's belief that such revisions would enable Americans to buy goods more cheaply, while permitting foreigners to increase their volume of business with the colonies.
Realizing that the reduction in tax receipts and the losses suffered by Spanish agriculture and industry would have to be offset, he offered as a remedy the increased number of mercantile expeditions to the colonies, exemptions for Spanish merchants, and subsidies for 109 the merchant marine. Even If the reforms would not reduce the volume of contraband trade, Lozano insisted that the government would still be able to preserve the colonies, lay foundations for a powerful navy, prevent the ruin of many families engaged in commerce, and also retain the respect of the other nations.
Actually, Pizarro should have anticipated opposition on the question of free trade. Before presenting his twenty-two point memorial, he knew the views prevailing among certain counsellors.
When the counsellors discussed the proposed Slave Trade treaty with
Great Britain, Egufa, Lozano, the Duke of Infantado, and others had opposed vociferously all references to permitting free trade. They had refused to acknowledge that at present Spain gained little from the existing free trade practices of the colonists. 37
In the session of October 1, 1817, the First Secretary once again presented the case for free trade. He acknowledged the effects on the economy of Spain, but believed, nevertheless, that only by granting free trade could the colonies be pacified. To buttress his argument, Pizarro mentioned that the various consultas of the Council of the Indies had recommended this concession. Moreover, all nationals but Spain*s were engaged in the illicit trade, and the
36Ibid.
"^Minute by Pizarro on "Acuerdo del Consejo supremo de Indias y voto particular de algunos de sus consejeros sobre el trafico de negros," Vazquez Papers, MSS, 436, fols. 164-173. 110
colonists had been enjoying Its benefits. To deprive them at this
late date would hinder any move toward pacification. He concluded, restating that if Spain could not calm the disturbances by making the
offer, then the government should use the concession to induce 38 European nations to mediate.
Two more weeks pased. On October 15, 1817, the ad hoc commis
sion formed in the Council presented its proposals. As was noticed
earlier, the majority of those proposals classified as direct measures won approval with relatively little debate. But the issue
of free trade evoked a much more substantial reaction.
That jyl hoc committee proposed that on the question of free
trade, the government should make any necessary concession, not only
to strengthen ties between the metropolis and the colonies, but also
to benefit the inhabitants of both. The ambiguous wording of the
proposal confused some counsellors. To clarify the ambiguity,
Guillermo Hualde, a member of the committee, explained that the
proposition referred only to trade between the metropolis and the
colonies, in no way implying permission for free trade--a question
which was left to be resolved at a later date. This interpretation
satisfied neither Pizarro nor Garay. As so restated, they argued, it
lacked substance. Another member of the commission, Josl Ibarra,
differed with his colleague Hualders interpretation of the proposal,
3&AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, session, October 1, 1817. Ill insisting that its purport was actually to permit foreigners to 39 trade with the colonies.
Accepting this interpretation, each side presented its arguments, adding little--if anything--to what had already been said many times. The Council was deadlocked. Meanwhile, Pizarro waited anxiously for its decision. Without a decision by the counsellors on the issue of free trade, he could not begin serious negotiations with foreign governments over a possible mediation of the dispute 40 with the colonies.
Instead of the usual weekly interval between sessions, the king, probably at Pizarro*s urging, called a meeting three days later. At the outset of the session of October 18, 1817, Pizarro insisted that the counsellors had already voted on the subject of free trade for the colonies. According to the minutes of the
Secretary of the Council of State, ten counsellors favored either limited or unlimited free trade; four opposed the concession; and three urged that it be deferred to a later date in the proposed 41 negotiations with foreign governments.
Notwithstanding Pizarro's insistence to the contrary, the counsellors debated the issue again at that session. Nothing new was
■*^AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, session, October 15, 1817.
*°Ibld.
^AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, session, October 18, 1817. 112 contributed to an understanding of the Issues involved. The numer ical distribution of votes remained the same. The counsellors thus failed to give their consent to the measure, leaving Pizarro in a quandary; he lacked the required substantial majority which would have enabled him to use that concession in any forthcoming nego- 42 tiatlon concerning foreign mediation.
This irresolution cost the First Secretary valuable time. In the Spanish rejoinder to the British Memorandum of August, 1817, the government hesitated to propose free trade as a basis of foreign mediation. This will be described in some detail in the next chapter.
To reiterate, as of the April 28, 1818 session of the Council of State, Pizarro had reduced the expediente on the pacification of
America to three cardinal points. One of these, and perhaps the most important, was the necessity of declaring the right of foreigners to participate in the colonial trade. Spain, he argued, could not ignore this situation, and besides, "it jwas] agreed and 43 merely hajdfj to be announced publicly to the world."
Furthermore, because of the increased importance to Spain of foreign mediation in the dispute with the colonies, and the prepon derant role expected of Great Britain in any such undertaking,
^AHN, Estado, lib. 20d, sessions, October 18; November 13, 1817.
^AHN, Estado, lib. 21d, session, April 28, 1818. 113
Pizarro informed the counsellors of England's attitude toward the . issue of free trade. He reported that Spain's ambassador in London, the Duke of San Carlos, had conferred already with Lord Castlereagh on the subject of the rebellious colonies. The Foreign Secretary had expressed regret that Spain had not declared publicly her program for a reconciliation with the colonies. As part of the plan, he hoped the Spanish government would adopt a more liberal commercial policy for the colonies, one which would satisfy the mercantile interests of each nation.
Such a policy, he told San Carlos, would dissuade merchants from overtly and covertly lending support to the rebellions. More over, with the implementation of a liberal program, Castlereagh believed the merchants would desire the rapid pacification of the 44 colonies.
Pizarro also buttressed his arguments for free trade with suggestions contained in a note from Luis Onfs. The preceding chapter described that ambassador's opinions regarding other reforms to be instituted by the government in order to pacify America. In addition, the First Secretary told the counsellors, Onfs had recom mended a policy of free trade for the colonies. Such a measure, the ambassador reasoned, would reduce the incentive for foreigners'
^AHN, Estado, lib. 21d, session, April 28, 1818; Castlereagh to San Carlos, March 24, 1818, FO 72/216. 114 support of the independence movements, and would correct one of the major grievances of the colonists,4^
After hearing Pizarro's latest information and proposals, the counsellors again debated the issue of free trade. The increased importance of foreign mediation in Spain's dispute with the colonies by 1818, (a subject to be covered in the next chapter), gave added significance to the question of free trade. The sessions on
April 2 8 ^ and May 6th of 1818 were the last ones to discuss this sticky problem.
The government's added emphasis on the desirability of mediation, coupled with an indication of Spain's inability to thwart the momentum of the rebellions, caused two former standpatters to adopt a more conciliatory posture. Guillermo Hualde and the Duke of Parque now sided, or so it would appear, with the reformers.
Aside from this change, the two camps remained the same, still at 46 odds over the issue of free trade.
Still the Council of State reached no conclusive accord.
Because of the additional support, however, Pizarro felt empowered to appeal directly to Ferdinand,,, In his final memorial to the king on the pacification of America, June 9, 1818, he proposed, among other
45AHN, Estado, lib. 21d, session, April 28, 1818; Onfs to Pizarro, January 14, 1818, no. 8, AHN, Estado, leg. 5643.
^AHN, Estado, lib. 21d, sessions, April 28; May 6, 1818. 115 measures, that the Americans be allowed to trade with foreign
countries. The First Secretary outlined a scheme that paralleled
suggestions made by the Council of the Indies, the Junta of Pacifi
cation, the Secretary of Finance, and other members of the Council
of State. For the non-rebellious colonies, he opted to designate
certain ports and to establish fair duties for foreign goods. The
adoption of this program would be one way to correct the abuses of a
restricted trading policy. Moreover, the concession would serve to
satisfy the foreigners* desire for markets, and dissuade their
governments from fomenting the rebellions. By thus granting the
concession, Spain would gain support in the struggle against the
insurgency. ^
As will be shown in the next chapter, Pizarro was able to
convince the king. For in June, 1818, Spain informed the mediating
powers of her future program for the colonies. She promised to
adopt, along with other measures, a more liberal commercial policy
for the Americas. Thus, the reformers had been victorious in
the second phase of the debate over free trade.
Notwithstanding the above, this ''victory” was to prove short
lived. Spain became dissatisfied with the responses received from
the European nations to her overtures for their intervention. In
^"ExposiciSn de Don Jose Pizarro al Rey sobre la pacificaci&i de America," June 9, 1818, in Delgado, op.clt.. pp. 373-380, 116
addition, she was to be excluded from the Congress of Aix-la-
Chapelle. Consequently, the Spanish government was never to propose
the measure again.
After the dismissal of Pizarro in September, 1818, a subject
to be discussed in Chapter VIII, the king was dissuaded from
permitting free trade. The new First Secretary, the Marquess of
Casa Irujo, insisted that this grant would bring about independence.
He accused foreign merchants of instigating rebellion in the
colonies. Moreover, he felt that the concession of free trade would have a further disadvantage, as it would force Spain to jeopardize
the peace and security of those provinces already pacified, com- / O pletely or partially.
The king was also dissuaded in a memorial from Rafael Morant,
a counsellor of the Indies. Written in December, 1818, it indicated
that the Council of State, contrary to what seemed the accepted idea,
had not resolved the question of free trade. Morant wrote the king
in reference to a consulta of the Council of the Indies. Their
report had recommended that the government continue to allow
foreigners to trade with Panama and to permit reshipment of these
goods to other ports in the Pacific; these privileges had been
conceded only by special decrees. Morant urged that the matter of
granting this permission permanently be referred to the Council of
^®''Exposici6n del Marquis de Casa Irujo a Fernando VII," September 21, 1818, in Delgado, op. cit.T pp. 396-399. 117
State. Since that body was considering the issue of free trade as part and parcel of the problem of the pacification of America, he felt that those counsellors also ought to examine the consults of the 69 Council of the Indies.
Outside official channels, vested interest groups lobbied too. They wanted the government to defer action on the consulta of the Council of the Indies until the Council of State had reached an accord on the question of free trade. The representatives of the
Consulado of C£diz, for example, advised both the Secretaries of
State and Finance to consider the matter carefully. They cited the hard-pressed state of Spanish commerce, and the need to protect the commercial classes, whose fortune affected other business enter prises. Moreover, they informed these officials of their petitions to the king during the protracted discussions on free trade in the
Council of State.^
Ferdinand, too, had resolved the problem. Despite his earlier support of Pizarro*s proposal, he did not intend to open the colonial trade to foreigners. The king proposed to reserve that trade for
Spaniards. He considered any concession to be detrimental to the
AQ "Exposicion del oficial de la mesa D11 Rafael Morant sobre la consulta del Consejo de Indias relativo al Comercio de Panama con los Extrangeros y de all{ a los Puertos de la Mar del Sur," December I, 1818, AGP, PR/31, vol. 16, fols. 186-190.
^Representatives of the Consulados of c£diz to the Minister of Finance, January 5; to the Secretary of State, January 13, 1819, AGI, Estado, leg. 86. 118 economy of the metropolis as well as dangerous to the preservation of peace in America.
Phase three, discussed in the last part of this chapter, did not begin, actually, until the Spanish government had decided to reject mediation as a means to pacify the colonies. The issue of free trade had raised fundamental questions for the Spanish govern ment, more so than the other reform measures recommended by the counsellors of state. In this field, the government had to tread warily. The consequences of any move would be far reaching: (1) the loss of economic influence in America; (2) the probable adverse effects on the economy of Spain; and, (3) the possible independence of the colonies, even if the grant were made.
Reform measures had proved ineffective. The rebellions continued unabated. Therefore, in the first and second phases of the question of free trade, the possibility still existed that
Spain could negotiate for foreign intervention. With this in mind, this study will turn to consideration of proposals to seek outside assistance in the dispute with the colonies.
Pedro Cevallos to the Duke of San Fernando, no. 474, October 17; Duke of San Fernando to Pedro Cevallos, November 21, 1819, AGI, Estado, leg. 86. CHAPTER VI
CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSALS TO SEEK EUROPEAN ASSISTANCE
The end of the Napoleonic wars in Europe raised Spanish hopes of foreign assistance in the struggle with the rebel colonies.
Naturally, the government would seek the most advantageous conditions
for this aid— approaching the country or countries that demanded the
fewest concessions. At first, Spain approached Great Britain, but the move proved futile, just as it had in 1811. Because of the new
European balance-of-power system, Ferdinand believed he could get help from other nations. From the Congress of Vienna, until Spain's rejection of mediation as a tool to pacify America, September, 1818,
the government maneuvered among the choices of calling on either
England, and/or other European nations, or the Quadruple Alliance in
concert„
I. RELATIONS WITH CONTINENTAL EUROPE (1814-1817)
Spain had played a minor role in the negotiations at the
Congress of Vienna. Regarding European settlements, she had shown
a special interest in affairs concerning Italy. Ferdinand desired
the return of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla to the Spanish Bourbons,
If the Big Four--England, Russia, Prussia, and Austria--did not
support his demands, Pedro G6mez Labrador, the Spanish ambassador to
the Congress, was instructed to press for the right of the House of 120
Parma to incorporate Sardinia. He also had orders to get the Big
Four to support the restoration of Ferdinand IV, a Spanish Bourbon, to the throne of Naples.^
In matters pertaining to America, Labrador's instructions were somewhat more specific. He was to oppose Portugal's restitution of
Guyana to France, as Madrid feared that French adventurers and merchants would aid the rebels of Venezuela. Also, he was ordered to avoid any discussion of permitting foreigners to trade with America.
In the event that England insisted on raising the issue, the Spanish ambassador had been advised to stress that British ports in Asia still prohibited the docking of Spanish ships destined for the
Philippines. Finally, Labrador was instructed to seek support from 2 the Big Four for Spain's claims to Louisiana.
At the meetings in Vienna the Spanish envoy strongly contested the provisions of the Treaty of Fontainbleau, which had provided that
Napoleon's wife and son receive the Duchies of Parma, Piacenza, and
Guastalla. He argued that these Duchies should go to the Infante
Don Luis or to his mother, the Queen of Etruria and sister of
Ferdinand VII of Spain. Notwithstanding his protestations, the Final
*Jer6nimo Bicker, Hlstoria de las relaciones exterlores <|e. Espafla durante el slelo xix (3 vols.; Madrid: Jaime Rites, 1924), I, 382-384; Wenceslao Ramirez de Villaurrutia (Marquess of Villa- Urrutla), Espafla en el Conereso de Viena (Madrid: Francisco Beltrin, 1928), pp. 60-62.
^Villa-Urrutia, 0£. clt.. pp. 60-62; Bicker, oe,. clt.. I, 374-375. 121
Act of the Congress of Vienna provided that the Parma Duchies would go to the former Empress. The question of reversion, however, was 3 not settled at this time.
Labrador considered the disregard of Spanish claims as an ominous sign. The smaller countries, he reported to Madrid, were at the mercy of the Big Four. These Powers used the Congress to
increase their territories by dividing lands occupied provisionally by their troops, forcing their decisions on these unfortunate nations.^ Moreover, he reported that he had not participated in the
discussions which led to the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna
(June 9, 1815) or the Second Peace of Paris (November 20, 1815).
Both agreements disregarded Spain's claims to the principalities in
Italy and contained a clause providing for the eventual restitution
of Olivenza to Portugal. Because the other nations refused to allow
the treaties to be signed with reservations attached, Ferdinand withheld acceptance.^
Madrid, however, had gained one point at the Congress. Over
the opposition of Lord Castlereagh, Labrador had succeeded in con vincing the other nations that the Final Act of the Congress of
Vienna should contain only a simple declaration condemning inhuman
■^Villa-Urrutia, op.cit.. p. 43; Bicker, op.clt.. I, 373.
^Bicker, 02.. sit., I, 376.
5Ibid.. pp. 377-381, 396-408. 122 slave traffic. It did not, as the English desired, prescribe when or how the trade would be abolished,^
The results of the meetings at Vienna and later at Paris affected Spain*s relations with other European nations in various ways. In addition to the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance (Paris,
November 20, 1815), Russia, Prussia, and Austria had signed the
Treaty of the Holy Alliance in September, 1815, France joined this league one month later. Formulated by Czar Alexander I of Russia, its three articles stressed the principle of mutual assistance and called on the monarchs to defend the "precepts of justice, chartiy, and peace.In May, 1816, at the suggestion of the Czar, Ferdinand
VII also subscribed to the Treaty of the Holy Alliance, In a letter to Czar Alexander, the King of Spain expressed how he hoped to be assisted by Russia in particular and the Holy Alliance in general to solve some problems:
With your support, , , , I will be able to overcome the problems which surround me. Within Spain, . . . order will be re-established; I am working at this unceasingly; the situation in the Colonies also begins to give hope that their union with the mother country will be reaffirmed. As to Spain's relations with the other Nations, as soon as it is known in Europe that Your Majesty desires the
6Ibld.. pp. 392-393; Harold Nicolson, The Congress af. Vienna: A Study in Allied Unitv. 1812-1822 (New York: The Viking Press, 1967), pp. 94-95.
"The Holy Alliance," in Introduction to Contemporary Civilization in the West (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 118-119. 123
prosperity of this Monarchy and that he accords me a personal Interest, the difficulties will disappear. . . . It is as your ally that I will call for your advice and support. I hope that our relations will continue to grow from day to day.8
In spite of the high principles which couched the terms of both the Treaty of the Holy Alliance and the Treaty of the Quadruple
Alliance, each major European nation still looked primarily to its own national interest. With Napoleon on St. Helena and Louis XVIII on the throne of France, the raison d’etre of the Quadruple Alliance seemed to disappear. Its members, in particular Great Britain,
Russia, and Austria, held conflicting views of its functions. Even though Castlereagh would have liked to consider it an expression of European unity, the English people only expected that coalition to prevent a revival of militarism in France. Alexander, for his part, viewed the Quadruple Alliance as the political arm of the Holy
Alliance. He hoped to use it to deal with the twin problems of the post-war period— foreign aggression and domestic upheaval.
Metternich, however, rejected the political implications of the
Czar's interpretation, fearing that such a system of collective security would justify interference as well as common defense. His approach closely paralleled Castlereagh's, but with certain signif- 9 leant differences.
8Ferdinand to Czar Alexander, n.d., in Villa-Urrutia, o j j, cit.. pp. 212-213. 1
%enry Kissinger, A World Restored (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1957), pp. 221-226. 124
Spain and the smaller countries also looked to their par
ticular national interests, Ferdinand endeavored to arrange a treaty with Holland and other interested countries against the Barbary
pirates, whose ships exacted a heavy toll from nations refusing to pay tribute. Under any arrangement, Madrid would have to supply
troops and make available a small squadron. Fulfillment of these
commitments would necessitate use of the revenue from the custom houses. The Council of State approved the use of these funds, but
since the king had not as yet endorsed the proposal, Cevallos had
been reluctant to so approach other governments.^
The smaller countries were interested in an alliance against
the Barbary pirates. Cevallos believed, nevertheless, that the Big
Four would be reluctant to commit themselves. In particular, he
censured Great Britain; he accused her of trying to destroy the
trade of other nations. The First Secretary hoped to conclude a
treaty with Holland, and expected France to join.^ Madrid also
decided to approach Russia, so as to get ships for the navy, and to 12 gain an ally against England.
^AHN, Estado, lib. I6d., sessions, December 6; December 13, 1815.
U-AHN, Estado, lib. 16d., session, April 17, 1816.
12AHN, Estado, lib. 18d., session, June 6, 1816. 125
Meanwhile, the King of the Low Countries had proposed that the treaty of alliance provide for both defensive and offensive oper ations, For his part, the First Secretary felt that such an arrange ment would present a stronger front against the pirates. Also, such an alliance would reduce Spain's commitments, because she alone would not have to patrol those regions frequently preyed upon by the Moors. In order to allocate sufficient funds for a Spanish squadron to co-operate with Holland, the Finance Minister suggested a reduction in the army's budget and an over-all re-examination of the nation's financial priorities. Notwithstanding the above, and despite the urging of Spain's ambassador in Brussels, Miguel de
Alava, Cevallos still believed that the government should await the response of Russia before signing any accord. 13
While attempting to arrange these bilateral and multilateral treaties, Ferdinand continued to withhold his signature from both the
Final Act of the Congress of Vienna and the Second Treaty of Paris.
The king was displeased with the articles relating to both the
Italian settlement and Olivenza. Cevallos contended, however, that
there was much to be gained by acceding to the treaties as they
stood, thereby insuring Spain's membership in the European confed
eration. Although Spain might justify her aloof position on moral
grounds, other governments, he asserted, had repudiated such
l3AHN, Estado, lib, 18d., session, June 12, 1816. 126
"legalistic” principles, and enlarged their territories by virtue of their military prowess. The First Secretary informed the Council of State that the country's over-all weakness should impel the king to forego any other considerations but those which conformed to the
Realpolitik of nations.
Acceptance of the treaty settlements could produce far- reaching benefits for Spain, The claims of the Queen of Etruria might be satisfied, and, at the least, Ferdinand could claim various indemnities owed him in accordance with the First and Second Treaties of Paris. Moreover, the king could then more readily approach his allies on other matters of importance to Spain. Even though these countries had geared their economies to the expected independence of the colonies, Ferdinand could hope to stress, with greater probability of success, his allies' legal and moral obligations in halting assistance to the malcontents in Spain and in America. On the other hand, argued Cevallos, continued opposition to the treaties, compounded by the resultant loss of funds to the Treasury, could create for Spain a situation in which there would be no "army, navy, domestic calm, or cordial relations with other governments."^
Cevallos' arguments seemed to be reinforced in October, 1816.
In the session of October 16, some counsellors questioned whether
^AHN, Estado, lib. 16d., sessions, December 13; December 15, 1815; lib. 18d., sessions, June 6; June 14; July 9, 1816. 127
Spain's refusal to sign the treaties had undermined prospects for the Allies' intervention in mediating the Luso-Spanish dispute over
the Banda Oriental, ***
Ferdinand finally agreed to sign both the Final Act of the
Congress of Vienna and the Second Peace of Paris. At first, he had
intended to do so with reservations attached.^ However, after the
Ambassadorial Conference at Paris resolved the problem of the Italian principalities--by an agreement that, after the death of Marie Louise
the throne would revert to the Spanish claimant--and after Czar
Alexander urged him to accept the treaties without reservations,
Ferdinand did so sign the documents in June, 1817.^
Meanwhile in America, Spain had begun to lose her earlier
advantage. By mid-1817, Sim6n Bolivar had returned to Venezuela,
and wars raged in northern South America. In the South, Portugal
controlled Montevideo. Josl de San Martin had conquered Chile--
an event which increased the probability of an assault on Peru--and
the United Provinces had declared their independence in July, 1816,
after having enjoyed de facto independence since 1810.
l^AHN, Estado, lib. 18d., session October 16, 1816. The question of the Luso-Spanish relations will be discussed in Chapter VIII.
^Alejandro del Cantillo (ed.), Tratados de paz y. dja comercio (Madrid: Alegria y Charlain, 1843), pp. 785-789,
^Charles K. Webster, The Foreign Policv of Castlereagh. 1812-1822 (2 vols.; London: G. Bell and Sons, 1963), II, 114-116; Bicker, ojv. clt.. I, 404-407. 128
The Spanish government's efforts at reform had failed to thwart the momentum of the rebellions. Because of the poor condition of Spain's armed forces, in addition to that country's financial straits (both of which will be discussed in detail in Chapter Seven), officials in Madrid favored outside assistance in the struggle with the colonies. Moreover, by turning this into a co-operative European effort against the rebels, Ferdinand expected to stop the supply of men and materials reaching the insurgents from Prussia, England,
Belguim, France, and other nations.
The Spanish government hoped to interest Russia on its behalf.
As previously noted, the Czar had already shown an interest in 18 Spanish affairs. So, after consulting with the Council of State,
Pedro Cevallos, in July, 1816, ordered his ambassador at St. Peters burg, Francisco Zea Bermudez, to stress the importance of pacifying the colonies. If the rebellions were suppressed, Spain's wealth would increase and she would become a more important ally. Other wise, rather than opening the colonial trade to all nations, independence would mean a British monopoly. To stave off the conse quences of emancipation, Zea was instructed to persuade Alexander to intervene on behalf of Spain in order to dissuade England from fomenting the rebellions. He also was ordered to request that the
Czar instruct the Russian envoy in Washington to support Spain in the
18 AHN, Estado, lib. 18d., session June 6, 1816. 129
19 discussions with the United States,
Russia’s response in May, 1817, to that communication and to another which Pizarro had sent in December, 1816, 20 was reassuring.
Zea advised Madrid that Alexander favored Spain's use of conciliatory measures to pacify America, Moreover, while not disputing Britain's intervention, the Czar believed that some disinterested powers of
Europe should also take part in these negotiations. In addition,
Zea reported Alexander's preference that "an agreement . . . be reached about the fundamental principles of the mediation."21
Shortly thereafter, Pizarro received the expected note from
Dmitri Tatistcheff, The Russian envoy in Madrid reported that the
Czar hoped Ferdinand would use firmness rather than severity toward the rebellious colonies. In a similar vein, the representative noted
that royalist successes "had not disabused men's minds concerning
those evils of colonial management attributed to the Motherland."
The situation in America caused the Russian government to favor
intercession by a foreign nation, but more important was its advice
^Pedro Cevallos to Francisco Zea Bermudez, July 13, 1816, in Floraligia Gimlnez Silva, La indeoendencia de Venezuela ante las canclllerfas eurooeas (Caracas: Biblioteca de la Academia Nacional de la Historia, no. 39, 1961), pp. 201-202. 20 Delgado, 22- cit.. p. 302.
^^-William Spence Robertson, "Russia and the Emancipation of Spanish America, 1816-1826," Hispanic American Historical Review. XXI (May, 1941), 196-197; Delgado, loc. cit. 130 that Madrid grant concessions to the colonists. 22
While this exchange was taking place between Madrid and St.
Petersburg, the Russian ambassador in Paris, General Pozzo di Borgo, had written home about the American problem. If the insurgents were successful, he told Count Nesselrode, the way would be paved for
'barbarous and ferocious tyrants.' In addition, some European nations might lose the advantages which they hitherto had enjoyed from the colonial trade. Like Tatistcheff, Pozzo emphasized the futility of subduing the rebels by force alone:
Spain should present to Europe a plan for the pacification of her colonies. The basis of this should be an improved local administration, the grant of certain privileges to the provinces, and a large measure of freedom of com merce. 23
Later Pozzo clarified his position in a note of October 3,
1817. Although opposing a guarantee of military assistance to Spain, he did not propose to jeopardize the mediation by a strict policy of nonintervention.^
Meanwhile, by July, 1817, Spain felt secure enough to bring the question of the rebellious colonies to the attention of the
Ambassadorial Conference at Paris. The ambassadors were already discussing the problem of relations between Spain and Portugal— a
^^Robertson, oj£. cit.. pp. 197-198.
23Ibid.. p. 198.
24Ibld.. pp. 198-199. 131 fact which led to questions of policy in the New World. The repre sentatives of the Big Pour had worked out a settlement with regard to the reversion of the Parma Duchies, which had enabled Ferdinand to sign the Second Treaty of Paris and the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna.
The opportune moment to raise the question of the colonies came after Madrid had received news of the March, 1817, insurrection in Pernambuco, Brazil. The Spanish communiqui to the ambassadors proposed to demonstrate the connection between the Portuguese invasion of the Banda Oriental in 1816, the revolt in Brazil, and the disorders in Spanish America.
In accordance with the "sacred principle of legitimacy," King
Joao should have proceeded to suppress the rebellion in Buenos Aires.
By his refusal to do so, and by his remaining on the other side of the Plate River, Madrid argued that he had thereby accorded recog nition to the rebel government. In addition to offending Ferdinand,
King Joao had jeopardized the tranquility and security of his own territory, bringing on the rebellion in Fernambuco. It was after his troops had departed for the Banda Oriental that the malcontents in Pernambuco struck.
The Spanish communique continued, stating that all Europe should realize the pernicious consequences of the revolutionary spirit. Because this rebellion came on the heels of events in
Spanish America, it served to buttress Ferdinand’s argument that the 132 primary function of the European confederation should be to protect the principle of legitimacy everywhere. From this, it followed that the governments should be prepared to use force to crush such risings:
Revolutions and anarchy are the enemies of sovereigns and nations. The perpetrators must be punished. Governments must show that they have a common interest and that their alliances are based on mutual co-operation for each other well-being. The first duty of rulers is their nation's security. When this is jeopardized all other matters are secondary. The King, . . . deeply moved by the latest news from Brazil . . . hopejs] that they [the Allies[l can agree to adopt common measures to suppress revolutionary condi tions which not only permit the evils to spread but also aim to undermine a nation's legally constituted government.
The ambassadors in Paris appeared receptive to the idea of discussing the rebellions in Spanish America. However, the English representative, Sir Charles Stuart, insisted that he did not have authority to discuss this matter. Great Britain considered it an internal problem for Spain, and one which fell beyond the juris diction of the Paris Conference. To thwart any future attempt by
Madrid to foist the question on the Ambassadorial Conference, and to guarantee that the controversy be discussed only at a special conference, England circulated her Cabinet Memorandum. By this document, London pre-emptorily informed the other governments of
British policy in the dispute between Spain and America.
^"Circular a los plenipotenciarios sobre la insurreceCon de Pernambuco," in Memories de Pizarro. II, 272-274; AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., session, September 10, 1817. 133
II. HISPANIC-BRITISH RELATIONS
Before analyzing the British Memorandum, the Anglo-Spanish negotiations preceding it must be examined. During the era of the
Cortes of C&diz, the Spanish government had turned to England for aid in suppressing the rebellions. Negotiations had stalled, however, over the problems of a liberal commercial policy for Spanish America and over Great Britain's refusal to intervene militarily if the 26 colonists themselves rejected the terms of the mother country.
By early 1815, Ferdinand knew that Britain's conditions for her intervention in the dispute with the colonies were: (1) aboli tion of the slave trade; (2) a liberal colonial commercial and administrative policy; and, (3) limitation of the mediation to pacific measures.
Cevallos told the Council of State that all Spain could expect from Great Britain was the "sterile promise to prohibit her nationals 27 from sending military supplies to the insurgents of Buenos Aires."
In his remarks to the counsellors, he had likewise censured Great
Britain for dissuading King Joao from assisting Spain by advising him to make an armistice with the rebels of Buenos Aires. These
^John Rydjord, "British Mediation between Spain and Her Colonies, 1811-1813," Hispanic American Historical Review. XXI (February, 1941), 29-50.
^AHN, Estado, lib. 14, session, April 3, 1815. 134
unfriendly acts, together with her apparent unilateral abrogation of
the treaty guaranteeing the inviolability of Spanish territory,
indicated that Great Britain proposed to continue her illegal inter- OQ course with the rebels in order to create markets for her products.
Shortly after informing the counsellors that Spain would not make any mercantile concessions until she had negotiated the nature
and extent of England*s intervention, Cevallos, with the support of 29 the Council of State, approached the English ambassador, Henry
Wellesley. The First Secretary wished to reopen discussions on the
possibility of mediation by England. Clearly, Ferdinand*s expec
tations that his restoration alone would mean an end to the rebel
lions had not materialized. The ambassador’s response to Cevallos was not encouraging. Wellesley accused Madrid of having suspended
the earlier negotiations, and stated that the consequent lapse of
time had diminished chances for a successful intercession. However, he did leave the door open by indicating that Spain should state
what concessions she was prepared to make to the Americans. 30
By late July, 1815, each side had stated, unequivocally, its
position. Before pursuing the issue of mediation, London wanted
2®AHN, Estado, lib. 14d., sessions, April 3; May 23, 1815.
^AHN, Estado, lib. 14d., session, May 23, 1815.
30„gxtracto hist6rico y razonado de la negociaci6n seguida entre los Gobiernos Espafiol £ Ingl£s . . .," Vizquez Papers, MSS, 442, fols. 27-53. 135 commitments about: (1) a treaty to abolish the slave trade, and,
(2) a new commercial arrangement as provided for in the Anglo-Spanish •> i accord of July 5, 1814, Madrid, for Its part, considered these topics to be of secondary Importance. Ferdinand, mentioned Cevallos, would consider England as an Impartial mediator only if she would disavow Lord Strangford's collusion with the rebels of Buenos Aires.
Moreover, she would have to adopt measures to indicate a decided preference for Spain in the struggle with the colonies. If not, the insurgents would continue their actions because of this apparent support from a major power. The other topics mentioned in the ambassador's note, Cevallos told Wellesley, were under consideration by the Council of the Indies and the Council of Finance. 32
Madrid also complained directly to Lord Castlereagh about the activities of the former British Minister to Rio de Janeiro, Lord
Strangford. In a note of July 17, 1815, to the Foreign Secretary,
Fern£n Nftflez presented a number of grievances. Castlereagh, in replying for the Foreign Office, denied that Strangford had acted clandestinely, and asserted that he actually had assisted Spain.
Castlereagh pointed out, for example, that Strangford had prevented
Brazil from extending her boundaries, acquiescing only after the
Spanish Viceroy in Montevideo, Javier Elfo, had himself appealed
3^Wellesley to Cevallos, July 12, 1815, AGI, Estado, leg. 88.
•^Cevallos to Wellesley, July 18; Wellesley to Cevallos, July 22, 1815, AGI, Estado, leg. 88. 136 to King Joao for armed assistance. To his credit, the Foreign
Secretary insisted, Strangford had prevailed upon the Marquess of
Casa Irujo, the Spanish Minister in Rio, to demand a written guarantee from Brazil that these troops would be withdrawn at 33 Madrid’s request.
Other problems between Spain and England proved more embar rassing. Protracted negotiations were required to reach an accord on a treaty to abolish the slave trade. Pushed by reform groups at home, Castlereagh had even attempted to compel other nations to end the slave traffic by threatening economic sanctions.
Madrid proposed to terminate the traffic within eight years, but London, with the support of St. Petersburg, insisted on a five- year deadline."*^ Fernin Ntinez informed Castlereagh that his govern ment was giving the issue serious consideration, but noted that even
Great Britain had spent twenty years studying all its ramifi- cations. 35
In Madrid, the king ordered all information and materials 36 pertinent to the slave trade assembled. The Council of the Indies
•^Fernfin Nfeez to Lord Castlereagh, July 17; Lord Castlereagh to Fernin N&iez, October 3, 1815, FO 72/180.
3^B6cker, o p . cit.. I, 422-424.
33Fernfin Nfifiez to Castlereagh, October 20, 1815, FO 72/180.
^Vaughn to Castlereagh, no. 7, February 5, 1816, FO 72/185. 137 examined memorials, royal decrees, and reports from officials.
According to a confidential report from Vaughn to Castlereagh, the majority of the counsellors believed that immediate abolition would
strengthen the existing alliance with England and enable Madrid to borrow desperately needed funds. Seven counsellors had dissented and had argued for gradual abolition of the slave trade. By this,
they meant immediate abolition above a line drawn ten degrees (10®)
North of the Equator, but postponement, until 1821, of abolition below that line. This gradual abolition was to protect the planter
class from a sudden rise in the price of slaves and a corresponding
decrease in the productivity of their land. If the king, never
theless, intended to disregard the interests of those planters,
the minority report urged him to demand, accordingly, an adequate 37 compensation from Great Britain.
For his part, Vaughn suggested that if London promised a loan
to the hard pressed Spanish government, Ferdinand would be inclined
to support abolition of the traffic. The king would be disposed,
furthermore, to grant England commercial concessions in Spain as well
as in America. The Spanish government, he reported, seemed receptive
to the idea, considering the benefits which would accompany the
3?Vaughn to Castlereagh, no. 17, Most Secret and Confidential, March 14, 1816, FO 72/185. 138
38 removal of existing prohibitions against British products.
While Vaughn was reporting these observations to London, the
Council of State was hearing FernAn Nfiflez’s communique on the antl-
Spanish feelings of the public in England. Cevallos advised the
counsellors that one manner of quieting such criticism would be to arrange a treaty on abolition of the slave trade. The First
Secretary proposed that Spain agree to end the traffic within five
years. However, both he and the counsellors felt that England should 39 make some concessions also, in return for the Spanish agreement.
After thus considering the problem, Cevallos presented his
proposals to the Council of State in March, 1816. He demanded
monetary compensation on the grounds that Spain would -.lave to spend
at least 1,000,000 pounds sterling. Settlers, he insisted, would
have to be sent to those areas affected by the labor shortage, which
would necessarily result from suppression of the slave trade. Unless
workers were sent, certain regions in America would become desolate
and the chances would increase for a slave uprising, similar to the
one which had ravaged Santo Domingo. Cevallos further required
England to join Spain and Holland in a defensive alliance against the
Barbary pirates.^® The Council approved this eight point program of
the First Secretary. In reply to Spain’s demands, however, Britain
38Ibid.
39AHN, Estado, lib. 16d., session, February 7, 1816.
*°AHN, Estado, lib. 16d., session, March 27, 1816. L39 refused to pay the proposed indemnity. She also contended that only those nations which had not wronged the Africans should join in the 41 proposed alliance against the Barbary pirates.
Although Vaughn was pessimistic about the concessions Spain
/ would make to render an accord possible, Cevallos had already expressed considerably modified views by September, 1816. In a note to the English envoy, he now agreed to the five year period proposed by Great Britain, providing the latter renounced the right of search.
He further agreed to lowering the indemnity to 500,000 pounds sterling, but he still insisted that England must join with Spain and / 7 Holland in the proposed alliance.
While willing to modify these demands, Madrid remained adamant in insisting on a monetary payment. In November, the Council of
State proposed complete abolition of the slave trade by 1819; immediate abolition North of the 10° line; and an end to all
Spanish slave expeditions eight months after the signing of the treaty. For these concessions, Spain expected England to pay 400,000 pounds sterling and to grant a loan of 700,000. Since Madrid considered this plan a "package deal," England's consequent rejection
^B^cker, op., cit.. I, 425-426.
^Vaughn to Castlereagh, no. 61, July 23, 1816, F0 72/186.
^Bicker, oj>, cit.. I, 427-428. 140
44 of the loan apparently doomed the project.
By November, 1816, it appeared that the two countries were closer to reaching an accord. Henceforth, the British ambassador,
Henry Wellesley, would continue to exert pressure on Pizarro, the new Secretary of State, in hopes of inducing him to come to terms and arrange a treaty. Wellesley mentioned that failure to conclude a treaty would prevent an accord on questions of greater importance to Spain. Reporting this and other conversations to London,
Wellesley stated that, without the promise of a loan, Pizarro feared the issue would be defeated in the Council of State, and Pizarro still demanded 600,000 pounds sterling, or 200,000 more than Britain was prepared to pay. Also, the ambassador mentioned that Pizarro had to contend with the "capitalists of the island of Cuba," who had offered Ferdinand "twenty millions . . . upon condition that the traffic in slaves and the general trade of the island as it now 45 stands should be continued,"
At this time, Great Britain was faced with internal financial problems. At the end of the Napoleonic wars, domestic conditions worsened. Peace brought hard times. Taxes were increased. There was, in addition, widespread unemployment, and many businesses were
44 Ibid.. pp. 428-429.
^Wellesley to Castlereagh, no. 36, March 17; no. 41, Most Secret and Confidential, March 17, 1817, FO 72/198. 141
forced to close. Commerce also suffered. In 1816, 4,770 fewer vessels were employed than the previous year, and outlets for goods also were difficult to find.^®
Because of the economic situation within the country, the
Tory government had instituted economy measures. For example, her
dockyards no longer provided naval stores for Spain, Portugal, or
Russia, all of whom had been so supplied during the war against
Napoleon. ^
Another factor contributing to the reluctance to aid Spain materially and financially was *-he unpopularity in England of 48 Ferdinand's government. Castlereagh attributed the dislike to
Ferdinand's repressive measures both in Spain and in America. That
government, according to the Foreign Secretary, still had not
"disclosed any liberal principles with respect to the system upon which they aim at reestablishing their authority in South America."
In addition, Madrid had continued to put "restrictions . . . upon
British produce and manufactures." Castlereagh believed that such
policies, coupled by a refusal to abolish the slave trade, would hinder any chances that either Parliament or the public would agree
^Manning, o j j. cit.. Ill, 1432-1434; Hasbrouck, o j j, cit.. pp. 31ff. ; AHN, Estado, lib. 16d., session, February 7, 1816.
^Fernin Nfiftez to Castlereagh, September 14; Castlereagh to Fernin Ntifiez, September 24, 1816, FO 72/191.
^AHN, Estado, lib. 16d., session, February 7, 1816. 142
to a loan "at a moment of great internal distress, [especially] for the support of the system upon which the Spanish cabihet has hitherto been acting," The Foreign Secretary confided to Wellesley, moreover,
that a loan would be opposed as a
covert attempt to impose by force of arms, through the means of our money on South America a system which the Spanish government for its own sake should not propose . . . {andj which this government ha£s] uniformly refused to countenance as a basis of mediation between Spain and her colonies.^
Constrained by public opinion, the Tory government pursued a more ambivalent policy toward Spain and her colonies than it might have desired, Castlereagh had to appease his constituents but stay within the bounds of Britain's legal obligations as a member of the 50 family of nations.
For its part, Madrid complained repeatedly of subversive activities being conducted in Britain, Mercenaries congregated on her shores and supplies were sent to America. In theory, however,
these activities were illegal. Pursuant to the Anglo-Spanish treaty
of July, 1814, Orders in Council had been issued prohibiting the
export of munitions to South America, and the Treasury had instructed
customs' officials to enforce the royal decrees and neutrality laws.^
^Castlereagh to Wellesley, Private and Confidential, December 20, 1816, FO 72/184.
^Manning, o£. cit.. Ill, 1432-1434.
^Great Britain, Public Record Office, British and Foreign State Papers (vols. II-IX; London: James Ridgway and Sons, 1835- 1839), IV, 140-141, 731-733; V, 227-228, 1024-1025, 1224; VI, 510-511. 143
Notwithstanding, authorities seemed content with giving warnings instead of acting to stop these practices. This fact led Cevallos to complain in the Council of State that, even though Britain did not openly support the rebels, her position was "so questionable that it appearJed} to be more than tolerant.""^
Madrid was disturbed also by Castlereagh's responses to complaints of official connivance in these subversive activities.
The Foreign Secretary insisted that it would be difficult to punish the offenders and likewise to take remedial action unless Spain could provide specifics about such infractions.-*-* To satisfy Castlereagh's demand, the Spanish embassy in London attempted to investigate carefully all reports about anti-Spanish activities. For example,
Fern£n Nitrlez reported the names of the captains and their vessels which were docked in the Thames and were being loaded with munitions for the insurgents— even though their destination was ostensibly
New Orleans.^ Even to such reports, however, the British feigned interest. The Foreign Office responded, for instance, that the accusations had been investigated, but the authorities failed to find
^AHN, Estado, lib. 14d., session, April 3, 1815,
^-*Fern£n Nfiftez to Castlereagh, December 29, 1815; January 4; April 20, 1816; Castlereagh to Fern£n Nfiftez, January 16; January 19; May 4, 1816, F0 72/190.
^Fernin Ntifiez to Castlereagh, December 18, 1816, FO 72/191. 144 munitions. Moreover, the captains had not violated English law.^
Meanwhile, the Council of State had heard even more discon certing news about England's position in the conflict with the colonies. One incident in particular reinforced Spain's contention that Britain interpreted laws to suit herself, A Spanish brigantine,
Voluntarlo. had intercepted the Acasta. an English vessel which carried a cargo of British and American goods destined for Gibraltar from Buenos Aires. The captors insisted that according to the laws of privateering this was a "good and lawful prize." On attempting to take inventory of the cargo, the boarding party was threatened by the captain of the Acasta. He had orders to resist, and even to open fire. To avoid a possible rupture of diplomatic relations, these Spanish officials had decided to refer the question to Madrid.
Pizarro told the counsellors that he considered the problem to be fundamentally one of "whether or not the flag covered the ship." He pointed out that Great Britain in the war with the thirteen colonies had acted as though the cargo was not protected by the flag. However, she would interpret any law according to her own interests, being able to do so because of her superior navy. To avoid precipitate action, the Council agreed to have the Admiralty
Board determine the legality of the capture. The counsellors also
^Castlereagh to Fernjn N&lez, January 13; to Joaqufn Campuzano, September 4; September 3, 1817, FO 72/203. 145 supported Pizarro's recommendation that the government make a formal protest to the English ambassador over the actions of the captain of the Acasta.^
A response was forthcoming, but not from official channels.
The British consul at c£diz had insisted that the cargo and the passengers were "under the protection of the flag."^ According to
Pizarro, however, London held the opposite view. The First Secretary substantiated his contention by informing the Council of State of an incident at Havana. An English captain had attempted to board a
Spanish merchant vessel to seize a deserter. The Spanish officer refused permission. As a result, the British officer insulted him as well as the commander of the naval station. In the opinion of
Pizarro, this incident demonstrated that British naval supremacy would only make allowances for its interpretation of the laws. 58
The Portuguese invasion of the Banda Oriental in 1816 produced further friction between England and Spain. Madrid came to believe „ 59 that King Joao had acted with Britain's consent.
^AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., session, January 22, 1817; R. Matthews (British consul at C£diz) to Hamilton, January 3, 1817, FO 72/201.
^R. Matthews to Hamilton, January 14, 1817, FO 72/201.
5®AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., session, February 5, 1817.
^AHN, Estado, lib. 18d., session, October 16, 1816. See also Chapter VIII, infra. 146
Initially, however, Ferdinand had expected the Prince Regent to support Spain in the dispute with Portugal, Castlereagh had been
indignant over the invasion. Nevertheless, he suggested to FernAn
Nuflez that it might actually have been no more than an attempt to prevent hostilities from spreading into Brazil, and that once pacified, King JoSo would return the territories, provided Spain
could send sufficient forces. At the same time, the Spanish ambas
sador also received assurances from the Foreign Secretary of the
continuing validity of the Anglo-Spanish alliance, which guaranteed
the non-alienation of Spain's possessions. Pursuant to this conver
sation, FernAn Ni&iez’s opinion was that England would support any
action undertaken by Spain to redress the insult.^®
As it turned out, the Spanish ambassador had been overly
optimistic in his report to Madrid. Castlereagh later advised him
that, although Britain disapproved of King JdSo's actions, she would
continue to uphold the guaranty of Portuguese dominions against
attack. FernAn NiSflez sent a corrected report of Britain’s views to
Cevallos, now informing him also that the Foreign Secretary did not
think it possible to organize support for Spain in Parliament, as
Brazil appeared to be championing a cause popular in England. As
some consolation, however, Castlereagh had mentioned that public
GOpemAn Nfiftez to Cevallos, no. 1030, September 10, 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 98. 147 opinion could be swayed if Spain made the necessary concessions to the colonists. Then, if Portugal persisted in refusing to justify 61 her conduct, Great Britain would readily assist Madrid.
Castlereagh continued to delay giving a positive response because he had not received any official information about Portugal’s 62 ~ intentions. To Spain, however, it appeared that King Joao intended to retain possession of the conquered territory. With this a pos sibility, Madrid was naturally disturbed by London’s continued vacillation. Ferdinand could not reconcile Castlereagh’s declaration that Spain should remain a strong and independent nation with the
Foreign Secretary's apparent support for aggression. The king wanted to know if Great Britain would back Portugal or how far she was prepared to assist Spain--whether militarily or merely by her good offices. Should the existing situation remain unchanged, Fernin
Nttflez had orders to point out to London that Brazil would become as serious a problem in South America to England as the United States was in North America.
England finally responded in December, 1816. The Foreign
®^Fernin Nfiftez to Cevallos, no. 1043, September 17, 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 98.
^M. de Freire to Castlereagh, September 21, 1816, FO 63/200; FernSn Nfeez to Cevallos, no. 1054, September 27, 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 98.
^•’Madrid 3 de Octubre de 1816-A1 Conde de FernAn Nfiftez,” in Pag£s y Belloc, cit.. Doc. IV; Webster, Britain and the Independence . . . , II, 346-349. 148
Secretary mentioned steps he had taken to elicit information from
Portugal; he refused to take any action without first consulting his allies, allies that Spain also had approached to intervene in the dispute. In addition, Castlereagh refuted the contention that
Brazil proposed to incorporate the territories, and mentioned to
Fernin N(Sfiez that Britain would endeavor, moreover, "to dissuade both states from premature . . . measures of military preparations, which will impede any amicable settlement."^
In addition to the official note, the Foreign Secretary had stated confidentially that his government would renounce its guaranty if Portugal did not agree to the suggestions made by the mediators.
Later angered at learning that Madrid could question Britain's lack of initiative in the matter, Castlereagh scoffed that the Portuguese soldiers were actually assisting Spain. After all, as he told Fern£n
Nfinez, the inhabitants of Montevideo and Buenos Aires "did not 65 recognize Ferdinand's suzerainty."
Meanwhile, at Madrid, Wellesley similarly stressed that London would stand behind the guaranty to Portugal— at least until the mediators attempted to settle the matter.®^
^^Fernin Niifiez to Castlereagh, October 17; November 30, 1816; Castlereagh to Fern&n Ntifiez, December 17, 1816, FO 72/191.
65pern£n Nfeez to Pizarro, December 18, 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 98.
^Wellesley to Castlereagh, no. 8, January 8, 1817, FO 72/197. 149
Spain was relying more and more on England to aid in solving
the country’s problems. This was also true with regard to the col
onies, Since the collapse of negotiations in 1812, England had
insisted that as a sine qua non to her participation in any pacific
scheme to pacify the colonies that Spain adopt a liberal program for
the Americas--a general amnesty for the rebels, a liberal trade 67 policy, and an equal consideration of criollos for official posts,
Madrid realized the importance of England's support in this
matter. In Wellesley’s judgment, Ferdinand was disposed to follow
the suggestions made by Castlereagh and to enact these measures if 68 it "would lead to the tranquilization of the colonies,"
The king finally did announce a program for the colonies in
February, 1817. Pizarro first mentioned the proposals to
Wellesley,^ then, the Spanish ambassador in London so informed Lord
Castlereagh--Spain was prepared to grant the rebels a general
amnesty, and a more liberal mercantile system, as well as to show
them preferential treatment in administrative appointments,
^FernAn Nfiftez to Cevallos, no. 1043, September 17, 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 98; "Madrid 3 de Octubre de 1816-A1 Conde de FernAn NAfiez," in PagAs y Belloc, op., clt.. Doc. IV; Webster, Britain and the Independence . . . , II, 309-321, 346-349,
®®Wellesley to Castlereagh, no, 2, December 16; no. 7, December 26, 1816, FO 72/188.
69Webster, Britain and the Independence . . . , II, 355n. 150
Ferdinand now expected, FernAn Nuflez told Castlereagh, that England would mediate the dispute, thereby satisfying the Americans, and
removing any pretext for the rebellions.^®
Since the question of British mediation was already under
discussion at Madrid, Castlereagh thought it advisable to avoid the
pitfalls of a double negotiation. He told FernAn Nunez that he
therefore preferred to have Wellesley handle the matter in the
Spanish capital,^
By April 1817, Ferdinand had come to realize that Great
Britain would make no effort to co-operate with Spain in any under
taking unless the slave trade were abolished. Pizarro, however,
failed to see any connection between a treaty regarding the
abolition of slave trade and other critical problems, such as British
mediation in the Hispanic-Portuguese conflict, in the pacification of
America, and in the negotiations being conducted with the United
States.
The First Secretary furthermore pointed out that, although the
whole economy of certain colonies depended on African labor, Spain
would nevertheless be willing to terminate the traffic within five
years, in return for England's increasing the monetary compensation
^®Fernfin Ntiftez to Castlereagh, February 3, 1817, FO 72/203.
^Castlereagh to Fernin Nfiflez, February 13, 1817, FO 72/203. 151 to 600,000 pounds--a sum well below the offers made by the planters
of Cuba to have that trade continued. Pizarro felt that the 200,000
pounds difference (which separated Spain's demands and the compen
sation of 400,000 pounds already proposed by the Prince Regent)
should not forestall England's intervention in rhe dispute between
Spain and the colonies.
Pizarro urged England to remember that independence would
damage her trade and industry. Still worse, the United States would
prosper from the separation. On the other hand, if kept under
Spanish control, the colonies would be "a rich market for British
manufactures,"
Referring to events in the Banda Oriental, Pizarro insisted
that Great Britain would benefit only if the territories were
restored to Spain, Otherwise, the Prince Regent would lose his
posture as an impartial umpire. More important though, was the
possibility that an increase in Portuguese territory could well
create a "powerful nation with interests antagonistic to England but
complementary to those of the United States." Madrid insisted the
conflict could be settled amicably, if Britain were just to follow
Russia's example, and announce her readiness to intervene, in order
that Spain's control might be recognized and accepted. Moreover,
this threat of intervention could be justified legally by the Prince
Regent, on the grounds that his guaranty to Portugal had never been 152 intended to support aggressive acts.
Pizarro ended his communique by arguing that England should support Spain likewise in the territorial dispute with the United
States. Involved here was not only the question of depredations against European shipping by corsairs from that nation, but also the more ominous consequences attached to that country's territorial aggrandizement. Futhermore, the First Secretary admitted that without London's co-operation in the matter, Spain could not 72 prevent the alienation of these territories.
In June, 1817, Wellesley again broached the subject of a slave trade treaty with Pizarro. The First Secretary stated that the
Spanish government was now prepared to accept the 400,000 pounds compensation previously proposed, but with the proviso that abolition could be deferred until 1820. The British ambassador then advised
Pizarro that his orders were to accept such conditions, and to proceed with negotiations over the provisions of the projected treaty.
The rapprochement between the two countries, together with the various treaties signed by Spain in June, 1817, with the Allies, had led Madrid to believe that the propitious time had arrived to
72»*Nota pasada a la Inglaterra, en 6 de abril de 1817, sobre nuestros negocios pendientes," in Memorlas de Pizarro, II, 259-264.
^B^cker, o p. cit.. I, 430. 153 request Allied assistance In the pacification of America. As already mentioned, England blocked this attempt. To prevent any future maneuver by Spain to have the Paris Conference discuss the question of the insurrection, Britain circulated a memorandum among the members of the Quadruple Alliance.
It apprised them of the negotiations which had taken place between England and Spain. The Prince Regent stated that he had been willing to mediate in 1812, but that the Regency in Spain had rejected his conditions. Now, despite the advanced stage of the rebellions, he believed that order could still be restored if Spain would adopt a more liberal colonial system. In order to convince the Americans of its intentions to fulfill these conditions, Madrid should inform the major powers of its plans for the future governing of the colonies.
Although the disorders continued in South America, London felt that they would abate if Spain and Portugal reached an amicable settlement of their differences. It was further recommended that the parties should ’’adopt a system of government within their respective dominions favourable [sic] to the interest and congenial to the feelings of the natives of those countries,” One such measure, stated the coimnuniqu&, would be the adoption by Spain of a liberal commercial policy. Also, England would have Spain discuss with
Portugal "the circumstances under which her [Spanish] sovereignty 154 is to be re-established in the Provinces in question through their
[Allied] intervention,"^
If all the aformentioned terms were fulfilled, Great Britain agreed to undertake mediation on behalf of her allies pursuant to certain conditions: (1) that Spain agree to a treaty for the abolition of the slave trade; (2) that a general amnesty be declared for all past offenses and an armistice be established "during the period which may be necessary for carrying on explanations in furtherance of the Mediation"; (3) that Americans be placed on an equal footing with Europeans as regards employment; (4) that free trade be instituted between America and all nations, with Spain enjoying "a fair preference"; and, (5) that any foreign intervention be of a pacific nature. 75
A treaty for the abolition of the slave trade was imminent already. While the British note circulated among the Allies, the
Council of State debated the issue of the pacification of America.
III. MEDIATION AND THE PACIFICATION OF AMERICA
IN THE COUNCIL OF STATE
In the Council of State, Pizarro admitted his aversion to mediation. He had attempted, nevertheless, to bring the question of
7^Webster, Britain and the Independence . . . , II, 352-358.
75Ibld. 155 the colonies Into the Paris discussion that dealt with Allied mediation in the Hispanic-Portuguese conflict. Unfortunately,
England*s opposition to the move had cooled the initial enthusiasm of the other nations, but Pizarro himself still believed that
Britain would relent, and permit the subject to be discussed at
Paris.
Mediation by England Discussed
England's disposition led Pizarro to brief the counsellors regarding that country's position on issues important to Spain. He pointed out, for example, that the Prince Regent had preferred to be the exclusive mediator in the dispute with the colonies. Also, he mentioned Great Britain's suggestion of the advantages that Spain actually derived from the Portuguese invasion and occupation of the
Banda Oriental,7®
After these preliminary remarks, Pizarro proposed that if
Spain could not equip a force of at least 8,000 to 10,000 men, she should seek outside assistance. Although Spain had first appealed to the Allies to act in concert, the First Secretary was himself more optimistic about the success of England's unilateral inter- ventibn.77 He would, however, limit foreign involvement, by
7®AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., session, September 10, 1817.
77AHN, E .ado, leg. 182. 156 insisting that Great Britain guarantee the results, and direct her mediation only to those areas completely beyond Spain's control-- namely, Buenos Aires and Caracas. In exchange for co-operating
"with Spain in order to subject the rebellious colonies or at least to promise to sever all commercial relations with them," England 78 should be granted mercantile privileges in America.
After hearing his comprehensive program, of which the above points constituted only one part, some counsellors favored postponing a decision on foreign mediation. Their idea was to wait until Madrid received precise information about the reactions of the other nations to the note that FernAn Ndfiez presented at Paris. Pizarro and Garay argued, however, that foreign intervention was of secondary impor tance, to be utilized only in the event that direct measures failed.
Therefore, any delay on the part of the counsellors in considering the larger question would tend to exaggerate the Importance of 79 mediation in the pacification scheme.
A few counsellors disputed Pizarro's optimistic reference to mediation by England. Lozano, for one, stated that the Prince
Regent had already refused five times. Moreover, he expressed surprise at the support given such a possibility by the Junta of
Pacification, which had readily admitted to the necessarily
^®AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., session, September 10, 1817.
^9AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., session, September 10, 1817. 157 detrimental side effects of England's intervention. The Minister of Gracia y Justicia continued, also censuring the English both for their assisting the rebels, and for supporting the Portuguese 80 aggression in South America.
Another counsellor, L6pez Araujo, cited the decided stand of
Lord Strangford as evidence of Britain's anti-Spanish position in the struggle. He also insisted that England's greed for trading privi leges would impel her to demand that Spain include all the colonies in the proposed mediation. 81 A third counsellor restated the argument that all demands by England would be deleterious to Spain,
OO a contention which even Pizarro supported. 83 The Finance Secretary, together with the Navy Secretary, believed that Madrid should approach Great Britain, but only as an alternative to the combined intervention of the Allies. Under such circumstances Great Britain could intervene in Buenos Aires and
Caracas, but Spain should eventually grant all the provinces similar privileges. 84
On the other side of the question, Garay insisted that, just
8®AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., session, September 17, 1817. Q 1 AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., session, September 17, 1817.
8^AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., session, October 18, 1817.
83AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., session, September 24, 1817.
®^AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., session, September 17, 1817. 158 as Spain's conditions for mediation had not changed from those
England had rejected in 1812, so Madrid should not expect the Prince 85 Regent to alter his position.
Pedro de Mendinueta and Anselmo de Rivas were not so skeptical of England. The former stated that Spain's post war difficulties necessitated outside aid, and that Britain's powerful navy would enable Madrid to put an early end to the disorders. The possibility of England's bad faith was countered by arguing that Spain's concessions would be in proportion to the extent of Britain’s involvement in the undertaking. Moreover, Pedro de Mendinueta felt that a regulated liberal commercial policy would not be so detri mental. It would both lessen the trade in contraband, and allow the 86 Treasury to profit from the additional revenue.
Mediation by the Powers in Concert
The Counsellors reacted more favorably to mediation by the
Powers in concert. It was expected that these would demand fewer 87 concessions than England from Spain. If the insurgents were to reject Madrid's overtures, some counsellors believed that the
8^AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., sessions, September 10; October 18, 1817.
AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., sessions, September 10; Septem ber 17, 1817.
®^AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., session, September 17, 1817. 159 principal powers should intervene militarily, and thereby avert the 88 disastrous effects of anarchy.
In order to interest these nations in the project, it was thought that Madrid should stress the importance of sustaining the principles of legitimacy and order, since both were fundamental to 89 the success of the European system. While offering such overtures or incentives, Spain had to be circumspect, and avoid making ruinbus concessions to the mediating countries. It was frankly acknowledged that some of these governments might prefer to condition their intervention by the principle of "what is mine is mine and yours is both of ours."^®
The counsellors finally voted on measures to adopt for the pacification of America. They agreed to continue negotiations with the Allies, emphasizing that those nations should be prepared to take effective action against the rebels. In spite of such nego tiations, however, the accord concluded that Spain should, in the 91 interim, implement the other measures voted in the Council.
Shortly after the resolution was passed by the Council of
88 AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., sessions, September 17; September 24, 1817.
®^AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., session, September 24, 1817. Qn AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., session, September 24, 1817.
^*AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., sessions, October 15; October 18, 1817. 160
State, the Spanish ambassador in Paris presented his government’s response to the British Memorandum. In the main, the communique reflected Spain’s irritation over Great Britain's inaction and the facade of her official neutrality, both stances maintained despite the forebodings of the revolts in America. It called on the nations of Europe, moreover, to adopt concrete measures in order to assure the success of their intervention.
Ambassadorial Conference at Paris. The Spanish note to the
Allies attempted to prove that the conflagration endangered the com mercial and political interests of Europe. It stated that the Concert of Europe should maintain the balance of power, as well as "make secure the principles of order and justice and extirpate revolutionary ideas." Aside from other considerations, if the rebellions did prove successful, the resultant anarchy would also destroy the advantages
Europe had hitherto enjoyed from the lucrative American markets.
The note criticized, in addition, the assertions made by
England concerning events in Brazil and the Plate area. Madrid attributed the rapid suppression of the revolt in Pernambuco to
King Joao residing in Brazil and not to any resolute measures on his
part. Ferdinand, on the other hand, confronted insurmountable
obstacles— the distance of the colonies, the bankrupt treasury, and
the extent and scope of the rebellions. Moreover, the Prince
Regent's insistence that Ferdinand specify his program for the con quered territories, it was argued, contravened the legal and moral 161 principles which should govern such cases of blatant aggression.
England's attempt to blame Spain for the failure of the earlier negotiations also came under scrutiny. The proposals made by
Great Britain in 1812 had been rejected because they contained no guarantees for the success of the mediation. The rejection did not stem, as Britain implied, from Spain's aversion to grant concessions.
The assurances demanded by the Prince Regent throughout the course of negotiations between the two countries favored the insurgents at the expense of the mother country. This bias only cast aspersions on
Spain's intent to fulfill her pledge; it failed to impugn the sin cerity of the rebels. These demands of "assurances” implied that any use of force would merely sustain the supposedly inequitable pre tensions of the mother country. However, Madrid contended that all the Powers should be ready to endorse those measures adopted in agreement with the legally constituted government.
To end the rebellions, the Spanish government was disposed to support reasonable proposals such as a general amnesty, but under no circumstances an armistice. Moreover, Ferdinand was prepared to adopt all measures compatible with his "honor and founded on the expectation of bringing the matter to a successful conclusion."
With this objective in mind, he believed that it was time for the
Allies to present their program for mediation to Spain. By so doing, they would allay the colonists' fears of any partiality of the proposal. 162
For mediation to be fruitful, it had to be enforceable. The
Powers should be prepared to take the necessary steps if the rebels refused to accept the conditions that had been agreed upon.
England's proposals, continued the note, did not give this guarantee.
England would commit the mediators to no more than a moral obliga tion to intervene. If accepted, her program would permit "the proponents of anarchy and the enemies to the existing order to be triumphant."
Toward the end of the rebuttal, Madrid again stressed her unity of purpose with the Allies, and the need to protect European hegemony. Contrary to Britain’s denunciations, Spanish officialdom were not defenders of any antiquated colonial system. They were guided by a belief in "the principle of legitimacy, . . . a govern ment by time-honored laws, and the improvement of world trade."
Therefore, the Powers must not dictate to Madrid, but rather, they must induce the insurgents to adhere to the carefully contrived program. The communique concluded by restating the king of inter vention desired by the King of Spain--one which promised assurances 92 of its success.
As the two memoranda were being circulated, it became evident that most of the European governments supported Britain's posture.
^"Respuesta a la Memoria de Ingleterra sobre la Mediaci6n de Am4rica," in Memorias de Pizarro. II, 274-280. Prince Mettemich told Robert Gordon, the British representative, that he would be "ruled by the voice of Great Britain throughout the discussion of this important subject," Fearing Russia might support
Spain and act without recourse to the wishes of the Powers,
Mettemich wanted "the question treated by the Allied Powers in general," but "conducted in fact by Great Britain as their organ and upon such terms as she wishes to propose,"03
Austria, in addition, proposed to win over Prussia. Gordon wrote that the government's reply to Madrid would convey "what may be considered as the unbiassed fsicj feeling of all Germany upon a Q A question which . . . all Europe is indirectly made to participate."
Even the Spanish ambassador in Vienna, Pedro Cevallos, appeared to endorse certain points of the English Memorandum. The
former First Secretary had confided to Mettemich, Gordon wrote,
"that without giving freedom to the commerce and entering into
favorable terms with the revolved Colonies, every endeavor to 95 obtain the desired reconciliation would prove negatory."
Prussia too had been contemplating measures similar to those
suggested by Cevallos. These were consistent, moreover, with the
93Webster, Britain and the Independence . . . , II, 3-4.
9*Robert Gordon to Castlereagh, no. 10, Secret and Confi dential, November 1, 1817, FO 7/J.37. 164
British communlquS. In support of mediation, Johann Anclllon, chief of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, informed the Chancellor, Prince Hardenburg, of the importance for
Europe in seeing the disorders ended. Peace would permit the continuance of trade with the colonies. Even more significant perhaps, it would prevent the formation of republican governments.
These, the official argued, would endanger the peace of Europe. To achieve that objective, he proposed that Spain agree, among other things, to a total amnesty for the rebels; to a commercial system adopted to the needs and desires of the colonists; to the appointment of qualified criollos to office; and, to an end to the slave trade. 96
The Prussian ambassador at London, Baron Alexander von
Humboldt, informed Qastlereagh that his government approved of the program outlined in the British Memorandum, especially the commitment to pacific measures.^ Hardenburg’s official reply was to restate those suggestions which Anclllon had made. In addition, it censured
Spain for pursuing outmoded policies which served to fan the flames of rebellion.^®
^®Iso Brante Schwelde, "Aleman ante la independencia sudamericana entre los aflos 1810-1825," Boletfn del Instituto de Invest leadones Historlcas. XIV, Nos. 51-52 (Buenos Aires, January- June, 1932), 4-5.
^Humboldt to Castlereagh, November 24, 1817, FO 64/111.
®®"Memorie de Prince de Hardenburg-Chancellier de Etat," copy, received from Humboldt, January 21, 1818, FO 64/111. 165
In mid-November, Czar Alexander announced his program, which
Pizarro felt contained no concrete proposals and dealt solely in go abstractions. The Russian note alluded to permitting the Spanish colonies to share in the advantages of the Act of Vienna. It urged a non-military intervention by the mediating powers, but at the same time mentioned the possibility of using economic coercion to force the colonies to return to their dutiful allegiance. Moreover,
Czar Alexander supported the Prince Regent's contention that Spain and Portugal should both reach an accord on the pacification of the colonies and settle their territorial disputes.
Three days later, on November 20, 1817, Tatistcheff received further instructions about his government's plan for America. Spain was enjoined to frame an act of reconciliation with her colonies and to indicate the nature of the mediation to be performed by the
Powers. In addition, Nesselrode suggested that Spain grant broader civil, political and economic privileges to the colonists.
Ferdinand did not heed the advice of the Allies in announcing a program for the colonies. Because Pizarro lacked the support from the Council of State which would have enabled him to propose concrete measures, his only recourse was an appeal to the principle
" Memories de Pizarro. I, 267.
10(>Manning, op. cit. r III, 1853-1859.
^^■Robertson, 02.. cit., pp. 200-202. 166 of legitimacy. Therefore, in his communique to the Allies, Pizarro went to great lengths to explain, and to emphasize how the rebellions
in America were a continuation of the disorders that had devastated
Europe. If Spain were to lose her empire, the rest of Europe would suffer the consequences, for those governments would be unable to suppress the increasing unrest of the masses. Peace and tranquility would be re-established only after much bloodshed.
In this communiqu! to the Allies, Spain's First Secretary
insisted that the independence of the colonies would result in the establishment of numerous democratic governments. Endowed with abundant resources, these countries would become a haven for the disaffected of Europe. By acting in concert, those regimes could counter any action proposed by the Allied Powers. In addition, contrary to the expectations of many industrialists, commercial agreements would be jeopardized because of the volatile character of democratic governments. This risk, Pizarro pointed out, should be weighed against the certainty of trade agreements that would exist with the continuation of Spanish domination. 102
The anticipated demoralizing effects of emancipation, both
on trade relations and on political stability, appeared to substan tiate Madrid's assertion that pacification concerned all nations.
102"Nota pasada a las potencias sobre la necesidad de una intervencion en America," in Memorlas de Pizarro. II, 280-285. 167
Ferdinand wanted his fellow monarchs to uphold the principle of legitimacy, by being prepared to use force in any intervention, and by co-operating to
put a period to the evils which threaten the world, should the American Continent be suffered to become a prey to a revolution so anti-social in its spirit, and so dangerous to governments, *03
Other negotiations and debates. From December, 1817, when
Pizarro presented this communiqul to the Allies, until April, 1818, when Pizarro again brought the question of pacification before the
Council of State, Madrid had continued to exchange diplomatic notes with the Allies. The Spanish government had persisted in these efforts, still with hopes of gaining support for its position.
In February, Fernln Nfiftez mentioned to Richelieu that his country was prepared to cede France part of Santo Domingo in exchange
for material assistance in the pacification of America— but the ministers of Louis XVIII disagreed over the Spanish proposal.
Richelieu agreed to provide gratis 5,000 men, and even to support
Madrid in its negotiations with the United States. The Ministers of Navy and Police, Counte Moll and Count Decazes, however, preferred
some territorial concession--Santo Domingo or Puerto Rico. Notwith
standing these divergent opinions, they all agreed on two points:
(1) that the question of the Banda Oriental was separate from that of
^°^Webster, Britain and the Independence . , II, 360-363. 168 the pacification of America; and, (2) they supported England's contention that Spain had to establish the basis of mediation, and decide with the Allies on the location of a special conference to discuss the issue of the colonies,
Pizarro slowly began to realize that the other governments would be guided by Britain's attitude. He attempted to demonstrate that Spain had not been remiss in her duties, but had actually made the required declarations about the concessions. The First Secretary wanted the Allies to announce support for a reconciliation between
Spain and her colonies, and to limit their mediation to those provinces where j|£. facto governments existed— thus excluding Mexico.
Moreover, he felt that the mediators should inform the insurgents of Spain's proposals, and stress that they were ready to guarantee the compliance of each party.
In all this, England accused Spain of shirking her respon sibility. Madrid, according to Castlereagh, had failed to announce any real "program" for the colonies. Rather, she had insisted that the mediators decide on one,
without any other guide . . . than an assurance, conceived in the most general terms, that His Catholic Majesty will
^^Delgado, op, clt. T pp. 311-314; William S. Robertson, France and Latin American Independence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1939), pp. 135-137.
105Delgado, 0£. cit.. pp. 313-314. 169
be disposed to lend himself to such measures . . . as the Powers . . . may concur (italics in original) in recom mending for his adoption.
Pizarro had to satisfy the persistent demands of the Allies.
Spain had to announce her own program for a reconciliation with the colonies. The First Secretary presented the Council of State with a detailed picture of the problems involved in the proposed mediation.
For instance, Great Britain prodded Spain to institute such reforms as would allay American fears that Madrid intended to enforce the outmoded colonial system. The other mediating powers, however, differed over the nature and extent of concessions to the colonists.
The First Secretary felt that a public statement should come only after the states themselves had reached an accord. He did not reject foreign intervention. In an attempt to accomplish the double objective of getting outside assistance, while allowing Spain time to suppress the rebellions by herself, Pizarro recommended: opening
American trade to foreigners; granting amnesty to the Spanish exiles; and, determining the details of the projected expedition to Buenos
Aires. These measures required the government’s immediate attention.
To delay a decision, he argued, would only serve to encourage the insurgents and to nurture the aggressive policies of the United
States and Brazil.
106Webster, Britain and the Independence . . . , II, 366-367.
107AHN, Estado, lib. 21d., session, April 28, 1818. 170
Spain's Finance Minister, Garay, reasoned that negotiations had to be activated, to accelerate the Allies' mediation. Spain
lacked the resources to cope with the problem of America. To get
outside support, Madrid had first to decide on a meeting place for
the preliminary conference of the mediators, and then to be disposed
to accept all reasonable proposals which did not result in a loss of
territory. In return for these sacrifices, Garay wanted the Allies
"to pledge themselves and to induce other governments in America to
co-operate effectively in pacifying the colonies by cutting off aid
to the insurgents." In addition, he would demand that the European
powers adopt the necessary measures--military as well as political-- 108 to bring an end to the disturbances.
Pizarro still was not satisfied with the suggestions of the
counsellors. He had anticipated receiving broad powers from them.
The government had to combat the Machiavellian tactics of the other
nations, some of whom were bent on the dismemberment of the empire.
Complex negotiations were required for a reconciliation with the
colonies. The First Secretary continued to protest in the Council
that he had formulated his program only after careful consideration.
If the counsellors opposed these related measures, they would have
to offer an alternative plan, or suffer the consequences--the loss
*®8AHN, Estado, lib. 2ld., session, May 6, 1818 109 of America.iU*
Again the counsellors had failed the First Secretary. They
were more concerned with debating the merits of the projected
expeditions to Buenos Aires. Pizarro, deserted by the Council,
had to use his own judgement in the negotiations with the mediators.
Aix-la-Chapelle. The European Powers did not convene a
special conference to deal with the problem of America. Never
theless, Ferdinand expected to propose the subject of the colonies
to the Allies at the forthcoming Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. Czar
Alexander had contributed to this belief, when in April, 1818, he
issued a call for a general conference of European states, similar
to the one held at Vienna. Spain's hopes of participating in this
conference had been raised by the fact that France had been invited
to send a representative to the meeting.
Anticipating an invitation to the conference, it was thought
necessary that Spain go prepared to satisfy the Allies' demands for
concrete proposals aimed at a reconciliation with the colonies. This
was the motivation in June, 1818, when Pizarro announced Spain's
program, which included: (1) a general amnesty for the insurgents
at the time of their submission; (2) equal consideration to criollos
109AHN, Estado, lib. 21d., session, May 6, 1818.
^^Robertson, France and Latin . . ., p. 138. 172 along with European Spaniards for appointive office; (3) regulation of the colonies' commercial relations with respect to foreign trade
"upon principles frank and suitable to the new aspect and political situation of those countries and of Europe"; (4) a disposition by the King of Spain to adopt in the course of the negotiations whatever suggestions by the Allies that were compatible "with his high dignity, and the preservation of his Rights," In addition, this communique to the mediators made constant references to a possible military intervention by the Allies, in the event that the colonists rejected the proposed plan.***
France and Russia were in favor of inviting Ferdinand to the conference. They had learned that Ferdinand had refused to abide by any decision reached in his absence. Under these circumstances, the two hoped that the assembled leaders could induce the King of 112 Spain to follow a more conciliatory policy toward the colonies.
But Austria, England, and Prussia refused to support a call for a general Congress. They were disinclined to permit a discussion on 113 3uch a wide range of European problems.
***British and Foreign State Papers. V, 1217-1219.
**^Delgado, ojj. clt.. pp. 337, 344-347; Robertson, France and Latin . . . , pp. 147-148.
l^Kissinger, pit.. pp. 221-224; Webster, The Foreign Policy . . . , II, 417-422. 173
In spite of the rebuff, Madrid hoped for a change of heart.
Ferdinand prepared instructions for San Carlos and the Marquess of
Casa Irujo, who were to be his representatives to the forthcoming meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle. They had orders to demonstrate how the rebellions damaged Europe's commerce and industry. Then, using that base, they were to request Allied intervention in the dispute.
Depending on the circumstances at the time, this action would be
either pacific or coercive in character.
As it turned out, Spain did not attend the conference. Never
theless, the problem of the colonies was considered there, but only after the Allies had first agreed on the subject of troop withdrawal
from France. A joint Franco-Russian note, issue in November, 1818,
restated a former position, i.e., that the Allies had to check the
progress of the insurrection. This communique reflected the ideas
first set forth in Spain’s reply to the British Memorandum of
August, 1817--namely, the adverse consequences that Europe would
experience if republican governments were established in America.
Despite their appeal to the institution of monarchy and to the
principle of legitimacy, Castlereagh dissented. He rejected any
form of military intervention. Castlereagh advised the Czar of this
decision. Consequently, Russia, too, withdrew her support for using
H^Delgado, 02.. cit. - pp. 353-354.
115Robertson, France and Latin . . . , pp. 152-154. 174 any measures other than pacific ones to end the disturbances in
America.
Even before the gathering at Aix-la-Chapelle, Madrid had reached a tentative solution on the matter of the colonies. As evidenced by the ouster of Pizarro, and the elevation of the Marquess of Casa Irujo to the post of First Secretary (in September, 1818), the government had come to realize that without the prospect of military intervention, foreign mediation would prove both costly and ineffective. Great Britain’s objections to Spain’s proposals of
June, 1818, had been seconded in varying degrees by the other 117 mediators. These objections, Ferdinand recognized, would not be overcome by simply throwing open the colonial markets. This measure was unacceptable, and even dangerous in the opinion of the new First
Secretary. He favored breaking off negotiations with the Allies, and accelerating preparations for the planned expedition to Buenos
Aires. He would dispatch this force as soon as possible, on the scale and magnitude proposed. Convinced by the rationale of his new
First Secretary, the king endorsed the recommendations of the
1 IQ Marquess of Casa Irujo.
116Webster, Britain and the Independence . . . , II, 62-67.
117oelgado, op. cit.. pp. 340-349.
118ngXpogici6n del Marques de Casa Irujo a Fernando VII,” September 21, 1818, in Delgado, gp, cit.. pp. 396-399. 175
Despite the earlier rebuff from Russia over the use of force,
Madrid again turned to the Czar. Zea was instructed to explain the
reasons behind Spain's change in policy. Moreover, he was to point
out the deleterious effects of opening the colonial markets--a
measure that would benefit only England and the United States. He
was also to stress that Ferdinand was disposed to make any concession 119 that would not "endanger the security of his possessions.'' Casa
Irujo gave Tatistcheff a note of similar tone. He also ordered
Fernin Nfifiez to inform the Prussian ambassador at Paris of the new
move.*20
Russia responded enthusiastically to the change of policy.
Nesselrode felt that this was the only way for Ferdinand to satisfy
his best interests without loss of national pride. He applauded
% the rejection of mediation, and urged the government to continue
military preparations. 121 The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs
also cautioned Madrid against expecting any assistance from Great
Britain in the matter of the American colonies. Moreover, by dis
patching the expedition immediately, he believed that Spain would
forestall the United States' recognition of the rebel regime at
119Casa Irujo to Zea Bermfidez, minute, October 17, 1818, in Delgado, op., clt.. pp. 358-359.
120oelgado, oji. cit.. p. 359.
*2*-Ibid.. pp. 359-360. 176
Buenos Aires. 122
The Spanish government had tried unsuccessfully to interest the Allies in its cause. Even by agreeing to open the colonial trade, Madrid had been unable to get their assistance on her own terms. For Spain, there was only one alternative open. If Ferdinand wanted to retain control of the colonies, he would have to reconquer them. Coercive measures would have to be used to pacify America.
With the support of Russia, the king proposed to adopt a course which he had never really rejected--one which supposedly would permit him to retain his dignity as well as his empire.
^-^Francisco Zea Bermtidez to Marquess of Casa Irujo, no. 459, April 21/ May 2, 1819, AHN, Estado, leg. 5661. CHAPTER VII
RECOURSE TO FORCE: CONSIDERATION OF PROBLEMS
RELATED TO THE USE OF MILITARY MEASURES
Admitting that pacific measures had failed, the government decided to suppress the rebellions in America by use of force. As
Spain would have to mobilize all her resources for this tremendous task, the king and his advisers set about examining the nation's financial and the military capabilities. The proposed undertaking was going to require large sums of money, as well as a concerted effort on the part of the armed forces. Thus it was that from 1814 until 1818, the Council of State and the Council of the Indies had continually been reassessing the government's ability to carry out such a project.
I. SPAIN'S FINANCIAL STRAITS
Between 1814 and 1819, nine persons held the office of Secre tary of Finance. This turnover attested to the government’s finan cial problems. Ferdinand, it is true, had inherited an empty treasury from his father. When Charles IV abdicated in 1808, the national debt was nearly 7,250,000,000 reales.^ By 1817, the annual 2 deficit stood at approximately 453,000,000 reales. The government's
IPintos Vieites, op., clt. pp. 290-292.
^Vaughn to Castlereagh, no. 79, August 13, 1816, FO 72/187; no. 112, November 12, 1816, F0 72/188; Wellesley to Castlereagh, 178 plight was aggravated by the loss of revenue from America, a fact 3 that Ferdinand admitted in May, 1817.
This financial crisis affected the government's foreign policy. Because of it and the manpower shortage (a subject which will be discussed later in this chapter), Spain had requested outside assistance in quelling the rebellions. Moreover, because of this crisis, Ferdinand had difficulty meeting his alliance commitments. He lacked funds to provide for an adequate naval force to combat the Barbary pirates. To relieve the shortage and thus enable construction of the necessary ships, the Navy Secretary had even suggested using revenue from America, a proposal which received no response from the Treasury.^ Also, as noted earlier, this need for economic assistance had led Pedro Cevallos to suggest in June, 1816, that Spain accede to the Final Act of the Congress of
Vienna and the Second Peace of Paris--no matter how offensive the provi s i ons.
To resolve the monetary problem, the Council of State created a special committee, the Junta of Finance. It was composed of representatives from the various ministries, who were expected to
2no. 80, June 15, 1817, FO 72/198.
^Decretos. IV, 215.
^AHN, Estado, lib. 16d., sessions, October 24; November 8, 1815. 179 recommend measures for economy in government spending, and for raising additional revenue.^
The members of the Junta, perhaps too close to the problem, had failed to take into account a number of possible solutions to the crisis. For example, in their suggestions, they had overlooked
Spain's investment in America. By pacifying the colonies, the government might have solved most of its financial problems. Pedro
Cevallos, although no longer a cabinet member, pointed this out in
December, 1816. He estimated the annual value of revenue and goods from the colonies to be 370,000,000 reales: while Spain spent there another 200,000,000 reales a year.^ The Junta had neglected to consider that, in the last decade of the eighteenth century, the total value of revenue and specie from the colonies had amounted to approximately 1,325,577,025 reales.^
Some of the proposals considered by the Junta to correct this financial problem were not even practical. The members discussed the possibility of floating a loan. This had drawbacks in the case of Holland, for instance. As a guarantor, she wanted either mines in
^AHN, Estado, lib. 16d., session, January 31, 1816; lib. 18d., sessions, October 22, 1816 and subsequent ones.
6AHN, Estado, lib. 18d., session, August 27, 1816.
^AHN, Estado, lib. 18d., session, December 11, 1816.
®Vaughn to Castlereagh, no. 112, November 12, 1816, FO 72/188, 180
Mexico or territory in America. Since Spain was already in debt to her, the Dutch had insisted on either of these in lieu of payment g for earlier loans.
The inability of that committee to make concrete recommen dations irritated Ferdinand. He decided, therefore, to create a second Junta in December, 1816.^®
Meanwhile, the debt rose steadily. From March, 1817, until
May of that year, the Council of State concentrated its efforts on trying to establish a sound fiscal program for the nation without which it would be impossible to pacify America. The Finance
Secretary presented his budget proposals in March, 1817. He based them on information received from special committees and from dif ferent cabinet members.
His allotment for some departments was far too small. Garay had considered only the known expenditures of each--he had failed to take into account any extraordinary outlays by the Secretaries.
Enraged by the oversight, the Secretary of State protested
the reduction of funds. In the Council of State, he asserted that
even in times of peace, the government had to conduct serious negotiations and carry on secret activities in many countries.
Emergency funds were needed to discharge what Pizarro considered
9AHN, Estado, lib. 18d., session, November 20, 1816.
^ Decretos. IV, 216; Pintos Vleltes, op., cit.. p. 346. 181 the routine business of his department. Because Spain lacked a sizable military establishment, the Department of State had many
"additional" duties,^
Alliances and seemingly cordial relations with other countries did not reduce the expenditures of the diplomatic corps. Many so-called allies permitted their nationals to aid the rebels, and allowed revolutionaries to muster on their shores. 12
The situation in the Plate region merely served to substan tiate Pizarro*s contention. The invasion of the Banda Oriental and the Portuguese connivance with the insurgents of Buenos Aires under- scored a need for an alert Department of State. 13 Moreover, to keep
informed of rebel movements in southern South America, the Spanish
legation at Rio de Janeiro operated an extensive intelligence net work. It also assisted the royalist forces in Upper Peru by
supplying subalterns who had escaped from rebel prisons. On their
journeys, these junior officers were able to discover enemy positions
^"Exposici6n al Consejo de Estado por el Sr D11 JosS Garcia de Le6n y Pizarro, Ministro de Estado, sobre el Plan de Hacienda," May 1, 1817, AHN, Estado, lib. 60d. Pizarro had written the memorial, however, on April 12, 1817.
^AHN, Estado, lib. 21d., sessions, April 28; May 6 ; August 5, 1818.
13AHN, Estado, lib. 18d., session, October 16, 1816; lib. 2ld., sessions, April 28; May 6 ; August 5, 1818; John Street, Art 1gas and the Emancipation of Uruguay (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), pp. 136-146, 279-309. The subject will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 182 and note the existing climate of opinion held in interior Brazil
regarding the disorders,^
The Legation's expenditures sometimes exceeded 400,000 reales a month. For additional funds, the members had to rely on their own resources. For instance, as surety for a loan from a London concern,
they pledged the value of their salaries, as little help came from
Madrid. Although continually in financial straits, the Legation had
to be circumspect, in order not to involve the government in any
speculative venture. They needed, moreover, to hide their indigence
from foreign diplomats as well as from rebel emissaries stationed in
Rio de Janeiro.^
Moreover, Pizarro received complaints about a lack of funds
from Luis de Onfs. The ambassador asserted that he could not carry
out his mission on the salary allotted. Many expenditures, he
explained, exceeded the normal call of duty. Even though it was
incomprehensible to members of the Council of the Indies, Onfs
suggested that bribes to congressmen could insure decisions favorable
to Spain,
l^Biblioteca del Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Madrid, "Memoria politfca y estadfstica de la Legaci6n de Espafia en el Brasil que comprende los aftos de 1817 hasta fin de 1821” (here after cited as "Memoria polftica"), MSS, 76, fols. 56-58.
15Ibld.T fols. 59-60. l^Onfs to Pizarro, April 6, 1817, in Memorias de. Pizarro. II, 246-250; Report of Four Members of the Council of the Indies, July 13, 1815, copy, AGI, Estado, leg, 88. 183
Despite Pizarro*s contention, Garay did not increase the allotment.^ Moreover, as will be seen later in this chapter, the government's lack of money also prevented apportioning sufficient
funds to the Navy Department.
The need to furnish troop transportation to America added to, and was closely connected with the government's financial problems. This predicament had persisted since the Cortes of Cfidiz.
In the earlier period, the Regency had ordered the consulado of
Cidiz to propose measures for reinforcing military units overseas, and also, to estimate the cost of transporting men and supplies.
After weighing the issue, the Consulado of C£diz reported that the program would cost 8,000,000 reales. To supervise the operation, the government created a semiautonomous agency-the Commission of
Reemplazos, also called the Junta of Reemplazos. The Commission had
to provide funds for supplies and to outfit expeditions. Orders for | O new expeditions, however, came from the government.
After Ferdinand's return, this agency continued to function, but it constantly lacked funds. In an attempt to aid the Commission,
the government extablished duties on imports and exports, in America
l^March 6, 1817, AHN, Estado, lib. 60d. ; Decretos. IV, 210-241.
^®A, Mat ilia Tasc6n, "Las expediciones o reemplazos militares enviados desde Cidiz a reprimir el movimiento de independencia de Hispanoamerica," Revlsta de Archlvos Blbllotecas y Museos. LVII, No. 1 (Madrid, 1951), 37. 184 and in Spain, and levied other taxes as well. 19
In light of its duties, the revenue from these taxes proved inadequate. On paper, the balance sheet showed a profit. Between
1811 and 1820 the Commission spent approximately 350,494,970 reales, but collected about 391,487,755. However, this estimate failed to take into account unauthorized expenditures such as the maintenance of troops at Cldiz; advance payment of salaries to officials; and, the outfitting of ships to protect the transports. 20
Unofficial responsibilities prevented the Commission from carrying out its primary task--to equip and dispatch troops to
America. Because of its remissness, the Council of State proposed to investigate its operations. The Navy Secretary had requested funds to equip the frigate Soledad, which was to protect the trans ports carrying reinforcements to Peru. However, the Finance
Secretary decided that he should use the 10,000,000 reales which had been assigned to the Junta of Reemplazos from the consulados in
Spain. In the Council of State, Vdzquez protested that this Commis sion did not have the money. He complained about its constant lack of funds. Josi Ibarra, the former Finance Secretary, concurred with
Vizquez and pointed out that the Commission could not borrow money
19«circular-Ministro de Guerra al Mlnistro de Hacienda," May 30, 1817, AGI, Estado, leg. 86; Matilla Tasc6n, gj>. cit.. pp. 44-50.
20Matilla Tasc6n, oj>, cit.. pp. 39, 50. 185 even at a 52% rate of interest. Its status as a bad credit risk, argued Ibarra, required an investigation into its operations. 21
Many counsellors of state did not appreciate the extent of the
Junta's difficulties. For example, few knew of the repeated com plaints made to the king and to the Navy and War Secretaries about insufficient funds. The counsellors, moreover, failed to realize that the domestic unrest in Spain had affected the functioning of the Commission.
After receiving news about the short-lived mutiny in Galicia led by Juan Dfaz Porlier, military authorities in Barcelona requested money from Madrid. In October, 1815, the king diverted 5,500,000 reales to pay soldiers in Catalonia, a sum which had been ticketed for the Junta from the Consulado of Barcelona. In order to compen sate the Commission, Ferdinand ordered the already bankrupt Treasury to advance the sum. 0 9 c
In spite of the problems besetting the Commission of
Reemplazos, the government ordered troops and supplies to America.
As its duties increased, the debts and expenditures mounted. Its credit rating steadily declined. The Junta had either to float a loan or to cease functioning. Since creditors in Spain were
2*AHN, Estado, lib. 18d., session, December 11, 1816.
22Minister of War to Minister of Finance, October 22, 1815, AGI, Ind. Gral., leg. 2383. 186 reluctant to make new loans, it appeared that the Junta would be
forced to do the latter,To meet the impasse, the king ordered
the Commission to borrow from London firms. These too, however, wanted guarantees. Consequently, to raise the 60,000,000 reales necessary to transport and equip 10,000 men, the Junta insisted
that the government be prepared to pledge the proceeds from its
agricultural crop. If the king would be willing to make this sacri
fice, then the Commission could approach either Spanish merchants
or London bankers.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE ARMED FORCES
The problem of the Army, and as will later be shown, that of
the Navy, added to the government's other woes. When Ferdinand
returned in 1814, the regular Army numbered 148,673. 25 That estimate was inflated and the effective fighting force was much smaller. 2 6
Even so, the morale of the Army was low. Whatever the reasons
behind this dissatisfaction— economics being an important one--a
2^Vaughn to Castlereagh, no. 70, July 27, 1816, FO 72/187; Vazquez Papers, MSS, 436, fols. 64-100; Matilla TascSn, op.. cit.. PP. 44-49.
2^V£zquez Papers, MSS, 436, fols. 101-106; AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., session, September 17, 1817.
25AGP, PR/29, vol. 14, fols. 60-68.
26Stanley Payne, Politics and the Military in Modern Spain (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. 7-10. 187 number of mutinies occurred and were planned between 1814 and 1819. '
These occurrences should have constrained the government to be suspicious of any future undertaking that involved the Army,
The government had to mobilize on two fronts. It had to organize for national defense, and be able to suppress domestic disturbances. In addition, troops had to be dispatched to the
7 0 colonies. In the Council of State, the Secretary of War estimated that 78,495 men would suffice to meet the nation’s needs. 29 To econ omize, this could be reduced to 64,000 men for the regular Army.
With this, he argued, the government could deal with internal dis orders, send men to America, and continue to maintain her prestige among the European nations. To be prepared for any possible domestic crisis, the Secretary of War proposed the formation of provincial militia units. The combined forces of the regulars and the militia, moreover, would be able to handle any wartime emer- gency. 30
The counsellors of state pondered the subject of dispatching troops to America. In spite of the high costs and great sacrifices,
2^Vlzquez Papers, MSS, 432, fols. 56-62; Cornelias, on. cit.. pp. 165-302.
2®AHN, Estado, lib. 18d., session, November 13, 1816.
29AHN, Estado, lib. 16d., session, December 27, 1815.
^®MExposici6n del S* Ministro de Guerra, Marquis de Campo Sagrado, sobre el mencionado Plan de Hacienda (1817)," April 30, 1817, AHN, Estado, lib. 60d. 188 the government had continued to send expeditions, many of which were better equipped than circumstances would normally have allowed. 31
However, unless a sizable force left for America, many counsellors believed that the rebellions would never be suppressed. But the vicious circle continued. Decimated by war, debilitated by the
flight of thousands for political reasons, and thwarted by an empty
treasury, Spain could send only token forces. The soldiers, more
over, were not eager to fight, with some deserting to the insur-
gents. 32
Troops had to be sent, nevertheless, to maintain the prestige
of the King, both at home and abroad. The counsellors of state
could not discount either the possibility of defectors, or that of a
domestic crisis. These two factors prompted some counsellors to urge
that the government institute reforms, try to negotiate with the
rebels, and weigh the merits of mediation. Even though they realized
that numbers alone could not keep the peace in the colonies, all the
counsellors nevertheless agreed that troops had to be dispatched to
those areas in open rebellion, and to those partially upturned. 33
■*^AHN, Estado, lib. 14d., sessions, April 3; May 23, 1815.
■*2AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., sessions, January 22; September 17, 1817; "Requena sobre las Americas,” September 6, 1815, AGP, PR/30, vol. 15, fols. 632-637.
33AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., sessions, January 22; September 24; October 1; October 8; October 15; October 18, 1817. 189
Discussions on the relative merits of resorting to the use of force resounded in the Council of State, At the same time, the subject was plaguing the Council of the Indies, whose recommen dations in the past had been re-echoed often by the counsellors of state.
One report from the Council of the Indies had recapitulated the government's dilemma--the lack of adequate resources which would otherwise enable Spain to suppress the disorders that continued to o I ravage the colonies. A second consults contained similar dis heartening observations. Military expeditions were too expensive to
continue, because they siphoned off much needed men and materials.
Even though some force was necessary, it had to be kept to a minimum.
Despite this military reduction and the apparent dismal picture it
conjured, the counsellors argued that fewer men could pacify the
colonies. An astute commander, using politic measures, could induce 35 the colonists to flock back to the loyalist side.
Ministers and officials alike realized that numbers alone were not the answer. On the contrary, better deployment of available manpower might relieve the burden on the Peninsula. The government
^^Report of Four Members of the Council of the Indies, July 13, 1815, copy, AGI, Estado, leg. 88.
^^Consulta of the Council of the Indies, May 17, 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 88. 190 had to prevent any overlapping of authority. Conceivably with this in mind, the king had given General Pablo Morillo broad military and political powers; to meet any emergency, the commander had the right 36 to alter even the king’s orders.
This was a beginning, but much more was needed. Francisco
Requena, counsellor of the Indies and a member of both the Junta of
Pacification and the Military Junta of the Indies, advised Ferdinand to increase the authority of the Viceroy in Lima. His recommen dations were based on his thirty-one years of experience in America.
In his memorial to the king, Requena contrasted the administrative organization of New Spain with that of South America. In the former, the Viceroy controlled everything, the only subdivision being the
Captaincy-general of Guatemala. South America, on the other hand, consisted of three Viceroyalties and two Captaincies-general. Of the administrative organization in South America, the Viceroy of Lima was the stanchest defender of regal authority. He had sent supplies to royalists in Montevideo, dispatched troops to quell the riots in
Quito, and brought Chile once again under royal control. These feats for the royalist cause, pointed out Requena, would justify giving him broad powers; this would include military jurisdiction over the territories comprising the audiencias of Chile, Charcas, and Quito.
36Antonio Rodriguez Villa, El_ tentente general Don Pablo Morillo (4 vols.; Madrid: Fortanet, 1908-1910), II, 443-448. 191
This proposal and others, like rotating military garrisons in
America, would enable Spain to retain control over these semi- autonomous units that had been created by administrative short- 37 sightedness.
If all these suggestions were implemented, would Madrid have to continue to forward men overseas? With problems at home, could the government really afford the added expense incurred either from reinforcing units in America or from outfitting a sizable expedition?
What might be done to lessen the burdens on the metropolis?
One branch of the services was perhaps more vital for a victory than another, and therefore, it should be given greater consideration. The Royal Navy had to protect convoys carrying men and supplies to America. Also, it was important in any attempt to cut rebel communications with foreigners, and to clear the seas of
insurgent corsairs which preyed on Spanish commerce. Unfortunately, because of Spain’s geopolitical situation, the Navy already had other responsibilities that it could not fulfill due to insufficient funds.
Consequently the fleet was undermanned and undersized.
In a memorial to the king, Jos4 V&zquez Figueroa contrasted
the poor condition of the Navy with the need for a powerful fleet.
Among other things, he mentioned that the disorders in America
37"Requena sobre las Americas," September 6, 1816, AGP, PR/30, vol. 15, fols. 632-637. 192 persisted because of Spain’s undersized navy. Unless sufficient numbers of vessels departed for the colonies, the colonists would lose contact with the metropolis. They would be compelled to fend for themselves against the ringleaders of the rebellions. Independ- 30 ence would be inevitable.
Ferdinand concurred with this appraisal. He returned the
Secretary’s memorandum with the comment, "Yes. Yes, you wi11 be given what you need."^^ (Underlined as in original.)
Nevertheless, the size of the fleet decreased, despite its increased responsibilities and the royalist setbacks in America. At the beginning of the French Revolution, there were eighty men-of-war and fifty frigates; by 1808, the number had been reduced to forty-two and thirty, respectively. Because of governmental negligence during the War of Independence, the number had been reduced further, to twenty-nine and seventeen, many of these being unserviceable. Of the twenty-four seaworthy ships, only two or three did not need a complete overhaul. The dockyards, however, lacked materials and personnel, and promised allotments had not been fulfilled.^®
•*®"Mi representacifin al Rey al hacerme cargo del Ministerio de Marina sobre su estado, importancia, y necesldad de su fomento," February 21, 1816, Vazquez Papers, MSS, 433, fols. 15-34.
39y£zquez Papers, MSS, 432, fols. 39-41.
^"Presupuesto de los tres departamentos y exposici6n al Rey pa el fomento de la Marina," August 20, 1816, Vazquez Papers, MSS, 433, fols. 54-61. 193
To be effective, the Navy needed funds. Vazquez informed the
Council of State that the Royal Navy had to have a minimum of twenty men-of-war, thirty frigates, and a proportional number of smaller craft. To attain this objective, his Department needed at least
120,000,000 reales annually.^
While acknowledging the importance of the navy in quelling the insurrection, the Finance Secretary was forced, by measures of / o economy, to cut the budget of the Navy to 100,000,000 reales. The counsellors of state, in general, opposed the reduction of funds as being detrimental to the best interests of the country. A crippled navy, mentioned L6pez Araujo, hurt the nation’s agriculture, com merce, and manufacturing.^ These were not the only casualties.
Without a sizable fleet, interjected the Secretary of Gracia y
Justicia, the rebellions in America would be prolonged.^ Even though the government might be prepared to send more troops to the colonies, victory would not be achieved, insisted the Secretary of
^AHN, Estado, lib. 18d., session, August 27, 1816.
^"Plan de Real Hacienda presentado por el Sr 0° Martin Garay, Ministro del ramo en 6 de Marzo de dicho aflo []l817| ," AHN, Estado, lib. 60d,
^"Dictamen del Sr D11 Manuel Lopez Araujo sobre el Plan de Hacienda," n.d., AHN, Estado, lib. 60d.
^"Dictamen del sr Ministro de Gracia y Justicia, presentado en la sesion del 30 de Abril de 1817, sobre el anterior Plan de Hacienda," AHN, Estado, lib. 60d. 194
War, unless the Navy protected the supply ships and escorted the convoys.^
Garay's measure, however, won out over the protests.
According to the royal decree of May 30, 1817, which announced the
official Budget, the Navy was allotted 100,000,000 reales. In actual
fact, Vazquez received only 20,000,000 reales. ^
The Navy did not have money to procure materials or to pay qualified personnel. Vazquez was unable, therefore, to meet the 47 continuous requests for naval assistance from government officials.
The Secretary of the Navy informed the counsellors of state
of his predicament, insisting that the pacification of America
depended on remedying the situation. Vazquez stressed that the
insurgency would be suppressed by capturing the corsairs, and by
preventing the rebels from receiving supplies from abroad. This
task could be accomplished, he mentioned, if the government would
allocate for the Navy two thirds of that amount being ticketed for
^"Exposicion del Sr Ministro de la Guerra, Marques de Campo Sagrado, sobre el mencionado Plan de Hacienda (1817)," April 30, 1817, AHN, Estado, lib. 60d.
^V^zquez Papers, MSS, 432, fol. 86.
^Secretary of the Indies to V4zquez Figueroa, December 27, 1814; Vazquez Figueroa to Secretary of the Indies, January 1, 1815, AB, carpeta 73; Francisco Abadfa to Vlzquez Figueroa, May 17, 1816, AB, carpeta 123; Vazquez Figueroa to Secretary of War, July 7, 1816, Vizquez Papers, MSS, 432, fols. 262-263; AHN, Estado, lib. 18d., sessions, November 20; December 11, 1816. 195 military expeditions, which the Secretary of War already had
/ fi pronounced a failure.
Ferdinand appeared receptive to the idea of more money for the Navy. He endeavored to bring the fleet to full strength by ordering the Secretary of Finance to institute whatever economy 49 measures might be necessary to provide additional funds.
Meanwhile, rebel corsairs took advantage of the plight of
the Royal Navy. They kept the sea lanes open. This action enabled
supplies to reach the insurgents from foreign countries. Moreover,
their ships plundered Spanish commerce. The merchants thus affected
demanded protection from the government ; they refused, nevertheless,
to contribute money toward strengthening the Royal Navy.^® Instead,
they preferred to form their own convoys. The merchants expected
the government to levy additional taxes to support their plan.
Vazquez opposed the scheme. He argued that their proposal was
detrimental to the best interests of the nation. The Secretary of
the Navy pointed out that a private fleet could sometimes involve
^8AHN, Estado, lib, 20d., session, January 22, 1817; Conde de Castafleda de los Lamos to Jos£ Pizarro, January 28, 1817, AGI, Ind. Gral., leg. 1356.
^Vizquez to Secretary of Finance, July 26, 1817, AGI, Ind. Gral., leg. 1356.
^®AHN, Estado, lib. 16d., session, April 17, 1816. 196
Spain in scrapes with other countries.*
This predicament indicated that official attempts to strengthen the fleet had failed. Ferdinand, nevertheless, had to act to satisfy the demands of the merchants, but without infringing on the prerogatives of the Royal Navy. After consulting with the
Council of State, the king issued letters of marque. These would lessen the existing burden on the Navy. Moreover, by this action, he hoped to end the contraband trade which flourished because of the 52 government*s inability to patrol the seas.
Although somewhat relieved by this measure, the Royal Navy was still powerless against the insurgents. Foreigners and rein forcements continued to enter the colonies. Sim6n Bolivar, for one, organized an expedition of eighteen schooners and 2,000 men that was
CO able to land at Margarita.From England, about 1,000 men sailed to join the insurgents in Venezuela.Filibustering expeditions to
"^"Mi dictamen sobre no deber haver [.sic]] en el Estado otras fuerzas que las del Gobierno, y ser preferibles las de la Marina Rl a las que armen los particulares para dar comboyes," May, n.d., 1817, Vizquez Papers, MSS, 433, fols. 185-195.
■*2AHN, Estado, lib. 16d., session, February 7, 1816; "Corsarios contra los insurgentses. Consideraciones con los buques armados en corso y mercancia," copy, February 9, 1816,Vazquez Papers, MSS, fols. 134-139.
^Navy to Finance, July 7, 1816, Vazquez Papers, MSS, 432, fols. 259-260.
S^Navy to War, June 13, 1818, Vazquez Papers, MSS, 432, fol. 292; Rodriguez Villa, oe.. clt.. Ill, 357-358. 197
New Spain were organized in the United States.^
Only a sizable fleet would stop aid from reaching the insur gents, and put an end to their mastery of the seas. By 1818, their activities had reached such proportions that the Navy Secretary received orders to guard troop transports to New Spain, Venezuela,
Peru, and other regions. But his meager resources prevented him from responding to even these requests.Moreover, the plight of the
Royal Navy was to jeopardize (as will be seen in the next chapter,) the success of the projected expedition to Buenos Aires.
Financial and military difficulties notwithstanding, Ferdinand decided to prepare for the expedition to Buenos Aires. The king expected the nation to be able to make a final all-out effort for that important undertaking. The cost would be high, undoubtedly.
The stakes, however, were higher--the preservation of the empire.
55 Vizquez to Sr Infante Almirante General, October 25, 1816; January 17, 1817, Vizquez Papers, MSS, 432, fols. 268, 270.
^Navy to War, June 13, 1818, Vizquez Papers, fol. 292. CHAPTER VIII
CONSIDERATION OF SPAIN'S ALTERNATIVE TO SOUTH AMERICA’S
INDEPENDENCE: THE EXPEDITION TO THE RIO DE LA PLATA
The situation in the Plate region proved particularly embarrassing to the government. Since 1814, the counsellors of state had been keeping a close watch on both the insurgent and the Portu guese activities in the area. The United Provinces had declared their independence in July, 1816. The existence of a revolutionary government at Buenos Aires served to disparage the metropolis in the eyes of European nations. Rebel corsairs attacked Spanish shipping in American waters with relative impunity, and even ventured to approach the environs of Cidiz. The government at Buenos Aires had even sent men and supplies to Chile. Moreover, after the crossing of the Andes by Josi de San Martfn, and the subsequent capture of Chile,
Madrid awoke to the very real danger of an attack on Peru.
In addition, the Portuguese complicated matters for Spain. By
1817, Portugal controlled Montevideo. Before the occupation, Spain had expected some assistance from Brazil in suppressing the rebel lions. Now, any move by Spain against the insurgents of Buenos
Aires had become contingent on relations between the two Iberian countries. Until they reached some accord about control of the occupied territory, a precipitate move might provoke retaliatory measures. 199
I. HISPANIC-PORTUGUESE RELATIONS
Even before the invasion of the Banda Oriental, relations between these two countries had been strained. This was a result of the controversy over Olivenza and other territories ceded to Spain by the Treaty of Badajoz in 1801. At the Congress of Vienna, the
Portuguese delegation strove to get the other delegates to support its claim to these territories.
Prior to the formal meeting at Vienna, Lord Castlereagh had
intervened in the dispute. He had suggested to the Spanish pleni potentiary that Spain take the initiative in resolving the problem of the territories. He wanted Madrid to return them to Portugal.
Because Labrador did not have instructions on this matter, he contacted his government, The reply from home stated that the issue
could only be resolved by direct negotiations between the interested parties. *
The Congress of Vienna arrived at no conclusive settlement with regard to the controversy. Article 103 of the Final Act of the
Congress of Vienna, however, indicated support for the Portuguese
claims. It stated that by restoring said territories, Spain would
demonstrate a willingness to establish friendly relations with
Portugal. Moreover, the provision mentioned that the signers would
AHN, Estado, lib. 18d., session, September 10, 1816; Secretary of Council of State to Secretary of State, September 13, 1816, AHN, Estado, leg. 181; Bicker, op., clt.. I, 394. 200
2 work toward achieving this objective. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, the inclusion of this article was one reason which led Spain to refuse to sign the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna.
The dispute between the two nations then remained dormant until Portugal broached the subject of a treaty of mutual assistance, having in mind the discussions to be held at Paris. The Portuguese proposal, which Madrid felt had been motivated by Napoleon’s escape from Elba, mentioned only a defensive alliance; each country would be required to assist the other in case of an invasion. At a later date, mentioned Count Palmella, the Portuguese negotiator, the treaty would be extended to include America.^
Madrid ordered its ambassador at Paris to insist on guarantees of mutual assistance against both internal and external enemies.
Labrador was also to investigate the possibility of extending the agreement to all America or at least the southern hemisphere.
However, if Palmella lacked authority to arrange such an inclusive treaty, then it should be merely for the Peninsula, but with a proviso included for another alliance of co-operation in America.
During the period of negotiations, Cevallos wrote, Brazil should cut all commercial relations with Buenos Aires, and furthermore, she
^Bicker, o e .. cit.. I, 395-396,
^AHN, Estado, lib. 16d., session, October 10, 1815.
^Bficker, o]>. cit.. I, 409-410. 201 should punish any infractions of Spain's mercantile code.^
Count Palmella countered with Portugal's proposals. These included points such as drawing demarcation lines between the
American territories of the two countries; providing mutual assist ance against the Barbary pirates; and, making arrangements for the abolition of the slave trade. Madrid, however, opposed one of the measures, that one which would have conditioned any proposed alliance on the return of Olivenza and the other territories on the Peninsula.
This provision, and the feeling in the Council of State that Portugal did not offer adequate guaranties, impelled the government to reject the plan.^
Despite the obstacles, the counsellors often discussed the question of an alliance. An agreement between Spain and Portugal, argued Cevallos in the Council of State, would be a sure way to draw the nations together. Spain's conditions for the proposed accord, moreover, would deprive the rebels of Buenos Aires of succor from
Brazil. But to cede Olivenza and the other territories demanded by
Portugal, reasoned the First Secretary, would raise doubts about the legality of both the war and the resultant treaty. Therefore, acceptance of the Portuguese proposals would discredit Spain's ruler
^Ibid.. pp. 410-411; AHN, Estado, lib. 16d., session, October 10, 1815.
®AHN, Estado, lib. 16d., session, December 27, 1815; Becker, op., cit.. I, 411. 202 at that tirae.^
Portugal was equally adamant. In an attempt to break the deadlock, Palmella journeyed to Madrid. He insisted that no mention had been made about abrogating the Treaty of Badajoz. Moreover, the ambassador argued that the Franco-Spanish invasion of Portugal in
1807 had already annulled that treaty. To efface all memories of
this unfortunate action, Palmella believed that Ferdinand should return Olivenza and the other territories. On the subject of a guaranty of each country’s possessions in America, Palmella con
trasted the chaos in the Spanish colonies with the tranquility in
Q the Portuguese.
The two Iberian powers had reached an impasse. Madrid, would not accept any proposals for the return of those territories within
Spain. The government continued to base its claim primarily on
international law as well as on its obligation to avoid what might
be construed as an insult to the prestige of the nation. Spain
admonished Portugal, on the other hand, for not honoring Article 3 of
the Treaty of Badajoz. King Joao’s refusal to return the conquered
territories in America, claimed Madrid, constituted a direct treaty
^AHN, Estado, lib. 16d., session, January 3, 1816.
8AHN, Estado, lib. 16d., session, January 10, 1816; Vaughn to Castlereagh, no. 3, February 28, 1816, FO 72/185. 203
g violation.
While the debates continued in the Council of State, and the governments exchanged diplomatic notes, the Portuguese invaded the
Banda Oriental. That invasion, side by side with the negotiations which were under way for the marriage of Ferdinand and his brother to the Portuguese princesses, certainly resulted in complicated rela tions between the two governments.
Portugal always had an interest in the Banda Oriental. Its control would allow her to extend Brazil's boundaries to the mouth of the River Plate. The fighting in 1810, between the provisional junta in Buenos Airea and the loyal government at Montevideo, provided the ever alert Portuguese with an excuse to intervene.
Carlota Joaquina, Ferdinand's sister and King Joao's wife, sent the loyalists her jewels, which incidentally were later returned, and a printing press to combat patriot propaganda. The fear of direct
Portuguese intervention, however, had led the leaders in Buenos Aires to appeal to Lord Strangford (the British ambassador at Rio de
Janeiro), for protection. They expected his assistance because
Portugal, Spain, and England were all allies in the fight against the French.^
Strangford's actions, however, did not prevent the Portuguese
9AHN, Estado, lib. 18d., session, September 10, 1816; Finance to State, September, 13, 1816, AHN, Estado, leg. 181.
^Street, o]j. cit.., pp. 136-137. 204 from crossing into Paraguay. Later, their troops advanced to the
Banda Oriental, just as the insurrection in favor of the revolu tionaries broke out. The Viceroy, Francisco Javier Elfo, was forced to request Portuguese assistance, after having failed in his attempt to buy off Jos4 Artigas. This invitation to King Joao had been supported in the first instance by the Spanish minister at Rio de
Janeiro, the Marquess of Casa Irujo. He had realized that Spain could retain possession of Montevideo only with Brazil’s help. With some foresight, however, the minister had endeavored to win promises that the troops would be withdrawn once the insurgents had surren dered. ^
When in October, 1811, the government at Buenos Aires agreed to withdraw its troops from the Banda Oriental, their action left
Elfo technically in control of that region. However, neither the
Portuguese nor Artigas and his band accepted this accord. Sporadic fighting continued. Subsequently, in August, 1812, King Joao ordered his troops to return to Brazil. 1 9 ^
Because of the explosive situation in the Plate area, Spain urged Portugal to take an active role in its pacification, w13
U Ibid.. pp. 140-141.
*2Ibid.. pp. 145-146, 158-161; Alan K. Manchester, British Pre- eminence in Brazil (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1933), pp. 130-135.
^Cevallos to AndrSs Villalba, February 8 , 1815, AGI, Estado, leg. 98. 205
Portuguese assistance in suppressing the insurgency, Cevallos insisted, could lead to a quicker solution of the controversy over 1& Olivenza,
The First Secretary informed the Council of State regarding the status of existing relations between the countries. He admitted that Carlota's actions seemed to indicate a sincere concern for
Spain’s rights in that region, but that the Portuguese government's policies more recently had changed. King JoSo had come under
Britain's influence, Cevallos claimed. Through their prodding, the king had agreed to an armistice with the rebels. This move gave the insurgency respectability and even legal sanction. Moreover, King
Joao's actions had voided, in the opinion of Cevallos, the treaty of reciprocal guarantees signed in 1777 between Spain and Portugal.
This series of events impelled the First Secretary to state that
Madrid should not expect Portugal to assist in suppressing the rebellion. On the contrary, he believed that she proposed to extend her boundaries and to profit from Spain's hapless situation.^
The Portuguese, it is true, had been carrying on negotiations with the rebels since 1813. Portefio leaders had sent various missions to Rio. In January, 1815, Carlos Alvear, the Supreme
^AHN, Estado, lib. 14d., session, April 3, 1815; Cevallos to Fern^n Nfiiiez, February 9, 1815, AGI, Estado, leg. 98.
*5AHN, Estado, lib. lAd., session, May 23, 1815. 206
Director, dispatched Manuel Jose Garcfa to request King Joao's intercession with Ferdinand.^ Even though these efforts to use the good offices of both the Portuguese and Strangford came to naught, the way was prepared for other arrangements later in the year.^
King Joao and his government welcomed any project to extend
Brazil's frontiers and he now had sufficient forces to carry out such an undertaking. The termination of the war in Europe had made
30,000 troops available for duty in the New World.In 1815, King
Joao transferred to Brazil 5,000 crack troops under the command of
General Carlos Frederico Lecfir.^ Military preparations in America were defended on the grounds that Artigas menaced Portuguese terri tory, and that these provinces had to be pacified because of their proximity to Brazil. 90
The following year, Cevallos' fears of Portuguese intrigues
IStiMemoria polltica," MSS, 76, fols. 3-5; Street, op. cit. . pp. 281-282.
^Street, op. cit. . pp. 282-284,
*®Ibi_d. , p. 2 8 4 .
l%larshal Beresford to Lord Castlereagh, June 29, 1815, FO 63/188.
2®AHN, Estado, lib, 18d., sessions, August 20; August 27, 1816; Villalba to Cevallos, no. 332, Muy Reservado, June 28, 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 98; Carlota Joaquina to Ferdinand VII, July 16, 1816, in Carlos Seco Serrano, "Dofla Carlota Joaquina de Borb6n y la cuesti6n uruguaya," Revista de Indias. Afio VIII, Nos. 28-29 (Madrid, 1947), 456-457. 207 were confirmed. In Lisbon, the possibility of sending more troops was discussed.In America, a fleet with 3,500 men left for the Rfo de la Plata. Henry Chamberlain, the British charg£, protested--but to no avail.
In Rio de Janeiro, various factions at Court endeavored to
justify the attack. The intrigues reached such proportions that
Carlota Joaquina expressed a desire to leave. 23 She was despondent over learning that groups once opposed to a policy of aggrandizement had since changed their position. Now, all parties stressed a need
for permanent frontiers, which meant the Parani and Plate rivers.
They urged the government to take advantage of the situation precipitated by the insurgency in Buenos Aires. Portugal should
offer Spain military aid, but in exchange for co-operating to
suppress the rebellion, King JoSo should demand territorial conces
sions in the area.2^
During the period of negotiations with Spain, Portugal, according to one plan presented to the king, was to keep a secret
2*Manuel de Lardiz£bal y Montoya to Cevallos, no. 140, April 17, 1816, AHN, Estado, leg. 4504.
2 9Manchester, o]j. cit.. p. 139. 23 Carlota Joaquina to Cevallos, June 15, 1816; Villalba to Cevallos, no. 332, Muy Reservado, June 28, 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 98.
2%enry Chamberlain to Castlereagh, Secret, March 31, 1817, enclosures, F0 63/202. 208 envoy in Buenos Aires. His Instructions were to convert the leaders to the Spanish cause. If this proved impractical, he should persuade them to acknowledge Portuguese sovereignty. Moreover, to avoid any possible confrontation with Britain, King Joao was urged to inform
London of his intentions and to stress his prior attempt aimed at reaching an amicable accord with Ferdinand to destroy the revolu tionary forces. This note to England should state that, if Spain did not agree to co-operate, Brazil would be compelled to act alone because her security was threatened. 25
Meanwhile, Brazil was to assemble troops along the borders and to wait for the "spontaneous uprising" on the part of the people.
But if nothing happened, the troops were to strike. The newly occupied territories, concluded the memorial to the king, would remain in Portugal's possession until she reached some accord with
Spain.
King Joao's advisers predicted that the conquests would push
Ferdinand to settle existing differences between the two countries.
Madrid, it was thought, would now expect either an invasion of Buenos
Aires or a possible intervention in Peru. Again, they stressed that
Spain had apparently abandoned the area since she had not sent enough
25"Memo, Rio de Janeiro, June 6, 1816," enclosure, Chamberlain to Castlereagh, Secret, March 31, 1817, FO 63/202.
26IblJ 209 troops. Therefore, the occupation could be effected under the guise of protecting Portuguese territory and of fighting the rebels, but
0 7 not the Spaniards.
In August, 1816, Portuguese troops entered Spanish territory to Madrid's chagrin. Visibly perturbed over events in the Plate,
Cevallos presented his views to the Council of State. He mentioned that in light of the upcoming marriages of the king and his brother with the Portuguese princesses, the Spaniards had expected Portugal to assist in subduing the rebels. Under present circumstances, the king should demand a satisfactory reply from King Jd3o, and he must warn his father-in-law of the probable consequences of that precip itate action. Otherwise, Cevallos told the counsellors, the people would believe that family ties had prevented Ferdinand from protecting his possessions, for which Spain had made many sacri
fices.^®
After listening to his denunciations of the attack, the coun sellors proposed that the king demand an explanation from King J0S0.
They wanted the reply before the princesses embarked for Spain. Upon
learning, however, that the two already had arrived at Cidlz, the counsellors agreed on three possible courses of action: (1) that
^Carlota Joaquina to Ferdinand VII, June 30; July 16, 1816, in Seco Serrano, "Dofla Carlota Joaquina , . . pp. 455-457.
2®AHN, Estado, lib. 18d., sessions, August 20; August 27, 1816. 210 the king should order a national mobilization for an attack on
Portugal; (2) that he should confine the princesses to a convent;
or (3) that they should be sent back to Lisbon.^ In addition, it was decided to suspend negotiations on the matter of Olivenza. The
Secretary of the Navy dissented on this point, however. He Insisted
on Montevideo’s strategic value in the fight against the insurgents
of Buenos Aires. Vazquez, in fact, was prepared to exchange the 30 territories in the Peninsula for those in America.
The king approved the suspension of negotiations. He
rejected, however, the other three recommendations. He concurred with still another suggestion made by the Council of State--Ferdinand
appealed his case to England, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France.
In March, 1817, these countries agreed to discuss the question at the
Ambassadorial Conference at Paris. The mediators pressed King Jo’ao
to explain the motives behind the invasion. 31
England, for her part, urged King Joao to negotiate with
Ferdinand. Chamberlain recommended that he give his representatives
^AHN, Estado, lib. 18d., session, September 3, 1816; Memorias de Plzarro. I, 219-220; Vaughn to Castlereagh, no, 85, September 5; no. 97, September 14, 1816, F0 72/187. 30 AHN, Estado, lib. 18d., sessions, September 10; September 17, 1816.
■*^An Undated Anonymous Memorial on the Subject of the Portuguese Invasion of the Banda Oriental from 1816 to 1817, AGI, Estado, leg. 102. 211
in Europe broad enough power to work out a settlement on all matters dividing Spain and Portugal. Moreover, the chargl insisted--a bit
too hastily— that England's continued guaranty of King Joao's
European possessions was contingent on an arrangement with Spain. 32
Goaded by England, King JoSo appointed Count Palmella his
representative at the meeting. Although acknowledging Ferdinand's
sovereignty over the disputed territory in America, Portugal wanted
guarantees that Spain could, in fact, control the area. Palmella
insisted on tying the question of restitution to the broader problem
of the pacification of America, reasoning that, otherwise, King
Jo'So would endanger the peace and security of Brazil. 33
After much wrangling and many bitter diplomatic notes between
Spain and Portugal, the two negotiators, together with the mediators,
arranged a five point program by the middle of 1818; (1) Portugal
was to hand over to an equal number of Spanish troops the city of
Montevideo; (2) Spain was to pay an indemnity of 7,500,000 francs at
the time of her reoccupation; (3) under the auspices of the Allied
Powers, the two were to begin negotiations to settle all territorial
disputes in Europe and in America; (4) the Spanish expedition to
Montevideo had to consist of at least 8,000 men; and, (5) if her
^^Castlereagh to Chamberlain, April 9, 1817, FO 63/201.
-^Memorias de Pizarro. I, 222-224; Wellesley to Castlereagh, Private and Confidential, November 8 ; no. 149, November 18, 1817, F0 72/200. 212 forces did not arrive within six months, Spain was to pay Portugal an indemnity of 300,000 francs per month until the city was handed over to Spanish troops. King Joao accepted the proposals, but
Ferdinand rejected them. The two countries never did settle the dispute.^
Therefore, when Madrid began, in 1816, to organize an expedition to Buenos Aires, Portugal's reaction to the undertaking was in doubt. In September, 1816, Portugal had five brigantines, two corvettes, two schooners, and a number of gunboats in the Plate area, a force that the insurgents could still match.^ Later, this force was increased by eight or nine men-of-war.^
The uncertainty of Portuguese policy, and their increased military build-up, compelled government officials in Spain to present varying estimates of the forces needed for the proposed expedition, which was expected to sail in August, 1817. If relations between
Spain and Portugal were cordial at the time--a probability enhanced 37 by the revolt in Pernambuco--ten thousand men would suffice. Under
^^Memorias de Pizarro. I, 225; Manchester, op^ cit.. pp. 145- 148; Pag£s y Belloc, op., cit.. pp. 10-12.
OR State to Navy, November 14, 1816, Museo Naval, Madrid, Salazar, MSS, 2047, fol. 144.
■^Vizquez Papers, MSS, 432, fols. 87-101.
^Gaspar de Vigodet to King, June 23, 1817; Anonymous Memorial to King, July 3, 1817, AGP, PR/31, vol. 16, fols. 159-181. 213 these circumstances, the fleet would consist of three or four frigates, some brigantines, and a number of smaller vessels.
However, if relations were strained, the Navy Secretary requested
OQ an additional three or four men-of-war.
In August, 1817, however, the expedition did not depart. The
Navy simply did not have sufficient funds to repair the ships.
Moreover, by September, 1817, Vazquez had not yet received precise 39 information about Portugal's reaction to the expedition.
Meanwhile, the question of the pacification of America was still being discussed in the Council of State. It seems the coun sellors were also suspicious of Portugal. They accused King Joao of aiding, and of negotiating with the rebels. Their fears had not been allayed in the least by that monarch's diplomatic assertion; he declared that he recognized Ferdinand's authority over the conquered territory, but that because Spain had abandoned it, he intervened— out of necessity— to protect his kingdom. Because of the Portuguese successes in that area, some counsellors argued that the expedition would have to leave immediately. Moreover, they urged the government to arrange a treaty with Brazil; otherwise, the troops would be
^®AHN, Estado, lib. 18d., session, November 20, 1816; Vazquez to Count Abisbal, July 4, 1817, V&zquez Papers, MSS, 432, fols. 155- 158.
3fyar to Navy, August 30; Navy to War, September 6, 1817, AB, "Expedici6n al Rio de la Plata al raando del Conde del Abisbal (30 mayo 1816-4 septiembre 1817)," carpeta 2. 214 exposed to unnecessary dangers, including the possibility of a war with that state as well.^® As will be described later in this chapter, these same fears were to again plague the government when both the Council of State and the Military Junta of the Indies, in
May, 1818, made a detailed examination of the long-projected expedition to Buenos Aires.
II. THE RIO DE LA PLATA IN THE SPANISH
PACIFICATION SCHEME
In addition to the problem presented by Portugal, the govern ment had to contend, a priori, with the insurgents of Buenos Aires.
Their dauntless corsairs even approached the Peninsula as they ventured to attack ships in the environs of C£diz.^* Their privateers captured rich cargoes off the Canary Islands. 42
Around American waters, the corsairs were more daring. With four vessels--two frigates and two brigantlnes--they were able to disrupt Spanish consnerce, Moreover, their ships could blockade
Valparaiso and Callao. Some even entered the Peruvian port to
^®AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., sessions, September 10; September 17, 1817; lib. 21d., session, April 28, 1818.
^AHN, Estado, lib. 18d., session, June 12, 1816; Cevallos to Manuel de Lardiz£bal, July 9, 1816, AHN, Estado, leg. 4504; Navy to State, October 31, 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 98.
^Pagls y Belloc, oj£. cit.. p.6. 215
bombard the fort. To continue the harassment, the rebels proposed
to increase their Pacific fleet by bringing cruisers from Buenos
Aires.43
The rebels exchanged animal hides and cereal products for
supplies from abroad. England was the principal trader. The
continuation of the trade illustrated Spain’s inability to control
the sea lanes. This traffic reached such proportions that Pizarro
believed Buenos Aires had become a British colony.44
The activities of the Buenos Aires insurgents came under the
scrutiny of the counsellors of state. Pizarro insisted that these
rebels* intrigues had extended beyond the Spanish colonies; this
contention, he felt, had been corroborated by the short-lived revolt
in Pernambuco, Brazil.
Because of their sinister projects, the First Secretary
proposed, in September, 1817, that Madrid pacify Buenos Aires. To
attain this objective, he would endorse either the use of military
force or the application of pacific measures, thereby including
the region with those regarding which the government intended to
^3Captain Fabian to J.W. Croker, extract, October 24, 1815, FO 72/192; Navy to King, minute, February 7, 1816, AB, carpeta 107; Navy to War, Reservado, June 16, 1816; Manuel L6pez Araujo to Navy, June 24, 1816, Vazquez Papers, MSS, 432, fols. 492-493.
^State to Navy, April 13, 1818, AGI, Estado, leg. 102. 216
request foreign mediation.43 No expense should be spared--or so
argued many counsellors in 1817, as well as in 1818— to destroy this 46 de facto revolutionary government.
Actually the Plate region had been of primary importance in
the Spanish pacification scheme since the rebellions first broke
out in the colonies. During the six year struggle against the French, 47 the Regency had sent more than 4,000 men to the area. But the
revolt had continued.
The restoration government also paid close attention to
events in the Plate region. The Secretary of State had received a
- memorial from delegates of the governor of Montevideo, Gaspar
Vigodet. They explained that in the earlier period, an additional
3,000 men would have sufficed to withstand the attacks of the rebels
and to cut their supply lines. At that time, Vigodet had stressed,
according to his representatives, that control of Montevideo would
assure Spain’s hegemony in South America. Because of the total
disregard shown his request, however, the situation had since
deteriorated. Therefore, the delegates were now instructed to
43AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., session, September 10, 1817.
4^AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., session, September 17, 1817; lib. 21d., sessions, May 6 ; May 22, 1818.
“^Matilla Tasc6n, oj).. cit.. p. 40. 217 request 12,000 troops.4®
This time, however, the petition was favorably received. 49
The government had come to realize the importance of Montevideo and the whole Plate area. Orders were given for the expedition, under the command of General Pablo Morillo, to sail for Buenos Aires--but the orders were changed. The expedition was rerouted to Venezuela.
In early 1815, the government did not feel capable of either organizing or provisioning another expedition of that magnitude.
Nevertheless, it did not abandon the idea to send such a force to the
Rfo de la Plata. In late 1814, the government had sent a special envoy to reconnoiter. Jos4 Marla Salazar was instructed to report on conditions in that region, and to ascertain King JoSo’s attitude
toward an expedition planned for the following year. He also was to
estimate the number of forces that would be required to mount an
offensive against Buenos Aires. Moreover, the envoy had to locate
the most suitable disembarcation point, report on what materials might be procured from Brazil, and gather other relevant infor mation.3*
^®Domingo de Torres and Joaquin Gfimez de Liafto to the Secretary of State, October 3, 1814, AGI, Estado, leg. 98.
^Minute of the Secretary of State, October 7, 1814, on Domingo de Torres and Joaquin G6mez de Liafio to State, AGI, Estado, leg. 98.
3®AHN, Estado, lib. 14d., session, May 23, 1815.
3*Instruct ions to Salazar, November 22, 1814, Salazar, MSS, 2047. 218
Assiduously, Salazar carried out his mission. He reported on military activities in and around Buenos Aires. The insurgents had
constructed forts and had sent artillery not only to c6rdoba,
where they intended to build another fort, but also to Peru. On the
brighter side, he remarked, the patriot cause had suffered a reversal
in the capture of Chile by the royalists. This victory had stopped
the flow of funds and gunpowder to the insurgents of Buenos Aires.
Moreover, because of the popularity of Josi Artigas, Madrid had to
win him over, or else his second in command, Fernando 0torgu4s. If
the government did not, any expedition, no matter how large, would be
useless. Paraguay, he condluded in his report, was independent of
Buenos Aires and would be easy to recapture. 52
Meanwhile, in June, 1816, the counsellors of state had learned
of the unsuccessful negotiations with Bernardino Rivadavia. That
failure seemed to indicate the futility of a reconciliation with the
rebels. The counsellors, therefore, favored a plan to send the
expedition immediately to Buenos Aires; this would prevent the
increase in rebel strength. They realized, of course, that there
were a number of contingencies. First, the government must decide
on the number of forces--both land and sea. Second, it would have to
know the enemy's strength. Third, Madrid had to take into account
52 Jos£ Marfa Salazar to Luis Marfa Salazar (Secretary of the Navy), February 13, 1815, Salazar, MSS, 2047, fols. 135-137. 219
Britain’s attitude; she had been accused of fomenting the rebellion and was known to have stationed near Rio de Janeiro at least three 53 men-of-war and approximately fourteen other ships. Finally, the
Secretary of Mar gave a conservative estimate of 100,000,000 reales for the cost of the expedition. To expedite matters, and to compen sate for the deplorable condition of the fleet, it was suggested that Madrid borrow ships from some foreign country. Portugal was mentioned. Obviously, the counsellors had not yet learned of the invasion of the Banda Oriental.^
The king supported tKe proposal for the expedition. He appointed Count Abisbal its commander, as well as the new Viceroy of the region. 55 To assure the success of the enterprise, which would involve between 10,000 and 11,000 men, the Secretary of State had orders to take all precautions. These included diplomatic as well as military measures. He had to dispatch an agent in order to inform the commander of existing conditions, including the availability of provisions. Moreover, to avoid a possible confrontation with Great
Britain or Brazil, Pizarro had to ascertain their attitude toward the expedition. Here, however, he had to be circumspect. Any exchange would tend to jeopardize the venture itself, because these countries,
S^ahN, Estado, lib. 14d(, session, May 23, 1815.
^AHN, Estado, lib. 18d., session, June 6, 1816.
55Vlzquez to Count Abisbal, July A, 1817, Vazquez Papers, MSS, 432, fols. 155-158. 220 as well as the insurgents, would know of its destination."*^
Preparations continued. The fleet had to consist of at least one man-of-war, two frigates, one corvette, one brigantine, and ten schooners or their equivalent. At that moment, however, Vazquez was able to muster only two frigates, one corvette, and one brigantine.^
III. ORGANIZING THE EXPEDITION
It was evident that the sailing date of any expedition would be contingent upon the state of preparedness of the Royal Navy. Many ships were in need of repair. Moreover, the government ordered
Vazquez to escort troop convoys to other parts of America and to designate ships elsewhere in accordance with the provisions of the treaty with Holland. These duties, coupled with the lack of money and the beginning of the most opportune departure season, resulted in another postponement of the expedition. The earliest it could
CO sail would be in August, 1817.
■***War to State, Reservado, June 10, 1816; minute of the Secretary of State, June 13, 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 98.
■*^War to Navy, Reservado, June 6, 1816, AB, "Expedici6n al Rio de la Plata al mando del Conde del Abisbal (30 mayo-4 septiembre 1817)," carpeta 8.
^®AHN, Estado, lib. 18d., session June 12; November 20, 1816; Navy to Count Abisbal, July 4, 1817, Vazquez Paper3, MSS, 432, fols. 155-158. 221
Between June, 1816 and August, 1817, Spain's control over
America weakened. After the conquest of Chile in 1817, the rebels prepared for an assault on Peru. Madrid was apprehensive about this last stronghold. There were not enough royalist troops. The fall of Lima, some observers believed, would be the death knell for
Spain's domination in South America, 59
By September, 1817, the government had accomplished very little. Pizarro proposed, therefore, to dispatch a sizable force to all those regions under rebel control--Buenos Aires included.^®
Moreover, the memorials of the various counsellors reflected a similar concern regarding the situation in the Plate area. For example, one counsellor stated that Madrid must efface the disgrace of an insurgent government existing on Spanish territory. Also,
Spain had to restrain the Portuguese from further conquests.
Whatever the prime reason behind the move, it was felt that the expedition had to leave immediately. To expedite matters, it was suggested that the Navy, War, and Finance Secretaries designate a portion of their budget allotment for this purpose, and that the government negotiate a loan from London firms,
^Wellesley to Castlereagh, no. 78, June 15, 1817, FO 72/198; Navy to Viceroy of Lima, June 20, 1817, AB, carpeta 2093.
®®AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., session, September 10, 1817.
^*AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., sessions, September 17; September 24, 1817. 222
In October, 1817, the counsellors agreed to send a sizable
force against the rebels of Buenos Aires, and to dispatch troops to other insurrectionary regions as well.®^
Six months later, the subject of the expedition to the Rfo de
la Plata was broached again. The government, as yet, had been unable to allocate 80,000,000 reales to send 12,000 men to Buenos
Aires. In April, 1818, consequently, Pizarro proposed that the
Military Junta of the Indies examine the feasibility of such an expedition.^ The counsellors concurred. The military advisory
council, they felt, was best qualified to evaluate the anticipated problems. These included Spain’s lack of resources; the advanced
stage of the insurrection in America; the problems of logistics; the
lack of precise data about places to disembark; and, the ramifi
cations flowing from the uncertainty of Brazil’s reaction to the
expedition.*^
The Military Junta of the Indies considered three proposi
tions: (1) that the forces should not expect to receive any
assistance from the country which the Portuguese occupied; (2) that
if Portugal did not occupy Montevideo, she would be neutral;and,
^AHN, Estado, lib. 20d., sessions, October 15; October 18, 1817.
*^AHN, Estado, lib. 21d., session, March 4, 1818.
64AHN, Estado, lib. 21d., session, April 28, 1818.
*^AHN, Estado, sessions, April 28; May 6, 1818. 223
(3) that Spain had the necessary resources to send the expedition.
Bearing these in mind, the members of the council had two choices regarding the expedition: first, to send it directly to Buenos
Aires; second, to send it first to the Pacific, where it would unite with the royalist troops, and then have the combined forces march overland to Buenos Aires.^
Military and government officials attended the meetings.
There were three former Viceroys: Felfx Calleja, Francisco Javier
Venegas, and Jose Fernando de Abascal y Sousa (Marquess of
Concordia). Representatives from the services included Juan Marfa
Villanciencio, Captain-general of the Navy; Joaqufn Gfimez Liano,
Intendant of the Army; Pedro de la Cuesta, a Brigadier; and Josi
Manuel Goyeneche (Count of Guaqui). Also present were Francisco
Requena, a counsellor of the Indies and of the Junta of Pacifi cation, and Gaspar de Vigodet, the former governor of Montevideo.
Some presented written memorials. Vigodet and Abascal took into account the abilities of the gauchos. The former Viceroy downgraded their military prowess. He felt that they had neither the discipline nor the courage of the Cossacks, and that they lacked competent leaders. These disadvantages would enable Spain'3 infantry, supported by artillery, to defeat them.^ Vigodet,
^Military Junta of the Indies, May 1, 1818, AGI, Estado, leg. 102.
^"Memorial of Marquess of Concordia," May 8, 1818, AGI, Estado, leg. 102. 224 however, contradicted this appraisal. In his opinion, the gauchos were indeed capable of fighting trained soldiers. He cited as proof, the fact that 300 gauchos had besieged Montevideo, which had at the time 10,000 Portuguese soldiers.This opinion of the military prowess of the guachos was corroborated by another member of the
Military Junta. Even though he did not present a written memorial at these meetings, G6mez Liafto supported Vigodet’s claims. In 1814, he had informed the Secretary of State that the gauchos were accustomed to the rigors of the country, and that they could field an army of 15„000 well-trained cavalry. 69
Turning aside from the evemy's military ability, the members moved on to the principal issue--whether the expedition should go
directly to Buenos Aires or first to Peru. With slight modifications,
Vigodet was representative of the supporters of the latter route. A
direct assault, this group argued, would create too many problems.
First, where could the soldiers disembark? If they were able to
occupy Buenos Aires, where would they receive supplies? Such a plan,
pointed out the former governor of Montevideo, would require a force
of 12,000 to 14,000 men, sixty or seventy transports, as well as
a number of both men-of-war, and landing craft. The Pacific route
^"Memorial of Gaspar de Vigodet," May 8, 1818, AGI, Estado, leg. 102.
^Domingo de Torres and Joaqufn G6mez de Liafio to State, October 3, 1814, AGI, Estado, leg. 98. 225 would be less expensive. For instance, 7,000 men would suffice.
Also, once the troops arrived at Arica, they could rest and get detailed information on conditions before starting the overland journey. Part of the force, moreover, could be used to reconquer
Chile. Afterwards, the two contingents could unite at Tucumfin and prepare for the attack on Buenos Aires.
The proponents of the direct route, many of whom presented written memorials, stated that everyone admitted that the primary objective of the expedition was to capture Buenos Aires. That was the seat of the revolutionary government, and it was in the capital that the rebel army had been organized, money had been collected, and arms had been furnished for anti-Spanish activities in other parts of South America. Buenos Aires, moreover, was only a ninety day journey from Spain, had a sizable number of loyalists to aid the
Spanish troops, and did have, contrary to belief, suitable landing points. Therefore, why should the government even consider the
Pacific route. That would require a larger expenditure, and it would also involve greater perils. The troops would be exposed: to natural hazards when rounding Cape Horn; to capture by insurgent corsairs; to sickness on board ship; and to deprivations when making
^"Memorial of Gaspar de Vigodet," May 8, 1818, AGI, Estado, leg. 102. 226 the final overland trek of more than 1,500 miles.7*
After hearing all the memorials, the members voted. A tie resulted between those who favored the direct route, and those who supported the Pacific route. Many had opted for the latter because they felt that Spain could not assemble such a sizable force as would assure the neutrality of Brazil.'1 7
Pizarro brought the Junta’s report to the Council of State on May 22, 1818. From April until May, the question lay dormant.
The counsellors had discussed it in the abstract, but realized that a final decision would depend on the advice of the military experts.
The First Secretary informed the Council of the deadlock.
He emphasized that the impasse had not resulted from an objection to the expedition. Pizarro insisted, moreover, that all the authorities had considered the Pacific route only as an altemative--to be adopted only if Spain could not send a sizable force.73
The counsellors voted on the proposition of whether to send the expedition directly to Buenos Aires or first to Peru. The
"Memorial of Count of Guaqui," May 7, 1818; "Memorial of Marquess of Concordia," May 8, 1818; "Memorial of Pedro de la Cuesta," May 8, 1818; "Memorial of Juan Marfa Villanciencio," May 8, 1818, AGI, Estado, leg. 102.
72«yotaci6n por que se termin6 esta sesion en la debia ventilarse si la expedici6n del Rio de la Plata, ha de ir a este Rio en derechura 6 dirigirse por el Mar del Sur," May 8, 1818, AGI, Estado, leg. 102.
73AHN, Estado, lib. 21d., session, May 22, 1818. 227
First Secretary endeavored to keep the discussion germane to the topic at hand. Some counsellors, however, went back, and once again questioned the need to send the expedition at all. For example, the Duke of Infantado mentioned that the government should direct its efforts to recapture Chile, and to reinforce Horillo's forces.
Guillermo Hualde argued that Spain should concentrate on two objectives. One was to suppress the rebellion in the Plate region.
The other was to pacify America, and he felt that the latter would require fewer men than the former. Therefore, if the expedition to
Buenos Aires proved impracticable, then the troops could be sent to other provinces. A few, in addition, voted to send the expedition by the Pacific route. That decision was founded on the need to protect
Lima, and on the lack of precise information about conditions in the
Rio de la Plata--especially the attitude of Portugal to the project.
Before a vote could be taken, however, the Navy Secretary would have to present his views. It was his duty to escort the expedition, and to establish a blockade of Buenos Aires. He divided the problem into two parts. Each was contingent on being able to send a sizable force. The first concerned Portugal. He believed that she would be inclined to side with the rebels, but that the force would compel her to remain neutral. The other concerned the route. By going directly to Buenos Aires, many obstacles and hazards would be avoided. These included, among other things, the lack of ships for such an enterprise; the perils of rounding Cape 228
Horn; the consequent ill-health of the troops after the journey; and the need to make the long arduous trek overland to finally arrive at their primary objective.^
The counsellors accepted Vazquez's analysis. They voted to send the expedition directly to the Rfo de la Plata. The final decision, nevertheless, would rest with Ferdinand.
Preparations continued. Pizarro, in his final memorial to the king on the subject of the pacification of America, urged that every effort be made to find 100,000,000 reales to defray the cost of the venture.7^ In addition, the Navy Secretary prepared an estimate of his needs. If Portugal opposed the expedition, the fleet would have to consist of six men-of-war, eight frigates, ten brigantines or
schooners, and twenty gunboats, representing a tot»l cost of
38.000.000 reales. On the other hand, if Portugal were found to be
either friendly, or even neutral, the amount could be reduced to
28.000.000.76
Moreover, Vazquez consulted the Admiralty on the practica bility of blockading Buenos Aires. Its conclusions were not too
encouraging. To accomplish the mission, the Navy needed a minimum of
^AHN, Estado, lib. 21d., session, May 22, 1818.
^-*"Exposici6n de Don Josl Pizarro al Rey sobre la pacificaci6n de America," June 9, 1818, in Delgado, op., cit.. pp. 373-380.
^®V5zquez Papers, MSS, 432, fols. 87-101. 229 three men-of-war and five frigates, all of which had to be fully equipped. Half of this force would have to be on duty continuously.
The ships would be required to guard an area of fourteen miles in order to disrupt effectively rebel communicat ions. These vessels would have to be sturdy enough to withstand the natural elements, which would force them to move from their assigned stations, and which could cause serious damages. Therefore, the other ships would have to remain on a stand-by alert while those damaged went into port for repairs.
Because of the questionable attitude of the Portuguese, it was uncertain how much assistance would be given. In any case, it would not be as extensive as in a Spanish port. The report concluded that the government would be taking a calculated risk in the entire venture. This was all the more apparent since the government actually had neither the ships nor the money for any undertaking— no matter how small.^
Optimism in official circles seemed to wane. Although the king was enthusiastic, the First Secretary himself knew very little about the state of preparedness. There was no co-operation between the Ministries. Each performed its particular duty and failed to
^"El Consejo Supremo de Almlrantazgo en Sala de Gobierno," July 6, 1818, AGI, Estado, leg. 102. 230
78 advise the others. Moreover, according to the Junta of Pacifi cation, the size of the expedition would have to be increased,, Now,
it would have to consist of approximately 16,000 to 20,000 troops, as 79 well as an adequate naval force.' Fewer men, insisted Count 80 Abisbal, could not accomplish the mission.
The plight of the Royal Navy added to the difficulties.
Pizarro informed the Council of State of the problem. In August,
1818, he stated that the fleet was so crippled that Spain could not avenge the insult of the invasion of the Floridas by the United
States. In addition, the government could not even deploy ships to O 1 suppress the rebellions in America.
The Navy Secretary had to tax his meager resources to prepare
for the expedition to Buenos Aires, Nevertheless, he continued to
be bombarded with requests for ships for other operations. His
responsibilities were overwhelming; he had to: intercept filibus
tering expeditions from the United States and Great Britain; stave
off an expected rebel attack on Puerto Cabello; and, also break the
^®Minute of the Secretary of State, July 18, 1818, in reply to War to State, Muy Reservado, July 16, 1818, AGI, Estado, leg. 89.
^Consults of the Junta of Pacification, July 31, 1818, AGI, Estado, leg. 88.
®^Wellesley to Castlereagh, Private and Confidential, September 10, 1818, F0 72/212.
81-AHN, Estado, leg. 5661, session, August 26, 1818. 82 blockade of Venezuela, which had been declared by Luis Brion.
The king intervened to assist Vazquez. He decided to postpone the expedition to Buenos Aires. The opportune departure season was already too advanced and preparations were not yet completed. Conse quently, the king ordered the Secretary of the Navy to attend to the
O'! other requests first.
In September, 1818, the king reversed this decision. The change in policy was provoked by a collision between two factions at
Court— Pizarro, Garay, and Vizquez on one side and Egufa, Lozano,
Ugarte, and others on the other. The conflict was over the issue of the expedition to Buenos Aires. The first group had insisted on the impracticability of the whole enterprise. Spain, they stressed, had neither the ships nor the money for such an undertaking. Vazquez had estimated the cost at 40,000,000 reales. The second group, however, had confided to the king that the Navy Secretary proposed that exhorbitant sum so as either to delay the expedition or cause it to be scrapped. Ironically, by June, 1819, the Junta of
Reemplazos, according to Vazquez, had already spent nearly 400,000,000 r e a l e s . This, and other factors— the accusation of their being
8^"Resumen," AB, carpeta 3014; Vizquez Papers, MSS, 432, fols. 87-101.
83Ibid.
8^Memories de Pizarro. I, 274n; II, 286-292, citing memoires of Vazquez; Wellesley to Castlereagh, Private and Confidential, September 10; no. 127, September 15, 1818, FO 72/212. 232
OC "liberals" was one--resulted in the ouster of Pizarro, Garay, and
Vazquez.
The government then reactivated plans for the expedition, notwithstanding the financial and military difficulties. As was mentioned earlier, the new First Secretary recommended that the king reject any form of mediation and that he prepare to send the expe dition. To keep its destination secret, the Marquess of Casa
Irujo proposed to provide faulty information to the representatives assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle, He ordered Francisco Zea Bermfidez to intimate to the ambassadors that the force would go to the
Pacific, both because of the advanced departure season, and because of the need to protect Peru. Only the Russian plenipotentiary, 86 mentioned the First Secretary, was to learn the truth.
The king proposed to reconquer America. He had resolved to proceed with preparations for the expedition. The advantages to be gained by sending the force to the Rfo de la Plata--that of sup pressing the insurgency in South America and that of thwarting Portu guese aggression--would outweigh, so Ferdinand believed, the hard ships imposed on the nation by the undertaking. That decision to
^ Memories de Pizarro. I, 273; Wellesley to Castlereagh, Secret and Confidential, September 15, 1818, FO 72/212.
^Marquess of Casa Irujo to Francisco Zea Bermfidez, November 15, 1818, AHN, Estado, leg. 5661. 233 use force was, a? seme officials intimated at the time, and as is now well known, nothing short of catastrophic: the troops rebelled;
Ferdinand was forced to become a constitutional monarch; and Spain lost most of her colonial possessions--even the Viceroyalty of New
Spain. CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
This study attempted to examine the problems that beset Spain during the independence movements in Spanish America between 1814 and
1820. In contrast to years of experiments at constitutional government which immediately preceded and followed this period, these were years of absolutism. In official circles, counsellors and ministers strove to check the conflagration in the American colonies. Despite domestic and foreign difficulties, they endeavored to prevent the dissolution of the Empire.
The records of the Council of State provided a logical point of departure for this study. First, a scribe kept minutes of its delib erations. Second, the king attended the sessions. Third, because of its composition, the counsellors discussed a wide range of subjects.
Fourth, their suggestions supposedly made allowances for the domestic and foreign repercussions of any measure that the government proposed.
Finally, the evidence uncovered would seem to indicate that intrigues at Court were instrumental in policy recommendations by the coun sellors.
The counsellors of state realized that the government was impaled on the horns of a dilemna. These were not normal times for
Spain, and the colonies were in open rebellion. After six years in exile, the king had returned to find his royal prerogatives cur tailed. Ferdinand had acted swiftly and resolutely to reassert his 235 control. Moreover, although the nation had defeated the French, the war had left its scars. The government had to confront problems of recovery--economic, military, and public morale.
With these difficulties in mind, the counsellors had advocated a simultaneous three pronged approach to pacify the colonies--reforms, mediation, and force. This plan had seemed best suited to meet the needs of Spanish statecraft, Nevertheless, there were drawbacks, especially with the latter two measures. With regard to mediation, the government had insisted on a guaranty from the mediating powers: that they be prepared to intervene militarily in order to compel the colonies to comply with the proposed plan of reconciliation. The program outlined by Great Britain and accepted by the other nations did not provide this assurance. Concerning the use of force, the counsellors had acknowledged that it was impracticable. The one concerted military effort to suppress the rebellions, that of General
Pablo Morillo, had failed for various reasons. Moreover, they had argued that the country would not sustain another undertaking of such magnitude.
Notwithstanding their appraisal of Spain’s limited capability, as well as other related drawbacks, and despite the advanced stage of the rebellions, the counsellors had been content to propose reforms which, in retrospect, appear to have been moderate. They had endorsed measures that would involve only minor changes in official policy and that would keep the colonies subordinated to the 236
Metropolis. More drastic reforms would have prevented the dismem berment of the empire. Nevertheless, the counsellors had not been prepared to recommend them, at least not until it was too late.
Even these seemingly "radical measures" were rather cautious in view
of the situation in the colonies.
To what may we attribute their irresoluteness? Why had they
refused to propose substantive reforms? Were the counsellors and
other officials in Spain, as many would like to assert, indifferent
to the grievances of the colonists?
The reasons for their inaction wera to be found in the
politics of the period. Because of cabals, the atmosphere at Court was tense. Officials appeared to lack imagination. Ministers were
apprehensive and reluctant to take any initiative with regard to
policy. This was evident in the Council of State, supposedly the
king’s principal advisory body. The discussions reflected this
undercurrent of fear among officials. A minister felt confident to
adopt a program only if it gained the support of a "substantial
majority." The counsellors readily supported "moderate" proposals.
However, those measures considered as "radical"--the question of
free trade was a classic example--entailed protracted debate. In
such cases, the minister had to return to the council chamber, in
hope of receiving the required number of votes. The process hindered
effective response to pressing matters. Moreover, while the
counsellors debated, the rebels consolidated their control in 237
America.
Despite the drawbacks, ofticials continued to consult with the Council of State. They wanted to protect themselves from hidden attack. By keeping important decisions in the open, ministers disarmed attackers. They needed security, however weak. Many officials had been dismissed on flimsy prt xts ; few lasted longer than two years, with the majority for shorter periods. The king seemed content to rely for advice more on "associates" than on appointees.
In the final analysis, Ferdinand must be held responsible, both for the nominal role played by the Council of State in policy recommendations and for the failure of Spain to prevent the disso lution of the empire. He should not, however, be blamed for all the ills of the nation, many of which he had inherited. It was his lack of support for his appointees and for their recommendations rather than his reactionary views that obviated effective action.
The king was the absolutist ruler. Ministers were subordinate to him. He selected them, as well as members of the Council of
State. It was his responsibility to make certain that the Council functioned effectively. The arm of the executive was only as strong as he wanted it to be. Since the king tended to minimize the influence of officials on policy and as he gave a sense of insecurity to his appointees, the raison d*etre of the Council of State disap peared. Instead of serving a constructive purpose, the ministers 238 consulted it out of fear for their position.
Ferdinand attended the meetings. He listened to the discus sions and he learned what many counsellors admitted, however reluctantly, that Spain was a second-rate power. The problems con fronting the government with regard to the colonies were thoroughly thrashed out. The counsellors knew that resolute measures were necessary to pacify the colonies and that token gestures at reform would prove inadequate. Once the question of pacification was taken out of the hands of the Council of State, it rested directly with the king. Ferdinand rejected the advice of those best qualified to judge. In the end, he seemed content to carry on with a project to reconquer the colonies. He was prepared to risk everything for the sake of preserving the empire. BIBLIOGRAPHY SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES
Jos4 Garcfa de Le6n y Pizarro.
He had served Spanish diplomacy since 1793. For a short term,
about three months, he had served as foreign minister under the
Regency. He had been distinguished by his anti-British attitude. In
1813, the Regency named him Minister to Prussia. He continued in the
corps until he was called back, and named Secretary of State by
Ferdinand VII on October 30, 1816; he remained in this post until his
dismissal on September 14, 1318.
Jos4 vizquez Figueroa.
He had a distinguished record as a naval officer and was a
competent official. Under Ferdinand VII, he served as Secretary of the Nnvv from January 27, 1816, until September 14, 1818. During his lifetime, he held that same post three times.
Pedro Cevallos.
He had been Secretary of State during the reign of Charles IV, but had been replaced by Mariano Luis de Urquijo. He accompanied
Ferdinand to Valencey and remained with the king throughout his six years in exile. After Ferdinand's return, he was appointed Secretary o f State, November 16, 1814, and held the post until October 30,
1816. He later served as Spain's ambassador to Naples and then Vienna, 251
/ Martin Garay,
He was a member of' the Finance section of the Junta Central in 1808. After the return of Ferdinand VII, he was appointed
Secretary of Finance on December 23, 1816; he held this post until
September 14, 1818.
Francisco Egufa.
During the War of Independence, he had been appointed Com mander of the troops in Entremadura, but was soon dismissed from this post. He was Captain-general of New Castile and twice held the office of Secretary of War, from May 29, 1814 to March 25, 1815; and
from June 19, 1817 to June 17, 1819.
Juan Esteban Lozano de Torres.
Of humble origin, he came to Madrid and first held a minor
post in the Ministry of Finance. He later served as Secretary of
Gracia y Justicia, from January 29, 1817 until November 1, 1819.
Marquess of Campo Sagrado (Francisco Jos4 Bernaldo de Quir6s).
He had fought against the French in 1794. At che beginning
of the War of Independence, he had been elected as the delegate from
Asturias to the Junta Central. He also had been Captain-general of
Catalonia, before becoming Secretary of War under Ferdinand VII,
October 23, 1815 until June 19, 1817. 252
Miguel de Lardizabal y Uribe.
He was a member of the First Regency in 1810, but resigned
in September of that year. Shortly thereafter he published a manifesto in which he censured the Cortes of Cadiz for usurping authority; for this work, he was tried and banished. When Ferdinand returned, Lardizabal was appointed to the post of Minister of the
Indies; he held this office from June 26, 1814 until Septembex1 18,
1818.