THE POWER TO PRIVILEGE 163 U. PA. L. REV. __ (2014) Mila Sohoni∗ University of San Diego School of Law 5998 Alcala Park, San Diego, CA 92110
[email protected] ∗ Assistant Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. Thanks to Bill Araiza, Nick Bagley, Jordan Barry, Chris Egleson, Richard Fallon, Vic Fleischer, Dov Fox, Edward Imwinkelreid, Shaun Martin, Dave Owen, Todd Rakoff, Teddy Rave, Daphna Renan, Matthew Spitzer, and to participants in the 2014 AALS New Voices in Administrative Law panel and the University of San Diego Junior Faculty Forum. THE POWER TO PRIVILEGE A new and startling development has recently occurred in the law of delegation: Congress has for the first time expressly delegated to an administrative agency the power to write rules of privilege. Privileges abound in federal law, but until now they have been defined either by statute or by judicial opinion. The type of law that Congress has now authorized agencies to create—the regulatory evidentiary privilege—is a true novelty in our system of law. This article is the first to grapple with the implications of migrating the power to write rules of privilege from Congress and the courts, on the one hand, to the executive branch, on the other. It begins by describing an underappreciated aspect of the administrative state: that the law of privilege is becoming increasingly important to the functioning of administrative agencies. As a result, administrative agencies are actively pursuing control over the law of evidentiary privilege in order to further their substantive mandates. Granting agencies that sought-after control through a privilege delegation will imperil key federal and state regulatory and governance interests.