Document of The World Bank
Public Disclosure Authorized Report No: ICR00001221
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H0490 TF-56516)
ON A
Public Disclosure Authorized GRANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 93 MILLION (US$126.8 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA
FOR THE
ROAD SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PHASE I PROJECT (APL1) Public Disclosure Authorized IN SUPPORT OF THE
SECOND PHASE OF THE
ETHIOPIAN ROAD SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (RSDP II)
June 29, 2010
Public Disclosure Authorized Transport Sector Country Department AFCE3 Africa Region
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective December 31, 2009)
Currency Unit = Ethiopian Birr SDR 1.00 = US$1.57 US$1.00 = 12.70 Birr
FISCAL YEAR July 8 – July 7
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ADLI Agricultural Development Led-Industrialization AfDB Africa Development Bank AIDS Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome APL Adaptable Program Loan CAS Country Assistance Strategy DCI Domestic Construction Industry DMO District Maintenance Organizations EIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return EMPs Environmental Management Plans ERA Ethiopia Road Authority ERTTP Ethiopia Rural Travel and Transport Program GOE Government of Ethiopia HDM Highway Development Model HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus ICB International Competitive Bidding IDA International Development Agency IOs Immediate Outcomes LCB Local Competitive Bidding M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MDG Millennium Development Goals NCB National Competitive Bidding NPV Net Present Value OPRC Output and Performance-based Roads Contracting ORF Office of the Road Fund PAD Project Appraisal Document PASDEP Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty PDO Project Development Objectives PSP Private Sector Participation QAG Quality Assurance Group QEA Quality at Entry Assessment RAPs Resettlement Action Plans RRO Regional Road Organization RSDP Road Sector Development Project
SIL Specific Investment Loan TA Technical Assistance TPO Transport Poverty Observatory URRAP Universal Rural Road Access Program VOC Vehicle Operating Costs WIDP Wereda Infrastructure Development Plan
Vice President: Obiageli K. Ezekwesili Country Director: Kenichi Ohashi Sector Manager: C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Project Team Leader: Yoshimichi Kawasumi ICR Team Leader: Roger Gorham
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA ROAD SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PHASE I PROJECT IN SUPPORT OF THE SECOND PHASE OF THE ROAD SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (APL1)
CONTENTS
Data Sheet ...... i A. Basic Information ...... i B. Key Dates ...... i C. Ratings Summary ...... i D. Sector and Theme Codes ...... ii E. Bank Staff ...... ii F. Results Framework Analysis ...... iii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs ...... v H. Restructuring (if any) ...... v I. Disbursement Profile ...... vi 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ...... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ...... 5 3. Assessment of Outcomes ...... 11 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ...... 16 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ...... 16 6. Lessons Learned ...... 18 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ...... 20 Annex 1. Project Costs ...... 21 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ...... 23 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ...... 30 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ...... 34 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ...... 36 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ...... 37 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ...... 38 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ...... 61 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...... 62 Annex 10. Ex Poste Assessment of Ex Ante Risk Analysis ...... 63 Annex 11. Transport Poverty Observatory Status and Findings ...... 65 MAP
A. Basic Information ET- Road Sector Country: Ethiopia Project Name: Development Phase 2 Project ID: P044613 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-H0490,TF-56516 ICR Date: 06/29/2010 ICR Type: Core ICR THE GOVERNMENT Lending Instrument: APL Borrower: OF ETHIOPIA Original Total XDR 93.0M Disbursed Amount: XDR 93.0M Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 93.0M Environmental Category: A Implementing Agencies: Ethiopian Roads Authority Ministry of Works and Urban Development Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:
B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 12/04/2001 Effectiveness: 11/14/2003 Appraisal: 03/31/2003 Restructuring(s): Approval: 06/17/2003 Mid-term Review: 03/31/2006 05/01/2006 Closing: 06/30/2009 12/31/2009
C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Low or Negligible Bank Performance: Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Satisfactory
C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Satisfactory Satisfactory Performance: Performance:
i C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry No Satisfactory at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of No None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status:
D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central government administration 10 6 Roads and highways 90 94
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Environmental policies and institutions 14 14 HIV/AIDS 14 14 Infrastructure services for private sector development 29 29 Poverty strategy, analysis and monitoring 14 14 Rural services and infrastructure 29 29
E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Callisto E. Madavo Country Director: Kenichi Ohashi Ishac Diwan Sector Manager: C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Maryvonne Plessis-Fraissard Project Team Leader: Yoshimichi Kawasumi John D. Riverson ICR Team Leader: Roger Gorham ICR Primary Author: Roger Gorham
F. Results Framework Analysis
Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The objectives of the Project are to assist the Recipient in increasing its road transport infrastructure and improving the reliability thereof, strengthening the capacity for road construction, management and maintenance and enhancing the financing program in relation thereto in order to ensure sustainability, and creating conditions conducive to private sector participation in the road transport sector. These objectives are to be
ii achieved through: (a) construction, rehabilitation, upgrading and preserving the priority federal road network;(b) strengthened ERA reform program;(c) improved resource mobilization, allocation and use for road maintenance and strengthened Road Fund Administration; and(d)developing the capacity in program implementation.
Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)
(a) PDO Indicator(s)
Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Overall PDO Indicator : Indicator 1 : Annual rate of conversion of roads into good condition # (a) asphalt roads; (b) gravel roads (c) rural roads 1997-2003: 2003-2009: Value (a) 3.0 % (a) 5.8 % quantitative or Not applicable (b) 0.8% (b) 4.0% Qualitative) (c) 1.2% (c) 3.7% Date achieved 05/19/2003 06/30/2009 10/01/2009 Indicator was not included in the PAD, but provides a good overall indicator as Comments to how well the capacity for increasing road infrastructure and improving its (incl. % reliability has been strengthened. Shows that the pace of creation of good roads achievement) has improved. DO1. (a) Roads constructed, non-rural (kms) Indicator 2 : (b) Roads rehabilitated (kms) Value (a) 0; (a) 119; (a) 99; (a) 99; quantitative or (b) 0 (b) 413 (b) 413 (b) 413 Qualitative) Date achieved 05/19/2003 06/30/2009 06/30/2008 10/01/2009 Comments This indicator is not included in original PAD, but is a mandatory core indicator (incl. % as of July 2009. Indicator shows that 100% of the intended output was attained. achievement) DO 2. (a) Ratio of road fund annual collection against total annual maintenance needs Indicator 3 : (b) Ratio of maintenance exp. against ann. maint. needs (c) Road fund revenues (all sources, in 10^6 ETB) (d) Road fund expenditures (in 10^6 ETB) / prop. rev. spent (a) Not specified in PAD; (a) Not available; (a) Not available; Value (b) Not specified (b) 0.6; (b) Not available; quantitative or in PAD; (c) 341.9 (c) 1,296 Qualitative) (c) 1,075 (d) 246.0 (72%) (d) 1,061.5 (82%) (d) Not specified in PAD;
iii Date achieved 05/19/2003 06/30/2009 11/30/2009 Denominators for indicators (a) and (b) are not available for the project period. Comments Indicator (c) represents the numerator of the above indicators. Indicator (d) (incl. % tracks resource use, shows higher mobilization & improved expenditure for achievement) maintenance. DO 3. (a) Value of contracts awarded to domestic contractors Indicator 4 : (b) Number of people employed in road works (a) ETB 2,776.1 (a) ETB 569.1 million (a) Not specified Value million; 17,435 (2003); in PAD; quantitative or (b) 47,694 (2008) -- (b) 31,667 (2005) -- of (b) Not specified Qualitative) of which 8% which 11% women in PAD women Date achieved 05/19/2003 06/30/2009 10/01/2009 Comments Indicator (a) shows a substantial increase in the value of contracts awarded to the (incl. % Domestic Construction Industry (DCI). Indicator (b) shows that there has been achievement) increasing employment generation associated with the RSDP program. DO4. (a) DMOs as cost centers Indicator 5 : (b) DMOs as profit centers (c) DMOs as commercial entities (a) Achieved by 1/1/04; (a) Achieved June Value (a) Not achieved; (b) Achieved by 2004; quantitative or (b) Not achieved; 7/31/05; (b) Not achieved Qualitative) (c) Not achieved (c) Achieved by (c) Not achieved 7/13/06 Date achieved 06/30/2003 07/13/2006 12/31/2009 Comments Only the first of the milestones was achieved. The tentative plan for (incl. % corporatization of DMOs is set in the Action Plan for December 2010. Under achievement) APL4, restructuring of ERA should address additional institutional reform needs.
(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)
Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Programmatic 1. (a) % of paved roads in good condition (b) % of gravel roads in good condition Indicator 1 : (c) % of rural roads in good condition (d) road kms per 1000 km2 (e) Average Distance to all weather roads (kms) (a) 35; (a) 57; (a) 70; Value (b) 30; (b) 42; (b) 54; (quantitative (c) 28; (c) 40; (c) 50; or Qualitative) (d) 31 (d) 35; (d) 43; (e) 17 (e) 14 (e) 11.8 Date achieved 05/19/2003 06/30/2009 12/31/2009 Comments Indicators show that programmatic targets are being substantially exceeded, and (incl. % that during RSDP II, there has been some improvement in rural accessibility.
iv achievement) Indicator (b) not included in original PAD, but is a variant of mandatory core indic. as of 7/09 Programmatic 2. (a) Reduction in freight & passenger tariff (b) Reduction in Indicator 2 : travel time (c) Reduction in vehicle operating cost 2007/08 (a) Freight (a) Freight - - Birr/ton/km Birr/ton/km, 1.08(0.58)*; Passenger - Passenger - Birr/km (a) Freight - Birr/ton/km Birr/km (ref."Key 0.12(0.06)* (b) Value 0.26: Passenger - Birr/km Issues 2"); (b) Average travel time (quantitative 0.09; (b) Heavy goods Average travel reduced by about or Qualitative) vehicle 3.22 Min/km; (c) time reduction 15 5% to 10% on VOC (index) - 139.77 %; (c) VOC paved roads (c) (index) - VOC (index) (ref."Key Issues 297(159.4) 2") (2007/08) Date achieved 05/19/2003 06/30/2009 10/01/2009 Comments (incl. % See ICR text for analysis. achievement)
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 10/22/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 04/26/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.00 3 10/25/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 16.04 4 01/06/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 16.04 5 02/11/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 16.04 6 05/03/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 16.04 7 11/23/2005 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 21.19 8 06/20/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 34.46 9 12/26/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 47.71 10 06/27/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 59.71 11 12/07/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 67.98 12 06/01/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 94.83 13 12/20/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 112.75 14 06/28/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 125.51 15 12/19/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 140.63
H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable
v I. Disbursement Profile
vi 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design
1.1 Context at Appraisal
1. Following serious decline and deterioration of the road network during the period of Communist Party rule, which ended in 1992, the Government of Ethiopia (GOE), in concert with the Donor community, including the World Bank, developed its Road Sector Development Program (RSDP), as an initially 10-year program of road rehabilitation in two phases. Implemented in 1997, this program was subsequently extended, such that the fourth phase of the program will continue until 2015. An early example of donor harmonization, RSDP from the beginning included arrangements to coordinate the actions of various donors, including the International Development Association (IDA), the European Commission, the African Development Bank, OPEC Fund, the Nordic Development Fund, and various bi-lateral aid agencies toward a set of mutually agreed, Government-driven objectives. Support from development partners, including the Bank, strengthened Ethiopia Road Authority (ERA) management, for example, with TA support and reporting systems for monitoring program performance. These arrangements later remained with the ERA management with advisory support from its Board during program implementation.
2. IDA's support for Phase I of the Government's RSDP (RSDP I) took the form of a Specific Investment Loan (SIL) known as the Road Sector Development Program Support Project (RSDPSP-Credit 3032-ET), providing a credit of US$309.2 million between 1998 and 2005. This credit funded the rehabilitation and upgrading of four major roads totaling 1,380 kilometers, and also supported capacity building to the ERA. Collectively, with funding from the GOE, IDA, and other donors, RSDP I facilitated the rehabilitation or upgrading of over 1,500 kilometers of trunk roads, and the construction or upgrading of over 800 kilometers of link roads between July 1997 and June 2002. As a result, the proportion of asphalt, gravel, and rural roads in good condition had increased from 17 to 35 percent, 25 to 30 percent, and 21 to 28 percent, respectively. Average road density by land area had increased from 24 to 30 kilometers per 1000 km2, and the average distance to an all weather road had declined from 21 to 17 kilometers.
3. Phase II of the RSDP (RSDP II) was designed to build on the achievements of RSDP I, continuing and enhancing the pace of road network rehabilitation, while at the same time placing more emphasis on institutional development, capacity building, and tying the results to larger developmental goals and poverty reduction, through reference to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It emphasized improved project and results monitoring, strengthened, and in some cases restructured, government institutions, further development of domestic construction capacity, and better environmental and social management of road construction projects. About 40 percent of the US$1.5 billion investment program would be funded by the GOE, and the remainder financed from the donor community, including roughly 25 percent from IDA.
4. As a long-range program with multiple phases and clearly defined interim and long-range targets, the Government's RSDP was a logical candidate for an Adaptable Program approach as a
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means of IDA support.8 The follow-on credit to the RSDPSP, therefore, was conceived as an Adaptable Program Loan (APL), in three phases, the first stage of which (APL1) was designed as a US$219.27 million credit. However, during project preparation, a grant envelope for Ethiopia became available, with a total amount allocated to the transport sector of US$126.80 million. The program was therefore redesigned as a four-stage APL program, whereby the components of the original APL1 were split into APL1 and APL2.
1.2 Original Program and Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators
Programmatic Objectives 5. The primary objective of the APL program as articulated in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) for the APL1 is to restore and expand Ethiopia's road network to reduce poverty and increase employment through promoting growth and access in a socially and environmentally sustainable manner. This objective has been refined through succeeding stages of the APL program; the programmatic objective is articulated in the PAD for the most recent and final stage (APL4) as follows: support the Government's RSDP9, and support the GOE in increasing the efficiency of the road sector through sector reform.
Project (Stage) Objectives 6. The Project Development Objectives (PDO) for the APL1 stage as reflected in the Grant Agreement are to assist the Recipient in increasing its road transport infrastructure and improving the reliability thereof, strengthening the capacity for road construction, management and maintenance and enhancing the financing program in relation thereto in order to ensure sustainability, and creating conditions conducive to private sector participation in the road transport sector. 7. The PDO for the APL1 stage as reflected in the PAD Annex 1 were as follows: (i) Construct, rehabilitate, upgrade and preserve the Federal road network (ii) Improve mobilization and use of resources for road maintenance (iii) Develop capacity in the private sector (iv) Strengthen ERA reform program
8. These latter objectives as articulated in the PAD have the characteristics more of intermediate objectives as understood in current, results-oriented practice, than of Project
8 Indeed, the IDA RSDPSP had been conceived as the first of a phased participation in a Sector Investment Program. At the time of appraisal of that project, however, the World Bank Board of Directors had not yet approved the Adaptable Program Loan instrument, so its use was deferred to the follow-on operation.
9 RSDP's primary objective was to restore and expand Ethiopia’s road network to reduce poverty and increase employment by promoting growth and access in a socially and environmentally sustainable manner.
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Development Objectives per se. There are minor inconsistencies between the Annex 1 articulation of the PDOs, and that presented in the main body of the PAD (Section A.2.2). Key indicators
9. There are substantial inconsistencies in the labeling and phrasing of the different indicators among the PAD main text (section A.3), the logical framework table in Annex 1 of the PAD, and Schedule 3 of the Project Agreement. This latter identifies the following as programmatic indicators: Reduction in freight and passenger tariff. Reduction in travel time. Reduction in vehicle operating costs. Number and value of contracts awarded to domestic contractors Number of people employed (by gender) in road works. Total annual payments made to domestic contractors. Ratio of Road Fund annual collection against total annual maintenance needs. Maintenance expenditure as percentage of needs of maintenance network.
10. However, these are identified as project (i.e. stage)-level indicators in the logical framework table in Annex 1, with the following indicators included as well: ERA DMOs as cost centers by January 1, 2004 ERA DMOs as profit centers by July 2005 ERA DMOs as commercial center by July 2006
11. Section A.3 of the main body of the PAD identifies "key output" indicators as the following: Increase proportion of asphalt roads in good condition from 35 percent in 2002 to 57 percent in 2007; of gravel roads from 30 percent to 42 percent; and of rural roads from 28 percent to 40 percent. Increase road density from 30 km / 1000 sq. km in 2002 to 35 km / 1000 sq. km. in 2007. Decrease average distance to all weather roads from 17 km in 2002 to 14 km in 2007. Ratio of maintenance expenditure (routine and periodic) to total requirements of the maintainable network increased from about 60 percent in 2002 to more than 90 percent in 2007. Number of people employed in road works in project areas (disaggregated by gender) Share of administrative costs to total expenditures
12. For the purpose of this evaluation, this Implementation Completion Report (ICR) interprets those indicators listed in the logical framework table of Annex 1 of the PAD (page 54) as the key outcome indicators for the project stage. All other indicators are treated as programmatic indicators. Under the Bank's standard PAD template at the time, no indicator monitoring plan was provided, and there were no objective targets provided for any of the stage- level outcome indicators, except the DMO-specific indicators.
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1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification
13. The PDO / indicators were not formally revised.
1.4 Main Beneficiaries
14. The enumerated target populations included: road users (including pedestrians, IMTs/NMVs users and non-transport structure / services beneficiaries), who would benefit through improvement in road surfaces, availability of all-weather roads and road safety; producers and consumers, through improved access to municipal and/or other basic social services, and in the transport of goods to the local markets and environmental protection; domestic construction industry, through enhanced opportunities to participate in business opportunities; road agencies, through improved management practices; and finance ministry, through greater efficiency in the use of resources and reduced demands placed on the national budget for road development and maintenance.
1.5 Original Components
15. The components in the project were the following:
(i) Rehabilitation and upgrading of Federal Roads (413 km) a. Nekempt-Mekenajo road (upgrading 127 km) b. Nazareth-Assela road (rehabilitating 79 km) c. Wereda-Gob Gob road (upgrading 99 km) d. Adi Abun - Adigrat road (upgrading 108 km) (ii) Construction of Federal link road: Dera-Magna section of Dera-Mechara road (119 km) (iii) Construction Supervision (iv) Rural Travel and Transport Program a. Preparation of Travel and Transport Plans for 100 Weredas b. Development of Information, Education and Communication Strategy c. Capacity building for the Ethiopia Rural Travel and Transport Program (ERTTP) structures at the National, Regional and Wereda levels (v) Technical Advisory (TA) support services for ERA a. Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) Control and Prevention b. Technical Advisory services for ERA in Project Planning and Implementation and Social Impact Monitoring (vi) Road Financing Study and Technical Auditing (vii) Planning activities a. Urban Transport study b. Preparatory Activities for future stages
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1.6 Revised Components
16. No components were formally revised. However, about 20 kilometers of the federal link road from Dera to Magna were removed from the project because engineering conditions would have required a substantial increase in time and resources to complete this section. Consequently, physical output for Component 2 was reduced from about 119 kilometers to 99 as planned originally.
1.7 Other significant changes
17. The project was extended by six months, from June 30, 2009 to December 31, 2009, in order to facilitate full disbursement owing to a number of minor procurement-related and design- change delays. Resources associated with the IDA grant increased from US$126.8 million at the time of appraisal to US$142.6 by project close, because of appreciation of the dollar against the SDR.
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry
18. Sufficiency of Background Analysis. The IDA grant was based on analysis performed for the development of the RSDP Phase II program in general; the form it took and the components it funded came out of this larger, programmatic analysis carried out jointly by the GOE and the development community, including the Bank.
19. Project Design. APL1's design mirrored the structure of the parent RSDP II program as a whole. In keeping with ERA practice, project components were distinguished from one another based primarily on the types of services being procured (e.g. works v. consultancy), the types of roads being addressed (e.g. trunk v. link road), and/or the nature of the improvements (e.g. new road v. upgrading existing road). Thus, Component 1 consisted of rehabilitation and upgrading of trunk roads, Component 2 of construction of a new link road, Component 3 of supervision, and so on. While this design helped to make the relationship of the APL1 to the Government's RSDP II more transparent, it also rendered the relationship between the IDA-funded components and their intended objectives more difficult to discern, thus complicating assessment of the project's success. This is discussed in more detail in Section 2.3.
20. Government Commitment. The project was designed to support the Road Sector Development Program, to which the government was and remains fully committed.
21. Assessment of Risks. The PAD identified most of the important risks to the main project development objective but in some cases did not characterize or categorize them accurately. As a result, a number of the proposed mitigation measures proved to be optimistic. For example, delays in contract implementation were characterized as a "negligible" risk, but in fact were fairly prevalent. Similarly, risk of availability of human resources in implementing agencies was characterized as moderate, but opportunities for carrying out the proposed mitigation measures – contracting out for additional capacity – in practice were limited by the fact that much of the human resource deficit occurred at the mid-level management level.
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2.2 Implementation
22. Implementation processes. Implementation of the project was generally satisfactory. Project staff in ERA was diligent, if not always fully effective, in pursuing timely execution of the civil works and other components. Where there were procurement-related delays or contractors fell behind in mobilizing resources and making progress, ERA generally responded appropriately, though there were some notable lapses in supervision quality and timeliness, as was the case, for example, with the supervision of the Nekempt-Mekanajo works. Similarly, the Bank team generally responded in a professional and timely manner to requests for No Objection and other required feedback. A midterm review was carried out in May 2006 and made no recommendations on structural changes to the project.
23. The contracting of the Wereda-Gob Gob section, intended to help develop the capacity of the Domestic Construction Industry (DCI), proved successful following a difficult start. The roughly 100 kilometer section had been separated into six lots to allow as many domestic contractors as possible to participate in the program. However, the lot sizes proved to be too small, and attracted few bidders; the road length needed to be divided into two lots, in order to attract bidders. 10 In addition, because of increased traffic volumes, road surface treatment needed to be redesigned. In the end, the contractors performed quite well, but these delays meant that the works were unfinished by project close, and needed to be finished using GOE's own funds.
24. Aspects of the project that could have been improved were: In-town road sections were not always well designed and/or well executed, requiring subsequent work to fix some of the problems (see Annex 2); Compliance with environmental monitoring plans – particularly restoration of borrow pits – was inconsistent; One International Competitive Bidding (ICB) civil works contract in particular was problematic, both in terms of pace and quality. The problem was exacerbated by poor performance of the Supervising Engineer; and While construction contracts for firms selected under ICB specified the number and kinds of expatriates that could be used on the contract, monitoring and enforcement of those provisions proved to be insufficient. Some ICB contractors employed skilled labor from their home countries. Although local employment may have been less than anticipated, some local employment, and the extent of use of skilled labor imported from home countries, was not readily reported under the ongoing monitoring and evaluation arrangements using data from the works progress reports. The question of employment generation and use of local labor resources on works contracts perhaps warrants more detailed study.
10 The division into six lots had been derived from a country procurement assessment for domestic contractors that limited contract size to $5 million. The Bank agreed to repackage the lots on an exceptional basis, with special contractual provisions including guarantee requirements, in order to allow larger-sized domestic contractors to participate in the bidding.
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Anecdotal evidence suggested that a number of the ICB contractors were using more skilled labor imported from their home countries than was needed or permitted under the contract. This probably resulted in less local employment generation than had been anticipated in the PAD, particularly for skilled laborers, since many positions that otherwise would have gone to locals were instead occupied by expatriates. 25. These problems may be symptoms of a more deep-rooted challenge for ERA; the long- standing difficulty in recruiting and retaining experienced mid-level staff – that is, staff with enough experience to know how to address these challenges.
26. Civil works cost control. Costs of the civil works components (Components 1 and 2) were estimated at appraisal at about US$132 million (US$158 million including contingencies). The ICB contracts were awarded between August 2004 and January 2005 with works period of 3.5 years, and with formal extension of time, were substantially completed between December 2008 and December 2009. Final estimated cost was about US$176 million, an increase of about 11 percent over appraisal estimates. This trend is notably low considering the high inflation rate experienced in the past two to three years and is much lower than the cost-increase trend observed on the road projects under APL2, which was contracted between July 2006 and July 2007 and for which close to a doubling of costs was observed.
27. ERTTP implementation. The ERTTP component, particularly the development of the Wereda Infrastructure Development Plans (WIDP), also posed a substantial implementation challenge to the implementing agency, because of its ambitious size and scope. The 100 WIDPs intended to be financed in APL1 were reduced to 6411, but 40 more were then financed under APL2. Additionally, other donors also financed some of these plans. The WIDPs involved the creation of two substantial reports – an information analysis report, and the development plan itself.12 Since each of these reports tended to be between 200 and 300 pages long, the WIDP sub-component of the ERTTP produced around 75,000 pages of text for review. Dedicated and committed staff in ERA could not fully cope with the review. Provision for additional consulting services to enhance ERA's capacity to review all the reports was not made in a timely manner, and staff of the Rural Roads Coordinator's office was called to support other rural roads implementation activities.
2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization
28. M&E Design. Tracking the performance of the RSDP as a whole has been a clear priority of the government from early on, and a robust program of indicators was designed and funded from the outset. Under RSDP phase II, in technical collaboration with the Bank, an additional set of indicators were added to track the program's impacts on poverty and social development, linked to the MDGs. This committed approach to tracking both efficiency and effectiveness indicators earned the RSDP accolades.
11 As a result of higher costs for services than anticipated, even though mostly local firms were used.
12 Each of these reports, in turn, would involve production of a draft and final version.
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29. The M&E framework put in place for the APL project stage, however, presented challenges. The approach agreed upon by the Government and donors from the outset of the RSDP was a single, unified indicators framework for both the parent program (RSDP) and individual donor financing. Thus, projects such as the APL1 would adopt the parent RSDP's indicators. By definition, such an approach meant that gleaning the relative contribution of the IDA-financed project activities to the overall RSDP effort (with the exception of easily quantifiable physical outputs) would be difficult. This difficulty was exacerbated by both the non-results-oriented structure of the project components, as discussed in Section 2.1 and by the inconsistent use and specification of intended project indicators across different parts of the project documentation, as discussed in section 1.2.
30. A Quality at Entry Assessment (QEA) in mid-2003 had rated this project's strategic relevance and approach as highly satisfactory. Of note were the highly satisfactory ratings of the consistency of project design and the clarity and realism of the project's development objectives. In the current environment, however, it is not clear that a QEA assessment of this project would garner the same high rating, for a number of reasons. First, subsequent experience with APLs has highlighted the need to differentiate indicators appropriate to different levels of programmatic design and implementation. Second, a shift in orientation within the Bank toward monitoring for results in operations has reinforced the need to account for results at all levels of an operation. While donor harmonization and country ownership in design and implementation remain important, the need to show operational results has emerged as a critical priority.
31. M&E implementation. Implementation of the M&E framework was effective and carried out with due diligence by the implementing agency. The methodologies applied to the gathering of data for construction of the required indicators were done so consistently throughout the life of the project, and were in line with best-practice.
2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance
32. Environment. The project was classified as Category A, requiring a full environmental assessment; OP 4.01, OP 4.12 and OPN 11.03 were triggered. Performance on environmental management during project implementation can best be described as a strong improvement over past practice, but still somewhat inconsistent. While Environmental Management Plans (EMPs) prepared for each of the contracts awarded under the APL1 were consistent with the Environmental and Social Management Framework which was developed for the project as a whole, and were linked contractually to the performance of the contractors, compliance to those plans has not been consistently enforced. Contractors were slow to formulate work plans to implement the EMPs, and, initially at least, slow to appreciate the need for and importance of compliance. Similarly, ERA seems to have been inconsistent in enforcement of those plans. While compliance generally seems to have improved throughout the implementation period, some of the contractors toward the end of their contract periods reported difficulties in restoring borrow-pits and quarry sites.
33. Social protection. Procedurally, the project implementation has complied with Bank policy and expectations regarding resettlement and HIV-AIDS prevention and control.
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Resettlement Action Plans were prepared and implemented in a timely manner (though there were some early problems with the reporting on that implementation), compensation was paid in a timely manner and in line with the RAPs, and sexually transmitted diseases (STD) / HIV-AIDS prevention and awareness plans were developed and implemented along the project routes and construction sites.
34. Substantively, however, a consistently weak point in the social protection performance of the project was the lack of attention to the needs of town dwellers in the towns and villages through which the roads passed, as alluded to earlier and discussed in more detail in Annex 2. In a number of instances, the Bank supervision team noted shortcomings related to pedestrian safety, safeguarding access of adjacent properties, neighborhood continuity, and quality of workmanship in urban road amenities that the contractors may have considered ancillary (such as drain covers).
35. This weakness appears to be a systemic problem, a function of institutional and financial constraints on ERA, as well as ambiguity in the allocation of financial responsibilities between ERA and the various towns through which its roads pass. While there is clear delineation of roles and jurisdictions, the sources of finance for ancillary urban treatment of roads, which are necessary during and after major works, are not clear. This problem has emerged in a number of different contexts, within the various stages of the APL and RSDP program as a whole. The contractor and consultant's performance monitoring system being implemented under APL3 may help alleviate aspects of this problem, but there is room to address the problem more systematically.
36. Financial Management. Financial management for the project has generally performed well. Bank-acceptable procedures were consistently followed, and reflect the fruits of past capacity-improvement efforts. Toward the end of the project, some audit reports were late, and there are some small difficulties in wrapping up Accounts Receivable / Accounts Payable, and in disposing of obsolete equipment for some of the contractors, but the overall good performance of financial management in the project is noteworthy in the larger context.
37. Disbursement. The estimated project cost at appraisal had been US$186.44 million, of which US$126.8 million (SDR 93 million) from IDA. The actual project cost totaled US$195.3 million, of which US$142.3 million was from IDA, reflecting historical exchange rates of the SDR. Disbursements throughout the project generally lagged on average by about 16 percent behind. This persistent lag is associated, initially, with the lengthy customs clearance process, and subsequently, with slow mobilization on the part of a number of the contractors in the project. Nevertheless, the disbursement performance is rather good compared to other sectors.
38. Procurement. Concerted focus on ERA's procurement capacity during the Bank's RSDPSP and other previous projects has resulted in the development of a strong procurement unit within ERA. As a result, there were no major problems with procurement per se during the project. Some delays occurred in the National Competitive Bidding (NCB) works procurement, with a large number of small lots procured. The Wereda-Gob Gob section needed to be re- tendered, but the resulting delay would likely have been substantially longer were it not for the strength of the procurement unit.
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2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
39. APL1 contributed to a number of initiatives in the RSDP that remain ongoing in further phases of the program. Further road network development. All three of the follow-on stages provide funding for road upgrading, and two provide funding for new links. For the most part, this financing extends and in some cases completes the links invested under APL1. Further development of ERTTP. APL1 funded the development of 64 WIDPs. APL2 provided further support to the ERTTP in the form of funding for 40 additional WIDPs, and institutional support to ERA to enable it to facilitate implementation of the WIDPs. Further support to the ERTTP in stages 3 and 4 were not included, however, because of the backlog within ERA associated with management of the already-submitted WIDP reports. The original program phasing of the APL anticipated implementation of at least some of the WIDP's developed; DFID-financed implementation of eight pilot WIDPs has yielded encouraging results. However, priorities for later APL stages did not include implementation of these programs, and current expectation is that these plans will be implemented under a successor-program to the ERTTP. Migration of ERTTP-oriented capacity-building products to new URRAP. The Government is pursuing a Universal Rural Road Access Program (URRAP) into which the ERTTP is being subsumed. The details of the URRAP have not yet been announced, nor shared with the Bank group, but GOE officials have indicated to the Bank that it will be based substantially on lessons learned under the ERTTP program supported by the Bank in the RSDPSP, and the RSDP APL1 and APL2 projects. Further institutional support to ERA. All three follow-on stages include important institution- and capacity-building components that build on the work of APL1, taking advantage of the overlapping implementation design. For example, APL2 further developed ERA's capacity in specific core functions. APL3 focused on enhancing ERA's ability to monitor and control quality and costs of contractors, as well as supporting ongoing efforts to commercialize the DMOs. Finally, APL4 provided resources to help ERA expand its capacities and core mandate to also assist the regions and possibly lower levels of government in the future. This includes the establishment of a Highway Engineering Research Center. Road network planning and management. APL4 builds on some of the initiatives begun under APL1 to improve the way roads are planned and financed in Ethiopia. This stage is funding an analysis of the results of the TPOs, and the implications for future planning. It is also updating the 2005 road financing study in the context of a greatly expanded network. Support to Addis Ababa on urban transport and traffic management. APL3 provides additional funding to the Addis Ababa transport branch, initially intended to support implementation of the urban transport strategy developed under APL1. Because of institutional and political challenges following the national and municipal elections of 2005, however, this activity was reoriented to support general traffic management needs in the city.
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3. Assessment of Outcomes
3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
40. With reference to longer-term outcomes envisioned in the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), dated April 2, 2008, and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty or PASDEP), from September 2006, the project's objectives are relevant. At least three of the four core strategic objectives of the above- referenced CAS have been addressed in some way by this project: (i) fostering economic growth, (ii) improving access to and quality of basic service delivery, and (iii) reducing Ethiopia's vulnerability. Expansion of the road network certainly helps to foster economic growth in a myriad of ways, enables the potential for physical access to a wide array of basic services, and reduces vulnerability by allowing for more rapid movement of people and goods. Enhancing capacity for road network expansion and maintenance also helps ensure the sustainability of such benefits for the long term. Furthermore, the PASDEP outlines, among other key approaches to poverty reduction, the need for geographically differentiated strategies, and the strengthening of urban-rural linkages. A strengthened trunk road network – and enhanced capacity for the future to deliver further strengthening of the road network – is fundamental to these approaches.
41. The emphasis in the CAS on improved access and in the PASDEP on geographical differentiation and interconnection, however, requires further work specifically on ensuring adequacy of transport service supply. Indeed, some of the indicators collected under the RSDPII / APL1 monitoring and evaluation framework suggest that transport prices, in real terms, have not come down in proportion with road quality improvements, suggesting the need for further study.
3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives
42. Effectiveness of achieving this overall PDO is rated as satisfactory. This rating is based on the observed improvement in the pace of conversion of roads into the "good" category under the RSDP II period, compared with RSDP I, and project's effectiveness in achieving the individual enumerated objectives, discussed below.
43. Objective 1. Construct, rehabilitate, upgrade and preserve the priority federal road network. APL 1 was responsible for rehabilitation, substantial upgrading and construction of approximately 512 kilometers of the Federal road network. The road works components (Components 1, 2, and 3 of the project) were clearly a priority of both the Government and the Bank supervision team, based on a review of the supervision documents, including ISRs and Aide Memoires. All four of the ICB contracts were completed by the close of the project, though defect-liability period for one – Adigrat-Adi Abun – continued beyond the close of the project. The two NCB contracts for the Wereta – Gob Gob road were also substantially delayed, such that completion will occur after the Grant closing date. The reasons for the delay included: (i) initial procurement delay associated with changes in contract sizes to facilitate procurement in a manner agreeable to the Bank, (ii) lack of experience of the local contractors, (iii) adverse
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weather in recent years, (iv) variation orders arising from increased works volume, (v) surface design change due to substantial traffic increase than initially forecasted, and (vi) the need to adjust alignment in response to recently encountered landslides on one of the road contracts.
44. Looking at the larger programmatic indicators, by the close of the project, road density went from 30.8 to 42.6 kilometers per 1000 sq. km. (end-of-project target: 35). The proportion of Federal roads rated Good were as follows: Asphalt roads, 70 percent, Gravel roads, 54 percent, rural roads, 50 percent (end-of-project target: 57 percent, 42 percent, and 40 percent respectively). Average distance to all weather roads was 11.8 km (end-of-project target: 14 km). Based on these indicators and overall performance over the life of the project, progress toward this objective is rated as satisfactory.
45. Objective 2. Improve mobilization and use of resources for road maintenance and strengthen the Office of the Road Fund. The main indicators specified in the PAD to track this objective were the ratio of the road fund annual collection and annual maintenance expenditure to annual maintenance needs. However, only the numerators of these indicators (annual road fund revenues and annual maintenance expenditure) are available. What can be calculated, however, is the ratio of expenditure to available revenues in any given year (a measure of resource use if it is assumed the funds are spent productively), and the ratio of annual growth of maintenance expenditures to annual growth in roads classified in good condition (which shows whether there is at least parity between changes in need and changes in resource mobilization). These indicators show that expenditures on road maintenance have grown from 72 percent of available resources in 2003 to 82 percent in 2009, suggesting that resource use is improving. The ratio of annual growth in maintenance expenditures to annual growth in the network needing to be maintained (that is, roads in good condition) between 1997 and 2003 was 0.83; while between 2003 and 2009 was 1.58. This suggests that resources are being better mobilized and used with respect to need in the RSDP II period than they were during the RSDP I period.
46. These indicators point toward progress in the better mobilization and use of resources for road maintenance. What cannot be determined from them, however, is the extent to which IDA- financed activities contributed to this result. Project activities carried out under APL1 seem to have had ambiguous impact on the source and use of resources for road maintenance, and on the Office of the Road Fund itself. For example, project Component 6 included a study on road finance and some technical audits on the functioning of the Office of the Road Fund (ORF). The road finance study was completed in 2005, but its forecasts were questionable, and its modest recommendations were not implemented. The audits (twice completed, and one ongoing as of this writing) found technical weaknesses in the capacity of the ORF to follow-up on the use of its funds, and raised questions about the kinds of activities that ERA in particular was funding with ORF revenues. Nevertheless, the audits so far seem to have had little impact in practice. Notwithstanding these ambiguities, progress toward this objective is rated as satisfactory.
47. Objective 3. Develop capacity in the private sector (i.e. Domestic Construction Industry). Civil works on the Wereta – Gob Gob link under project component 1 was reserved for NCB, in order to strengthen the capacity of the DCI. Originally divided into six lots, the link was eventually divided into two, which attracted the larger firms and proved to be more viable for the firms involved. These firms were able to deliver their output while containing cost escalation more successfully than their ICB counterparts under APL1. Despite some problems and delays
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associated with the contracts, the NCB sub-component showed that the domestic industry can successfully compete for and deliver road projects in the context of an IDA credit or grant.
48. There is also some evidence suggesting that the DCI is getting stronger. The value of construction contracts awarded annually to domestic contractors has increased, from ETB 569.1 million to ETB 2,776.1 million during the implementation period. Also, the average price per contract awarded to domestic contractors grew substantially - which was ETB89 million in 2002, ETB203 million in 2004, and ETB619 in 2009. Figures provided by ERA's Consultant tracking RSDP indicators also show that active contract value held by domestic contractors rose from 5.1 percent of all contracts in 1999 to 17.6 percent in 2009 (after peaking at about 58 percent in 2007/8). More significantly, the proportion of total road disbursements made to domestic contractors increased from 4.7 percent in 1998 to 31.5 percent in 2009. At the same time, the share of disbursements to foreign contractors decreased by 5.1 percent, and those to force account operations by 21.7 percent, over the same period. Finally, the range of works capabilities of domestic contractors has also increased, as demonstrated by the redesign of the Wereta–Gob works to include asphalt concrete. Because of this evidence, and successful – if somewhat delayed – implementation of the NCB sub-component of Component 1, progress toward this objective is rated satisfactory.
49. Objective 4. Strengthen ERA reform program. This outcome objective was addressed in APL1 primarily through Project Component 5, particularly Technical Assistance on project planning, and was also reinforced through a number of activities undertaken in other APL stages, and support from other donors such as the AfDB. With regard to the APL1-funded activities, the client's assessment of this activity was extremely positive (see Annexes 2 and 7), suggesting that it likely had a positive impact on staff performance. However, the only formal indicators specified in the original monitoring and indicators framework related to the accomplishment of milestones in the structural changes in ERA service delivery. Of the three, the milestone for transformation of the DMOs into cost centers was met.
50. Nevertheless, there are some other indicators available in the parent RSDP's general monitoring framework (not incorporated into the APL1 M&E framework) that show that ERA's performance has been improving. Evidence suggests, for example, some improvement in contract processing and service delivery. Contractor invoice approvals and payments have become more efficient, with a reduction in the ratio of actual invoice approvals to contract- specified invoice approvals of 0.61 in 1997 to 0.23 in 2008, and in the ratio of actual payment time to contract-specified payment time of 0.85 in 1997 to 0.08 in 2008. Indicators of ratios of approval and payment to a benchmark for consultants also show substantial improvement during this period. Similarly – though less convincingly – data suggest some improvement in average delivery time of contract and civil works milestones against contractual benchmarks, as shown in Table 1.
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Table 1. Ratio of Actual to Allotted Time-to-Complete Monitoring Year Activity 1996/97 2008/09 Feasibility Study 1.7 1.3 Approval of Feasibility 1.2 0.8 Detailed design 1.9 1.5 Contractor prequalification 1.0 1.7 Tendering 2.2 1.7 Mobilization 1.1 0.5 Source: W T Consultants.
51. Notwithstanding these improvements however, the reform program has had some challenges. Staff turnover and difficulties in retention have meant that capacity building within ERA has not been as sustainable in the long-term as had been anticipated. ERA transformed the DMOs into cost centers, but subsequently prioritized other reform measures, so that transformation into profit or commercial centers has not met anticipated milestones. Finally, a concerted effort to develop a coherent and coordinated Federal / regional resource allocation methodology or process has not borne fruit. So while some trends are encouraging, others are not, and success at reaching the formally identified targets for the project cannot be reported. For these reasons, overall progress toward this objective is rated as moderately satisfactory.
3.3 Efficiency
52. Efficiency is rated as satisfactory. The project's civil works, with the notable exception of Adi Abun-Adigrat, performed more or less as expected (notwithstanding some cost increases), and in the case of Wereta-Gob Gob, created more economic value than had been anticipated. While project costs escalated more than had been anticipated in the sensitivity analysis of the ex ante economic analysis (20 percent) for all projects except Nekempte-Mekanajo, traffic also grew faster than had been anticipated (again, with the exception of Adi Abun-Adigrat). However, even this latter project meets the threshold for cost-of-capital (EIRR of 18.6).
53. The project's non-civil works components' expenditures were in line with those anticipated at appraisal, and these investments yielded the outputs that were anticipated.
3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Satisfactory
54. The project contributed substantially to the achievement of the implicit overall development objective, which was to improve domestic capacity to deliver and maintain quality road infrastructure in the face of constraints, and it did so at a reasonable cost overall. This implicit objective is important for facilitating many of the goals of the CAS and the PASDEP, but had the project taken a more holistic approach to road transport (that is, focusing on infrastructure and services) it may have done more than just facilitate, but also improve the chances for attainment of the CAS goals.
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3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts
(i) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development
55. Provision of roads is conventionally seen as a key enabler for poverty reduction. Roads facilitate access to services, which help alleviate poverty in both the short and long runs, such as medical services, markets for surplus household products, off-farm employment activities, agricultural and small industrial support services, and schools. Prior to the APL, the magnitude of this impact, however, was generally assessed based on anecdotal evidence or not at all. To allow for more rigorous and quantitative assessment of the impact of road development on poverty alleviation, the project established a Transport Poverty Observatory, whose role was to monitor the poverty alleviation impacts of road project investments in areas of influence of RSDP-supported projects, at both the community and household levels. Three years of data on 35 indicators of poverty and transport behavior have been collected so far, and will be continued and rigorously evaluated in a study funded under APL4.
(ii) Institutional Change/Strengthening
56. In addition to components supporting the strengthening of ERA's capacity to manage non-force-account road construction and maintenance and the Office of the Road Fund, APL1 also supported institutional development and better management of rural accessibility. While rural accessibility was not a primary focus of the Government's RSDP2, there is clear recognition by both the GOE and the donor community on the need to scale up rural connectivity once the core road network is restored to a functioning critical mass. Thus, the project invested over US$4 million in institutional strengthening to enable better management of rural accessibility investments. Expanding a previous pilot that had been funded by Ireland Aid and DFID for preparation of WIDPs, the project developed 64 such programs (which were supplemented by additional WIDPs supported from other APL stages and other donors). It also developed an information, education and communication strategy for reaching out to Weredas, developed a systematic capacity-building program targeted to different levels of government (Federal, regional, Wereda, and Kebele), and, unsuccessfully, tried to harmonize the information platforms for detailed Wereda-level information gathering.
57. The effort turned out to be timely, because the Government is currently developing a large-scale program for rural accessibility enhancement, to be known as the Universal Rural Road Access Program (URRAP). Unlike the RSDP, which was the result of a collaborative process between the Ethiopian Government and the donor community, particularly the Bank, the URRAP is wholly a government project, so the precise details are not yet known. However, the counterparts have affirmed that institutional development outputs of the ERTTP component of the RSDP, including those under the APL1, are being incorporated and used in the new program.
(iii) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)
58. There are no noteworthy unintended outcomes or impacts.
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4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate
59. A number of factors may adversely influence continued progress toward the project's development outcome. Financially, there is a risk that prices will continue to escalate in a manner that will push the continuation of the RSDP beyond the reach of the Government. Institutionally, there is also a risk that the rapid growth in the size of the road network will affect the ability of Federal and sub-national institutions to maintain it.
60. These risks, if they occur, will mostly affect future road development activities; the benefit stream from project components of the APL1 has already produced long-term development outcomes. For that reason, this project's risk to development outcome is rated as low.
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
5.1 Bank Performance
(i) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Satisfactory
61. The design of the project, and the APL program as a whole, supported the overall RSDP in an effective and responsive way. The project was conceived to effectively support and respond to the size and complexity of that program. The project preparation stage involved senior Bank experts and consultation with the Government, stakeholders and development partners in confirming the strategic and program development targets and priorities. Notably, in June 2002, the Bank with PPIAF resources and co-financing from DFID assisted GOE in organizing a workshop on Public-Private-Partnership in Infrastructure that introduced the Toolkit on PPP for Highways. The workshop contributed to the sensitization and acceptance of increased domestic contractor participation in road contracts, which was also an increasing Government priority and private sector desire.
62. As discussed previously, the project's design and M&E framework were rooted in the overall RSDP framework; it did not incorporate later standards for Bank-financed projects requiring monitoring for results. Nevertheless, that design and framework pushed the envelope for donor harmonization and support to country-driven processes, and, as such, were considered best practice for the standards of the day, as evidenced by the project's Quality at Entry Assessment (QEA) rating. In the final analysis, it is possible to gauge overall progress toward the project's enumerated objectives, because of extensive parent-project monitoring program put in place, in part, through due diligence of the design team at up-stream phases of the project cycle. For these reasons, Bank performance at quality-at-entry is rated satisfactory.
(ii) Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory
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63. Because of the volume of activities not only within the various components of APL1, but also occurring simultaneously in first the preparation, then supervision of subsequent stages of the APL, this has been a difficult project for Bank staff to supervise and manage. The APL program as a whole has required the dedication of two full-time civil engineers, engaged in a near-continuous cycle of procurement review. Unfortunately, constraints on variable costs within the supervision budget have limited the ability to engage international consultants to relieve the burden of these reviews. Despite these difficulties, the client has expressed satisfaction with the performance of the task team.
(iii) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Satisfactory 64. Notwithstanding problems in the clarity of how the project's objectives were articulated and the results monitored discussed above, the Bank team maintained fidelity to those objectives, through several changes of task teams and task team leaders, and generally guided the project successfully to fruition, and put the adaptable lending program on a sure footing to meet its programmatic objectives. For this reason, the Bank's performance is rated satisfactory.
5.2 Borrower Performance
(i) Government Performance Rating: Satisfactory
65. Road network development is clearly a priority area for the Government, but its commitment goes beyond simply providing kilometers of serviceable roadway, to ensuring both the quality and effectiveness of the roads developed. Ministry of Finance has identified road network development as a priority area, and was a committed partner in the development of the APL1 and subsequent stages, but has also largely stayed out of the way in terms of implementation. However, the Government needs to address problems in the structure of the road transport service sector, if the benefits of its road development programs are to be fully realized.
(ii) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Satisfactory
66. The Ethiopian Roads Authority's (ERA) primary mandate has been to build and maintain roads classified under the federal road network. It is generally perceived as one of the most effective public institutions in Ethiopia. Beginning with the RSDP, however, ERA effectively and successfully began integrating new functions and roles into its operations. It has developed capacity not only to manage stringent environmental and social safeguards requirements, but also to learn from problems related to their compliance and improve practices, as well as foster an appreciation among staff of the value of these additional "burdens". It has improved its performance vis-à-vis procurement and contract processing, and developed an appreciation for the benefits from more effective information management.
67. One structural problem that continues to affect ERA's performance during the project implementation, however, has been high staff turnover, particularly of experienced staff in mid-
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career positions. On the ground, this is particularly noticeable where conditions are non- standard and require more thorough case-by-case monitoring, such as highly variegated terrain or urban environments. A second noteworthy challenge is the need to ensure more effective and timely interaction between ERA and the ORF, which is charged with ensuring the technical and financial accountability for road maintenance.
(iii) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Satisfactory
68. Borrower performance is rated satisfactory because of the overall level of support provided by the highest levels of Government, and the consistent and improving performance of the implementing agency.
6. Lessons Learned
69. Contractual obligations to ensure environmental performance of contractors can be strengthened. A number of key environmental actions need to occur toward the end of the construction cycle, such as restoring parts of construction sites, borrow pits, and quarries. Although provisions for environmental mitigation were made in Bills of Quantities, further action can help ensure contractors do not renege on their contractual obligations, such as requiring up-front environmental performance bonds, or increasing retention amounts and creating specific set-asides for end-of-contract payment upon supervisor certification of environmental compliance.
70. The urban interface is a complex component of roads projects, which must be approached more systematically. Urban areas – cities, towns, even villages – have more complex, contextual elements that must be planned for and incorporated than standard rural sections of roadway. The additional complexity comes from a number of sources, including the nature and frequency of vehicular cross-movements and parking, the amount of concentrated pedestrian activity, the rapid increase in recent years in the length of roads near towns and cities requiring urban treatment (that is, urban expansion), and generally more complex relationships with abutting properties and their access to the road. Not only must the road adapt to these urban conditions, which generally require detailed and accurate contextual design, but also the city or town needs to adapt to the new or newly reshaped road. There is room for these complexities to be more systematically taken into account at the national level, as the outcomes affect the rural- urban interface created by roads' passing through urban areas, and consequently affect national development. This would have two implications for how GOE manages its trunk road development program. First, ERA must effectively coordinate with regional and urban authorities in the planning, scope and timing of urban section designs and development. In the process, it must ensure that design of urban sections not only is contextual, but also makes sense from an urban development as well as a traffic-moving point of view. Although there are provisions for incorporation of such considerations in the design stage TORs, more effort could be made to ensure compliance. Second, the GOE needs to address more squarely the question of how resources for ancillary improvements around roads in towns and cities are funded and allocated. These questions might form the basis of a more detailed study.
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71. Training and capacity building are not as effective as they could be, as long as civil service reform is not on the agenda. Inability to retain staff results in high staff turnover; as a result, investments in human capital do not have much longevity, since junior staff tend to move on to other opportunities elsewhere after being trained. For example, the environment management branch has difficulty filling vacant posts, and when they do, training and capacity development efforts have to restart from zero. Civil service / public sector reform could address this issue, improving retention rates by emphasizing good salaries and performance-based monitoring. This will be increasingly important as ERA moves to separate its planning and implementation functions.
72. Scaling up works under the Government's RSDP, both in terms of size and pace, requires redoubled efforts to ensure no loss of quality. Unless concerted efforts are made, quality of various aspects of the civil works program – design, safeguards, follow-through (particularly in urban areas) – could suffer in an effort to maintain the pace of expenditures, and keep up the rate of growth of the network. One potential solution to this challenge is greater use of Output and Performance-based Road Contracting (OPRC). APL3 is funding the preparation of bidding documents for a potential (OPRC) project, the financing for which would be identified later. Another potential solution is to further strengthen capacities in ERA, but this potential is, again, limited by difficulties in staff retention identified above.
73. Mobilization delays continue to be a source of difficulties for both on-time delivery of promised outputs and final project costs; ERA and the donor community need to maintain focus and collective purpose to avoid such delays as much as possible, and to minimize their financial impact when they do occur. As a result of experience from earlier projects, including the Emergency Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project (ERRP-Credit 2351-ET) and the RSDP phase I, ERA had put into place measures under APL1 to minimize government-caused delays associated with customs clearances and land acquisition, and to allow more time contractually for mobilization. Yet some of the ICB-procured civil works still suffered from significant delays. These delays seem to stem from contractors' weak management capacity, indifference, and / or malfeasance, combined with ineffective supervision by selected firms.
74. Further recognition and accounting for the above problems have led to additional efforts under APLs 3 and 4 to address them. For example, APL3 funds the development within ERA of a contract performance monitoring system, which will allow ERA to monitor contract performance and progress via benchmarks, rather than relying exclusively on supervising engineers' assessments. Similarly, project costs will also be monitored and compiled, enabling more independent assessments of engineers' cost estimations.
75. Road asset management requires needs-based maintenance programming. The road asset value in Ethiopia has climbed substantially since concerted investments began under the RSDP in 1997, and requires concerted efforts to preserve it. The project financed a study to assess maintenance needs, currently being updated under APL4, but the results need to be fully incorporated into the maintenance planning cycle. To do so, the ORF needs to be strengthened to allow them to provide timely technical and financial audits of road maintenance by different agencies, including ERA. Doing so will allow planners to make good, long-term strategic allocations of resources and preserve the asset developed to date.
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76. To effectively address constraints to accessibility and unmet transport needs, the GOE and its donor partners will need to look beyond the provision and maintenance of road infrastructure, toward a more holistic approach to the sector, including services. The RSDP and the APL1 focused almost exclusively on road hardware, and strengthening the necessary institutions to deliver and maintain it. To ensure that transport plays its full role in alleviating poverty and contributing to the economic life of the country, however, the availability and affordability of transport services will need to be approached in a consistent policy framework. In the process, there is need to pay more attention to strengthening the institutions that monitor and regulate this sector.
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (i) Borrower/implementing agencies 77. Comments made by ERA on earlier drafts of this ICR have been fully incorporated into this document.
78. The Borrower's ICR, shown in Annex 7, includes a table of project performance indicators that are not fully consistent with the project indicators as identified in Annex 1 of the PAD, and as discussed in Section F, the Results Framework Analysis, and Section 3, Assessment of Outcomes of this ICR.
(ii) Cofinanciers No comments were received by other donor partners
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Annex 1. Project Costs
Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)
(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)
Appraisal Actual/Latest Estimate (USD Estimate (USD Percentage of Components millions) millions) Appraisal
1. REHAB.& UPGRADING OF FED.TRUNK & LINK ROADS 123.39 156.26 126.64 2. CONSTRUCTION OF FEDERAL/LINK ROAD 34.41 19.43 56.47 3. CONSTRUCTION SUPERVISION 11.93 8.38 70.24 4. RURAL TRAVEL & TRANSPORT PROGRAM 7.54 4.59 60.88 5. CAPACITY BUILDING & TRAINING 4.8 4.26 88.75 6. ROAD FINANCING STUDY & TA 0.46 0.28 60.87 7. PREPARATORY ACTIVITIES & URBAN STUDIES 3.91 2.13 54.48
Total Project Costs 186.44 195.53 104.88
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(b) Financing
Appraisal Actual/Latest Estimate Estimate Percentage of Source of Funds (USD millions) (USD millions) Appraisal* IDA 126.8 142.6 112.46 Borrower 59.64 52.93 88.75 Total 186.44 195.53 104.88
*Because of the exchange rate, between birr and dollar and dollar and SDR the amounts changed. Although in real terms it was 100% contribution of both Borrower and IDA.
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Annex 2. Outputs by Component
Component 1. Rehabilitation and upgrading of federal trunk and link roads
i. Nekempt-Mekenajo Road (127 km. Estimate US$41.86 million, actual US$49.72 million)
1. The Nekempt-Mekenajo Road upgrade from gravel to asphalt was undertaken by a contractor following International Competitive Bidding ICB). Works were completed on time by December 2008, with the defects liability period extending through December 2009. This represents a substantial catching up compared to the contract performance at the time of the mid- term review. At that time, physical accomplishment had been 26.4 percent, against a planned accomplishment of 30 percent.
2. Visits to the town sections of these works (Nekempt, Gimbi) exemplify some of the distinct challenges that urban sections have presented during the Government's RSDP implementation. In a number of cases, initial design and / or execution of the road had cut off access - both road and town access - for adjacent residents and businesses, necessitating redesign and / or corrective measures. Earlier attention to appropriate traffic calming measures, to ensure that through traffic negotiates the urban areas at town speeds, rather than highway speeds, and to pedestrian movements might have also improved conditions for town residents. ii. Nazret-Assela road (79 km. Estimate US$23.13 million, actual US$29.13 million)
3. The Nazret – Assela Road rehabilitation was awarded under ICB procedures, and work was completed by February 2008, with defects liability period extending through February 2009. Civil works for this contract were completed ahead of schedule. iii. Wereta – Gob Gob road (98.9 km. US$28.82 million, actual US$33.33 million)
4. The upgrading of the Wereta-Gob Gob Road from gravel to bitumen was undertaken in two lots, awarded under National Competitive Bidding (NCB) procedures. The works were originally intended to be contracted out in six lots of 15 to 20 kilometers each, following a local capacity assessment, which suggested about US$5 million per NCB contract. However, when the works were put out to bid in summer of 2004, the resulting proposals were substantially higher than expected. In even the least-cost bid, the proposed price was 195 percent the cost estimated by the Engineer, with most of the difference coming in the day-work rates applied. ERA speculated that the reasons were the relatively small size of each lot (between 14 and 18 kilometers each) and the ratio of qualified bidders to the number of lots up for tender (four : six). Consequently, ERA proposed, and the Bank eventually agreed to, an exception to the procurement limit, with the works to be repackaged as two lots of about US$13 million each, and rebid. The construction period was extended from two to three years, and each (previously qualified) contractor was limited to bidding on only one contract.
5. In the intervening time, however, traffic had grown on the existing roads more substantially than expected. A decision was made, therefore, to redesign the road surfaces in order to handle the existing traffic. This led to further delay in the progress of the works, but did give the local contractors valuable experience in working with asphalt bitumen, one of the key 23
objectives of this component. As of the close of the project, the works were 92 percent (Lot 1) and 85 percent (Lot 2) complete. The reasons for the delay included: (i) lack of experience of the local contractors, (ii) adverse weather conditions during the construction period, (iii) variation orders arising from increased works volume, (iv) surface design change due to a traffic increase substantially higher than initially forecasted, and (v) the need to adjust the alignment in response to recently encountered landslides on one of the road contracts. The uncompleted portion of these contracts is being funded from the Government's budget.
iv. Adi Abun Adigrat road (108 km. Estimate US$29.57 million; actual US$43.75 Million)
6. While all four of the ICB contracts suffered from slow initial mobilization to some degree, the upgrading of this portion of the Adigrat – Shire road from gravel to asphalt suffered from such mobilization delays that the contractor was unable to recover within the contract period. Progress remained well below 50 percent of expected performance, throughout much of the contract period, for a number of reasons, including: repeated changes in project management of the contractor, lack of support to the site by the Contractor's headquarters, lack of equipment and experienced staff, poor quality of the equipment that was available on-site, lack of communication skill in English, and poor site protection practices prior to and during the rainy season (leading to the subsequent need to rectify erosion problems).
7. As a consequence, the contract period for this work needed to be extended to August 2009 and while the main works were completed by that time, the defects liability period extended beyond the closing date of the IDA grant; consequently, cost of some claims might need to be borne by the Government.
8. Price adjustment on this contract was particularly onerous. According to ERA figures, contractual adjustments to unit prices more than doubled the initial contract price. As a result the AdiAbun-Adigrat road had a relatively large price escalation compared to the other civil works contracts under APL1; final contract price was more than double the initial price, and almost 1.5 times the cost estimated at appraisal.
Component 2. Construction of federal link road – Dera-Magna section of Dera-Mechara road. (Originally 119.4 km; reduced to 99 km. Estimate US$34.41 million; actual US$19.43 Million).
9. The construction of the Dera-Magna section of the Dera-Mechara Road was undertaken following International Competitive Bidding. The road alignment goes through five towns, and follows about 28.6 kilometers of previously gravel and about 2.4 kilometers of earth road, respectively. The remaining 68 kilometers is greenfield development, primarily through difficult soil known as "black cotton".
10. The contract was reduced in scope following contract signing in August 2004; the final stretch of the link (about 20 kilometers from Chole to Magna) was removed from the contract, because of a changed alignment through mountainous terrain. The Government is constructing this link with its own resources. In addition, the contract originally called for about 19 kilometers of bituminous penetration macadam – through townships and along steep portions – but this was reduced to less than 6 kilometers, when it was found that aggregates were not
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bonding with gravel surfaces because of prevailing temperatures and rates of precipitation. (The remaining 13 kilometers of these areas were finished with gravel surface.) The Bank's civil engineers believe that this latter problem probably could have been identified and corrected by the design consultants. As a result of these changes, the cost of the civil works for this component was substantially lower than anticipated at appraisal.
11. The construction period was extended from an end date of February 2008 to June 2009, but even that deadline was missed as there were a number of items outstanding at project closing, including completion of about 20 kilometers of roadway, some erosion protection works, erection of traffic signs, and reinstatement of borrow and quarry sites.
12. Notwithstanding these problems, the project team rated the progress of the contract as satisfactory in its final supervision mission report. To some degree, this rating may reflect the superior performance of the contractor in fulfilling his obligations under the Environmental Management Plan, particularly in the reinstatement of borrow pits and quarries, relative to other contractors active in the project.
Component 3. Construction Supervision. (Estimate US$11.93 million; actual US$8.38 Million).
13. Six construction supervision contracts were issued to oversee the works, one for each of the civil works contracts.
14. Quality of the supervision of the Nekempt-Mekenajo road suffered, initially because of performance problems associated with the assigned Resident Engineer (RE), and later because of the prolonged absence of an RE from the site because of inability to find a suitable replacement, and related continuity problems.13
Component 4. Rural travel and transport program. (Estimate US$7.54; actual US$4.59 Million.)
15. The Road Sector Development Program, which the entire IDA APL program is supporting, was primarily envisioned to make progress on trunk roads in Ethiopia. It has long been recognized that as the network matures, focus needs to be placed increasingly on rural access to that trunk network. The ERTTP was intended to explore the mechanisms by which that objective might eventually be operationalized. The program was intended to build on the experience of eight "Wereda Integrated Development Plans" (WIDP) that had been piloted using financing from the Development Cooperation of Ireland (DCI) and technical support from the World Bank; the core of the ERTTP under APL1 was the development of 64 WIDPs, in eight lots of eight Weredas each. The program also involved the development of an information, education, and communication strategy, and capacity building for institutions likely to be
13 The lack of RE in this contract seems to have exacerbated some of the quality performance problems of the contractor in urban areas in particular, such as Nekempt. Recruitment and retention of qualified engineers on site is a growing industry-wide challenge.
25 involved in scaling up of a WIDP program at the federal, regional, and Wereda levels. Together, the development of the WIDPs, the IEC strategy, and the capacity building formed the three key elements of the ERTTP that had been identified in the PAD. These are discussed in more detail below.
16. In addition to the above core components, the IDA grant has also financed a number of support elements to the program, including:
Capacity building, training, and some material support (procurement of vehicles) to support implementation of the eight pilot WIDPs (with the implementation itself supported by DCI and WIDP); and Development of a unified and consistent database to compile data collected during WIDP development process. Work carried out on this activity was largely ineffectual. A consultant was hired to develop a common database framework, and, indeed, this tool was released in November 2006. However, the database platform eventually developed turned out to be overly cumbersome; while consultants could physically enter data in a program with a friendly user interface, once entered, the data could not be extracted in a useable way. The consultants engaged in WIDP data collection exercise, therefore, were forced to maintain two data base maintenance exercises, one to put the data in the "common" format ERA was requiring, and one to put the data in a form that was useable for subsequent analysis. i. Preparation of 64 Wereda Travel and Transport Plans.
17. This subcomponent proved to be challenging for implementation. . Reduced from 100 to 64 Weredas, this component's output involved production of two substantial reports (in both draft and final form) for each Wereda – an information analysis report, and the development plan itself. Each of these reports tended to be between 200 and 300 pages long, meaning that this subcomponent alone would have produced over 75,000 pages of text that would need to be thoroughly reviewed if the work was to be properly supervised. ERA tried to procure consulting services just to help with the review of this material, but that procurement was interrupted by shifts in personnel and programmatic priorities.
18. These difficulties highlight the inherent problems of top-down coordination of local development strategies. The sheer volume of analysis and processing involved can easily overwhelm the capacity of centralized (federal) agencies; such an initiative may require an element of bottom-up organization to be manageable, but this approach would require a great deal of already-developed decentralized management capacity. Such decentralized capacity is feasible in Ethiopia in the near term, given its high levels of economic growth in recent years, but it is unlikely to be available equally in all locales. Rather, local management capacity likely occurs as a by-product of local economic development, which, in turn, would happen where economic concentration (urbanization) occurs and facilitates economic development. In short, ERA's experience with the WIDP may point to the need for a more bottom-up orientation in the approach to rural infrastructure development, supported by funding at the Federal level which recognizes inherent differences in capacity to develop and implement programs.
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ii. Development of information, education, and communication strategy.
19. This subcomponent led to the development of a strategy paper for information, education, and communication (IEC) on the ERTTP. The strategy paper recommended specific communications approaches to different stakeholders on a range of issues, grouped by seven themes:
1. Rural accessibility and mobility; 2. Productivity and income diversification in rural areas; 3. Integrated holistic approaches to rural development; 4. Community ownership, gender equity and empowerment; 5. Environment; 6. Resource mobilization; and 7. Performance monitoring and evaluation.
20. The strategy paper also recommended a rather elaborate institutional structure to ensure coordination of the ERTTP and its communication strategy. As the Bank team noted, this strategy could be used not only for the ERTTP and its successor program(s), but also for investments made under the Protection of Basic Services project as well. Staff at ERA indicated that they expected this strategy to be adopted for the URRAP program. iii. Capacity building for ERTPP institutions at national, regional, and Wereda levels
21. This activity included development and implementation of a capacity assessment method for Weredas, strengthening information technology availability, and providing some vehicles for selected ERTPP institutions. The capacity building strategy developed was recommended for use in the subsequent URRAP program.
Component 5. Technical Assistance (TA) support services for ERA i. Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) Control and Prevention (Estimate US$500 thousand; actual US$0)
22. Although TA for HIV/AIDS control and prevention had been identified in the PAD to support the RSDP II's objectives in this area, ERA was fully able to meet its objectives regarding HIV/AIDS control and prevention without recourse to such TA. Indeed, it has maintained a vigorous and robust effort on HIV/AIDS, hiring three full-time professionals in the Environmental Monitoring Branch and requiring specific line-items in contractors' budgets for HIV/AIDS prevention and control for the first time under APL1. Such mechanisms are now generally required on all Bank-financed road contracts over US$10 million value, but it is noteworthy that ERA adopted these measures prior to such standardization. Unfortunately, monitoring of HIV/AIDS infection rates has not been as successful as the control measures themselves; placeholder indicators on HIV/AIDS were incorporated into the RSDP M&E framework, but, to date, have not been populated with data.
27 ii. TA Support for ERA in Project Planning and Implementation and Social Impact Monitoring (Estimate US$4.30 million; actual US$4.26 million).
23. This component entailed three relatively distinct activities. First, about 15 or so ERA staffs were trained at the Masters' level, in accredited programs in the UK and the Netherlands. Second, a detailed training program on all aspects of project planning and implementation was developed and implemented for ERA staff. This training program covered aspects of project management, planning, procurement, contract administration, review of engineering designs, claims avoidance, and dispute handling. This program was well received by staff at ERA, who not only appreciated the quality of the training itself and the materials produced, but also – and particularly – the attitude and availability of the consultant's personnel carrying out the training. Material developed for the training has been deposited with the University of Addis Ababa, where it is intended to be made available to engineering students.
24. Finally, this component involved the development and fielding of a Transport and Poverty Observatory (TPO), to monitor the poverty alleviation impacts of road project investments in areas of influence of RSDP-supported projects, at both the community and household levels. While the link between transport and poverty alleviation has long been suspected, it has never been studied systematically in Ethiopia. This ongoing effort examines transport service characteristics and poverty outcomes along four corridors, and tracks 35 indicators. The APL1 grant tried to reverse this, by developing a program to examine transport service characteristics and poverty outcomes along four corridors rehabilitated under the Government's RSDP. The grant funded three years of data collection, tracking 35 indicators, but annual monitoring is expected to continue until at least 2012, using resources to be determined. (About ETB 1.7 million remains on the monitoring contract.) So far, the data collection exercises have yielded a wealth of information and interesting indicators, summarized in Annex 11. Under APL4, an analytical study will be commissioned to assess those results in more detail.
Component 6. Road Financing Study & Technical Audits (Estimate US$0.46 million; actual US$0.28 million)
25. This component funded a road finance study which looked at existing revenue sources and planned future development of the road network, and estimated the extent of maintenance needs through 2015. However, it only provided detailed needs expenditure estimates for five years, from 2004 through 2009, and these estimates subsequently proved to be inaccurate. Since its recommendations were not taken up by the Road Fund, it is already obsolete. In fact, a new Road Fund study has recently been launched financed under APL 4, which will look at additional revenue sources besides the traditional fuel levy.
26. This component also financed some technical audits of the road fund itself. The first two of those audits examined maintenance works that were being funded by the road fund, and found that ERA was using Road Fund resources to fund more than routine maintenance, but rather periodic (heavy) maintenance activities and even rehabilitation. They also found that the evaluation capacity of Road Fund staff was somewhat weak. It remains unclear the extent to which the results of this audit have affected either ERA or Road Fund staff in terms of their day- to-day practices.
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Component 7. Planning activities
Urban Transport study (Estimate US$ 1.12 million; actual US$0.37million) Preparatory Activities for future stages (US$2.79 million; actual US$1.76 million)
27. This component funded preparatory studies of potential investments to be funded later. It included feasibility, design, and environmental and social impact studies for civil works investments under stage III of the APL. It also funded an urban transport strategy for Addis Ababa, the implementation of which was also meant to be prepared under APL 3. Shortly after the strategy was completed, however, the Addis Ababa municipal Government entered a period of institutional instability, so efforts to implement the strategy were halted. The preparatory activities for future stages of the APL, however, did come to fruition, as APL3 is currently financing civil works for facilities whose plans were developed under APL1.
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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis
I. Introduction
1. The ex post economic analysis was carried out by ERA staff, using updated numbers based on the original Feasibility Study.
2. Economic results were updated for the following road projects, using a benefit-cost approach with the HDM model: Nazareth-Assela, Adigrat – Adi Abun -Adwa, Wereta – Gob Gob , and Nekempte – Mekenajo 3. Economic analysis of the Dera-Magna section (part of Dera – Mechara link) had used a producer-surplus approach, and had determined an economic internal rate of return (EIRR) of 18.5 percent for the entire Dera – Mechara link. That analysis has not been updated, because resource constraints have precluded the collection of detailed agricultural production data for the zone. However, field observation suggests that agricultural activity in the zone has been robust since completion of the road link, and construction costs were substantially lower than anticipated, because of the removal of about 20 kilometers of bypass around Chole. Consequently, it is a reasonable proposition that the final EIRR was at least as high as that assessed in the ex ante evaluation. For the other links, a number of the assumptions of the initial economic evaluation have been revised as a result of observations during the implementation period. The results of the economic viability of the roads have been modified taking into consideration actual projects cost and updated traffic figures. Moreover, the analysis period has been changed to incorporate the current starting period of construction.
II. Methodology
4. The Highway Development Management (HDM 3) model (in HDM Manager) that was developed by the World Bank has been used for the analysis for sake of consistency with the original analysis. The project scenario has been compared with a “do minimum” case. The “do minimum case” assumes that a minimum amount of maintenance of the existing road will be carried out. The economic analysis is based on benefits to road traffic (in terms of savings in vehicle operating costs (VOCs) & road maintenance costs) compared with the costs of rehabilitation/upgrading and maintenance. Discounted benefits are then compared to discounted costs to produce measures of worth.
5. The results are expressed in Economic Internal Rates of Return (EIRRs) and Net Present Value (NPV). The basic concept of economic evaluation is to maximize the returns on investment. Costs are expressed in terms of financial and economic costs. The financial costs are market prices that the consumers pay for. However, economic costs explain the true cost of resource consumption. Financial costs have been converted to economic costs by subtracting taxes, levies and duties.
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6. To be acceptable for implementation, the proposed investments have to result in an EIRR of at least equal to the opportunity cost of capital in Ethiopia, which is set at 10 percent. NPV's are calculated using opportunity cost of capital as the discount rate.
III. Construction Alternatives
7. The construction and maintenance alternatives for the HDM analysis have been defined based on the improvement options identified for each road. For each alternative defined, a set of maintenance and improvement standards are assigned. The maintenance and improvement standards define the work items to be carried out on the project road over the analysis period. The different alternatives proposed for each road are presented below.
Table 1. Alternatives Proposed for Project Roads Project road Alt 1 Alt 2 Nazareth-Assela Do Minimum AC Option Wereta -Gob Gob Do Minimum AC Option Adigrat – Adi Abun Do Minimum AC Option Nekempte – Mekenajo Do Minimum AC Option
8. It is assumed that the road is open to traffic in year 2010 and the analysis period is assumed to cover 20 years.
IV. Traffic Projection
9. Traffic projections on the project road have taken into account past and future trend in GDP growth, population increase, agricultural activities, tourism, Average Annual Daily Traffic (AADT), vehicle fleet and fuel consumption. These are among the major factors influencing traffic growth rates on the project road.
10. It is assumed that the current fairly high level of traffic growth rates will reduce in the future as the economy stabilizes to steady growth. Thus, two sets of growth rates have been estimated for the period 2009-2019 and 2020-2029.
11. Table 2 shows the Average Annual Daily traffic considered for the base year, and Table 3 shows the growth rates assumptions for the two periods.
Table 2. Average Annual Daily Traffic –Base year (2008) Length M/ Road link Car L/R S/Bus L/Bus S/T H/T T/T Total (km) T Nazareth -Assela 79 250 401 460 323 141 454 283 262 2574 Wereta – Gob Gob 99 1 129 70 55 43 72 105 74 547
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Adigrat –Adi Abun- 109 0 62 76 37 70 71 66 53 435 Adwa Nekempte – Mekenajo 127 3 67 82 38 71 105 116 30 512
Table 3. Assumed Growth Rates of Average Annual Daily Traffic (percent per year) Road link Year Car L/R S/Bus L/Bus S/T M/T H/T T/T
2009-2019 3.5 5.0 6.0 6.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 6.0 Nazareth -Assela 2020-2029 2.5 3.5 5.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 4.0
2009-2019 3.0 6.0 8.0 8.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 Wereda – Gob Gob 2020-2029 2.0 5.0 7.0 7.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0
Adigrat –Adi Abun- 2009-2019 4.0 4.0 8.5 8.5 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Adwa 2020-2029 3.0 3.0 7.5 7.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.0
2009-2019 2.5 3.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 8.5 Nekempte – Mekenajo 2020-2029 3.5 4.0 3.5 3.5 7.0 8.0 5.0 6.0
V. Economic Analysis Results
12. Summary of the results of economic analysis using HDM-3 model for the project roads are summarized below.
Results of the Economic Analysis (Internal Rate of Return (IRR) in percentage and NPV in million Birr):
Table 4. Nazareth- Assela Road Project Road Project Length AC Option (km) IRR NPV Nazareth -Assela 79 49.2 1543.7
Table 5. Wereta -Gob Gob Road Project Road Project Length AC Option (km) IRR NPV Wereta – km 49 49 23.7 291.9 Km 49 - Gob Gob 50 26.7 383.6 Wereta – Gob Gob 99 25.2 675.5
Table 6. Adigrat –Adi Abun- Adwa Road Project Road Project Length AC Option (km) IRR NPV Adigrat –Adi Abun- Adwa 109 18.6 514.4
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Table 7. Nekempte – Mekenajo Road Project Road Project Length AC Option (km) IRR NPV Nekempte – Mekenajo 127 24.4 719.7
VI. Sensitivity Analysis
13. The benefit estimate which mainly deals with traffic forecasting involves uncertainties. Sensitivity analysis has been carried out by changing benefit estimates. The results of the sensitivity analysis are given below. The results indicate that all the project options have a high economic rate of return.
Table 8. Results of Sensitivity Analysis – (Nazareth -Assela) (IRR in % and NPV in Million Birr) Scenario AC Option IRR NPV Base case 49.2 1543.7 Benefit decrease by 20% 43.3 1194.6
Table 9. Results of Sensitivity Analysis – (Wereta -Gob Gob) (IRR in % and NPV in Million Birr) Scenario AC Option IRR NPV Base case 25.2 675.5 Benefit decrease by 20% 20.9 464.9
Table 10. Results of Sensitivity Analysis – (Adigrat –Adi Abun-Adwa) (IRR in % and NPV in Million Birr) Scenario AC Option IRR NPV Base case 18.6 514.4 Benefit decrease by 20% 16.2 336.7
Table 11. Results of Sensitivity Analysis – (Nekempte – Mekenajo) (IRR in % and NPV in Million Birr) Scenario AC Option IRR NPV Base case 24.4 719.7 Benefit decrease by 20% 20.3 485.5
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Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes
(i) Task Team Members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending
Supervision/ICR Tafesse Freminatos Abrham Financial Management Specialist AFTFM Tesfaye Ayele Procurement Specialist AFTPC George A. Banjo Sr Transport. Spec. ECSS5 Anil S. Bhandari Sr Adviser AFTTR Edeltraut Gilgan-Hunt Environmental Spec. AFTEN Yeshi Gizaw Program Assistant AFCE3 Roger Gorham Transport. Economist AFTTR Samuel Haile Selassie Senior Procurement Specialist EAPPR John L. Hine Consultant SASDT Jose Luis Irigoyen Senior Manager AFTSN Mesfin Wodajo Jijo Sr Transport. Spec. SASDT Yoshimichi Kawasumi Sr Highway Engineer AFTTR Farida Khan Operations Analyst AFTTR V. S. Krishnakumar Manager AFTPC Ajay Kumar Lead Transport Economist AFTTR Antoine V. Lema Senior Social Development Spec AFTCS Negede Lewi Sr Highway Engineer AFTTR Mirafe Marcos Economist AFTP2 Richard Olowo Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPC C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Sector Manager AFTTR John D. Riverson Consultant ETWTR Mercy Mataro Sabai Sr Financial Management Specialist AFTFM Eshetu Yimer Sr Financial Management Specialist AFTFM
(b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) USD Thousands (including Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY00 3 4.61 FY01 6 30.08 FY02 21 120.78 FY03 43 188.57
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FY04 0.00 FY05 0.00 FY06 0.00 FY07 0.00 FY08 0.00
Total: 73 344.04 Supervision/ICR FY00 0.00 FY01 0.00 FY02 0.00 FY03 0.00 FY04 50 148.96 FY05 32 117.46 FY06 33 98.04 FY07 27 85.21 FY08 22 118.51 FY09 27 0.00
Total: 191 568.18
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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results
Not applicable
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Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results
Not applicable
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Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR
1. General
In 1997, the challenges facing the roads sector in Ethiopia were immense. The total road network was only 26,550 km, of which over half was in a poor condition. Only 22% of the network at that time was in a good and serviceable condition, finances were scarce and maintenance was all but neglected.
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) set out a clear strategic direction for the restoration and expansion of Ethiopia’s road network under the Road Sector Development Program (RSDP). The first 5-year phase of the RSDP, known as RSDP-I, was officially launched in September 1997 with the major portion of the finance provided by the World Bank, EU and the Government of Ethiopia. RSDP-I ended in June 2002. The second phase, RSDP II, stretched over the period July 2002 to June 2007. The third phase, RSDP III, commenced in July 2007 for a period of 3 years.
Under the RSDP priority construction and rehabilitation of the road network was undertaken and coupled with actions and reforms that would improve both road management and road maintenance. At the same time efforts were made to strengthen the capacity of the domestic road construction industry (DCI).
During the period of the RSDP the total road network has grown by some 20,262 km to 46,812, an average annual growth of 8%, of which 54% is now in a good and serviceable condition. The Road Fund now supports routine and periodic maintenance works and a whole series of policy and institutional reforms have been realized that bring with them an improved efficiency and effectiveness to the sector.
The World Bank has remained an important development partner during the execution of the RSDP through its significant financial support and its contribution to knowledge learning and sharing in the sector. The experience shared by the institution and its experts has made a significant contribution towards a better understanding, meeting the challenges of the sector and delivering the RSDP.
Performance of RSDP (physical work excluding community roads)
Financial Phases of the Physical (in km) (in million Birr) % % program Budget Disb. Plan Acco. RSDP I (Five 9,812.9 7,285 74 8,908 8,709 98 Years) RSDP II (Five 15,985.9 18,112.9 113 8,486 12,007 142 Years)
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RSDP III (Two 20,863 19,930.1 96 14,314 17,277 121 Years) Total (Twelve 46,661.8 45,327.4 97 31,708 37,994 120 Years)
Donor support to the RSDP implementation amounts to around 31%, of the requirement. The contribution through the International Development Association (IDA), alone, has been significant, amounting to 14.2% of the total requirement.
This Credit Closing and Implementation Completion Report presents an assessment of the achievements of the project objectives and identification of important lessons learned during the implementation process.
The report captures an assessment of Borrower’s and Bank’s performance, the physical accomplishment to date and an analysis of project costs by component that gives the actual costs to date compared to appraisal estimates (Loan Utilization). The report further summarizes key performance indicators and results, along with assessment of the performance of the key actors. Emphasis is given to the Environmental and Social Impact of road projects, along with identification of any major factors affecting implementation and any lessons learned.
Part II of the report gives detailed information on Performance Indicators, the Ethiopian Rural Travel and Transport Program, Safeguards, the Transport Poverty Observatory and finally an analysis of the project costs.
2. Assessing Objectives of the Project
2.1 The Objectives
The objective of the APL I were set out as follows. To:-
(i) Construct, rehabilitate, upgrade and preserve the priority federal road network. (ii) Strengthen the ERA reform program with a focus on:- - creating a more commercially oriented ERA through upgrading systems and procedures; - creating commercially oriented District Maintenance Organizations which can deliver cost effective maintenance services; - strengthening Regional Road Organizations; and - developing a coherent planning and programming approach based on network stabilization program, in which federal and regional agencies formulate common methodologies for allocation of available resources.
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(iii) Improve resource mobilization, allocation and use for road maintenance and strengthen the Office of the Road Fund.
(iv) Develop capacity in program implementation with a specific focus on:- - enhancing the capacity in road construction and maintenance by creating an enabling environment for participation of domestic private contractors and exploring feasibility and option for private sector participation, - reducing adverse effects of road works on road safety and the environment by incorporating mitigating measures during design and implementation stages, - promoting use of labor – intensive technology and ensuring community participation in building and maintaining regional and community roads, - planning for the provision of integrated community – based village travel and transport infrastructure and services, and - conducting monitoring and evaluation studies on the poverty alleviation and environment of investments in the sector.
2.2 Assessment of Objectives
Objective I Under APL I 513.1 km of main asphalt and gravel roads have been upgraded, rehabilitated or constructed. This has contributed to an overall improvement in the proportion of asphalt roads in good condition from 17% (1997) to 70% (2009) and for gravel roads from 25% (1997) to 54% (2009).
Objective II This component was mainly supported by DfID and Government of Ethiopia. IDA provided backstopping support for short term experts and significant feedback on strategic issues related to the whole ERA reform package. ERA’s District Maintenance Organizations were divided into two functional units, assuming the role of the client and service provider. As a result own force maintenance is provided through commercial principles under a pre – agreed Internal Service Level Agreement. Both units are now ready to separate from the regulatory body of ERA when a decision is taken on the implementation of the Business Process Re – engineering of ERA.
Government has provided significant support to assist the reform process and provide institutional upgrading in the regional/rural road authorities (RRAs) of the four emerging regions, namely Somali, Benishangul–Gumuz, Gambella and Afar. Guidelines were provided on Network Planning and Contract Management and a number of associated training events for regional staff were conducted. Importantly, four senior engineers were assigned to work with each RRA for a period of over 18 months. These engineers were tasked with providing RRA staff on-the-job training and to transfer skills in nine priority areas: (i) Construction projects planning (ii) Microsoft project application in project planning,
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(iii) Contract formulation and procurement, (iv) Labour-based contracts administration, (v) Computer application in road design, (vi) Works contracts administration, (vii) Design and supervision contacts administration, (viii) Claims assessment and management in works contracts, and (ix) Construction project monitoring and control.
Objective III Two important studies were undertaken as part of APL I to identify improved resource mobilization for road maintenance funding and to strengthen the administration of the road fund. These were: i. A study of Road Financing in Ethiopia providing a main report and three manuals on, Road Fund Procedures, Evaluation and Assessment of Fund Utilization to Work Done and Financial Recording Systems; and
ii. Establishment of Technical and Financial Auditing of the Road Fund
Objective IV APL I made provision for the exclusive participation of local contractors in asphalt road works. Contracts, which are now substantially completed, were awarded to two local contractors for asphalt road construction works. These local contractors have managed to build up their capacity, improve turn-over (to an estimated ETB500 million) and can compete effectively on the local market
APL I provided sufficient funds to undertake training of personnel and to provide technical assistance (TA) services to support ERA in areas of project planning and implementation. More than 15 key staff and senior professionals undertook post-graduate MSc training in UK and the Netherlands on Construction Management, Transport Planning, Procurement, Structural and Highway Engineering, Construction Law and Environmental Management.
SMEC Int. Ltd. of Australia was engaged in a 3 year technical assistance programme to provide additional support on contract administration, planning and design. This support also provided a series of guidance manuals on: . Planning and Procurement . Environmental Management and Road Safety . Contract Administration . Claims Avoidance and Dispute Handling . Human Resource Development
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Over 2000 participant training-days were provided through more than 60 courses. These course included delivery of ‘Training for Trainers’ courses for a number of selected and experienced staff.
To strengthen regional and wereda planning for integrated community – based village travel and transport infrastructure and services APL I supported provision of transport to 8 Districts and 8 Regional Road Authorities. APL I also supported development of an Information, Education and Communication (IEC) strategy to promote wider implementation of the Ethiopian Rural Travel and Transport Program. APL I also assisted with the development of a District Capacity Building Strategy and supported provision of over 70 Wereda Integrated Development Studies throughout the country.
APL I also introduced a Transport Poverty Observatory (TPO) study that is aimed at assessing and measuring the poverty alleviation impacts of road and road transport interventions in Ethiopia. Under this initiative poverty surveys and data collection was undertaken in 2007 & 2008 on four road corridors for collation and comparison to 2005 baseline information. The poverty impact assessment uses three indicators groups, based on (i) Transport operation output indicators, (ii) Transport operation outcome indicators, and (iii) Welfare or living standard outcome indicators. The third year survey is underway and the service will continue until 2012.
In developing and enhancing capacity in the sector, APL I has benefited the local industry and provided vital road infrastructure in parallel with important capacity building initiatives that have supported the federal, regional and local management agencies. Road safety systems and the needs of the environment have been integrated and addressed in the design and construction process. Importantly, planning systems for sustainable community infrastructure have been tested and rolled out and monitoring and evaluation programmes have been implemented that will allow a better understanding of the poverty alleviation impacts of investments in the sector. Most importantly, all of the components of the APL I have been delivered and are integrated in revised and improved working practices across the sector.
3. Description of Projects and Implementation Assessment
3.1 General IDA Grant No. H0490 ET includes 5 civil works contracts providing rehabilitation, upgrading and construction of 512.2 km of trunk and link Roads along with their respective supervision contracts. In addition there are five components providing technical assistance and studies. The IDA financed construction contracts/projects and the technical assistance and studies are as listed below:
1. Nazareth – Assela Rehabilitation of Federal Trunk Road (79 km) 2. Nekempt – Mekenajo Upgrading of Trunk Road (127 km) 3. Wereta – Gob Gob Rehabilitation of Link Road (98.9 km)
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4. Adigrat – Adwa Rehabilitation of Link Road (108 km) 5. Dera – Magna Construction of Link Road (99.3) 6. Construction supervision for the above civil works 7. Ethiopian Rural Travel and Transport Program 8. Technical Assistance to ERA in project planning and implementation and strengthening of associated social actions 9. Road financing study, technical audit and annual Road Fund maintenance financing 10. Preparatory activities and urban studies
The report discusses the status of the APL I road projects that were financed through the IDA (Grant. No. H0490 - ET). The Nazereth – Assela, Nekempt – Mekenajo, Adigrat – Adi Abun and Dera – Magna projects have been completed. The Woreta – Km 49 and Km 49 – Gob Gob roads have been substantially completed; more than 96% at the end of March 2010. The delay in completion was due to the landslide problems incurred on some stretches. The five technical assistance and study components of the APL I are all complete.
The details of implementation status of each project component of APL I are presented in the sections below.
3.2 Engineering Design and Environmental Impact Assessment Africon of South Africa were appointed by ERA to undertake the design reviews and the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) studies for the road works projects that were designed by different Consultants.
3.3 Rehabilitation of Trunk Roads
3.3.1 Rehabilitation of Nazareth – Assela (79km)
General The project road is situated in the southern part of Ethiopia, starting at Nazareth, in Oromiya regional state, approximately 98 km southeast of the capital city, Addis Ababa. The road passes through five towns en route, namely Awash Melkassa, Dera, Iteya, Gonde and Kulumsa before terminating at the southern end of Assela town. The original riding surface was paved with a 7m carriageway and 1.5m shoulder. The road was in a fair to poor condition.
Basic data Funding: IDA/GoE Employer/Contracting Authority: ERA Commencement Date: 23 August 2004 Completion Date: 22 February 2008 Original Contract Price: ETB 177,338,107.65 Revised Contract Price: ETB 198,589,871.67
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The supervision of the works was awarded with a contract amount of USD 315,700 & ETB 4.334 million.
The project was completed on February 11, 2008. All the outstanding works were completed within the defect liability period and the defect liability certificate was issued by the Engineer on June 1, 2009.
Main Factors Affecting Contract Performance
. Contract specification problems for the AC wearing course . Design problem which resulted in flooding at km 3 – 5
3.4 Upgrading of Trunk Roads
3.4.1 Nekempt – Mekenajo (127 km)
General The road is located in the western part of Ethiopia, entirely situated in the Oromiya region, at a distance of 330 km from Addis Ababa. The route is situated at the heart of a coffee producing area, and is also a potential area for mining, mainly marble and gold, all of which are essential sources of foreign exchange earnings for the country. The area also experiences surplus production of cereals and grain for domestic needs. The road links two major towns Nekempte and Gimbi and also connects five villages and towns enroute. The project was upgraded from an existing gravel road to an asphalt concrete surface, with a 7.0 m wide carriageway and 1.5 m shoulders.
Basic Data Funding: IDA/GoE Employer/Contracting Authority: ERA Commencement Date: 25 August 2004 Original Completion Date: 24 February 2008 Revised Completion Date: 27 December 2008 Original Contract Price: ETB 300,723,746.00 Revised Contract Price: ETB 518,453,396.25
The supervision work was awarded on August 25, 2004 at an original contract price of USD 529,400 and ETB 5.914 million and an original completion date of February 25, 2008.
The project was completed on December 27, 2009. Almost all outstanding issues have been settled. A defect liability certificate will be issued soon.
Main Factors Affecting Contract Performance . Delay in removal of obstructions, i.e., late possession of site . Design problems resulting in modifications and the issuance of variations . The project was subject to adverse climatic conditions . Consultant’s poor handling of claims, resulting in additional dispute costs
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3.5 Upgrading of Link Roads There are two road projects under the civil works of rehabilitation of federal link roads; Wereda – Gob Gob (98.9km) and Adigrat – Adi Abun (108km). The detailed status of each project is presented as follow.
3.5.1. Wereta – Gob Gob (98.9 km)
General The road, entirely in the Amhara region, commences from the western end of the town of Wereda and terminates at Gob Gob, a small settlement on the road leading to Woldiya. This 98.9 km section is part of the Wereda – Woldiya road upgrading project that covers a total length of about 293 km. The road is of high socio–economic importance and serves as a major traffic collector, traversing difficult terrain between the Wollo and Gondar sub–regions. The road is classified as a major link road, and was a fully engineered gravel surface road, originally constructed between 1977 and 1983, and later regravelled as part of the ERRP. The mountainous nature of the area caused rapid and severe erosion and surface wear. The road was recommended for upgrading from gravel to a double bituminous surface treatment with carriageway width of 7m and 1.5m wide shoulders.
This project consists of two sections; Wereda – 49km and 49km – Gob Gob. The status of each section is presented as follows;
3.5.1.1 Wereda – 49km
Basic Data Funding: IDA/GoE Employer/Contracting Authority: ERA Commencement Date: 24 April 2006 Original Completion Date: 23 April 2009 Revised Completion Date: 19 December 2009 Original Contract Price: ETB 169,069,040.05 Revised Contract Price: ETB 229,153,109.91
The supervision contract was awarded on 12 April, 2006 with contract price of ETB 7.503 million. The commencement and the original completion dates of the project were on April 24, 2006 and April 23, 2009 respectively.
The Project has been substantially completed i.e., 92% of the total work. The outstanding works will be completed before May 2010.
Main Factors Affecting Contract Performance . Resurveying and re-fixing of the survey reference. Re–design of the entire length of the road was mandatory due to missing benchmarks. . Alignment problems needing alignment adjustment.
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. Landslide hazards at km 31+850 – 31+960. . Change in the surfacing type from DBST to AC.
3.5.1.2 49km – Gob Gob Basic Data Funding: IDA/GoE Employer/Contracting Authority: ERA Commencement Date: 02 May 2006 Original Completion Date: 01 May 2009 Original Contract Price: ETB 200,038,395.63 Revised Contract Price: ETB 253,856,067.33
On April 12, 2006 the supervision contract was awarded with an original contract price ETB 8.067 million.
The Project has been substantially completed i.e., 85 percent of the total works. The remaining works will be completed by the end of June 2010.
Main Factors Affecting Contract Performance . Delay in mobilization of equipment. . Frequent breakdown of asphalt concrete equipment
3.5.2. Adigrat - Adi Abun
General The road is part of the Adigrat – Axum – Shire road that provides an important east – west link between the two primary North – South trunk roads in the northern region of Tigray. The mountainous terrain, which the road traverses, makes transportation difficult during the wet season. The road was a fully engineered gravel surface road with a carriageway width of 7m covering an underlying Telford base. The Telford base was exposed over some sections of the road in spite regravelling under the ERRP. The road was 50 – 60 years old and the pavement condition was fair to poor. It is classified as a major link road and was been recommended for upgrading from the existing gravel surface to an asphalt concrete surface.
Basic Data Funding: IDA/GoE Employer/Contracting Authority: ERA Commencement Date: 16 February 2005 Original Completion Date: 17 August 2008 Revised Completion Date: 28 August 2008 Original Contract Price: ETB 283,224,198.59 Revised Contract Price: ETB 333,496,443.00
The Consultancy service contract was awarded for a contract amount of GB 654,725 & ETB 4,742,643.
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The physical work of the project has been completed. A few disputed issues are under settlement.
Main Factors Affecting Contract Performance . Delay in mobilization, lack of permanent work and withdrawal of sub–contractors . The Contractor did not understand the role of the consultant which made the supervision difficult . The contractor mobilized without the consent of the Engineer and this made it difficult to follow up on the defect and environmental mitigation works.
3.6 Construction of Federal Link Roads
3.6.1 Dera – Magna (99.3km)
General The project is located in the central part of Ethiopia in the Oromiya region 124km from the capital. The road branches off at Dera town on the Nazareth - Assela trunk road, and runs in a northeasterly direction to connect to the Arbreketi – Mechara road.
Basic Data Funding: IDA/GoE Employer/Contracting Authority: ERA Commencement Date: 17 August 2004 Original Completion Date: 15 February 2008 Revised Completion Date: 7th June 2009 Original Contract Price: ETB 269,002,448.83 Revised Contract Price: ETB 146,212,273.09.
The Consultancy service contract was awarded at a contract amount of GBP 428.6 and ETB 4.198 million.
Following the start of construction in the severe escarpment section, KM.99+200 – 119+434 (Chole – Magna), construction was subsequently halted due to unforeseen ground condition. Following submission of preliminary and final reports by the Consultant, ERA approved the omission of this section from the contract. A variation order was approved for the accommodation of the omission, reducing length to 99.2 km, resulting in revised contract value of ETB 146,212,273.09.
The physical works have been completed. A few disputed issues are under settlement.
Main Factors Affecting Contract Performance . The contractor had no experience of working in Ethiopia and made an apparent underestimate of the individual unit rates. This resulted in site staff, attempting to construct at BoQ rates, which in many cases were apparently significantly below the actual cost of work. This resulted in cash flow difficulties and progress of the works. . Considerable delay in mobilization of the contractor’s staff and plant.
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. Realignment of the escarpment section km. 25+000 – 28+500 to improve vertical and horizontal alignments and reduce construction costs and time . Realignment of the escarpment section km.13+700 to remove potentially dangerous deep cuts in unstable terrain to accommodate designed retaining walls . Redesign of Kaleta Bridge due to anomalies in the original design and site location of the proposed replacement structure . Raising the road level km. 0+080-9+500 to accommodate drainage provisions . Increase in the provision of slab and pipe culverts through the alignment to accommodate storm water flow
3.7 Ethiopian Rural Travel Transport Program
3.7.1 Wereda Integrated Development Plans in 64 – Wereda
The objective of this component was to formulate Wereda Integrated Development Plans (WIDP) using the integrated rural development and accessibility planning framework of ERTTP. Development of the plans involves consultation and assessment that considers the overall development needs of the Wereda, Kebele and communities. The consultancy services were carried out by eight consultants working in 77 wereda. The study has resulted in preparation of a ten year Wereda Integrated Development Program that captures both transport and non- transport interventions to address community access problems. The cumulative status of the studies is summarized below.
Cumulative status of the Wereda Integrated Development Plans
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No. of Wereda Submitted Reports
Total Contract Amount Data Co. & Name of WIDP % Project Analysis consultant Before After Accomp. Split split ETB USD EURO Draft Final Draft Final
LOT - Techni Plan 1,863,100 480,140 8 8 8 8 8 8 100 1 LOT - PANAF 2,900,570 8 8 8 8 8 8 100 2 LOT - SPAN 2,562,040 317,000 8 12 12 12 12 12 100 3 LOT - CAL BRO 2,794,864 293,473 8 10 10 10 10 10 100 4 LOT - ICT 5,856,000 405,600 8 8 8 8 8 8 100 5 LOT - SELAM 6 DEVELOPMEN 8 13 13 13 13 13 100 T 3,224,200 LOT - ADDIS 8 9 9 9 9 9 100 7 ANTENEH 3,645,575 LOT - PANAF & AFRO 3,151,405 8 9 9 9 9 9 100 8 25,997,754 1,202,740 293,473 64 77 77 77 77 77 100
3.7.2 Information, Education and Communication (IEC) & Strategy Formulation & Action Plan Preparation for ERTTP
The objectives of this consultancy service were to: i) Develop an Information, Education and Communication (IEC) strategy that would facilitate wider acceptance of the objectives and approach of the ERTTP and to strengthen the rural development impact of ERTTP. ii) Preparing action plans for the ICE implementation.
The consultancy service has been completed successfully. See Attachment 2 for more details.
3.7.3 Consultancy Service for Capacity Building and Strategy Formulation for ERTTP
The objective of this consultancy service was to develop a capacity building strategy, action and capacity building guideline that would assist implementation of the ERTTP program at Federal, Regional, Wereda and Kebele levels. The consultancy service would produce a capacity building strategy, action plan for building capacities and guideline for capacity building. This service would also supply of IT equipment for the eight Regional / Rural Roads Authorities.
The consultancy service has been completed successfully. See Attachment 2 for more details.
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3.7.4 Database Integration Consultancy
The objective of this consultancy service was to create a standard system for the compilation and analysis of data collected under the Wereda Integrated Development Studies mentioned in 3.7.1 above. The system was expected to be able to allow the aggregation of all the data collected into one data set for wider analysis.
The consultancy service has been completed. See Attachment 2 for more details.
3. 8 Technical assistance to ERA in project planning and implementation, and strengthening of associated social actions
3.8.1 ERA Capacity Building
The objective of this service was to provide technical assistance to ERA for improved project planning and procurement, review of engineering design, administration of contracts, claims avoidance & dispute handling and human resource development. The technical assistance was completed successfully and additional arrangements were made to handover all training materials to the University of Addis Ababa for incorporation into undergraduate and postgraduate training courses.
3.8.2 Transport and Poverty Observatory
The Transport and Poverty Observatory study monitors poverty impacts and changes realized as a result of road transport investment on a sample of the road network. The study follows on from an earlier consultancy that established a series of baseline data and monitoring indicators The sample road corridors are Alemgena – Butajira - Sodo (308 km), Dera - Mechara (240 km), Woreta - Woldiya (300 km), and Assosa - Guba (240 km).
In addition to the Baseline and Annual Survey reports the study generates annual Monitoring Indicators reports. A set of 35 monitoring indicators are tracked, comprising largely of 10 direct and 25 indirect indicators. These reflect and track impacts on the growth of the local economy, its diversification and the socio-economic welfare of the people.
The contract agreement for the consultancy service was signed on February 19, 2007. The study is on-going and it is on the third year of performance monitoring. The service will continue until 2012. See Attachment 4 for the detailed findings.
3.9 Road Financing Study and Technical Audits
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This component provides support to the office of the Office of the Road Fund (ORF) with the aim of establishing technical and financial auditing systems and procedures. It also supports the auditing of operations financed by the Road Fund including outsourcing of these services. The Road Fund follows the technical audit systems and procedures developed and uses the findings as a basis for determining annual allocations of the Road Fund resources to Road Agencies. The component also supports the day to day activities and operations of the office. The study has been completed and all documents were submitted to the Road Fund.
3.10 Preparation Activities and Urban Studies
This component has provided consultancy services for preparation of follow up activities. These have included feasibility, and EIA studies, as well as, design and/or design review for road projects that are included in APL stages III. This component has also included support to the Addis Ababa City Government for the preparation of an urban transport strategy and policy document. This intervention has a longer term vision to address access and mobility constraints, and development of a pilot project. Studies have been completed and all documents provided to the Addis Ababa City Transport Authority, Municipalities, Addis Ababa City Road Authority and Ministry of Transport & Communications.
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4. Key Performance Indicators and Results Status of agreed outcomes indicators: Indicators Measurement Insert the measured value, or a qualitative indicator, or a brief explanation of why indicators are not available, together with the date of the information Baseline Value Progress To Date End-of-Project Target Value Number or text Date Number or text Date Number or text Date PDO Indicator DO1. Construct, (a) 30.8 km/1000 sq 05/19/2003 (a)42.6 km/1000 Dec. (a) 35 km/1000 June 30/09 rehabilitate, km. sq. km. 31/09 sq km. upgrade and (b) (i) Good asphalt (b) Road Condition - (b) Road preserve the road roads - 35%; (ii) (i) 70%; (ii) 54%; Condition: (i) network. Good gravel roads - (iii) 50% (b) Road 57%; (ii) 42%; 30%; (iii) Good rural Km. of roads Density Index (iii) 40%. (b) constructed / roads - 28%. 42.6/1000 sq. km Road Density: 35 rehabilitated / (c) Average Distance restored to all weather roads - km/1000 sq. km. 11.8 km (c) Average Distance to all weather roads reduced to 14km. DO2. Improve RF revenue = ETB 05/19/2003 RF Revenue = ETB Dec. RF revenue = ETB mobilization and 258.2 million 1,094 mil. (equiv. to 31/09 1,075 million use of resources US$95.1 mil.) for road collected in the FY maintenance. 2008 ending July 2008 (assuming 1US$ = 11.5) DO3. Develop 28% 05/19/2003 38% Dec. 90% capacity in private 31/09 sector. ( Value of contracts awarded to domestic contractors) DO4. Strengthen DMOs operations 05/19/2003 ERA DMOs operate Dec. (a) 01/01/04 (b) June 30/09 ERA reform under ERA as force as Cost Centers 31/09 07/31/05 (c) program. account units since June 2004, but 07/13/06 (d) 30 (ERA District not as profit center. road sector staff in Maintenance The tentative plan different fields operations for corporatization of commercialized, and DMOs is December staff capacity 2010. enhanced. (a) DMOs as cost centers; (b) Profit Centers; (c) Commercial Centers; (d) Training)
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Intermediate outcome indicator(s) 1. Improved road 17 km. 05/19/2003 11.8 km Dec. 31/09 14km. June access in rural 30/09 areas. (Average Distance to all weather roads) 3. (a) Reduction 2002 (a) Freight - 05/19/2003 2007/08 (a) Dec. 31/09 (a) Freight - June in freight & Birr/ton/km 0.26: Freight - Birr/ton/km – 30/09 passenger tariff (b) Passenger - Birr/km Birr/ton/km 1.08 NA* (b) Average Reduction in 0.09 (b) Heavy goods (0.58)*; Passenger - travel time travel time (c) vehicle 3.22 Min/km Birr/km reduction 15 % (c) Reduction in (c) VOC (index) 0.12(0.06)* (b) Vehicle Operating vehicle operating 139.77 Average travel time Cost – NA* cost reduced by about 5% to 10% on paved roads (c) VOC (index) 297(159.4)*for year 2007/08
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5. Assessment of Costs
*Cost at Original Cost at Appraisal Contract Completion Project Components (in million Amount (in (in million ETB) million ETB) ETB) Component I Rehabilitation & Upgrading of Federal Roads Nekempt – Mekanejo URP 367.8 300.7 523.9 Nazereth – Assela RRP 203.2 177.3 280.2 Wereta – Gob Gob URP 251.4 369.2 553.4 Adigrat – Adi Abun URP 257.3 283.2 580.4 Sub- total 1079.7 1130.4 1937.9 Component II Construction of Federal/Link Road Dera –Magna CRP 301.1 269.0 250.5 Component III Construction Supervision for all Civil works 104.4 63.5 60.7 under APL I Component IV ERTTP (WIDP) preparation &support the institutional arrangements for establishment of 83.6 40.7 35.0 ERRTP Component V TA Services for ERA 46.8 26.4 38.9 Component VI Road Financing Study & Technical Audits 4.0 13.2** 10.4** Component VII Preparatory Activities to Support APL II & III 34.2 12.8 17.4 Grand total 1653.8 1556.0 2350.8
*Exchange rate used US$1= ETB 8.75 - available at the time of appraisal ** Training component is included.
The total project cost for the entire project components under APL I was ETB 1653.8 million at the time of appraisal. At completion this cost has increased to ETB 2350.8 million. For the civil works (rehabilitation and upgrading of federal/link roads) the reasons for the cost increase are summarized as follows: The final completion cost of upgrading the Nekemept – Mekanejo Road was ETB 523.9 million. Delays and problems with the original designs explain the cost increases at appraisal rising by 42 percent and from the original contract amount rising by 74 percent.
The final completion cost of upgrading the Wereta – Gob Gob Road was ETB 553.4 million. Changes of pavement type from DBST to AC due to traffic levels increasing
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significantly, design modifications and substantial increases in design quantities explain the cost increases at appraisal rising by 50 percent and from the original contract amount rising by 120 percent.
The final completion cost of upgrading the Adigrat – Adi Abun Road was ETB580.4 million. Widening of the road in three towns sections, provision of dual carriageway for Adwa and Adigrat towns and mobilization delays explain the cost increases at appraisal rising by 105 percent and from the original contract amount rising by 126 percent.
The final completion cost of the Nazereth – Assela Road was ETB 280.2 million. Contract specification problems, flooding on a 2 km section and additional works to construct vehicular access and DST asphalt parking lanes explain the cost increases at appraisal rising by 38 percent and from the original contract amount rising by 58 percent.
Construction of Dera – Magna Road showed a reduction in its final completion cost as compared to cost at appraisal and original contact agreement. The major reason for the reduction was the omission of Chole – Magna section (about 20 km) due to instability of the escarpment sections and geometric design problems.
Other components except road financing study and technical audits have also a reduction in their final cost as compared to cost at appraisal. The completion cost for road financing study and technical audits component increased from appraisal by 160 percent due to inclusion of the training component after the appraisal.
These factors have increased the overall cost at appraisal of the APL I project components by about 42 percent.
6. Assessment of Beneficiaries
Traffic has grown significantly on all of the rehabilitated and upgraded projects under APL I. There has been substantial traffic growth in public and goods transport services indicating improved mobility of people and the availability of transport for agricultural and industrial inputs. Movement of consumer goods to and/or from the affected areas has also increased considerably.
The targeted groups who have benefited through implementation of the APL I and RDSP include; . Road users (Pedestrians, IMT/NMV users, motorized road users, non–transport structure/services beneficiaries), who has benefited through improved in road surfaces, availability of all weather roads and better road safety; . Producers and Consumers, in the transport of goods to the local markets and environmental protection. . The Domestic Construction Industry, through enhanced opportunities to participate in business opportunities; . Federal, Regional and Local Road agencies, through improved management practice, and
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. Ministry of Finance and Economic development and the Road Fund Office, through greater efficiency in the use of resources and reduced demands placed on the national budget for road development and maintenance.
7 Impact of Intervention on Mobility
An assessment of traffic along the main roads has revealed a rapid increase in volume of traffic. The rate of traffic growth is on average about 9 percent per annum, even where improvement works have not yet been completed under the RSDP. The traffic growth in all rehabilitated and upgraded projects under APL I has significantly increased. The following table shows the comparison of volume of traffic before and after the intervention of the road projects under APL I program.
APL 1 Roads Traffic Growth Rate
Truck & No. Direction Year Cars Buses Trucks Trailer Total 2003 AADT 273 408 635 66 1382 1 Nazareth - Assela AADT 651 783 878 262 2574 2008 % Growth 138 92 38 297 86 2003 AADT 45 52 138 34 269 2 Adigrat – Adi Abun AADT 62 112 207 53 434 2008 % Growth 38 115 50 56 61 2003 AADT 29 24 157 8 218 3 Nekempte - Mekenajo AADT 70 120 293 30 513 2008 % Growth 141 400 87 275 135 2003 AADT 54 24 110 71 259
4 Wereda – Gob Gob AADT 91 66 180 62 399 2008
% Growth 69 175 64 -13 54
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After the intervention, the volume of traffic in each major vehicle category on the roads substantially increased. In most cases, the traffic movement for buses and truck with trailer has shown a very significant increase. Movement of cars has also increased significantly, particularly along the Nazereth – Assela and Nekempt – Mekanejo roads. The slight reduction of traffic movement observed along Wereda – Gob Gob route for truck and trailer occurred because the route was under construction in 2008 when it was difficult for trucks with trailer to use the detour. In general, the volume of traffic has grown and it indicates that the movement of people and goods has considerably increased along all roads under the APL I program.
8. Assessment of Borrower and Bank Performance
8.1 Borrower
The Government of Ethiopia
The road rehabilitation project was initiated by the Government of Ethiopia through the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development which requested about US$ 181 million from IDA to support the implementation of the second phase of the Road Sector Development Program. Accordingly, the IDA Grant No. H0490 was signed with an amount of US$ 126.8 million between IDA & the Government of Ethiopia on August 27, 2003; and the grant was finally declared effective on November 14, 2003 after the fulfillment of all of the conditions of effectiveness. The Government’s commitment in meeting its counterpart funds and overall coordination was exemplary as proved from time to time by the IDA supervision mission.
Implementing Agency
The Ethiopian Roads Authority, the legal authorized agency of the Government, responsible for management of the country's roads, was the Implementing Agency. For the purposes of the project, ERA opened and maintained in dollars a special deposit Bank account (IDA USD A/C No 02615/013146/00) in the National Bank of Ethiopia on terms and conditions satisfactory to the IDA,
During the project implementation period, ERA assigned suitable counterpart staff to assist with management and implementation of each component of the project. These staff followed the project works and ensured that the projects were carried out according to the design and the agreement made between ERA and the Contractors. The quality and the quantity of the works performed by contractors and consultants were approved and certified by ERA’s Contract Construction Implementation Division. Accordingly, ERA's Finance Division, with the approval of IDA had withdrawn the required amount from the Grant Account, and payment was effected on time to the Contractors and Consultants for their specific services rendered to the project.
During execution of the project, quarterly progress reports were prepared by ERA’s Planning and Programming Division and these were sent to IDA regularly. In order to prevent or reduce
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problems being encountered during the execution of the project, ERA would conduct regular meetings with contractors, supervising and project consultants as well as delegation from the Bank. In addition, ERA evaluated and approved work schedules and performance, material delivery schedules, on site availability programs for major construction equipment, projected cash flows, project organization charts and staffing plans that were prepared by the contractors to ensure practicability and effective utilization of resources.
During the course of implementation, all of the project components were regularly inspected by ERA and IDA staff and subsequent discussions would be held with the contractors and supervising consultants.
8. 2 The World Bank
Lending
The Bank has been supporting the primary objective of the road program which is to restore and expand Ethiopia’s road network, reduce poverty and increase employment through promoting socially and environmentally sustainable growth and access. Accordingly, IDA agreed to grant to the Government of Ethiopia, an amount of USD 126.80 million for investment under the second phase of the road sector development program. The grant covered primarily i) the rehabilitation and upgrading of priority Federal Roads, ii) rehabilitation and construction of priority Federal Link roads, and iii) the implementation of the Ethiopian Rural Travel & Transport Program, along with technical assistance support to ERA and the Addis Ababa Transport Authority.
Supervision
The Bank’s team continuously and closely monitored the execution of the various APL I projects. The team focused on the implementation of the projects, adequacy of the Bank and Government input for implementation, project restructuring, and the financial status and claims.
During the implementation period supervision missions of the World Bank would undertake field visits to inspect ongoing and completed works on the road projects and would also carry out effective supervision on all of the other project components. The reports of the supervision missions, i.e. submitted by the Task Team Leader to ERA, reflected their thorough assessment; and the aid memoirs provided detailed advice for improving the performance and correcting any short-comings. The missions rated as satisfactory progress of the projects toward meeting the development objectives and moderately satisfactory the implementation progress and the project management.
9. Implementation of Safeguards
Following the Ethiopian Roads Authority’s full commitment an independent Environmental Unit was established within its structure in order to mainstream environmental issues in road infrastructure planning and implementation. Key activities undertaken as new initiatives in the course of APL I implementation (detail is attached to part II of this report as Attachment 3) include the following:
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(i) Mainstreaming HIV/AIDS prevention and control activities at the work places of ERA. Noticeable is the inclusion of separate costs for the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS activities at road construction projects which was started for the first time in APL I road projects. The implementations of the prevention activities were regularly monitored by independent personnel recruited only for HIV/AIDS prevention and control activities. This practice has been extended to all ERA Projects under RSDP.
(ii) Inclusion of sociologists and environmentalists as permanent staff in construction supervision team. This practice started for the first time on APL I road projects and is now extended to all projects.
(iii) Development of Report Formats. To follow up the implementation of ROW Management, HIV/AIDS prevention and control activities, specific reporting formats were developed with the World Bank and as part of a quarterly reporting regime.
10. Lessons Learned
In the course of implementing the APL I road projects, ERA has learned many important lessons, some of the most important, summarized below:
(i) Availability of quality design is crucial for timely delivery of the road and to avoid incurring unnecessary additional costs at construction. (ii) Close follow up is required for the mobilization of contractors’ major resources within the stipulated mobilization period. Late mobilization of resources by contractors affects the performance of the projects, causes delay and prevents timely delivery of the project. (iii) Availability of advisory input to properly handle claims and disputes is necessary. (iv) Timely removal of right of way obstructions should be considered as a priority measure to prevent delays and to minimize the claims. (v) The preparation of Resettlement Action Plans was first started during the appraisal of APL I road projects. This has brought a new idea of identifying the exact PAPs and calculating affected properties at its replacement costs, which left the PAPs much better off. (vi) The inclusion of environmentalists and sociologists in the supervision teams has helped to provide opportunities to update works contracts with stronger socio-environmental clauses. (vii) ERA has clearly understood that carrying EIA study alone cannot bring about the required results unless key recommendations are captured as items in the BOQ of the works contract. (viii) Preparing site specific Environmental Management Plans improves the quality of monitoring and environmental performance. (ix) The 2002 ERA technical specifications lack key environmental clauses. Important clauses have been modified for incorporation in future projects.
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Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders
(No comments were received by donor partners)
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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents
1. Aide Memoire – Identification Mission, June 2001 2. Aide Memoire – Preparation Mission, March 2002 3. Aide Memoire – Appraisal Mission, March/April 2003 4. Aide Memoire – Implementation Support Mission, March/April 2004 5. Aide Memoire – Implementation Support Mission Activities, July/December 2004 6. Aide Memoire – Implementation Support Mission Activities, December 2004/ June 2005 7. Aide Memoire – Implementation Support Mission Activities, June/November 2005 8. Aide Memoire – Mid-Term Review Mission, May 2006 9. Aide Memoire – Implementation Support Mission, November 2006 10. Aide Memoire – Executive Summary, October/November 2007 11. Aide Memoire – Supervision Mission, April/May 2008 12. Aide Memoire – Supervision Mission, October/November 2008 13. Aide Memoire – Supervision Mission, April/May 2009 14. Aide Memoire – Supervision Mission, October 2009 15. Findings report on RSDP performance MDG transport indicators, W.T. Consult, April 2010. 16. Signed Minutes of Negotiated Draft Works Contract – Adigrat-Adwa/Adi Abun Civil Works Contract 17. Project Appraisal Document, May 19, 2003 18. QAG Report, August 2003 19. RSDPSP ICR, November 2005 20. Independent Review and Assessment on Status of the Processing Stages of Ethiopia’s Road Sector – APL Program APL1, 2, and 3- October 2008 21. RSDP Performance: 12 year assessment, ERA. 22. Ethiopia Public Finance Review, March 2009, World Bank 23. Ethiopia Country Assistance Strategy, 2008. World Bank 24. Ethiopia: Building on Progress. A Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP), 2006.
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Annex 10. Ex Poste Assessment of Ex Ante Risk Analysis
1. This annex provides an analysis of the specific risks associated with the project by the appraisal team.
2. The Government of Ethiopia (GOE) budget and Road Fund levels may not be kept high enough to meet the road maintenance needs (M). In practice, it is difficult to assess this risk, because there is little effort (and perhaps little capacity) in Ethiopia to continuously assess road maintenance needs on a rolling basis. Road maintenance funding is generally assessed in relation to revenues available (or likely to be available) rather than a detailed needs assessment per se. Project and the Ethiopia Road Authority (ERA) staff think that maintenance expenditures are meeting about 60 percent of needs, but nobody is really sure. While the project did carry out a maintenance needs assessment for the period 2005-2010 (and an update is just getting underway funded under the Adaptable Program Loan (APL4)), the results of this study were not subsequently evaluated against available revenues. Nevertheless, given the size and rate of growth of the Federal network, it is likely that a moderate rating was understated.
3. Annual road maintenance program may not be implemented as scheduled (M). Following the road maintenance study of 2005, an implementation plan or program, was not developed. Rather, maintenance needs tend to be articulated with respect to funding available. This risk as articulated made an assumption that there would be a maintenance program to be implemented.
Contractor claims may not be settled on time (M) 4. This risk was probably rightly assessed at the time of appraisal. Evidence suggests that ERA's contract management practices in general have been improving; while a specific indicator on claims has not been tracked, it is likely that claims settlement time would improve as other aspects of contract management improves as well.
5. Private sector may not show much interest (M)
6. Domestic contractors may not be willing to bid for available work (M).
7. In retrospect, this risk turns out to have been negligible, and probably not particularly relevant, because the supply of work is plentiful relative to the size of the domestic industry. Disbursements to domestic contractors has increased from 4.7 percent of all road construction disbursements in 1998, to 31.5 percent in 2009, and the proportion of contracts captured by domestic contractors increased from 5.1 percent in 1999 to 17.6 percent in 2009. Currently, about 27 percent of funds disbursed to private contractors for road construction go to domestic firms.
Further investments may not have an impact on poverty alleviation (S). 8. The risk matrix under the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) rated this risk as substantial. But the "mitigation" measures proposed consist primarily on developing indicators and mechanisms to monitor project impacts, including the Transport Poverty Observatory. In
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other words, there were no real mechanisms put in place to ensure that future investments actually do have an impact on poverty alleviation, merely that the effects be monitored.
9. That said, the preliminary results from the Trade Promotion Organizations (TPO) (baseline and first follow-on survey) seem to provide some limited evidence that the road investments are having a positive impact on poverty alleviation. The number of households in the project areas with tin rather than thatched roofs (a measure of wealth) increased by about 10 percent over three years, the daily travel distance and time spent traveling by women in the project areas declined from the baseline, and the number of schools in the area of the road corridors under study increased by 227 percent.
10. Material and human resources in implementing agencies may not be available and capacity adequate as needed (M). This risk turns out to have been validated, but perhaps for reasons other than what the appraisal team had in mind. ERA did suffer from staff turnover, particularly at the mid-career level, and this turnover affected the quality of different outputs in various ways. However, the mitigation measures proposed in the risk mitigation matrix – namely, contracting out for additional capacity and institutional strengthening in critical areas – suggest that the appraisal team thought the risk might apply more either to junior staff or to areas of activity wholly new to ERA.
Resettlement Framework paper and Action Plans may not be implemented on time (N) 11. The PAD risk matrix characterized this as a "negligible" risk. This rating seems to have been borne out by experience. The risk was real, as this was the first time the ERA was to prepare and implement resettlement action plans. Perhaps, because of the awareness of the risk, and its contractual implications in terms of claims for late site possession, actions were taken to minimize the risk. Result on the ground confirmed that the risk was taken seriously and addressed.
Delays may occur in procurement, contract processing and implementation (N) 12. The PAD risk matrix characterized this as a "negligible" risk. In fact, delays in mobilization and implementation occurred in a number of the works contracts that were procured under the first stage of the APL. While these delays did not affect the overall quality of the works or the attainment of the project's objectives, they did ultimately lead to the extension of the project beyond the initial closing date, and their ubiquity suggests that a "negligible" rating was overly optimistic.
Contractor performance may not be satisfactory as per contract (M)
13. This risk was probably well characterized and rated. In practice, most of the contracts did not finish exactly as per contract, particularly in the area of on-time delivery. Only one contractor finished the works within the initial contract period; the remainder needed contract extensions, and the sum total of these extensions necessitated an extension of the project itself. The mitigation measures proposed, "Contractor post qualification, early and prompt warning of, penalty clause application for delayed contractors," may have prevented even further delays.
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Annex 11. Transport Poverty Observatory Status and Findings
1. Introduction
In addition to the extensive monitoring assessment of the RSDP using more than 60 indicators (Roads and MDG-related), the Ethiopian Roads Authority, in collaboration with the WB, has initiated the “Transport and Poverty Observatory” study in four selected road corridors located in different parts of the country. The target corridors are: Woreta-Woldya, Dera- Mechara, Assosa-Guba, and Alemgena-Butajira-Sodo Road corridors. Thus the following section of this status report presents the objective of the initiative, summarized findings of the study, the financial status, and the way forward to the reaming services at hand.
2. Overall Objective
The overall purpose of this initiative is to monitor the poverty reducing impacts of road project investments at local community and at household level in the Ethiopia RSDP road-rations.
3. Overall Accomplishment
On the basis of the base line survey which was conducted on April 2005, a large number of monitoring indicators have been provided, classified into direct and indirect impacts as well as short, medium and long-term in relation to the time frame of realizing the impacts. Finally, monitoring indicators were selected on the basis of availability and reliability of information without going into the conceptual and methodological issues. A set of 35 monitoring indicators is given, comprising largely of 10 direct indicators and 25 indirect indicators, having impact on and reflecting the growth of the economy, its diversification and socio-economic welfare of the people.
In accordance with the service contract agreement the Consultant has performed various tasks in the last two years; and has submitted an Inception Report, First Year and Second Year Preliminary Findings and Monitoring Updating Reports.
The Preliminary Findings Reports Outlines, the preliminary first year and second year poverty impact analysis based on the comparison of findings from the baseline (2005) and the follow-on survey (2007). These reports comprise of: . A general introduction to the study. This part has been literally taken from the baseline report with minor adjustments. . The general poverty profile of the country and the project road corridor Regional States in terms of the income (monetary) non-income (non-monetary), as well as temporal and spatial dimensions of poverty. . Survey design and methodology along with the sample size. . A conceptual framework for the study of poverty impact analysis in the context of transport operations.
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. The report also presents the results of the households survey carried out in the project influence area of all the four corridors. The survey results at the house hold level have been aggregated at the village/town level, classified by male and female head of households. The results are presented for each project road corridor separately, classified by rural and urban divide.
Concerning the Monitoring Update Reports, since the poverty impact assessment of road improvement and transport operations covers a large range of issues; a large set of variables was collected. And the relevant monitoring indicators were organized in three broad categories as: . Transport Operations Output Indicators: covering vehicle operating costs, travel time, fares and freight rate(s) of transport, accessibility of services, and frequency of trips. . Transport Operations Outcome Indicators: including access to jobs, markets, commodities and services, health and education facilities, and narrowing down rural– urban inequality (disparity) as well as price differential. . Welfare or Living Standards Outcome Indicators: comprising incomes, literacy, health status, house structure, etc. Generally these reports presents the findings from the assessment of the trends in the updating of the transport operations out put indicators for the first year of analysis (2007).
4. Financial Status
The consultancy service is jointly financed by the World Bank and the Government of Ethiopia on the proportion as agreed on the financing agreement. The details of financial accomplishments to the service are shown in the table below:
Item Description % WB GOE Total No (Birr ) (Birr) Amount in ETB 1. Contract 100 85 15 3,344,703.00 (Amount ) (Amount) Excluding Local taxes. 2. Submission of final inception report 20 668,940.60 100,341.09 769,281.69 3. 1st year final findings 10 334,470.30 50,170.55 384,640.85 reports 4. 2nd year final findings 20 668,940.60 100,341.09 769,281.69 reports Total to Date 50 1,672,351.50 250,852.73 1,923,204.23 Remaining Sub Total 1,672,351.50 VAT 250,852.73 Total 1,923,204.23
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5. Findings of the Study
The findings of the study is presented in the following tables but not limited to these.
Household property
(Roof type of house in PIA of the Corridors Number/Percent) Thatched Tin Total Road Corridors Baseline Current Baseline Baseline Current Study Study Study Current Study Study Study Assosa-Guba 245 175 25 28 270 203 (90.7) (86.2) (9.3) (13.9) (100) (100) 120 67 100* 86 220 153 Worota-Woldya (54.5) (43.7) (45.5) (56.2) (100) (100)
Dera-Mechara 116 79 96 96 212 175 (54.7) (45.14) (45.3) (54.9) (100) (100) 216 143 92 111 308 254 Alemgena-Butajira-Sodo (70.1) (56.3) (29.9) (43.9) (100) (100)
Total All four Corridors 697 (464) 313 321 1010 785 (69.0) (59.1) (31) (40.9) (100) (100)
. A household that owns a house with tin roof is considered to be wealthy or rich in the Community Compared to the baseline, in the corridor PIAs, house structures covered with thatched grass roof have decreased from 69 percent to 59.1 percent.
Economic Activities
(Percentage distribution of major occupations of the PIA Household Heads Alemgena-Butajira- Survey Assosa-Guba Worota-Woldya Dera-Mechara Sodo Occupation Type Time Total Total Total Total Rural Rural Rural Rural Urban Urban Urban Urban Baseline 1.4 0 1.1 1.1 0 1 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.8 1.3 Farm wage labour Current 0.60 2.86 0.99 1.71 0.00 1.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.96 4.44 1.57 Baseline 94.1 62.5 88.5 95.6 17.5 79.5 97.2 43.8 89.2 96 14.3 81.2 Farming 87.1 22.2 84.2 Current 94.61 51.43 3 96.58 8.11 75.32 90.32 58.82 87.21 97.61 2 5
Government Baseline 2.3 16.7 4.8 1.7 25 5.9 0.5 12.5 2.4 0.8 23.2 4.9 Employee 22.2 Current 0.60 17.14 3.47 0.00 18.92 4.55 0.00 17.65 1.74 1.44 2 5.12 Baseline 0.9 14.6 3.3 0.6 40 7.7 0.6 28.1 4.7 0.4 37.5 7.1 Trade 42.2 Current 2.40 28.57 6.93 1.71 45.95 12.34 1.94 23.53 4.07 0.00 2 7.48 Baseline 0.5 2.1 0.7 1 7.5 2.3 3.1 0.5 1.6 3.6 1.9 Unemployed Current 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.41 1.30 2.58 0.00 2.33 0.00 2.22 0.39 Baseline 10 1.8 9.4 1.4 5.4 1 Other Current 1.80 0.00 1.49 0.00 21.62 5.19 5.16 0.00 4.65 0.00 6.67 1.18 Baseline 0.8 4.1 1.6 0 10 1.8 3.1 0.4 14.2 2.6 No Response Current 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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. Trade as a major occupation has increased in the two road corridors that are under construction.
Average Distance Traveled by Women Alemgena-Butajira- Household Activities Average Assosa-Guba Worota-Woldya Dera-Mechara Sodo Distance/Time Baseline Current Baseline Current Baseline Current Baseline Current Purchasing HH items Distance (km) 8.28 4.23 5.98 5.23 4.27 5.44 5.23 3.90 Collection of drinking water Distance (km) 1.39 0.98 2.47 1.06 1.73 1.24 1.9 1.31 Fuel wood collection Distance (km) 3.21 2.91 2.44 1.53 4.37 1.77 2.44 2.24 Medical assistance Distance (km) 5.96 4.53 5.3 4.12 5.81 5.65 6.21 2.54 Child rearing/care for old Distance (km) 0 0.47 0 0.02 0 0.00 0 0.26 Basketry, weaving, pottery Distance (km) 0 2.66 0 1.05 0 0.00 0 0.63 Support for cultivation Distance (km) 3.35 3.50 2 0.80 1.42 0.04 2 1.29 Religious/ social activities Distance (km) 3.94 2.64 1.96 1.22 1.82 0.74 2.41 1.34 Any other activities Distance (km) 0 0.00 0 0.00 0.2 0.00 3.67 0.00 All activities average daily Km 4.36 2.77 3.36 1.74 2.80 2.1 3.41 1.82 distance traveled
Average daily time spent on the Time (hr) 4.66 0.53 5.7 0.31 4.65 0.36 4.46 0.36 activities pursued
Women specific household activities (average distance and time spent by women-rural and urban HHs) Average Distance Walked Road Rural/Urban Daily(km) Average Time Spent on activities (Hrs) Corridor household Baseline Current Baseline Current Assosa- Rural 4.58 4.13 5.62 1.14 Guba Urban 2.1 0.17 1.58 0.14 Worota- Rural 3.74 1.98 6.23 0.50 Woldya Urban 0.83 1.17 1.93 0.21 Dera- Rural 3.56 2.01 5.73 0.44 Mechara Urban 1.18 0.30 2.08 0.23 Alemgena- Rural 3.6 1.66 4.73 0.44 Butajira- Sodo Urban 2.31 0.92 1.8 0.25
. The average distance traveled by women to accomplish a specific task is dissimilar across the road corridors. In Assosa-Guba and Dera-Mechara Corridors traveling to seek medicinal assistance is one of the most time taking task for women while in Woreta- Woldya and Alemgena- Butajira- Sodo women travel the farthest distance to purchase household items.
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Household income (Average annual House hold income) Project Road Corridors Households Assosa-Guba Worota-Woldya Dera-Mechara Alemgena-Butajira-Sodo Baseline Current Baseline Current Baseline Current Baseline Current Overall Average 906.0 15869.0 2,575.0 7818.0 3,206.0 12806.0 2,067.0 12344.0 Male-Headed Households 904.0 11939.0 3,061.0 6674.21 3,255.0 8978.12 2,256.0 9352.93 Female-Headed Households 920.0 18095.0 1,214.0 3120.47 2,905.0 7367.36 1,288.0 5647.26 Urban Households 1,729.0 29521.7 5,875.0 14818.0 6,750.0 22188.0 2,336.0 16343.0 Rural Households Average 728 8,535 1,841.00 4,237 2,576.00 9,115 2,008.00 8,690 Rural Households up to 3 km 707.0 6665 1,102.0 4570 3,203.0 11001 2,574.0 10347 Rural Households up to 6 km 161.0 9635 2,077.0 4149 2,259.0 7607 1,925.0 8230 Rural Households up to 9 km 1,087.0 9305 2,324.0 4102 2,267.0 8738 2,007.0 7493
. Except in the Assosa–Guba Corridor, the female headed households generally show lower income compared with the male-headed households. The urban areas in all road corridors have a relatively better income that the rural areas.
Social services
(Percentage of response on availability of education institutions) Baseline Study Current Study
Road Corridor No of No. of School School School School School School No School No School Secondary Secondary Secondary Households Households Elementary Elementary Non-formal Elementary Junior High Junior High Non-Formal Literacy School School Literacy School Literacy
Assosa-Guba 270 43.3 13 9.6 22.6 2.2 203 75.18 1.46 1.46 0.00 21.90 Worota-Woldya 220 73.2 8.6 11.8 2.7 0.9 153 95.45 0.91 1.82 0.91 0.91 Dera-Mechara 212 55.7 31.6 6.6 2.8 1.4 175 89.83 1.69 0.00 0.00 8.47 Alemgena-Butajira-Sodo 308 41.2 40.9 6.2 - 7.1 254 73.16 11.58 0.00 0.00 15.26 Total 1010 51.8 24.5 8.4 7.2 3.2 785 81.62 4.86 0.72 0.18 12.61
. Percentage of households in all road corridors that reported the existence of educational institutions.
(Percentage change in No. of Schools by Road Corridor) Road Corridor Baseline Current % Change Worota-Woldya 27 44 163 Dera-Mechara 8 31 388 Assosa-Guba 20 39 195 Alemgena-Butajira-Sodo 15 45 300 Total 70 159 227
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(Percentage distribution of Health Facilities in the PIA of the corridors) Baseline Study Current Study Health Services/Facilities Alemgena Alemgena- Assosa- Worota- Dera- -Butajira- Assosa- Worota- Dera- Butajira- Guba Woldya Mechara Sodo Guba Woldya Mechara Sodo Health Post 38.5 22.6 19.2 19.7 30.58 7.11 30.08 32.23 Clinic 31.4 16.3 9 43.3 26.06 7.75 30.99 35.21 Health Center 20.4 24.2 22.5 32.9 17.77 28.76 25.04 28.43 Hospital 18.4 41.9 4.9 34.8 21.11 20.85 29.34 28.70 Overall 26.7 23.9 15.5 33.9 23.39 17.59 28.62 30.39
. Over all for all corridors will be 100 percent
Transport and Accessibility
Percentage distribution of household response to travel to market Baseline Study (%) Current Study (%) Road Corridor Within 5-10 Above 10 Within Above 2km 2-5 km km km 2 km 2-5 km 5-10 km 10 km Assosa-Guba 37.8 21.2 19.2 21.8 93.5 6.5 0 0 Worota-Woldya 17.5 23.8 30.8 27.9 98.2 1.8 0 0 Dera-Mechara 11.8 16.4 43.7 28.2 90.0 8.9 1.1 0 Alemgena-Butajira-Sodo 20.6 30.2 34.3 14.9 88.67 10.34 0.00 0.00
Percentage distribution of HH Response to Travel Needs Baseline Current Study Frequency Frequency
Road Corridor week week Daily Total Daily Total Week Week weeks weeks Monthly Monthly Once in a Once in two Once a week week a Once Occasionally Occasionally Occasionally Two times in a Two times in
Assosa-Guba 2.8 44.9 13.4 2.8 36.2 100.0 20.26 84.97 15.69 1.96 9.15 100 Worota-Woldya 5.3 38.2 5.3 15.0 36.2 100.0 1.97 37.40 3.94 3.54 0.79 100 Dera-Mechara 2.0 54.0 11.5 6.0 26.5 100.0 9.71 47.43 10.29 4.57 18.86 100 Alemgena-Butajira-Sodo 4.0 34.0 25.3 2.2 34.3 100.0 11.82 58.62 33.00 2.96 4.93 100 Total 3.5 42.2 14.7 6.0 33.6 100.0 9.81 54.39 15.16 3.31 7.52 100
. In making a choice for the market places, the major consideration in the project corridor PIAs for over 42 percent of the households in the short distance. This is followed by
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better prices with 24.5 percent response rate, while easy access accounts for 20.4 percent and ready buyers for 17.07 percent of the HHs.
Proxy indicators Children (Under 5 years age) Immunized Baseline Study Current Study Road Corridor Immunized Children (%) Immunized Children (%) Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total Assosa-Guba 77.5 87.9 79.2 50.41 52.38 50.69 Worota-Woldya 88.1 88.9 88.2 84.17 72.73 82.39 Dera-Mechara 85.6 100.0 87.3 22.22 25.00 22.55 Alemgena-Butajira-Sodo 87.4 92.7 88.3 31.71 55.56 36.00 Average (all the four corridors) 85.6 47.91
. Further, the female headed households recorded lower rates of immunization in Alemgena-Butajira-Sodo and Woreta-Weldya corridors when compared with the male- headed households, both in rural and urban areas respectively.
6. The Study to Continue for the Coming Three Years Up to the end of this quarter of the fiscal year, about 50 percent of the contract time has been elapsed; half of the financial resource and also half of the total service were accomplished. The 3rd year survey is in progress. But as the service is under APL -I package and since this grant is closed by December 31, 2009, there is a need of financial amendment to finance the remaining works according to the supplementary agreement made on the of October 9, 2007.
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E T H I O P I A R e d 15° 15° ROAD SECTOR DEVELOPMENT Zalambessa PHASE I PROJECT (APL1) Adi Adigrat S e a Abun Axum Humera Inda Silase Asele Adwa T I G R AY Wikro Abiy Adi IDA FINANCED ROADS Mesfinto Mekele Adi Gudom Debark L. Afdera ASPHALT, ALL-WEATHER ROADS Abergele Betemariam Metema GRAVEL, ALL-WEATHER ROADS Dabat Korbeta Atbara Maychew RURAL AND/ OR DRY-WEATHER ROADS Aykel Gonder Sekota Korem Azezo Alamata Gorgora Kobo INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS Adis Zemen A F A R Balas Lalibela L. Tana Debra Gob Logiya Omedla Woreta Gob Weldiya Tabor Tendadho D J I B O U T I SELECTED TOWNS Nefas Mille R. Asaita Almahel Bahir Dar Mewcha Wegel Tena L. Assal A M H A R A Bete Hor Mile L. Gamarri STATE/ REGION (UNOFFICIAL 1994 BOUNDARIES) Bumbadi Guba Tis Isat Hayk Dangla Adet Tenta Bati L. Abe BENSHANGUI- Mota Dewele INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES Injibara Dese Chagni Mekane Kombolcha Finote Debre Selam GUMUZ Aysha Bure Selam Work Kabi Belad Were Ilu Karakore Kurmuk Bichena Jamma Mehal Meda Debre Efeson Alem Sela Gewane Markos Dejen Ketema Asosa Dingay 10° 10° Goha Jihur Robit Alibo Tsiyon Fiche Debre Mendi Debre Sina Dire 0 100 200 300 Gebse Guracha Birhan Dawa Ejersagoro Togochale Bombasi Nejo Shambu Kachise Mukature Erer O R O M I A Kulubi Fonyan KILOMETERS Hena Fincha Muger Gorabela Bira Jijiga Guliso Inchini Alem Maya Mekenajo Jeldu Sheno Mieso Hima Harer Nekempt Bako Deder Gimbi Adis Alem Arba Girawa Yubdo Gedo Sendafa Awash Asbe H A R A R This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. Sire Ginchi Addis Ababa The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown Guyr Hagere Metehara Burka Arjo Hiywar Akaki Gelemso on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any Alge Meyumuluke judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or Mojo Welenchiti Mechara Duba Giyon Tulubolo acceptance of such boundaries. Supe Bedele Nazret Abomsa Gambela Degeh Aware Jikao Metu L. Koka Magna Suntu Welkite Dera Bur Gore Sire Fik Indibir L.Ziway Misrak Gashamo G A M B E L L A Butajira Ziway Agaro 35° 40° 50° Assela Domo SAUDI ARABIA Hora Langano Ticho Jima Abgiata Shek Husen Gog Asendabo Hayk Gecha Chira Shola O R O M I A Segeg Hosaina Hayk Bekoji Kolito Tepi Bonga Agarfa Shashemene Ginir S O M A L I Chida Robe Dimbira Awasa Hayk Goro Warder Geladi 15° Mizan Teferi Waka Awasa 15° R E P . O F Sodo Kefole Adabe Dubub Y E M E N Dodola Kebri Dehar Shasha Megalo Wendo Vigra Alem Nansebo S U D A N Jamu S E P R A Abaya Hayk Imi Gelta Chencha Meslo Denan D J I B O U T I Maji Felege Dila Neway Arba Minch Kibre Shilabo Ch’amo Fiseha Gode Mengist 10° E T H I O P I A 10° Hayk Genet El Kere Jinka Addis Ababa Shakiso Kelafo Agere Key Afer Bitata Hamer Maryam Mustahil Koke Konso Negele Ferfer Kelem 5° 5° Lema Shilindi L. Yabela Yet 5° 5° L. Chew Turkana Bahir SOMALIA Wachile Dolo Odo I N D I A N
Mega UGANDA O C E A N El Leh K E N Y A I N D I A N 0° 0° Moyale Lake U G A N D A Victoria O C E A N 35° K E N Y A 40° 45° 35° 40° 45° 50° MAY 2003 IBRD 32466
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R e d 15° 15° ROAD SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM PHASE II (2002-2007) Zalambessa S e a Adi Adigrat PROPOSED ROAD IMPROVEMENTS Abun Inda Silase Axum Humera Asele Adwa PROGRAM: T I G R AY Wikro Abiy Adi TRUNK ROADS REHABILITATION Mesfinto Mekele TRUNK ROADS UPGRADING Debark Adi Gudom L. Afdera Abergele Hiwane LINK ROADS UPGRADING Metema Dabat Betemariam Korbeta NEW LINK ROADS Atbara Maychew REGIONAL RURAL ROADS Aykel Gonder Sekota Korem Azezo Elidar EXISTING: Gorgora Alamata Adis Zemen Kobo A FA R RSDP COMPLETED ROADS (JUNE 2002) Balas Lalibela L. Tana Gob Omedla Debra Woreta Gob Weldiya Logiya ASPHALT, ALL-WEATHER ROADS Tabor Tendadho D J I B O U T I Nefas Mille R. Asaita Almahel Bahir Dar Mewcha Wegel Tena L. Assal GRAVEL, ALL-WEATHER ROADS A M H A R A Bete Hor MileL. Gamarri Bumbadi Tis Isat Hayk RURAL AND/OR DRY-WEATHER ROADS Guba Dangla Adet Tenta Bati L. Abe BENSHANGUI- Mota Dewele INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS Injibara Dese Chagni Mekane Kombolcha Finote Debre Selam GUMUZ Aysha SELECTED TOWNS Bure Selam Work Kabi Belad Were Ilu Karakore STATE/REGION (UNOFFICIAL 1994 BOUNDARIES) Kurmuk Bichena Jamma Mehal Meda Efeson INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES Debre Alem Sela Gewane Markos Dejen Ketema Asosa Dingay 10° 10° Goha Jihur Robit Note: The 8043 km regional roads to be rehabilitated and the Alibo Tsiyon Mendi Fiche Debre 5399 km to be constructed under RSDP I are not shown. Gebse Guracha Debre Sina Dire Birhan Dawa Dengego Togochale Bombasi Nejo Shambu Kachise Mukature Erer Ejersagoro O R O M I A Kulubi Fonyan 0 100 200 300 Hena Fincha Muger Gorabela Jijiga Guliso Alem Maya Bira Mekenajo Jeldu Inchini Sheno Mieso Hima Harer KILOMETERS Nekempt Bako Arba Deder Gimbi Adis Alem Sendafa Awash Girawa H A R A R Yubdo Gedo Addis Ababa Asbe This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. Sire Ginchi Guyr Hagere Akaki Ejire Metehara Burka The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown Arjo Hiywar on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any Gelemso Meyumuluke Alge Welenchiti judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or Duba Giyon Tulubolo Mojo Mechara Supe Bedele Nazret Abomsa acceptance of such boundaries. Jikao Gambela Metu L. Koka Degeh Aware Suntu Welkite Dera Magna Gore Sire Fik Bur Indibir L.Ziway Misrak Gashamo G A M B E L L A Butajira Ziway Agaro 35° 40° 50° Assela Domo SAUDI ARABIA Hora Langano Ticho Jima Abgiata Shek Husen Gog Asendabo Hayk Gecha Chira Shola O R O M I A Segeg Hosaina Hayk Bekoji Kolito Tepi Bonga Agarfa Shashemene Robe Ginir S O M A L I Dimbira Chida Awasa Hayk Geladi Waka Goro Warder 15° R E P . O F 15° Mizan Teferi Awasa Kefole Sodo Adabe Dubub Dodola Kebri Dehar Y E M E N Shasha Megalo Wendo Vigra Alem Nansebo S U D A N Jamu S E P R A Abaya Hayk Imi Chencha Meslo Denan D J I B O U T I Maji Felege Gelta Dila Neway Arba Minch Kibre Shilabo Ch’amo Fiseha Mengist Gode 10° Genet 10° E T H I O P I A Hayk El Kere Jinka Addis Ababa Shakiso Kelafo Agere Key Afer Bitata Hamer Maryam Mustahil Koke Konso Negele Ferfer Kelem 5° 5° Lema Shilindi L. Yabela Yet 5° 5° L. Chew Turkana Bahir SOMALIA Wachile Dolo Odo I N D I A N
Mega UGANDA O C E A N El Leh K E N Y A I N D I A N 0° 0° Moyale Lake U G A N D A Victoria O C E A N 35° K E N Y A 40° 45° 35° 40° 45° 50° MAY 2003