<<

Trustees of Princeton University

Contentious in New : , , , and , 1989- 93 Author(s): Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik Source: Politics, Vol. 50, No. 4 (Jul., 1998), pp. 547-581 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054056 . Accessed: 09/08/2013 10:17

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

. JSTOR is a not-for-profit that helps scholars, researchers, and discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Cambridge University Press and Trustees of Princeton University are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to World Politics.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES

East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, 1989-93

By GRZEGORZ EKIERT andJAN KUBIK*

I. Protest and Postcommunist Democratic Consolidation

the aftermath of the collapse of state socialism, East Central Eu states are well on IN ropean their way toward establishing working can a democracies; and with the exception of Slovakia, they all boast solid record in the of political liberties and human rights.1These democratized are not in re newly regimes any immediate danger of to same verting authoritarian rule. At the time, the progress of political and economic transformations has been uneven and their chances of are achieving full democratic consolidation still uncertain. Conse quently, the study of various aspects and limits of democratic consoli states as one most dation in postcommunist has emerged of the areas intriguing and challenging of . This paper explores the question of democratic consolidation from a specific analytical and empirical angle?the comparative study of collective protest in the former East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and to to Slovakia. By doing so, attempt accomplish three goals: (1) correct a bias in the on transitions proelite literature democratic by studying the behavior of nonelite actors; (2) to determine which factors account for and of different magnitudes specific repertoires protest; and * was at The project funded by the Program for the Study of Germany and the Center of European Studies, Harvard University; the National Council for Soviet and East European Research; the American Council of Learned Societies; and the Elfriede Drager Memorial Foundation. We to would like thank Sidney Tarrow for his generous help and encouragement. For their indispensable to assistance and advice, special gratitude goes Beissinger, Nancy Bermeo, Valerie Bunce, Ellen Comisso, Ela Ekiert, Krzysztof Gorlach, Bela Greskovits, Anna Grzymala-Busse, Samuel Huntington, Kazimierz Kloc, Janos Kornai, D. Kennedy, Martha Kubik, Christiane Lemke, Juan , Darina Malova, Alexander Motyl, Maryjane , Susan Pharr, Dieter Rucht, Anna Seleny, Mate Szabo, Charles and N. Zald. 1 Tilly, Mayer See Freedom House, : of Political Rights and Liberties, 1994-1995 (New : Freedom House, 1996).

WorldPolitics 50 (July 1998), 547-81

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 548 WORLD POLITICS

to consider the that (3) proposition protest endangers democratic consolidation. All countries are eco of in the throes of difficult nomic and adjustments structural changes that have engendered dislocations and exacted considerable social costs. It has often been ar that a a to new gued such situation poses great danger these democra the costs of transitions can cies; high social easily provoke widespread to or protests leading the collapse serious weakening of democratic in stitutions.2 We economic new ask whether and how the policies of the were some more regimes actively contested. Did countries experience protest than others? What factors determine variation in protest mag nitudes and protest repertoires?the type of transformation strategy adopted, the political and social legacies of the communist rule, the social cost and new of hardship produced by the reforms, institu or re tional of the post-1989 polity, the organizational sources and various collective capabilities of actors? For example, with our a recent tra Poland the only country in sample that had strong and dition of political conflict and protest, a high level of protest could have been expected.3 Its magnitude in the former GDR is surprising, how since 1989 East has been ever; Germany similarly contentious, despite the absence of any considerable protest traditions before 1989. Are the in same high levels of protest East Germany explained by the conjunc tion of factors that operated in Poland? state Moreover, the fall of socialism opened the way for political par as case ticipation and contentious collective , is the when state a re institutions undergo significant transformation and abandon one a pressive political practices. Thus although would expect high level in of political mobilization and protest activities such transitory poli a not out: ties, preliminary overview of protest politics does bear that events not the number of protest in the four countries under study is in in two higher than consolidated European democracies, and cases it is distinctly lower.Why is that so? ex Comparative studies of collective protest offer four theories for as as plaining the incidence of contentious collective action, well its 2 costs to a are Gray, for example, argued that "the human and social of transition market economy most so to can for of the post-Communist states great that it is foolish suppose that the transition be to conducted under liberal democratic institutions." John Gray, "From Postcommunism Civil Society: The Reemergence of History and the Decline of theWestern Model," in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, and Jeffrey Paul, eds., Liberalism and theEconomic Order (: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 44. 3 See Grzegorz Ekiert, "Rebellious : Political Crises and Popular Protest under State Socialism, 1945-1989," East European Politics and Societies 11 ( 1997).

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 549

can ex forms and magnitude. Variation in protest characteristics be plained by underscoring (1) discontents and grievances that can be into translated protest through psychological mechanisms of relative deprivation; (2) changes in the structure of political opportunities and to existence actors' calculated responses them; (3) the prior of tradi tions, repertoires of collective action, and mobilizing collective action resources frames; and (4) the availability of (material and organiza as tional) determinants of protest activities.4 We will consider the in our explanatory power of these four theories analysis. It should be we not to nor are we a noted, however, that do aim verify them, in po to of more variance. nature sition determine which them explains The our is not to we of data suited such tasks. Moreover, adopt here the more to comparative strategy indebted the case-oriented comparative to assume method than the variable-oriented approach. We also that we are of From dealing with multiple and conjunctural types causation.5 are not this point of view, the four theories (or analytical perspectives) to a set mutually exclusive; rather, they help identify of explanatory or not outcome variables that may may codetermine the in any given case. turn out a It may also that each of the four theories explains spe more cific dimension of collective protest and is useful for understand one set cases ing of than for understanding others. of on an Our analysis contentious politics is founded assumption a that democratic consolidation is highly contingent and complex pro cess in of the of taking place several spheres sociopolitical organization society.6 Developments within each sphere and the relationship be tween outcomes increase uncer them often produce confusing and as tainty. Moreover, democratic regimes take different paths toward so too consolidation, do the degrees of contentious political participa tion and stability of their institutional arrangements vary. 4 see For the most recent assessment of these theories and their mutual relationships, Doug on McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives Social Movements nature our we (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). The of data (events) is such that need to use macrotheories (historical-sociological), rather than microtheories(game-theoretic), of collective see s action. For the discussion of the significance of both perspectives, Marc Lichbach, The Rebel Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), esp. chap. 10. 5 are serves to These ideas developed by Ragin. The concept of conjunctural causation indicate that on in the social world causes work in interaction with each other and their effects the dependent/ are not explained variable merely additive. The concept of multiple causation indicates that there may or same be several combinations of independent variables (conditions factors) that produce the out come (dependent variable). See Charles Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). 6 see For the elaboration of this point, Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, Collective Protest and Demo on cratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989-1993, Pew Papers Central Eastern European Reform and no. , 3 (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1997).

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 550 WORLD POLITICS

Earlier studies of democratization and democratic consolidation fo cused on of these structural preconditions processes. More recently many researchers abandoned structural approaches and adopted the elite-centered perspective. O'Donnell, Schmitter, and their collabora tors are to argue that "elite pacts" essential the successful transition from authoritarian rule.7 Similarly, Diamond and Linz claimed that "the skills, values, strategies, and choices of political leaders figure our prominently in explanation of the enormously varied experiences with in America."8 Higley and G?nther contended that "in independent stateswith long records of political instability and out authoritarian rule, distinctive elite transformations, carried by the constitute the main the route to elites themselves, and possibly only democratic consolidation."9 This almost exclusive focus on elites creates a theoretical weakness in the existing studies of regime change and a on consolidation. Moreover, methodological emphasis rational choice and on as further re explanations modeling political processes games10 on dem inforces the already dominant elite-centered focus of research ocratic transition. Additionally, the greater availability of elite data favors the elite-centered perspective. Party programs, public speeches on re and interviews of leaders, reports electoral campaigns, election so on are sults, journalistic commentaries, and all readily accessible in sources one to reconstruct the the public domain. Such data enable po elite actors litical positions of and the bargaining processes among to trace them and then their compromises, coalitions, and policy on nonelite actors are choices. By contrast, data the political activities of not have been used as readily available; public-opinion polls routinely source on the of the the sole of empirical knowledge politics populace at large. more We also find that the existing literature has accorded promi nence to certain dimensions of consolidation and neglected others: in structures stitutional choices of governmental and electoral institutions, as as are as most well the formation of party systems, usually viewed the in and consolidation of democ important elements the stabilization racy.The importance of institutional choices is emphasized by Lijphart 7 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Con clusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Press, 1986), 37-39. 8 in Larry Diamond and Juan Linz, "Introduction: Politics Society and Democracy Latin America," in Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Democracy inDeveloping Countries: Latin America (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989), 14. 9 in John Higley and Richard G?nther, eds., Elites and Democratic Consolidation Latin America and xi. Southern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 10 Choice Case See Herbert Kitschelt, "Comparative Historical Research and Rational Theory: The to of Transition Democracy," Theory and Society 22 (1993).

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 551

. . . and Waisman, who argue that "in all cases the transition involves or similar tasks': in the polity the design reestablishment of govern mental institutions and electoral systems. In the economy the estab ... a lishment of the institutional infrastructure of market economy."11 Haggard and Kaufman underscore the importance of political parties, to arguing that "the capacity organize stable political rule?whether thoritarian or democratic?in the modern of broad social mo rests on bilization and complex economic system ultimately organized in turn rest on systems of accountability, and these political parties."12 on to on in In addition, works tend focus the complex teractions between economic and political reforms.13 This problem has come to as or be known the "dilemma of simultaneity" the "transitional incompatibility thesis."14 concern The preoccupation with (1) elites, (2) institutional choices ing governmental and electoral systems, (3) party systems, and (4) the is for relationship between political and economic changes responsible a considerable gap in the democratization literature. We know very lit actors tle about the activities of nonelite and how these activities shape the processes of democratization. Some students of democratic transi tions have begun, however, studying the importance of the "resurrection of civil society" and its political role both during the decomposition of authoritarian rule and in its aftermath.15 It is often noted that the great

11 New Arend Lijphart and H. Waisman, eds., Institutional Design in Democracies (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996), 2. 12 Transitions Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 370; Geoffrey Pridham, ed., Securing Democracy: Politi cal Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe (London: Routledge, 1990); Juan J. Linz, Marks and "Change and Continuity in the Nature of Contemporary Democracies," in Gary Larry Diamond, eds., Reexamining Democracy (Newbury Park, Calif: Sage, 1992); Herbert Kitschelt, "The and no. Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe," Politics Society 20, 1 (1992). 13 Univer See, for example, , Democracy and theMarket (Cambridge: Cambridge to a sity Press, 1991); Grzegorz Ekiert, "Prospects and Dilemmas of the Transition Market Economy on Bresser in East Central Europe," in Research Democracy and Society 1 (1993); Luiz Carlos Pereira, Jose Maria Maravall, and Adam Przeworski, Economic Reforms inNew Democracies (Cambridge: Cam University Press, 1993). bridge14 See Claus Offe, "Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Tran no. 4 Great sition in East Central Europe," Social Research 58, (1991); Piotr Sztompka, Dilemmas of the on no. Transition: A Tentative Catalogue, Program Central and Eastern Europe Working Paper Series, Thomas 19 (Cambridge: Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 1992); Leslie Armijo, Biersteker, and Abraham Lowenthal, "The Problems of Simultaneous Transitions? Journal ofDemoc racy 5, no. 4 (1994). 15 most recent in For the examples of this growing interest in the role of civil society democratiza see tion, Sidney Tarrow, "Mass Mobilization and Regime Change: Pacts, Reform, and Popular Power and in (1918-1922) and (1975-1978)," in Richard G?nther, Nikiforos Diamandouros, in Per Hans-Jurgen Puhle, eds., The Politics ofDemocratic Consolidation: Southern Europe Comparative Victor The Return Civil spective (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Perez-Dias, of of Moderation: Con Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); Nancy Bermeo, "Myths frontation and Conflict during Democratic Transitions," Comparative Politics 29 (April 1997);

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 552 WORLD POLITICS

est to states come challenge the policies of the newly democratized may from various of civil in organizations society (for example, labor unions, terest on groups, and popular movements). Tilly in his work collective over action in and Britain convincingly demonstrates that the two centuries were last organizations of civil society the typical of protest.16 Yet the development of such organizations and their polit not ical role have been systematically documented and analyzed. The study of the role of citizens in democratic transitions has often to an on been reduced examination of political attitudes, conducted wave representative samples of the population. The third of democrati zation allows, that is, for the administration of unconstrained public a opinion polls?often for the first time in the history of given society. to Understandably, many scholars have seized the opportunity study public attitudes and their changes during the transition process.17 But our to while such studies expand knowledge of public reactions regime us change, they tell little about the actual political behavior of nonelite actors. we trace As Tarrow emphasizes, "Unless the forms of activity how people use, these reflect their demands, and their interaction with we cannot or opponents and elites, understand either the magnitude in the dynamics of change politics and society."18 was on event Our research project based the assumption that analy in on ac sis and, particular, the systematic collection of data collective can new on tion from shed light the political behavior of actors nonelite during democratic consolidation. Following the pio event neering work of Charles Tilly and his associates, analysis became an in accepted and often indispensable research method the study of movements. collective action, protest, and social Despite its limitations, use event acknowledged by those who it, the analysis is uniquely capa

Philippe Schmitter, "Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy" (Manuscript, Stanford Uni and New versity, 1996); Stephen Fish, Democracy from Scratch: Opposition Regime in the Russian Revo lution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Philip D. Oxhorn, Organizing Civil Society: The in Popular Sectors and the Struggle for Democracy (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). 16 See, for example, Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly, The Rebellious Century, 1830 1930 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975); Charles Tilly, The Contentious French (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986). This regularity is confirmed by all systematic studies of protest in contemporary societies. 17 an See, for example, impressive series of studies produced by the Center for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, and coordinated by Richard Rose; Peter McDonough, Samuel H. Barnes, and A. Lopez Pina, "The Growth of Democratic Legitimacy in Spain," American Political Sci ence no. Review 80, 3 (1986); Krzysztof Zagorski, "Hope Factor, Inequality, and Legitimacy of Sys temic Transformations: The Case of Poland," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 27, no. 4 (1994). 18 Sidney Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965-1975 (Oxford: Claren don Press, 1989), 7-8.

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 553

ble of sets on providing extensive and systematic of data protest activi ties and their different components and dimensions.19

II. Incidence and Magnitude of Collective Protest in Post-1989 East Central Europe

In our we to construct a research project sought detailed database of all forms and incidents of collective in protest the former East Germany, a Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, for the years 1989-94. We adopted broad definition of protest event to cover all types of noninstitutional and unconventional and we political actions, used identical coding pro tocols in the four teams two countries.20 Our research scanned daily and four weeklies in each for newspapers country the entire period under and recorded all available study information concerning reported protest actions. The number of protest events recorded in each country is presented inTable 1. The table reveals striking differences in the number of protest events in the various countries. Poland and the a former GDR had high number of protest events during the analyzed with period relatively small differences between years. Hungary and a Slovakia had much lower incidence of protests. This situation calls for close the all examination, given fact that countries have been undergo a turbulent transformation and ing political implemented comprehen sive economic a adjustment programs involving substantial level of cost. disruption and social In Slovakia the low number of protest activ ities and as the predominance of nondisruptive methods, such protest is One a letters, especially surprising. might expect country breaking from a and an away long-standing independent state to a level of experience high popular mobilization. 19 For the of event see review methodological issues and various applications of the protest analysis, as a of Roberto Franzosi, "The Press Source Socio-historical Data: Issues in theMethodology of Data Co?ection from Newspapers," Historical Methods 20 (1987); Charles Tilly, Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); Dieter Rucht and Thomas Event Ohlemacher, "Protest Data: Collection, Uses and Perspectives," inMario Diani and Ron Eyer man, eds., Studying Collective Action (London: Sage, 1992); Susan Olzak, "Analysis of Events in the of Study Collective Action," Annual Review of Sociology 15 (1989); Dieter Rucht, Ruud Koopmans, and Friedhelm Protest Event Neidhardt, eds., Analysis: Methodological Perspectives and Empirical Results (: Sigma Press, 1998). 20 define event as at to We the protest collective action by least three people who set out articulate spe as cific demands. Our database includes also extreme, politically motivated acts such self-immolation, or acts terror out to a ac strikes, of carried by individuals. In order qualify as protest event, such cannot be or a or tion the routine legally prescribed behavior of social political organization. Strikes, or are to our rallies, demonstrations considered be protest events for the purpose of analysis because of see their radical and disruptive nature. For various definitions of events used in event analysis, Olzak to none (fn. 19), 124-27. From 1989 1994 of the four countries experienced the sort of governmental censorship that would systematically distort information on protest activities.

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WORLD POLITICS

Table 1 Protest Events

_(1989-93)_ 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

314Poland 306 292 314 250 1,476 ? Slovakia 50 82 116 295 47 Hungary 122 126 191 112 699 148 East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1,254

The numbers presented inTable 1 are not weighted by the size of our set the population. Also, given definition of protest event, the of events our street protest recorded by coders included both small, brief of several duration. in gatherings and strike campaigns months' Hence, to in a unit time we order grasp the magnitude of protest given of had to construct a synthetic index of magnitude. Inspired by Tilly's idea of we to gauging simultaneously several dimensions of protest, attempted construct an our such index, by multiplying three variables of data pro tocol: duration, number of participants, and scope.21 Unfortunately to the variable with the fre "number of participants" proved be highest to quency of missing values.22 Two attempts estimate missing values, on different thus relying different assumptions, produced very results; the validity of our composite index of magnitude proved to be dubious. a index based on the "duration" We settled for simpler solely variable, we an create the for which have almost perfect record.23 To this index, event was as the number of duration of each protest expressed twenty it was For a strike four-hour periods composed of. example, seven-day was a seven we summarized the assigned value of protest days. , new events a values of this variable for all protest in given calendar year. us an for each That gave approximation of the protest magnitude year we means in all four countries. Additionally, calculated of protest mag number nitude for each country for the entire period under study. This was then divided by the number of adults (individuals aged fifteen to in to arrive at the index for each sixty-four) order weighted of magnitude are in 2 country. The results of these calculations reported Table and

21 to 162-64. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization Revolution (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 22 are our More than 50 percent of the values missing in Polish, Slovak, and Hungarian databases for several calendar years. 23 a construct or can be the number of in The validity of synthetic category improved by increasing measures on it is based and measures as correlate with each dependent which finding such strongly see Calif: 18-21. other; Robert Philip Weber, Content Analysis (Newbury Park, Sage, 1990), on one measure its is weak. But we Since our index of magnitude is based only (duration), validity traded validity for higher accuracy.

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 555

Table 2 Measures of Protest Activities

_(1989-93)_ Poland Slovakia Hungary GDR Population (15-64) inmillions 25 7 4 11 Protest events 1,476 295 699 1,254 Protest days 14,881 2,206 2,574 5,349 Protest/year 295 74 140 251 Protest days/year 2,976 441 515 1,070 Protest days/million population (15-64) 119.4 110.3 73.6 97.3 Strikes 432 6124 107 Demonstrations 544 87 244 607 Ratio: demonstrations/strikes 1.26 3.63 4.05.7 Strikes/year/million population (15-64) 3.5 1.5 1.74 1.95 Demonstrations/ year/million population (15-64) 4.35 5.45 6.97 11.04

illustrated in Figure 1. As the figure clearly demonstrates, each country had its own specific dynamic of protest during the period studied.24 In Poland the magnitude of protest decreased in 1990 but then increased every year thereafter.This increasing magnitude of protest in Poland is the most our unexpected finding of study. We assumed that the regime transition, the transfer of political power, and the introduction of dra matic economic a reforms would produce higher level of popular mobi at lization and contentious politics the beginning of the analyzed In the was in period. Hungary magnitude of protest highest 1989, de two at clined in the following years, and increased again the end of the analyzed period. In Slovakia protest intensified until 1992 and declined afterward. In the former East Germany the magnitude of protest peaked in 1992 and declined in 1993. a The order of weighted indexes of magnitude produces somewhat turns out to surprising ranking of the four countries. Poland have been most contentious state con the during the early phase of democratic not solidation. Given Poland's traditions of contentious politics, this is a is.The latter did surprise; but Slovakia's second-place ranking country as as were not have much protest other states and protest actions mostly but on the nondisruptive (protest letters, statements), per capita basis its to contentious. The is population proved be quite biggest surprise in since accounts are more Hungary coming last, by all

24 on Another index of magnitude, based partially the "numbers of participants" variable (whose were missing values estimated), produced almost identical approximations of protest dynamics be tween 1989 and 1993.

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 556 WORLD POLITICS

Hungary Slovakia 4500 4500 4000 4000 3500 3500 3000 3000 2500 2500 2000 2000 - . 1500 1500?. 1000 1000?. 500 500? . 0 0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Poland East Germany

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1990 1991 1992 1993

Figure 1 Protest Days, By Country dissatisfied with the post-1989 changes than are Poles or East Ger one more mans; would expect them to be contentious. In the fourth section we offer several explanations for both the differential patterns of each in our protest dynamic and country's standing protest ranking.

III. Selected Characteristics of Protest Politics

The countries analyzed in this paper differ not only in terms of inci in terms dence and magnitude of protest but also of other protest char acteristics (even though the repertoire of contention closely mirrored standard strategies used by protesting groups in contemporary politics). were non Protest actions in Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia decidedly such as street violent. In Poland disruptive strategies demonstrations were most and strikes common; in Hungary and Slovakia nearly 70 were percent of the strategies used by protesting groups nondisruptive.

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 557

Table 3 General Protest Strategies (number and percentage of total)

Protest Strategies Poland Hungary Slovakia GDR Violent 115 21 9 286 5.0% 1.7% 2.0% 13.2% Disruptive 1,145 382 142 1,054 49.5% 30.8% 31.2% 48.7% Nondisruptive 1,051 838 304 826 45.5% 67.5% 66.8% 38.1% N= all 2,183 strategies_2,311 1,241_455

In contrast to these three countries, the number of violent protests in the former GDR was significantly higher, and disruptive strategies dominated the repertoire of collective action. See Table 3. Our database did not in strate record any important shifts protest gies used by challenging groups. Dominant types of strategies remained consistent we throughout the entire period under study. Nor did regis ter were any significant in protest activities that later dif one or fused from category of protestors to another among various and in groups organizations. Thus the repertoires of contention each over we country remained relatively stable time. This may indicate that are not dealing with the type of protest cycle that Tarrow says is char acterized among other things by expanding repertoires of contention.25 the of and Although general strategies protest (violent, disruptive, not to nonviolent) did vary significantly from country country, there were nevertheless to in specific forms of protest that tended dominate each country. In all four countries disruptive strategies including street were demonstrations, marches, and blockades frequently used by were most common in protesting groups and the former East Ger were many. In Poland strikes and strike alerts used regularly, with the at in number of strikes there being least three times higher than any of the other countries. If we combine strikes and strike alerts, this form of constitutes 36.4 the protest percent?that is, plurality?of protest was strategies in the Polish repertoire. The number of strikes signifi cantly smaller in the other three countries. In Hungary and Slovakia letters statements were the most used to protest and frequent strategy

25 Sidney Tarrow, "Cycles of Collective Action: Between Moments of Madness and the Repertoire in Action N.C.: of Contention," Mark Traugott, ed., Repertoires and Cycles of Collective (Durham, Duke University Press, 1995).

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 558 WORLD POLITICS

Table 4 Specific Protest Strategies (number and percentage of total)a

Protest Strategies Poland Slovakia Hungary GDR Strike 432 64 25 128 18.7% 5.1% 5.5% 5.9% Occupation of public 1198 76 4 5.1% .6% .8% 3.5% Demonstration/march/blockade 544 296 79294 23.5% 23.7% 20.7% 36.6% Strike alert/threat to undertake 408 141 64 48 protest action 17.7% 11.3% 10.5% 3.0% Violent action 21 115 9 286 5.0% 1.7% 2.0% 13.2% Open letters/statements 316406 182180 13.7% 32.5% 40.0% 8.3% Other 377 312 93 639 16.3% 25.0% 20.4% 29.5% N=number of strategies 2,311 1,248 455 2,165 a Due to rounding, not all percentages total 100.

most express grievances and convey demands. The frequently used our are strategies recorded in database presented in Table 4. were Not all social groups and categories active in contentious poli seem to tics; those who have been hardest hit by the market reforms were scene. often absent from the protest Relatively few protest actions were as homeless organized by marginalized social groups such the and or was the unemployed by minorities. Rather, it mainstream social and were most professional groups that often involved in protest actions. In sector Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia public employees (excluding workers in the most state-owned enterprises) constituted protest-prone were more in social category. In Poland workers and farmers prominent were protest activities than they in the other three countries. Youth were more in in former frequently involved protest actions the GDR two and Poland than in the other countries. This finding, however, has to we were to be carefully interpreted; unable determine the category of we are participants in the majority of demonstrations, because missing a amount on substantial of data the social and professional profile of protesters. This amount is lower for Poland, because it is easier to iden were in tify participants in strikes, which the dominant strategy that on country. The data sociovocational categories of protest participants are in presented Table 5. The main cleavage of postcommunist politics

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 559

Table 5 sociovocational category of participants and percentage of _(number total)_ CategoryPoland Slovakia Hungary GDR Workers 516 71 74 170 34.4% 14.3% 22.0% 18.4% Farmers/peasants 28141 1524 9.4% 5.6% 4.4% 2.6% Service sector 17121 1831 8.1% 3.4% 5.3% 3.4% Public state sector 161350 111 194 23.3% 32.5% 32.8% 21.0% Youth 154 63 20 255 10.3% 12.7% 5.9% 27.7% Other 218 156 100 248 14.5% 31.5% 29.6% 26.9% = N total recorded categories 1,500 496 922338

our state own revealed by research is between the and its employees. This contention is supported by the data regarding protest organizers and targets. on are more our Our data protest organizers reliable. We falsified is to initial hypothesis that the incidence of spontaneous protests going events in be high during the early stages of regime transition. Protest were all countries usually organized by well-established organizations. s was a set of or Each country protest politics dominated by different actions ganizations, but the range of organizations sponsoring protest was to activities in other similar those sponsoring protest European interests countries. They included labor unions, political parties, movements. contrast groups, and social The only with West European was role of social movements in experiences the much smaller sponsor role ing protest activities and the relatively larger of traditional organi as or zations such political parties, trade unions, professional were most associations.26 In Poland trade unions the active organizers were of protest activities. In Hungary and Slovakia political parties the most of In the former East so frequent organizers protests. Germany movements were cial dominant, followed by political parties. The data on are in 6. protest organizers presented Table

26 New social movements organized 36.1 percent or protests in France, 73.2 percent in Germany, 65.4 percent in the , and 61.0 percent in . See JanWillem Duyvendak and Kriesi et New Social Movements in Hanspeter Kriesi, "National Cleavage Structures," in Hanspeter al., of Minnesota 20. (Minneapolis: University Press, 1995),

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 560 WORLD POLITICS

Table 6 organizations sponsoring or leading protest actions (number and percentage of total)a

Category Poland Slovakia Hungary GDR None 167 125 50 174 11.6% 12.2% 11.7% 10.5% Political parties 26389 33599 6.2% 25.8% 23.2% 20.1% Labor unions 709 160 70 275 49.1% 15.7% 16.4% 16.5% Peasant/farmer organizations 80 6 3 9 5.5% .6% .7% .5% Interest groups 11791 5656 6.3% 11.5% 13.2% 3.4% Social/political movements 228137 55369 15.8% 13.4% 16.2% 33.2% Other 80 213 79 262 5.5% 20.9% 18.5% 15.7% = N number of organizations 1,444 1,021 426 1,664 a to not Due rounding, all percentages total 100.

we Initially, expected that the demands of the protesting groups would be concerned primarily with political issues. We accepted the notion common in the on East literature European transitions that in the wake of the of state collapse socialism, people have difficulty artic their economic cannot ulating interests, mostly because they easily lo cate themselves structure within the amorphous class inherited from state socialism.27 Yet our data show that the demands pressed by were concrete protesting groups predominantly expressions of everyday economic concerns. And when were tenor was they political, their a turns out mainly reformist, with antisystemic proclamations rarity. It that regime transitions and the establishment of democracy after decades of authoritarian rule did not create a environ highly politicized ment characterized the even by predominance of symbolic politics. Thus, in one the language of contention finds evidence of broad support for de mocracy and the market economy. re The particular of demands in each of the four countries

27 David "The Politics of in See Ost, Interest Post-Communist Society," Theory and Society 22 (Au Valerie gust 1993); Bunce, "Should Transitologists Be Grounded?" Slavic Review 54 (Spring 1995), 121.

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 561

Table 7 Types of Demands (number and percentage of total)3

CategoryPoland Slovakia Hungary GDR Economic 1,100 301 119 458 57.2% 29.5% 26.0% 26.9% Political 586 444 176 524 30.5% 43.5% 38.5% 30.8% Other 236 276 162 722 12.3% 27.0% 35.5% 42.4% = N total 1,704 demands_1,922 1,021_457 a Due to rounding, not all percentages total 100.

concerns fleets the of the dominant organizers. In Poland, where trade most active in economic unions played the role organizing protest, in and Slovakia demands predominated, while Hungary political par more ties organized protests than other groups and political demands were most common. In the former East Germany political demands economic The on of only slightly outnumbered demands. data types are in Table 7. the variation in demands presented Despite protest ac strategies, demands, and protest-sponsoring organizations, protest were the state were ad tions uniformly directed against and demands was an dressed to state authorities. There evident similarity in the are to targets of protest actions in all countries. (Targets understood be the authorities to which the demands were addressed and who were ex to to The followed pected respond them.) governments, by state were most and other national-level agencies, by far the frequent in do we see targets of protest actions. Only the former East Germany a to local and au significant number of demands addressed regional structure state. thorities due to the federal of the A surprisingly low were to number of demands addressed the management of enterprises or owners. seems that of the issue at and domestic foreign It regardless look to the state and central authorities for so stake, protesting groups lutions. Table 8 presents the distribution of targets of protest in all countries.

In sum, even the cursory look at various features of protest actions in this section reveals considerable contrasts unex presented alongside the four countries. Such vari pected similarities among postcommunist as well as in ations in magnitude, scope, and forms of protest actions,

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 562 WORLD POLITICS

Table 8 Targets of Protest Actions (number and percentage of total)a

Ultimate Targets Poland Slovakia Hungary GDR President 92 25 204 4.8% 2.5% 4.2% .2% 247 155 125 272 12.8% 15.8% 26.4% 14.5% Government/ 989 449 239 654 ministries, central agencies 51.3% 45.6% 50.4% 34.8% Local government 177 111 11 493 9.2% 11.3% 2.3% 26.3% Management 322 38 3923 16.7% 3.9% 4.9% 2.1% Domestic and foreign owners 1525 69 0 .8% 2.5% 0% 3.7% Other 87 181 56 347 4.5% 18.4% 11.8% 18.5% = N number of targets 1,929 984 474 1,878 a to not Due rounding, all percentages total 100.

to in types of protest organizers and groups prone participate collective a to account action, raise number of interesting questions. In order for we examine such differences, will briefly several possible explanatory leads suggested by the following set of theories, which are derived from the arsenal of theories of social protest.

1. Relative deprivation links variation in protest activities to the changing and assessments of situation. perceptions peopled (particularly economic) 2. Instrumental institutionalism is founded on the concept of political oppor which on constraints tunity structure, focuses institutional and opportunities available to protesters, including those that are linked to the transformation in the processes taking place . 3. Historical-cultural institutionalism interactions between insti emphasizes tutionalization and cultural and turns our attention toward learning historically "traditions" of contentious action. shaped 4. Resource mobilization resources available to theory emphasizes challenging groups.

An examination of the fit between these theories and our data should us to are allow determine which factors primarily responsible for peo new on ple's protest behavior. This, in turn, should shed light the poli tics of postcommunist consolidation.

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 563 IV. Explaining the Patterns of Protest Politics in East Central Europe

Conventional wisdom among observers of East Central European new state transformations initially held that building democratic insti ease. tutions could be accomplished with relative Also, the introduction was seen as of competitive elections and the formation of party systems a straightforward, uncomplicated task. The re-creation of civil society, was to a a however, predicted be lengthy and difficult process, spanning or tran two.28 After the experiences of the early years of the are to sition, however, these claims ready be revised. During the first five years of consolidation, the rebirth and/or expansion of civil society occurred with in unexpected speed and intensity every country. The was not so as state, however, much reformed weakened. The develop ment of was often and political parties slow, tedious, unpredictable. Moreover, these processes differed from country to country. East Ger a new many experienced the swift establishment of political and legal framework as a result of the unification, and the new state administra more tion has been stronger and efficient than in any other postcom munist regime. Similarly, the party system crystallized and stabilized much faster, with German parties extending their organiza tional reach to the five new L?nder.29 In the other three countries the to states and party systems have been in flux; relative Poland and Slo most a vakia, however, Hungary has been the successful in developing relatively stable and clearly articulated party system.30 in The four countries included the project represent distinct types of postcommunist transformations and have experienced contrasting po litical and economic developments since 1989. The major differences them stem among from the type and sequence of economic policies and from the nature and extent of the state transformation. These differ ences are ex summarized in Table 9. The first dimension represents the tent structures of changes experienced by the bureaucratic of the 28 See Ralf Dahrendorf, on the Revolution in (New York: , 1990). 29 Reflection Europe In the words of Gissendanner andWielgohs: east norm The transformation of Germany differed from the post-socialist because of three a particular circumstances: (1) east Germany received well-balanced and proven institutional east was system with unification; (2) the German transformation dominated by external (west actors were German) who empowered by their experience with this institutional system; (3) eastern benefited from massive financial transfers which compensated for the social costs of economic reforms and which financed infrastructure investment.

See Scott Gissendanner and JanWielgohs, "Einheit und Differenz: The Transformation of East in German Politics 6 1997), 181. Germany30 Comparative Perspective," (August See Kitschelt (fn. 12); and idem, "Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-communist Democra no. cies: Theoretical Propositions," Party Politics 1, 4 (1995), 447-72.

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 564 WORLD POLITICS

Table 9 Economic Transformations and Level of State Continuity

Level of Continuity

Economic Transformations Continuity Discontinuity

RapidPoland former GDR GradualHungary Slovakia

state. a state was postcommunist In all countries classical party rapidly was state dismantled. The Communist Party eliminated, basic institu were were tions redesigned, amended, and parliaments were and governments given supreme authority and reestablished under democratic control. of president, albeit with different pre was rogatives, created in all four countries. a In Poland and Hungary there has been notable continuity in the state. institutional organization and personnel of the This continuity is a result of two factors: first, in the final years of communist rule these a countries introduced number of institutional reforms compatible with a and both the requirements of market economy democracy; second, state on countries exited socialism the basis of intraelite negotiations a state in and pacts, which assured significant degree of continuity of stitutions. In contrast to these two countries, the former GDR and Slo a more in the state vakia experienced profound change organization. In 1990 theGerman Democratic was unified with West new were Germany and the five L?nder incorporated into the federal same time institu framework of theWest German Republic. At the all state were tions of the East German dismantled and replaced by insti were tutions and laws transferred from the West. State employees became an state on screened and purged. Slovakia independent 1,1993, following failed efforts to renegotiate the Czechoslovak feder under the fed ation. Many institutions of the Slovak Republic existing state eral arrangement of the Czechoslovak simply became Slovak national institutions; however, new segments of the state administra to from the tion had be organized almost scratch. Moreover, rapid and state in countries con contentious departure from socialism these to old tributed institutional discontinuity with the regime. states economic The newly emerged democratic inherited different economic East and legacies and pursued contrasting policies. Germany and radical economic transformations. The Poland implemented rapid in to Balcerowicz Plan, introduced in January 1990 response the dra matic deterioration of the Polish economy and the threat of hyperinfla

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 565

measures. tion, imposed harsh macroeconomic stabilization This ad arrest justment program instantly reshaped Poland's economic system, an ing escalating economic crisis and imposing new, market-friendly rules. It opened the way for comprehensive structural economic reforms combined with privatization and welfare reforms.31 In the former East was to Germany the economic transformation designed economic economic institutions, fiscal and monetary policies, and conditions be tween two parts of the country. The change affected the entire institu structure were tional of the economy. Stabilization policies combined a with structural reforms, comprehensive privatization, and thorough transformation of welfare institutions. The dismantling of all legacies was more of state socialism faster and radical than in any other post communist country. It included the massive and swift privatization of assets state. all economic previously controlled by the communist This was an immense institutional change cushioned by unprecedented transfer of , bureaucratic know-how, and assistance from the to contrast to West the East. In Poland and East Germany, Hungary a more and Slovakia chose gradual pace for economic transformations, in terms of both macroeconomic and privatization policies. not no This analysis does reveal any clear patterns: there is correla nature extent state tion between the of power transfer, the of continuity, on one and the type of economic reforms, the hand, and the magnitude on one of protest, the other. However, if puts aside Slovakia and East two a amount Germany, countries where significant of protest resulted on from the dramatic redefinition of the polity, and focuses Poland and one seems to Hungary, may conclude that the factor which explain the collective is the and eco varied magnitude of protest type sequencing of nomic introduced the reforms reforms by postcommunist regime: rapid more resulted in protests than did gradual reforms. This is what the critics of the shock therapy programs have often argued. Such argu ments build, although usually implicitly, on the logic of some "depriva cannot a tion theory." We will demonstrate that such views withstand more systematic scrutiny. as The reasoning goes follows: (1) rapid economic reforms produce costs more higher social and dissatisfaction among the populace than more slower, gradual reforms. In turn, (2) the heightened level of dis satisfaction with the reforms and the elites that designed and imple

31 to MIT Ben See Jeffrey Sachs, Poland's Jump theMarket Economy (Cambridge: Press, 1993); Slay, The Polish Economy: Crisis, Reform, and Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Kazimierz Poznanski, Poland's Protracted Transition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TABLE 10 Selected Rankings of the Central European States'

12 3 4 5 6 7 8 910 11 12 Protest Cumulative Sachs- Kornai: Rutkowski: CSPP: Inequality Ferge: CSPP: Mason: Ferge: Mean Magnitude Decline Warner Real 1993: Gini P90/P10 P90/P10 Index Evaluation of Wages, Approval of Approval of of Ranking GDP, 1993 as % Political Economic Political Reform Coefficient of Change 8-11 1989-93 Index ofl989 Regime; System; Alienation in 1993 minus 1993 minus 91 91 Poland 1 3 1,2,3 112 13 3 2 3 3 (-12.2) (72.0) (30) (2.92) (6.57) (+17) (+19) 39%worse; (2.75) (44%better) Slovakia 2 1 1,2,3 2 3342 1,5 422 (-27.4) (73.3) (19.5) (2.4) (2.89) (+2) (-10) (Czecho- (51%worse (2.375) Slovakia) 32% better) ? ? ? ? ? GDR 3 3 4 4 (3.05) (19%worse; (3.5) 57% better) 4 Hungary 2 1,2,3 3 2 1 2 1 1,5 1 1 1 (-16.8) (85) (23) (3.6) (3.31) (-6) (-10) (51%worse; (1.125) 26% better)

SOURCES: Data for columns 2 and 5: World From Plan toMarket York: Oxford Development Report: (New University Press, 1996), 69, 173; and Michael Wyzan, "In creased Economic Transition 4 24-27. Column 3 is on Inequality, Poverty Accompany Transition," (October 1996), based Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, Achieving Rapid Growth in the Transition Economies Central Discussion Harvard Institute for International of Europe, Development Papers, Development, no. 544 (Cambridge: Harvard 1996). Column 4: Bill for Goulash-." The for University, July Janos Kornai, "Paying figure 1990 refers only to the category of work ers and employees and excludes workers in agricultural from 1991 on the data include these Column 6: cooperatives; categories. Jan Rutkowski, Becoming Less Equal Economic Transition in Pew on Central Eastern Reform Wage Effects of Poland, Papers European and Regionalism (Princeton: Center of International Studies, ton University, 1996). Column 7: (fn. 37). Columns 8, 9, see fn. 35; column see fn. column see fn. 37 of Ferge 10, 36; 11, (heads households evaluate the regime For columns 8 and 9 the numbers were obtained the of the change). by subtracting percentage respondents who approved of the regime in 1993-94 (New De mocracies Barometer III) from the of those who the in fall 1991 It should be also percentage approved regime (NDB-I). emphasized that Poles disapproved of the com munist regime and the socialist economic system much more than either the or the a decisively Hungarians. The rankings in columns 1,5,6, 7, and 10 are from the to the lowest values of the in columns and 12 are from the to highest indexes; 8,9,11, they lowest the highest.

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions contentious politics 567 mented them results in the increased protest magnitude. Finally, (3) in tense protest about the downfall of the reforming, neoliberal elites. As we will demonstrate in the next section, the second link in this rea at the not soning?which is heart of deprivation theory?is confirmed our do not to in by empirical data. We intend engage refuting depriva are to assess tion theory; its weaknesses well established.32 Our goal is its in the context of on plausibility studies democratic consolidation. The evidence pertaining to the first link of the reasoning sketched on one one can above is ambiguous; depending which variables uses, ei or the economic ther refute confirm the proposition that the deeper de cline (measured by "objective" indicators), the more dissatisfied the and 1993 the de population. Between 1989 Slovakia suffered steepest in GDP: saw cline -27.4 percent. Slovaks also their drop by on counts was 27 percent (Table 10, column 4). Hungary's decline both were more with much less dramatic. Yet Hungarians dissatisfied the were post-1989 changes than Slovaks (Table 10, columns 8-12), per haps because postcommunist Hungarian society became less egalitar ian than Slovak society (Table 10, columns 5-7). in It should be noted here that variations protest magnitude and are not to variations in protest repertoire systematically related the the as so-called objective economic indicators, is clearly evidenced by the to comparison of data reported in Table 10, columns 1-3. According the analysis by Sachs and Warner, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia have scores on moreover almost identical the composite Reform Index; their scores are the Yet the the highest for entire postcommunist world. pat terns were of protest activities in these three countries widely divergent. GDP Moreover, the country where the accumulative decline of during was the that was first in the 1989-93 period the smallest and country overcoming the "transitory recession"?that is, Poland?experienced the highest intensifying magnitude of protest. Protest as an Expression of Deprivation or Grievances

us now turn to Let the examination of the relationship between the the and other features of level of people's discontent and magnitude is if protest. As already noted, this relationship frequently, only implic itly, theorized with the help of some simplified version of the relative to summarize the classical variant deprivation theory. It is impossible of this theory, as proposed, for example, by Ted Gurr in his WhyMen a Rebel, it is nonparsimonious and intricate theoretical system, founded

32 in of See J. Craig Jenkins and Kurt Schock, "Global Structures and Political Processes the Study Domestic Political Conflict," Annual Review of Sociology 18 (1992).

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 568 WORLD POLITICS

on main the concept of "relative deprivation."33 However, the thrust of in its most the argument?at least popular and influential version?is simple and easily falsifiable. In general, various relative deprivation ap assume proaches that an increase in extent or of or and the intensity grievances deprivation develop ment of occur to the of social movement ideology prior emergence phenomena. Each of these perspectives holds that discontent produced by some combination an of structural conditions is a necessary if not sufficient condition to account of the rise of social movement and any specific [or protest?G.E. J.K.] phe nomenon.34

In this rendition of the theory, proposed byMcCarthy and Zald, the concept of "deprivation" replaces "relative deprivation," which consid nature erably changes the of the argument. We will follow McCarthy we no and Zald, mostly because know of comparative study of relative we deprivation in the four East Central European states, whereas found various several comparative studies dealing with aspects (indicators) of or political and economic "deprivation" "intensity of grievances." We will a simple hypothesis: the higher the level of discontent with the post-1989 economic and political changes or the higher the of or sense intensity grievances the of deprivation, the higher the mag test we rank countries ac nitude of protest. To this hypothesis, the four to cording the results of several comparative studies that measured of various aspects of people's discontent and then compare the results on of these rankings with the ranking based the magnitude protest. The studies we have chosen for this exercise were conducted in at we are least three countries interested in during the 1989-93 period. same set The surveys asked the of questions in all countries, thereby producing comparable results. These studies include 1. The New Democracies Barometer IV: A 10-Nation Surveyzs 2. Mason's on attitudes toward the market and the state in study postcom munist Europe36 3. on with the reforms37 Ferge's study the satisfaction post-1989 33 Relative deprivation is "a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value are to are capabilities. Value expectations the goods and conditions of life which people believe they are are of rightfully entitled. Values capabilities goods and conditions they think they capable attaining or means to maintaining, given the social available them." Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 13. 34 John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Par an tial Theory," in Zald and McCarthy, eds., Social Movements in Organizational Society (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1987), 17. See also Lichbach (fn. 4), 4. 35 Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, Change and Stability in theNew Democracies Barometer: A Trend (Glasgow: Center for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1996). 36 Analysis David Mason, "Attitudes towards the Market and the State in Postcommunist Europe" (Paper at presented the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, , 1992), 14. mean a The index of alienation, reported by Mason, is the response (for sample of respondents from

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 569

our not con Table 10 presents the results of analyses. The hypothesis is firmed: Hungarians are clearly most dissatisfied with the post-1989 is changes, and yet the magnitude of protest there lower than else contrast where. The with Poland is particularly striking: Hungarians aremore dissatisfied than Poles, yet Poland has a higher magnitude of protest. Another anomaly from the point of view of the regularity our a gested by hypothesis emerges from comparison of Hungary with in is former East Germany. The situation the latter country dramati cally different from that in other postcommunist states, given the fi nancial transfers between theWestern and Eastern areas of the country to and the efforts of the German government equalize their standards a the of the five of living. As result of this massive assistance, economy a new German L?nder grew between 7 and 10 percent year between 1992 and 1994, and as Kopstein points out, "Purely in terms of living standards, East Germans are the clear winners of communism s col And East Germans in activities with a lapse."38 yet engage protest more who are far less sat higher frequency and zeal than Hungarians, isfied with the results of the collapse of communism. A comparison of the pattern of changes during the studied period mixed results. As 2 the Slovak and Hun produces Figure illustrates, to the the garian data conform the predictions of deprivation theory: in countries the fluctuations of protest magnitude these follow pattern s economic and of the fluctuations in people approval of political sys tems. As However, the theory fails dismally for Poland. peoples ap economic increases so proval of the political and systems systematically, does the magnitude of protest! Given the data reported inTable 10, it is possible to falsify the de in different For the privation hypothesis many ways. example, given data in column 4 (Kornai s estimates of the realwages decline), this hy a pothesis would predict that Poland and Slovakia should have similar o? one that would be than in whose magnitude strikes, higher Hungary, earners a in their incomes. wage experienced much smaller decline Also, Polish and Slovak protestors should issue economic demands (for

on was in sam each country) four five-point scaled questions. Hungary's index the highest the whole was ninth tenth ple: 3.61. Poland's the fourth highest (3.27); East Germany's, (2.94); 's, was summer (2.91). The study conducted in the spring and of 1991. 37 and for the Zsusa Ferge, "The Evaluation of Freedom, Security, Regime Change" (Paper prepared on Euroconference , organized by ICCR-, , November 8-11,1995). Ferge in 1994. presents results of the Social Consequences of the Transformation Survey administered 38 Transition 26 Jeffrey Kopstein, "Weak Foundations under East German Reconstruction," (Janu ary 1996), 64. Cumulative transfer of funds into the former East Germany reached $494,039,000 by and Slovakia 1995, while Hungary received $10,634,000 of foreign investment, Poland $6,459,000, $483,000.

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 570 WORLD POLITICS

Hungary Slovakia

80T 70

Itit 1991 1992 1993 ton 1991 1992 1993 politicalO economic politicalOeconomic

Poland East Germany

80 80 y 70. . 70-. 60?. 60.. 50 50 40 40 30 30 20 20 10 10 0 0 1991 1992 1993 1991 1992 1993

IuJl politicalDeconomic politicalDeconomic

FIGURE 2 Approval of Political and Economic Regime, by Country

SOURCE: Rose and Haerpfer (fn. 35), 25, 47.

counter higher wages) with greater frequency than their Hungarian is not parts do. The first expectation confirmed by the data presented in Tables 2 and 4: Poles more strikes than either organized^?r Hungar or in ians Slovaks. The second expectation fails light of data presented in Poles on economic issues Table 7: concentrated their demands far more more often than did the Hungarians?as expected?but also often than the Slovaks. course on one One could of argue that Poles, the hand, and Hungar on ians and Slovaks, the other, expressed their economic deprivation through different idioms and organizational strategies. But this is pre cisely the kind of argument that the deprivation approach is ill to in various measures of equipped field. Changes protest?magnitude,

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 571

mobilizational and so on?do not the strategies, efficacy, success, reflect in sense fluctuations peoples of deprivation (dissatisfaction). In light of our empirical evidence, the reasoning behind a popular thesis attributing the downfall of the neoliberal elites to protests by in on two counts. an creasingly dissatisfied populations is faulty First, for a average year of the period under study, Poland had higher magnitude of protest than Slovakia and Hungary, although its economy performed two better than the economies of the other countries and although Poles were more than were Slovaks and with the results far satisfied Hungarians as of the postcommunist economic reforms.39 Second, the performance of the Polish economy improved and Poles' satisfaction with the reforms so increased, did the magnitude of protest. Clearly, the deprivation theory not in does explain fluctuating magnitudes and patterns of protest the four must turn an countries. One therefore elsewhere for explanation. We hypothesize that the many differences in the magnitude and character are istics of protest actions in the four countries under study related both to the post-1989 processes of the reconstitution and institutionalization of and to of state democratic politics the institutional legacies socialism. Instrumental Institutionalism

structure state a If the institutional of the is critical variable in explain ing the incidence and magnitude of collective protest,40 transitory poli structure ties where all stable characteristics of the political opportunity are an arena constant in flux should have been of collective struggles. are not state Since they and since the magnitude of protest varies from to structure to care state, the concept of political opportunity has be in to it to cases fully reconsidered order apply of regime change. a to structure We argue that there is need distinguish between the of for stable and unstructured political opportunity (characteristic polities) feature of A in some opportunity (a transitory, "open" polities).41 change

39 a GDP rate Only in 1990 and 1989 did the Polish economy have lower growth than the Hungar was ian and Slovak economies, and it only minimally lower. Moreover, its economy began growing al two ready in 1992, while the other economies kept declining (negative growth rates) throughout the entire period under study. See Jan Svejnar, "Economic Transformation in Central and East Europe: at The Task Still Ahead" (Paper presented the meeting of the Per Jacobsson Foundation, Washington, to Oxford D.C, October 8,1995); and World Development Report: From Plan Market (New York; Uni versity Press, 1996), 173. 40 See, for example, Hanspeter Kriesi, "The Political Opportunity Structure of New Social Move ments: on Its Impact Their Mobilization," in J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans, eds., The Politics on Movements of of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives States and Social (Minneapolis: University Minnesota Press, 1995). 41 most are access to The changes in opportunity structure four: the opening of participa tion, shifts in ruling alignments, the availability of influential allies, and cleavages within and among 86. elites"; Sidney Tarrow, Power inMovement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994),

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 572 WORLD POLITICS

structure dimensions of the opportunity in stable countries will be im as an to act actors mediately treated incentive by all those collective who to their state. have been prepared press claims against the When the or are "initiator" groups organizations successful in pressing their de mands, others may follow, expanding the range of issues and institu arenas one tional of contentious politics.42 Thus could argue that in stable but gradually changing polities, alterations of the political op structures incentives for contentious action. portunity provide in countries and By contrast, undergoing rapid political economic structure transition, the four elements of the political opportunity spec are are ified by Tarrow in flux. Opportunities for collective action wide open and constraints are uncertain. Such a situation may either have or demobilizing effects simply encourage mobilization without limits. were in For organized collective actors, issues that important the past no new or not may longer be relevant and issue-areas may be unclear in more sta yet established. Moreover, agendas for contentious politics are on it ble polities built the assumption that is relatively clear who is friend and who is foe and who bears responsibility for specific policies us serves as a and problems. The distinction between them and guide post for the struggle. But in transitory polities this underlying cultural on an matrix of allies and foes takes ambiguous character: former op over state it is no positional activists take the apparatus and longer clear who is us and who is them. Such which we will call unstructured offer conditions, opportunity, are or protesters considerable freedom of action: there few established are no ganizational boundaries that should be abolished; there prede fined agendas whose expansion may be demanded; ruling alignments are available and change often; there potentially many allies; cleavages are state man within and among elites fluid and poorly identified. The to it re ages maintain order within the public domain, but offers little seems to sistance to nonviolent protest actions and it ignore protesters. state not how to with Additionally, functionaries do know deal protest as are ei ers, formal and informal procedures through which protesters or in are ther marginalized included the policy-making processes It is to features poorly developed.43 therefore difficult analyze changing as to of protest responses changing opportunities: opportunities, de as not fined general characteristics of the political system, simply do change much.

42 on See debates cycles of protest and especially Doug McAdam, '"Initiator and '-off Move ments: Diffusion Processes in Protest Cycles," inMark Traugott (fn. 25). 43 an see For analysis of the significance of such mechanisms, Kriesi (fn. 40), 173-79.

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions contentious politics 573

In an East Central Europe, where such unchanging and poorly structured opportunity emerged after 1989, the magnitude of protest is and lower than in more democracies. We that by large established suspect a structures this is result of the demobilizing effect of the opportunity struc "excessive" openness44 and the weakness of institutional support tures for protest activities (including the availability of organizational, in material, and symbolic resources), comparison with West European democracies. same At the time, the protest magnitude in all countries fluctuated although the openness of the system (its political opportunity structure) not. did And protest strategies and demands also varied from country to seem to country, although their political systems have been equally nor the open. Since neither deprivation theory macrolevel opportunity structure we to theory explains this variation, need specify other mech in anisms. We observe that despite the lack of openings the political structure opportunity (in Tarrow's sense), collective action is patterned new by several old and institutional constraints. The situation is fluid cannot and unstructured; that is, protesters' demands and strategies be as to or in carefully crafted responses partial openings here there the preestablished institutional network of the polity (as inWestern a not democracies). Such network simply does exist. But singular insti tutional do exist: can be found the insti points of reference they among tutionalized legacies of past conflicts and among the emerging new institutions of the political domain. Both these legacies and the concrete emerging institutions offer incentives for collective actions. can This new, unstructured political opportunity be examined with use For we the of the available institutional modes of analysis. example, realized that the relatively high magnitude of protest in Poland can be a of re explained through comparative study distinct, though mutually two inforcing, institutional mechanisms suggested by the institutional theories listed in Section III, cultural-historical and instrumental, as as resource we more well by the mobilization theory. Since have vari we cannot a test ables (and their values) than cases, conduct rigorous us to that would allow pinpoint the best explanation. We can, however, our to ex determine whether the patterns existing in data conform the pectations suggested by major institutional arguments. are two con In of protest studies there major arguments cerning the link between protest magnitude and characteristics and other institutional features of the political system: 44 a most This constitutes corroboration of Eisinger's thesis, which posits that protest is likely "in a systems characterized by mix of open and closed factors." See Tarrow (fn. 41), 86.

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 574 WORLD POLITICS

can be construed as a calculated to the lack ?Protesting rational, response of access to other channels the lack ofcor policy-making through (for example, poratist inclusion). The more restricted the access to other channels, the higher the probability of protest. can best be seen as a useful in com ?Protesting strategy interorganizational there are unions union petition. When several competing (or ), for tend to in in order to demonstrate their creden example, they engage protest tials as champions of the working people and to outbid each other inwooing potential supporters.45 Thus, the more fragmented and politically divided the labormovement, the higher the probability of protest.

we Following the logic of the first explanation, expect fewer strikes and labor-related demonstrations in states that institutionalized the inter state action between labor unions, employers, and the relevant agencies. As Schmitter, Nollert, and Wallace and Jenkins noted, the institution alization of neocorporatist bargaining diminishes the likelihood of with a protest.46 Countries strong social (Hungary) a sector East and centralized labor (Hungary, former Germany, Slova are to kia) expected have fewer industrial conflicts and strikes than a more unions not would pluralistic country with several that do have access to "direct" the political process (Poland).47 are our These expected regularities indeed confirmed by data. One most of the prominent features of Hungarian, Slovak, and East Ger man was transitory politics the early institution of top-level corporatist arrangements. Hungary established the Council for Interest Reconcil iation already in 1988, Slovakia's Council of Economic and Social was Agreement established in 1990, and in Germany neocorporatist to new in the institutions expanded the L?nder 1990, during early as a stages of unification.48 And expected, Poland, where tripartite mechanism was only established in February 1994, had by far the high

45 on as This explanation draws the logic of historical institutionalism, defined by Hall and Taylor. Historical institutionalists, while searching for explanations of group conflict, began paying "greater to structure to attention the way in which institutions political interactions" and "began argue that to outcomes struc other [than state] social and political institutions could also contribute political by or over scarce turing conflict among individuals groups resources." Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C R. "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," Political Studies 44, no. 3 (1996). Taylor,46 Philippe C. Schmitter, "Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability in Contemporary Interests Western Western Europe and North America," in Suzanne Berger, ed., Organizing in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 287; Michael Nollert, "Neocorporatism and Political Protest in theWestern Democracies: A Cross-National Analysis," in Jenkins and Klandermans (fn. 40). Michael Wallace and J. Craig Jenkins, "The New Class, Postindustrialism, and Neocorporatism: Three Images of Social Protest inWestern Democracies," in Jenkins and Klandermans (fn. 40). 47 Wallace and Jenkins (fn. 46), 134. 48 See Lajos Hethy, "Tripartism in Eastern Europe," in Richard Hyman and Anthony Ferner, eds., Richard New Frontiers inEuropean Industrial Relations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994); John Thirkell, N.Y.: Scase, and Sarah Vickerstaff, Labor Relations and Political Change inEastern Europe (Ithaca, Cor nell University Press, 1995); Helmut , "Representation of Functional Interests inWest and

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 575

est incidence and magnitude of strikes, organized predominantly by trade unions. com The second institutional explanation, emphasizing interunion our sector petition, is also confirmed by data. The Polish trade union was much more diversified, politically divided, and decentralized than its Hungarian, Slovak, and German counterparts. As expected, Poland set had the higher magnitude of strikes, which often outcompeting as one with rival trade unions of their goals. Thus, instrumental insti tutionalism a of gives greater understanding protest magnitude (plural ist with have more polities competing organizations will protest) and to in it is specifies the major groups likely engage protest activities; par in variation in ticularly helpful explaining the protest organizers.

Historical-Cultural Institutional Explanation

to Strong evidence points traditions and previous experiences of protest as a is good indicator of future protest actions. Collective action predi on as as resources cated here learning experience well the availability of our inherited from previous struggles. The comparison of countries clearly shows that the high magnitude of protest in Poland can be to was linked the existing tradition of protest. Poland the only country in crises the former Soviet bloc that experienced five major political in that culminated the "self-limiting revolution" of 1980-81. During the period millions of Poles participated in collective protests is and learned the skills of contentious politics. This argument addition ally supported by the fact that Solidarity had earlier on developed the as core most common forms of protest (strikes) its strategy of contention. a street Hungary, by contrast, has well-established tradition of demonstrations and struggles (1956 in particular), which played a sig nificant role during the power transfer of 1988-90.49 The unions and other protest organizers in former East Germany should be influenced over by the dominant action repertoire brought by West German movement most unions and other social organizations, which organize of the protest actions there. As Koopmans and Kriesi report, demon strative strategy dominated the German protest repertoire.50 Moreover,

East European Democracies: Theoretical Coordinates and Empirical Assessment" (Berlin: Max Planck-Gesellschaft, Humboldt Universit?t, 1995). 49 See Tamas Hofer, The Demonstration ofMarch 15,1989, in : A Struggle for Public Memory, on no. Program Central and Eastern Europe Working Paper Series, 16 (Cambridge: Center for pean Studies, Harvard University, 1991). 50 Ruud Koopmans and Hanspeter Kriesi, "Institutional Structures and Prevailing Strategies," in Kriesi et al. (fn. 26), 50.

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 576 WORLD POLITICS

the 1989 oppositional movement in East Germany relied heavily on street as demonstrations its main protest strategy. Finally, in Slovakia, are protest traditions almost nonexistent, though it should be noted that as Czechoslovak dissidents employed letter writing their main form of protest. Given these historical traditions in the four countries, Poland should have the highest magnitude of protest. The Polish ratio of street to lower demonstrations strikes should be considerably than in Hungary or or Germany; Slovakia should experience few strikes demonstrations. to are The empirical data used verify these hypotheses summarized are in Table 2. The hypotheses strongly confirmed. Poland has the highest magnitude of protest. Hungarian protesters participated in street more went on demonstrations four times often than they strike; more went German protesters demonstrated six times often than they on strike. Poland had the highest magnitude of strikes, and Poles were to as to This is an re almost equally prone strike demonstrate. expected sult given Poland's relatively long tradition of political conflicts dis as was most guised industrial conflicts. In Slovakia letter writing the frequently used protest strategy (see Table 4). In summary, historical-cultural institutionalism contributes to the is most use explanation of the overall magnitude of protest; it however ful in explaining the variation in protest repertoires among countries. Resource Mobilization Theory

Both institutional arguments (instrumental and historical-cultural) are of specify factors that the key determinants variation among the four countries in (1) protest organizers and participants and (2) reper to toires of contention (for example, various ratios of strikes demon not a strations). They do provide complete explanation of the observed variation in protest magnitude, however. For example, the magnitude of protest was unexpectedly high in the five L?nder of the former East one to Germany, but would be hard pressed argue that East Germans a inherited long-standing and elaborate domestic tradition of protest, street East shared particularly demonstrations?1 Additionally, Germany a with Hungary similar institutional framework; both had tripartite a sector. commissions and relatively unified trade-union Yet Hungary a had much lower magnitude of protest. in we turn to re To explain this variation protest magnitude, the source mobilization approach, which suggests that number, size, and

51 However, a very recent tradition of demonstrations developed in some locations. See, for example, Susanne Lohmann, "Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in , East Germany, 1989-91," World Politics 47 (October 1994).

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 577

events on of material and or duration of protest depend the availability resources to the countries ganizational challenging groups. Accordingly, access to resources where protest organizers have easier will have higher resources levels of contention. Such maybe developed internally within a or from resource given society (Polish Solidarity) may be transferred case rich to resource-poor countries and regions (as in the of GDR). are it rare While international links and diffusion relatively common, is to and re find wholesale transfers of organizational structures, activists, sources?as can occurred after the reunification of Germany. One argue therefore that the high magnitude of collective protest in East Germany reflects the external transfer of resources for collective action. Poland, a In Hun another resource-rich country, also had high level of protest. a the gary, with relatively low supply of protest-facilitating resources, was lowest. constitutes an magnitude of protest the Slovakia anomaly: an minimal limited resources, early-established tripartite council, and a of intraunion competition coexisted with relatively high magnitude to that the Slovak protest per capita. It needs be emphasized, however, was the least and bothersome for the au repertoire of protest disruptive was as letters and thorities; it dominated by such strategies open public statements. of these can be ex The nondisruptive character protests at least the lack of and plained partly by material, organizational, sym bolic resources.

Protest and Democratic Consolidation

most the architects of Perhaps the important challenge facing post comes communist transformations from the tensions generated by the necessity of implementing political (democratization) and economic it often been (marketization) reforms simultaneously. In particular, has that the -term social costs of neoliberal reforms will argued high will utilize the freedoms and the public, which newly acquired to block economic transfor newly established democratic procedures elites. the of collec mations and depose the reforming Moreover, logic his that tive action advanced by Mancur Olson and followers suggests the losers should be much easier to mobilize than the beneficiaries of are the reforms; the latter scattered throughout the society while the sectors as former are concentrated in such easily mobilizable large In as various of Latin enterprises of heavy industry.52 fact, analyses cases reaction to neoliberal American amply demonstrate, the public

52 and How Sectors the See, for example, D. Michael Shafer, Winners Losers: Shape Developmental States N.Y.: Cornell 39-42. Prospects of (Ithaca, University Press, 1994),

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 578 WORLD POLITICS

in is to take the form of reforms, particularly the "losing" sectors, likely mass turn protest, which may violent and casualties.53 to to In turn, protest is often deemed be detrimental democratic Przeworski consolidation.54 For example, Bresser Pereira, Maravall, and conclude that for the successful consolidation of democracy "all groups must channel their demands through the democratic institutions and on in Central Eu abjure other tactics."55 The database protest the four us to test ropean countries allows this reasoning. First, we found out that in contrast to Latin America, the four Cen we no massive and violent tral European countries studied experienced the economic re rebellions against the economic reforms, despite deep standards of liv cession, rapidly growing , and declining the the ing during the initial stages of reform process. Also, despite for collective political turbulence and expanding opportunities action, in was lower than in the es the magnitude of protest Central Europe tablished democracies of Western Europe. Throughout the period not activ under study these countries did experience escalating protest a to their established ity that would constitute significant threat newly institutions. While the of industries or sec political employees "losing" as ar tors were often at the forefront of protest activities, the Olsonian leaders gument would predict, their organizations and rarely challenged new or the of eco the legitimacy of the sociopolitical order necessity we that in East Central nomic restructuring.56 Thus, conclude Europe one protest became of the routine modes of interaction between the state a at and the society, regular feature of many democratic regimes the end of the twentieth century. our not be a threat to Hence second major conclusion: protest need a it facilitate budding democracy. In fact, under certain conditions may democratic consolidation. This happens when

53 See John Walton, "Debt, Protest and the State in Latin America," in Susan , ed., Power Social Movements of California and Popular Protest in Latin American (Berkeley: University Press, Protest: World 1991); J.Walton and Charles Ragin, "Global and National Sources of Political Third to and Bela Responses the Debt Crisis," American Sociological Review 55 ( 1990); Greskovits, and The Political Economy of Protest and Patience: East European Latin American Transformations Com pared(Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998). 54 in See, for example, J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Democratic Consolidation Post-Transitional Settings: and Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions," in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Ind.: of Notre Dame and Ron Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame, University Press, 1982), 85; Pag A of nucco, "Social Movement Dynamics during Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Synthesis Political Process and Political Interactionist Theories," Research ofDemocracy and Society, jai Press, 3 (1996), 21. 55 Bresser Pereira, Maravall, and Przeworski (fn. 13), 4. 56 see Take All: The Pol For another critique of the Olsonian argument, Joel S. Hellman, "Winners itics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions," World Politics 50 (January 1998).

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 579

?protest is employed as ameans of bringing forward demands for reforms and not challenging the legitimacy of the regime ?its methods are as a sector of the recognized legitimate by large populace ?it is channeled through well-known strategies and coordinated by estab lished organizations.57 are Our research shows that these the predominant characteristics of protest in the postcommunist countries of Central Europe. case The Polish illustrates this best. What transpired there during was a the early postcommunist years different kind of institutionaliza or one tion consolidation of democracy from the Bresser Pereira, Mar avall, and Przeworski had in mind. Increasingly institutionalized a as protest became "democratic institution," which functioned part and were parcel of the democratizing polity.58 Although Poles often dissat isfied with the existing conventional channels of interest articulation as to as (such parties and the Parliament) and therefore turned protest a concerns way of signaling their and influencing policy decisions, they were nonetheless increasingly satisfied with democracy itself. are Our research confirms that the way peoples grievances translated into context within political action is determined by the institutional actors most which collective (and, importantly, their leaders) find as themselves. Under certain circumstances, activists will choose protest in a a the preferred strategy. For example, country like Poland with de in veloped tradition of striking, the lack of inclusionary neocorporatist a stitutions, divided and competitive labor sector, and the ready of the of availability protest-facilitating resources, magnitude protest should be (and was) high. This means that in some postcommunist a a countries, democratic consolidation may take specific direction: de a mocracy with heightened level of contentious politics may emerge. more we in our In general terms, the patterns detect data suggest no or that there is correlation between the magnitude type of protest and the quality of democratic consolidation. Among the four Central we of European countries studied, Poland had the highest magnitude were protest, Hungary the lowest. Slovakia and former East Germany in the middle. At the same time, for most observers, the progress of former democratic consolidation in Hungary, Poland, and the East

57 one Eckstein and Gurr observe that "the risk of chronic low-level conflict is of the prices demo crats should expect to pay for freedom from regimentation by the state?or by authorities in other or social units, whether industrial establishments, trade unions, schools, universities, families." Harry A Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr, Patterns ofAuthority: Structural Basis for Political Inquiry (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), 452. 58 This argument is developed in Jan Kubik, "Institutionalization of Protest during Democratic Movement Consolidation in Central Europe," in David S. and Sidney Tarrow, eds., The Social a and Society: Contentious Politics for New Century (Lanham, Md.: Rowman Littlefield, 1998).

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 580 WORLD POLITICS

no an Germany passed the point of return; authoritarian reversal in states these is unlikely. By contrast, Slovakia, the country with the least a disruptive repertoire of protest and low level of strike activity, is be to lieved be the least consolidated democracy of the four.59

VI. Summary of Conclusions

we a to In the first section of this paper established need study the bot of we tom-up mechanisms democratic consolidation and proposed, fur ther, that this largely neglected area can be fruitfully studied through event of third sections analysis protest behavior. The second and pre our sented selected results from four-country study of the postcommu nist protest politics. The fourth section offered explanations of the observed phenomena derived from the four established research tradi us to a tions. This exercise leads number of general conclusions. no First, modes of breakdown of communist regimes had noticeable on impact the magnitude of protest. Thus, countries that experienced as "pacted transitions" (Poland and Hungary) have much variation be tween as themselves do countries where "popular upsurge" forced the removal of the communist elites from power (Slovakia and the former GDR). Second, variations in the magnitude, repertoires, and strategies of cannot to a protest politics be explained by reference configuration of economic factors. Balcerowicz is to "objective" (or political) right argue must that "the scale of protests have been determined mainly by factors other than the type of economic strategy."60 can these variations Third, neither be explained by invoking people's assessments as perceptions and of their situation, the "deprivation" ap states more not proach suggests: the with discontent do necessarily more have protest activities than the states with less discontent. There of in fore, all analyses the post-1989 reforms East Central Europe that successes explain political changes (for example, electoral of the post communist to parties) by simply relating them people's growing dis content erroneous. it may be For example, has been suggested that Poland, which instituted the most radical economic reforms (shock of This therapy), would also experience the highest magnitude protest. our causes expectation is indeed confirmed by analyses. Yet the of such

59 were on According to the Freedom House Survey, for 1992-93 Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia same terms the level in of "political rights" and "civil liberties": all scored 2 in both categories. In was a 1993-94 there serious disparity: while both Poland and Hungary scored 1 in "political rights" and 2 in "civil liberties," Slovakia scored 3 and 4, See Freedom House (fn. 1). 60 respectively. Leszek Balcerowicz, Wolnosc I rozwoj (Krakow: Znak, 1995), 372.

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 581

high magnitude and the specificfeatures of protest in Poland cannot be explained by linking them to a general sense of deprivation felt by the as is we populace, usually, though often implicitly, practiced. As the in even demonstrated, magnitude of protest Poland kept increasing as popular approval of the postcommunist economic and political order cases a also grew. Our comparative analysis of four confirmed thesis ac commonly accepted by the students of protest politics, that protest are our tivities driven by much subtler mechanisms, summarized in next conclusion. no Fourth, single theory of collective action explains all of the ob we served variation in protest characteristics discovered. The best fit be tween is theory and empirical results achieved when propositions are derived from several theories combined. Our argument is that col new an lective protest in democracies is best explained from institu resources a tional perspective that combines the concept of in broad sense?that is, including traditions, symbols, and discourses alongside material and organizational elements?with the concept o? institutional which are opportunities, produced by emerging organizational patterns of the new resource of such a polity. The segment syncretic explanation to account in helps for the variance protest magnitude. The institu to tional component also contributes the explanation of protest magni in tude, but it is particularly useful explaining other features of protest. to account More specifically, historical-cultural institutionalism helps for the differences in protest repertoires, while instrumental institu in tionalism is particularly suitable for explaining variation magnitudes and organizers. not a to And finally, protest does necessarily constitute threat demo cratic consolidation; indeed, under certain conditions it facilitates this a process. There exists therefore type of democratic consolidation with a contentious action. The is heightened level of collective best example con Poland during the first five years of its consolidation. Slovakia, by a more in trast, had less protest?and protest of type much benign than state the other three countries?and yet five years after the collapse of was socialism its democracy weaker than in Poland.

This content downloaded from 140.247.110.190 on Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:17:48 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions