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Home , Austrian Netherlands

A Sketch of Policy

France and the during the War of the Austrian Succession

Pieterjan Schepens

Promotor: prof. dr. René Vermeir Commissarissen: dr. Klaas Van Gelder en drs. Michiel Van Dam

Masterproef voorgelegd aan de Faculteit Letteren en Wijsbegeerte voor het behalen van de graad van Master in de Geschiedenis

Academiejaar 2014-2015 Content

Note on terminology ...... 4 Introduction: Peace without victory? ...... 5 Methodology ...... 7

The War of the Austrian Succession ...... 11

The current state of research ...... 16 Natural Borders and French expansionism ...... 16 French anti-expansionism ...... 18 Dynastic prestige ...... 22 Constraints by the international system ...... 23 Incompetence...... 27 Exhaustion ...... 30 Conclusion ...... 33

The Southern Netherlands and France’s memoranda writers ...... 35 The road to war in the Southern Netherlands ...... 35 Preparing the invasion ...... 42 France invades the Southern Netherlands ...... 48 Winning a European war ...... 55 The death of the Emperor ...... 64 France victorious ...... 74 Clouds in the sky ...... 89 Modération, désintéressement, and peace ...... 97 Ligonier ...... 109 Aix-la-Chapelle ...... 121

Conclusion ...... 130 Acknowledgements ...... 136 Bibliography ...... 137

Samenvatting in het Nederlands ...... 140

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Note on terminology

The is something of a minefield when it comes to unambiguously referring to countries and regions. I have followed historiographical convention as much as possible, and my nomenclature will be self-evident in most instances. In some cases it requires an additional word of explanation. I use ‘Southern Netherlands’ to designate that part of the that was directly ruled by the Emperor Charles VI in 1740. For most of the eighteenth century, the most convenient term to designate this political entity would be ‘Austrian Netherlands’, but in the context of the War of the Austrian Succession it is less confusing to use the more geographical ‘Southern Netherlands’. Contemporaries referred to this region in French as ‘les Pays-Bas’ or as ‘la Flandre’. I have only kept these terms in quotations. When referring to the wider geographical region encompassing the ‘Austrian Netherlands’, the prince-bishopric of Liège and even French , I have used ‘Southern Low Countries’. To designate the Northern Netherlands, I have used ‘United ’ and ‘’, and occasionally, when it could do without ambiguity, ‘the Republic’. In the eighteenth century this state was often referred to as ‘Holland’ or even ‘the States-General’. In contemporary sources, is referred to as the ‘Queen of Hungary’, as this was her highest remaining title. I have nevertheless used ‘Austria’ to refer to her monarchy. Contemporaries continued to refer to the ‘House of Austria’. Moreover, there is little cause for confusion: when speaking about the geography of the country we now call Austria, the eighteenth century would have used ‘Lower Austria’ and ‘Upper Austria’, as well as Tyrol or Carinthia. I occasionally refer to the ‘Habsburgs’ as well, even though the Habsburg dynasty technically died with Charles VI, and Maria Theresa’s children belonged to the -Lorraine. ‘’ was a geographical expression. In France, it roughly meant ‘across the Rhine and north of the Alps’. I have used it when appropriate.

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Introduction: Peace without victory?

To a patriotic Frenchman in the early spring of 1748, a look at the map of Europe must have been a gratifying experience. French fortunes during the ‘War of 1741’ had waxed and waned, but there could be no doubt now that France’s northern border had never been more secure. Gone were the dark days of Marlborough and Prince Eugene, when the enemies of the King had penetrated France as far as Lille; gone were the days when the treaties of Ryswick and Utrecht had taken away the French monarchy’s northernmost possessions, the fruit of several decades of warfare against the Spanish. France had nothing to fear from that quarter now: the armies of King Louis XV marched freely through the Southern Netherlands on their way to garrison the formidable Dutch fortress of Bergen-op-Zoom or to open the trenches before the walls of Maastricht. Frenchmen – and most Europeans with them – could entertain good hopes that the war which had started eight years earlier would soon be over. Within earshot of the guns pounding the walls of Maastricht, representatives of Europe’s foremost powers had convened in the Free Imperial City of Aachen – known as Aix-la-Chapelle to contemporary Englishmen – and were now busy negotiating a treaty of peace. To an observer of European politics there could have been little doubt that France would abandon most of its conquests if it did not want to rule out a lasting peace– or find yet another ‘Grand Alliance’ assailing its frontiers. But France might very well compensate itself for its efforts with a few fortresses along its northern border, if only to erase the losses of less than half a century before, and Marshal Vauban’s pré carré restore to its original condition – that ring of fortresses protecting the North of the kingdom from the sea to the Alps. At the end of April, the representatives of Louis XV and George II concluded a preliminary treaty. The people of France burst out in celebration at the news of the peace; but the joy made place for bewilderment as the actual content of the preliminaries spread. The King of France had forsaken annexation of even a single square inch of territory. Soon Frenchmen took to complaining that they spent eight years fighting a ‘war for the King of Prussia’ and turned ‘bête comme la paix’ – as foolish as the peace – into a proverb. If they had been privy to the actual negotiations, their astonishment would have been greater still: their

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King had not even tried to gain any territorial compensation. Why would Versailles throw away its triumph?

This question, which troubled most contemporary observers, has not ceased to plague historians. All sorts of theories explaining this remarkable renunciation have been advanced – but all them come from historians primarily interested in another subject of research, whether a traditional history of the war or a theoretical analysis of international relations; a biography of Louis XV or a reconstruction of the negotiations at Aix-la-Chapelle. French policy towards the Southern Netherlands during the War of the Austrian Succession has never been studied in its own right. It may seem a limited subject in a vast war, but there is a need for it. First, because the theories advanced till now simply do not entirely satisfy; second, because the very complexity of the War of the Austrian Succession easily results it too much forest and too few trees. The War of the Austrian Succession seems indeed to be even more complex than other wars of the period, and the primary culprit may well be the lack of a unifying theme. The conflict started over the inheritance of Emperor Charles VI, but soon other interests entered the fray. The war that was concluded at Aix-la-Chapelle deserves the qualification ‘of the Austrian Succession’ more because it followed from it than because the Austrian Succession dominated it. An ‘embedded’ perspective – the French view towards the Southern Netherlands – has therefore something to reveal that the helicopter view cannot discern. This thesis therefore proposes to look at the actions and motivations of one country, France, rather than at the War of the Austrian Succession as a whole. But the War of the Austrian Succession not only suffers from opacity: it has never been a favourite of historians or of the general public. It is eclipsed by the drama of the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Year’s War. Few of its battles are memorable. The motives driving it seem petty; the peace following it inconsequential. Of course all of this does not apply to the story of the Prussian leap to the forefront of the European scene, but that is a story that can quite easily be told without paying much attention to what happened outside of Central Europe, or even outside of and Bohemia for that matter. The War of the Austrian Succession is not irrelevant, however, whether we limit ourselves to the eighteenth century or look at international relations from a more long-term perspective. Scholars often point to the eighteenth century as the period when the doctrine of the Balance of Power became institutionalized. The War of the Spanish Succession is the prime example, then, of the international system reacting against a hegemon, and the Seven

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Years’ War is what allowed that system’s ultimate balancer, Great Britain, to acquire its definitive dominance and preserve the continental balance of power for the coming centuries. The War of the Austrian Succession on the other hand shows a more ‘balanced’ Balance of Power, when no power was truly dominant, and no country emerged absolutely victorious. But the War of the Austrian Succession also constitutes a warning not to see history of the eighteenth century as merely a showcase for the workings of Balance of Power, or, in a more narrow form, as the story of Franco-British rivalry, incarnated in its worst form in the concept of the ‘Second Hundred Years’ War’. As this thesis will show, rivalry with Great Britain was far from the only motivator of France’s policy towards the Southern Low Countries.

Methodology The subject of this thesis is Versailles’ policy towards the Southern Netherlands. More specifically, it asks whether France intended to annex part of them, and if so, why it eventually decided against it. In line with a more ‘embedded’ approach, the primary sources upon which I have based my research are memoranda found in the archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris (La Courneuve). These memoranda were not exclusively written by Versailles’ decision-makers – a great deal of them were authored instead by people we know fairly little about, and in some cases no additional information can be linked to the names of the authors. Some memoranda are even completely anonymous. Therefore, the intent of this thesis is most certainly not to identify who decided to invade, to abandon, to annex or not to annex the Southern Netherlands. Instead, I seek to reconstruct which ideas were circulating in France’s governing circles and amongst people who took an interest in foreign policy and the war. Herein lies at once the major disadvantage of this approach: we have no way of knowing whether the ideas represented in these memoranda were ever entertained by the people who ultimately decided – the King, the ministers, and a few people without a formal role in government who were influential nonetheless. However, we do know that someone in the department for Foreign Affairs considered these memoranda to be important or valuable enough to be preserved, and, as proven in some case by remarks written on them, to be read, so that they were included in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But on the positive side, this approach allows us to bypass to some extent the perennial problem of who made decisions in Versailles. Contemporaries and historians alike have been

7 in doubt as to what extent Louis XV actually ruled, or how important certain ministers were. These questions have been addressed at numerous times, and it does not appear to me that there is a conclusive answer. Indeed, even if a general answer can be given – for instance, recent research has shown that Louis XV was not the lazy, womanizing incompetent which traditional historiography made and still makes him out to be – there is still no way of knowing whether the general rule can be applied to a specific case. I therefore prefer to leave this issue aside as possible, so as not to burden the problematic of this thesis by another one which transcends it. Nevertheless, it will have to be addressed from time to time, as certain theories explaining French policy towards the Southern Netherlands ascribe it to one or more specific people. Bypassing the question of who decided does not simplify the historical reality – in a way, the contrary even applies. Indeed, documents written by the actual decision-makers cannot reflect all the ideas by which they were influenced: a lot of discussion must have happened orally. We could maybe have assessed this a little better if the minutes of the meetings of the Conseil du Roi had survived, but these have been lost during the .1 In any case, they would not have given account of private meetings between the king and a minister, or between two ministers. Moreover, the French government did not operate in a social vacuum: court life and private reunions offered opportunities to both king and ministers to discuss policy with people who were not strictly concerned with it. Even if we were to assume, as an extreme theoretical example, that Louis XV decided everything, he would still have been exposed to the opinions of the people around him. Indeed, the official purpose of the Conseil du Roi was precisely to advise the King.2 Perusing a wider range of sources, vaguer yet covering a bigger group of people, increases our odds of picking up something of this lost oral (and disappeared written) world. Focussing on final documents – diplomatic statements and correspondence – can convey the image of foreign policy as the result of a coherent plan, rationally conceived to pursue a predetermined goal.3 These memoranda instead express varied and contradictory opinions, showing that even if there was a ‘plan’, it was subject to constant discussion.

The vast majority of these memoranda were found in the archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They come primarily from the series ‘Mémoires et documents’, as well the

1 Michel Antoine, Louis XV, 9 2 Bernard Hours, Louis XV, 509. 3 What Jeremy Black has called the “reification” of foreign policy (Jeremy Black, From Louis XIV to Napoleon, 33.)

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‘Correspondance politique’ for the Southern Netherlands (‘Pays-bas espagnols et autrichiens’) and for the United Provinces (‘Hollande’). The latter category includes diplomatic correspondence as well as memoranda concerning those countries. For the Mémoires et documents and the Correspondance politique for the Southern Netherlands I have limited myself to the period leading up to and during the French invasion; the Correspondance politique for the United Provinces I have only studied from about mid-1747, since from then on it contains the documents on the negotiations leading up to the congress at Aix-la-Chapelle, as well as those of the congress itself.4 Expanding the time frame and including the ‘Correspondance politique’ for other countries would certainly yield more results. The primary countries concerned would of course be Great Britain and Austria, as France’s leading opponents (although relations with them were officially ruptured after the declaration of war in 1744), as well as Spain, its principal ally. Saxony would also be of interest, as France used the Court of Dresden as a mediator to negotiate with Vienna. The documents for the United Provinces anterior to those which I have studied must certainly be looked at as well. They will include, amongst others, the conference in Breda, which was an attempt to gain time for most of its existence but it was a venue for negotiation with Great Britain and the United Provinces nonetheless.5 Similar research in the archives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of other countries would yield information about how those perceived French policy, and, in case they still maintained a diplomatic representation in Versailles, about their diplomats’ impression of the goings-on at the French court. Because the memoranda I have used as my basic sources have seemingly never been systematically studied, I have preferred to focus my attention and time on them. I have not used at least two readily accessible sources which do nevertheless have a direct relevance for the problematic: the memoirs of the Marquis d’Argenson, France’s secretary of state for foreign affairs from late 1743 till early 1747, and the correspondence of Louis XV and Marshal Noailles, edited by Rousset in 1865.6 As both have been used for a long time by historians treating the War of the Austrian Succession, I have assumed that no new information would readily be found in them. Moreover, historians who have used them seem

4 The Correspondance politique for the Dutch Republic was included in Olaf van Nimwegen’s book. 5 Dutch policy during the War of the Austrian Succession has already been extensively researched by Olaf van Nimwegen, De Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden als grote mogendheid: Buitenlandse politiek en oorlogvoering in de eerste helft van de achttiende eeuw en in het bijzonder tijdens de Oostenrijkse Successieoorlog (1740-1748). Most of van Nimwegen’s research is based upon Dutch sources; French archives have been consulted but can still be expanded upon. 6 Both can be accessed on gallica.bnf.fr.

9 to ascribe a particularly important role to d’Argenson, and to a lesser extent to Noailles, for the formulation of France’s policy towards the Southern Netherlands.7 They were undoubtedly important, but I would like to avoid bias towards them merely because of the sheer quantity of material written by them that has reached us. I have therefore relied on what other historians’ research have concluded about them. I could thus focus on the memoranda, which provide new information. The content of these two sources will therefore be discussed insofar as other historians have used them.

7 I will elaborate on this in the next chapter.

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The War of the Austrian Succession

The history of the War of the Austrian Succession is complex and not widely known. It will therefore be useful for the reader to have a quick summary of the basic military and diplomatic events at his disposal. Several issues will be dealt with in more detail later on; the following contains merely the basis necessary to understand a more detailed treatment.

The , Charles VI, died on the 20th of October 1740. He was the last male descendant of the House of Habsburg; with his death, the dynasty which had held the Imperial crown uninterruptedly since the fifteenth century came to an end. Of the dynasty’s female progeny, by contrast, there was no shortage. Charles VI had fathered two daughters, and so had his elder brother, the previous Emperor Joseph I. At the beginning of the eighteenth century Charles’s and Joseph’s father, Emperor Leopold I, had made the brothers sign a ‘Pact of Mutual Succession’: if Joseph were to die without a male heir, he would be succeeded by his brother Charles, but if Charles were to produce no male offspring either, the succession would revert to Joseph’s daughters. Not content with this exclusion of his own female offspring, Charles spent his whole reign drumming up European support for his ‘Pragmatic Sanction’, which changed the terms of the Pact of Mutual Succession and made his eldest daughter his sole heir. Charles’s efforts were rewarded: by 1740, the Pragmatic Sanction had been recognized by all of Europe’s great powers. And so it was that upon the death of her father, Maria Theresa ascended to the Habsburgs’ hereditary possessions. But to the throne of the she could not succeed: that was elective and exclusively male. Her husband Francis Stephen, though, was a candidate. Francis Stephen had been Duke of Lorraine and was now Grand Duke of Tuscany8 – a result of the Treaty of Vienna two years before, which had ended the War of the Polish Succession and had awarded Lorraine to Stanislas Leszczyński, former King of Poland and

8 Both of which made him a subject of the Holy Roman Empire. Although it lay enclaved in French territory, Lorraine was not a part of France but of the Empire, and Tuscany nominally belonged to the Holy Roman Empire as well.

11 the father-in-law of Louis XV of France, with the provision that the Duchy would pass to France on Stanislas’s death. Francis Stephen’s main qualification for the throne was that he was married to the daughter of the former Emperor, but so were two other rulers: Charles Albert of Bavaria and Augustus of Saxony, both married to the daughters of Joseph I. As such the Pact of Mutual Succession entitled them both to the Habsburg inheritance. Charles Albert decided to pose his candidature for the Empire as well. At first, this dynastic maze only led to diplomatic activity. But in December, the resort to arms came from an unexpected quarter: Frederick of Brandenburg-Prussia, soon to receive the epithet ‘the Great’, invaded Silesia. His legal claim to this dependency of the Crown of Bohemia even Frederick himself considered a joke, but he had decided to grasp the opportunity anyway. Bavaria and Saxony soon followed his example.

Upon the death of the Emperor France had remained aloof; it had then decided to support Bavaria’s claim to the Imperial Throne; and it now decided to intervene militarily. But it did so as an auxiliary: it was not officially at war but merely supported its ally by putting French troops under the Bavarian flag. It is for this reason that France marched straight into Germany, and left the Southern Netherlands aside. Nonetheless, the parlous state of the Austrian monarchy must have made some Frenchmen look towards the north as well. In 1740, France’s northern border was intrinsically linked to the legacy of the previous reign. The armies of Louis XIV had pushed the French border deep into the then : cities like Courtrai, Oudenaarde and Ath were at one point part of the Kingdom. Some of these newly conquered cities had been fortified by Vauban, and became part of France’s defensive circle of fortresses, the ceinture de fer. After the wars in the latter part of the reign of the Sun King, France was forced to return some of these cities to the Southern Netherlands. France’s northern border had thus been born out defeat – all the more vividly manifested by the fact that some of Vauban’s fortresses were now pointed against France. It was not only the loss of its northernmost fortresses that had maimed the ceinture de fer: the Treaty of Utrecht had also stipulated that the fortifications of Dunkirk were to be demolished, and had provided for British commissioners to be allowed into the city to verify this. London had been anxious to neutralize Dunkirk’s role as a base for privateers; but to France, Dunkirk was not only an important naval port but a part of its continental defence system as well. With Dunkirk unfortified, the westernmost part of the ceinture de fer lay open.

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Apart from these questions of military security, some minor border questions as well were under dispute between Versailles and Vienna. Even after the , France remained in possession of a few enclaves in Austrian Hainault, centred on Philippeville, Mariembourg and Barbençon. In between these enclaves and the rest of France lay the Austrian-ruled cities of Chimay and Beaumont. France had acquired rights of passage through them, but there were voices in France that Chimay and Beaumont should to be annexed to France outright. A more longstanding dispute was that over the Abbey of Saint-Hubert, enclaved in the Duchy of , which claimed independence but over which Austria claimed sovereignty as well. To preserve this independence, the Abbey had a tradition of turning to France for support, which then demanded that Austria give up its claims of sovereignty.

The intricacies of the military campaigns in Germany need not concern us here. Suffice it to say that Maria Theresa’s situation was very dire, but that she managed to fight back. It was true that Charles Albert of Bavaria was elected Emperor and that in Silesia the Prussian army remained firmly entrenched, but by the end of 1742 she was back in control of Prague after a Franco-Bavarian army had occupied the city for over a year. Prussia agreed to a truce – Frederick had no interest to involve his forces for the sake of his allies if he did not gain anything for himself. But by 1743, the War acquired a larger scale. Spain finally obtained French support for an invasion of Italy. In 1739 war had broken out between Spain and Great Britain over commercial disputes, and France had sent an auxiliary fleet to the Caribbean to support its Bourbon ally. But the death of the Emperor had shifted attention back to Europe (although 1739’s commercial disputes would continue to play a role in both London and Madrid for the rest of the war) and when Spain sought to take advantage of Austria’s weakness to carve out an Italian principality for the Infante Don Philip, France initially resisted because it wanted to focus on Germany.9 But in 1743 Sardinia concluded an alliance with Austria and Great Britain at Worms, in spite of Spanish overtures to the Court of Turin. Outraged, France finally agreed to give full support to its Spanish ally.

9 Don Philip was the second son of Philip V and Elizabeth Farnese. Elizabeth belonged to the recently extinct ducal family of Parma. As Philip V had a son from a previous marriage, Don Ferdinand, who would succeed him as King of Spain, Elizabeth was obsessed with securing Italian principalities for her own offspring. Her eldest son Don Carlos had become King of Naples-Sicily thanks to the War of the Polish Succession. At the death of the Emperor, she was bent on repeating this for her second son Don Philip.

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The British equally stepped up their involvement: in the spring of 1742, they had already sent troops to the Southern Netherlands. The Southern Netherlands were the linchpin of the British defence system against France. The territory was an Austrian possession, but its defence relied primarily on the Dutch Barrier – a series of fortresses in the Southern Netherlands manned by Dutch garrisons. These would slow down the French advance – it was calculated that the Barrier would hold out for about three years, allowing the British and Austrians to organize themselves, and then counterattack. In this way, the Southern Netherlands were meant to bind together the members of the old Grand Alliance against Louis XIV. But the very existence of the Barrier had altered the reality it was meant to prevent. Both during the War of the Polish Succession and in 1740 France had decided to leave the Southern Netherlands alone: it had no desire to provoke British and Dutch involvement. As a consequence the Maritime Powers, as they were collectively called, had largely kept out of both wars. But in the spring of 1742 a new British ministry decided to send troops to the continent after all. The Southern Netherlands were the first destination. In 1743 the army – joined by Hanoverian troops –passed into Germany. Under the personal command of George II, it won an important victory against the French at Dettingen on the Main in 1743. At the same time, the Austrians conquered Bavaria. The camp of Maria Theresa was now resolutely on the offensive.10 For the campaign of 1744, France decided to invade the Southern Netherlands. The causes for this will be dealt with later on. France quickly conquered a few border fortresses, but it had to cut short its advance and redirect its army towards Alsace when the Austrians invaded from the east. In the face of French military superiority, the Austrians orderly escaped across the Rhine. In early 1745, Emperor Charles Albert unexpectedly died, putting the Imperial election once more at the forefront of international politics. In September, Francis Stephen was elected. In the meantime France continued its advance in the Southern Netherlands, winning the in May. 1746 saw the same series of French successes, beginning with the capture of in the early winter of that year. In Italy, 1745 had likewise been a good year for the Franco-Spanish alliance. But in early 1746, the allied Sardinians and Austrians quickly undid their advance, and then even proceeded to invade Provence. A revolt in Genoa (which had allied itself with the French and

10 They actually reconquered it. They had first done so in 1742, but a French army had pushed them back.

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Spanish and was now occupied by the Austrians) convinced the Austro-Sardinians to focus on Italy proper – but for the rest of the War the Franco-Spanish did not manage to regain the advantage in Italy. In 1747, the French invaded the Dutch Republic. The ensuing panic led to the restoration of the Stadholderate, which had been left vacant after the death of William III. Dutch Flanders was taken without efforts and the great fortress of Bergen-op-Zoom fell as well. In April 1748, the preliminaries for peace were signed. They nevertheless made a provision that France would be allowed to take Maastricht, which it did shortly afterwards. In October and November, all parties signed the final Treaty.

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The current state of research

French policy towards the Southern Netherlands during the War of the Austrian Succession has never a subject of study in its own right. Still, several historians have touched upon it in the course of their research on another subject, and have advanced more or less elaborate theories. In this chapter, I shall give an overview of these theories in thematic order, as they often share common elements. A quick summary of the main relevant literature will help the reader. There exist only two modern histories covering the entire War of the Austrian Succession, written by Browning and Anderson (both 1995). French historians have produced a series of biographies of Louis XV, the main goal of which is to rehabilitate the King from his popular reputation of a lazy incompetent, and these biographies obviously discuss France’s policy during the War of the Austrian Succession as well. The first one was written by Michel Antoine (1989), followed by Hours (2009) and Petitfils (2014). Jean-Pierre Bois’s history of the battle of Fontenoy (1996) covers the subject extensively as well, as do several articles and books written by Lucien Bély. Olaf van Nimwegen researched the policy of the Dutch Republic during the War (2002). A longer-term perspective is adopted by Jeremy Black (1999) and Heinz Duchhardt (1997).

Natural Borders and French expansionism An outdated yet still influential view, which for the sake of completeness and understanding must not go unmentioned, is the idea that ever since the Middle Ages France had striven to attain its ‘natural borders’. According to this view, at the time of the War of the Austrian Succession, France had achieved this goal in respect to its Western, Southern, and South- Eastern borders, where the Atlantic Ocean, the Pyrenees, the Mediterranean and the Alps protected France from foreign threats, and therefore made further enlargement unnecessary. Expansion towards the Rhine was thus the only remaining task for France to complete.

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At least in popular imagination, this doctrine of natural borders has not completely lost its grasp. But already in the 1930s, the French historian Gaston Zeller published a series of articles and books debunking it as a serious theory, noting that before the French revolution there was no coherent idea that France was ‘naturally’ meant to annex the Southern Netherlands.11 The Dictionnaire critique de la Révolution française adds that the idea was somewhat present during the Old Regime in a latent way, through confusion of France with Classical Gaul. The ‘natural borders’ were therefore “not a political tradition, but a passion, of which we can discern the sources in ancient France, but to which only the revolution has given an explosive power”.12 But even as serious historiography abandoned the doctrine of natural borders, the more limited idea that French kings and statesmen somehow should have annexed the Southern Netherlands did not entirely disappear from French and sometimes even international historiography. Gaston Zeller himself provides a perfect example: in an overview of French policy towards the Southern Netherlands, the eighteenth century is an “ère d’abandon et de refus”. He notes that ever since Louis XIV toyed with the idea near the end of his reign, France was anxious to show itself to the world as “freed from all territorial ambition” and seemed to have lost all interest in the Southern Netherlands. Indeed, the Peace of Aix-la- Chapelle was not “une improvisation, une erreur du moment”, given that France notified the Dutch Republic of its willingness to restore all its conquests in the from 1746 onwards. It did so because Louis XV and his councillors were convinced that the Maritime Powers would never agree to a cession of the Southern Netherlands. But, Zeller notes, the conflict with Great Britain at the time had wholly different origins. Worse still, French ‘désintéressement’ towards the Southern Netherlands was to continue for generations (a statement ominously followed by three suspension points). He concludes his treatment of the French renunciation at Aix-la-Chapelle by admitting that “nous avons quelque peine à comprendre”. In the final conclusion of his article, he again proclaims that it was not British opposition that was responsible for the fact that “the Old Regime did not acquire the Netherlands”. England was often too preoccupied with other affairs to intervene, or it was already at war with France, or it would even have given its assent. Neither even “fatality nor a lack of luck” can be blamed. Instead, it is the “clumsiness or the blindness of our statesmen”

11 Notably La monarchie d’ancien régime et les frontières naturelles (1933) and Histoire d’une idée fausse. 12 Denis Riche, “Frontières naturelles,” 223, 230.

17 that led to “cette décevante histoire”, and, by extension, it is “us, Frenchmen, and us only that are to be held responsible for this disgrâce”.13

French anti-expansionism In contrast to the abovementioned theories, one could also assume that France sincerely wanted to return the Southern Netherlands in 1748. This would in fact be based on a literal reading of some of the French government’s statements at the time: that it demanded nothing for itself and merely continued the war for the sake of its allies. Serious historiography in the 19th century has advanced this theory – for instance the Duke of Broglie in his account of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle14 – but the expansionist theory remained the more popular one, whether in the incarnation of the natural borders or as Zeller’s missed opportunity. Indeed, it shows the strength of it that even a historian like Zeller, who attacked the determinist theory of national borders, should still bitterly accuse Louis XV and his ministers of negligence. It is within such a context that a later generation of French historians developed the non- expansionist version, covering not only the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle and maybe a few years before that, but the entire eighteenth century15. In their view, Aix-la-Chapelle was not as the exception to the rule, but the demonstration of a new way of strategic thinking in Versailles. In this way historians such as Michel Antoine, followed by Lucien Bély and Jean- Pierre Bois, proposed that eighteenth-century France was a satiated power, a country that needed no further conquests to guarantee its security. They emphasized that France was the foremost land power of its time, boasting a well-defended border surrounded by fortresses, mountains and seas. They point out that the Regent Philip of Orléans and Cardinal Fleury had based their policy on this analysis, and they claim that it became widespread in France after the acquisition of Lorraine in 1738, France’s last substantial territorial enclave.16 Louis XV merely followed this trend when he returned the Southern Netherlands to Austrian rule: France did not need the region for itself, and the King would rather avoid lasting enmity with London and Vienna. These historians in fact gave France the role of a balancer in the Balance of Power, a role that the traditional view only ascribed to Great Britain. A balancer sought no

13 Gaston Zeller, “La France de l’Ancien Régime devant la question des Pays-Bas,” 177-179. 14 Broglie, La paix d’Aix-la-Chapelle, 78. 15 That is, 1713 until 1789-1792. 16 Lorraine was awarded to Louis XV’s father-in-law, the former King of Poland Stanislas Leszczyński, by the Treaty of Vienna of 1738, with a clause that it would revert to France after Stanislas’ death. This only happened in 1766, but in practice the Duchy was controlled by France from 1738 onwards.

18 advantage for itself save the stability of the European state system: this sufficed for its national security. France thus became, in the oft-repeated words of , “l’arbitre de l’Europe”.

Two variants exist to explain the origins of this foreign policy system. A first ascribes it to the moral inclinations of the King; a second combines it with his evaluation of the Balance of Power. Michel Antoine finds the primary reason for French anti-expansionism in the character and upbringing of the Louis XV. His education had presented him with the example of former statesmen who had renounced unjust conquests, and first and foremost he would have been inspired by the example of his ancestor Saint Louis, who, as the exemplar of the Christian king, would never put his own interest before justice. Louis XV would thus have been convinced that the strength of his monarchy would depend less on its military prowess than on the credit of its virtuous King. Historians who support this thesis substantiate it with Louis XV’s famous saying that he would make peace “not as a merchant, but as king”, or with his letter to the King of Spain, explaining his conduct at Aix-la-Chapelle as being less motivated by “the spirit of aggrandisement”, than by “the pity for my peoples and Religion”.17 It is of course impossible to determine what Louis XV’s personal convictions in this regard were. Nevertheless, it is somewhat hard to believe that the acquisition of Lorraine – and with it, the dispossession of one of the oldest dynasties of Europe and the loss by the Holy Roman Empire of what had always been its fief – was somehow more ‘just’ than the annexation of the Habsburg Netherlands would have been. It is true that the former was done by treaty whereas in the latter case a treaty would merely have confirmed a right of conquest – but the Ducal dynasty of Lorraine had hardly had a say over its own fate, as Versailles very well knew. Louis also had no qualms about letting Frederick the Great keep Silesia, his legal pretentions to which even the King of Prussia himself considered a joke. Louis’s Bavarian and Saxon allies certainly had a better claim, in virtue of the Mutual Pact of Succession of 1703, but this does not obscure the fact that Louis brushed aside the signature he had put under the Pragmatic Sanction barely two years before. If Louis saw himself as solely motivated by considerations of justice, he could certainly have done a somewhat better effort to give more convincing proof of it. At any rate, as I have noted before, I would like to leave aside the question of who decided in Versailles as much as possible. Historians who advocate the role

17 Michel Antoine, Louis XV, 401; Bernard Hours, Louis XV, 167; Jean-Christian Petitfils, Louis XV, 442-43.

19 of Louis’s personal convictions obviously maintain that he made the decision alone – in the most recent biography of Louis XV, Jean-Christian Petitfils adds that the King did it “without even consulting the great hero of the war, marshal de Saxe”.18 Besides being factually untrue – Saxe knew about the intention to return everything before Aix-la-Chapelle, and would certainly have had the opportunity to bring it up with Louis19 – Saxe was no minister or even courtier. Ministers were expected to voice their opinions to the King, and several courtiers also had the opportunity to do so. The King certainly had the ultimate say over such an important question as the enlargement of his Kingdom, but to what extent he was influenced by his childhood memories over the opinions of his councillors it is impossible to tell. Lucien Bély continues the tradition started by Antoine, emphasizing the idea of France as a satiated power and the importance of the King’s personal convictions. To him, France returns its conquests “as if, the old claims of France on Artesia and Flanders having been satisfied, the experience of the past advise[d] not to go any further.” He notes how “[u]ne preoccupation frappe” when reading contemporary texts: the French administrators of the occupied provinces worked under the assumption that the occupation was maybe only temporary. Likewise, the native authorities also seem to have counted on a possible return to Habsburg authority.20

Jean-Pierre Bois does not dismiss the importance of the King’s character, but he considers it “fragile to reduce an entire international system to a question of sensibility or morality”. He therefore adds Louis’ evaluation of the contemporary Balance of Power to the equation. Not that this diminishes the role of Louis; indeed Bois pushes it even further than Antoine and his followers. In his view, the King becomes the master planner of an entire new international system. The “objectif profond” of the King in the War of the Austrian Succession is a “general pacific rebalancing between the powers of Europe”.21 Of central importance is therefore Louis’s role as arbiter of Europe: “The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle is first of all the King’s peace. […] It is not the blind or brutal application of the right of the strongest. It results from the set of diplomatic equilibriums considered by the

18 Jean-Christian Petitfils, Louis XV, 443-44. 19 In a letter to his half-brother Augustus III of Poland-Saxony, written at Versailles on the 10th of February 1748, Saxe mentions that “Nous voulons tout rendre, comme nous disons. Jusqu’à présent, j’assurerais bien que cela est sincère, mais en mangeant l’appétit vient, comme on dit […].” Quoted in Broglie, La paix d’Aix-la- Chapelle, 14; original in Vitzthum von Eckstadt, Karl Friedrich, ed., Maurice comte de Saxe, et Marie Josèphe de Saxe, dauphine de France: lettres et documents inédits des archives de Dresde (Leipzig-Paris-London, 1867), 202. 20 Lucién Bély, “Le royaume de France et les Pays-Bas,” 645; id. “Un intendant en pays occupé,” 47, 50-51. 21 Jean-Pierre Bois, Fontenoy, 129, 133.

20

King of France, and the set of interests of which he makes himself the arbiter.” It is for this reason that he renounces all of his conquests: it makes his conditions for peace so generous that he becomes “entièrement maître du jeu diplomatique d’Aix-la-Chapelle”. Two centuries of Franco-Habsburg rivalry find their end in a French peace in Europe, which for the first time since the Treaties of Westphalia recognizes neither conqueror nor conquered. Louis is the first ruler to base European relations not upon force, but on equilibrium. In order to implement such a system, France had to be “vainqueur sans partage”. Its renunciation of conquest in the Netherlands should not bear any suspicion of weakness, if it were to serve as the first example of this new order renouncing territorial aggrandisement, that eternal source of conflict between states. Somewhat paradoxically Bois then maintains that Louis did not contest the right to territorial enlargement – he annexed Lorraine and Corsica after all – but that he affirmed “hautement” “that land is not to be conquered by arms, and that sovereignty does not reside in force.” Louis obviously did not believe in a right of nations higher than the right of kings, but still “one should not neglect, in the general context of the Enlightenment, the slow birth of a Europe of Nations preparing itself to succeed to the Europe of Kings”.22 This is of course an expression of the idea that France was by then believed to be territorially satiated. Bois points to the soon-to-be-expected acquisition of Lorraine, which would enlarge France without provoking a European crisis, and which offered the further benefit of leaving France’s formidable network of fortresses as its main defence. He believes that this network had proven its effectiveness, as France’s territory had never been invaded since the last Spanish incursions during the Thirty Years’ War – somehow glossing over the allied occupation of Lille in 1708 and the Austrian invasion of Alsace in 1744.23 On the long term, the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle might have become as important as the Treaties of Westphalia. Unfortunately for Louis, it did not last. The culprit is Frederick the Great, who spoiled the “paix juste” of the King with the “intérêts cyniques de son Etat”. Even more unfortunately for Louis, his subjects did not understand him: when Maurice de Saxe wrote his tirade to Count Maurepas about not being able to understand “votre diable de politique”, he showed that he was “incapable of extending his conception of the grandeur of the Kingdom beyond mere territorial possessions.” But Maurice expressed what all Frenchmen thought. As they were unable to understand that “Louis XV [was] the initiator of a veritable diplomatic revolution with very great consequences, they unanimously denounce[d]

22 Jean-Pierre Bois, Fontenoy, 59, 124, 127, 131 23 Jean-Pierre Bois, Fontenoy, 128

21 the Bien-Aimé24, who was already becoming the Mal-Aimé, notwithstanding the greatness of his arms”.25

Jean-Christian Petitfils, Louis XV’s most recent biographer, concludes from Louis’ statement that he wished to make peace not as a merchant but as king that he “had intervened above the mêlée as a kind of benevolent arbiter”. He immediately admits that Louis was mistaken in this. Louis probably believed that the European equilibrium had been restored in a just and durable way, but no settlement for the commercial conflicts between Europe’s powers had been found, and Austria remained vindictive. Therefore, the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, “paix boiteuse”, announced the Seven Year’s War, and France would then have been in a less vulnerable position if it had conserved the Southern Netherlands and Nice.26

The view described above postulates that France never even thought about annexing the Southern Netherlands during the War of the Austrian Succession. It follows that in their view, the decision to invade proceeded from nothing more than strategic considerations. To this, they often add that Louis XV himself desired to personally lead the next campaign. This would have made the Southern Netherlands a better battlefield than Germany: it lay right next to France and promised mostly sieges – a situation which had the least risk of putting the French monarch in danger. They do not assume this to have been the main reason to invade however – strategic considerations suffice.27

Dynastic prestige The non-expansionist approach entails that France’s grandeur was no longer to be measured by its territorial extent, but by its prestige. Jeremy Black proclaims “royal prestige as a major objective of French policy”. It was closely linked to the success of French diplomacy. Its ultimate incarnation – the King as the ‘arbiter of Europe’ – had already been voiced occasionally in the decades before the War of the Austrian Succession, including in 1727 when both Marshal Villars and Parisian public opinion had proclaimed it as glorious for the Monarchy.28

24 Louis’s original nickname, the Beloved. 25 Jean-Pierre Bois, Fontenoy, 128, 133-134. 26 Jean-Christian Petitfils, Louis XV, 442. 27 Michel Antoine, Louis XV, 363-365 28 Jeremy Black, From Louis XIV to Napoleon, 11.

22

Nevertheless, it is not an idea that frequently returns in relation to the War of the Austrian Succession – outside of the non-expansionist thesis, that is. “It is rarely mentioned”, says Petitfils, that Louis XV not only thought in terms of the national interest, but also cared for the interests of his dynasty. Petitfils points to the example of Louis XIV, who decided to support his grandson’s claim to the entire Spanish succession rather than stick to the previous agreement to divide the inheritance and directly annex part of it to France. In the same way, Louis XV dreamed of setting up a system of “brother kingdoms”, encompassing the Bourbon rulers of France, Spain, Naples and Parma, just like the French revolutionaries would create “sister republics”.29 Duchhardt deduces that the primary reason for France to have continued the war must have been to show “dynastic solidarity and harmony”. He believes that this was in the first place directed towards the colonial theatre, although neither wanted to gear up the war too much there. The other terrain was Italy, where the Franco-Spanish armies were nevertheless on the defensive since 1746. Duchhardt comes to this conclusion rather by default: he finds France’s war aims difficult to grasp. Germany could no longer be at issue after Prussia and Bavaria made peace with Maria Theresa. As for the Low Countries, it is “not certain whether France meant to annex the Southern Netherlands or merely to neutralise them, in order to control the [Dutch] Republic and also Great Britain – the French statements only allow the conclusion that this question was under dispute within the ministry itself”.30

Constraints by the international system The oldest and most widely used theory points to how France was constrained by the international system. These historians generally assume that France would have liked to annex the Netherlands, but finally decided against it for fear of arousing international opposition. This theory generally bears the influence of the classical Balance of Power interpretation of eighteenth-century international politics, namely that countries united against a hegemonic power – that is, France –, under the leadership of the ultimate balancer Great Britain. They often do not combine these elements into one coherent grand framework – such as the preceding anti-expansionist theories – and conclude rather that the concurrence of various elements ultimately proved decisive. Still, they often ascribe a particular importance to

29 Jean-Christian Petitfils, Louis XV, 443. 30 Heinz Duchhardt, Balance of Power und Pentarchie, 309-310.

23 consideration for one particular country, whether Great Britain, the United Provinces, Austria, and in a minor way, Russia.

Jeremy Black provides a good example of this interpretation. According to him, peace without conquest was necessary to placate Great Britain and Austria. These two should not be antagonized, for fear that the wartime coalition should stay together after the peace. France had not managed to break up the Habsburg Empire or install a client regime in Great Britain, and thus had to work within a less perfect international system than it had hoped for in the beginning of the war. This can also be seen after Aix-la-Chapelle: the secretary for foreign affairs Puyzieulx pursued better relations with Britain.31 In addition Black notes French fear of the 40.000 Russians marching towards the Rhine. France had grown increasingly wary of Russia the years before: it had been setting up an anti-Russian network of alliances including Sweden and Prussia, and had been using its traditional connections with the Ottoman Empire to this effect.32 Black is not the only one to mention the Russian army – Reed Browning says that they might overturn France’s military superiority on land, and Michel Antoine mentions the possibility of their arrival being a factor, although he does not go any further.33 Their influence should not be exaggerated though. This was not the great hordes of Russia descending on Europe, but an army of only 40.000 soldiers slowly making its way through the continent. The French army in the Southern Netherlands was far bigger than that. Entrenched as it was in Bergen-op-Zoom and Maastricht, it was in an excellent position to resist any attack on the Southern Netherlands, and from Maastricht it could even harass an army advancing through the Rhineland. The Russians were not even a simple negative for France: as they were being subsidized by London, they proved yet another drain on Great Britain’s coffers, as noted by Jean-Pierre Bois.34 Finally, Black affirms, the complete return of the Southern Netherlands also posed less of a problem because “the notion of gaining a slice of the Austrian Netherlands no longer seemed of such value, a source of power and prestige, as had been the case seventy years earlier”.35 He does not explain why.

31 Jeremy Black, From Louis XIV to Napoleon, 100. 32 Jeremy Black, From Louis XIV to Napoleon, 99. 33 Reed Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession, 328; Michel Antoine, Louis XV, 403. 34 Jean-Pierre Bois, Fontenoy, 126. 35 Jeremy Black, From Louis XIV to Napoleon, 99.

24

The French historian Bernard Hours points to “simple pragmatism” to explain the renunciation, in opposition to the “principes chimériques” embraced by many of his colleagues. He finds the insistence on Louis’ moral principles unconvincing and reeking of the modern right to national self-determination. Instead, Hours believes that Louis “rather logically” reached the conclusion that annexation posed more risks than it promised profits. It would antagonize England, with which relations were already tense in the colonial area, and it would stimulate Austrian vindictiveness, of which Vienna had already proven itself quite capable over Silesia. Hours believes that Louis was by then already striving for a better understanding with Austria. Furthermore, France needed “appeasement” if it was to accomplish its grand objective for nearly two decades: to re-establish French influence in Northern Europe.36 To take but one example, the King had been secretly collaborating with his distant cousin the Prince of Conti to install the latter on the Polish throne, in case the present occupant, the Dauphin’s father-in-law Augustus III, was to die.37 This made accommodation with Austria indispensable. The restitution thus becomes a token of goodwill towards Vienna.38

Hours is not exclusive in the view that France tried to improve its relations with Austria. From about 1745, an influential group in Versailles advocated better ties with Vienna, and initial contacts were made through the mediation of the Court of Dresden. Underlining these overtures also fits in with the renversement des alliances, which in this view was being prepared from this time onward. However, it should not be forgotten that the renversement happened quite suddenly, when France panicked as a result of Prussia’s allying itself with Great Britain and finally reciprocated the contacts which the Austrians, under the initiative of Kaunitz, had indeed been making since the end of the War of the Austrian Succession. If France had truly wanted to achieve an Austrian alliance or connection, it could have done so at an earlier date. In this spirit is would also have been less than fortunate that France finally opted to make peace through Great Britain rather than through Austria at Aix-la-Chapelle. It also somewhat glosses over the persistent austrophobia in French society, which did not

36 At the time, Poland was considered part of ‘the North’. 37 This secrèt du Roi had started in 1746, as a group of self-declared Polish patriots had approached the prince of Conti to save their country from Russian and Austrian domination, personified by Augustus III, who had won the Polish throne with their support. By 1748, however, France had marriage ties with Saxon dynasty and was using the Court of Dresden as intermediary with Vienna, so the contacts established by the secret du Roi would only beuseful if Augustus III were to die. 38 Bernard Hours, Louis XV, 555-556.

25 disappear even after the renversement. This is not to say that a desire for better relations with Vienna cannot have been a factor; it is simply unlikely that it was a major one.39

Hours’ “pragmatist” reasons are not entirely dismissed by his colleagues, although they rather cite them as a sort of annex to their main theory. Michel Antoine mentions Versailles’s fear for British and Dutch opposition to annexation – but he also believed that France was by then territorially satiated, an in any case he believed Louis’ personal convictions to be more important.40 Jean Pierre Bois, leaving the somewhat lofty plain of Louis XV’s grand plan, admits that “Louis’s moderation could be explained by rather classical reasons, pertaining to interests, if not bargaining”. Bois mentions that depriving Austria of its Netherlandish possessions would probably provoke revanchism in Vienna, given Maria Theresa’s obstinate refusal to accept the loss of Silesia. So it might be, but Maria Theresa had in reality indicated at several points in the war that she was willing to cede at least parts of the Netherlands, if that would get France out of the war and allow her to concentrate on Silesia. But Bois also mentions the certainty of active hostility on the part of Great Britain and the Dutch Republic – and this would indeed seem beyond doubt, given that the keystone of Great Britain’s security system was keeping the Southern Netherlands out of French hands. According to Bois, this knowledge had become an “axiom” of French diplomacy during the reign of Louis XIV, as both Maritime Powers could never countenance to become a French port. In view of these considerations, Bois adds, Louis’ has well understood that peace could not be based on territorial conquest – which then, of course, leads to his main theory of this having been Louis’s plan all along. Nevertheless, France did obtain considerable advantages even with a renunciation of conquest: Austria had lost its prestige in Germany as the other German states had refused to follow it, Prussia had emerged as a leading opponent, Saxony could now serve as an intermediary, Hannover was controlled by British interests, and the lesser princes of Germany wanted peace to promote baroque culture and the Aufklärung. Finally, the Habsburgs had lost its control over Italy, and the Bourbon powers now controlled important positions there.41 All this is a bit exaggerated: Austria’s position was more favourable than Bois believes. It had proved to be quite capable of defending itself in very dire situations, even of counterattacking in Bavaria and Italy. In Italy it remained in possession of Milan and

39 Max von Braubach, Versailles und Wien, 375. 40 Michel Antoine, Louis XV, 401. 41 Jean-Pierre Bois, Fontenoy, 128.

26

Tuscany. Its diplomatic system had not collapsed either – although it is true that the old Austrian-Dutch British alliance was no longer what it used to be.

Several historians mention France’s favourable position in the Balance of Power of 1748, rather than the country being constrained by it. Anderson affirms that France at Aix-la- Chapelle was in an extremely strong position. It was victorious on land, and both Great Britain and Austria sought to come to terms separately with the French representative. However, it did not exploit its position due to an increasing war-weariness.42 Lucien Bély supports Michel Antoine’s views – based upon France’s status as a satiated power and Louis’s personal convictions – but, like Bois, he adds that France gained a lot from the War of the Austrian Succession. The power of the Habsburgs in Germany had been weakened: even as they regained the Imperial throne they had not been able to persuade the Holy Roman Empire to declare war upon France, and Vienna now had another powerful adversary in Frederick the Great’s Prussia, which would prevent it from focussing too much attention on France. Also, the Dutch Republic would no longer follow the lead of England.43 Brendan Simms, who admittedly wrote a history of British policy and does not focus on other countries, also points to France’s overwhelming strength, as by 1748 it threatened to overrun the Dutch Republic “and thus completely overrun the European Balance of Power as London understood it”. Peace, as quickly as possible, was imperative. This finally determined the British government to consent to the return of Louisbourg to France – a highly unpopular move domestically that ministers had been trying to avoid ever since it was captured, but one that was nonetheless inevitable because France absolutely insisted on getting it back. At the basis of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle lay therefore the exchange of Louisbourg for the Southern Netherlands.44

Incompetence As demonstrated by Zeller, the idea that the French government at the time was negligent or plain incompetent flows logically from the view that France should have annexed the Southern Netherlands, whether to fulfil its ‘natural’ destiny or to simply grasp the best opportunity it had ever had to forever achieve France’s territorial security. This is of course a

42 Matthew Anderson, The War of the Austrian Succession, 202-203. 43 Lucien Bély, La France moderne, 519. 44 Brendan Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat, 348-350.

27 prescriptivist historiography. However, in one of the two recent standard works on the War of the Austrian Succession, Reed Browning resurrects the view that the French government at the time was simply incompetent. To explain the French renunciation of all its conquests, Browning points out that the French government itself was in doubt as to whether it would annex part the of the Southern Netherlands (annexing all of it being no option as the British, Dutch and Austrians would never accept it). “Louis found himself, almost against his will, hankering after a trophy of some sort to justify all his efforts. But Pâris-Duverney [an influential financier] advised him that if he wanted to promote the trust “so necessary for the reestablishment of public tranquillity,” he needed to honor [sic] his promise not to grab land.”45 Browning fully subscribes to the old tradition depicting Louis XV as an idiot, at one point describing him as “the silliest of kings”.46 Louis had hardly known in the first place whether he wanted war, or what he wanted to do with it as it went on, and now, as peace finally approached, he did not know either whether he wanted to keep part of the Southern Netherlands or give it all back. Pâris-Duverney then convinces him to stick to his promise, made a few years before, to forsake territorial conquest.47 This leads us back again to the question of who decided in Versailles – and, as stated before, it is unlikely that Louis made such a choice in isolation. This is partially accounted for here by the role of Pâris-Duverney; but while he may certainly have talked to the King about the question, he would not have been the only one. At any rate, Browning does not go any further to elaborate this claim. Incompetence is one of the leading themes of Browning’s depiction of the French government throughout the war. One major factor for this – apart from the old cliché that Louis was a fool and unable to impose coherence on his government – is the importance he attaches to France’s Secretary of State for foreign affairs from November 1744 until January 1747, marquis d’Argenson.48 He is not alone in this: Matthew Anderson and Olaf van Nimwegen rely greatly on him as well. Neither is it surprising: d’Argenson’s published memoirs have been readily available since the nineteenth century. D’Argenson also provided a theoretical description of the international system he was trying to accomplish, which maybe makes him more intellectually appealing and in any case seemingly easier to understand than if we would have to rely solely on ad hoc documents in archives. However,

45 Reed Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession, 329. 46 Reed Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession, 192. 47 The question of whether such a promise actually existed will be dealt with later on. 48 Not to be confused with his younger brother, count d’Argenson, who was Secretary of State for War from 1743 til 1757.

28 his plan was fantastical and bore little relation to the actual reality of his time.49 Using it to understand French foreign policy cannot but result in considering the French government incompetent, both because it was unable to carry out the plan and because the plan itself was worthless in the circumstances. Furthermore, relying too much on d’Argenon puts the historian at risk of following his interpretation of the operation of the French government at the time. As argued by Bernard Hours, the marquis had a habit of imputing every decision to the machinations of the factions at court and in the ministry: the content of ideas was of little decisive value according to him. D’Argenson obviously regretted this, both because according to the ideology of the Ancien Régime divisions were bad, and because he himself was unable to take part in it. Thus, through d’Argenson’s memoirs, the thesis was introduced in historiography that the divisions in government coincided exactly with the factional divisions at Court, which “masked the autonomous functioning of the Council on the one hand, and its dependence on the King on the other.”50 This would also explain why it is Pâris-Duverney who convinced the King according to Browning: a financier is a quintessential embodiment of the machinations of factions. As Reed Browning believes d’Argenson to have been France’s “helmsman”51 in the period he was Secretary of State – there being a need for a ‘helmsman’ as the King was unable of providing leadership –52, it is understandable that he reached the conclusion that the French government itself was incompetent. However, it is unlikely that d’Argenson really fulfilled such a role. There are four ways conceivable through which he could have imposed his will on the government: through his talent and the value of his ideas, through his connection with the King, through his relationship with his fellow ministers, or through his relationship with the court. The first can immediately be ruled out. The second leads to the question of who decided, but even if Louis absolutely imposed his will on his government, we know that he did not support d’Argenson fully: as his recent biographers have shown, he liked to rely on multiple people and in some cases he even actively countered d’Argenson’s foreign through the diplomatie secrete of his own.53 Finally, d’Argenson was not a popular or

49 The basis of his ideas was that France was a satisfied power, and should become a neutral arbiter protecting the tranquility of Europe against those who sought to disturb it: mainly Great Britain, Spain, Austria, and Russia. He wanted to make Italy completely independent of foreign influence, and he saw the United Provinces as a potential French ally. It goes without saying that these views encountered some friction with the reality that Spain was allied to France and that the Dutch Republic was largely hostile. (Olaf van Nimwegen, De Republiek als grote mogendheid, 212.) 50 Bernard Hours, Louis XV, 510-511. 51 As in the titel of the chapter containing marquis d’Argenson disgrace: “France changes its helmsman”. Reed Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession, 294. 52 There is indeed a historiographical discussion that France would have needed a Prime Minister at this moment. 53 For instance, by reaching out to Vienna through Saxony, which was anathema to the Austrophobe d’Argenson.

29 gregarious figure: in contrast to his sociable and talented brother the count d’Argenson, the marquis was known as “d’Argenson la bête”.54 He therefore had little support at court, and it is rather improbable that the faction-ridden ministry would have united around a man neither brilliant nor amiable, and that he would have been able to impose his views on genuinely talented and more experienced ministers like Secretary of State for War count d’Argenson and Secretary of State for the Navy Maurepas. The role d’Argenson plays in Browning’s narrative is therefore unwarranted, and his thesis of governmental incompetence must lose some of its force. The search for competence is also connected to what Jeremy Black calls the “reification early-modern foreign policy”, which obliges historians to look for coherence and consistency. Black argues, however, that this cannot be expected: royal interventions were unpredictable, various advisors different in opinion, and the Foreign Office was ridden with patron-client relationships.55 At any rate, it must be expected that any ministry of the past would seem slightly incompetent in our eyes – but we have the benefit of hindsight, whereas they had to react to situations of which they neither knew the consequences nor often even all of its causes.

Exhaustion Several historians mention the military or economic exhaustion of France, or at least a growing war-weariness, to explain the timing of the peace and to a lesser extent the renunciation of conquest in the Netherlands. Reed Browning qualifies Aix-la-Chapelle as a ‘peace of exhaustion’. He believes that France needed peace more than any other country. Its entire economy was suffering. Military mobilization had disrupted the labour force. The country’s capital markets were being drained, leading to “a borrowing competition it could not hope to win”. British raiding severely diminished French trade, its overseas Empire was under attack, and it had had a bad harvest in 1747. It could not hope much from its next military offensive either: the Russian troops were coming, and a further invasion of the Dutch Republic might bring Prussia and the Holy Roman Empire into the war. All this diminished Versailles’ room for manoeuvre. France’s opponents were in a dire situation as well: Austria was suffering from a huge debt and inflation in Lombardy. British government loans were becoming increasingly

54 Jean-Christian Petitfils, Louis XV, 373. 55 Jeremy Black, From Louis XIV to Napoleon, 33.

30 expensive, and British trade with Portugal and the West Indies was suffering. It could not hope to ever field an army as large as France’s. A stalemate had therefore been reached, and this made everyone more amenable to peace. As we have seen, Browning does not impute the decision to return the Southern Netherlands to France’s state of exhaustion: that was due to Louis’s indecision and Pâris-Duverney’s skills of persuasion.56 Anderson points to the importance of economic factors as well in order to explain the timing of the peace. Both Austria and Great Britain were increasingly worried about the financial costs of the coming campaign. This cost was maybe the highest for France. French commerce was suffering due to the British blockade, and this was now “having some effect, though still only a limited one, on France’s economic life”. Since 1744 government expenditure had been a third higher than Britain’s, which had a more efficient system of taxation and finance. Like Britain it subsidized various allies, notably the Palatinate and other smaller states in Germany, and like Britain it might have wondered if the benefits of this measured up to the cost. Most importantly, Anderson states, the will to fight was increasingly lacking, and this meant that “France’s very strong position vis-à-vis the Dutch and the British was therefore never exploited to the full.57 Whereas Anderson still points to France’s overall superior position, Jeremy Black believes France to have been “in a parlous state”. The British only feared for the Low Countries. France in contrast saw its commerce diminished by the British blockade, suffered from 1747’s poor harvest, and had serious financial problems; it expended more than Austria and Great Britain combined in 1744. The Provence had been invaded by Austria and Sardinia in 1746. Its system of alliances was falling apart as well: Ferdinand VI no longer supported France’s schemes, and opened independent negotiations with the British in 1747.58 According to Duchhardt, the war continued after 1744 because of the colonies, although both sides did not want to expand the war there. Eventually everyone tired of the conflict. France was suffering from a famine due to 1747’s bad harvest, and it was losing money due to the British blockade. It was afraid that Britain could carry on the war at sea forever, and that it could so lose its sugar islands. There was a risk that Spain would conclude a separate peace with Great Britain. Austria wanted to focus on internal reforms. Great Britain was the last one to come out in favour of peace, as its public had wanted to carry on the war until France was defeated, but it finally reached the conclusion that it had already spent more

56 Reed Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession, 325-328. 57 Matthew Anderson, The War of the Austrian Succession, 198-199. 58 Jeremy Black, From Louis XIV to Napoleon, 98.

31 than it had during the War of the Spanish Succession, and bankruptcy was becoming imminent. As no nation saw its own position as especially favourable, peace could be concluded quickly.59 Van Nimwegen on the other hand points merely to the military stalemate. France had played its last card in the Netherlands in 1747, and in France the military situation was beyond redemption. Versailles therefore opened up negotiations with the British, as it was only through them that it could regain Louisbourg and obtain an Italian principality for Don Philip.60 The theme of a ‘peace by exhaustion’ is especially popular in the Anglo-Saxon and English-influenced world – probably because of the popularity of the realist analysis of foreign policy, which traditionally underlines the importance of financial and economic factors.61 In France, where the realist approach is less influential, it is only used to demonstrate the weakness of France’s opponents. Jean-Pierre Bois points out that both Great Britain and France wanted to finish ‘a costly and in the end useless war’. We know that in Bois’s view Louis XV’s goal had always been peace. Great Britain on its part worried about having to pay the Russian troops that were advancing to Western Europe. Austria had obtained the Imperial crown, and had not managed to break the Franco-Spanish alliance. The Dutch were the most intransigent, which is why the campaign of 1747 was directed against them.62 Petitfils copies Bois’s arguments. He points to Britain’s financial exhaustion (including its apprehension to pay the Russian troops), and its being left as the only support of the severely threatened Dutch Republic. Austria felt abandoned by its allies and had not managed to break its opponents’ alliance. Again, the Dutch stadtholder, “creature de la faction anglaise” is the only obstacle to peace – which is why Maastricht was chosen as the next target for the French army.63 The other French historians – Antoine, Bély, Hours – do not mention France’s deteriorating economic situation as a factor to either make peace or renounce conquest.

Whilst it cannot have been without consequences, France’s economic malaise must not be exaggerated. The British economic blockade was undoubtedly annoying. However France at

59 Heinz Duchhardt, Balance of Power und Pentarchie, 310-312. 60 Olaf van Nimwegen, De Republiek als grote mogendheid, 356. 61 David Onnekink and Gijs Rommelse, Ideology and foreign policy, 13. 62 Jean-Pierre Bois, Fontenoy, 126. 63 Jean-Christian Petitfils, Louis XV, 439.

32 this time was still a predominantly agricultural country and revenues from trade were not vital for the continued survival of the French state – at least not in the short term. The bad harvest of 1747 and the ensuing famine must have been a much more severe problem. But famines were endemic in the pre-industrial world, and can hardly have been a reason to stop the war at once. France had been in a far worse situation economically during the War of the Spanish Succession and it had still managed to carry on: if the French government had wished to continue the war in 1748, it would undoubtedly have been able to do so. Fears of eminent conquest of the French sugar islands were ill-founded as well: British plantations owners lobbied hard in London to avoid new domestic competition through the annexation of more sugar islands. And France was hardly alone in suffering from economic and financial problems: in the beginning of 1748 the Dutch announced that they would not be able to pay for another campaign64 – Bois’s claims of the Dutch being adamantly against peace are as far from the truth as they can be –, and in London fears of bankruptcy were mounting. France’s economic situation must thus have made peace desirable, but not imperative.

Conclusion There are some general conclusions we can draw from historians’ treatment of France’s policy towards the Southern Netherlands during the War of the Austrian Succession. A few theories seem unworkable and do not promise to become very productive even if they were to be expanded upon. I have already dwelt at length on how difficult it is to determine exactly how powerful certain individuals in Versailles were, or by whom they were influenced. Any theory attributing the decision to one person – whether Louis XV or the marquis d’Argenson – must therefore be considered suspect. It is not that these individuals were not influential, but the environment in which they worked and lived did not encourage decision-making in complete isolation. The arguments in favour of the ‘pacifist’, or at least non-expansionist theory, are unsatisfying as well. French policy during the eighteenth century, and even during the War of the Austrian Succession, shows too many contradictory signs to accept it outright. Stronger proof than merely Louis’s upbringing or France’s alleged territorial saturation would be necessary. Nevertheless, a few observations can be made that are certainly useful to further research.

64 Olaf van Nimwegen, De Republiek als grote mogendheid, 347.

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A very remarkable fact is that there is no consensus on whether France was in a strong or a weak position in 1748. Those who believe it was strong are apt to believe that France had become pacifist, or that it had become war-weary. Those who see France as being in the weaker position, generally think it was constrained by the international environment. Historians also seem to focus either on the period directly before the congress of Aix- la-Chapelle, or on a longer-term perspective. The renunciation thus becomes an impromptu decision, based up the realities of the war in 1748, or a manifestation of a longer-term pattern, whether French pacifism of French consideration for its rivals. The subject is rarely seen within the context of the War of the Austrian Succession itself. Historians have known for a long time that France was proposing the return of all its conquests in 1746; they know as well that the negotiations with Vienna through Dresden in 1745 still demanded the surrender of a few towns. Admittedly, these statements must not be absolutized: they were made in the context of diplomatic negotiations, and as such they may well have been tactical ploys to obtain something else. But at any rate they were just mentioned by historians: they have not been investigated. This is of course due to the lack of a specific study on the subject: to most historians, French policy towards the Southern Netherlands was only touched upon when it was relevant for their own research, and interpreted within the context of that research. Still, it remains that the factor of time has been conspicuously absent from the treatment of the subject. In the same trend, few historians seem really to have taken into account that next to returning or keeping all of the Southern Netherlands, France could also have decided to keep only part of it. Only the ‘pacifist’ historians seem to have remarked that the return of all France’s conquests was somewhat dogmatic – even if their explanation is unsatisfying.

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The Southern Netherlands and France’s memoranda writers

The memoranda in the French archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are well suited to fill out the gaps left by the research up until now. They avoid the problem of personalities and allow us to focus much more upon the ideas, and what might have caused these ideas. In this way they show the variation in policy both at one given moment at over a longer period of time – and, as we have seen, the time factor was almost completely lacking in research. For this reason, the memoranda will be analysed in chronological order.

The road to war in the Southern Netherlands During the first phase of the War of the Austrian Succession, France did not show any hostile intentions towards the Southern Netherlands. Petitfils claims that the Duke of Belle-Isle – the driving force behind France pro-war party – “dreamt” of annexing them65, but even if this was the case Belle-Isle does not seem to have developed any concrete plan for doing so. Still it would not be surprising if he did “dream” about it: France had a long history of war and annexation in the Southern Netherlands. Moreover, that enterprise was particularly associated with the memory of Louis XIV. Belle-Isle was certainly susceptible to this strain of thinking: he had fought in the War of the Spanish Succession, and he had been thirty years old when Louis le grand had died. As France went to war after the death of Emperor Charles VI, the Southern Netherlands were in spite of sentiment not a strategically desirable battlefield. It was not there that the real action would happen: Prussia, Bavaria and Saxony were marching on the heartlands of the Habsburg of dynasty. It would have been useless for France to look towards a harmless periphery, if it could strike at the heart of its enemy. Moreover, any attack on the Southern Netherlands would have set the Barrier system into motion, bringing the Dutch and British into the war. France even had a precedent for how to deal with a Central European war. During the War of the Polish Succession, which had started in 1733, France and the

65 Jean-Christian Petitfils, Louis XV, 291.

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Dutch Republic had concluded a Convention of Neutrality for the Southern Netherlands, and both The Hague and London had indeed stayed out of the war. And just so, as French troops started to cross the Rhine in August 1741, the French ambassador in The Hague hinted to the States-General that France would be willing to negotiate a similar Convention of Neutrality. However, by the end of 1741, it became clear that the Dutch Republic turned the offer down.66 Still, as long as the Dutch and British did not send more troops into the Southern Netherlands, France need not fear for its Northern border. It was well defended, and to breach its fortresses a considerable army and siege-train would have been necessary. Traditionally, only the Dutch possessed a siege train that was large and well-organized enough to assail the frontière de fer.67 And as long as France stayed clear of the Southern Netherlands, the odds were that the States-General would not lend their support to an allied attack on France via the Southern Netherlands. In any case France’s fortresses could be expected to hold out long enough for a French army to come back from Germany. All this was reflected in the fact that France had not entered the war as a principal party, but as an auxiliary to its allies – especially Bavaria. This meant that legally France was not at war with Maria Theresa – nor with anyone else at that moment. Hypothetically France could have sought to award itself with a Netherlandish crumble of the fallen Habsburg Empire at the negotiating table, receiving it as a token of its allies’ recognition for French efforts on their behalf. But even if I did not thoroughly examine this period, it is safe to assume that France did not have any concrete plans regarding the post-war Southern Netherlands: none of its behaviour during this time would predict them. As it was, France and its allies never had to consider the post-war order in detail. Maria Theresa proved resilient. It is within a context of deteriorating French fortunes that we encounter the first memorandum mentioning the possibility of war in the Southern Netherlands, dating to September 1742.68 Fittingly, the memorandum posed the question whether France should continue fighting in Germany, or acknowledge the hopelessness of it and give up the project “qui devoit faire pour toujours la gloire et la sûreté de la monarchie”, namely the “abasement” of the House of Austria. The memorandum claimed that France was forced to retreat to cover its allies Saxony and Bavaria. Indeed, at the end of 1741 an Austrian army had invaded Bavaria, and France

66 Olaf van Nimwegen, De Republiek als grote mogendheid, 148-153. 67 Olaf van Nimwegen, De Republiek als grote mogendheid, 393. 68 MD 511, 9. Refflexions sur la situation presente de l’Europe en septembre 1742, September 1742.

36 had retreated a part of its army from Bohemia to come to their aid. It had been to no avail: the Austrians had crushed the succouring French army and occupied Munich. The weakened French garrison in Prague had been put under siege. A French army under marshal Maillebois which had hitherto been stationed in the Rhineland was sent to Bavaria, and although it had managed to push the Austrians out of Bavaria, it had not been particularly successful otherwise. According to the memorandum, the main cause for this bleak situation was the disruption of the alliance with Saxony. Prussia – now exposed as utterly untrustworthy after a separate truce and peace with Maria Theresa – refused to cede Upper Silesia, which had been promised to Saxony as a corridor to Poland (the Elector of Saxony was also King of Poland at this time). If the alliance with Saxony were not restored, the memorandum gloomily predicted the situation would soon become as bad as it had been before Maillebois’s advance four months before. In addition to all of this, the British had started sending troops to the Southern Netherlands in the spring. The memorandum claims that the allied force in the Austrian Netherlands now numbered 60.000 – more than France could put against them as long as the war in Germany continued. Apparently some people in Versailles wanted France to disengage from Germany to protect its northern border, but the author argued that this was not necessary at the moment. He gave six reasons: 1. France did have enough troops for a defensive war against an invasion from the Southern Netherlands. 2. All its fortresses were in good condition. 3. Winter would start soon, which would give France time to prepare itself to such a point that it would have nothing to fear. 4. The Dutch would be anxious to avoid a war so close to them. 5. If the British conquered something, France could easily gain it back. 6. The damage that the British could inflict in Flanders was in no relation to what France could obtain in the Holy Roman Empire, “on which depends, as has been said, the glory and the security of the monarchy”. In view of this, the author concluded, France should endeavour to restore the alliance with Saxony. If it did not succeed, Germany would have to be abandoned, and all the money that had been poured into the enterprise would be wasted. France should then “expect to possibly undergo a long war in Flanders and on the Rhine”.

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This memorandum confirms what I have argued before about France’s attitude towards the Southern Netherlands at this moment. The centre of operation was Germany: it was there that it would obtain both “glory and security”. The allied forces in the Southern Netherlands posed no great threat to France’s border, and the Dutch would be unlikely to support a war there. The author even presents a war in the Southern Netherlands as a worst- case scenario, as it would be a defensive war. Finally, it is of interest that he did not even mention the possibility of an offensive war there: France could only achieve its goals in Germany.

This train of thinking is reflectd in two memoranda written by marshal Noailles in early 1743. Noailles was an influential personality at the French court: he was close to the King and maintained a regular correspondence with him. This is also the only regular personal correspondence by Louis XV that has survived. Both aspects are significant. The fact that Noailles had the opportunity to regularly expose his views to the King gave him influence, but at the same time Louis was a prolific letter-writer: Noailles cannot have been his only correspondent.69 The latter should not be forgotten if we are not to exaggerate Noailles’s influence on French policy – which some historians seem to do, although not nearly as much as they do for marquis d’Argenson. A veteran of the War of the Spanish Succession, Noailles had a good understanding of military matters. The two memoranda bear the trace of this. The first memorandum70, written on the 9th of January 1743, reacted to the possibility that the allied army in the Southern Netherlands should enter Germany.71 Noailles called this this option “the most dangerous for the general situation” and he proposed to analyse what can be done about it. Noailles began by remarking that the King’s enemies could only pass into Germany because they knew that France would not attack the Southern Netherlands out of consideration for the United Provinces. This statement implicitly admits the possibility of French offensive action towards the Southern Netherlands, and shows how the French

69 Michel Antoine, Louis XV, 9. 70 MD 511, 17. Mémoire de M. le Mal de Noailles, 9th of January 1743. 71 It will be remembered that the British had only sent troops to the Southern Netherlands at this moment; it was now under discussion in the allied camp how they should be put to use.

38 perspective on the war was beginning to widen.72 However, the Southern Netherlands were still only considered in relation to the German theatre of war. The theme of ‘French consideration for the United Provinces’ is a recurring one in literature on the War of the Austrian Succession – and, as shown by Noailles, in the contemporary point of view. This attitude was logical: the Dutch Republic was the only member of the Grand Alliance which had not committed itself fully, and seemed little inclined to do so. Apart from not bringing their own army into the war, they were thus a restraining influence on Great Britain and Austria, especially in the Southern Netherlands. However, some historians make this an overarching theme of French policy during the entire war – especially those who look towards marquis d’Argenson, who believed Franco-Dutch enmity to be outdated. This is rather exaggerated: France was fighting against Great Britain and Austria as much as it was trying to keep the Dutch Republic out of the war, and France’s conduct does not reflect greater efforts to the latter than for the former purpose. Noailles’s statement should therefore be seen for what it is: as something that was relevant for early 1743. Noailles believed that the allied crossing into Germany could serve two purposes: to capture Emperor Charles Albert in Frankfurt or chase him from it, or else occupy the upper course of the Danube so as to isolate Bavaria from France. It should be remembered that at this moment, Bavaria was again partially in Bavarian hands after Maillebois’s advance, but Prague the French army had been forced to abandon in the freezing cold of December. Help for Bavaria could thus only come from France itself. And it is this, Noailles pointed out, that demonstrated the danger of an allied decent into Germany: France had no troops left to oppose it. Noailles assumed that a new army would only be ready by the end of February, consisting of troops returning from Germany and garrisons that had remained in France, half of which would have to come from the border. The issue was complicated even more by the fact that there was no certainty as to whether the allied plan to pass into Germany was still in force, although Noailles himself believed that to still be the case. IN order to make it easier to react to this, France should immediately place all of its troops from the sea to the Saar under one commander, as the enemy as well had occupied this entire region. With a military commander’s eye, Noailles then considered the various routes from the Southern Netherlands towards the Upper Danube, as well as what France could do to oppose it. It is of no interest to repeat his exact observations here. Suffice it to say that

72 Note that at this moment French military involvement was still confined to Germany: France had not yet sent troops into Italy.

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Noailles preferred to move the army towards Trier or the Lower Palatinate. The other option was to occupy the Abbey of Saint-Hubertus, which proclaimed independence and was supported in this by France over Austrian claims that it belonged to the Southern Netherlands. Sending troops towards it would thus be of symbolical as well as military value, as it would distract the Austrian army in Luxembourg. However, it would not prevent the rest of the allied army from crossing into Germany. As an aside, Noailles repeated an argument he had apparently made in November, namely that France should never leave Maritime Flanders and especially Dunkirk undefended against English attack. The retranchements the French army had built there should be brought closer together, as the gaps between them were too large. A postscript mentioned that this memorandum had been superseded now that the enemy had suspended departure for Germany. Noailles recommended that other options ought now to be considered, including a defensive war – that is, a war defending against a force attacking from the Southern Netherlands. This memorandum illustrated that at this point France was still primarily concerned about Germany. The Southern Netherlands forcibly came into view, however, as France’s enemies amassed troops there, and as the adjacent Rhineland looked set to become the next battlefield. The goal remained still to succour Bavaria, although the issue was well on its way to become the security of France itself.

Noailles reaches the logical consequence of this situation in his next memorandum on the 27th of February.73 Putting into question the underlying logic of the war, he asked whether it would be better if France would wait for the enemy to attack, or if it should attack itself and declare open war, abandoning the status of auxiliary. According to “generally recognized maxims”, Noailles remarked, it was far more disadvantageous to wait for the enemy than to attack first. Therefore, a defensive war could only be politically motivated. At present, France did not enjoy any of the advantages of its status as an auxiliary. The normal disadvantages of this status were that the fighting often happened far from one’s borders, where all money spent was at pure loss for the state, and retreating was difficult. In compensation, the auxiliary could expect to be putting merely his troops at risk and not the state itself: possible losses were known in advance and were limited.

73 MD 511, 18. Mémoire de Mr. le Mal de Noailles, 27th of February 1743.

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Being an auxiliary was not the same thing as fully supporting an ally: then one was treated as an enemy and so one underwent all the inconveniences of an openly declared war. In a declared war, a state should not operate far from its borders; this reduced costs and made that most of the money spent stayed within its borders. In such a war a state determined operations itself, in view of what it sought to obtain. The possible risks were therefore higher, but so were the gains. And so, Noailles wrote, France should ask itself whether its efforts now were limited and the state was not at risk. This was not the case: its troops suffered and they cost more since they were far away in Germany, and Maria Theresa had boasted that she wanted to re- annex the Alsace to the Holy Roman Empire (she had indeed proclaimed that she would compensate the loss of Silesia with the annexation of a part of France). France would gain nothing out of a war in Germany, and the costs would only increase. A single lost battle would be without remedy, as retreating would be arduous and the loss of the army nearly certain. The enemy could then invade France whilst it was unable to defend itself. By contrast, an army that has lost a battle close to its borders could regroup under the cover of fortresses. Noailles thus concluded that a war in the Low Countries would be preferable to one in Germany. France should therefore declare to the Dutch that since they provided Maria Theresa with troops, France no longer felt itself obliged to respect a non-reciprocated neutrality. But there was a risk in going to war in the Southern Netherlands: it might cause the Dutch to supply more troops to France’s enemies, or even persuade Prussia to join the coalition against France – after two betrayals Noailles clearly no longer had any trust in Frederick. But some things could not be avoided, so Noailles believed and it was quite possible that the Dutch would openly join France’s enemies even if France did not invade. In any case, France would have to wait three more months before its battered army from Bohemia would be fit again, and in the meantime the enemies would reveal their intentions and make the choice for France. If they decided to attack France proper, the King was advised to declare war at once, without consideration for the Dutch, and regain the initiative in Flanders as soon as possible. As a final argument for an attack against the Southern Netherlands, Noailles concluded that it would allow hitting the Dutch and the British where they were weakest: in their trade. The Southern Netherlands were indeed an important market for British and Dutch commerce. France did not follow Noailles’s way of thinking in 1743, if only because the enemy ‘Pragmatic Army’ – assembled in defence the Pragmatic Sanction – did indeed pass into

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Germany. The campaign struck a severe blow to France’s position in the Holy Roman Empire: Bavaria was once more occupied, and the French army itself suffered an ignominious defeat at Dettingen, although the French army managed to escape relatively unscathed. If anything, the events of 1743 only reinforced Noailles’ arguments.

Preparing the invasion The next memorandum unambiguously mentioned that the next French campaign would concentrate on the Southern Netherlands.74As it was written in December 1743 and the previous memorandum dated from February, I cannot show when exactly the decision was taken to invade the Southern Netherlands. Theoretically, it is even possible that France would already have preferred to do so for the campaign of 1743, if it had been left with the choice and Noailles’s way of argumentation had prevailed. However, it is telling that Noailles had reached the conclusion that a campaign in the Southern Netherlands would be preferable by February 1743– just two months after Prague had been lost and right after he came to believe – wrongly, as it turned out – that the allied army would not pass into Germany. As the campaign of 1743 proved once more what should have been obvious by the end of 1742, it should not surprise that the French government came to a conclusion which at the beginning of the year had already been clear to Noailles at the very least: France’s supply lines towards Bohemia or even Bavaria were simply too long and too exposed. In order to operate in Bohemia, France would have to defend both Bavaria and the Upper Rhine. An attack on any of those regions would disrupt the whole chain – as in fact happened when the Austrians descended into Bavaria. British and Hanoverian forces could easily and without opposition assemble somewhere on the Lower Rhine, and then march to threaten French supply lines on the Upper Rhine. This was a structural problem that could not be remedied: if France secured the Upper Rhine, it could reconquer Bavaria. But to gain any lasting advantage, it would then have to march on either Prague or Vienna, starting the entire process anew. In contrast, the region where France chose to carry the war now gave it a structural advantage. The Southern Netherlands lay right next to the French border, and its main rivers all had their sources in France. The French army and supply train could thus simply march downriver, especially along the and . Moreover, as the Southern Netherlands had a highly productive agriculture, the French army could be fed locally.

74 MD 418, Etat de la situation de l’Europe au mois de decembre 1743, December 1743.

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This change in circumstances seems to have heartened the author of the December 1743 memorandum I mentioned.75 He noted that the war seemed to increase. Austria has occupied and dismantled all Bavarian fortresses76, shipped off their cannon to Vienna, and forced the Bavarians to swear an oath of loyalty to Maria Theresa. As France could not rest as long as the Emperor was not safely returned to his hereditary lands, peace could not be expected anytime soon. Yet, the author proclaimed, provided the right measures were taken France and Spain could force Great Britain and the Dutch Republic to make peace. France might be exhausted, but it had unlimited resources and superior armies. The author counted that if France arms itself on sea, the Dutch and British would be “seriously disconcerted”. And then, the author noted, “France which does not want to conquer could well procure for itself a barrier against its enemies if the war proceeds in its favour, and push back that of the Dutch”. This formulation is a bit odd: France did not want to conquer, but it might still annex a few barrier fortresses. It demonstrates two things: the author was aware of some sort of French promise not to conquer anything, but he also believed that it did not apply to the Barrier in the Southern Netherlands. The most likely explanation for this is that the French government had indeed proclaimed that it did not seek anything for itself – but that was a logical consequence of France’s status hitherto as an auxiliary to Bavaria. Indeed, France’s position was best served by pretending it merely sought to uphold its ally’s just claims to the Austrian inheritance, rather than by emphasizing the geostrategic advantage it would obtain from the collapse of the Habsburg Empire. It is not clear why the author believed that this intention would no longer apply to the Southern Netherlands. Maybe he wanted to suggest that France should not let its earlier promise deter it from taking advantage of new situation; maybe he believed that the annexation of a few Barrier fortresses would somehow not constitute conquest. The rationale could be that this would not be done out of avarice, but simply to defend itself against a structurally hostile chain of fortresses. And this would correspond with the relevant part of the peace plan that the author subsequently proposed: he suggested that France take the fortress of Mons, as that would protect the frontière de fer in its weaker part near Maubeuge. But even this theory does not stand up to further scrutiny: the author would also have France annex Savoy – without any justification as to why France

75 MD 418, Etat de la situation de l’Europe au mois de decembre 1743, December 1743. 76 Note that this would make a French advance any further than Bavaria even more difficult: the French army would now not even have any fortresses to defend its supply lines.

43 would be entitled to it. The former option is therefore more likely: the author wanted to demonstrate that, although France didnot want to conquer, this should not keep it from doing so in the new circumstances of the war in 1744. Those circumstances had indeed changed quite a lot since 1740. Since 1741, France had been fighting in Central Europe, where it could not possibly want to annex anything for itself. In 1744, however, France would be fighting in its immediate neighbourhood: in the Southern Netherlands, on the Rhine, and in Italy. For in October 1743, France had finally agreed to give full support to Spain under the terms of the Treaty of Fontainebleau, also known as the Second Family Compact. Its main provision was that France help Spain obtain an Italian principality for Don Philip. The author of the memorandum qualified this as the “point critique” of this war. Nevertheless, he warned that France should never send troops into Italy as they would not be able to retreat in case of defeat. France should limit itself to using its fleet to transport Spain’s troops which had already conquered Savoy into Italy, and take over the occupation of Savoy. As mentioned, the author of the memorandum proposed a peace plan as well. He warned that it would be wise for the Austrians and British to conclude peace before the opening of the campaign, during which France would make gains so considerable that it would be in a position to exact even better terms in 1745.77 A simple change of policy – going to war in the Southern Netherlands, a proposed reinforcement of the navy, and probably the planned naval invasion of Great Britain as well78 – had already transformed three years of defeat in Germany into victory in the eyes of the author, allowing him to suggest that France make only demands and give nothing to Austria in compensation, as if the Austrian occupation of Bavaria counted for nothing. Indeed, Austria should return Bavaria to the Emperor (including the furniture it had taken from the palace in Munich), and cede Further Austria to the Emperor as well. France would obtain Mons and Savoy, and the fortifications of Luxembourg would be dismantled. Don Philip would obtain the Duchies of Parma and Piacenza, Saxony a part of Bohemia. France, Spain, Great Britain and the Dutch Republic would guarantee Silesia to Prussia. To solve the commercial disputes between London and Madrid in the Americas, Great Britain would lose all its privileges and all nations would only be allowed to trade with the Americas through Cadiz. This proposal is obviously fantastical: it bears no relations to the actual situation at the end of 1743. France had been forced to retreat from Germany; the Emperor had lost nearly all

77 France’s enemies did not know at this time that France was going to invade the Southern Netherlands in 1744. 78 The author does not mention it specifically, but it might be implied when he talked about naval armament.

44 of his hereditary possessions. France was in no place to make demands. It goes without saying that several Frenchmen would have had a better grasp of the situation, but it is telling that the decision to shift the war to the Netherlands (and probably the plan to invade Great Britain as well) had apparently been sufficient to make at least this one person overly optimistic about the outcome of the conflict.

Notwithstanding the previous’ author’s conviction that Great Britain and Austria would do well to make peace before the new campaign destroyed their position, it appears that neither of them really anticipated what would happen. France indeed did its best to keep its preparations as secret as possible. Of course, the concentration of troops in Maritime Flanders could not go unnoticed. Still, it seems that even then the British, Dutch and Austrians did not have a clear image of French intentions. They were certainly confused by the fact that in early 1744 France was planning as well to make a naval descent on England at the same time of the invasion of the Austrian Netherlands – both of which would conveniently be launched from French Flanders. A short overview of the letters France received from its ambassador in Brussels in the months before the invasion does much to illustrate how underprepared France’s enemies were, and how well aware France was of this fact. In early March, Versailles received letters from its ambassadors in The Hague and Brussels confirming that its quarantine of Dunkirk was effective – France had hermetically closed down the port as its troops started embarking. Nevertheless, as indicated by a letter written by the governor of the Barrier fortress of Furnes to the greffier of the Dutch States- General79 that the French ambassador in The Hague had forwarded to Versailles, rumours were starting to spread that the naval invasion of England was not serious and only intended as a diversion. At about the same time Ticquet, France’s ambassador in Brussels, reported that Dutch Barrier troops on leave had been recalled to their garrisons, and that the Austrians had transferred 300 hussars from Luxembourg to Oudenaarde.80 Still, measures to prepare the Austrian Netherlands for war did not go much further than that. On the first of April, Ticquet wrote from Brussels that the Barrier was still gravely undermanned – the important fortress of being garrisoned by only three battalions. The inhabitants of the Southern Netherlands understandably became seriously concerned

79 Hendrik Fagel, second then first greffier of the States-General. 80 PB 137, Copie de la lettre de M. de Swartzenberg a M. de Swartzenberg a M. le Greffier Fagel de Furnes le 8 mars 1744: Avec la lettre de M; de la Ville du 13 mars 1744; PB 137, Lettre de M. de Schwartzenberg gouverneur de Furnes du 14 mars 1744: avec la lettre de M. l’abbé Delaville du 20 mars 1744; PB 137, Ticquet to Versailles, Brussels 10 March 1744.

45 when news reached them that France had declared war upon Great Britain and that Louis XV intended to lead the troops himself – a sure sign that the Southern Netherlands were going to be the theatre of the next campaign. They counted on the arrival of troops from Germany both to form an observation corps on the Moselle together with the garrison of Luxembourg and to reinforce the allied army in the rest of the Netherlands. They even believed, Ticquet pointed out, that it would be the allies who would open the campaign through the siege of Condé, a French fortress on the Scheldt. Moreover, they were convinced that the Dutch garrisons would join in this enterprise – meaning that they would abandon their purely defensive status as barrier troops and assume an offensive role.81 Five days later, they had even come to believe that Dutch would even send over their entire army. In truth, Ticquet wrote, the Dutch had limited themselves to storing food and ammunition in their fortresses, and had made no further preparations. “It seems,” Ticquet remarked, “that they are not overly in haste to make any effort for the defence of this country.” Nevertheless, “it is believed that the Dutch are the most interested in its conservation for the Queen of Hungary.” Talk of an army of observation on the Moselle continued as well, although some had argued to transfer some regiments from Luxembourg to Brussels.82 The atmosphere in Brussels deteriorated in the following days. On the 8th, Ticquet wrote that there were doubts as to what the Dutch would do – even if the ministry and the generals still claimed that they were convinced that they would come to their aid. Rumours had even sprung up that Prussia would declare war against the Southern Netherlands. People were also beginning to say publicly that Maria Theresa had abandoned them, and worse, that she had sent 20.000 Croatian Pandurs to their aid – irregular troops who would rather plunder the Southern Netherlands itself than risk their lives in the French borderland. Several English officers had told Ticquet that they would have to return to England if the Dutch did not do as much as the British had done. He had also heard that the first ships with new British recruits had arrived of Dunkirk. British joy about their arrival was mitigated when they heard reports that French troops were returning to Dunkirk in order to re-embark.83 By the 15th, Ticquet reported that “it still appears here that the most necessary preparations for the start of the campaign are something alien to the present circumstances and absolutely useless.” Such preparations as had been undertaken were intended merely to persuade the Dutch to intervene. Nevertheless, the government in Brussels was doing some

81 PB 137, Ticquet to Versailles, Brussels 1 April 1744. 82 PB 137, Ticquet to Versailles, Brussels 5 April 1744. 83 PB 137, Ticquet to Versailles, Brussels 8 April 1744.

46 effort to fill in the gaps left by the Dutch by rearranging its native regiments and by levying new recruits.84 In his next letter, Ticquet said that even though the Austrians recruited everything they found, up to thirteen year old boys, they did not manage to find as many men as desired. The garrisons would therefore be extremely weak, as they tried to make their field army as strong as possible.85 Twenty days after the rumour of a French declaration of war against Great Britain, time seemed to have mitigated the initial panic. On the 21st, Ticquet, replying to a letter from Versailles announcing that war would be declared against the Queen of Hungary within a few days, wrote that nobody was expecting anything, as a reassuring quiet seemed to have returned. Nobody expected France to invade the Southern Netherlands anymore.86 He reconfirmed this in a letter two days later: “L’on continue a estre icy dans la securité la plus parfaite”. The government in Brussels had persuaded itself that the Dutch Republic would engage all its forces, and they were also convinced that the King of France would not dare provoke them. People even seemed to believe that peace was near.87 The next day, Ticquet wrote that “the illusion is so strong here” that the Dutch governor of had decided to stay in Brussels for another three weeks instead of returning to his post, whilst the governor of Furnes had also recently arrived in Brussels. Everyone was convinced that France would prefer to remain on the defensive, at least for a few more months.88 This complacency was broken on the 24th, when a courier from The Hague brought news that the French ambassador there had declared war against the Dutch Republic, and that the King of France would soon follow with a declaration of war against Hungary.89 Nevertheless, Ticquet noted, no news about the decision to declare war had reached Brussels from Paris. In any case the news from The Hague did nothing to galvanize the allied armies: Ticquet noted that the English only made camp under the walls of a fortress in which they could take refuge, that the Hanoverians were continuously deserting, and that the Dutch refused to leave their fortresses. Because in this way only Freikorps – volunteer units – and

84 PB 137, Ticquet to Versailles, Brussels 15 April 1744. 85 PB 137, Ticquet to Versailles, Brussels 18 April 1744. 86 PB 137, Ticquet to Versailles, Brussels 21 April 1744. 87 PB 137, Ticquet to Versailles, Brussels 23 April 1744. 88 PB 137, Ticquet to Versailles, Brussels 24 April 1744. 89 France in fact had no intention of declaring war against the Dutch Republic. Ambassador Fénelon did mention on the 23th that France would declare war against Austria though, and as this would automatically entail an attack on the Barrier fortresses, the news might have been magnified to include a declaration of war against the Dutch Republic as well.

47 hussars would make sorties, the French army should easily be able to win control of the countryside. On the 27th, letters from Paris announced that the declaration of war was being printed and that Louis XV would leave for Flanders on the 2nd of May.90 Nonetheless, on the next day, Ticquet reported that the public still believed that the Dutch had found a way to prevent war.91 As France did indeed formally declare war against the Queen of Hungary on the 27th Ticquet was soon afterwards obliged to leave the Southern Netherlands, taking with him a report detailing the most important personalities and the Austrian troops present in the Southern Netherlands.92

France invades the Southern Netherlands A cursory glance at France’s declaration of war against Maria Theresa might confirm the pacifist hypothesis. 93 It stated that when France came to Bavaria’s aid, “It had no intention to become a principal party in the war. If the King [Louis XV] had wanted to take advantage of the circumstances to extend the borders of his Kingdom, nobody is unaware of how easy it would have been for him to achieve it, whether through arms, which would have met but feeble resistance at the time, or by accepting the advantageous and repeated offers that the Queen of Hungary has made to detach him from his allies.” However, “His Majesty’s moderation has not produced the effects that it should have promised. The actions of the Court of Vienna against France have become so bitter and violent, that His Majesty cannot postpone any longer to make his just resentment manifest.” France then accused Austria of having mounted a propaganda campaign against France all over Europe, and to have disrespected treaties. Moreover, it had tried to incite the King’s subjects to revolt, as well as to invade Alsace. Thus Louis XV was forced to declare war in order to “avenge insults, to defend his lands, and to support the rights of his allies”. The declaration did not mention anywhere that France would continue its policy of ‘moderation’ – indeed, it said that this had not worked. Neither does it mention that France would ask nothing for itself at the eventual peace. Indeed, the phrasing left open the possibility: “avenging insults” might very well

90 PB 137, Ticquet to Versailles, Brussels 27 April 1744. 91 PB 137, Ticquet to Versailles, Brussels 28 April 1744. 92 PB 137, Etat en racourci de la Cour de Bruxelles au mois d’avril 1744. Avec les caracteres de ceux qui y ont le plus de part aux affaires, des officiers et generaux, et des gouverneurs de places des Pays bas autrichiens. April 1744. 93 Ordonnance du Roi Portant Declaration de Guerre Contre La Reine de Hongrie. Du 26 Avril 1744. Paris, 1744.

48 become an excuse to annex territory as a sort of indemnity. After all, Austria had declared it would annex a French or two – France would only return the favour if it annexed a few Austrian cities in the Southern Netherlands. The declaration thus presented the war that will follow not as a continuation of the pre-1744 war by other means, but as having been provoked by Austria’s treatment of France during it. The wars before and after 1744 were related to each other through cause and effect, but they were not one and the same war – both in form and in content. Still, France did not present itself as an aggressor – before 1744 it practiced moderation, after 1744 it was forced into taking a more aggressive stance. In the Austrian declaration of war against France on the 16th of May, French hypocrisy thus understandably became the major theme. It expressed incomprehension that France “tried to make the sensible world believe (as though it sought to play with it) that the fulfilment of treaties, moderation, love of peace, and the purest intentions, are compatible with hostility pushed to the highest degree”. France was accused of trying to divide in order to impose its will on all in the end. The motivations France presented can thus “only make an impression on those who seek to blind themselves, to forge their own chain, to betray their fatherland and to act against good sense”.94 By June 1744, there is hardly anything left of France’s proclaimed moderation – which several historians have interpreted as pacifism and non-expansionism. France itself made no effort to proclaim the continuity of the principle in its own declaration, and Austria deridingly made clear that it had been hard to believe in the first place. Even if we were to do no further research, these official declarations alone might suffice to demonstrate that the decisions of 1740, of 1744 and of 1748 were not made in the same spirit.

As the reports of the French ambassador in Brussels during his last months in the Southern Netherlands have shown, France’s enemies almost made an conscious effort to ignore the possibility that it might invade the Southern Netherlands. Part of it seems simply to have been unwillingness to face up to reality, but there were also better arguments to believe that France would direct its efforts elsewhere. By the end of May, the campaign season was already well under way and yet France had taken no action. When the first reports of a French attack spread in Brussels in early March, the timing must have seemed right for the start of a French invasion; but as time progressed, it must have appeared increasingly more likely that France

94 PB 137, Declaration de guerre de la Reyne de Hongrie comme souveraine des Pays bas autrichiens contre la France, Brussels 5 June 1744.

49 would fight a defensive war. This would also have seemed a logical continuation of France having been driven out of the Holy Roman Empire the previous year: as its enemies were on the offensive, it would now have to defend itself. The Austrian declaration of war provides another clue. As it discussed France’s declaration of war against George II, it remarked that since France’s naval invasion of England had failed, it would now turn against Hannover and rekindle the war in Germany. This was all the more likely since France had declared war against George both in his quality of King of Great Britain and in that of Elector of Hannover. France’s military preparations in Maritime Flanders might as well have been directed solely against Great Britain.95 Finally, as Ticquet’s descriptions of the attitude of the inhabitants of the Southern Netherlands have shown, they put an almost blind fate in Dutch resolve to protect their Barrier. This seemed justified both by Dutch efforts during the War of the Spanish Succession to conquer the Spanish Netherlands, and by their negotiation of the Treaty of Neutrality during the War of the Polish Succession. Hope both of a full-scale Dutch military intervention and of a neutrality treaty indeed appeared in Ticquet’s reports.

In hindsight we know that by late 1743 France had decided to abandon all these reservations and to invade the Southern Netherlands in 1744. I have already pointed out the structural geographical advantage France enjoyed here, and to these must now be added the effect of surprise. As late as the 16th of May – one day before the first French troops crossed the border of the Southern Netherlands – Austria declared that France would direct its efforts against Hannover. Of course, in the Southern Netherlands itself, the government and military authorities would have known by then that Louis XV had arrived in Lille on the 12th, confirming rumours that he would lead the campaign himself. Not that they could do anything to remedy the Southern Netherlands’ underpreparedness in such short order. Fortresses were undermanned and the field army was weak and fearful. Moreover, the Dutch had no intention to intervene – and this the French apparently realized better than the Austrians and British. This was all the better: France was indeed anxious to avoid Dutch involvement – although an attack on the Southern Netherlands automatically entailed the risk of provoking them. France did not declare war on the Dutch Republic as it opened formal hostilities with Great Britain and Austria. In a memorandum written before or during May 1744 and addressed to the Dutch, France explained that it saw no enemy in the Dutch Republic, even as

95 PB 137, Declaration de guerre de la Reyne de Hongrie comme souveraine des Pays bas autrichiens contre la France, Brussels 5 June 1744.

50 it attacked its Barrier fortresses: it only did so because they belonged to the Queen of Hungary. However, the memorandum continued, France could hardly neglect that the Dutch had joined their forces to an army which sought to attack France. Moreover, the Dutch had not opposed the formation of such an army in the Southern Netherlands at a time when France had retired its armies from Germany. There was no longer any reason for the Dutch to pretend that they were merely defending Maria Theresa’s possessions – indeed Maria Theresa was attacking France herself. However, the memorandum concluded, France still sought friendly relations with The Hague, and hoped that they would maintain their neutrality in order to serve as a mediator between the opposing parties.96

Given France’s overwhelming advantages, it is not surprising that several border towns quickly yielded for its troops. Within a few weeks, Menin, Courtrai, Ypres and Furnes fell to French forces. However, an Austrian invasion of Alsace starting on the last day of Jun cut short the advance, as a substantial part of the French army, nominally commanded by Louis XV, was directed towards the east to halt the invaders. Nevertheless, a few weeks had sufficed to demonstrate France’s future possibilities in the Southern Netherlands. This optimism translated itself into expansionism – both on the level of ideas and of actual decisions. As I have shown shortly before in relation to France’s declaration of war, this should not surprise: it had made no effort to preserve its policy of ‘moderation’ – whatever meaning that term might have covered. In early June, France concluded a secret treaty with its lapsed Prussian ally.97 It engaged Prussia to attack Maria Theresa in Bohemia, and France to attack the Southern Netherlands “without distinction”. If Austrian troops were to retreat from the Rhine, France was to follow them with a “powerful army” into Germany. The result of the joint effort would be the division of Bohemia between Prussia and the Emperor. Prussia would guarantee French

96 MD 515, Memoire qui contient les motifs qui ont engagé le Roy a porter ses conquetes dans les pays bas, 1744. Contrary to what the title suggests, it does not really contain French motives – apart from the idea that France itself had been attacked and a counterattack against Maria Theresa was therefore warranted. This is of course the same idea as found in France’s declaration of war. 97 France had concluded at treaty of alliance with Prussia in 1741, although Frederick had broken it the same year through the secret truce of Kleinschnellendorf with Austria – which became less secret since it allowed Austria’s troops to leave Silesia for Bohemia. In 1742, Frederick had then once more assumed the offensive in concert with his allies, before abandoning them again at the end of the year at the Peace of Breslau in which he obtained formal recognition of his Silesian conquests from Maria Theresa. By 1744, Frederick became increasingly wary of Austria’s growing power, prompting him to decide to enter the fray once more.

51 possession of Ypres, Tournai and Furnes, of the Hainault enclaves, and of any other conquests France might make. Austria was also to demolish the fortress of Luxembourg.98 It thus becomes even clearer that France had given up every pretence of fighting the war for the sole territorial benefit of its allies. This is not to say that it had abandoned them: as the treaty with Prussia indicated it still promised to send an army into Germany and it subsequently concluded other treaties with German rulers. It was also gearing up support for Spain in Italy in consequence of the Treaty of Fontainebleau of 1743. Likewise, the authors of the memoranda I shall now discuss never lost view of the European, or even extra-European context of the war.

On the 23rd of June – when France was still fully concentrating on the Southern Netherlands – a certain de Ruginale99 wrote a memorandum to Maurice de Saxe, the commander of the French army. De Ruginale claimed to have lived in the Southern Netherlands, the inhabitations of which had often expressed to him their hatred of Dutch and Austrian rule. They had even assured him that they would open the gates for the armies of the King of France, if the latter promised never to return them to Austrian rule. This would nevertheless not be necessary as no city in the Southern Netherlands would be able to hold out for long. However, it would speed up the French advance even more because the loyalty of the inhabitants would make it superfluous to leave garrisons in newly conquered towns.100 In a second memorandum at the end of August, de Ruginale considered the wider context of the war. He maintained that the Dutch had wanted war to weaken both France and Austria, as they were jealous of the former and wanted to financially ruin the latter, so that Vienna would be forced to cede part of the Austrian Netherlands to Holland as an indemnity for Austrian debts. They were particularly desirous of Ostend. It was for this reason that they had sent no troops to come to Maria Theresa’s support. The Austrians were indeed hard- pressed, since they no longer had “only hospitals to besiege and the sick to fight against” – a describing the French army when it was still fighting in Germany. As Maria Theresa was in a desperate situation in the Netherlands, in Silesia and in Italy101, it would be better to propose to her that she voluntarily surrender part of the Southern Netherlands, and be indemnified at the expense of the Dutch – all the more fittingly because it was the Dutch who had stimulated

98 MD 516, Engagements connus par rapport a l’Empire et a l’Allemagne, 1744; MD 516, Engagements des parties contractantes des Traités de l’autre part relatifs à la France specialement, 1744. 99 I have found no further information about him. 100 MD 516, 3. Letter from M. de Ruginale to Maurice de Saxe, sent in Paris on 23 June 1744. 101 The Franco-Spanish army was making considerable gains at her expense at this moment.

52 her to go to war in the first place. Moreover, “all sovereigns have an interest in the destruction of the Republic of Holland. It is an example of revolt that still survives, and the more it becomes powerful the more revolt will become attractive for restless, active and rebellious spirits”. But if Maria Theresa refused to accommodate, de Ruginale argued, France should persuade the Ottomans to move their army into the Banat – the region around modern Timişoara – in order to intimidate the Austrians. In 1745, de Ruginale added to this memorandum that the proposed operation had become even easier after the death of the Emperor Charles Albert and the arrival of Charles Edward Stuart in Great Britain (whom de Ruginale wrongly describes as ‘King Edward’). France could offer Maria Theresa to recognize her husband as Emperor and give her all of Holland as well, so that in return she would more easily cede the Austrian Netherlands, Luxembourg included. The Ottoman operation had therefore become useless, “through the death of the Emperor and the conquests of our invincible Monarch.”102 De Ruginale’s memoranda show a few things. First – if this still needs repeating – French annexation of the Southern Netherlands was considered self-evident. Even when he proposed the exchange of the entire Southern Netherlands for Holland, he did not feel the need to justify why that would be desirable. Second, the anti-Dutch sentiment he expressed was not unique to de Ruginale: several authors will be seen to have similar views. The idea that they wanted to annex part of the Southern Netherlands specifically returns a few times. It shows that the attack on the Southern Netherlands could mean several things to different people: it was a continuation of the war against Maria Theresa, it was an indirect way of attacking England, or it was a way of reducing Dutch power. It also shows that the idea that the Southern Netherlands had hitherto not been attacked out of consideration for the Dutch cannot be applied automatically: there were people in France who had little respect for them. At the opposite side of the spectrum, there were people like Marquis d’Argenson who were convinced that the old Franco-Dutch enmity was obsolete – although in d’Argenson’s case, that should be seen within the context of his wider ideas.103

102 MD 516, 4. Memoire de M. de Ruginale, 31 August 1744; MD 516, 5. Memoire, suitte du memoire du 31 aout 1744. 103 See the note on page 26.

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In October 1744, a certain de Lasarraz,104 living in Paris, wrote a memorandum about the military and fiscal situation of Europe. It did not concern itself with the result of an eventual peace. Although an unknown person described it in a marginal annotation as having been written by a man with “little exact notions of the present situation” – which in some instances is certainly not untrue – some of the issues the memorandum raised are useful to gain an understanding of the disposition of power in Europe at that moment. Lasarraz argued that the French army should use the next campaign – that is, 1745 – to march on Newport and Ostend. This would force the English army to retreat to Antwerp or into Holland to maintain communication lines with Great Britain. Apart from Antwerp, all fortresses in the Southern Netherlands were in a bad state, so that by September France would be in control of the entire country– Luxembourg included. This alone would have sufficed to justify the accusation that Lasarraz had a poor grasp of reality: in truth, France would advance far more slowly, reaching Brussels only in January 1746. Capturing Luxembourg would have required a long siege, as it was considered one of the most impregnable fortresses of Europe – which is why the French left it alone during the entire war, and more realistic proposals, the secret treaty with Prussia to take but one example, sought to see it demolished through diplomatic means. As the Austrians were alarmed by the speed of French conquests, Lasarraz declared, they had chosen the only option left to them: the invasion of Alsace (in reality the Austrians had been planning this even before 1744). This had put France on the defensive, but nobody had dared attack the remaining French army in the Southern Netherlands. In Germany Lasarraz was overly optimistic as well: he believed the joint efforts of the Prussians, Bavarian and French would soon meet with success and allow the retaking of Bavaria for the Emperor. As far as the potential to gear up the war efforts was concerned, Lasarraz claimed that France was the strongest country in Europe, capable of maintaining up to 300.000 soldiers and still subsidize its allies. The country could raise even more revenues, but, Lasarraz adds, the King was too good to impose such a burden on his subjects. The only country able to compete with France was Russia, thanks to its size and its despotic form of government. France’s allies, however, were weak. The Emperor was broke and would remain so for considerable time. Bavaria had been devastated as well as Bohemia – Lasarraz assumed that it would be conquered once more for the Emperor– and would yield no revenues for years to

104 I have not found any further information on him, apart from the Lasarraz family being of Swiss origin.

54 come. Spain’s trade has suffered from the war with England and the country was pouring all of its money into Italy, leaving it with no reserves. France’s minor allies could raise no further revenues either. Only Prussia was rich, given the wealth of several of its provinces and the considerable treasure left by Frederick’s father (although he had largely depleted it by then). Austria was in a dire state as well. It had lost some of its richest provinces – Silesia, Italy, part of the Southern Netherlands – and the rest was exhausted. It therefore had to be propped up by British, Portuguese – I have no idea where Lasarraz got this from – and Dutch money. Great Britain, by contrast, was extremely rich, due to its trade and domestic manufacturing. Hannover was rich as well. The Dutch Republic was poor, although its inhabitants were rich, forcing the state to finance its efforts through domestic loans. The King of Poland, finally, gained almost nothing from his Polish territories, although he could raise considerable revenue from Saxony. Lasarraz thus calculated that what he interestingly still calls the party of the Emperor – even though France was a principal party by now and clearly the pillar of the coalition – disposed of 589 million French pounds; the opposing Austrian coalition had only 419 million. This translated itself into a total of 389.000 troops for the party of the Emperor, and 333.000 for the Queen of Hungary. I am in no position to evaluate how correct these figures are. Regardless of their validity, it is clear that Lasarraz believed France and its allies to be certain of victory, both because of his overly optimistic predictions for the campaign of 1745 and because of his estimates of their financial strength. As said, he did not translate this into a peace plan.105

Winning a European war Interestingly, the author of the next memorandum, de Champeaux, writing in November, was despondent about France’s situation. 106 De Champeaux is probably Gérard-Claude Lévesque de Champeaux, whom van Nimwegen identifies as a confidant of marquis d’Argenson who would be entrusted a year later with negotiations with Sardinia.107 De Champeaux believed that the events of 1744 had shown that France and its allies did not dispose of enough troops to accomplish their goals, even though they were already

105 MD 516, Considérations sur l’Etat présent des affaires de la Guerre et sur les suittes qu’elles peuvent avoir, par Mr. de Lasarraz, Paris October 1744. 106 MD 516, Mémoire par monsieur de Champeaux, November 1744. 107 Olaf van Nimwegen, De Republiek als grote mogendheid, 283.

55 operating at their maximum capacity. France’s enemies by contrast were easily capable of raising more troops than they had done until now. Moreover, he thought that most of Europe was sympathetic towards Maria Theresa, so that her coalition would be able to win new members. For the campaign of 1744, Champeaux calculated, France had deployed about 160.000 to 170.000 troops, and it was unable to raise more. Spain likewise could not go further than the 40.000 men it was already using in Italy. Naples would not be able to contribute any troops, as it needed all its soldiers for its own defence. The Emperor and his allies could not go above 120.000 soldiers, financed by French subsidies (this presumably included Prussia’s army). This coalition thus reached a total of 320.000, and even if this figure were not entirely correct, Champeaux claimed that it would be “easily demonstrated” that it would never be able to go above 350.000. In the opposing coalition, Austria was presently using 90.000 to 100.000 soldiers in Germany, 25.000 in Italy, and 8.000 to 10.000 in the Southern Netherlands. As Vienna had used an increase in subsidies from London to recruit new soldiers, its army would reach 150.000 during the next campaign. The Dutch were deploying 42.000 so far, and would probably reach 60.000 the next year. The British contribution, consisting of British, Hanoverian and other German or Danish troops, would reach 80.000. Sardinia had proven itself capable of maintaining 30.000 soldiers, and as Great Britain had augmented its subsidies this number would certainly not diminish. Finally, Saxony disposed of 22.000 troops, and Russia would contribute 12.000 (notwithstanding de Champeaux’s conviction of Russian involvement, the Russians would only conclude a formal alliance with Austria in 1746, although it was sympathetic before that). This meant a total of about 354.000 soldiers. During the next campaign, the balance of forces might still be evenly matched. However, as France would have to send armies into Bavaria and Westphalia where there were no fortresses or friendly supplies, it needed a substantial superiority over its enemies. Fighting in distant lands increased the risk for illnesses and demoralization; moreover, the local population was bound to be hostile and would kill any French soldier when given the chance. And French soldiers took no interest in Germany; the enemy’s soldiers, by contrast, were defending their homes. But France could not compensate for this structural disadvantage: it could neither increase its forces nor even maintain its present effort for long, whereas France’s enemies were recruiting from densely populated lands, which allowed them to still make a substantial increase to their forces. From this description, Champeaux argued, there can only flow the conclusion that France should make peace as soon as possible.

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Champeaux then proceeded to analyse what the different belligerent parties sought to obtain out of the war: -Austria wanted to cede no more land and receive compensation for the losses it had made to Prussia and Sardinia108. -Great Britain wanted to maintain the Balance of Power – that is, to prevent the House of Bourbon from growing any stronger – and maintain or expand its commercial rights in the Spanish Americas. -Sardinia, like Austria, wanted to prevent Bourbon expansion in Italy. -The Dutch Republic sought to maintain the Balance of Power and to preserve the Southern Netherlands from French conquest. If France sought to attack them – it is not clear whether Champeaux referred to the territory of the Republic itself or to the Southern Netherlands109 – they would commit all their forces to the cause of the Queen of Hungary. The binding principle of this coalition was the preservation of the Balance of Power. If the war went very well for them, they would try to take a few provinces from France (Maria Theresa had indeed proclaimed that she would indemnify herself for the loss of Silesia with a part of France). Holland, Saxony and Hannover would also try to retake Silesia from Prussia, as they were afraid of Prussia’s growing power (whilst it is true that George II loathed his nephew Frederick of Prussia, the British government – which admittedly did not control Hannoverian foreign policy – had no intention to force Prussia to cede Silesia: since the beginning of the war London had been trying to persuade Austria to accept Silesia as Prussian territory and reach an accommodation with Frederick, in order to concentrate on France). Champeaux believed the motivations of the opposing coalition to be the following: -The Emperor sought to annex as many Habsburg territories as possible. -Spain wanted to obtain at least Milan and Mantua, and deny commercial rights in its American possessions to the British. If the war went well, it would demand Gibraltar and Minorca (both of which were British since the Treaty of Utrecht). -France “seems to have no other interest in this war than to procure some satisfaction for the pretensions of the Emperor and of Spain.” -Prussia wanted to prevent Austria from becoming strong enough to reconquer Silesia. It therefore had an interest in making Maria Theresa lose even more territories.

108 In order to win Sardinian support, Austria had ceded part of its Italian territories to Sardinia at the Treaty of Worms of 1743. 109 De Champeaux must have shared d’Argenson’s reservations about attacking the Southern Netherlands for fear of provoking the Dutch, so it might be that even at this point he still hoped that France would not continue the invasion.

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-Russia had no pretensions, save for its treaties with Austria and Great Britain (which, in reality, at the time did not commit it to war). As Maria Theresa’s party was increasingly superior, no peace was possible that led to her losing more territories. Likewise, Great Britain’s commercial pretensions would have to be satisfied. However, Spain and the Emperor would not agree to a peace that did not at least satisfy some of their claims, as they were wont to “judge their affairs through their desires rather than through their forces”. France was therefore obliged to give them some satisfaction, as failing to do so would spoil political and commercial relations, and tarnish the honour of King and Nation. A peace treaty should therefore be based upon a satisfaction of France’s allies, preservation of the Balance of Power, France’s renunciation of all conquest, satisfaction of British commercial claims insofar as they did not conflict with the interests of Europe as a whole, and no additional costs or compensation for the Queen of Hungary – since she had proven to be strong even after losing Silesia, the Balance of Power would be maintained, and so Great Britain and Holland would see no reason to exert themselves any further to obtain compensation for her. Such a peace would be accepted by Austria and Great Britain, as it would antagonize their allies if they refused. The main task for France, thus, was to diminish the Emperor’s and Spain’s desires. Champeaux proposed to give Further Austria to the Emperor, and Parma and Piacenza or Sardinia and Corsica, or some smaller Italian states to Spain. Austria could then be indemnified for this loss in Italy and Germany – presumably through the secularization of some ecclesiastical states of the Holy Roman Empire. France could start the peace process by making a proposal on the basis of the above, whilst gearing up its war effort at the same time, so that Austria and Great Britain would have nothing to win from a continuation of the war. It should be careful not to make any new enemies – and for this, it was essential to avoid any action which might raise the suspicion of a French desire for conquest. This, Champeaux wrote, was in any case what France should have done in the first place: if it had hitherto done every military effort possible whilst showing peaceful intentions, the peace parties in other countries might have won. The author concurred that accommodating one’s secret enemies too much can be undesirable – but by ceasing to do this one could turn them into open enemies. This last remark seems to be a thinly veiled criticism of French policy in the Southern Netherlands and towards the Dutch Republic – raising the spectre, as it did, of French annexationism and making “open enemies” out of secret ones. Apart from this reference, however, the Southern Netherlands are conspicuous in their absence. Champeaux did not

58 mention the operations that took place there a few months before, and he was obviously against their continuation. This is remarkable since he described a situation that was very reminiscent of that in which France found itself in late 1743110 – and which the invasion of the Southern Netherlands was meant to remedy. For Champeaux, however, the war ought to end as soon as possible, and the only reason why France was still engaged in it was the satisfaction of its Bavarian and Spanish allies’ claims. Even as a strategic move, the invasion of the Southern Netherlands must therefore have seemed a stupidity to him, as it could only serve to convince the other powers of France’s belligerent intentions, whilst on the contrary it should unambiguously proclaim its desire for peace. All of this is conjecture, as Champeaux did not describe his views on the matter himself – oddly in a climate where the Southern Netherlands had after all been invaded as a strategic move to solve the same problem that Champeaux is trying to solve. It is difficult to understand why he should not seek to disqualify this idea. France had indeed kept an army on the Rhine in 1744 (which had not proved very effective as the Austrians under Charles of Lorraine managed to cross the Rhine into France), and after the Austrian retreat from Alsace Louis XV himself had participated in the siege of Freiburg in the Breisgau, at about twenty kilometres from the French border.111 This might have made Champeaux believe that France would continue fighting in Germany during the next year, in concert with Prussia. However, as France’s fortunes did not look very bright there, as they hadn’t for over two years, – it is the very subject of Champeaux’s memorandum – this did not preclude a further offensive in the Southern Netherlands. I can only venture that this memorandum must have been written for people who shared this view – his friend Marquis d’Argenson, rabidly anti-Austrian and hoping to convert the Dutch to the French cause, was indeed opposed to the war in the Southern Netherlands, of which he said in his memoirs that “la raison politique cessa de presider à la raison de guerre”.112 In the absence of clarification, the memorandum only serves to remind us that even after the invasion, some people still deplored it and looked towards Germany as the principal theatre of war.

110 It is however beyond doubt that is was written in november 1744, as written on the memorandum itself. It mentions the Prussian violation of Saxon territory – an event which only took place in August 1744. If it weren’t for such more subtle details, the quick reader would be forgiven for thinking it was misdated. 111 Freiburg was the capital of Further Austria – the series of small Austrian possessions between Bavaria and the Rhine, which were frequently proposed as compensation for the Emperor. Freiburg was thus of interest to France both to better defend its Rhine border and as a diplomatic pawn. 112 Van Nimwegen 180.

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On the 29th of November 1744, a certain Du Faur de Barbazan wrote a letter to the Secretary of State for War Count d’Argenson, announcing that he had compiled a sketch of French legal claims to the Southern Netherlands. He had done so on his own initiative, and now inquired whether d’Argenson required him to continue his work, as only he knew whether “present cirucmstances would be favourable to implement this work”. He had paid special attention, Du Faur de Barbazan informed d’Argenson, “to anticipate all objections that might be made against me if Vostre Grandeur orders me to continue: [including] the sophism our enemies have invented since a few years that a supposed droit de convenance of all Europe [saying] that the King should not be master of and possess these rich provinces, should win according to them from equilibrium and justice. I have sufficient arms to destroy such miserable arguments; I only need Vostre Grandeur’s orders.” Du Faur de Barbazan’s letter is of special interest because it demonstrates that reflection on France’s policy was not confined to the French government of Versailles. Du Faur de Barbazan probably had no connections at Court, or at least in its highest circles: at the end of his letter he explicitly identifies himself is an advocate living on “Rue Montmartre, in front of the Rue de la Jussienne”.113 There was indeed a Du Faur de Barbazan living on that address who was an advocate at the Parliament of Paris.114 He possibly wrote the letter – and did his research – to make himself known to the government: he concludes it by saying that “I should wish, Sir, that my application to the study of the interests of sovereign princes, and to the public ius gentium, should merit me the protection of Vostre Grandeur and of your brother [Marquis d’Argenson].” But whatever his intentions might have been, it proves that we should not limit our search for the ideas that determined French policy to a few important members of the Court and government. It should also be remarked that Du Faur de Barbazan’s formulation is interesting: he attacked the droit de convenance – that is, the Balance of Power doctrine –, for being against equilibrium and justice. Apparently, he believed that the Europe would be more balanced if France acquired the Southern Netherlands. Indeed, Frenchmen at the time often saw British advocacy of the Balance of Power as a trick to keep France weak and the Continent divided, so that Great Britain could enrich itself with overseas trade.115

113 Both streets still exist. 114 Almanach Royal Année MDCCLI, 1751, p. 237.. Accessed on Google Books: Almanach national: annuaire officiel de la République française, 1751. https://books.google.be/books/about/Almanach_national.html?id=ILZsQNzf8yMC&redir_esc=y 115 PB 137, Letter of Du Faur de Barbazan to Count d’Argenson, 29 November 1744.

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Count d’Argenson forwarded the letter to his brother, whom he believed it concerned more as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. It is thus the Marquis who wrote a reply on the 3rd of December: “Je suis bien éloigné d’exiger que vous y donniez vostre tems et vostre application, surtout s’agissant d’une matiere sur laquelle la conjuncture presente n’exige pas absolument qu’il soit pris de plus grands éclaircissemens que ceux que l’on a déjà, mais je ne pretend point non plus arrester la […] du desir que vous auriez de marquer votre zele pour le bien du service du Roy en la mettant encore dans un plus grand jour, et je vous asseure meme que ce que vous vous proposez , repondant à l’idée que vous m’en donnez, je me porteray avec empressement à le faire valoir pour votre satisfaction.” Unfortunately, the formulation is very subtle and does not shed any unambiguous light on the ideas of the French government at the moment. We do not know what d’Argenson meant by “the present conjuncture” requiring no further clarifications. It could indicate that the French government had already compiled sufficient legal arguments. Conceivably, he could also have meant that the legal arguments were of secondary importance at the moment, as the government still had to decide whether it wanted to annex anything. Although it is partly a formula of respect, d’Argenson’s last sentence on the other hand might indicate that Du Faur de Barbazan’s line of reasoning – that is, annexation – would be followed. Unfortunately the phrasing is too vague to allow any definitive conclusions. What is most important, however, is that d’Argenson did not deny that the French government was considering annexation. Indeed, if it was still following its policy of ‘moderation’ – which I have already indicated it wasn’t – he should have discouraged French subjects from developing legal arguments to justify annexation. Even more so if France was committed to non-expansionism, as proposed by several historians: in such a case d’Argenson should have made clear in his reply that the King of France did not consider conquest by force justified. We can thus reasonably conclude that at this moment, the French government was in favour of annexation, or still not certain as to what it would do. Non- expansionist it certainly, if there were any need for further proof, was not.116

The next document gives us insight into the ideas of the French government as well. In December 1744, the Controller-General of Finances Philibert Orry gave order to the provincial intendants to compile a work presenting the “Situation of the peoples of the King of France in the year 1745”. The description of the Generality of Flanders (Lille) unambiguously stated that “this generality includes only French Flanders and consists of

116 PB 137, Letter of Marquis d’Argenson to Du Faur de Barbazan, 3 December 1744.

61 fifteen castellanies, including those conquered the previous year. Its principal cities are Lille, Douay, Cambray, Dunkirk, and Ypres.” It provided, for the castellanies of Ypres, Menin and Furnes, their number of inhabitants, the silverware present in them, and, for Ypres, a qualitative description of the city’s economy. In contrast to the cities residing under the Generality of French Flanders before 1744, it did not include the number of people who could be called into the militia nor the revenues on real property. In both cases, this was justified by a mention that the Intendant received an “ordre particulier” from the Court telling him not to include these two categories for Ypres, Menin, and Furnes.117 The rationale behind the choice is not very clear. The inclusion of the number of inhabitants is logical – this would have been useful knowledge even if the region were given back. The amount of silverware was interesting to know as well. It might have been inspired by the lack of liquidity France experienced during the Spanish War of Succession, as its coins left the country to pay for war expenses abroad. Knowing how much silver was available in France was necessary for a prompt response in case this happened again.118 But the value of real estate would have been useful for tax purposes as well, and France certainly did not hesitate during the war to extract money from the Southern Netherlands. Only the exclusion of the militia makes sense: it would not have benefited public order had the inhabitants of the newly conquered territories been immediately drafted into the French militia system. Even if we do not entirely understand why Versailles gave order to exclude two categories, it is remarkable that the newly conquered territories were included in a state of the “Peoples of the King of France”. Had France been determined to give them back, it is hard to believe that it would explicitly state that the newly conquered territories belonged to the Generality of French Flanders, and that Ypres was a principal city of that Generality. This does not, of course, prove beyond doubt that France would annex them: after all, two categories were excluded. The most likely explanation, once again, seems to be that France was still not entirely sure entirely sure as to what it would do with the Southern Netherlands. For the meantime it regarded them, at least generally, as part of France.

The next author – the memorandum is anonymous – returns in January 1745 to the bleak situation described by de Champeaux. He argued that Austrian successes against Prussia –

117 MD 1767, Memoires concernant la situation des peuples de la généralité de flanders en l’année 1745. In: Memoires concernant la situation des peuples du Roy de France en l’année 1745: Premier volume. 118 The shortage of coin during the War of the Spanish Succession had made an abiding impression on Frenchmen: in Noailles’s February 1743 memorandum, he uses the argument that money would not leave France as an argument to advocate war in the Southern Netherlands as well (MD 511, 18. Mémoire de Mr. le Mal de Noailles, 27th of February 1743).

62 they had chased Frederick back into Silesia – had made Austria and even the Dutch unwilling to negotiate for the near future, and peace had thus become impossible. The goal, for France, was thus to prevent them from gaining any more successes. It therefore had to analyse how strong its enemies were going to be, by winning information from its diplomats in foreign courts. If its enemies were going to keep the superiority they enjoyed in 1744, they would only grow stronger every year. France would then have to force (brusquer) peace as soon as possible. If, on the other hand, the balance of forces would be evenly matched, France should seek to employ its troops better, and that would give it superiority over time. The author spent the rest of the memorandum analysing this last option. He began by arguing that France’s allies took account only of their own interests when they were developing plans for the next campaign. If France wished to oblige them, it would therefore have to send troops into Italy and Germany. This would leave France itself undefended and would not “serve any enterprise that is useful to France. Fighting in foreign lands will drain the Kingdom […] of money”. Moreover, it would leave France dependent on its allies. If they lost a battle or made a separate peace, the French army would have to retreat. As past experience had shown that in such a case “nearly only the flags reach the borders”, France would be unable to defend itself against pursuing enemies. After such a campaign, it would be even more difficult to make peace, “whether or not you show consideration for your allies in the next campaign”. The author expanded upon this idea. He argued Spain would be unable to send a large army to Italy after the losses it has suffered there until present. Moreover, it might well make a separate peace with Great Britain, if London offered to mediate for an Italian principality for Don Philip. Prussia as well might make a separate peace with Maria Theresa, and maybe even turn its armies on France if that was what was required to obtain Silesia. Prussia, the author declared, could never be satisfied. It would be unhappy if France continued its advance in the Southern Netherlands, as that would be of no use to it: Maria Theresa would leave its defence to the British and Dutch, concentrate on regaining Silesia, and, if successful, return strengthened to the Southern Netherlands. To gain Prussia’s approval France would therefore have to send troops into Germany. Going into Westphalia would not be sufficient: again, Maria Theresa would leave its defence to the Dutch and British-Hanoverians. If France truly wanted to oblige Frederick, it would have to send troops to Bohemia or to Bavaria and Austria. But in such a case it would also have to keep an army on the Lower Rhine, to maintain communications and intimidate the smaller German princes. And, if French troops marched once more deep into Germany, they would suffer huge losses, as the entire

63 population would be against them, and the Austrians had the advantage of supplies, enabling them to open the campaign long before the French, who would have to wait until they could live of the land. France would be defeated, forcing it to break its promise to its allies and causing its troops’ reputation to suffer. And if somehow France managed to win, would it not be likely that the Treaty of Breslau repeated itself? In conclusion, France could not simultaneously oblige its German allies and improve the odds for peace there. France was simply not capable of maintaining sizable armies at the same time in Flanders, on the Lower Rhine, in Bohemia, in Italy, and in Alsace, to protect France itself. And even if its forces were equal to those of the enemy, geography would always give it a disadvantage. The best course for France, therefore, was to try and obtain peace through Great Britain. For this purpose it would have to avoid any further losses, and seek to persuade the British that as the Austrians would never be able to reconquer Silesia, the best way to protect their ally was to make peace. If this plan did not work, Saxon mediation could be attempted as well.119 The author of the memorandum did not propose a continuation of the war in the Southern Netherlands as way to resolve France’s quandary. The problem with it was not of a military nature: France could win in the Southern Netherlands in the short term, but then its allies would lose elsewhere, which would cause France to lose both the war and its reputation in the longer term. At the same time, it could not win even if it sent troops to support its allies. Peace through diplomatic means was thus the only option.

The death of the Emperor As bad as France’s situation might have seemed in early January 1745, it became worse still on the 20th of that month, when Emperor Charles VII unexpectedly died. He had been France’s official justification for military involvement in the Holy Roman Empire, first as an auxiliary and then as a principal party. By 1745, admittedly, he was only of symbolic value: both his court and his army depended entirely on French subsidies. Frederick the Great’s invasion of Bohemia in 1744 had indeed caused the Austrians to abandon their occupation of Bavaria, after which a small Franco-Bavarian army had marched into the Electorate and the Emperor had been allowed to return to his capital. But this was only a temporary victory: the

119 MD 516, 13. Memorandum written at Versailles, Januari 1745.

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Emperor was still in no position to defend his hereditary lands if the Austrians ever regained the offensive. As the Emperor died, however, France lost even the symbolic advantage of fighting for the rightful Emperor. It was unlikely that Charles VII’s son and successor in his hereditary lands, Maximilian III Joseph, would carry the election: he was only eighteen years old, and his hold on his Electorate was still very fragile. Maria Theresa’s husband Francis Stephen seemed to be best placed to become the next Emperor. Yet this unexpected situation also opened up opportunities: with the death of the Emperor, France was offered a chance of retreating from the German theatre without loss of face, or even of negotiating an end to the entire war. After all, France now held the extra card of being able to exchange its support for Francis Stephen’s candidature.

Charles Albert’s death and its strategic implications and possibilities understandably became the starting point for subsequent memoranda. The first of these was written on the first of February, not even two weeks after the Emperor’s death, by a certain Mandat (probably Galiot Mandat V), a Master of Requests.120 Mandat started out his memorandum by remarking that the situation would have been easily solved if all parties had been mere auxiliaries: then all could have withdrawn from Germany and allow a free election. But as it was, there were three options. The first – to proclaim a truce uti possidetis and let the election take place – did not meet Mandat’s approval because it would be disadvantageous to France (France’s hold on Germany at this moment was of course rather tenuous). A second option, which carried Mandat’s preference, was to negotiate “a solid peace” before the election, which would then be allowed to take place freely. The third option, to continue the war as if Charles Albert had not died, Mandat wished to avoid, since it would risk “putting all Germany in flames”. According to Mandat, France possessed unassailable rights to the Habsburg Succession, as a consequence of the Habsburg house laws and Louis XV’s descent of Anna and Maria Theresa of Austria (the wives of Louis XIII and Louis XIV). Renunciation of these rights had not been included in France’s acceptance of the Pragmatic Sanction in 1738; and in any case, Louis XV could only have renounced his own claims, and not those of his heirs. Until now, however, Louis had sacrificed his own claims in order to support those of his allies – justly so, thought Mandat, as by doing so, Louis could ensure that the rich Habsburg

120 MD 516, 14. Mémoire sur l’état présent des affaires de l’Europe ce premier février 1745, par M. Mandat, maître des requêtes, 1 February 1745.

65 inheritance was divided among his allies, and that all European countries would gain equal commercial rights in Spanish America. Mandat did not believe that a Treaty of Peace would be very difficult to achieve. Maria Theresa had only a very tenuous legal claim to her father’s inheritance: once she realized that, she would content herself with a small part of it – if it were not for the English who encouraged her pride. However, as the English were not really interested in her and would abandon her when it suited them, and as the Turks were bound to attack her sooner or later once they were delivered of the attacks of Persia’s Nader Shah, she could soon be in a very difficult situation. It would therefore be wise for her to make peace as soon as possible, as only France could support her against the Turks. Moreover, by doing so, she would gain herself an ally who would protect her lands to which she really had no rights. Accommodation with Austria was the first part of Mandat’s plan; the second was to preserve the alliance with Prussia. France and Prussia were “natural friends” and should become perpetual allies. Mandat even maintained that France would have no choice but to support Frederick’s candidature for the Imperial throne if he were to embrace Catholicism, but, Mandat rather ruefully admits, Frederick’s conversion at present would clearly not be sincere. In any case, France should concert with Frederick as to who should be supported for Emperor. Mandat thought the Elector of Saxony should be the preferred candidate, due to Augustus III’s own strength and his good relations with Russia. Moreover, Augustus’ election would antagonize Maria Theresa, thus weakening Austria even further. Mandat was not the only Frenchman to support Augustus’s candidacy; Marquis d’Argenson, to take the most prominent example, ardently sought to obtain his election – notwithstanding the Saxon Elector’s own lack of enthusiasm. Moreover, Mandat’s (and d’Argenson’s) Prussophilia seems to have made them forget that Frederick had violated Saxony’s neutrality when he marched on Bohemia in 1744, and that he was adamant that Saxony should not profit territorially from his own successes against Austria. Mandat did acknowledge that Prussia might turn on its allies once more, but that would be “un revers incroyable” and force the French to abandon Germany altogether. Mandat aimed to revise France’s relationship with the Dutch Republic as well. He believed that it was because of English influence that the Dutch supported Maria Theresa. He admitted that the interest of the Republic also genuinely seemed to be to support Maria Theresa, so as to preserve the independence of the Southern Netherlands and keep a buffer against France. But this “panic terror” should end, he thought: the Dutch Republic ought to realize that France would always be a better friend to it than Great Britain, which was really

66 only interesting in taking over Dutch trade. As there was no intermediary power left between the United Provinces and France after the extinction of the Habsburg dynasty – as we have seen, Mandat did not recognize Maria Theresa as sole heiress – the Dutch Republic would be wise to reconsider the Treaty of Partition of 1735. To my knowledge The Hague and Versailles did not negotiate a partition of the Southern Netherlands in 1735 (they had concluded a Neutrality Treaty in 1733), but Mandat was probably referring to the Treaty of 1635, which allied the French and the Dutch against the Spanish and which provided for an eventual partition of the Southern Netherlands. At any rate, Mandat believed that the Dutch would never get a better opportunity to extend their territory and increase their trade than through association with France and Spain. It would allow them “to enjoy in perpetuity the sweetness of peace, following the example of the Republic of Venice, which is not so happily situated as that of Holland since the Turk is a redoubtable neighbour which often makes her tremble”. France should therefore try to prove to the Dutch that it is well-disposed towards her. This would not be easy to do, Mandat admitted, since the proximity of France makes them fear her. On the basis of these considerations, Mandat develops a peace plan. The principal relevant stipulations were the following: -In compensation for a French renunciation of its rights on the Habsburg inheritance, Maria Theresa would cede to France its present conquests in the Southern Netherlands – Ypres, Menin, Fort Knocke121, Diksmuide and Furnes –, as well as St.-Ghislain, Mons, and Luxembourg. To Bavaria she would cede Further Austria. Don Philip would receive Parma, Piacenza, Cremona and Mantua.122 Modena, which had been occupied by Austria after its Duke had come out in favour of France and Spain, was to be restored to its Duke. -The King of Sardinia would cede the Duchy of Savoy and the County of Nice to France. The Marquisate of Finale, a Genoese possession the King of Sardinia had occupied as a consequence of the Treaty of Worms, would be returned to Genoa. -Every European country was to gain equal commercial rights in Spanish America. Spain might accord the Assiento to Great Britain if it chose so. Mandat proposed that the essentials of the Treaty be drafted before a congress met at Aix-la-Chapelle (the city was neutral, which made it convenient for negotiations), which would then have to last no longer than three months, after which the Imperial election would

121 A fortification on the Yser River. 122 Mantua would first go the the Duke of Guastalla, but after the extinction of his family, which was eminent (it happened in 1746) Mantua as well was to go to Don Philip.

67 take place in Frankfurt. The Treaty would stand regardless of whether Francis Stephen or Augustus III would be elected as Emperor. It goes without saying that Mandat’s proposals bore little relation to reality: as the authors of other memoranda have made clear, France was in no position to dictate peace to Vienna. But he was not alone in following his line of thinking. There were still ardent Prussophiles in France, even after Frederick’s betrayals, and Marquis d’Argenson shared his desire to placate the Dutch and have the Elector of Saxony chosen as Emperor. At any rate, Mandat neatly demonstrates how the death of the Emperor was seen as an opportunity for peace, even if the terms he proposed would be utterly unacceptable to Vienna. Moreover, it was self-evident to him that France should annex part of the Southern Netherlands, and he even advocated cooperating with the Dutch to annihilate the Southern Netherlands as a buffer state altogether.

The next memorandum also considered the possibilities flowing from the death of the Emperor. It was written on the 6th of February by a certain Carondas, about whom I have found to further information.123 Carondas remarked that Maria Theresa’s goal had always been to have her husband elected as Emperor. If France offered to support her in this, it could ask something in compensation. She would maybe be willing to cede Tuscany, Parma and Piacenza to Don Philip (technically, Maria Theresa had only the status of consort in Tuscany; it would be Francis Stephen who would do the actual renunciation). Moreover, she could cede the Duchy of Milan, or at least a part of it, to the King of Sardinia, in compensation for what the latter would be required to cede: a few towns on the right bank of the Po River to Don Philip, and Savoy to France. Bavaria would be compensated with Further Austria and with the title of King. Carondas proposed an interesting settlement for the Austrian Netherlands: Maria Theresa would transfer sovereignty over the Southern Netherlands to her brother-in-law, Prince Charles of Lorraine, who had already been appointed governor-general of the Austrian Netherlands in 1744. Francis Stephen would be formally excluded from the succession. This would gratify France, as prince Charles would be but a weak neighbour, as well as the Dutch Republic, as his weakness would ensure the perpetual neutrality of the Southern Netherlands.

123 MD 516, 15. A Monseigneur d’Argenson ministre et Secretaire d’Etat pour les affaires etrangers. Mémoire. Par M. de Carondas, 6 February 1745.

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Carondas is the first author to suggest the complete neutralisation of the Southern Netherlands by handing the region to Prince Charles as an independent third party. It is, however, somewhat hard to believe that no-one else should have thought of such a possibility before him – after all, a complete neutralisation of the region was a rather evident solution for the problem the Southern Netherlands posed to the European international system. Whoever might have thought of it originally, it is an idea that will return a few times from now on. In compensation for these cessions, France would guarantee the indivisibility of Maria Theresa’s remaining territory under the Pragmatic Sanction. It would equally guarantee Prussia’s possession of Silesia. Carondas expected Prussia to be content with this settlement, as it weakened Austria and increased Bourbon power in areas where it would constitute no threat to him.

Right after this memorandum we find an interesting note written by Marquis d’Argenson.124 It is unfortunately not clear whether it applied to the preceding or the following memorandum. At any rate its content is of general interest. D’Argenson wrote that he received many such memoranda and that he did not keep a single one of them. The authors could ask them back. If some of them indeed chose to do so, it follows that the archives at La Courneuve do not contain every memorandum that was received by the Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs. The reason for this, d’Argenson continued, was that these authors try to “take into consideration the totality of present affairs, but they believe things that are very impossible to be very feasible”. Ironically, d’Argenson was accused of much the same thing by his contemporaries: he had no grasp of his reality and based his foreign policy on an abstract and theoretical system.

The next memorandum was written on the 7th of February – d’Argenson’s complaint that he received many of these memoranda does seem justified at this moment. It was “recommended” by a certain de Langres (the exact spelling is not entirely clear), but the author is not known.125 The starting point of this memorandum is the claim that for over a century, the only goal of France had been to diminish the power of the Habsburgs. The death of the last male Habsburg finally allowed her to finish off its rival. However, the author believed that France

124 MD 516, Note du ministre monsieur le marquis d’Argenson. 125 MD 516, 16. Mémoire, 7 February 1745.

69 had made crucial mistakes during the war that had prevented her from partitioning Charles VI’s inheritance. The first mistake was to send armies deep into Germany, resulting in the loss of France’s finest troops in Bohemia through exhaustion. Moreover, as France moved ever more troops east to compensate for its losses, it diminished the threat against Hanover and Holland, allowing the British and Dutch to come to Maria Theresa’s aid as auxiliaries. This eventually resulted in a French declaration of war against Austria and against Great Britain – the latter of which the author called forced by the “instances impérieuses” of the Queen of Spain, and which was disastrous as it led to the total destruction of French commerce. This complaint is exaggerated: the systematic patrol of France’s Atlantic coast by the British Western Squadron was only set up in late 1745, and it would take longer still before the effect on French commerce reached the disastrous proportions the author describes – if it ever did.126 The second mistake was to not have accorded a greater share of the Habsburg inheritance to Saxony. This caused Saxony to drop out of the war, and since Prussia abandoned its allies as well, France was chased out of Germany whilst its Bavarian ally’s territory was occupied by Austrian troops. It was reduced to defending itself on the Rhine, and even on French soil itself. The third mistake was not to have secured an alliance with Sardinia. History should have taught France, and the lesson had repeated itself during this war, that crossing the Alps was very difficult, if not impossible, as long as Sardinia was hostile. Nevertheless, Madrid closed the road to Italy by its refusal to recognize the King of Sardinia’s claim to Milan, pushing him into the arms of Maria Theresa. Because of this, France and Spain spent the war in Italy exhausting themselves only to get into the peninsula. After the death of the Emperor, however, the Imperial election became the most important issue, as it was on this that the eventual domination of the House of Bourbon or of the House of Habsburg would depend. The author believed Francis Stephen to harbour an inveterate hatred of France – which is why Charles VI had chosen him as his son-in-law. This hostility had only been reinforced by France’s disrespect for the Pragmatic Sanction, which it had promised to uphold in the same Treaty of Vienna that had taken away Francis Stephen’s Duchy of Lorraine. Therefore, if Francis Stephen were to be elected as Emperor, he would use this position to oppose France in the Southern Netherlands and in Italy. Moreover, the Dutch would come out fully in favour

126 Reed Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession, 307.

70 of Maria Theresa, as the election of her husband would have decisively shifted the balance of power in her favour. It was for this reason that Maria Theresa would be prepared to do everything to secure Francis Stephen’s election – including recognizing Prussia’s claim to Silesia or ceding part of the Southern Netherlands, maybe even Luxembourg. The author was afraid that France would be blinded by this offer, which would allow Maria Theresa and Francis Stephen to use the peace to prepare their vengeance. They would first deal with Prussia, and then persuade the Holy Roman Empire to declare war on France. Russia would join in as well. Holland would take advantage of this to push back France from its borders, and Great Britain would seek to restore the balance of power that would have been distorted ever since France obtained the Barrier. Therefore, the author urges, France should not abandon its policy of abasing Austria: “Richelieu and Mazarin would have bought with their dearest possessions circumstances that are as happy and as favourable as those in which we now find ourselves” and which, if France only grasps them, “offer us naturally to become through the annihilation of the house of Austria the masters and arbiters of Europe”. France should therefore find another candidate for the Imperial throne. The Elector of Saxony would refuse it, as it would force him to relinquish the crown of Poland, which he was trying to make hereditary. Moreover, he was too close to Vienna and Saint-Petersburg. As the Elector Palatine was too weak, the only candidate could be the Elector of Bavaria, that is, the son of the dead Emperor. France should thus endeavour to get Maximilian Joseph elected. To this end, the author developed a diplomatic plan that is of little interest to repeat here, as it chiefly concerned Germany. Militarily, however, France should stick to fighting in the Southern Netherlands and on the Rhine, and only invade Germany when absolutely necessary.

Only three days later, on the 10th, yet another memorandum was written on the Imperial election, this time by a certain de Bussy.127 It is preceded by a note written by Marquis d’Argenson, addressed to Le Dran, the most senior civil servant for Foreign Affairs.128 D’Argenson mentionned once more that he did not intended to keep “one piece of paper” and expressed his exasperation that “such ideas are founded only in the fire of the imagination of the author.”

127 MD 516, 19. Examen des différents points de vue que présente l’élection d’un nouvel empereur, relativement aux affaires generales, 10 February 1745. 128 Jeremy Black, From Louis XIV to Napoleon, 12.

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Bussy presented the death of the Emperor as an unambiguously good affair. It freed France from the responsibility to sustain the Emperor and expand his hereditary lands. France’s enemies, on the other hand, would be driven apart: Maria Theresa’s efforts to have her husband ascend the Imperial throne would antagonize Saxony-Poland, her most important ally. Moreover, just as France was extricating itself from the German morass, Great Britain would be forced to involve itself ever more by paying even higher subsidies to Austria to obtain Francis Stephen’s election. The affairs of Europe would thus be decided at the Imperial election. France faced three options: it could support Francis Stephen in return for generous peace terms; it could develop a general peace plan, including the election of a new Emperor, with Great Britain; or it could convince Augustus III of Saxony to abandon his reluctance to become Emperor. For the first option, Bussy remarked that Maria Theresa would only agree to this when she was left with no other choice – namely with a Saxon counter-candidate and without sufficient British and Dutch support. In such a case she might offer a great deal to France. The maximum would be the cession of the entire Southern Netherlands, but she would never trade this for French inaction alone. She would also demand French subsidies, to compensate for the inevitable loss of Dutch and British support once news reached them of the handover of the Southern Netherlands to France. Moreover, if France were to receive the entire Southern Netherlands, it would have gained so much that it would be in no position to ask any further compensation for its allies. And, Bussy warned, no matter how alluring the Austrian offer, it would be a trap. Hatred of France was endemic in Vienna, and Maria Theresa would lose no time to publish the agreement, leaving her allies with no choice but to support her more if they wished to prevent the transfer. And even if the offer were genuine, Bussy argued, it would still be disadvantageous to France. France’s allies, including Spain, would abandon it, and possibly even declare war. Accepting the Austrian offer would thus result in the outbreak of another war to get out of the present one. Moreover, it would be a break with a three hundred year old tradition – why support Austria when France could finally get rid of it? It was very conceivable that Austria would start another war against France in the future: Francis Stephen might want to gain Lorraine back, or he might exploit the fact that a cession of Imperial territory was not final until the Diet had ratified it and declare an Imperial war against a France that illegally occupied the Southern Netherlands. A settlement with Austria would therefore only be possible if it were less generous for France and more advantageous to its allies. This would make the peace “more solid and

72 honourable”. The author proposed as an example that France should obtain for itself the destruction of the fortifications of Luxembourg, a repetition of Francis Stephen’s renunciation of his claims on Lorraine, the restoration of all France’s treaties with the Holy Roman Empire – France had been a legal protector of the Westphalian constitution since 1648, providing it with a justification for war against the Emperor –, and the abolition of the clause in the Treaty of Utrecht stipulating the destruction of Dunkirk’s fortifications. For its allies, France could ask a limited compensation for the Elector Palatine, the restoration of Bavaria to Maximilian Joseph, and compensation in the form of Upper Austria or of part of it, an Italian principality for Don Philip, and finally the confirmation of the Treaty of Berlin of 1742 ceding Silesia to Prussia.129 Still, Bussy admitted that even such a settlement would probably never be accepted. He therefore saw better potential in the second option. France wanted peace, he declared, and Great Britain ought to want it as well. Lord Carteret, who had formulated Great Britain’s interventionist foreign policy from early 1742 to late 1744, had fallen because his ideas only led to a never-ending spiral of involvement in the War. The new Imperial election would hurtle Great Britain only further down that path. Moreover, as France and Great Britain financed the opposing coalitions, both had an interest in ending the war. Bussy was only afraid that Great Britain had not yet come around to this way of thinking, and would maybe try to open separate negotiations with Madrid and Berlin, or even draw out the peace process in the hope that France would give in out of exhaustion. An accommodation with Great Britain also presented a major drawback: they would not readily consent to “notre arrangement du coté de la Flandre”. He therefore suggested to open negotiations with Great Britain and to keep them going, but he advised to only make peace through them when all other negotiations had failed. Bussy ultimately preferred the third, Saxon option, as he thought it the most likely to succeed. Austria had not much to offer to Augustus III: only a slice of Bohemian territory, the guardianship over the future Joseph II, and in that capacity of ward temporary control temporary control of the Kingdom of Bohemia. But Maria Theresa would never cede a substantial part of Bohemia, and at any rate Saxony’s possession of it would never be certain as long as Francis Stephen was Emperor. France, on the other hand, could offer Augustus the Imperial throne – his election would be guaranteed because France enjoyed enough support

129 There is some historiographical confusion regarding nomenclature here: the Treaty of Breslau was preliminary, the Treaty of Berlin was definitive. For practical purposes, however, both are used almost interchangeably to refer to the formal transfer of sovereignty over Silesia to Prussia.

73 among the Electors. Moreover, it could offer him Bohemia as far as the Elbe and the Moldau, formally guarantee his possession of this territory, and seal the alliance through a marriage with a French princess130. His loss of the title of King of Poland could be compensated with the creation of a Kingdom of Thuringia. The only problem with this plan was that the Elector himself was weak-willed and might be afraid of the consequences of a rupture with Austria, but Bussy proposed to circumvent this problem by prodding the ambition of the people around him. Bussy also countered the argument that it would merely be a repetition of the catastrophe that Charles Albert had been: he claimed that calculations at the time were made on the basis of theoretical troop numbers, whereas now they were done on the basis of the actual number. Moreover, nobody knew at the time how Great Britain and Maria Theresa herself would react: now it was quite likely that Great Britain would soon diminish its involvement or even retreat from the war. Moreover, Saxony might be able to sway the Russian court to the French camp.

France victorious The death of the Emperor understandably shifted the strategic perspective of France’s memoranda-writers. Here was an opportunity, it seemed, to end the war or alter it to France’s advantage – a solution through diplomacy for the same problems that had made France invade the Southern Netherlands in the first place. Yet France did not manage to exploit the death of the Emperor to its advantage. Augustus III refused to push his own candidacy, and on the 22nd of April, three months after the death of his father, Maximilian III Joseph of Bavaria made peace with Austria. In return for the restoration of all his hereditary lands, the Elector recognized the Pragmatic Sanction and pledged his vote to Francis Stephen. As three out of nine Electors were ruled by a member of Bavaria’s Wittelsbach dynasty, Francis Stephen’s election was now guaranteed, and it took place in September. Bavaria’s defection made France’s involvement in Germany obsolete: there was nothing it could obtain there anymore. Frederick the Great was still fighting on until he made a separate peace in December. But France could not possible reach him, nor did it have any interest to do so. Henceforth the war was to focus on the Low Countries and Italy.

130 Presumably with Augustus’s heir, as the Elector himself was married already.

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France started its campaign in the Southern Netherlands in late April; on the first day of May it opened the trenches before Tournai. Taking that city was essential if the French army was pursue its advance into Flanders along the Scheldt River (during the campaign of 1744 France had already taken control of the Southern part of the Lys), which would take it to and finally Antwerp. An allied relief force was sent, but the French army, in the presence of Louis XV, soundly defeated it during the Battle of Fontenoy on the 11th of May. For the rest of the year, the French would meet no resistance capable of halting their advance. After the fall of Tournai, in June, they proceeded to occupy the County of Flanders. In August, they reached Dendermonde. By early September, all of Flanders was under French control.

I have found no memoranda dating from this period. Admittedly, no new developments took place inthe Southern Netherlands during these months: Flanders fell without great trouble, as had been foreseen. Nevertheless, the war in Italy in this period went far better than the previous year, with the Austrians and Sardinians largely on the defensive. In the colonial theatre, by contrast, France did suffer a reverse: in June an army consisting largely of British Colonials captured Louisbourg, the capital of the French colony on Cape Breton Island. These two events did change the strategic possibilities: it would therefore be odd that no memoranda were written between mid-February and early August. Possibly some were written and were classified in series I have not consulted – in series about Italy or about Great Britain, for instance. Another option is that Marquis d’Argenson simply refused to accept any new memoranda for some time, and that they were sent back to their writers, as he hinted at in his two notes from early February. Memoranda concerning the Southern Netherlands reappear on the 13th of August, in a “Memorandum on Ostend”, the siege of which had started on the 7th, and would last until the 21st.131 It was written in Ghent (which had fallen to the French in July) by an anonymous author, although we can assume that he was either an officer in the French army, or a civil official administering the occupied province. The memorandum moreover specifies that it was “read in the Council” – which proves that at least some memoranda were not only read by the concerned ministers of civil servants, but by the entire Government as well. The memorandum explored the strategic possibilities offered by the French capture of Ostend. The author observed that the British had used Ostend to introduce their own

131 PB 137, Mémoire sur Ostende, 13 August 1745.

75 manufactures and Oriental products into Germany, and this had led to a sharp decline of the Dutch Republic as a commercial transit centre. The value of the Dutch East India Company’s shares had fallen from 25.000 to 6.000 guilders in forty years’ time. The mistake of the Dutch was that they failed to realize that an increase in one country’s trade necessarily leads to a decrease in that of another – just as they failed to realize that the British set them up at Utrecht. Now that they had come to understand the consequences of all of this, they would try to seek vengeance upon the British when given the chance. France could take advantage of this situation, the author argued. One option would be to hand over Ostend to the Dutch, who would then destroy it, causing an even greater rupture between London and The Hague. France could also exploit the rivalry over Ostend to permanently keep the city for itself. If France were forced to give it back to Maria Theresa – which would continue the present situation, favourable to the British –, Versailles could demand in compensation the reestablishment of Dunkirk’s fortifications. This focus on Ostend never returns in subsequent memoranda or negotiations. It is therefore likely that the King’s Council did not consider it a worthwhile path to follow: there is no indication that Versailles ever attempt to test Ostend’s worth before the British or the Dutch.

The next memorandum is again written by Mandat, on the first of September. Its subject was “universal and perpetual peace in Europe”.132 Mandat traced this idea back to a plan developed by Henry IV. Henry and Sully proposed to partition the Low Countries among French and English sovereign lords, in return for their cooperation against the House of Austria. France itself would not expand. The result of this reordering would be a perpetual peace. Subsequent events did not allow this idea to be achieved, but, Mandat proposed, maybe now was the time to think once more about establishing universal peace. Mandat did not consider France’s strength to be problematic – on the contrary, it was necessary if Europe were ever to achieve lasting peace. Only a power that had nothing to fear or covet from its neighbours would be able to achieve justice and prevent those neighbours from resorting to war. Every other plan would have no chance of success, since all princes had a certain natural propensity to expand their territories. But if there were only one strong power in Europe, instead of two rivalling ones, that strongest prince would find it more

132 MD 516, 20. Traité sur la paix universelle et perpetuelle de l’Europe du premier septembre 1745, par M. Mandat, 1 September 1745.

76 honourable to preserve peace than fight wars. As it was common knowledge that large kingdoms did no last very long, this prince would content himself with a kingdom that was safely protected by seas, mountains, and unassailable fortresses – such as those that France could now conquer in the Southern Netherlands. Once France had achieved that, it would make no sense for the King of France to desire any further expansion. And even if a future King were more ambitious than Louis XV, Mandat argued, there would be nothing worthwhile for him to conquer. Holland would lose its value if it were taken by France: it was far more useful as a trading partner. Germany was no option either: the example of Charlemagne had shown that conquests there would ultimately lead to France’s collapse. Neither would it be any good to send troops to die in the mountains of Switzerland: Louis XI and Francis I had learned that the hard way. Italy, Mandat concluded, should not even be talked about: it was commonly known as the “tomb of that valorous nation [of France]”. France’s present conquests in the Southern Netherlands were therefore the last that it would ever make: after that, it would be interested only in the preservation of peace. Mandat demonstrates in this memorandum that even to those who wanted France to embrace pacifism, that long-term goal was not incompatible with the annexation of the Southern Netherlands. Indeed, Mandat even believed it to be a prerequisite. It should be noted that Mandat did not subscribe to the natural borders doctrine (which, as has been noted, was not formulated until the Revolution): he made a neat difference between the borders nature has given to France – the sea and the mountains – and the fortresses which it could acquire in the Southern Netherlands.

The next memorandum as well was written by an author we have encountered before: Lasarraz, who had calculated the relative strength of the opposing coalitions in an October 1744 memorandum. It was written on the 2nd of September 1745.133 Lasarraz believed that a general peace could only be reached through a separate peace between two powers, and that this was so imminent that there would be a general peace by the next winter. France was in the happiest of situations, he claimed. It had won a great victory in an important battle – that is, the battle of Fontenoy – and conquered Flanders; its Prussian ally was threatening Bohemia for the third time; and in Italy, the Franco-Spanish coalition was pushing the Austrians out of the peninsula. As France’s opponents had contrary interests, it

133 MD 516, Mémoire par M. de Lasarraz, 2 September 1745.

77 was but a matter of time before one of them should abandon its allies and make peace proposals to France. The most natural proposal would come from Maria Theresa, since Austria, like France, was the head of its coalition. On this assumption Lasarraz then went on to formulate a peace project. Strangely, it made no reference whatsoever to France’s allies or to Italy. In relation to the Low Countries however, Lasarraz proposed that Austria cede all Dutch Barrier fortresses that France had conquered. He remarked that this would constitute not so much a conquest as a restoration, as these places had been acquired by France at the Treaties of Nijmegen and Rijswijk, and ceded involuntarily at Utrecht. In regard to the other lands France has conquered in the Southern Netherlands, Lasarraz continued, “we are not bold enough to indicate their destiny, both because we are profoundly ignorant as to the King’s intentions thereupon, and because how many or how few of his conquests that he will conserve at the Peace will depend on the amount of force and credit that His Majesty shall have during the negotiations of the Congress. However, when we consider the present situation of his affairs, we believe that we can reasonably presume that he will be able to conserve all of Austrian Flanders that now obeys him, or at least those places of that province as shall please him the most.” This cession, Lasarraz argues, would not be contrary to the Pragmatic Sanction since it has already been infringed on so many points that the indivisibility of the Habsburg inheritance could no longer be said to subsist. It is especially interesting that Lasarraz differentiated between two types of territory in the Southern Netherlands. On the one hand there were the Barrier cities, which could be annexed by virtue of former possession. The rest of the territory could be annexed by right of conquest, although Lasarraz did seem to find it necessary to justify his disrespect of the Pragmatic Sanction (which France had recognized after all in 1738) by referring to Maria Theresa’s cessions of Silesia and part of her Italian possessions to Sardinia at the Treaty of Worms. He did not question the desirability of annexing as much of the Southern Netherlands as possible, and the annexation of the Barrier fortresses is presented as a foregone conclusion. In contrast to several other writers, however, he did not urge France to demand the surrender of places it had not conquered, such as Luxembourg. In spite of the annexation of the Barrier fortresses, Lasarraz advocated good relations with the Dutch Republic. He therefore believed France should convince Maria Theresa to give a new Barrier to the Dutch in the Southern Netherlands. Namur, the only remaining Barrier fortress, could be supplemented with Ath and Charleroi. If, however, Namur fell to France, it could be substituted with Mons. Lasarraz did not seem to realize that in such a case Ath,

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Charleroi and Mons would be nearly surrounded by French fortresses, and that moreover they would not impede a French thrust into the heart of the Southern Netherlands along the Scheldt – as France was demonstrating at that very moment. If France annexed Ath and Charleroi as well the Dutch could be given Mons, Oudenaarde and Dendermonde (which already had a joint Dutch-Austrian garrison). If these cessions became problematic – although he did not mention it, Oudenaarde and Dendermonde were already conquered by France, and Lasarraz did assume that France would keep them – he proposed that Austria make of full transfer of sovereignty over the Marquisate of Antwerp and the Waasland to the Dutch Republic. He believed that this had been secretly proposed at the time as an alternative to the Third . I have not found any other reference to this however, and it would indeed be very unlikely that Austria would ever have preferred have preferred the full cession of one of the Southern Netherlands’ most important cities to admitting Dutch garrisons in its newly acquired possessions. At any rate, Lasarraz considered it desirable in the present situation, and thought that France should support the Dutch Republic to obtain it.

The date of the next memorandum is illegible, but its place in the series allows us to assume it was written between September and November 1745. The author is unknown.134 Louis XV had only few conquests left to make before he would be master of the entire Southern Netherlands. In the past France had been forced to give back all such conquests, and there was a risk that its enemies would now unite again – possibly even including Prussia – and force it after a long war to do so once more. It was therefore necessary that France “fascine les yeux du public”. In order to do this, the author proposed to restore the region to Spanish sovereignty, and “even push the comedy so far” as to have a Spanish Governor- General accompanied by a few Spanish troops installed. Although French troops should remain to provide for defence, everything should assume the trappings of genuine Spanish sovereignty. To win over the affection of the population, one of the first deeds of the new government should be the re-establishment of the . After the conclusion of peace, Spain should then surrender sovereignty to France. To prepare the inhabitants for this step, France could grant them the status of subjects of the King in matters of trade from now on. In Germany, France should seek no compensation for its traitorous former allies Bavaria or Saxony. Nevertheless, it was still in the French interest to partition the Habsburg

134 MD 516, De l’objet que l’on devroit avoir dans chaque endroit ou l’on fait actuellement la guerre, s.d.

79 territories. The author therefore proposed to support Prussia in Bohemia, restore the non- hereditary status of the Bohemian monarchy, and have the Elector Palatine, who had remained loyal to France, elected as King. This would be beneficial to Prussia as well, as the new King of Bohemia could confirm the cession of his Kingdom’s rights on Silesia. Strangely for a memorandum proclaiming to indicate France’s goals “in every place where we make war”, the author did not mention the Italian theatre at all.

Notwithstanding the previous author’s optimism, France was in a less favourable position than ever in Germany. On the 13th of September, Francis Stephen was elected Emperor. Frederick of Prussia was in no position to overcome Maria Theresa: he was running short of money – and furious at France for not increasing his subsidies –, Austria and Saxony concluded an alliance in late August, and the risk of a Russian intervention was growing. In December Frederick managed to knock Saxony out of the war; and ten days later he concluded peace with Austria. His possession of Silesia was reconfirmed. In this atmosphere of growing optimism that Austria was experiencing in the last months of 1745, Vienna put out feelers on whether France would be willing to negotiate. As both countries had broken off diplomatic relations, the Austrians approached Versailles through Saxony. The French government decided to reciprocate. This of course happened in the utmost secrecy: the memoranda will therefore bear no trace of it. France’s conditions were that Silesia should be guaranteed to Prussia, that Don Philip should gain a substantial Italian principality, and that France should receive Ypres, Tournai, Furnes, and Nieuwpoort. The Austrian envoy was authorized to cede Ypres and Furnes, and accommodate France in regard to the question of Saint-Hubert and of the Hainault enclaves. But further than this Vienna was not willing to go: Tournai and Nieuwpoort it would not give away, and it would not agree to a principality for Don Philip of the size that France demanded. Negotiations broke off. But they had not been entirely fruitless: they started a tradition of Saxon mediation that was to last until the end of the war.135 1745 might have brought the final collapse of France’s position in Germany; but in Italy its fortune shone as bright as in the Southern Netherlands. The Austrian army was forced to abandon city after city. In December, Don Philip entered Milan and made it the capital of his new principality. And in a new theatre as well, France was encountering unexpected success. In early August, a French ship had landed Charles Edward Stuart, the son of the

135 Matthew Anderson, The War of the Austrian Succession, 151-152; Max von Braubach, Versailles und Wien, 374.

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Jacobite pretender, in Scotland. He managed to rally several clans to his cause, and in September he proclaimed his father as King James VIII of Scotland. He then marched into England, going as far South as Derby. His success resurrected in France the idea of an invasion of Great Britain, and made it dream of the installation of a friendly regime in London. A substantial part of the British army in the Southern Netherlands returned home to deal with the revolt.

This situation is reflected in the next memorandum, once more written by Mandat, on the 9th of December 1745.136 As solid as France’s position in the Southern Netherlands was, Mandat admitted that it would not be easy to plan next year’s campaign. There was a lot that was uncertain: what would happen in Scotland, what would happen to Prussia, whether the Circles of the Holy Roman Empire would remain neutral – now that Francis Stephen was Emperor he might well induce them to declare an Imperial war upon France. Mandat, whose two previous memoranda were somewhat grandiose peace projects, now applied himself to how France should best engage its troops to achieve a “glorious peace”. His starting point was that France should concentrate on Great Britain and the United Provinces, as Austria was dependent on their money. The rebellion in Scotland ought to be supported with all possible means. The Dutch were untrustworthy, Mandat argued once again, and war should be declared against them at least by next April. All their ships in French ports should be halted. The nucleus of it all should be two large armies in the Southern Netherlands – a siege army of 40.000 and an observation army of 60.000. When necessary, this total could be reached by substituting regular troops in garrison with militia. Mandat then proposed to use the siege army to take Mons, and direct the observation army towards Brussels, Louvain, and Malines. After that, Maastricht should be taken, and then Antwerp, after which Charleroi and Namur would soon fall. This would give France control over the Meuse River, allowing it to march into Holland and threaten the Dutch on two fronts, forcing them to split their army. This should lead towards an advantageous peace with the United Provinces and Great Britain. It would be desirable that France should wage an offensive war in Germany as well, but this seemed unlikely. If Maria Theresa concluded peace with Prussia – she would do so two weeks after the memorandum was written –, she could send an army against France; it that army were successful, the Circles of the Holy Roman Empire would soon join her. To

136 MD 516, 28. Plan de la Campagne de 1746, ce ix decembre 1745, par M. Mandat int. des requetes, 9 December 1745.

81 prevent this, France would have to put an army of 60.000 men on the Upper Rhine. Nevertheless, the Alsace could not easily be invaded from Germany as Freiburg and Altbreisach had been destroyed, leaving the Austrians without bases in the region. In addition, France should direct 20.000 men towards the Moselle, to intimidate the Ecclesiastical Electors of Mainz, Cologne and Trier. A siege of Luxembourg should not be undertaken: its fortress was too strong, and it would be better to acquire it after the peace. In Italy, Mandat urged to win over the King of Sardinia as an ally: that would free troops to march towards the Rhine. To assure Sardinian loyalty, he should be required to hand over one of his fortress as a guarantee and send his son to Madrid for the duration of the war, where he would marry an Infanta. If France were to do all this, Mandat argued, a “long and glorious peace” would follow, since Austria’s revenues were already severely depleted, Great Britain’s credit might suffer from the Jacobite rebellion, and Holland as well had already taken on huge loans and it would soon be easy to invade it.

In the following memorandum, a certain Sacquet analysed France’s attitude towards the various goals the belligerent powers sought to achieve.137 It was written on the 20th of December. It is of no interest to repeat all of his observations here, but he did make a few important remarks about the Southern Netherlands. In relation to Spain, Sacquet believed that it would “very easy” to provide an Italian principality to Don Philip because of “les conquestes en Flandres et sur le Rhin que le Roy a faites sur la Reyne de Hongrie et que vraysemblablement S.M. n’a pas compté de garder en entier pour elle”. It is somewhat remarkable that Sacquet at this point believed that the conquests in the Southern Netherlands would be necessary to win an Italian principality for Don Philip: by December 1745, the Franco-Spanish army had occupied Parma and Piacenza, and at about the same time Sacquet wrote this memorandum Don Philip entered Milan, although we do not know whether Sacquet was – or could have been – aware of this fact by the 20th. Sacquet might have thought that what the French and Spanish were asking – he admits to not knowing the terms of the Treaty of Fontainebleau, but he presumed it was Milan and possible Mantua – was so much that Maria Theresa would not agree to cede it if she did not receive something substantial in return, that is, the restoration of the Austrian Netherlands. His use of the formulation “n’a pas compté de garder” seems to betray that he thought that

137 MD 516, Sur les differents objets de la negociation pour la paix, par Mr. Sacquet, 20 December 1745.

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France would not keep all of its conquests no matter what, so that their return might as well be capitalized upon to make the cession of Italian territory to Don Philip “very easy”. Still, Sacquet was convinced that France should keep part of the Southern Netherlands: “those who know the Flemish border agree that without Ypres, Menin and Tournai our Flemish border remains ill-defended”. These cities had been part of Vauban’s ceinture de fer and their forced abandonment at Utrecht had weakened France’s northernmost border. Sacquet believed that “si l’on prenoit le party de manager les Pays bas pour Don Philippe la distraction des trois places ne seroit vraysemblablement pas un obstacle a cet arrangement.” Moreover, Tournai was the “cradle of our monarchy” and there would be “no honour in keeping it away from the Crown in perpetuity” – Tournai was the capital from which Clovis had conquered the rest of France. All in all, Sacquet believed that the “conquests that the King has made in the previous campaign and those that he can still make this year will provide enough material [étoffe] to obtain what we want from the Queen of Hungary”. France’s invasion of the Southern Netherlands out of strategic considerations was of course intrinsically linked to the idea of obtaining leverage there to remedy a less favourable situation elsewhere from the start. Sacquet however is the first author to link the Southern Netherlands to one specific goal – Don Philip. What should moreover be remembered is that he did not advocate a complete return to achieve this goal: France was allowed to, and should, keep the cities that were necessary for the security of its border.

A following memorandum was written on the 19th of January 1746 by a sieur Garigues de Froment. 138There was indeed an Antoine-Joseph Garrigues de Froment who was a priest and polemicist; however, he was exiled from France at this moment, and the use of sieur instead of abbé as well would suggest that the memorandum was not written by this Garrigues de Froment. Moreover the abbé had lived in Holland: the rabidly anti-Dutch attitude the author manifested would then be hard to explain. As the object of his memorandum, de Froment proposed to describe how to restore trade with America, expel the Austrians from Italy and the Southern Netherlands, and annex the better part of that region to France. He argued that although this might seem fantastical, it could easily be achieved.

138 MD 516, 34. Par le sr Garigues de Froment, 19 January 1746.

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A general peace congress de Froment deemed useless: it would take too long. The best way was conclude a separate peace with one of France’s enemies. It was this procedure that had been followed at Nijmegen, Ryswick, and Utrecht as well. The Dutch were out of the question, de Froment argued: negotiations with them would be long and arduous. It would be better to negotiate without them and even against them. Why this should be de case de Froment did not explain, although he did add that “they deserve it”. The Austrians it was best to avoid as well: they demanded a lot, their style of negotiating was duplicitous, and “they squabble endlessly about the interpretations of the concessions they make, or the advantages they win”. Moreover since Westphalia they had only ever concluded peace when all their allies had abandoned them. A better choice would be for the Court of Turin. However, de Froment believed that the war in Italy was doomed like that in Scotland: it would fail or else take too long. Moreover, Spain had not made particularly enticing proposals to Turin until then either. Although de Froment did not seem to be aware of it, France was indeed involved in negotiations with Turin at that very moment (conducted by de Champeaux, who wrote a memorandum in November 1744). However, as the French would soon find out, de Froment’s accusation of Austrian duplicity might as well or even more appropriately have been directed towards Charles Emmanuel of Sardinia. Great Britain was the best choice, de Froment concluded. There Versailles had the advantage that it could quite easily come to an understanding with George II. George would be happy to let Don Philip have Milan if that would “let him live in quiet on his isles”. He was angry at the Habsburgs for drawing him into this war, which was exhausting his finances and had moreover provoked a rebellion against his dynasty. He wanted to get rid of the Stuarts, and for that he needed to reach an accommodation with France and Spain. George’s ministers shared his concern about all this, but the obstacle for the British as a nation was the fate of Louisbourg and Flanders. These were vital causes for France as well. It needed Louisbourg back to secure its trade with the West- and East Indies. Flanders was necessary for “the honour of the King and the utility of his subjects”. Possession of Ostend and the re-establishment of the fortifications of Dunkirk would provide France with a lasting thorn in the side of the Maritime Powers. The ideal situation for France would thus be both to see Louisbourg returned and to keep Flanders, or at least its most important fortresses. De Froment argued that this was possible, although not by hoping for a Jacobite and French conquest of Great Britain, which he believed chimerical. However, in return for a restoration of Louisbourg, France could propose a provisional truce uti possidetis in Flanders

84 and a promise never to support the Stuarts again. The eventual abandonment of the Stuarts de Froment considered inevitable: it would be better to do so now and at least obtain a lasting settlement and amnesty for them and their supporters. All other questions should be relegated to a general peace congress, to be held in France, preferably in Reims or Soissons. “Dexterity of negotiation” would ultimately deliver Flanders to France, as the provisional uti possidetis in Flanders would “infallibly” become definitive, yet it would soften the blow of a French annexation. De Froment argued that the British King and Government would accept this, even though public opinion did not want Louisbourg to return to France, as it was their “dominant interest” to secure the “wavering throne” of the Protestant dynasty and quell the unrest which might otherwise well go on for a long time. Moreover, they would have no qualms about abandoning Maria Theresa, as they were well aware of how much she had cost them already, and she could hardly ask for more now that she had obtained the Imperial crown for her husband. If this did not suffice, France could use the carrot of an expansion of Hanover in Germany as well. De Froment thought that this was the basis of the agreement between Hannover and Austria: the bishopric of Hildesheim would be secularized, and George would moreover obtain an establishment in Flanders. France could likewise offer the secularization of Hildesheim and add that of Osnabruck139, so that George would not demand an impossible establishment in Flanders. However, if the British would consent to a French Barrier in the Southern Netherlands – De Froment probably means a Dutch-style garrison in the region that would otherwise remain Austrian – they might be allowed to receive Bruges. If the British agreed to this, the Dutch would be left with no choice but to acquiesce, if they were to save what was left of their Barrier or acquire a new one. Without Dutch and British support, Maria Theresa would be forced to give up as well. Maybe a partition of the Southern Netherlands would be among the possibilities, “the great object that the Court of France must never leave out of sight for a single moment, neither in war nor in peace”. If, however, the British would refuse to listen, France should mount a vigorous attack against them, restore its navy and use it better than it had until then. The alternative of Flanders without Louisbourg, or Louisbourg without Flanders, should be refused. But when left with no other choice, it would still be better to consent to a temporary cession of

139 The bishop of Osnabruck was alternately Catholic and Protestant. The Protestant bishop was traditionally a member of the Hanoverian dynasty. The present bishop was a Catholic, the Wittelsbach Klemens August, Elector of Cologne and brother to the deceased Emperor Charles Albert.

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Louisbourg in return for the annexation of Flanders, Hainault, and Luxembourg. “I know”, De Froment commented on this, “that there are people who think otherwise, but it would be easy to show that they are mistaken, because of multiple reasons, the details of which would burden this memorandum too much.” This comment shows that there were indeed other people who had different opinions and who expressed them in discussions, but who have written no memoranda that we know of, reflecting the ‘lost oral world’ that I spoke about in my introduction. Unfortunately, because of this, we do not know whether those people proposed exchanging the entire Southern Netherlands for Louisbourg, or only part of them, like Sacquet proposed in relation to Milan.

Sardinia was not the only power France was negotiating with in early 1746. At the end of December 1745, it had suspended a Treaty of Commerce with the Dutch Republic – it should be remembered that Versailles and The Hague were not formally at war with each other –, that granted very generous terms to Dutch merchants. Marquis d’Argenson then let it be known that the Treaty would be restored if The Hague agreed to abandon its auxiliary involvement in the war and adopt complete neutrality. In February, the Dutch agreed to send an envoy to Versailles to further discuss the matter. Meanwhile, France opened the campaign early in the Southern Netherlands. At the end of January, Maurice de Saxe marched on Brussels. The city capitulated in February. The French did not immediately press their advantage: they returned to their winter quarters for the time being. The Jacobite rebellion, on the other hand, did not proceed as well as expected or hoped for. In mid-December, Charles Edward had reached Derby, but there he had been persuaded to return north. He had not lost any major battles yet, but his momentum was gone. The retreat also foreclosed cooperation between an invading French army in the South and the rebels in the North. France thereupon called off any preparations for a naval invasion it had already made and redirected its troops towards their winter quarters in the Southern Netherlands.140

It is within this context that the next memorandum was written, in February 1746, by an anonymous author.141

140 Olaf van Nimwegen, De Republiek als grote mogendheid, 243-245,249-254. 141 MD 446, 9. Mémoire sur les conjonctures presentes, Feburary 1746.

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The memorandum argued that “no-one could disagree that the veritable interest of France is to have a gate into Italy, a barrier in Flanders, and to restore its navy”. The question, then, was whether France possessed the means to achieve them. It did, the author argued, and they should be exploited now, as France’s situation might become less favourable in the future. These means were Dutch neutrality and the situation in Scotland. Dutch neutrality would remove Great Britain from the war: during the War of the Polish Succession and in the early part of the War of the Austrian Succession the British had not acted until they were certain of Dutch support. If this were to fall away now, the British would give up their subsidies to Turin and Vienna as well. However, the Dutch should not be approached as mediators: they were far too pro-Austrian for that. And if the Dutch were to refuse neutrality, the author argued that France should threaten to give Ostend to the British – the importance of Ostend to the Dutch merited a memorandum of its own that we have discussed before – and to give any Dutch territory it might conquer to Prussia. The author did not explain why the Dutch would take seriously a threat that involved a king who had betrayed France thrice by then. As for Scotland, the author maintained that France had no interest in seeing the Pretender installed on the British throne as he would certainly turn against France to win the support of his new subjects, and he would do so even more virulently than the Hanoverians because he would have to prove himself. George II on the other hand was becoming tired of the war. France should therefore try to keep the rebellion going for another three years, until Great Britain had become so weak France and Spain could overtake its trade. But it should always prevent the Pretender from becoming King of all of the British Isles: he must only be allowed to obtain one or two crowns at most.

The author of the next memorandum142, written in February 1746, was especially optimistic about the situation in Italy. There the project of Richelieu was being completed, he declared: the Austrians chased from Italy, Savoy attached to France as a gateway across the Alps, Sardinia entering the French fold – just like Richelieu once made Sweden a French ally. Moreover, the situation in Italy “seems to indicate to us the means to forever restrain the House of Austria in its German lands, to indemnify France for the immense expenditures it has made in this war in order to destroy this balance of power, that eternal objection to the power of the King, and finally to let Louis XV receive part of the rights that Louis XIV has

142 PB 138, Propos d’un partage des Pays bas, February 1746. The name of its author is difficult to read: it might Prince de Liny or Lucy, although these titles seem never to have existed.

87 acquired over Flanders through his marriage with Maria Theresa of Austria.” One might object that the other countries of Europe would seek to prevent this by force, or that France should seek peace. But the situation had never been so favourable to France, the author countered. Austria had lost Flanders and Italy and was left without money or allies; “the Englishman is top occupied in his Island to leave it” and the Dutch were alone and afraid that France would attack them. The prospect of another campaign therefore must not prevent the King from “executing a plan which can assure him a glorious and long-lasting peace.” The author then presented two plans to achieve this. The first, he said, was the easiest and the least advantageous to France. It was simply the consequence of Maria Theresa’s present predicament after the loss of Brussels and Sardinia’s retreat from the coalition143:she would now be only “too happy to buy back part of the conquests of the King through the sacrifice of the other part”. However, she would maintain a desire to seek vengeance when the opportunity presented itself. To prevent this, the author argued, France should force her to cede the remaining part of the Southern Netherlands, including Luxembourg, to her brother- in-law Charles of Lorraine. This pill could be sweetened by a clause providing for the return of the Southern Netherlands to Austrian rule in the absence of male heirs.144 However, the author soothed, it was unlikely that this would ever become reality: even if Charles were to have no children, France could still enforce the status quo through a subsequent treaty. In this scenario, France would only have a count of Flanders to deal with on its northern border, and one that could be won over by marriage to one of Louis XV’s daughters. The second option, the author asserted, was more complicated but also more advantageous. Moreover, the only real difficulty lay in the first step: nothing was lost if it failed. Just like the Duchy of Milan was to be divided among Sardinia and Don Philip, so the Southern Netherlands could be partitioned between France and the Dutch Republic. Richelieu concluded such a treaty with the United Provinces in 1635, which stipulated a line between Blankenberge and Rupelmonde: what lay west of it would become French, what lay east Dutch. Why would the Dutch not be content now, the author asked, with a line of partition that was more generous to them than that of 1635? If it went from Ostend or Nieuwpoort to Namur, then Ostend, Bruges, Ghent, Brussels, and the richest part of Flanders and Brabant would become Dutch – then they would certainly consent to France keeping its conquests in Flanders, and receiving Hainault and the land east of the Sambre and Meuse Rivers, including

143 Sardinia was only negotiating a separate peace with France: it had officially abandonned Austria yet (and neither would it eventually do so). 144 This is in contrast to Carondas, who specifically wanted to prevent this.

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Luxembourg. A Barrier consisting of Ostend, Bruges, Ghent, and Brussels, properly fortified, would be a formidable obstacle, and the costs to maintain it would be compensated for by the wealth of the surrounding country. And there would be no reason for the Dutch to believe that the British and the German princes would be less interested in the protection of the Republic’s southern border because it now exercised sovereignty over it.

Clouds in the sky Early March suddenly upset the atmosphere of success. The Sardinians broke off the negotiations which they had been conducting since late 1745 and unexpectedly attacked the French garrison at Asti on the 5th. In the following weeks, as an Austrian army came sweeping down the Po Valley as well, the French and Spanish position broke down completely. On the 19th, Don Philip was forced to flee from his capital of Milan. The morale of the French army collapsed: within a month it lost 15.000 men. The Spanish dug themselves in at Piacenza.145 Marquis d’Argenson was in the middle of negotiations with the envoy of the Dutch Republic over Dutch neutrality when news of the disaster in Italy reached Versailles. A startled d’Argenson quickly formulated thirteen ‘Ideas’ that he presented to the envoy “not as minister, […] but as a private person”. In return for peace with the Maritime Powers, he offered the restoration of the Austrian Netherlands, except for the Duchy of Limburg and Austrian , which were to be ceded to the Elector Palatine, and the disputes over the enclaves in Hainault and the Abbey of Saint-Hubert, which were to be solved in France’s favour. In return, d’Argenson demanded a joint Franco-Dutch guarantee of neutrality for the Southern Netherlands, the destruction of the fortifications of Luxembourg, the return of Louisbourg, and the reestablishment of the fortifications of Dunkirk. Italy, the Stuarts, and the Asiento were to be left out of the discussion for now.146 D’Argenson was clearly overreacting: by the time he made his proposals (mid-March) nobody could have known exactly how bad the situation in Italy really was. Moreover, as war with Maria Theresa would continue and Italy was to be left out of the discussion with the Maritime Powers, he was essentially proposing to shift the war from a theatre that was structurally very favourable to France (the Southern Netherlands) to one where France would always be at a disadvantage (Italy). It was very much a product of the worldview of

145 Reed Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession, 269. 146 Olaf van Nimwegen, De Republiek als grote mogendheid, 257-258.

89 d’Argenson: he had always wanted to turn the Dutch into allies and to concentrate on Italy, which he wanted to liberate from Habsburg rule (and from Bourbon rule as well, for that matter). Still, it is in d’Argenson’s Idées that the principle of a complete return of the Southern Netherlands appeared for the first time – albeit with reservations for Limburg, Guelders, the enclaves and Saint-Hubert. It should also be remembered that it did so as a consequence of the deteriorating situation in Italy.

France’s memoranda writers did not share in d’Argenson’s panic – quite the contrary, even. On the 20th of April a memorandum and entitled “Réflexions d’un bon François” was written. Its author Silhouette, probably Etienne de Silhouette, later to become Controller-General of Finances, did not even mention the deteriorating situation in Italy.147 Silhouette declared that the war would only end if there was a revolution in England, or if Maria Theresa lost either British and Dutch subsidies, or the entire Southern Netherlands and Italy. Silhouette proposed to achieve all of this simultaneously. France should send reinforcements to the Jacobites in Scotland, and always keep a strong fleet ready at Dunkirk to provide support when necessary – Silhouette could not know yet that Charles Edward Stuart had been trounced only four days before at Culloden. France was also to deploy a large army in the Southern Netherlands, led by the King himself, and send a substantial amount of troops to the Meuse, Moselle, and Rhine. It should also send troops to Canada. At the same time, Spain was to conquer all of Italy. France should support them with a large number of troops, and send a fleet to the Mediterranean to chase away the British navy. All of this could be done because “if it is notorious that the finances of the English and Dutch do not go well, it is equally well known that they go well in France and in Spain: we don’t lack money, we don’t borrow it.” France and Spain should only make sure that this financial prosperity remained constant: for that they must only protect their maritime trade routes with Veracruz, Martinique, Haiti, and the French East Indies. It was then only a matter of time before France conquered all of the Southern Netherlands, and then it would be able to dictate peace. Silhouette’s peace plan was as follows: -The Southern Netherlands would go to Charles of Lorraine, who would marry a French princess. He should destroy the fortifications of Luxembourg, and cede Tournai to France.

147 MD 516, Réflexions d’un bon François, par M. Silhouette, 20 April 1746.

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-Don Philip would become King of Lombardy, ruling over all the formerly Austrian lands in Italy. He would join the Swiss Confederation. -The Stuarts would renounce their claims to the British thrones, become Grand Dukes of Tuscany, and marry a French princess. -Gibraltar and Minorca were to return to Spain; Louisbourg to France. -All European countries would gain equal commercial rights in Spanish America; the Asiento would go to France. -France would receive eastern Hispaniola in recognition of its efforts on behalf of Spain.

Silhouette’s optimism might be unsurpassable, but other authors were far removed from despair either. Mandat, writing another memorandum on the 22nd of April, spoke about some “clouds in Italy” that would soon disappear due to the superiority of the French and Spanish armies.148 The overall situation was more favourable than it has ever been under Louis XIV, and it was possible for France to achieve a glorious and eternal peace. The policy France had followed for two years had been a resounding success. It had achieved a lot in the Southern Netherlands, including the demolition of several Barrier fortresses.149 Moreover, it had enabled an invasion of Great Britain, which had proved to be a huge nuisance to London. It could now invade the Dutch Republic as well. When it did so, Mandat encouraged France to demolish the fortresses it captured, unlike in 1672. This would leave the Dutch without any barrier, forcing them to live in friendship with France. They would then become “the happiest people on earth”, living in conditions similar to those of the Venetians and Swiss. If the Dutch wished to avoid an invasion and proclaim neutrality, France should demand in return that all barrier fortresses, even Luxembourg, be handed over to it, in order to demolish them. Certain Dutch cities were moreover to receive temporary French garrisons, in order to guarantee Dutch neutrality until the conclusion of a general peace. The only threat to France’s position was that the Circles of the Holy Roman Empire should abandon neutrality. It was only this neutrality that had hitherto allowed France to deploy such large armies in the Southern Netherlands. If Maria Theresa managed to bring a

148 MD 516, 40. Réflexions sur l’état présent de la France ce vingt deux avril 1746, par M. Mandat, 22 April 1746. 149 See later on for the demolition of the Barrier fortresses.

91 large army to the Rhine, there was a risk that the Circles would join her. If was therefore imperative for France to prevent this from happening. According to Mandat, the main cause for the less happy situation in Italy was that Spain and the Italian princes ignored their true interest. They should all strive to drive the Habsburgs out of Italy. Sardinia would never again be offered such an opportunity to expand, but Spain had refused to cede part of Milan to him. Spain should content itself with a smaller principality for Don Philip if this would win over Sardinia. France, for its part, had to support Don Philip because he was a Bourbon, not out of any real interest. Moreover, it was a useful distraction to France’s main goal: the defeat of the Maritime Powers, who were the heads of the coalition. After they were defeated, Austria and Sardinia would soon follow. As the Southern Netherlands were most suitable to achieve this goal, France ought to concentrate on this theatre. But this should not keep France from trying to reach an accommodation in Italy by offering Milan to Francis Stephen in return for Tuscany – a cession which would actually strengthen Austria’s position in Italy, Mandat remarked. This might induce Maria Theresa to make peace, “and she would take less of an interest in the preservation of the [Southern] Netherlands, which will always be an apple of discord between France and her”. Unfortunately, this formulation is not very clear, but it does seem to suggest that Mandat believed that she would then be more amenable to cessions in the Southern Netherlands – we know from his previous memoranda that Mandat supported French annexation of at least part of the Southern Netherlands.

Notwithstanding the unabated annexationism in the memoranda of this period, in his official diplomacy with the Dutch, Marquis d’Argenson stuck to his idea of giving up the entire Southern Netherlands, albeit with reservations. As the French Court moved to Brussels in early May – Louis XV was again going to lead the campaign – d’Argenson delivered an more official version of his Idées to the Dutch representatives.150 The basis of it remained complete neutrality for the Southern Netherlands: neither France nor the Dutch Republic were ever to attack it, and the Dutch would be bound to join France in protecting it if a third party violated its neutrality. France would restore all of the Southern Netherlands, with the known exceptions of Limburg, Dutch Guelders, the enclaves of Hainault (especially the cities of Beaumont and Chimay), and the abbey of Saint-

150 PB 138, Plan de pacification generale projetté à Bruxelles en May 1746, May 1746.

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Hubert. In contrast to his Idées, d’Argenson did include provisions about the Stuarts and Italy this time: France would agree to stop supporting the Stuarts, and Francis Stephen would cede Tuscany to Don Philip “out of zeal for the tranquillity and the general good of Europe”. If Don Philip were to die without heirs (defined as the male descendants of his mother Elisabeth Farnese), Tuscany would go to Charles of Lorraine. If he were to have no heirs as well, the Grand Duchy would go to the King of Sardinia. This proposal, like the Idées, were not well received in the Dutch Republic, and even less so in Great Britain. It was the clause of absolute neutrality that was problematic: it would dismantle the Barrier system. Neither is it certain that d’Argenson received the full support of his ministry for these proposals: they might have allowed him to make them simply to keep diplomatic channels with the Dutch open.

Apart from d’Argenson’s proposal, France certainly made no effort to prove its newfound non-expansionism in this period – if such really existed In March, France had decreed that Courtrai, Ath, Beaumont and Chimay would henceforth belong to the customs area of French Flanders and French Hainault respectively, and it moved its customs offices to the borders of their castellanies.151 It was essentially an economic matter: the declaration is principally concerned with the marking of textile products with a French tag. It was not a complete annexation152, but the wording “to put them on the same level of French Flanders [and] French Hainault, of which they were formerly part” must hardly have seemed encouraging to those who feared for just that.153 All four cities had indeed belonged to France under Louis XIV. Beaumont and Chimay were the subject of longstanding French claims, and even d’Argenson’s plan included their annexation. After this measure was implemented, the States of Flanders154 corresponded with the Intendant of Flanders Séchelles and even the French government to protest against it. The subject of their protest was not a possible annexation of the castellanies to France – which would not have been very wise protest to make, as it was not impossible that the County of Flanders, or part of it, would be annexed by France – but the economic consequences of this decision. The exact content and argument need not bother us here; suffice it to say that they accused special interest groups of having lobbied for it – the linen bleachers155, or “avid

151 In the case of the castellany of Courtrai this put the customs border at less than 15 kilometres from Ghent. 152 The city of Courtrai maintained its representation in the States of Flanders, for instance. 153 RG Staten van Vlaanderen 10997, Extrait des registres du conseil d’etat, 17 March 1746. 154 I have not examined the States of Hainault. 155 Linnen was mostly bleached in Holland as linnen from Holland was considered more prestigious.

93 merchants”156 –, and that they predicted the collapse of Courtrai’s linen industry together with their ensuing inability to pay subsidies to the French crown.157 The measure was finally rescinded in early January 1748, probably because the economic consequences had turned out dire, as predicted.158

Since neither Mandat nor Silhouette mentioned the idea of returning the Southern Netherlands (almost) entirely, we can assume that it had not yet become widely known in this period. This should not surprise us: Marquis d’Argenson had formulated it in the context of negotiations with the Dutch, which were meant to remain secret. On the 9th of July, we finally find de Champeaux picking up on d’Argenson’s idea – but he was a confidant of d’Argenson after all, and he had been tasked with conducting the negotiations with Sardinia.159 De Champeaux opened his memorandum by admitting that “The more I think about it, the more the project to keep Naples, to treat with the King of Sardinia, and to re-establish the affairs of Italy through the advantages that you gain in Flanders, provokes a lot of reflections.” The crux of d’Argenson’s views was apparently still to win over Sardinia: de Champeaux mentioned that “your project” was to make Sardinia a mediator or an ally of France. De Champeaux had his doubts about this: Turin was too unreliable in negotiations. Moreover, France’s offer was not very different from the one that had been under discussion during the winter, even though Sardinia’s position had improved and that of France had deteriorated. Sardinia’s basic outlook had not changed either: it was still apprehensive about Bourbon expansion in Italy and wary of Spanish promises. Neither could France offer much more than it had done before: Sardinia was simply too unreliable to be allowed to expand a lot. Therefore France could only persuade Sardinia when it could threaten it, but that would only be possible if the Austrians turned against Naples, allowing the French and Spanish to invade Piedmont. Even then, the French and Spanish must not inflict too much damage on Sardinian territory, for fear of alienating Turin forever. De Champeaux believed that the situation in Italy could be remedied if Bourbon-ruled Naples could march north, but he was uncertain whether Don Carlos would not prefer to

156 Who wanted to profit from lower tariffs at the French border. 157 To take but a few examples, see RG Staten van Vlaanderen 10997, The city of Courtrai to Séchelle, 17 June 1746; Letter of the castellany of Courtrai, 31 January 1747; Letter to Séchelle, Ghent, 7 August 1746. 158 Vanhoutte 108. 159 MD 516, Projet général de M. de Champeaux pour la situation présente des affaires, 9 July 1746.

94 remain on the defensive even if France and Spain were to send reinforcements. About Don Philip de Champeaux preferred not to talk at all: the situation there was too uncertain. De Champeaux had his doubts as well about d’Argenson’s “seeming to believe that we must re-establish the affairs of Italy through Flanders”. “I see,” de Champeaux argued, “that they begin to say abroad that the restitution of a dismantled Flanders is not such a considerable objects, and that the enemies will not attach the same price to this restitution as you do.” This introduced a new element into the discussion: the Southern Netherlands would only be valuable if its fortresses were still intact, whereas France had demolished a considerable number of them. I have not discovered why France started to dismantle the Barrier fortresses: leaving them intact would have made the Southern Netherlands more easily defensible. On the other hand, there was always a possibility that peace would be concluded soon – there were several negotiations in this period – and it would be preferable to give back only a dismantled Barrier. Moreover, even if France’s enemies were to reconquer the Southern Netherlands, their hold on an unfortified country would be only tenuous, whereas France could still dispose of its own ceinture de fer to defend itself and mount a counterattack. The situation would be easier to comprehend if I knew when exactly France started the dismantlement, but I can only say it began before April 1746. Neither do I know which fortress was destroyed when: I only know that when the Austrians returned in 1749, it turned out that the fortifications Ypres, Menin, the citadel of Tournai160, Oudenaarde, Ath, Charleroi, and Mons were severely damaged. The destruction of Ypres certainly did not start before May-June 1746, as d’Argenson threatened to destroy it if the Dutch did not agree with his proposals. 161 The dismantlement of the fortresses might of course be a sign the French government had fully adopted d’Argenson’s plan and expected to give the Southern Netherlands back; but in the absence of more specific information we must limit ourselves to mere conjecture. Returning to de Champeaux, he continued to point out to d’Argenson that he was afraid that if the Austrians were to conquer Naples, and Sardinia managed to occupy part of the Republic of Genua, d’Argenson would not be able to get much in exchange for the unfortified Southern Netherlands. It would be even worse if the Austrians and Sardinians were to follow up their successes with an invasion of Southern France.

160 This was probably only due to the siege in 1745. 161 Olaf van Nimwegen, De Republiek als grote mogendheid, 269, 360.

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De Champeaux therefore proposed to drop Don Philip if Naples were conquered, and limit what was asked in return for the Southern Netherlands to Naples, Louisbourg, and the Duchy of Modena. For this plan to work Genoa must be preserved at any cost, and the conquests in the Southern Netherlands had to be expanded as much as possible without subtracting from the defence of Genoa. If possible, Piedmont had to be invaded as well. Only then would a restoration of Naples, Louisbourg and Modena be possible. De Champeaux followed up on this in another memorandum written in July.162 Looking at the wider European perspective, he considered it impossible to reach an accommodation with Maria Theresa at that moment: she was hoping to win an indemnification for Silesia in Italy. The Dutch Republic and Great Britain would not force her to make peace as long as the Bourbons did not “re-establish their affairs” and Sardinia left the alliance. This would not happen unless a “mésintelligence” occurred between Turin and Vienna. To make matters even worse, the non-belligerent powers of Europe were all in favour of Maria Theresa, as they wanted to preserve the Balance of Power and prevent Bourbon expansion.

De Champeaux’s gloomy remarks were still not shared by everyone: in a memorandum written in the summer of 1746 Mandat still did not refer to the ever-deteriorating situation in Italy.163 In regard to Austria, Mandat declared, France had to make sure that Silesia remained in Prussian hands, and that it kept the Southern Netherlands itself. In Italy, Sardinia had to annex the duchy of Milan until the Adda River (that is, including the city of Milan); Don Philip was to have Parma, Piacenza, and Cremona.164 Only thus could Austrian power be contained. The British position could only be diminished by attacking British trade: for this reason Spain and France had to reinforce their navies, and Spain was not to grant London any commercial privileges in America. The Southern Netherlands should remain in French hands not only to contain Austria: it would force The Hague as well to assume an “intimate relationship” with France. Dutch fear of France would only disappear if there was no buffer left between the two countries. The

162 MD 516, Mémoire sur la situation présente par M. de Champeaux, July 1746. 163 MD 516, 47. Memoire pour scavoir de quels moyens on pouroit se servir pour diminuer la Puissance de la Reine d’Hongrie et de l’Angleterre et augmenter celle des Hollandois, par. M. Mandat, 1746. The exact date is illegible but its place in the series suggests it was wrirten between July and September. 164 This maybe implies that Mandat was aware that Don Philip would never be able to secure Milan.

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Dutch Republic would then emulate the example of Venice. This plan, Mandat, would actually “augment” the power of the Dutch Republic. Mandat’s ideas were obviously pipe dreams, but they do show that even at this stage, not everyone had woken up to the reality of what was happening in Italy. A clue might lie in the fact that Mandat did not consider the wishes of France’s allies. It is not inconceivable that among the people who shared these perspectives, France’s situation must indeed have seemed far less bad.

Modération, désintéressement, and peace Still, other people were all too aware of the implications of what was happening in Italy. In early September, the abbé de Mably wrote two memoranda analysing how France should deal with the situation. 165 Mably was a philosophe, but in this period he was involved in France’s diplomatic service as well.166 Mably wrote just days after the Austrian army took Genoa – the last French and Spanish ally left standing in Italy, apart from Bourbon-ruled but officially neutral Naples – and imposed harsh conditions upon the conquered city. This, Mably argued, changed the entire basis upon which peace might yet have been built. As long as France and Spain had maintained a presence in Italy, there had been a possibility that the situation might turn around again. But now the gates of Italy were shut, and Provence and Dauphiné were under threat. In the present circumstances, it was out of the question that Maria Theresa would be amenable to negotiations. London as well, if it wanted peace, would now ask more than it had before. And to make matters even worse, France itself was now obliged to ask for more in compensation for its allies: it should not abase itself and abandon them now. France’s only option was therefore to continue the war, and the main question, how to use its available troops. There were arguments for and against as to whether an army ought to be stationed in the Dauphiné and Provence region. Those in favour were that an army there would constitute a necessary diversion to prevent the Austrians from attacking Don Carlos in Naples; moreover, how else could Genoa and Modena be liberated, and Don Philip be given his principality? Against this it could be argued that another campaign in Italy was extremely

165 MD 516, 48. Réflexions sur la situation de la France, dans le cas que l’Espagne fît sa paix particuliere avec les Cours de Londres et de Vienne, par l’abbé de Mably, September 1746; MD 516, 49. Réflexions sur les intérests de la France dans la conjoncture présente, par l’abbé de Mably, 2 September 1746. 166 Peter Friedemann, Die Politische Philosophie des Gabriel Bonnot de Mably (1709-1785), Münster: LIT Verlag, 2015, p. 290. Consulted on Google Books.

97 risky, since the enemies of the Bourbons had already won there. Moreover, to lead another army into Italy, the army in the Southern Netherlands would have to be weakened. No additional troops from Spain were to be expected, as that country was exhausted and its new King – Philip V had died in July – was less interested in Italy and in his half-brother Don Philip than his father had been. Militarily it would therefore be best to remain on the defensive, but this would solve nothing for Don Carlos and Don Philip, Genoa and Modena. For this reason Mably advocated that France urge Spain to conclude a separate peace with Great Britain – a mounting possibility in this period. If Madrid made commercial concessions to London, it should be able to gain British support for Genoa, Modena, and Don Philip in return. London would be only too happy to agree to this if Spain would then abandon its French ally, and it would use this same argument to persuade Maria Theresa to agree to the Spanish proposals. But in reality, Mably argued, this would actually strengthen France. It would only have to keep a defensive army in Provence and Dauphiné, compensating for the loss of Spanish troops. Sardinia would be left with no incentive to carry on the war, as the British would surely insist on Sardinian expansion as promised at the Treaty of Worms, leaving Turin satisfied. It would possibly even seek accommodation with France, to avoid a further increase of Habsburg power on the peninsula. France’s financial situation would ameliorate as well, as the neutrality of Spain would allow it to circumvent the British navy preying on French trade by using Spanish ships to trade in safety. If the situation in Italy were thus settled, France itself would be left only with seeking the restoration of Louisbourg and a compensation for the Elector Palatine. The Southern Netherlands should provide sufficient material to achieve this, and the French position there remained excellent. It was true that Russians had finally promised to send troops. Yet their army would not be very large, as they would want to leave enough troops behind to contain Prussia, and it would take a long time before they arrived. Another threat was that the Holy Roman Empire might abandon its neutrality; but that could be prevented through bribes, and Prussia, Saxony, Wurttemberg, Cologne and the Elector Palatine would certainly not support an Imperial war. Whilst France should remain on the defensive in Italy and Germany, it should become offensive towards the Dutch Republic. There was not much more left to conquer in the Southern Netherlands, and it would be useless to respect Dutch neutrality if they still supported France’s enemies. Moreover, a war in the United Provinces would have the advantage of carrying the war further away from France’s conquests in the Southern

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Netherlands, from which more revenue could then be extracted. It might also persuade the Dutch to make a separate peace, which might then become the catalyst for a general one. But the Southern Netherlands were not necessarily to be used as simple exchange material. Apparently there circulated yet another alternative at the time, that advocated ceding the Southern Netherlands to the Elector Palatine. Mably called this idea “très ingénieuse”, and considered it “bien propre à persuader le desintéressement du Roy”. This last remark suggests that by this time, probably because it had adopted d’Argenson’s plan, France had resumed propagating that it did not seek anything for itself. On the other hand, he did fear that it might cause France’s enemies to believe that the King did not genuinely want peace – apart from the Dutch, who would probably support the cession. This shows that France was not only using the full cession of the Southern Netherlands to prove its désintéressement, but to prove its desire for peace as well. It might also, Mably continued, make the Elector Palatine suspicious that he received so much without good reason. It was nevertheless important to maintain his support: he disposed of 12.000 soldiers, and his possessions at Jülich and Berg were useful to invade the Dutch Republic from the east. All in all, Mably believed that peace would soon follow after a separate peace between London and Madrid. Great Britain would have obtained satisfaction in America, so its Parliament would demand peace. Turin would be satisfied as well. The Dutch Republic would soon be invaded and ask for peace.

The next memorandum, equally written in September 1746 by an unknown author, contained a vehement critique of French policy.167 The author did not believe that the situation in the Southern Netherlands compensated for that in Italy. It was true that Louis XV had achieved more in the Southern Netherlands than any of his forbears, and that those same forbears had always suffered in Italy – but that notwithstanding the “conduite mâle, inébranlable et suivie” that had enabled the successes in the Southern Netherlands, France had “never imposed less than now”. To prove the truth of this argument, the author declared, it sufficed to look at France’s war aims “the justness, moderation and wisdom of which we cannot praise enough”: to liberate the Holy Roman Empire from Austrian despotism, to protect the claims of France’s old Bavarian ally and the “unassailable rights” of Spain on Austria’s Italian possessions, to

167 MD 446, 10. L’Etat actuel des affaires en France, September 1746.

99 protect Modena against Austria, to protect Genoa against the coalition of Worms, to put the Stuarts on the thrones of the British allies. If these goals, the author continued, were now compared to what France had actually achieved, the picture was bleak indeed. The Holy Roman Empire, “instead of regaining its freedom, is now annexed to the rest of the Austrian inheritance”. France had first promised to oppose itself to the election of Francis Stephen, and then by its retreat from Germany had enabled it. Bavaria had been forced to “buy back its hereditary lands by the sacrifice of its claims, and by a submission to the will of the Court of Vienna little different from the most shameful serfdom”. The Elector Palatine, still loyal, had seen his territory ravaged. Genua, instead of recovering the Marquisate of Finale which had been taken away from it by the allies of Worms, was now occupied and maybe faced destruction – just like Modena. The Stuarts were the last to have come under the protection of the King, but notwithstanding great successes, they had lost and only managed to save their name. In other words, of all the projects that France had undertaken, there was not one that had not been concluded in favour of its enemies, and “of all the Princes, who, during this war, have carried the name of ally of Your Majesty, there is not a single one who does not resent today the lamentable consequences of this alliance”. Allowance must be made for the exception of Prussia, but that was only due to its own efforts. This was not all France’s fault, the author admitted, but the King would understand that Europe had lost faith in him. The author had not mentioned the Southern Netherlands, he continued, because their conquest was not one of France’s original war aims – “All Your Majesty’s declarations indicate, on the contrary, in the most solemn terms, that [France] does not desire to extend its borders, so that we should necessarily suppose that Your Majesty has undertaken the conquest of the Southern Netherlands only to alleviate your allies by a necessary diminution of Austrian power”. But “who is the ally,” the author then asks, “who has been protected from the oppression of the Court of Vienna by the successes in Flanders? Which, of all the goals of war, has been obtained or facilitated by these successes? It rather seems that they have all been sacrificed to a conquest that had never been announced, and that an imagined diversion for the alleviation of France’s allies has become the principal cause of their abandonment and of their miseries.” In other words, the successes in the Southern Netherlands had had no other effect than to rekindle the old jealousy against France. It would be something, the author argued, if this jealousy was a consequence “of the superiority that France should have gained over its enemies everywhere; it would then contain them through fear, and this method to establish one’s security is preferable among Princes to that of softness and moderation. But

100 the case at hand is very different. The conquest of the [Southern] Netherlands is seen everywhere as an effect of French weakness, and in no way as proof of its power.” The King’s enemies believed that France had only invaded the Southern Netherlands because it would be easy to conquer a land that was “without defence, abandoned by its sovereign, neglected by its guardians, and always attacked by the double or triple of the forces that were opposed to it. Those objects which demanded vigour, firmness, constancy in their execution have been abandoned in favour of things that were nearly taken by themselves, and in this way France’s prosperity there proves only its weakness and can never pass for an effect of might.” In this regard, to the enemies of France this “generosity, […] Your Majesty’s renunciation of his conquests, only comes forth from a war-weariness that France does not even try to disguise”. Because of this reputation of weakness, the author warned, France’s enemies were assembling a coalition to attack France in the spring of 1747. France would be able to overcome this attack, the author was convinced, if it made better use of its resources. Foremost, Louis XV had to announce that he would no longer accept the old strategy, and “show a firm and irrevocable determination to conserve and defend the [Southern] Netherlands until all allies of France have been entirely satisfied”, and completely abandon the policy of “moderation” by augmenting his army and navy, and counteract the machinations of Vienna with money. The conspiracy theory about an imminent pan-European attack notwithstanding, the author did raise some interesting points. In late 1746, none of France’s allies had indeed profited from its association with Versailles, and neither did it seem likely that the tide would soon turn. Its successes in the Southern Netherlands were indeed to a large extent due to a structural advantage.168 What is especially interesting is how France’s strategy of compensating for this by offering the return of the entire Southern Netherlands was received. According to the author, it led to Europe believing that France was weak and war-weary. It did not convince of French désinteréssement or commitment to its allies. But what this strategy did succeed in, was in presenting itself as having been there all along – the author referred to it as the “maximes anciennes” which governed the entire War of the Austrian Succession. To the author this was not a positive thing: he rather interpreted it as a reason for France’s lack of success.

168 It would be interesting to speculate what would have happened had France lost the Battle of Fontenoy – as it nearly did – but this is beyond the scope of this thesis.

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This theme stuck when France started discussing whether the Dutch Republic should be invaded during the next year’s campaign: the idea that France had to prove its willingness to fight became an important argument. In itself the decision to continue the war on the territory of the United Provinces was a rather natural consequence of the progress of 1746: in early June France had conquered Antwerp, which lay just south of Dutch territory. France had thereupon decided not to march on the Republic but to complete the conquest of the Southern Netherlands by an attack on the fortresses of Hainault and Namur. In October, France won an important victory over its opponents at Rocoux, near Liège, where their army had assembled. The defeat was not as total as the French had hoped, and a large part of the allied army managed to escape.169 Still, the Southern Netherlands were now clearly under French control – apart from Luxembourg, the conquest of which would be too difficult and was strategically unimportant to defend the Southern Netherlands. It is of no interest here to analyse in detail the memoranda discussing the question, as they go beyond the scope of this thesis. However, some of the arguments directly or indirectly concern France’s policy towards the Southern Netherlands, and a quick look at them can therefore be of interest. A memorandum dating from October squarely described France’s “invariable” goal as peace, and the question was therefore how that can be achieved as quickly as possible. The “system of moderation” that the King had used until then might conform best to “his goodness and the greatness of his spirit”, but a “long experience” had shown how harmful it was to “his affairs and the general reconciliation”. The prime object of this moderation had been the Dutch. But if the King now went on doing so, the Holy Roman Empire would sense weakness and declare war on France. The Kingdom would then be attacked on all sides. For this reason, France had to attack the Dutch Republic, and open the campaign in the winter already by an attack on Maastricht, accompanied by a manifesto that France was always prepared to conclude peace. Maastricht had the advantage that it could serve as a base to intimidate a substantial part of the Holy Roman Empire. The memorandum also advocated a renewed attack on Italy, but it did not explain how this would succeed, apart from an affirmation that the joint French and Spanish troops in Savoy would be “sufficient”.170 Another memorandum, equally written in October, maybe by the same author171, supported attacking the Dutch as well. It gave multiple reasons for doing so, one of them

169 Olaf van Nimwegen, De Republiek als grote mogendheid, 275-277. 170 MD 446, 11. Memoire sur l’état actuel des affaires générales, October 1746. 171 They share a title, at least.

102 being that France’s enemies thought that it was weak. They therefore saw peace only as a second choice. The Dutch Republic was the “knot” of the coalition against France, and the only way France’s enemies could prevent France from severing this knot by force, was to “surprise the King’s moderation through the artifices of the Dutch”. This, of course, meant that France should attack them at once. It would moreover be just, as France would in this way treat an ally of Maria Theresa in the same as she has treated France’s ally Genoa.172

In November, Silhouette wrote a new memorandum.173 Even he had fallen victim to some of the new trends: France, he claimed, wanted nothing more than to live in peace, and notwithstanding the number of its conquests, it would agree to any reasonable demands made by the Dutch and British. Apart from that, Silhouette mostly repeated the content of his memorandum from April. France would cede the Southern Netherlands to Charles of Lorraine, with the exception of a few places next to French Flanders. If Charles were to die without heirs, the Southern Netherlands would go to the Duke of Chablais, a younger son of the King of Sardinia, who was five years old at the time. If he were to have no descendants either, they would pass to Charles’s (and Francis Stephen’s) sister Anne Charlotte, the Abbess of Remiremont. When she died, the States-General of the Southern Netherlands would be allowed to choose a new sovereign, with the provision that he must never be a member of the Houses of Bourbon, Habsburg, Stuart, or Hanover. The Southern Netherlands were to remain a barrier against France, when necessary organized by Great Britain. Their sovereigns were also never to establish a trade company. The Dutch, Silhouette believed, simply wanted neutrality, commerce, and a barrier. France and Great Britain could guarantee this. Great Britain would cede Gibraltar, Minorca, Portobelo (an important port city in present-day Panama which the British had captured in 1739, although they were no longer in control of it in 1746), and Newfoundland. In return France and Spain would find an establishment for the Stuarts in Italy, who were then to renounce all their claims on the British thrones. Louisbourg would be returned to France. France would receive the eastern half of Hispaniola and the asiento; in return it would cede Louisiana to Spain.

172 MD 446, 12. Mémoire sur l’état actuel des affaires generales, October 1746. 173 MD 516, 34. Sistème pour faire la Paix, pour faire la Guerre, et pour ne point manquer d’Argent, par Mr. de Silhouette, November 1746.

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In Italy, the Trentino was to become independent under its bishop and join the Swiss Confederation. The other Austrian territories would form a Kingdom of Lombardy under Don Philip. The future Joseph II was to marry the youngest daughter of Louis XV, his uncle Charles of Lorraine the oldest. The Duke of Savoy (the heir to the King of Sardinia) was to marry a Spanish Infanta. The widowed Old Pretender would marry a princess of the House of Lorraine, the Young Pretender would marry a French one.

The end of 1746 unexpectedly provided a glimmer of hope to the Bourbon powers in Italy. When the Austrians captured Genoa in September they had imposed harsh conditions upon the city, and in early December, a spontaneous popular revolt broke out in the city. By the 10th, the Austrians were forced to abandon it. This did not immediately provide relief to the French. In late November, the Austrians and Sardinians had started the invasion of Provence. This was mostly the brainchild of the British; the Austrians and Sardinians were not particularly enthusiastic about it. Both thought the chances of success slim, the King of Sardinia would have preferred to consolidate his gains, and Maria Theresa still hoped to conquer Naples, which her father had lost during the War of the Polish Succession. When the French counterattacked in early January, they easily decided to retreat back into Italy. In any case, they now had to focus on reconquering Genoa, as the easiest route for the French and Spanish to re-enter Italy ran through Liguria. For the next months, the Austrians settled for a siege, whilst the French and Spanish sent reinforcement to the city.174 Meanwhile, in Germany, France had started negotiations with the Court of Dresden for a marriage between the recently widowed Dauphin and a daughter of the Augustus III. France hoped to use the marriage to reinforce its links with Saxony-Poland, but also to reinforce Dresden’s role as a mediator for diplomatic contacts with Vienna, which had started in 1745. These negotiations of course remained secret, and there is therefore little trace of them in 1747’s memoranda. The indirect negotiations with Vienna did have a domestic effect: Marquis d’Argenson, adamantly opposed to any accommodation with Austrians, was fired. His replacement was Marquis de Puyzieulx, who had represented France at the Breda negotiations

174 Matthew Anderson, The War of the Austrian Succession, 166-169;, Reed Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession, 289.

104 with Great Britain (this congress had started in 1746, but it soon became a formality that neither wanted to break off for fear of being accused of not genuinely wanting peace).

A following, long memorandum was written in January 1747 and considered the European situation in detail. The author is not known.175 The memorandum began with a short history of the war, which it is of interest to repeat here, as it shows how that history was interpreted by then. The author first recalled what he believed to have been the reasons why France became involved in the War: fear lest the House of Lorraine should succeed to the Habsburg Empire, France’s longstanding relations with Bavaria, and the desire to diminish the power of Great Britain and the Dutch Republic by destroying their association with Austria. It should be remembered, the author emphasized, that the war was initially only intended as an incursion of a few months, after which it was expected that Maria Theresa would yield. As France lost its allies in Germany, it was forced to find a new ally in Spain, the author claimed. This is not true: France only fully started to support Spanish ambitions in Italy after the Treaty of Worms was concluded. The association with Spain, the memorandum continued, also led to a projected invasion of England (as Spain was at war with Great Britain). Although this failed, war was nevertheless declared against Great Britain, which provoked the British to gear up their war effort, resulting in heavy losses for French shipping and the capture of Louisbourg. The invasion project also led France to attack the Southern Netherlands, “whilst the political system would have demanded at the time that the army be directed towards Germany”. An opportunity for peace was then provided by the death of the Emperor. As France only had two war aims – supporting the Emperor and Don Philip – the situation could have been solved by exchanging support of Francis Stephen’s candidature for an Italian principality for Don Philip, but France unwisely chose to oppose him. This view is obviously a consequence of the revisionist belief that even then France was asking nothing for itself: neither territory nor the breakup of the Habsburg Empire. Peace could now best be reached through the British. They could only be targeted directly by attacking their navy and trade. But to do that, France first had to restore its own navy, and this could only be done in times of peace. It was true that the British had already spent an extraordinary amount of their wealth on the war, but it should not be believed that they had reached the end of their means: they would not accept peace at any cost. The state of

175 MD 446, 13. Memoire sur la conjoncture présente des affaires, January 1747.

105 their finances did demand, however, that they agree with a reasonable proposal. France should also exploit the British party system, as well as the division between certain ministers and George II, who wanted to continue the war to get rid of the Stuarts and to keep his Hanoverian troops in British pay. The Dutch Republic, by contrast, was not option as a negotiating partner. It was weak and politically torn. Its dominant party was pro-English, mostly because the Republic’s rich had parked their money in British funds. The Dutch were therefore not very influential and not very suitable to act as intermediaries. Austria would continue the war as long as possible out of a sense of vengeance. It would never stop trying to gain back its lost territories or to find compensation for them. Moreover, the end of the war would deprive Austria of the most substantial part of its British and Dutch subsidies. Its chief diplomatic goal for the moment was to persuade Russia and the Holy Roman Empire to enter the war. Sardinia wanted to prevent any further increase of Bourbon power in Italy. However, is was also distrustful of Vienna, which could be expected to try to regain what it had ceded at Worms when given a chance, and it did not want Habsburg power to increase either. France should not count upon a Sardinian defection, but it was possible that they would join the Bourbons if the tide turned. What was uncertain was the attitude of Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and the Holy Roman Empire. Russia had indeed agreed to send troops, but as it was poor, it would not be able to send a large body of troops far from its borders, unless the British increased their subsidies, which was unlikely. It was not option to ask Poland to oppose the Russian expeditionary corps: it was Russian support that had put Augustus III on the Polish throne, and he still needed Saint-Petersburg now to protect him against Prussia. What was possible, by contrast, was to exploit the peace between the Ottoman Empire and Persia to have them both attack Russia. However, an alliance with the Porte would do no good to France’s reputation, and in any case distance did not allow for operations to be coordinated. In the Holy Roman Empire, finally, France could count on the opposition of Prussia, Saxony and the Electoral Palatinate against an Imperial war. Vienna would therefore only obtain Imperial support if it managed to bring a large army to the Rhine. This was one of the reasons to continue the war in Italy, as this would keep Austria’s troops from marching into Germany. France’s only remaining allies were Spain and Genua (and Naples, which France guaranteed but which was officially neutral). Without them, France would have no interest in

106 the war.176 Its enemies would for this reason do everything to promote a Spanish defection. It was therefore vital that France should not abandon Don Philip, as doing so would result in a rupture with Spain. In contrast, the return of Gibraltar and Minorca which had also been promised in the Treaty of Fontainebleau, even Spain would acknowledge would be impossible to achieve. Genoa had to be supported because it was “glorious” to do so, because it was a useful diversion that might yet result to a turning of the tide in Italy, and because it would increase French influence in Italy after the war, as the Genoese would not soon forget how France had stood by them whilst the Austrians, Sardinians and British treated them with cruelty. Peace was nevertheless becoming necessary, because of “the exhaustion of the peoples [of the Kingdom], the decay of commerce, and difficulty to sustain the war for much longer”. Moreover, France needed to repair its navy if it was to win dominance over Great Britain in the longer term. France should thus try to make peace with London. As France’s other war aims would automatically be accomplished at the end of hostilities – no-one would refuse the restoration of Genoa and Modena –, the only difficulty would be Don Philip’s principality. Great Britain, however, would see little difficulty in awarding some of Austria’s Italian territory to the Infante, as this would not upset the Balance of Power. The latter was in any case no longer under threat, as the survival of the Habsburg Empire was no longer at stake. In expectation of a diplomatic breakthrough with Great Britain, France would still have to continue its campaign. In the Low Countries there were only two options: to attack Luxembourg or to invade the United Provinces. The former would grant no advantage; the only question was whether to attack the Dutch. After giving due consideration to the pros and cons, the author came out in favour of the invasion. A formal declaration of war should nevertheless be avoided: France should issue a declaration that it had no quarrel with the Republic itself, but only with the foreign factions that now dominated it. A declaration of war would only complicate matters, whereas the only goal of the invasion would be to precipitate peace. At the same time, the war in Italy should be continued. It was there that France’s only war goals were to be accomplished, and it was there that Maria Theresa’s troops should be kept to prevent them from marching to Germany. An invasion of Piedmont might also persuade Sardinia to switch sides, which would liberate part of the French army in Italy to gain an even greater superiority in the Low Countries.

176 In reality, France was also still allied with Modena – although Modena was completely overrun by the Austrians – and the Electoral Palatinate.

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By contrast, a memorandum from February believed that Sardinia would never be won over.177 France should therefore turn its complete attention towards the Dutch. It should begin by demanding complete neutrality; if they refused, the Republic should be invaded, without a formal declaration of war. The author thought it likely that the Dutch would soon opt for peace. They had no reasons to continue the war. He could not believe that they would really want the Barrier back, which had cost them so much money and effort and had earned them nothing. It had forced them into wars that did not even involve the Southern Netherlands directly. If France were to invade the Republic, they would suffer even more. Even the British would then opt for peace, to avoid losing the Dutch market after they had already been deprived of that of the Southern Netherlands. More as an aside, the author then drew an analogy between Lorraine, which had been occupied multiple times and would soon become part of France, and the Southern Netherlands, and warned that maybe the Dutch Republic might be the next step. The author’s references to the Southern Netherlands are difficult to interpret. They could simply be threats that the author suggests the French should use when dealing with the Dutch – but his disbelief that the Dutch would want the Barrier back seems to imply that France would keep it for itself, as does his assertion that the Southern Netherlands were already lost as a market to the British.

The following memorandum accepted that France would return its conquest in the Southern Netherlands, but argued nevertheless that it should use the opportunity to obtain some border correction. It was written on the 29th of April by a certain chevalier de Bonneval, who is described as an “ingénieur ordinaire du Roy” – and as such probably attached to the army –, and was included in a letter Bonneval wrote to the Marquis de Puyzieulx.178 Bonneval argued that a few border corrections would make the Kingdom safer both in time of peace and in war – enclaves were convenient asylums for lawbreakers in which to hide. Although “it appears that His Majesty does not plan to keep [his conquests]”, Bonneval was quick to add that it was “not presumable” that a few exchanges of enclaves would be seen as an expansion of the Kingdom.

177 MD 317, 1. Essay sur les operations politiques et militaires de la campagne prochaine, February 1747. 178 MD 317, 2. Memoire Pour L’Etablissement General des Limites du Royaume, joint a la lettre du Chevalier de Bonneval au Mr. de Puyzieulx du 29 avril 1747, 29 April 1747.

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In regard to the Southern Netherlands, Bonneval surprisingly made very few recommendations. He only specifically referred to a few exclaves of the Duchy of Luxembourg between the Saar and Moselle Rivers, which France should try to obtain during negotiations. Some of them could then be exchanges for exclaves of the Electorate of Trier in the same region. But about the rest of the border Bonneval said nothing. There was, nevertheless, the issue of the French enclaves in Austrian Hainault, in the context of which France claimed the cities of Chimay and Beaumont – as seen, these had been included in the earliest proposals offering a complete return of the Southern Netherlands. We can only presume that they were implied when Bonneval mentioned that “the operation to do from here [Luxembourg] until the sea will become less complicated because we will always have our object before our eyes” – by which he presumably referred to the straightening of the border.

Ligonier On the 17th of April, France announced to The Hague that it would no longer stay clear of Dutch territory. As recommended there followed no formal declaration of war, since France was not hostile towards the Republic itself. On the same day, the French army moved into Dutch Flanders, and in the following weeks it occupied the region without difficulty. This provoked a popular panic in the Republic, and as had been foreseen179, the stadholderate was quickly restored. This had little practical effect, but it would convince subsequent memoranda writers than the Dutch Republic was now a British client state – the British had supported the restoration because they believed it would lead to a more effective government of the Republic, and moreover the new Stadtholder was married to a daughter of George II. After the swift conquest of Dutch Flanders, the French were left with the choice between a siege of Bergen-op-Zoom, directly north of Antwerp, or that of Maastricht. It opted for the latter. On the 2nd of July, the French army encountered the allied army protecting the city on the battlefield of Lauffeld (today Lafelt). Maurice de Saxe won, but the allied army managed to retreat and the French probably lost more soldiers than their opponents. A siege of Maastricht could now not be undertaken, but Maurice quickly sent part of his army to start the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom. As the city was protected by one of the most formidable fortresses of Europe, the siege lasted until December, when the city was taken by storm.

179 The question whether the re-establishment of the stadholderate was something to be feared was one of the main point of discussion in the memoranda dealing with the desirability of an invasion of the United Provinces.

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Lauffeld had another interesting consequence. One of the senior allied commanders, the British lieutenant-general Ligonier, had been captured. Ligonier was a Huguenot, and as such technically a Frenchman in foreign service and at traitor; but the French decided to use him to communicate a peace proposal to the British commander, the Duke of Cumberland. It is thus that the diplomatic process began that would eventually lead to the congress of Aix-la- Chapelle.

The French gave no instructions in writing to Ligonier. In the archives we do find, on the 16th of July, a memorandum that is directed towards the British.180 It is clearly a draft, and it is marked as “not delivered”, but the overall content does agree with what must have been said to Ligonier. The memorandum opened by saying that France “sincerely” desired to reach an accommodation with Great Britain, and expressed its belief that only mistrust now prevented peace. It would therefore be frank about its ideas. France demanded the restitution of Cape Breton; the cession of Furnes181; the re- establishment of the Republic of Genoa as it was before the war – that is, including the Marquisate of Finale which the Treaty of Worms had awarded to Sardinia –; the re- establishment of the Duchy of Modena; and the satisfaction of Spain. This last point concerned Don Philip and the Anglo-Spanish commercial disputes over America; France indicated that it was in no position to speak for Spain on those matters, but it promised that it would persuade the Spanish to agree to reasonable proposals. As for the following points, France demanded that they be treated only at the future congress, as it was not suitable to insert them in the preliminaries: the Hainault enclaves; the jurisdiction over the abbey of Saint-Hubert; some compensation for the Elector Palatine; the guarantee of Silesia to Prussia. In return, France would return all its conquests to their original owners. It would also restore the city of Dunkirk to the state it was in before the war – that is, without landside or seaside fortifications, as stipulated by the Treaty of Utrecht – but it asked that Great Britain should not send commissaries to see to the execution. Finally, France would recognize Francis Stephen as Emperor. Since Ligonier was given no written instructions, we do not know whether the details of this memorandum correspond to what was communicated to him, or whether this was a

180 H 467, Non-delivered memorandum of 16 July 1747. 181 I will explain this presently.

110 first draft that was altered later on. As it was “not delivered” and not written in a definitive style, we can assume that the latter was the case. However, as will be seen, the majority of its point will return in later memoranda and proposals. This memorandum contained the first instances of several points that were to remain present in subsequent negotiations. The first is the demand to keep Furnes. Although this is not made explicit in this memorandum, this was closely linked to the question of Dunkirk. The absence of fortifications there left a gap in France’s ceinture de fer, as Dunkirk fulfilled the double role of a sea port and of a fortress protecting France’s northern border. To solve this problem, France could either ask for an even more northern fortress – Furnes – or ask for permission to rebuild the landward fortifications of Dunkirk. In subsequent proposals, France was to present its interlocutors with a choice between the two options. Here, it either calculated that since the British would not agree to the re-establishment of Dunkirk’s landward fortifications – because this would have made attacking the port from the seaside more difficult as well –, it was better to present them with the more palatable alternative of ceding Dunkirk; or else this was simply a diplomatic bluff, intended to make the British agree to the restoration of Dunkirk’s landward fortification. At any rate, the question would be merely theoretical: since France asked would accept no British envoys to ascertain whether France did not rebuild Dunkirk’s fortifications, London would have no official way of knowing whether France would stick to its side of the bargain. Secondly, in d’Argenson’s original proposals to the Dutch, he announced the principle that France would return the entire Southern Netherlands with the qualification that it would unilaterally decide the border litigations in its favour by keeping Chimay and Beaumont and by demanding that Austria renounce jurisdiction over the Abbey of Saint-Hubert. Moreover, Austria must indemnify the Elector Palatine with the Duchies of Limburg and Gueldres. In this proposal, France merely announced that it would like these issues to be discussed at a future congress. Not including them in the preliminaries greatly reduced the odds of their resolution in France’s favour in the eventual peace treaty – and France would have known this. We can thus assume that from this point onwards, France was prepared to return the entire Southern Netherlands (with the qualification of Furnes) even if it did not win on these points.

Knowledge of these overtures was restricted to a limited group of people. An anonymous memorandum written on the 22nd of July was unaware of them, and indeed assumed that

111 peace, and peace to France’s advantage, was becoming less and less likely.182 It claimed that even France’s victories were now becoming useless, as France lost more troops in order to win than the enemy to lose. France’s last great victories of Lauffeld and Rocroux (in late 1746), had indeed cost it dearly whilst allowing the enemy to escape. The author remarked as well that France’s financial state was quickly deteriorating, and that the British would hold out longer the French. Moreover, the loss of French shipping was their gain. France’s memoranda writers were clearly increasingly taking their country’s financial situation in the equation. Nevertheless they were exaggerating: commerce, about the loss of which most of them panic, only accounted for a relatively small fraction of France’s total finances, as France was still by far a predominantly agricultural country. In this regard, France’s bad harvest in 1747 would have been far more important, as has been noticed before, but it is unlikely that the full effects of that were being felt by France’s policy makers by July 1747. The British, the author claimed, would only stop the war when they had completely destroyed French trade and made Austria as strong as possible. France, by contrast, could do little to stop them: its navy could not contend with theirs. Declaring war upon Great Britain had therefore been a mistake. For this reason, it would equally be a mistake to invade Holland: without the Dutch, France would have no commerce left. If it conquered the Republic, it was to be expected that many Dutchmen would migrate to Great Britain. Conquered Dutch territory would be a “desolate and sterile” country, and France already had “more land than arms”. From this we can assume that the author believed conquest in Dutch territory would mean annexation, and, by implication, he would also have believed that France was still going to keep its conquests in the Southern Netherlands. This contrasts with the author’s later assertion that “the conquest of the Southern Netherlands becomes useless to us if we add to it the conquest of Italy, which is the Gordian knot of the peace”. From this it would seem that the author was aware of the plan to exchange the Southern Netherlands for Italy. Maybe, as he mentions elsewhere that peace could not be won through military means, he believed that there would simply be no opportunity to exchange the Southern Netherlands, as there would be no peace, and the war would simply keep going on, leaving France in de facto possession of the Southern Netherlands for a long time. The author nevertheless believed that France should bring a force into Italy “against which nothing can resist”. It was only thus that the struggle could be ended in a sure and

182 MD 317, 3. Memoire, 22 July 1747.

112 prompt way. It was France’s fault to have presented itself to its enemy with equal forces, rather than taking advantage of the fact that only France was capable of raising the largest armies of Europe. Next to the operations in Italy, France also had to persuade the Ottomans to attack Maria Theresa in Hungary and Transylvania. And France should attack the British in their own country – the Jacobites had shown how easy that was. Finally, it was to build a navy that was thirty to forty ships stronger than that of the British. The author did not seem to realize that France could only build a navy in time of peace, as its wood for ships had to come from the Baltic region.

On the 29th of July, Marquis de Puyzieulx sent a note to Maurice de Saxe, to inform him of the state the negotiations with Austria through Saxony – in which Maurice was implicated because Augustus III was his half-brother.183 Puyzieulx mentioned that he had told nothing to the Saxon representative about the negotiations with Ligonier. France was by now indeed conducting separate negotiations with the two formal allies Austria and Great Britain, without them knowing about each other. This put it in a diplomatically strong position, and it is significant that even in a situation where it had such considerable bargaining power, France never once tried to go back on its promise to return the entire Southern Netherlands. It is hard not to reach the conclusion that the point had assumed the status of dogma.

This ‘dogma’ is nicely formulated in a letter Puyzieulx sent Maurice de Saxe – who was also involved in the negotiations with Ligonier – on the 2nd of August, and which Maurice forwarded to Ligonier on the 5th.184 It began with the formula: “Le Roy n’a point fait la guerre par ambition, et il ne l’a continuée que pour ses allies. Sa Majesté est determinée a rendre ses conquêtes en faveur de ses allies.” The letter then provided a quick summary of French demands. Louisbourg was to be returned; France in compensation would restore to Great Britain what it had conquered in India. A French army had indeed captured the British fort of Madras in 1746, but there never really seems to have been a discussion as to whether France should keep it. Indeed it was hardly ever mentioned – even when it could have been presented, as is done here, as a bargaining chip for Louisbourg.

183 H 467, A.M. le cte du Saxe, 29 July 1747. 184 H 468, Joint a la lettre de M. le M. de Puyzieulx au Mal de Saxe general de l’armée du Roi, du 2e aoust 1747, et envoyé par ce general le 5 au general Ligonier.

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The second point offered the choice between the re-establishment of Dunkirk’s landward fortifications and allowing France to keep Furnes. The phrasing explicitly confirmed that this was “to cover the maritime border”. The third point simply mentioned “arrangements for the enclaves of Hainault, and other objects to be settled in regard to the borders and the bordering countries”. It did not go any further than this vague phrasing. The memorandum said as well that “We do not count that there should be any difficulty for the restitution of the States of Modena and of Genua as they were in 1740 before the war”. As was also argued in the long January 1747 memorandum, the question of Modena and Genua was not seen as a point of contention. In regard to Spain, the memorandum repeats that “the consideration the King [Louis XV] wants to have and must have for His Catholic Majesty does not allow him, even for the success of the negotiation, to do any particular proposal”. Instead, it again urged the British to contact Spain themselves.

On the 11th of September, the overtures through Ligonier led to an encounter between Puyzieulx and the British envoy, the earl of Sandwich, at Liège. It is of no interest here to provide an overview of the entire negotiations, as they of course covered much more than the Southern Netherlands alone. However, Puyzieulx’s account of the conversation does provide some additional information regarding the Southern Netherlands.185 When the representatives were discussing Louisbourg, Sandwich said that his government agreed to the return, with certain “modifications”. Upon being asked what was implied by that word, the earl refused to give additional information. Puyzieulx then said that if Great Britain wanted to keep it, “we would agree to it, but we as well will keep all our conquests in the Southern Netherlands, and [I said] that I was ready to sign the convention.” Puyzieulx continued that this would afflict him most greatly, but that at least France would have “reason and justice” on its side, and “one could not suspect the King of not wanting peace whilst he wanted to return all his conquests to give it to Europe”. Only in direct diplomatic negotiations did French negotiators follow the criticism the memoranda of the second half of 1746 had made against France’s intention to return everything: France should announce to keep everything unless its demands were met, rather than making its promise to return everything the starting point of negotiations.

185 H 468, Précis de la conversation que le Marquis de Puyzieulx a eue a Liege avec le Comte de Sandwich le 11 de septembre 1747, September 1747.

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In regard to Furnes, Sandwich said that “Holland would never agree to a dismemberment of the Southern Netherlands, and as the Barrier fortresses have been destroyed, their conservation was even more important”. However, the British government would also never agree to abolish the clauses of Utrecht regarding Dunkirk. Puyzieulx thereupon reacted that France would have either Furnes or the fortifications of Dunkirk, and that it would never accept British commissaries. Later in the conversation, he proposed that Great Britain cede on this point to obtain the expulsion of the Stuarts from France. As for Don Philip, Sandwich said that Great Britain agreed to give him a Principality in Italy; however, he feared that Maria Theresa would never agree to make another sacrifice. Versailles did not react positively to the Liège conference: it believed that it showed that Great Britain did not want to negotiate. A congress would nevertheless be assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748.

At the same time, France was communicating peace proposals to Vienna through Saxony. They contained the same clauses as had been communicated to London, with the exception of Dunkirk, where France simply asked for the re-establishment of the fortifications. After all, whether Dunkirk was fortified or not was of no interest to Vienna: Furnes, on the other, hand, would be its sacrifice to make.186

Unaware of these negotiations, France’s memoranda writers went on making proposals of their own to achieve peace. The author of an October memorandum187 believed Austria continued the war to reconquer the Southern Netherlands, to preserve Italy, and, in case of success, to reconquer Silesia as well. Although it was powerful on its own, it could not transport its troops over long distances without British subsidies. As for the British, apart from their subsidies to their allies, their main contribution to the war lay in the damage they were doing to British and French shipping. The more money they spent on this, the more likely it was that their ultimate goal was the complete destruction of French and Spanish commerce. The British were also in complete control of the Dutch Republic. The French invasion had only strengthened the Dutch war party instead of weakening it. Nevertheless, the actual interest of the Dutch lay in neutrality: the financial effort was crippling them, and there was a risk that “the facility with which the King has made

186 H 468, Puyzieulx to Saxe, 1747. 187 MD 317, 4. Nouvelles réflexions sur l’état présent de la guerre, October 1747.

115 conquests in the Republic might provoke in him the desire to keep them all, or part of them, to recover the expenses he has made on this conquests”. The French position had only been strengthened by the recent campaigns: the wealthy and densely populated provinces of Flanders and Brabant could make a considerable contribution to the French treasury and provide large numbers of recruits. In France itself recruitment of new soldiers and payment of taxes were going very well. But the situation was not all rosy: France’s credit would increase as long as it was winning, but defeat might destroy it and stop “the circulation of money, which has upheld itself so well until now” – reflecting the fear that the scenario of the War of the Spanish Succession would repeat itself. In regard to France’s war aims, the author claimed that France had only undertaken the war for its allies, first as an auxiliary to the Elector of Bavaria. The “insults of England” then pushed Versailles to declare war upon them; the declaration of war against Maria Theresa came due to Spanish pressure and the desire to procure an Italian principality to Don Philip. Note that previous authors have argued the exact opposite: Spanish pressure led to war with Great Britain, Austrian insults to war against Austria. France now also sought the restoration of Genoa and Modena, and of Louisbourg. In view of these war goals the author urged France to abandon its campaign in the Low Countries. He believed it would be all too easy to believe that France not only fought for Italy and Louisbourg, but also to permanently conquer the Southern Netherlands or even part of the Dutch Republic as well, given that it continued to fight where it supposedly sought nothing for itself, and was sacrificing its commerce in the process. If France sincerely wanted peace, it would direct its efforts against those who opposed it – that is, the British, since it was only because of them that the war continued. Moreover, fighting in the Dutch Republic only strengthened the British, because it convinced the Dutch that the British were their allies and the French their enemies. The author therefore proposed to take halt after the fall of Bergen-op-Zoom, to repair the fortifications of that city, leave only a defensive army in the Low Countries, and march the majority of the army towards Italy. This would have the additional advantage of being less costly than the siege warfare in the Low Countries. France could use that extra money to start rebuilding its navy, by using it to start paying the interests on the loans taken out for that purpose. It could circumvent the problem of not being able to transport Baltic construction wood to France by having its ships built in Sweden, and let them sail to France under a Swedish flag, under the pretext that they had been built for Portugal.

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If, by contrast, France chose to continue in the Low Countries, it would need at least two campaigns to capture Maastricht, , Venlo, Grave, Nijmegen, ‘s-Hertogenbosch, and Breda. The same amount of time would be necessary to restore the navy. It was therefore preferable to opt for the latter, as this would take away the certainty of the British that they had nothing to fear from the continuation of the war. This would make the peace more solid. In addition to all this, the author also believed that “it might be rather necessary given the lack of success of the negotiations started during the present war that His Majesty’s Council abstain from grasping all opportunities to declare the King’s inclination for peace, and His Majesty’s moderation on the conditions. Maybe it would be better to show, instead of this moderation of which the enemies are only too convinced, the risk in this young monarch, enjoying a good health […], adored by his subjects, obeyed with a zeal and a unanimity of which the splendour of the monarchy has no example. If the enemies feared that these advantages should give to the King an appetite for conquests and inspire in him the desire to expand his borders, maybe the enemies would be less certain of themselves. Should we not fear that they say in their councils: the inclination of the King of France for peace is known to us, his moderation is certain – we do not have anything to fear from his ambition, what do we risk by continuing the war?”

A memorandum written in November equally argued that the British were France’s real enemies, but offered a completely opposite suggestion as to how to deal with this.188 Peace with the British was no longer possible: they were single-mindedly focused on the utter destruction of French trade. But this gave France an advantage: as the rest of Europe had no interest to Great Britain monopolize trade, they did not share Great Britain’s war aims. France should exploit this. This would be analogous to the way peace was made in 1712, the author argued: Great Britain abandoned Austria when it became too strong. Austria and Sardinia had now reached the limits of what they could get out of the war: continuing it would only diminish their power. The Dutch Republic, on the other hand, was now a British province ruled by a “hereditary and tributary viceroy”. Whatever France might propose to the Dutch, it would have the same effect it would have on a “chained and sleeping slave of our enemy”. Moreover, threats and further conquests would only strengthen those chains. France should bear this lesson in mind when dealing with other powers. Further proof

188 MD 317, 5. Memoire sur les moyens de faire la paix, November 1747.

117 was provided by Germany: there the Holy Roman Empire had remained neutral less because France had constantly assured it of its good intentions, than because it had retired its armies. For this reason, France’s strategy during the next campaign should be defensive, and seek not to inspire fear. If France kept the Southern Netherlands, Savoy, Nice and Genoa it had enough to obtain what “justice” entitled it to. It should avoid increasing its superiority over its enemies on any front. There would be no risk that the enemy would interpret France’s inaction as weakness, as it would still keep large armies on its borders and it would still occupy large territories: it would rather be a sign of wisdom and justice. This de facto truce would soon lead to a legal one. To force the British to come to terms, the moderation of France’s peace proposals should be made utterly clear. It should publish the details of the peace proposals made to Vienna and Turin. If Great Britain’s allies became aware of France’s good intentions, they would tire of London’s bellicosity. Finally, the British would end up universally hated. But France should not make a separate peace with Turin or Vienna; rather, those two should persuade the British to give up the war.

Noailles contributed to the discussion in January 1748.189 He agreed that the continuation of the war depended solely on Great Britain, and that its motivations for doing so were a desire to destroy its commercial competitors and to expand its influence on the continent. These two were linked: it needed money from commerce to subsidize its allies, and it needed continental allies to focus on commerce. For this reason, France had to concentrate on the British. The trouble was that Great Britain could not be attacked directly: for this, a strong navy was necessary, and in any case an invasion could only be a temporary diversionary action doomed to fail, as the Jacobites had demonstrated. France therefore had to attack Great Britain indirectly. In 1748, France could attack either the Dutch Republic or Italy; of these, the Dutch Republic would have the greatest effect on the British. The present Dutch government was a creature of British influence; if it failed, this would reflect badly upon London. Moreover, “since of all the enlargements to which France is susceptible, those which it would make in the Southern Netherlands would contribute the most to the augmentation of the power of its commerce and of its navy, and since this land is incidentally within reach of the coasts of England, one notices how much the jealousy of that nation is interested in that France should

189 MD 525, 1. Mémoire de Mr le Mal de Noailles, January 1748.

118 not extend its domination into a region which is so important in all regards.” Noailles did not tackle the question of whether France’s known “moderation” had not spoiled the Southern Netherlands as a bargaining chip, as other authors had contended. As 1748’s campaign had to be waged in the Low Countries, then, it only remained to be decided against which city it should be directed. Noailles believed Maastricht would be most appropriate. As the enemy army would soon be reinforced by 40.000 Russian soldiers, France had to ensure that it could easily defend its conquests in the Southern Netherlands. The capture of Maastricht, then, would protect its right flank, like Bergen-op-Zoom already protected the left. If the Russians would move against Alsace, Maastricht would moreover allow attacking them in the rear. The latter option was at any rate unlikely: Alsace was replete with fortresses. Finally, Maastricht would allow the French to protect its German allies and keep the Holy Roman Empire in check. Noailles then proceeded to explain in much detail how Maastricht could best be captured.

The campaign of 1748 would indeed be directed towards Maastricht. The city had an additional advantage that Noailles did not mention: as Maastricht lay at less than thirty kilometres from Aix-la-Chapelle, it would give the negotiators assembled there a fine demonstration of French military might. The sound of French cannon would be heard at the negotiating table.

In early 1748, two memoranda drew attention to the commercial importance of the Southern Netherlands to France. A first one was written on the 12th of February by a certain Godefroy, residing in Lille. Above this memorandum is written that it had to be given to the count of Saint-Sévérin190, who was to be France’s negotiator at Aix-la-Chapelle. The memorandum described how the remnants of the Southern Netherlands’ had been throttled after Spain concluded an alliance with the Maritime Powers in 1672. Philip V had quickly tried to restore trade, but the Treaty of Utrecht and the Barrier Treaties undid his efforts. The main problem for the Maritime Powers was that France was the Southern Netherlands’ natural trade partner due to the Lys and Scheldt rivers; they therefore had to make this trade “unpractical”. The memorandum then proceeded to describe how they had done it – it is of no interest to repeat this here. The author did recommend that France discuss several of these trade-throttling measures at the congress, and if possible obtain their annulation. To take but one example, the

190 “à remettre au comte de St. Severin par copie et garder l’original”

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River Lys had been declared common property only until the mouth of the Deûle River; the author recommended that this be extended until the village of Halluin (where the Lys became surrounded by territory of the Southern Netherlands on both of its shores). The author did qualify that this should only be done “in case the possessions of the King remain in the state in which they were before the war” – apparently he was not aware that France certainly would not annex any territory. This would be logical: as the memorandum was highly technical and written in Lille, it would be unlikely that Godefroy would have been aware of the exact content of negotiations.191 The other memorandum, equally written in February, dealt with the Les Moëres region.192 It was drafted by a certain d’Herouville de Claye, who was involved in the drainage of that marshy region in this period. D’Herouville argued that as this region crossed the border into the castellany of Furnes, it was important that Furnes should remain with France. The memorandum was marked as containing “very strong arguments”, and it was recommended to be forwarded to Saint-Sévérin as well.193

The next memorandum was written by a certain Isaac Van-der Lohe, and intended as advice to the envoys assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle.194 The author was Dutch or pretended to be Dutch, but as an annotated transcript was found in the French archives, somebody in France clearly took the time to read it. If the author was indeed Dutch as he claimed195, it allows us to look at the European reaction to French policy – a subject which transcends this thesis, but which is of course of interest. Van der Lohe provided a detailed overview of what would be awarded to each country. It is of no interest to repeat them all here; those that concern the Southern Netherlands will suffice. In its declaration of war against Maria Theresa and the declaration of 17 April 1747 against the Dutch Republic, France “had formally explained that it acted less out of desire for conquest than in a spirit of vengeance and resentment”, and from this Van der Lohe deduced

191 PB 139, Mémoire concernant L’Etat present du commerce des Pays Bas autrichiens avec la France, L’Angleterre, et les Etats Generaux des Provinces Unies, 12 February 1748. 192 Moeren in Dutch. 193 H 468, Memoire sur la […] des Moeres, by D’Herouville de Claye, February 1748. 194 H 468, Conseils paciffiques presentés aux Ministres Plenipotentiaires aux Congrès d’Aix-la-Chapelle, par Isaac Van-der Lohe, 1748. 195 The French annotator writes about the author as “pretending [feignant] to be Dutch”. It would indeed be quite strange that a Dutchman should not have known that Antwerp was a Brabantian and not a Flemish city, as he claimed when he awarded Antwerp to the Dutch Republic. Moreover, Van der Lohe expressed outrage at another peace plan that apparently circulated, which proposed to secularize several Catholic prince-bishoprics to indemnify belligerent powers. But it is of course possible that the author was a Dutch Catholic.

120 that, if Louisbourg were returned to it – a preliminary condition for the French –, France would probably content itself with a small number of cities in the Southern Netherlands: Menin, Ypres, Courtray, Diksmuide, and Ostend, and agree not to develop Ostend to become a competitor for the Dutch East India Company. The annotator added to this: “As the author claims to be Dutch, he does not give to this crown all the advantages that it could ask.” It is quite clear that even at just a few months before the peace agreement was announced, Europeans still did not know how to interpret French “moderation”. The Dutch Republic, Van der Lohe claimed, wanted peace as soon as possible, provided that the territory France had conquered were returned to it and the Barrier treaty renewed. In compensation for Dutch efforts, Van der Lohe proposed that Maria Theresa indemnify it with Antwerp, which would become part of Dutch Flanders. He was aware that Amsterdam would be opposed to it, but he remarked that it would be easy for him to prove that they were wrong, “if I were dealing with a less enlightened state”. The Elector Palatine, finally, would be awarded with the Duchy of Limburg. The Elector would then cede the cities of Neuburg and Sulzbach to Bavaria. As both rulers were Wittelsbachs, this would be a net gain for their dynasty.

Aix-la-Chapelle A March memorandum discussed France’s negotiating strategy – the envoys would start arriving in Aix-la-Chapelle later that month.196 The author questioned the sincerity of British commitment to peace, noting that since they were finding it more difficult than expected to find new loans, they were maybe only maintaining negotiations to prop up their national credit by making the public believe that peace was imminent. Although a peace with Great Britain would be useful to France because it would start with the reopening of overseas trade, the author urged France to pursue negotiations with Vienna as well. This would have the double advantage of giving France the opportunity to extract from the Austrians advantages that the British were not willing to concede, and of making the British public irritated at their ministers’ failure to make peace on British terms. The author therefore encouraged Versailles to pay close attention to the overtures Vienna was making through Kaunitz. The author thought that Vienna had good reasons for wanting to reach an accommodation with Paris. It had little incentive to believe that its British ally had its best

196 MD 525, 5. Mémoire, March 1748.

121 interests at heart: London had urged Maria Theresa from the very beginning to acknowledge Prussian sovereignty over Silesia. As most of the articles under discussion now touched her lands, putting her trust in the British would only be justified if they would be able to extract better conditions from Versailles than she herself would obtain. This, however, was not the case, as France’s commitment to returning the Southern Netherlands was well known and rendered a British intervention useless. Moreover, as the British had communicated the proposals France made to Ligonier to Vienna, the Austrians now knew that the British only cared about their own interests, as they could have ensured the prompt restitution of the Southern Netherlands to Maria Theresa from that moment on. Their decision to continue the war could only stem from their own desire to gain control over all overseas commerce. In Austria the argument against a separate peace with France could be advanced that it would halt British subsidies to Maria Theresa; however, the end of the war in Italy and the restitution of her territories would compensate for this. If necessary, France could offer her subsidies of its own to substitute for the loss. The author believed that there already existed an agreement between Versailles and Vienna on the main points of the settlement for Don Philip, the restoration of Modena and Genoa, and the return of the Southern Netherlands. In regard to the re-establishment of the fortifications of Dunkirk, it would be unnecessary to propose the cession of Furnes as an alternative, as it was unlikely that Vienna would oppose itself to the restoration of Dunkirk. When negotiating with the British, in contrast, the choice should be kept. From this it is clear that the author considered the conservation of Furnes to be less desirable option. The difficult point would be the timing of the return of the Southern Netherlands. If the British would still not agree to a peace after a separate Franco-Austrian agreement, France would have to continue its campaign against the Dutch Republic. Surrendering the Southern Netherlands would therefore leave France without a possibility to hurt Great Britain, and would lead to its eventual defeat. Versailles should therefore insist that the Southern Netherlands remain in French hands until the general peace, or at least that the Austrians should grant passage to French troops. In recognition of the fact that Maria Theresa suffered a great loss of income as long as the Southern Netherlands were not returned to her, the author proposed that France pay a subsidy to her for as long as the war continued. This subsidy should be higher than what the Southern Netherlands would normally yield to Maria Theresa, so as to create an incentive for France to return them as soon as possible. This amount would moreover be roughly equivalent to what she now received from the British. If Maria Theresa were nevertheless to insist on an immediate return, France should demand that the military

122 infrastructure of the region remain in French hands for the duration of the war, whilst the civilian administration would return into Austrian hands. A peace with Vienna would be highly advantageous to France, the author argued. It would put an end to the war in Italy – Sardinia, left without Austrian support, would have to capitulate immediately – and definitively end any threat coming from Germany. The British and Dutch would only be able to continue the war against France’s concentrated forces if they were to be joined by Russia and Prussia. However, it was unlikely that the British faction at the Court of Saint-Petersburg would prevail against the Austrian one, and Frederick would not be keen to direct his forces to the West whilst Maria Theresa was free to act against Silesia and Brandenburg. In the face of overwhelming odds, the Dutch Republic would be forced to capitulate, even on punitive terms. In the longer term, the Old Alliance system would be left in shatters: trust would not be restored between London and Vienna for a long time to come, and the Barrier Treaty would in all likelihood not be renewed. This would also rule out the possibility that anyone might invest in the rebuilding of the demolished fortresses of the Southern Netherlands. Furthermore, Austria would be likely to ask French support if it ever tried to recover what it had ceded to Prussia and Sardinia. And France, under a Franco-Austrian peace, would not have been required to guarantee Prussia’s and Sardinia’s expansion: France would then be in an excellent bargaining position, being at the receiving end of a bidding war amongst all those powers vying for French support.

It is of no interest to describe the negotiation process in 1748 in detail. Most of the points under discussion did not concern the Southern Netherlands directly, and France never wavered from its resolution to return them. It shall therefore suffice to make a few general remarks about the more marginal topics that remained under discussion.197 As indicated by the preceding memorandum, France was engaged in two separate negotiations at this moment, with Austria and Great Britain. Until the arrival of the French negotiator, the count of Saint-Séverin, in Aix-la-Chapelle on the 26th of March, negotiations with Austria still happened through Saxony mediation; after that Saint-Séverin negotiated directly with Kaunitz. Both Great Britain and Austria seem to have been largely unaware of France’s dealings with the other. Nevertheless, save a few details, France’s demands did not

197 For those seeking a more detailed treatment of the subject, Broglie’s La paix d’Aix-la-Chapelle is still relevant.

123 differ between the two negotiations: what was under discussion was the expedience with which peace could be achieved. As France had unilaterally announced the return of the Southern Netherlands but still sought to use it as a bargaining chip, the timing of the return was important. In its dealings with Great Britain this had little relevance, as a deal with London would almost certainly be followed by Dutch and Austrian acquiescence, as both depended on British financial support. If, on the other hand, France concluded peace with Austria, it needed a provision to allow it to continue using the Southern Netherlands as a base from which to attack the Dutch Republic. Since France eventually opted for Great Britain, this question thus became moot. Nonetheless, the Franco-British preliminaries still explicitly allowed France to take Maastricht, so that it was guaranteed control of its conquests until the time of withdrawal – the importance of Maastricht to this end has been discussed in Noailles’s last memorandum. Great Britain especially tried to downplay the importance of the French determination to return the Southern Netherlands. On first meeting Saint-Séverin in Aix-la-Chapelle, the earl of Sandwich told the French envoy that “the restitution of the Southern Netherlands was not such a marvellous thing, after the destruction of nearly all its fortresses”. Moreover, London’s dealing with its allies allowed it to hope for success in the next campaign – he was maybe referring to the Russians – and “the superiority of the English navy and the deterioration of our commerce had to enter the balance for the conditions of peace”. Sandwich was almost certainly bluffing in order to reduce the importance of France’s bargaining chip: the Southern Netherlands were not only of importance to Great Britain because of its Barrier role, but because they kept the ports of Ostend and Antwerp out of French hands as well. Saint-Séverin thereupon answered that “if His Majesty had announced, or even only allowed the suspicion to exist that he wanted to keep part of his conquests, they would maybe not explain with so much indifference the price of the sacrifice that he wants to make out of love for peace and to convince all of Europe that it is not the spirit of aggrandisement that has made him spill so much blood and money”.198 In contrast to what was recommended in the previous memorandums, France offered the choice between Furnes and Dunkirk to both Vienna and London. The French assumed that the Austrians would not care greatly about whether Dunkirk was fortified – an annotation on a memorandum says that “the Court of Vienna will regard this article with great indifference199 – and would thus easily grant the refortification of Dunkirk. However, during the negotiations

198 H 468, Saint-Séverin’s account of his arrival at Aix-la-Chapelle, 30 March 1748. 199 MD 525, 3. Projet d’articles préliminaires, avec des observations, early 1748.

124 at Aix-la-Chapelle, Kaunitz indicated that Austria was willing to support France in this matter, and that “the proof that his Court supported it was the cession of Furnes that it offered us, but that it could not take any further engagements than to consent to it”. France had to settle this matter directly with Great Britain, along with the question of Louisbourg. To this Saint-Séverin replied that indeed Austria could not do anything about Louisbourg, which lay on the other side of the world. Dunkirk, however, was close-by. In his account sent to Versailles, Saint-Séverin remarked that it appeared to him that Austria had “neither desire nor interest to see [Dunkirk] demolished, but that it did not want to take upon itself an engagement that would earn it British reproaches”. Saint-Séverin could thus go no further than announce that France would remain intransigent on Dunkirk and Louisbourg.200 In the Franco-British preliminaries, the question was eventually left de facto unsettled: officially, the provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht on Dunkirk were renewed, but Great Britain would send no commissaries to see to their execution. France made some lacklustre attempts to obtain the cession of the Duchies of Limburg and Austrian Guelders to the Elector Palatine. However, the count of Loss, the representative of Saxony which then still served as intermediary between France and Austria, quickly made clear in a conversation with Puyzieulx in March that this was out of the question. Puyzieulx then tried to obtain some lesser compensation by shifting the question of compensation towards smaller German territories, but even when he argued that the Palatinate should at least receive Limburg and the small Duchy of Falkenstein – which had been given to Francis Stephen so that he would possess at least one truly German territory – Loss answered that the Emperor might be persuaded to cede Falkenstein, but that it would be better not to talk about it at that moment.201 A later memorandum omitted Limburg and Guelders altogether, but still sought to obtain Falkenstein and the Duchy of Pleistein for the Elector Palatine – Pleistein had belonged to the Elector Palatine, but as it was a fief of the Kingdom of Bohemia, it had been confiscated by Maria Theresa during the war. The memorandum mentioned that the Austrians justified their refusal to return Pleistein to the Elector Palatine on the grounds that the Elector had acceded to the Treaty of Dresden without mentioning his claims, and that he had thus abandoned them. The memorandum thus urged the French negotiator at Aix-la-Chapelle to try to obtain at least Pleistein for the Elector, but forbade him to break off negotiations if he did not succeed.202 France was willing to pay Francis Stephen to cede Falkenstein when

200 H 468, Saint-Séverin account of his talks with Kaunitz, 10 April 1748. 201 H 468, Joint à la note du 14 mars 1748. 202 H 468, Projet d’articles preliminaires, avec des observations, joint a la note du 15 mars 1748.

125 necessary, but this payment was to happen in secret.203 Saint-Séverin’s first encounter with Kaunitz immediately made clear that Maria Theresa would never allow any compensation for the Elector Palatine; the question was henceforth omitted from the negotiations.204 A memorandum sent to Saint-Séverin on the 8th of April from Versailles explained that “some prolongations of the subsidies granted to the Elector Palatine will make Mannheim forget about the mention made in the plan of Brussels205 [to give] Limburg and Gueldres to this prince”.206 The questions of the enclaves of Hainault and of the abbey of Saint-Hubert were consistently relegated in the preliminary negotiations to the future congress at Aix-la- Chapelle. Once this had started, it was simply determined that these questions “will be settled amicably, in the spirit of the previous treaties, or they will be a settled by a mutually agreeable arbitrator”. 207 They were in other words tabled for the time being. An annotation on a memorandum analysing the preliminaries concluded between Saint-Séverin and Sandwich agreed that “these particular objects of discussion between the King and the Queen of Hungary cannot and must not be treated but between the two Courts, and between the envoys of those two powers only”.208

The preliminary peace agreement between France and Great Britain was signed on the 30th of April. As its content spread through France and Europe, many people could not understand why France would return all of its conquests. Frenchmen took to complaining about “the war for the King of Prussia”, and turned “as stupid as the peace” into a proverb. In September 1748, we find in the archives of La Courneuve a response to a critique of French policy entitled Interests of the Empress, The Kings of France and Spain and their allies neglected.209 According to the Huguenot author Rousset de Missy it was written by the abbé Garigues de Froment210 – a name we have encountered in a January 1746 memorandum, although I then

203 H458, Projet d’articles preliminaires, N. 7. Joint a la note du 15 mars 1748. 204 H 468, Saint-Séverin’s first conversations with Kaunitz, No 2, 30 March 1748 205 The more concrete proposals, following from his 13 Ideas, that d’Argenson made to the Dutch representatives in May 1746 in Brussels. 206 H 468, Princippes generaux dont M. le Comte de Severin pourra faire souvent l’application sans s’arrêter neanmoins trop scrupuleusement à chaque article, 8 Aprili 1748. 207 H 468, Projet d’articles préliminaires, envoyé le 8 à M. le Cte de St. Severin, 8 April 1748. 208 H 468, Projet des preliminaires pour la paix generalle signez à Aix la Chapelle le 30e avril 1748 entre la France, l’Angleterre et la Republique de Hollande avec des remarques sur ces articles. 209 MD 410, 3. Réponse au memoire qui a pour titre Interets de l’IMperatrice, Les Roys de France et d’Espagne et de leurs alliez negligés dans les preliminaires du 30 avril 1748, 1 September 1748. 210 The author of the pamphlet is identified as such by Rousset de Missy, who wrote an answer to it as well. Rousset de Missy, Les interets et la tranquilité de l’Europe défendus contre le Fanatisme Politique de l’Auteur des Interets de l’Impératrice Reine &c. Négligés dans les Préliminaires de la Paix d’Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748.

126 said that is was doubtful that he wrote that memorandum. The unknown author of the rebuttals did not mention Froment, however: he was either not aware of it or Rousset was mistaken in his attribution. For the sake of convenience I shall refer to him as Froment. I shall only examine the points concerning the Southern Netherlands. Froment commenced his pamphlet by declaring that France had never been in a more advantageous position. The author of the rebuttals contested this by remarking: “Our situation was beautiful in Flanders, but we and the Spanish were waging a defensive war in Italy; the Duke of Modena, Spain’s ally, was robbed of his lands; a part of the territory of Genoa was conquered by the enemy. It is true that we had captured Savoy and the County of Nice, [but] our situation was bad at sea for the two crowns. The simple facts respond to a too advantageous portrayal. Moreover, there was still no settlement for Don Philip in the heart of the Italy, everything was bad for us, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was ill equipped and very exposed.” When Froment suggested that there is too great a “disproportion between what we give return and what we receive”, the author therefore responded that France was at risk of “losing much more on the sea, in the East and West Indies, and in Italy”. There was a risk that Naples would be invaded, that there would be a new war on the Rhine, and whilst “it is true that multiple Dutch provinces were very exposed to the superiority of our arms, those republicans become twice as strong when they defend their own hearths; they have shown it enough at the birth of their independence, and the deceased King experienced it in 1672”. Moreover, Froment did not take into account “what we obtain for the Infant, and the restitution of Modena and the Eastern Riviera to their sovereigns211. Our enemies win in the sense that the war ends, but do we not win as well the end of many evils and the beginning of many good things? Does the evil [suffered by] others repair ours? The King had announced that he would not expand his territory through this auxiliary war; His Majesty fulfils his word. The more the situation might have seduced another prince, the more his generosity will touch his neighbours. The reputation which attracts confidence will always be worth more to our state than a few fortresses which we are reproached here of not having wanted to keep.” Froment then argued that France should never have returned the border fortresses that “were absolutely necessary to our Flemish border”, not even to a prince who would have married a French princess – as we have seen, a few authors had argued to cede the Southern Netherlands to Charles of Lorraine (or to the Elector Palatine), who would then have married

Consulted on Google Books. I will not examine Rousset’s critique, as he lived in Holland (he was a Huguenot exile) and considered the subject from the point of view of international law. 211 That is, the return of the Marquisate of Finale to Genoa, which the Treaty of Worms had awarded to Turin.

127 a daughter of Louis XV. To this, the author replied that France could never have kept “such a beautiful conquest” peacefully, as Europe was already “too jealous of the House of France, which, from its ordinary strength, has conquered the ten provinces of the [Southern] Netherlands”. All of Europe would therefore have united against it “with reason”. Moreover, France’s Flemish border was much stronger than that which opposed it there: its enemies would never prefer to attack France there if they could attack it on the Rhine: “Those places on which the essential security of the Kingdom supposedly depends were not worth it to break the promise [we made] not to keep anything. Our neighbours will rarely attack us spontaneously, we have more and better fortresses than they have, we have a better understanding of attack and defence, multiple ones of their [fortresses] have been dismantled in their entirety or partially. We will always be earlier in Ghent than they will be in Orchies.” To the suggestion that the Southern Netherlands would have been ceded to a son-in-law of Louis XV, the author responded that this was the way of thinking of “the good people of Paris who think about affairs of state as they do about the affairs of their family”: the Kings of France were not in the habit of giving such a large dowry to their daughters. This would indicate, then, that the author was not aware of the idea to give the Southern Netherlands to Prince Charles, or else he simply believed the scheme impractical. Froment then argued that Tournay, Ypres and Menin were of the old patrimonium of France, and should therefore have remained with France after the peace. To this the author replied that they had been ceded by the treaties of 1713 and 1738, and that a long possession by the present owner nullified the rights of the previous owner. This equally applied to Froment’s argument that France should have restored its old suzerainty over parts of the Southern Netherlands, which Francis I had ceded at the Treaty of Madrid. In contrast to this overall expansionism, Froment agreed that France was wise not to demand Luxembourg, as the Holy Roman Empire would have been implacably opposed to its loss. This argumentation the author believed to be untrue – Luxembourg was of little value for the defence of the Empire since it could easily be passed by – but he concurred that it would have been of little value for France to annex. However it would have been in France’s real interest if Versailles had insisted on the demolition of its fortifications. In a critique of France’s strategy during the war, Froment repeated the by now classic argument that France had shown too much consideration for the Dutch until 1747: “We will never win over our enemies through kindness; we should have expanded our borders now that we had conquered so much, we would have taken away from our enemies [their Barrier].” The author responded by arguing that in contrast to Froment’s Machiavellism, it was justness

128 that would give France “the preponderant voice in the society and discussions of Europe”. Moreover, it was untrue that France had been too lenient towards the Dutch until 1747: it had conquered their Barrier and then continued its conquests into the territory of the Republic. This was a lesson of French might that the Dutch would not soon forget. At the end of his rebuttal, the author included a project of his own. He declared that the situation in Europe should remain as it was now, but that particular ambitions opposed this. Nevertheless, he was hopeful about France: “At last we begin to think in the world that since sixty years France has adopted the reasonable system of not extending the domains of the crown any longer, and to obtain only the noble consideration which gives [influence] in the affairs of one’s neighbours”. It would be desirable if Europe’s other powers would follow the French example – not only in regard to its ‘pacifist’ politics, but also in regard to its Salic law, which prevented that “the sterility or repudiation of a woman caused the deaths of a million men”. If Europe would abandon this kind of politics, “commerce, industry, and labour will be privileged, and states will overflow with abundance and the arts.”

After a few months’ haggling over the exact interpretation of the preliminaries, the final peace treaty was signed on the 18th of October. On the 13th of February 1749, the French army retreated from the last occupied part of the Southern Netherlands.

129

Conclusion

What did France want? Its soldiers had fought and died in Bohemia, in Bavaria, in the Rhineland, in Alsace, in the Low Countries, in Italy, in Provence, on sea and overseas. It had lost – in Bohemia, in Bavaria, in the Rhineland, in Italy, on sea and overseas. And it had won – in Savoy, in Nice, in India, and in that large, rich, previously unconquered area stretching from Bergen-op-Zoom and Maastricht over Brabant, Namur, Hainault and Flanders all the way to the fortifications of Dunkirk, Lille, Valenciennes and Maubeuge. What did France want? Most of those who lived through all this did not know it. Was it land that France wanted? Peace? Justice? Glory? Land for somebody else? Or did it not know? Historians have not really known it either. It conquered because it had to. It conquered but did not want to. It wanted to conquer but could not. It did not know. I shall not pretend that I know either. But I do believe that I can provide a sketch of contours. France’s memoranda writers did not govern – and in many cases we can only be glad that they didn’t – but they did live in a community that was connected to those who decided. They were inspired and may even have inspired others. They provide us with a very rough sketch of the ideas that were circulating in those times – a distorted, exaggerated and often highly personal sketch. But when we stare somewhat less at the quirks of the lines and try to compare, evaluate and understand, we can catch a glimpse of what was happening around these memoranda and their authors. It is a sketch – but it shows more than we have known until now, and can help us to discern what we should look for in the future. What does this sketch tell us about what France wanted?

In the first few years of the war, as it send its armies into Germany to strike at the root of the Habsburg Empire, there is no reason to believe that France wanted anything but to leave the Southern Netherlands in peace, and to be left in peace in return. The fighting happened in Germany, and it was in Germany that the real prize was to be obtained. Yet when we allow ourselves a little indulgence in the counterfactual, it must be admitted that the Austrian Netherlands could not have escape unscathed from the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire.

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Let us suppose that Charles Albert conquered Bohemia and Upper Austria, and left Maria Theresa with a rump state consisting of Lower Austria and Hungary: the distance separating her from the Southern Netherlands would have been unbridgeable. The Dutch and British would insist that they go to somebody better capable of defending them. Would a victorious France have accepted a simple change of ruler, asking nothing for itself? But in real history, France never had the opportunity to ponder this question. The war went badly – badly to a point that the Kingdom itself might be invaded. Rather than repeat the German bet that had failed it twice or risk a stalemate on the Rhine, France would no longer risk losing the war, but it would seek to strengthen its position where it was certain that it could do so. In 1747 memoranda writers could say that France had chosen the easy option: but in 1743 room for manoeuver must have seemed much more limited. But a strategic choice though the invasion was, it changed the conflict to such an extent that land-grabbing entered the possibilities. Even before the invasion properly started, France’s memoranda writers were proposing plans to annex the Southern Netherlands. The French government itself abandoned the pretence that it was only fighting for its allies: this would be open warfare. Its policy of moderation had not worked, and was now discarded. As it promised Prussia support, it demanded that Frederick should guarantee any conquests France should make in the Southern Netherlands. Surely there were still Frenchmen who argued that a German problem could only be solved in Germany, and the Austrian invasion of Alsace must have temporarily strengthened them in their conviction. But when the Emperor died, it is a bit hard to escape the impression that many memoranda writers felt relief that France could now extricate itself from the German morass. Most went on advocating expansion in the Southern Netherlands. Some went for everything. Others, more realistic, would be satisfied with only a few cities, and proposed to use the rest of French conquests to make (larger) demands elsewhere. The French government shared their convictions: in secret negotiations with Austria, organized by Saxony, it demanded the surrender of Nieuwpoort, Furnes, Ypres, and Tournai. There is no real reason to believe why this demand should not have been genuine: what could it have gained elsewhere by demanding and insisting on all four even in the face of Austrian opposition? A crack appeared over Italy. It came from a predictable place: a complete return of the Southern Netherlands, the visualisation of French désinteressement, found fertile ground in the idealistic Marquis d’Argenson. Did he simply react on impulse, or had he been looking for the opportunity to drive home his views? We do know, but the project remained associated

131 with him for the coming months: as late as July, even his confidant Champeaux referred to it as “your project”. If the idea had been circulating in a like-minded group in Versailles before Italy collapsed, Champeaux should have been privy to it: in late 1744 already he expressed despair over France’s position. We may therefore assume, at least for the time being, that it was d’Argenson’s idea. But even he did not give it the purity of dogma: the Southern Netherlands would be returned, but the border disputes – which were rather substantial, after all, involving as they did two cities – France would solve in its own favour, and in the East some territory should go to the Elector Palatine. For a few months, the project remained confined to secret diplomatic negotiations. How universally accepted it was by the French government it is difficult to tell. The inclusion of several cities in the customs area of French Flanders and Hainault was an ambiguous sign, but it must also be said that the decision was not reversed until just a few months before the peace, well after the French government had decided that the Southern Netherlands would be returned. On the other hand, the dismantlement of several Barrier fortresses, as difficult to understand as it still is, seems to have started in this period, and this might indicate that the French government had indeed adopted d’Argenson’s plan. But even if this was the case, knowledge of the plan does not seem to have spread much beyond it. Then, suddenly, a flood of memoranda writers took to complaining about French “moderation”. Just like the French government itself had denounced the ineffectiveness of moderation two and a half years before, so now the memoranda writers accused France of losing the war because it was not willing to be hard enough. But that first denunciation of moderation they completely forgot: moderation became the maxim that had governed French policy since the beginning of the war. The non-expansionism that twentieth-century French historians advocated as a leading principle of eighteenth-century French foreign policy in fact goes back to a re-interpretation, an invention of tradition so to speak, that already took place during the war itself. The primary foreign target of the memoranda writers was the Dutch Republic. It had benefitted the most from French moderation, and an example should be made of it through a prompt invasion of its territory. Some memoranda writers only denounced moderation but did not complain about désinteressement: it was all right that France should abandon its conquests for the sake of its allies, but its diplomatic strategy was wrong. The attitude of France’s negotiating partners somewhat corroborated them: those tried to downplay the importance of the Southern Netherlands now that some of its fortresses had been dismantled. Other writers did not know

132 about or simply ignored both moderation and désinteressement, and went on to propose or assume that France would annex something. Meanwhile, the principle of ‘returning the entire Southern Netherlands’ gradually came to overrule the qualifications that d’Argenson had given to it. The border disputes were tabled as they were referred to the future congress and finally to bilateral negotiations. The idea of compensating the Elector Palatine with the Duchies of Limburg and Guelders was given up without much resistance. There remained the question of Dunkirk: but even there France offered a way to keep the Southern Netherlands intact. And notwithstanding the argumentations of its memoranda writers, France never officially changed its default diplomatic position to threatening to keep the Southern Netherlands unless its demands were met. Puyzieulx and Saint-Séverin might use this on occasion when they were engaged in direct negotiations, but France never ceased to see the return of the Southern Netherlands as the very basis of negotiations.

Why did France do this? Pacifism and non-expansionism can be ruled out: between 1744 and 1746, France abandoned moderation and désinteressement both in theory and in practice. D’Argenson proposed the project after the collapse of French fortunes in Italy: this certainly remained, all the way until 1748, one of the primary motivators. Louisbourg entered the consideration as well from time to time, but that fortress was captured in June 1745 already. It was added only after the decision to return the Southern Netherlands was made. Fear lest an all-European coalition should be formed against it as France became too powerful must not be excluded. Even at the height of its fortunes, France never asked for more than a few cities, and memoranda that ask for more always carry a whiff of the fantastical. From late 1746, war-weariness and financial exhaustion appear as themes as well. But no-one suggested that France should make peace at any cost. It can only have strengthened the argument that France should gain peace through the cession of the entire Southern Netherlands, but it did not lay at its origin. The simple proposition to return the entire Southern Netherlands seems to have taken a force of its own as well. I have already pointed out how the principle came to override the qualifications, and how France never wavered from it – not even from how it used the return diplomatically. There must have been moments when some Frenchmen realized that France was in a relatively strong diplomatic position. Yet instead of trying to gain something out of this, it abandoned even the qualifications it had initially made. That France did not want to lose face now that it had promised a restoration explains part of this. But the ease with which

133 it accepted to drop its peripheral demands and its refusal to change its negotiating strategy seems to suggest that the principle of the return acquired a life of its own.

The sketch of France’s policy I have made above, allows us to make a few observations about France’s foreign policy in the eighteenth century in general. It is difficult to accept the theory that eighteenth-century France accepted its borders as definitive. It reeks too much of teleology, it downplays the fact that France did acquire Lorraine and Corsica. France did consider, and even proposed in diplomatic negotiations, to annex a part of the Southern Netherlands. But we should not relegate non-expansionism to the dustbin in its entirety. There were a few memoranda writers who advocated it throughout. And if the return of the Southern Netherlands became something of a dogma as I propose, non-expansionism did become a virtue. Maybe it was only temporary, but it does mean that the theme of unabashed expansionism from Richelieu to the Revolution must cede to nuance as well.. The sketch I have made also shows how many considerations entered French foreign policy at this moment. Those few historians who raised the point were right to point to the importance of dynastic prestige: it probably did play a role to make France willing to cede so much for Don Philip. But this sentiment was easily accompanied by hard-boiled realism. France was not strong enough to take on Europe on its own: it needed allies. And from 1746 onwards, it is true that not a single ally of France had gained from the alliance. If France chose for its own enlargement now and abandoned its suffering allies, concluding alliances in the future would have become much more difficult. And in the case of Spain especially this would have been very diplomatic: France could only hope to defeat the British navy if it could count on the support of the Spanish fleets. But consideration for the European international system did not permeate France’s entire foreign-policy community, if we may call it as such. There were memoranda writers and in all probability the French government as well who were never willing to go beyond more than a few cities in the Southern Netherlands – but several others showed a blatant disregard for how much the rest of Europe might be opposed to a substantial or even full annexation. The Balance of Power, to them, was often just a British trick. This has of course to do with the remaining popularity of expansionism in some groups of Frenchmen, possibly even in the majority of them – people who were narrowly focussed on not even only France’s national interest but on its glory as well. As intellectually appealing as it might be to see foreign policy as the result of careful consideration of the various interests at play, it must not

134 be forgotten that there remained, even in the Age of Realism and of the Balance of Power, a considerable group of people who did not think this way. They maybe did not make policy, but they did live in a community that overlapped with that of those who did.

135

Acknowledgements

The first word of gratitude upon finishing a master’s thesis must surely be for the fact that it is over. But I would lie if I did not say as well that I am grateful for the opportunity I have had. In spite of the occasional – dare I say all too frequent – laments and bouts of procrastination, I can wholeheartedly admit that I have found the research and writing an instructive and occasionally even enjoyable experience. A few additional words of gratitude are therefore in order. The first must surely go to my supervisor, Prof. René Vermeir, for introducing me to the subject, for pointing out its possibilities, and for providing me with information both asked and unasked. I would also like to thank my family and friends for their support material and immaterial, for their interest, and if I may go a bit further than this thesis only, for their friendship.

136

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Samenvatting in het Nederlands

Tijdens de Oostenrijkse Successieoorlog slaagde Frankrijk erin het grootste deel van de Zuidelijke Nederlanden te bezetten, tot Bergen-op-Zoom en Maastricht toe. Een dergelijk wapenfeit was ongezien in de Franse geschiedenis, maar toch gaf Frankrijk tijdens het Congres van Aken (1748) al zijn veroveringen aan de oorspronkelijke eigenaars terug. Deze teruggave is nooit adequaat onderzocht geweest in de historiografie. Verscheidene historici hebben ze proberen verklaren binnen de context van hun primair onderzoeksterrein, gaande van algemene geschiedenissen van de oorlog tot biografieën van Lodewijk XV. Zo wezen ze onder meer op de toestand van uitputting waarin Frankrijk op dat moment zou hebben verkeerd, op een angst dat enige annexatie tot een grote vijandige coalitie zoals tijdens de Spaanse Successieoorlog zou leiden, op de incompetentie van de Franse regering, op het karakter van Lodewijk XV, op het pacifisme of op zijn minst non- expansionisme dat in achttiende-eeuws Frankrijk zou hebben geheerst. Hoewel zich hier nuttige elementen in bevinden, is er geen afdoend coherent model uit af te leiden en spreken de theorieën elkaar tegen. Opvallend is ook dat het onderwerp nooit binnen de tijdsspanne van de Oostenrijkse Successieoorlog zelf is bestudeerd, maar dat er ofwel wordt gewezen naar langetermijnontwikkelingen, ofwel naar de toestand in het jaar 1748. Ik heb de onderzoeksvraag grotendeels benaderd via memoranda die zich in de Franse archieven van Buitenlandse Zaken bevonden. Ze zijn weliswaar niet noodzakelijk geschreven door personen met beslissingsbevoegdheid of zelfs aantoonbare invloed, maar in hun geheel laten ze ons toe de ideeën te schetsen die op dat moment in Frankrijk circuleerden. Ze laten ons toe om meer officiële uitspraken en diplomatieke voorstellen in hun context te plaatsen, en om rekening te houden met de diversiteit aan meningen en de variatie over de tijd. De belangrijkste vaststellingen van mijn onderzoek zijn als volgt. In de beginjaren van de Oostenrijkse Successieoorlog is er geen reden om aan te nemen dat Frankrijk zich direct aan de Zuidelijke Nederlanden interesseerde. Dit veranderde naarmate de militaire en diplomatieke situatie in Duitsland verslechterde. De inval in 1744 werd daarom in de eerste plaats vanuit strategische overwegingen genomen. Maar er werd toen ook afstand genomen van de politiek van “gemattigdheid” (modération) die Frankrijk tot

140 dan toe gebezigd had. De memorandaschrijvers stelden ogenblikkelijk projecten voor om op zijn minst een deel van de Zuidelijke Nederlanden te annexeren. De Franse regering gewaagde in zijn diplomatie evenzeer van gebiedsuitbreiding. Dit veranderde in het voorjaar van 1746. De militaire situatie in Italië zakte pijlsnel ineen ten gevolge van een Sardijns-Oostenrijkse offensief. Om de Franse eisen in Italië dan maar diplomatiek te bereiken, maakte de Franse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, markies d’Argenson, plots aan vertegenwoordigers van de Verenigde Provinciën het voorstel over om de Zuidelijke Nederlanden in hun geheel terug te geven, hoewel met enige kwalificaties. Dit voorstel schijnt enige tijd geheim te zijn gebleven, tot het in het najaar plots werd opgepikt door de memorandaschrijvers. Ze vielen daarop de Franse “gematigdheid” aan, die volgens hen al de gehele oorlog had overheerst – ook al had Frankrijk er in 1744 afstand van gedaan. Niettemin hield Frankrijk zijn nieuwe politiek vol: tot in 1748 bleef het de teruggave van de Zuidelijke Nederlanden als vertrekpunt van de onderhandelingen presenteren, zonder toe te geven aan binnenlandse druk dat het zou moeten dreigen dat de teruggave slechts zou plaatsvinden wanneer aan Frankrijks eisen werd voldaan. Het principe van de teruggave schijnt zich zelfs te hebben versterkt in het verder verloop van de oorlog: geleidelijk aan liet Frankrijk zijn aanvankelijke kwalificaties vallen, en bood het de mogelijkheid van een integrale teruggave aan zijn gesprekspartners aan.

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