From: Helms, Douglas

From: Helms, Douglas - Washington, DC [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Tuesday, September 01, 2009 7:04 PM To: Fúgate, Susan Subject: RE: Doug Heims' PubÜcation

Susan,

i grant permission for ttie National Agricultural Library to provide access on ther website to the digitai copy for my dissertation, "Just Lookin' For A Home."

Thank you for doing this.

Douglas Helms Resource Economics and Social Sciences Division National Historian USDA/NRCS/Room 6149-S P.O. Box 2890 Washington. DC 20013-2890

[email protected] (W) 202-720-3766 Fax 202-720-6473 THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

JUST LOOKIN' FOR A HOME: THE COTTON BOLL WEEVIL AND THE SOUTH

by DOUGLAS HELMS

A Dissertation s\ibmitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

U/. R >-?^j^-^ Professor Directing Dissertation J^^,

ftl3

Smithsonian Institution '^

(A INTRODUCTION

The annual yearning to return home for Christinas created an unusual sight in 1973. Trains once again ran with loaded passenger compartments and bus depots were awash with people who normally disdained such mundane transportation. Restrictions.on gasoline sales during the oil embargo forced automobile-dependent Am.ericans to overtax the nation's common carriers. Textile manufacturers, too, had come to rely heavily on petroleum for fibers and nervously sought additional supplies of what television advertisements deem "nature's fiber." The oil embargo; increased export sales, especially to the People's Republic of China; and the fact that much of the nation's cotton crop had already been contracted for on futures sent prices soaring. Farmers selling cotton during December 19 7 3 received nearly double the price paid the preceding year. Most southerners hardly noticed the phenomenon. In times past when cotton was "Religion, Politics, Law, Economics, and Art," jubilation during the holiday season would have

Quoted in Rupert B. Vance, Human Factors in Cotton Culture: A Study in the Social Geography of the American South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1929), p. vii.

11 iii been widespread. The price of cotton concerned not only farmers, but practically all southerners, regardless of profession. The southern economy revolved around it. Weather was the chief topic of concern because weather determined the region's economic health. Then the boll weevil came. The pest could reduce the South's income as effectively as a poor crop, or conversely, an abundant crop and resulting low prices. Boll weevil depressions struck communities all across the South and sent waves throughout the region's economic and social structure. Banks failed, land prices dropped, farmers turned to other crops, landlords and merchants refused to furnish tenants for the coming season, and some tenants took to the road in pursuit of a livelihood. The intensity of the impact and the longevity of the changes varied depending on the geographic conditions and the ingenuity (or lack of it) in any particular community. The knowledge and assistance of archivists and librarians are essential to a successful research endeavor. Those who were generous with their time and skill were the staff of the Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Miriam Jones of the Alabama Department of Archives and History, Carolyn Wallace of the Southern Historical Collection at the University of North Carolina, Cornelius "Mac" McKissick of the National Agricultural Library, and IV my colleagues at the National Archives, Helen Ulibarri and Harold Pinkett. The U.S. Department of Agriculture provided svunmer employment at their Cotton Insects Research Station at Tallulah, Louisiana, where I researched that station's records. The station's director, Tomie Cleveland, was most helpful in opening up the world of field investigations in boll weevil research to me. The Smithsonian Institution granted a year-long predoctoral fellowship. The institution's curator of agricultural implements, John T. Schlebecker, and Wayne D. Rasmussen of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's history office directed the research diiring the period. They also read and offered helpful suggestions on the dissertation manuscript and served on the defense committee. I would like to thank professors John H. Moore, James P. Jones, Paul Strait, and Burke G. Vanderhill for reading the manuscript and serving on the committee. Special thanks goes to William W. Rogers for his patience and the nxomerous improvements in the final copy of the dissertation. Lee Lockwood proofread the manuscript. Faye Helms Griffin and Sue Urbanski typed the drafts and eliminated mistakes that might have otherwise appeared in the final copy. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION ii Chapter I. A LITTLE BLACK BUG IN SOUTH TEXAS .... 1 II. AWAKENING TO THE PROBLEM 32 III. NO EASY SOLUTIONS 63 IV. GOVERNMENT RESEARCH 106 V. KNAPP OR HUNTER: WHO SHOULD SPEAK TO THE FARMER? 163 VI. TROUBLE IN TEXAS 186 VII. TO THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER AND BEYOND . . . 221 VIII. MIGRATION AND DIVERSIFICATION 277 IX. A NEW PEST FOR THE OLD COTTON BELT . . . 300 X. FIGHTING BOLL WEEVILS 322 XI. "MR. BILLY BOLL WEEVIL" 363 XII. A BLESSING IN DISGUISE? 389

APPENDIXES 404

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY 406 CHAPTER I

A LITTLE BLACK BUG IN SOUTH TEXAS

The United States Department of Agriculture readied itself in 19 76 for yet another program predicated on the eventual eradication of the cotton boll weevil. The Economic Research Service, commenting on the "Environmental Statement," questioned the assertion that the boll weevil is "the most economically important agricultural pest in the United States." During most of the twentieth century the assertion would have gone uncontested. There was, in fact, much evidence to support it. The National Cotton Council, an admittedly biased observer, credits the boll weevil with the loss of $12 billion to the nation's economy since 189 2, with current losses ranging from $125 million to $224 million yearly. It has been and remains, in the words of a prominent entomologist, "one of the most complex, challenging problems confronting the U.S. cotton industry and the U.S. scientific com- 3 munity." The current utilization of more insecticides

Environmental Statement for Trial Boll Weevil Eradication Program, Animal Plant Health Inspection Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., June 1976), pp. 2, 277. ^Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 228. 2 on boll weevil control than on any other insect or insect complex, in a public atmosphere increasingly aware of the ultimate dangers of reliance on such chemicals, increases 4 the complexity of devising controls. The cotton boll weevil, limited in its destructiveness to a single plant and restricted to only a part of the nation, came quickly to the nation's attention. The dependence of the southern population on the crop affected elevated the cotton boll weevil to a social and economic prominence that it might not otherwise have attained. Most Americans, unaware of the boll weevil's present importance in cotton production or of its continued existence, attest to its historical importance by recognizing the name as an important insect pest of the past. The Department of Agriculture received the first indication of the boll weevil's potential importance to the country's cotton industry in 1894. A distressed citizen of Corpus Christi, Texas, C. H. DeRyee, wrote the Commissioner of Agriculture describing the difficulties of the farmers confronted with a new pest. DeRyee's appraisal of how the weevil damaged cotton was exceedingly perceptive for its time:

4 Ibid., p. 2. The "Top" crop of cotton in this section has been very much damaged and in some cases almost entirely destroyed by a peculiar weevil or bug which by some means destroys the squares and small bolls. Our farmers can combat the cotton worm but are at loss to know what to do to overcome this pest. They claim the ordinary methods of poisoning for cotton worm have no effect on these bugs. They probably deposit their eggs in the square and their larvae enter the boll as soon as sufficiently formed and are there out of reach of the poison.6 DeRyee sent specimens of the weevil to the department, and the Entomologist of the United States, Leland 0. Howard, attempted to determine if the species had been previously identified, or whether it was new to the entomological community. The new insect proved a mystery to the entomologists in the Department of Agriculture. Equally perplexed was Henry Ulke, a prominent entomologist of Washington interested in beetles. Ulke forwarded the specimens to one of his numerous entomological correspondents. Dr. George Horn of Philadelphia, America's foremost beetle authority. Horn then forwarded the specimen to

The cotton produced by the squares at the top of the plant; also the last squares produced. Since weevils multiply during the svmmier, they are more destructive of the last squares. g C. H. DeRyee to the Commissioner of Agriculture, October 3, 1894, "Correspondence, 1894-1897," Records of the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, Record Group 7, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Hereafter citations to records in the National Archives will include the abbreviation RG for the record group, followed by the record group number, and NA. Dr. August Salle in Paris, who provided the determination. Salle's reply provided also the generic name, Anthonomous grandis (Boheman). The Swedish entomologist, Carl H. Boheman, had first described and classified the insect in 1843 when he received specimens from Vera Cruz, Mexico. The German entomologist Eduard Suffrian had made a similar discovery in Cuba in 1871. There were then three specimens of the insect available to the scientific com- o munity, all in European museums. Further investigation by the Department of Agri- culture in October 1894 revealed that the Department had also received previous notice of the insect from one of its employees. Dr. Edward Palmer, an English botanist traveling for the department in 1880, sent the authorities in Washington specimens of an insect that had stopped the production of cotton in the Monclova district of northern Mexico. His explanation that the "insect deposits its egg and the boll falls" capsulized the method of crop 9 destruction. After determining the history of the be weevil's discovery, the department replied to their

7 Leland 0. Howard, A History of Applied Entomology (Somewhat Anecdotal), Smithsonian Miscellaneous Publica- tions, No. 74 (Washington, D.C., 1930), pp. 124-25. g Idem, "Startling Entomological Events of the Last Decade of the Nineteenth Century," Scientific Monthly 31 (July 1930): 12. 9 Walter D. Hunter and Warren E. Hinds, Mexican Cotton-Boll Weevil; A Summary of the Results of the 5 correspondent in Corpus Christi with their assessment of the potential danger of the situation. DeRyee was informed that the new insect was "a most undesirable addition to the enemies of the cotton plant, and there is imminent danger that it may spread into other portions of the cotton belt." The department had already made provisions to send an agent to Texas. Palmer's and DeRyee's observations on the boll weevil's means of impeding cotton production provided the basic reason why the insect has been so résistent to control measures. The cotton plant provides a shelter during the critical development of the larvae. The terra "cotton boll weevil" is something of a misnomer. While the weevil will attack bolls, it prefers the more tender squares. The square, along with the bolls, is referred to as the "fruit." It consists of a bud surrounded by three or more bracts which eventually open to expose the bloom. The bloom then wilts, drops off, leaving the boll underneath. The boll matures and opens, exposing the locks of fiber, ready for picking. By depositing eggs in the squares or bud and utilizing it as a source of food for the developing larvae, the boll weevil prevents

Investigation of this Insect up to December 31, 1911, Bureau of Entomology Bulletin No. 114, U.S. Department of Agriculture, S. Doc. 305, 62nd Congress, 2nd Sess., 1912, p. 15. Acting Secretary to C. H. DeRyee, October 26, 1894, Correspondence 1894-1897, RG 7, NA. 6 the development of the boll, and ultimately the cotton fiber. The adult weevil is about one-fourth inch long, with half that length being the snout. After emergence from winter hibernation, the weevil punctures the square with its snout and deposits eggs in the square. Infesta- tion counts are obtained by counting a specified number of squares and recording the number of punctured squares. If one hundred squares are examined and twenty-five are punctured, then the infestation count is 25 percent. Egg punctures must be differentiated from feeding punctures, the damage from these being minimal when compared to the former. Counts made of weevils yield statistics that can prove deceptive: live adult weevils are more difficult to find and, when found, live ones "play possum." The square puncture counting method reveals the desired information—damage to the cotton crop. Under normal conditions the egg hatches in about three days. Within seven to twelve days the larvae passes into the pupa stage, which corresponds to the cocoon stage of a moth. The pupa stage lasts three to five days, and the adult weevil emerges from the square in another five days. The total time lapse from egg stage to adult stage ranges from sixteen to twenty-five days depending upon climatic conditions. Females generally refrain from depositing eggs in a square already 7 punctured. Yet in the late summer when the number of squares is reduced, several eggs may be deposited in the same square. The average weevil lives about fifty days during the summer. Obviously the population increase is great since it takes only from sixteen to twenty-five days to produce an adult. The number of generations for the whole stammer varies, but the estimated progeny for a pair of weevils has been estimated at 12,755,100. Entrance into hibernation in the fall and emergence from hibernation in the spring vary considerably depending upon climatic conditions. 12 Weather conditions were the primary factor in limiting or enhancing the destructiveness of the boll weevil. Less important were the use of poisons and the utilization of various methods of cultivation. A mild, wet summer insured a large population by the beginning of fall. A mild, dry winter was most favorable to a high spring survival rate. The cotton farmer prayed for weather conditions exactly opposite. Understandably, the humid East was more conducive to the high infestation and the rapid extension of the boll weevil-infested

J. W. Folsom, Insect Enemies of the Cotton Plant, Farmers' Bulletin No. 1688 (Washington, D.C., July 1932) , p. 1. 12 Walter D. Hunter and Bertram R. Coad, The Boll- Weevil Problem, Farmers' Bulletin No. 1329 (Washington, D.C., June 1923), pp. 6-10. 8 territory than was the Texas prairie. Also, the forests of the Southeast, which adjoined most cotton fields, provided better winter protection. The USDA continues to make counts of weevil emergence from winter hibernation. The practice was begun early in the twentieth century. Yet too much importance can be attached to weevil emergence as an indication of future weevil damage. A small number of weevils can multiply rapidly under ideal summer weather conditions. Conversely, a dry, hot sximmer can alleviate the effects of a high winter survival. Before the Department of Agriculture recommended calcium arsenate as an effective insecticide, they favored the "cultural method" of control, sometimes referred to by farmers as the "government method." The concept sought to alter cotton production methods to take into consideration the weevil's life history. While the department periodically added recommendations to and made deletions from the system, the basic tenets remained the same. The first recommendation was to plant as early as possible and to use early maturing varieties of cotton. During most years the boll weevil population expanded, reaching a peak in late summer. The time of emergence from hibernation and the rate of weevil population increase depended upon the weather, but the farmer could alter slightly the date of harvesting. The hope was to plant early before there was a sufficient number of weevils 9 to infest most of the squares and to have the bolls "set" by the time of heaviest weevil infestation. Recommenda- tions of fertilization plus thorough and frequent cultivation also aimed at rapid maturation of the crop. The proposal to have wide spacing between rows, wide planting, was to allow the svm's rays to-reach the fallen squares and kill the weevil larvae by heat. After being punctured, most squares fell to the ground. Fallen squares were generally taken as a sign of high infestation. Although the plant sheds punctured squares, about 30 percent of the squares are shed from natural causes and the inability of the cotton plant to support all the squares it produces. The recommendation that the department's experts in the Bureau of Entomology came to regard as the most important was destruction of the plants as soon as possible after harvesting. The practice reduced the niimber of weevils entering hibernation, and thereby the number emerging from hibernation in the spring and the possible destruction the following spring. Leland 0. Howard, chief of the Division of Entomology, selected C. H. Tyler Townsend to travel to Eagle Pass, Texas, to investigate the damage wrought by the cotton boll weevil. Townsend had recently returned from a special department assignment in northern Mexico, where he was investigating insects injurious to cultivated 10 crops. 13 Townsend's proximity to Texas (he was based at the New Mexico College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts at Las Cruces) and his predilection for entomological adventures made him the likely choice. Townsend maintained a touch of the itinerant naturalist about him. He was forever beseeching Leland 0. Howard for special commissions from the Department of Agriculture to study the insect life of sparsely settled regions, particularly in Latin America. Howard finally advised him to forego "this rolling around in yellow fever and poisonous snake regions," and to take a permanent position for the comfort of his family. 14 Townsend arrived in Texas in November 1894 with detailed instructions from Howard. His immediate reaction was that burning the plants in the late fall and flooding where possible would kill the hibernating weevils. At Beeville, Texas, the farmers estimated that the insect had destroyed over 50 percent of the crop. The fact that irrigation was not practiced made Townsend's idea of flooding impractical. He then suggested to Howard that the state legislature prohibit cotton cultivation for

13 Leland 0. Howard to C. H. Tyler Townsend, September 24 and October 23, 1894, Correspondence, 1894- 1897, RG 7, NA. Hereafter citations to frequent correspondents such as Leland 0. Howard, C. H. Tyler Town- send, and Walter D. Hunter will include only the surname. 14 Ibid., Howard to Townsend, November 24, 1896. 11 one year. Since the farmers grew only cotton as a cash crop, voluntary abandonment had slight chance of acceptance. Townsend's was merely the first in a long succession of various plans predicated on the idea of abandoning cotton and starving the insect. Townsend found the weevil particularly destructive at San Diego, Texas, where residents estimated a 75-90 percent crop loss. A farmer from San Diego, H. J. Delamar, informed Townsend that the weevil first appeared in his three hundred-acre cotton field twenty miles north of San Diego in 1892. Seventy-five percent of his crop was destroyed. A drought in 1893 retarded both the cotton and the boll weevil, but the weevil became destructive again in 1894. The information was the first that Townsend received of the boll weevil's appearance in Texas before 1894. After a visit to Brownsville, Townsend concluded that the boll weevil had been present there for about ten years, but the Department of Agriculture eventually came to accept 1892 as the date when the pest crossed the Rio Grande River near Brownsville, Texas.

15 Townsend to Howard, November 15, 16, December 3, 1894, Letters Received from C. H. Tyler Townsend, Southern Field Crop Insect Investigations, RG 7, NA. Hereafter citations to series of records in the section on Southern Field Crop Insect Investigations will include the abbreviation SFCII. 16 Ibid., Townsend to Howard, December 6, 13, 1894. 12 Townsend returned to Las Cruces in mid-December and submitted his report. Although he had conducted no experiments, his report contained much useful information from field observations and conversations with the farmers of Texas and northern Mexico. At San Juan Allende, Coahuila, Mexico, farmers pointed out that the weevil usually retarded cotton production by attacking buds before flowering, thus preventing the boll's formation. 17 The weevil's occurrence on both sea-island and upland cotton led Townsend to the conclusion that it was futile to concentrate one's effort on an immune cotton plant. He admittedly based the conclusion on insufficient evidence, but his conclusion would prove correct. Townsend's recommendations of burning the plants after cotton picking and then flooding the fields were based on a belief that the majority of weevils remained in the cotton field for hibernation. Later observations revealed the extent to which weevils hibernated in surrounding woodlands. Townsend recommended the use of Paris green and London purple, two arsenical poisons long used on fruit trees. He realized the difficulty of poisoning the boll weevil because of the protection afforded by the square. Other recommendations included picking and burning infested bolls, the use of lime and

17 Ibid., Townsend to Howard, November 23, 1894. 13 ashes to repel the weevil, and letting cattle forage after harvesting. 18 The main proposal in Townsend's report was the establishment of a fifty-mile wide non-cotton zone along the Rio Grande. The zone would be utilized with quarantine laws against the importation of Mexican seed cotton and cotton in bolls, and laws mandating the destruction of cotton plants which sprang up voluntarily in the spring, Farmers cultivated cotton on the United States side of the Rio Grande only at Del Rio and between Brownsville and Carrizo. The action was to be a state one. The weevil in 1894 was limited to a few counties in Texas' newer and less productive cotton areas. Should the boll weevil spread to the established cotton sections of Texas, any plan for the abandonment would be negated. Leland 0. Howard realized that the boll weevil would in time spread to other parts of the cotton belt if it went unchecked. It would become an important, most likely the prime, cotton insect. He asked Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Charles W. Dabney, Jr. to station Tyler Townsend at Brownsville, Texas, where he could study the insect's life history. If the appointment began in January, Townsend could trace the hibernation

18 C. H. Tyler Townsend, "Report on the Mexican Cotton-Boll Weevil in Texas," Insect Life 7, Division of Entomology, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., March 1895), pp. 304-6. 14 and emergence of the insect. 19 Townsend arrived in Brownsville on February 1, 1895, to begin his investigations. 20 The Department of Agriculture, no doubt at Howard's advice, decided that a one-year prohibition of cotton growing in the infested section offered the best hope for eliminating the pest. Not until the passage of the Insect Pest Act of 1905 would the United States have any laws against the importation of injurious insects. The advice contemplated by the department was, in the political philosophy of the time, definitely a state matter. Charles W. Dabney conferred with the governor and legislature of Texas in early 1895 about the department's recommendations. That there were no known host plants of the boll weevil other than cotton bolstered the department's contention that a one-year moratorium 22 would eliminate the boll weevil. The legislature did not act.

19 Howard to Charles William Dabney, Jr., December 26, 1894, Correspondence, 1894-1897, RG 7, NA. 20 Townsend to Howard, February 2, 1895, Letters Received from C. H. Tyler Townsend, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 21 Vivian Wiser, Protecting American Agriculture; Inspection and Quarantine of Imported Plants and Animals, Agricultural Economic Report No. 266, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., July 1974), p. 19. 22 Samuel Lee Evans, "Texas Agriculture, 1880-1930" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Texas, 1960), p. 61. 15 The year in Brownsville was not a happy one for C. H. Tyler Townsend. After complaining to Howard about the pestiferous insects in his office, he lamented further : All this is nothing, however. When I sit down at my desk with the temperature a little short of 100° and the hximidity at a maximum, my garments fast soaking and the beads of perspiration bedewing everything around me, there come from an organ in the next house twenty feet from my window the mournful strains of "What a friend we have in Jesus," followed by "Safe in the arms of Jesus," and "Jesus lover of my soul," all many times repeated with many and long variations. The proximity of the sound forbids forgetfulness. With a spirit of rivalry the Mexican Protestant Church two doors away on the corner holds services and breathes forth stentorian psalms every day and night in the week for weeks at a time; while if either of these fail a piano across the street drxims out plaintive and disappointed, ribald and bald-headed melodies, so that one leads a variegated existence in this, the elite portion of the city.23 All this, combined with the loss of his library in a fire and the possibility that his gravely ill wife might die, made Townsend anxious to leave Brownsville. To add to his personal woes, the hurricane of late August 1895 destroyed his cotton plants. Leland O. Howard was disappointed, terming Town- send 's summer in Brownsville "unproductive." Howard wanted more information on the life history of the weevil, particularly the number of generations during a sximmer» 25

23 Townsend to Howard, June 15, 1895, Letters Received from C. H. Tyler Townsend, SFCII, RG 7, NA, 24 Ibid., Townsend to Howard, September 23, August 31, 1895. 25 Howard to Townsend, September 17, 1895, 16 Townsend succeeded in securing some parasites of the boll weevil. 26 Howard also sent Eugene A. Schwarz, a German-born and trained entomologist, who was one of division's most respected scientists, to what Schwarz described as "this miserable mesquite and cactus brush" to investigate the boll weevil. 27 The three entomologists, without yet having fully described the life history of the boll weevil, struck upon methods of control which would remain controversial years after the life history was understood and after numerous experiments with each method had been conducted. Townsend proposed an insecticide mixed witíi molasses to 28 be applied continuously before the bolls formed. Application at this time presximably destroyed the emerging weevils and reduced the summer population. Years later when the USDA advocated the use of calcium arsenate, there was a continuous controversy between the Department of Agriculture, which recommended the dust form, and state agencies and individuals who preferred the insecticide mixed with molasses. Both Schwarz and Howard disagreed

Correspondence 189 4-1897, RG 7, NA. 26 Townsend to Howard, July 18, 1895, Letters Received from C. H. Tyler Townsend, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 27 Eugene A. Schwarz to Henry G. Hubbard, May 19, 1895, Office Files of the Chief of the Bureau of Entomology, 1880-1950, RG 7, NA. 28 Townsend to Howard, July 5, 1895, Letters Received from C. H. Tyler Townsend, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 17 with Townsend. Schwarz had seen large-^scale operations in picking up and burning the fallen infested squares at Nuecestown and Sharpsburg and thought it practicable and cheap. Howard, either on his own or reflecting more faith m Schwarz's ideas, had a similar opinion. 29 The department eventually endorsed picking fallen and hanging infested squares, only to reject it as too expensive and time-consuming when compared to the derived benefits. Department officials continued for years to make additional experiments because the method was kept in use by farmers. Townsend wished to spend the latter part of 1895 in the Yucatan to study the boll weevil in its native habitat. Howard rejected the idea because it made "no practical difference to the people of Texas whether the weevil occurs injuriously in Yucatan." The discovery of natural enemies would be the only practical benefits of the trip. He directed Townsend to determine the geographical boundary of 'the boll weevil infestation. More importantly, Howard was operating under the mistaken assximption that the limits of the spread of the cotton boll weevil would prove coterminous with the limits of

29 Eugene A. Schwarz to Townsend, July 11, 1895; Howard to Townsend, July 24, 1895, Correspondence 1894- 1897, RG 7, NA. Townsend to Howard, November 11, 1895, Letters Received from C. H. 'Tyler Townsend, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 18 the ratton cultivation of cotton—cultivating the plant, a perennial, for several years without replanting."^■'" Townsend explained that the practice was hardly followed in Texas, and that it would be difficult to establish the limits of volunteer cotton since the extent would vary yearly depending on the weather conditions. The research accomplishments of C. H. Tyler Townsend in 1895 may not have been all that his mentor in Washington desired. Yet Townsend concluded his year with some perceptive observations for the future which he passed along to Howard. He contended the Texas legislature would never enact legislation compelling any type of control for fear of rejection by their constituents; even if passed, such laws would not be enforced. The only two control measures at that time, picking squares and killing volunteer cotton, were only partial remedies that farmers would not practice. The boll weevil was already having an effect on farmers' cotton planting plans. Planters had already largely abandoned cotton cultivation near the Rio Grande on the Texas side, and many farmers in southwest Texas had no plans for replanting in 1896. The result

31 Howard to Townsend, November 16, 1895, Cor- respondence 1894-1897, RG 7, NA. 32„ Townsend to Howard, November 25, 26, 1895, Letters Received from C. H. Tyler Townsend, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 19 would be ntimerous uncontrolled volxinteer plants to serve as propagating ground for the boll weevil. To Townsend most emphasis should be placed on parasites as a possible remedy: "These work without legislation, and would kill the weevils while the Mexicans sit in the shade of an adobe wall!"^^ Again the Department of Agriculture tried to get the state of Texas to take some action. Governor Charles A. Culberson met with Leland 0. Howard and Charles W. Dabney in Washington in early 1896. Howard recommended that Texas adopt insect pest control laws based on those of California, which had the most stringent statutes to protect its horticultural interests. Unper- suaded, the state took no action. It remained to elicit as much voluntary action as possible. Townsend's report from his first visit in 1894 had been published in the March 1895 issue of Insect Life. That Department of Agriculture publication was limited in its circulation to professionals in the field. In April 189 5, a Division of Entomology circular bearing Howard's name generalized that the absence of knowledge

33 Ibid., Townsend to Howard, November 25, 1895. 34 Howard to Governor Charles A. Culberson, March 6, 1896, Correspondence 1894-1897, RG 7, NA. The letter is erroneously addressed to Governor David B. Culberson. 20 about the weevil's life history reduced any recommendations to theory. 35 In February 1896, Howard issued another circular, published in both English and Spanish, for distribution to south Texas farmers. In it he omitted an earlier recommendation that cotton pickers carry an additional sack to collect infested bolls. Instead, Howard now favored collecting and burning infested squares. In addition, the department advised the early planting of 7 a few plants to trap weevils before Qiibernation. Howard and his comrades in the division already realized that the main hope for averting extensive damages was to secure the maturation of the early bolls and squares. With the boll weevil population expanding throughout the summer there was little hope of harvesting the latter bolls or the "top crop," as it was generally called. Ironically, the circular mentioned but did not emphasize early planting and thorough cultivation. Those practices would remain prime tenets of the "cultural method" of control long after trap plants and picking the squares had been abandoned by the department. Howard emphasized the uniform fall destruction of plants as the best hope for control, preferably ordained

35 Leland 0. Howard, "The Mexican Cotton-Boll Weevil," Division of Entomology Circular No. 6, Second Series, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., April 2, 1895), p. 5, 21 by legislation. He doubted that voluntary compliance would be followed. Already the entomologists familiar with northern and raidwestem agriculture recognized the peculiarities of southern agriculture. Howard noted that renters or other non-proprietors whose primary concern was maximum production for the present year produced over half of the cotton in Duval County, Texas. The renters had little incentive to follow practices designed to maximize production the following year; they could well be tending cotton on another plantation at that time. The law envisioned by the USDA provided for the appointment of commissioners in each county when a specified number of residents agreed to the proposal. The commissioners could inspect and order remedial work, primarily fall destruction of the plants, and levy 36 penalties for non-compliance. Townsend finally received his wish. He was sent to the Yucatan to study the boll weevil in what was believed, probably correctly, to be its original habitat. Howard directed him to search specifically for other food plants and for parasites. The timing of the trip, February to May, 189 6, mitigated the possibility of any

36 Leland 0. Howard, "The Mexican Cotton-Boll Weevil," Division of Entomology Circular No. 14, Second Series, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., February 12, 1896), pp. 5-8. 22 significant discoveries: the boll weevil was not particularly active during the early spring. Townsend accomplished 37 little. ' Howard sent his second in command in the division, Charles L. Marlatt, to Texas in April and May, 1896, to study the boll weevil. Marlatt made several observations which added to the growing body of knowledge on the insect. He observed that sparsely planted cotton seemed to suffer less damage than cotton where the rows were completely shaded by the plants. He surmised, correctly, that the sun's heat often killed the larvae in the fallen squares. Tests made with London purple and arsenic on early cotton convinced him that poisons would work. Marlatt also assessed the difficulty of getting farmers to follow the department's suggestions. Unlike Howard, he did not view the crop lien and the tenant system as a disadvantage. To Marlatt the system was a means of insuring that the recommendations would be followed: The difficulty of getting farmers to read or act on printed suggestions sent out by the Department or State authorities was very evident. Through conversation with merchants and bankers, a method of practically compelling action on the part of farmers, who, otherwise would be indifferent or neglectful, suggested itself. The system almost universal in the south, and in this portion of Texas also, is the practical carrying of farmers a year in advance by

37 Townsend to Howard, March 23, 1896, and "Extracts from Townsend Correspondence, 1896 and 1897," Letters Received from C. H. Tyler Townsend, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 23 merchants and bankers. These same merchants and bankers also are commonly large land owners and their clientage is frequently in greater or less part composed of their own renters. I was informed by these business men that they would be perfectly willing to distribute recommendations to their customers and that they could, by reason of their control over customers, either as landlords or as a result of the system of advancing referred to, practically enforce the carrying out of any recommendations that we would guarantee to be effective and practical. This system of reaching the cotton growers found immediate endorsement on the part of all the persons to whom it was suggested and it is believed that by working through these landlords rather than with the farmers themselves much good can be done.38 Landlords, no doubt, exercised some control over the cultivation practices of sharecroppers and tenants, if not over renters. Merchants and bankers could seldom achieve such results. Similar schemes would be advanced later to promote diversification by withholding credit from those who planted cotton exclusively. The upcoming cooperative demonstration work of Seaman A. Knapp, a response to the boll weevil's ravages, addressed the problem by inducing better agricultural methods in a more realistic manner. Texans had by 1896 begun to experiment with machines designed to capture the insect. Marlatt observed a farmer using an attachment on his plow which struck the cotton stalks to knock off the infested squares. The

38 "Boll Weevil Notes, Charles L. Marlatt, April 24 to May 6, 1896," Letters Received from C. H. Tyler Town-^ send, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 24 squares were then buried in the process of plowing. Townsend returned to Texas in August 1896. In mapping the yearly advance of the infested territory, a task which the department continued to undertake, he located another machine invented by a poor German farmer named Strouhall of Beeville, Texas. With his muledrawn machine, consisting of revolving brooms which shook weevils into attached pans, Strouhall supposedly made a good cotton crop while his neighbors' crops suffered damage. Townsend examined the machine and assured the inventor that the department would recommend it, should it prove successful. 40 Strouhall's machine never received official recommendation. Neither did any of the numerous weevil-catching machines submitted, although all were tested that were made available to Townsend. The drought of 1896 had severely restricted the boll weevil. Samuel Dabney, a resident of Victoria, Texas, reported to his brother Charles in Washington that "the Mexican pest does not seem to be injuring the cotton so much this year, at least I do not hear of it as much,"

Ibid. 40 Ibid., Townsend to Howard, September 1, 14, and 19, 1896. 41 Samuel B. Dabney to Charles W. Dabney, October 16, 1896, C. W. Dabney Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. 25 L. O. Howard received other information that the drought had decreased popular interest in the boll weevil. Yet he predicted that, based on the experience of the past two years, "we will soon begin to hear of it again with 42 a vengeance." Marlatt summarized the mood he found in Texas : A general feeling of security, or an absence of a sense of real danger is now current from the fact that a good crop has, this season, been had in spite of very bad weevil scare in spring. The fact that the crop is due to the assistance of the drought is recognized but ignored for the future and another bad weevil year may be necessary to demonstrate to many the danger from the weevil. This does not apply to the more intelligent of those who have investigated the subjects for themselves. A new circular printed in English, German and Spanish should be prepared it seems to me and made especially strong and emphatic in the cultural method of control.^3

Not only did the 1896 season inhibit the boll weevil's pillaging, but the actual extent of the infested territory 44 was reduced. The phenomenon of retreat was something that occurred intermittently during the progress of the weevil across the South, often giving farmers the mistaken impression that the boll weevil disappeared after several years.

42 Howard to Townsend, August 13, 189 6, Corres- pondence 1894-1897, RG 7, NA. 43 "Cotton Boll Weevil Preliminary Report," type- script by Charles L. Marlatt, October 1896, Letters Received from C. H. Tyler Townsend, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 44 Ibid., "Report on Cotton Boll Weevil in Texas for 1896," manuscript by C. H. Tyler Townsend, December 8, 1896, 26 The Department of Agriculture continued to press the state of Texas to pass effective legislation. Charles Dabney importuned the governor to submit a bill to the legislature relating to all injurious agricultural insects based on the California laws. If this failed, he should siibmit one relating specifically to the cotton 45 boll weevil. Culberson replied that the suggestion arrived too late to be included in his message to the legislature, but added that "it shall have proper attention."^^ During 1897, Howard made use of Townsend's presence in Mexico to make further investigations of the parasites of the boll weevil. 47 "In the total absence of reports of injury by Anthonomous," 48 Howard saw little reason to have a man in Texas for the summer, but he sent Townsend to map again the fall migration of the boll weevil.

45 Charles W. Dabney to Governor Charles A. Culberson, January 7, 1897, Insects-Boll Weevil, General Correspondence, Office of the Secretary of Agriculture, RG 16, MA. This letter is erroneously addressed to Governor David B. Culberson. The copy cited is located in the general correspondence of the Secretary's office under the year 1922. 46 Charles A. Culberson to Dabney, January 15, 1897, Correspondence, 1894-1897, RG 7, NA. 47 Howard to Townsend, May 8, 1897, Letters Sent, 1893-1908, RG 7, NA. 48 Ibid., Howard to Townsend, August 3, 1897. 27 Drought conditions in 1897 severely restricted cotton production, but the Department of Agriculture attributed little of the reduction to the boll weevil since the drought also lessened its damage. 49 Townsend returned to Texas in the spring of 1898 to participate in experiments designed to test Marlatt's theory that the use of Paris green or London purple on early plants would kill most of the weevils emerging from hibernation. While deciding that early poisoning was practicable, Howard concluded that "the prevention of weevil damage is more a question of the adoption of a proper system of cultivation than of remedial or preventive schemes," The "cultural method" consisted largely of early fall destruction of the plants after harvesting, thorough cultivation, and the addition of a crossbar to the plow to knock the infested squares loose from the plant. The department would add other items later. That much of the cotton culture was of the "rather careless sort," as Howard described it, did not aid 51 matters. Some Texans became impatient with the work of

49 Leland 0. Howard, "The Mexican Cotton-Boll Weevil in 1897," Division of Entomology Circular No. 27, Second Series, U,S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., December 31, 1897), p. 2, 50 Idem, "Remedial Work Against the Mexican Cotton- Boll Weevil," Division of Entomology Circular No. 33, Second Series (Washington, D.C., July 1, 1898), p. 2. Ibid. 28 the ÜSDA. The department began to receive some criticism, as it would throughout the remainder of its work. Town- send reported to Washington from Cuero, Texas: Many do not take to the recommendations of Department as to preventive measures. They want a poison to kill them quickly and be over with it. One prominent man felt very strongly on the matter (a lawyer and well educated, and personally interested), and said that, while he had always been a strong believer in and supporter of the Dept., he thought the Dept. was practically doing nothing in the matter so far as helping the farmers to find a remedy was concerned.^2 Townsend in his travels thought he had seen one remedy that would satisfy the desires.of the impatient Texas farmers: From whole observation I infer—That poisoned molasses smeared on volunteer plants early in the spring, just at time when these plants are beginning to put forth leaves, will be the sovereign remedy for the cotton foliage is killed in winter and volunteer appears in spring. A comparatively few volunteer plants will attract probably every weevil in vicinity . . . then every weevil that wintered through will I believe be killed.53

The citizens of Cuero, Texas, where Townsend observed the experiment, considered it as "assured," and it exceeded Townsend's "most sanguine expectations," 54 The arg\iment impressed Howard sufficiently so that he included a recommendation for a mixture of white arsenic (arsenious acid), water, and molasses in his next circular

52 Townsend to Howard, June 3, 1898, Letters Received from C. H. Tyler Townsend, SFCII, RG 1, NA. 53 Ibid., Townsend to Howard, June 11, 1898. 54 Ibid., Townsend to Howard, June 16, 1898. 29 55 for distribution. This was the "new and important spring remedy . . . [which] put Texas cotton planters into possession of a knowledge of how to economically keep their fields free," described in the 1898 Yearbook.^^ The efficacy of the remedy rested on the premise that the molasses attracted the boll weevil. The department came to reject this idea, but state and private authorities continued to recommend mixtures of molasses and poisons as a means of economizing on poison and having the poison adhere to the plant longer. Events soon brought about a hiatus in the Department of Agriculture's work in Texas. The abnormal summer drought conditions and harsh winters conspired to limit the rate of weevil migration. The three years' experience of seeing slow migration north and east led L. 0. Howard to the erroneous conclusion that the boll weevil would not spread "to any great extent beyond the region of growth 57 of volunteer cotton." Townsend had tried to dissuade Howard from this position, but to no avail. Townsend spent much of the summer of 189 8 in Texas where he found

55 Howard, "Remedial Work Against the Mexican Cotton- Boll Weevil," Circular No. 33, p. 3^ Yearbook of Agriculture, 1898, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 1898), p. 32. 57 Howard, "The Mexican Cotton-Boll Weevil in 1897," Circular No. 27, p. 2, 30 "numerous people dissatisfied with the Department's recommendations," and "experimenting with remedies." 58 Reluc- tance to rely entirely on the USDA manifested itself in series of meetings to find solutions to the boll weevil. Victoria, Texas, hosted the first of a long series of boll weevil congresses on October 11, 1898. One delegate suggested raising cattle in conjunction with cotton, while others advocated the abandonment of cotton. The prevailing opinion was to find a solution, hopefully extermination, although control was generally recognized as the most that could be achieved. The plight of some farmers was evident from what one man considered a success. J. H. Love used Townsend's molasses and arsenic mixture and got twenty-two bales on seventy acres of cotton while his neighbors prospered even less. The Victoria congress formed the Farmers' Cotton Association of Texas whose first actions were to suggest the prac- ticality of the state's employing a trained entomologist. The USDA was asked to give "aid and advice" and to station CO a permanent entomologist in the infested region. Howard's belief that the boll weevil might remain confined to one state and the state legislature's belated

5 8 Townsend to Howard, June 3, 189 8, Letters Received from C. H. Tyler Townsend, RG 7, NA. 59 Ibid., "Report of Boll Weevil Congress at Victoria," manuscript by C. H. Tyler Townsend, October 11, 1898. 31 provisions for a state entomologist led the department to turn its attention and appropriations to other matters. The Texas authorities selected Frederick W. Mally over Townsend for the position. Mally was a former employee of the Division of Entomology, concentrating on cotton insects. Howard considered him competent, and not wanting to interfere with Mally's work, decided to withdraw from the state. The winter of 1900-1901 brought a rapid increase in the infested territory. The insect was now within one hundred miles of the Louisiana border and the spectre of its spreading eastward became a matter of concern. The Texas authorities appealed for assistance, and the U.S. Congress passed a special appropriation act to com- mence in fiscal year 1901-1902. Howard decided to use part of his general funds and have someone in the field in the spring. He selected Walter David Hiinter, a graduate of the University of Nebraska, and dispatched him to Texas in March 1901.^■'-

6 0 Howard to Townsend, October 19, 1899, Letters Sent, RG 7, NA. "Report of the Entomologist," Annual Reports of the Department of Agriculture for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1901 (Washington, D.C., 1901). p. 146; Howard. A History of Applied Entomology, p. 129. CHAPTER II

AWAKENING TO THE PROBLEM

, In January 1901, the House Committee on Agriculture reported favorably on a special appropriation to investigate the cotton boll weevil, and Howard set out to find a qualified scientist. The status of graduate training in entomology in most southern agricultural colleges was in its infancy at best, and in most cases nonexistent. Therefore, Howard selected a graduate of the University of Nebraska, then employed by the Iowa State College of Agricultural and Mechanical Arts at Ames. Walter D. Hunter remained an employee of the Division (later Bureau) of Entomology until his death on October 14, 1925. His work on the cotton boll weevil eventually expanded to cover the research on all agricultural pests of southern crops in a unit of the bureau known as the Southern Field Crop Insect Investigations.^ Ignorant of cotton culture. Hunter read the USDA publications on cotton and its insects, and reviewed his

Howard to Hunter, January 28, 1901, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 2 Arnold Mailis, American Entomologists (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1971), pp. 102-5,

32 33 Spanish to prepare for the new position. Howard, on a trip to Texas in 1896, had been surprised to find a prosperous cotton planter who knew no English, and he considered it fortunate to hire an entomologist who could communicate with Spanish-speaking Texans. Further- more, after having experienced the difficulties of research interrupted by Townsend's family problems, Howard viewed Hunter's marital status (a single man) as a strong recom- 3 mendation for his employment. The Houston Post heralded the return of the USDA to the state as the beginning of the end for the boll weevil: The United States Department of Agriculture is after it [the boll weevil] with a sharp stick, and unless the little bug proves more elusive and less susceptible than is now considered, representatives of the department believe they will go back to their headquarters with the little scalps dangling from their girdles and receive unrestrained approbation of the heads of the departments as well as the sincere gratitude of the Texas planters for their triumphant victory.^ Such optimism was not appreciated by Hunter and his colleagues, who felt such statements misled farmers into believing quick remedies were forthcoming. The lack

3 Howard to Hunter, February 12, 15, 1901; Hunter to Howard, February 12, 1901, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 4 Houston Post, April 16, 1901, Newspaper clippings relating to the cotton boll weevil, SFCII, RG 7, NA, Hereafter newspaper citations from collections will include the source of the clipping. 34 of communication and misunderstanding in some cases led to farmers' dissatisfaction with the department for not fulfilling promises. Hunter further believed that farmers would be inclined to disregard the advice of his office while waiting for the inevitable panacea. Hunter arrived in Texas at a propitious moment. The rapid spread of the boll weevil in fall and winter of 1900-1901, supposedly aided by storms, created intense interest by Texas farmers. Merchants and farmers in Washington County sponsored an anti-boll weevil parade in the county seat of Brenham in May 1901. In Texas paying for hand-picking weevils seemed to be the solution of most of these small citizens meetings, George H. Echols, a Brazos River cotton farmer, headed a movement that raised money in Bryan to pay for weevils. Merchants in town had the money on deposit and paid ten cents per hundred for weevils. Businessmen of Calvert paid twenty- five cents per hundred for weevils gathered within ten 7 miles of that city. The Goldman Ginnery of Victorxa paid fifteen cents per hundred for live weevils between May 25 and June 15, 1909, and was prepared to pay for up iSOl ^ g to one million weevils. The town of Caldwell established

Îbid., May 19, 1901. Îbid. 7 Ibid., Galveston Daily News, May 24^ 1901. Îbid., Victoria [Texas] Advocate, May 25, 1901. 35 9 a price of ten cents per hundred. The fund established by Waelder merchants to pay fifteen cents per hundred was rapidly expended when totals of fifteen thousand and thirty-five thousand weevils were brought in on successive days. Farmers of DeWitt County, near Thomaston, were reportedly paying fifty cents per hundred for weevils. The citizens of Franklin were more eclectic in their recommendations. After the discovery of boll weevils in the vicinity, a meeting at the courthouse resolved "to combat them by every known method." 12 Handpicking boll weevils continued to be utilized, but the collective paying for weevils seems to have been a short-lived phenomenon. Concern over the prospective damage by boll weevils in the spring of 1901 was so great that the Houston Post reported that farmers near Plantersville were talking of 13 plowing up the cotton and planting corn. The fact that insects and worms constituted the diet of birds had long been known. Even before the Department of Agriculture had conducted experiments to determine that birds fed on boll weevils, the Texas Farmer reported that fanners in southern Texas were attempting to enact laws against quail hunting.

^Ibid., Galveston Daily News, May 25, 1901. ■^°Ibid., May 28, 1901. "'■■'■Ibid., May 25, 1901. 12 Ibid., Houston Post, June 1, 1901. ■'■■^Ibid., May 13, 1901. 36 14 in an attempt to control the weevils. The Austin News reported that the fanners of Travis County were organizing to limit quail hunting. The vast majority of farmers who attempted any type of control opted for poisons. There was, according to contemporary evidence in June 1901, a panic to obtain insecticides. There were several reasons for this trend. Before the boll weevil's entry, the primary cotton insect had been the boll worm. Arsenical poisons proved in certain seasons to be economical and were endorsed by agricultural experts. Farmers looked to their previous experiences with the boll worm and naturally turned to arsenical poisons to control the boll weevil. The recommendations of Frederick W. Mally, state entomologist, also played a part. Mally's work with the Department of Agriculture had been on cotton insects, many of which were susceptible to the economic use of poison. Mally was under a considerable amount of pressure. As the first state entomologist of Texas, he had been hired for a specific purpose: to solve the boll weevil problem. The season of 1901 was,the first in which there was widespread alarm about the boll weevil, and Mally had

14 Texas Farmer, June 29, 1901, p. 8, Austin [Texas] News, October 28, 1901, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 16 Evans, "Texas Agriculture, 1880-1930," p. 65. 37 little time to conduct experiments. He recoiranended a mixture of one ounce of white arsenic, one po\ind of arsenate of lead, one gallon of molasses, and twenty-five gallons of water. He also recommended the use of a knapsack sprayer to distribute the solution, which could be applied for fifty to sixty cents per-acre. 17 Mally later claimed that the panic conditions in which farmers rushed to purchase poisons caused their failure to follow the recommended cultural practices. 18 The press of the state probably contributed to the general confusion and to the excessive enthusiasm for poisoning. The use of insecticides in 1901 began too late in the season to effect even limited control. Prior to the USDA's endorsement of calcium arsenate after World War I, there continued to be controversy about whether known insecticides could be used economically against the boll weevil. Mally made recommendations before there were any extensive experiments, but the Department of Agricul- ture, especially the chief of the Division of Entomology, Leland 0. Howard, committed similar offenses in some of the earlier USDA publications. The general ignorance of the Texas populace and the demands that the problem be solved instantaneously contributed to the difficulty.

17 Texas Farmer, November 2, 1901, p. 8. 18 Evans, "Texas Agriculture, 1880-19 30," p. 65. 38 Illustrative of the attitude toward agricultural science was the twenty-seventh legislature of Texas, whose members ridiculed Mally's work, calling his chosen profession "bugology."-"-^ The Department of Agriculture dropped its earlier recommendations for the use of poisons, leading to conflicts between W. D. Hunter and Mally. More important was the consternation the conflicts must have caused among Texas farmers. It was difficult to foster adherence to a single system, and now the experts presented the farmer with two competing systems of control. According to Mally, there was "a scandalous disregard for accuracy in the close adherence to formula and directions for preparation," and there was also a misconception "among a large class of people that any insecticide will do." To encourage the use of his discovery, Mally conducted speaking tours through the infested territory. He claimed that farmers achieved "splendid results" with his formula and that the mixture could "rid the territory of the present pest as effectively as they did of the leaf worm that played havoc for so many years." 21 Circulars describing the formula and its application were printed

19 Texas Farmer, November 1, 1901, p. 8. 20 Galveston Daily News, July 29, 1901, SFCII, RG 7, NA.

^■'■Ibid., May 18, 31, 1901. 39 and distributed: two thousand in English, one thousand in German, and five hundred in Spanish to the multi- lingual Texas populace. 22 Leland 0. Howard met with Mally in Victoria in the summer of 1901 but failed to resolve the differences 23 in recommendations. In its 1901 Yearbook of Agriculture the department recommended early planting, destruction of plants after picking, wide planting, and hand picking boll weevils. Such recommendations were a direct refutation of Mally's recommendations. Howard believed that he had never "treated a man . . . with more consideration" 24 than he had treated Mally, but the professional relationship continued to deteriorate. Mally wrote to Hunter that "your Division has offered many obstacles and dis- advantages in one way or another and I simply state that I shall reserve the privilege of submitting facts and data on the contrary of the question shall it come up at the 25 Farmers' Congress." Hunter reported the letter to his superior, stating that "the under feeling of ill will that

^^Ibid., May 15, 1901. 23 Hunter to Howard, July 5, 1902, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 24 Howard to Hunter, July 8, 1902, General Cor- respondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 25 Fred W. Mally to Hunter, July 3, 1902, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 40 was apparent at the time of your conversations with him here last summer, manifest from the beginning of our work, has at last taken complete control of him." In another letter Mally complained that the Division of Entomology's information "has been systematically used by designing individuals to discredit me." 27 The Farmers' Congress held at College Station, Texas, July 15-18, 1902, occurred without any friction over control methods espoused by the two parties. Hunter conferred with Mally prior to the meeting to avoid any direct attacks upon his methods. 28 The state had in fact released Mally from the position of state entomologist prior to the meeting. 29 The new entomologist, W. Dwight Sanderson, exacerbated the situation by publishing a statement critical of Mally's experiments and recommendations. Hunter reported to Howard that "Prof. Sanderson brought our at present amicable relations with Prof. Mally back to status quo." After writing a conciliatory letter to Mally and persuading Sanderson to drop the criticism. Hunter believed that he had placated Mally.

26 Ibid., Hunter to Howard, July 5, 1902. 27 Ibid., Fred W. Mally to Hunter, July 12, 19 02 28 Ibid., Hunter to Howard, July 21, 1902. 29 Howard to Hunter, July 8, 1902, General Cor- respondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. Hunter to Howard, December 10, 1902, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 41 Although state authorities showed a lack of understanding of the time required in developing insect control systems in firing Mally, their concern with the boll weevil was understandable. The early infestation in south Texas was in one of the less productive cotton growing areas. This fact had been one of the considerations in recommending the abandonment of cotton growing to stop the progress of the boll weevil. The elimination of the southern portion of Texas would deduct little from the total cotton production of the state. By 1901 and 1902, the weevil had spread to some of the more productive cotton lands, including the Colorado and Brazos River bottoms. The effect on cotton production became obvious. Through a combination of the boll weevil and climatic conditions the per acre production in 1901 fell to 148 povmds, the lowest per-acre production during the time since 1866, the period for which statistics are available. The production in 1902 and 1903 was 146 pounds per acre. Production increased slightly in succeeding years but dropped to 119 pounds in 1907. 32

31 Statistics on Cotton and Related Data, Statis- tical Bulletin No. 99, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., June 1951), p. 18. The statistics after 1898 are equivalent to five-hundred-pound bales. Prior to that the statistics are in "running bales" of no specific size.

Ibid. 42 Understandably, the state's cotton interests became involved and supplemented activities by state and federal governments. A group of prominent citizens met in Dallas in December 1902, and formed the Texas Boll Weevil Con- vention. George N. Aldredge served as chairman of the executive committee, but as secretary, J. H. Connell, editor of Farm and Ranch, did most of the work. Walter D. Hunter served as a member of the executive committee. The meeting, which Hunter addressed, endorsed the cultural method, rather than any poisons. Working through the county judges and local commercial clubs, the executive committee hoped to organize a committee in each county. In turn, the committee would collect revenues of one cent on each bale grown in the county, and the money would be used to support the work of the Boll Weevil Convention. 33 The organization eventually came to rely on contributions from businessmen and organizations connected to the cotton trade rather than on contributions from the farmers. J. H. Connell explained his feelings to Hunter: "The farmer will not organize for the purpose of levying a tax. We must look elsewhere for the funds to support our campaign in the present state of ignorance of our farmers upon this boll weevil problem." 34 The executive committee

33 J. H. Connell to Hunter, December 22, 1902, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. ^^Ibid., April 14, 1903. 43 of the Texas Boll Weevil Convention held meetings throughout 1903, published its own bulletins recoiranending the cultural methods, and distributed questionnaires to farmers and the commercial interests. J. H. Connell, the secretary, became increasingly interested in the idea of promoting the introduction of early-maturing varieties of cotton. The USDA had espoused early planting to avert the increased boll weevil damage in mid- and late summer, but had not recommended any particular varieties of cotton. Neither did the USDA advocate the general introduction of varieties from the eastern and northern cotton belt. Connell wrote that "there is no denying the fact that the boll weevil was fairly beaten wherever the quick maturing cottons were used this summer, with intelligent cultivation." Consequently, he wrote to eastern cotton belt seed breeders inquiring about the availability and cost of cotton seed. He also wanted to arrange meetings with the freight agents of railroads to argue for lower freight rates on cotton seed, believing that, "as usual, the freight rates will control the situation."^^ The Texas Boll Weevil Convention arranged to have a large meeting on October 8, 1903, sponsored by the Dallas Commercial Cliib. They expected Hunter to reveal the results of his early experiments, but he pointed out

■^^Ibid., September 29, 1903. 44 that any report would be prior to the conclusion of his investigations, undeterred, the convention changed the date to November, and Hunter protested that he would have to circumvent USDA policy by revealing the results of his work before submitting it to his superiors for approval. 36 There was an obvious public relations problem. The convention and the Dallas Commercial Club envisioned a meeting of interested parties from New Orleans and other sections of the South. Hunter classed the Dallas people sponsoring the meeting as "the most influential cotton men of the State." He appealed to Howard not only for advice, but also for instructions: "I do not see how I can well avoid going up to their meeting in case they persist in having it, . . .1 believe that they will persist in having the meeting." 37 The Dallas Commercial Cli±> persisted in calling the meeting. Not only did Hunter participate, but twelve hundred attended the meeting, including Secretary of Agriculture James "Tama Jim" Wilson; Beverly T. Galloway, Chief of the Bureau of Plant Industry and a power in the USDA; Herbert J. Webber, the leading cotton breeding expert in the department; and Seaman A. Knapp, who was in the process of beginning his farmer cooperative

36 E. S. Peters to Hunter, September 25, 1903; Hunter to Peters, October 4, 1903, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 37 Ibid., Hunter to Howard, October 14, 1903. 45 38 demonstration work. Their attendance testified to the increasing awareness of the importance of the boll weevil in southern agriculture, and to the political pressure of Texas' congressmen and senators. Already Representative Dudley G. Wooten of Texas had introduced an appropriation bill on January 22, 1903 (amounting to $500,000) for extermination of the weevil. 39 The meeting was the apex of the Texas Boll Weevil Convention's work. The convention printed and distributed two hundred thousand pieces of free literature and continued during the next season to foster the movement to import early maturing varieties of cotton seed from the upper South. In April 1905, chairman George N. Aldredge and secretary J. H. Connell notified members of the executive committee of their intention to dissolve the Texas Cotton Convention and deposit the remaining funds with the Texas division of the Southern Cotton Association. The main result of the meeting was a move to expand the involvement of the Department of Agriculture in experimental work. The Congress appropriated $10,000,

38 Evans, "Texas Agriculture, 1880-19 30," p. 72; Texas Farmer, November 14, 1903, p. 1. 39 H.R. 16973, January 22, 1903, Original House Bills, Records of the United States House of Representa- tives, RG 233, NA. 40 Texas Farmer, November 14, 1903, p. 1. 41 J. H. Connell to Hunter, April 8, 1905, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 46 $20,000, and $30,000 successively in fiscal years 1901-03 to investigate the boll weevil. After returning from Dallas, members of the Texas and Louisiana delegations met with Secretary of Agriculture Wilson and prepared a petition signed by all the members of the two congressional delegations. The members then advised and secured the support of leading cotton growers in the two states. The growers and representatives met with President Theodore Roosevelt and successfully solicited his partial support. Roosevelt's annual address to Congress included the statement: "I suggest to the Congress the prompt enactment of such remedial legislation as its judgement may approve." The plan, outlined in the petition, envisioned a cotton commission of five members: one from the Bureau of Plant Industry, one from the Bureau of Entomology, two practical farmers from the infested state of Texas, and one practical farmer from Louisiana. The Secretary of Agriculture would have discretionary use of a "cotton-investigation fund" amounting to $500,000. Twice that amount might be required in the upcoming year if the department decided to condemn and destroy any infested cotton m the anticipated spread to Louisiana. 42

42 Hearings before the Committee on Agriculture on Bills Having for Their Object the Eradication of the Cotton-Boll Weevil and Other Insects and Diseases Injurious to Cotton, House, U.S. Congress, 58th Cong., 2d sess., 1904, pp. 1-9. 47 Members of the Texas and Louisiana delegations acted expeditiously to obtain the appropriation before the next growing season. The Texas and Louisiana delegations and the officials of the Department of Agriculture testified before the House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture in mid-December 1904. They painted a gloomy picture of the devastation wrought by the boll weevil. Congressman George F. Burgess testified that the pest reduced the cotton crop of his home county of Gonzales by 50 percent in 1903. He stated that one of the largest planters in Gonzales County normally produced as much as 1,700 bales on 2,200 acres, but that he would make only 103 bales on the same acreage in 1903. 43 Congressman Scott Field and his brother of Calvert, Robertson County, usually picked six hundred bales on their eight hundred acres, but they would harvest one hundred bales or less in 1903. Cotton merchants in Calvert usually shipped 20,000-24,000 bales. The anticipated 1903 shipment was 5,000 bales or less. 44 The Department of Agriculture echoed the dire circvmistances described by the representatives. L. 0. Howard reported that Hunter estimated a loss from full production of 600,000 bales. The boll weevil accounted for 300,000 of them—an 45 estimated loss of $15,000,000.

43 44 ■^Ibid., p. 9. ^Ibid., p. 36 45 Ibid., p. 35. 48 The non-southern member of the committee wished to know why, considering the insect's destructiveness, the Texas legislature had not done more to impede the boll weevil. Congressman Field replied that the state constitution prohibited such expenditures: "We just simply can not appropriate money for that purpose." Congressman Gilbert N. Haugen of Iowa thought that the crisis merited a constitutional convention to rectify this deficiency. Scott Field replied rather lamely, "We have got the corporations gripped, and whenever you talk about calling a constitutional convention in Texas they say it is the corporations that are struggling, and if you ever loosen the bonds you will never get them bound again." 46 It was a weak argiiment. The southern states had, along with other states, solicited Congress to fund internal improvement projects. This situation seemed different; the novelty of the representatives from the bastions of states' rights and limited federal activity in state affairs appealing to the Congress was not lost on the representatives. Scott Field explained that "the time was when a southern member would hesitate to go to the Government asking relief, even though the damage was exceedingly great. . . . Times have changed, and we have modified our views." 47 The federal government had participated previously in the

^^Ibid., p. 40. ^^Ibid., p. 36 49 extermination of the foot and mouth disease in the New England states, but the states contributed the condemnation payments for the animals destroyed. Gilbert Haugen and others thought that the southern states should participate in the funding. George Burgess contended that, in both the case of the foot and mouth disease and the case of the boll weevil, the idea was to prevent their introduction into other states. Thus it was a federal question. Burgess concluded, "It is undoxobtedly not the privilege of the National Government but it is its solemn duty to protect these other States against this injury. ..." 48 A dreary summation of the boll weevil's import to the New England cotton milling industry brought some non^southern support to the legislation. The arguments proved persuasive, and Congress appropriated $250,000 to be expended at the discretion of the Secretary of Agriculture. Dropping the proposal to create a commission consisting of USDA personnel and private citizens, Congress made the funds available for January 15, 1904. Work could begin without having to wait for the beginning of the fiscal year in July. The secretary held a portion of the funds in reserve and allocated the remainder according to the plans submitted to the Congress. The Bureau of Entomology, of course.

Ibid., p. 41. 50 had responsibility for the study of the life history of the boll weevil and experiments in control methods. The Bureau of Plant Industry had the other experiment responsibilities. The secretary designated $40,000 to be spent on the farmers' cooperative demonstration work of Seaman A. Knapp. In his early effforts at improving agricultural practices by a system of owner-operated demonstration farms. Knapp had impressed the chief of the Bureau of Plant Industry. The amount of money allocated to Knapp's work exceeded that of any other item in the Plant Industry program. The other items called for cotton breeding and selection, work on cotton diseases, investigations of tropical cottons for introduction into the United States, and the introduction of new crops and 49 diversification. Simultaneously with the meeting of the House of Representatives' Agriculture Committee, the Louisiana state legislature, in a special session called by the governor, considered the boll weevil problem. There had been several reports of the boll weevil's arrival prior to its immigration over the western boundary in late 1903, The boll weevil appeared first in Louisiana at the Louisiana Experiment Station in Audubon Park, New Orleans,

49 "Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Plant Industry," Annual Reports of the Department of Agriculture for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1904, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 1904), pp. 74-77. 51 but authorities there believed that someone intentionally brought the weevil to the station. According to Beverly T. Galloway, director of the station. Dr. W. C. Stxibbs, had a disagreement with a New Orleans resident over certain matters pertaining to cotton, among which, was the gentleman's contention that the boll weevil already existed in Louisiana. He thereupon produced some weevils from the experimental plots. Stubbs contended that the boll weevil "was put there by hximan hands . " Galloway also believed that someone placed the weevils there for "speculative purposes," presumably for its effect on the cotton market. Director Stubbs had all stalks including roots burned, the ground treated with crude petroleum oil, and the area flooded with water from the Mississippi River. 52 The measures proved successful, for the boll weevil eventually arrived in Louisiana by the normal process of migration. The residents of De Soto Parish acted precipitously when they heard rumors that the boll weevil was in Shelby County, Texas, adjacent to De Soto. The police jury in Logansport exercised an astonishing degree of local autonomy by placing a quarantine against all cotton

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, Cotton-Boll Weevil, 1904, p. 17. New Orleans Picayione, August 26, 1903, RG 7, NA. 52 Hearings, Boll Weevil, 1904, p. 17. 52 produced in Shelby County. According to W. D, Hunter, the town was practically committing economic suicide since it was dependent upon cotton produced in Shelby County. This isolated incident of attempted exclusion was a harbinger of coming state action. At the cotton convention in Dallas, the director of the experiment station, W. C. Stubbs, and the state entomologist, H. A. Morgan, promoted a plan to establish a non-cotton belt along Louisiana's western boundary to deny entry to the pest. 53 Morgan explained the plan's feasibility: There is little exchange of products between Texas and Louisiana and elimination of cotton along the State line will be about all that can be done. I believe this will have the desired effect. If we can secure the co-operation of Arkansas, the acreage of cotton land to be abandoned for quarantine purposes will not be large. The rice and timber lands inter- vene between Texas and Louisiana for a great part of the distance, and the timbered belt along the Arkansas and Texas line is also considerable.54 Hunter and the Bureau of Entomology had prior knowledge of the proposed plan. At the Dallas meeting, he and Secretary of Agriculture James Wilson lobbied against the plan, but Hvinter reported that "they are not at all disheartened and are going to attempt to convene the Louisiana legislature in extraordinary session soon to take actxon." 55

53 Hunter to Howard, September 24, 1903, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 54 Texas Farmer, November 14, 1903, p. 9. 55 Hunter to Howard, November 7, 1903, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 53 The Louisiana cotton interests held a convention in New Orleans preceding the special session of the legislature. Hunter expected to be stigmatized and excluded because he had opposed the plan at the Dallas meeting. Although not on the program, he attended and was surprised to be called upon to answer questions. The special session of the legislature passed an act establishing the Crop Pest Commission of Louisiana. The commission employed a few competent entomologists, particularly Wilmon Newell and a man who would work with Newell later in Florida, George D. Smith. Newell and Smith conducted some of the first experiments with arsenate of lead, and the Department of Agriculture assisted the commission in various experiments with cooperative arrangements and financial assistance. If the state legislature expected the commission to expel and exclude the pest from Louisiana, the commission wanted considerable assistance, primarily financial, in accomplishing the task. The question at issue was whether the Department of Agriculture would allocate funds from the $250,000 to make condemnation payments on cotton fields destroyed in western Louisiana when the boll weevil appeared. Governor Heard, Dr. W. C. Stubbs, and other officials met with Secretary Wilson and USDA officials in the secretary's

^^Ibid., December 2, 1903. 54 Office in early 1904 to discuss the plan. On February 4, 1904, Hunter and Seaman A. Knapp met with Stubbs, Morgan, and J. L. Lee, the state commissioner of agriculture, in New Orleans. A dispute arose over whether the secretary had authorized condemnation payments. The Louisiana people contended that he did, but Hunter and Knapp dis-' sented. Stubbs expressed displeasure that Beverly T. Galloway of the Bureau of Plant Industry seemed to have great influence in the expenditure of the appropriation. Stubbs feared that the entomological work would suffer. 57 The secretary sent instructions to Hunter through Howard that the department should participate in destroying "incipient outbreaks" of the weevil until they were out of control, but evidently he did not clarify the issue of condemnation payments. The Louisiana people, particularly Morgan, intensified their efforts and pressured the department through Hunter. When Morgan located three isolated weevil colonies in Sabine Parish, he wanted to make agreements with the farmers to abandon approximately five hundred acres of cotton and have the department reimburse them. Hunter, felt that it was "a very dangerous proposition," and that the department should not become involved. 58

^'^Ibid., February 4, 1904. ^^Ibid., February 10, 1904 55 Wilson delayed. Hunter reported his difficulties in cooperating with the Louisiana conunission by writing to Howard that, "it is already a very burning question for me. Without an official stand by the Department it is rather difficult for me to deal with the Louisiana authorities." 59 The Bureau of Entomology eventually stationed five entomologists in western Louisiana to locate infested fields. Apparently the department never agreed to make indemnity, if in fact it could legally do so under the legislation. The Crop Pest Commission persisted with the plan. Entomologists in early September 1904 identified the boll weevil in eastern portions of Calcasieu and Vernon Parishes, many miles east of the control strip established by the commission. The scheme had failed. Hunter wrote that "Prof. Morgan is consequently very dejected. He is about to call his Commission together to reorganize their plan entirely." 60 This was the last attempt to impede the progress of the boll weevil across the South, except through quarantine measures, which were intended to inhibit artificial migration. Authorities repeatedly cited the failure of the Louisiana experience to demonstrate the futility of non-cotton strips. A non-cotton strip of

^^Ibid., February 20, 1904. ^°Ibid., September 7, 1904. 56 sufficient width would no doubt have stopped the migration, but the legislative complications and the prevailing view of what were acceptable state and federal responsibilities mitigated against such action. Although the department recognized the possibility of introducing the boll weevil by intentional or unintentional means to the uninfested territory, the primary objections of the department to future non-cotton quarantine strips were non-entomological considerations. W. D. Hunter categorized the difficulties as "the very great cost, the extensive police regulations required, the interference with commerce, the more or less doubtful constitutionality, [and] the difficulty of pro- curing harmonious action within the different states." The Department of Agriculture had opposed the effort, but considered it valuable because it demonstrated the futility of such plans. They would refer to it repeatedly when similar plans were proposed as the boll weevil continued its inexorable migration across the South. The 1904 Yearbook of the Department of Agriculture stated its opinion of the Louisiana experiment, a position from which it did not deviate: Certainly if it were possible to check the pest anywhere in the United States it would have been most feasible in the western portion of Louisiana, where the cotton fields are small and situated in isolated locations in the pine forests.

Ibid., Hunter to Charles L. Marlatt, August 1, 19 05 57 Although the results have been negative, the complete demonstration of the impossibility of checking the advance of the pest will doubtless prevent a great number of similar attempts that might otherwise be made from time to time in other states in possibly less favorable localities.^^ The cotton boll weevil did little damage in its first year in Louisiana, but the citizenry, or at least the informed agricultural interests of the state, were attuned to the coming problem. The Louisiana Boll Weevil Association, formed at the New Orleans meeting in December 1903, held its second meeting in Shreveport on November 3 and 4, 1904. According to newspaper accounts, a number of Texas planters contended "that the boll weevil had not done near the damage in their state that he had been given credit for. ..." They assured Louisiana planters that three-fourths a full crop could be had with early varieties of seed and fertilizer. The Louisiana people remained skeptical and believed the situation serious enough to merit a "national convention." In addition to various resolutions praising and recommending the work of the USDA and the Crop Pest Commission of Louisiana, the meeting called for a national convention to be held in Shreveport a month later, in December.

6 2 Yearbook, 1904, U.S. Department of Agriculture, pp. 202-3. 6 3 New Orleans Times Democrat, November 16, 1904, RG 7, NA. 58 The National Boll Weevil and Cotton Convention called for December 12-14, 1904, in Shreveport constituted the largest gathering yet of interested individuals. In addition to fanners, businessmen, particularly railroad representatives, attended along with representatives of federal and state departments of agriculture and elected government officials. The presence of officials from states east of the Mississippi attested to a growing recognition that the boll weevil was a threat to the entire cotton belt. The Shreveport convention opened with. Governor Newton C. Blanchard of Louisiana sounding the issue's national importance : This cotton mine of ours will make the South the richest of covmtries if preserved. It is bound to be so. . . . That golden stem turns the balance of the world's trade in favor of the United States. It makes us a creditor nation. Let it fail and we become a debtor nation. The destruction of the Mexican boll weevil thus becomes a great national question and Congress and the nation should take hold of it. Let this convention point the way.^** The selection of a permanent chairman resulted in controversy on the first day. A reported statement by Dr. W. C. Stubbs of the Crop Pest Commission of Louisiana favoring a neutral non-cotton zone in Texas provoked a fight. The Texans attempted to install a chairman sympathetic to their position. Stubbs disavowed making the statements

64 Ibid., Fort Worth Morning Register, December 13, 1904, RG 7, NA. 59 quoted in the press, but the western contingent succeeded in selecting two Texans, E. S. Peters and J. H. Connell, as chairman and secretary respectively. The USDA was well represented: Secretary of Agriculture James Wilson delivered an address, as did Hunter, detailing the department's work in the South and listing some effects of the weevil. He claimed that in the past five years it had raised the price of cotton to consumers, caused the loss of $80 million, destroyed the credit of small farmers, driven Negroes from cotton lands, and resulted in some diversification. 66 Daniel A. Tompkins, a textile industrialist of Charlotte, North Carolina, discussed cotton generally, pointing out the boll weevil's influence in encouraging foreign countries to undertake "the production of cotton in parts of the world where the savage may be turned into a cheap laborer." Tompkins also called for a movement to foster immigration from Europe to replace farmers being drawn to southern factories. At least one country, Germany, had its ambassador at the convention and was in the process of developing cotton production in its colonies. 67

^^Ibid. ^^Ibid. 6 7 Ibid., Dallas Morning News, December 15, 1904 Tompkins operated an engineering company, had various business interests, and was a well-known prophet and propagandist of the "new South." 60 Praise as tke best speaker went unanimously to a man mistakenly identified in the press as D, E. Smith of 6 8 South Carolina. He repeated some of the old clichés about the irony of the actual producer going hungry: "We are clothing the world, but we go hungry, and then we talk of our intelligence, and this in the blaze of the twentieth century." It was reported that Smith "made a ringing speech and was applauded frequently, some of the delegates getting so enthusiastic as to throw their hats in the air." 69 The greatest excitement was reserved for a resolution by Georgia's M. L. Johnson. It provided for the abandonment of cotton growing in the infested region for one year. "Just as soon as that part of the resolution was read there was a loud clamor from the Texas contingent who arose as one on the floor," according to Robert R. Poole, commissioner of agriculture from Alabama. In a heated discussion one delegate reminded the Georgians and South Carolinians of their concern for states' rights and claimed the same prerogative. Another alluded to "Mark

6 8 Ellison Durant Smith, elected U.S. Senator from South Carolina in 1908. He later gained the nickname "Cotton Ed" by persistently championing the interests of cotton farmers. 69 Shreveport Times, December 13, 1904, RG 1, NA. Ibid., Montgomery Advertiser, December 20, 1904, 61 Twain's patriotism when he sent his relatives to war," Finally, the Georgians were warned that "Texas was a bad place to raise a row; that the boll weevil was the only thing that had ever raised a disturbance in that state and survived." The author of the resolution, M. L. Johnson, insisted that "the situation was alarming, and that it was the duty of Texas to stop growing cotton for one year in order to serve the other states." Further- more, he said the spread of the cotton boll weevil to the more hximid East would give Texas a "cotton monopoly" because the East provided better climatic conditions for the weevil and required more fertilizer to grow cotton. 71 There was some truth in his statement. "Cotton Ed" Smith, a South Carolina politician who had earned his reputation as an "expert" on cotton, was present. He entered the discussion in support of the resolution. Smith believed the question was of such import that South Carolina could afford to confiscate one-third of the state's property to make indemnity payments to Texans and Louisianans. Stanley Morgan of Houston accepted the challenge by offering a sxobstitute providing for a tax of $20 on every bale of cotton to go to the farmers, railroads, and business interests affected.

71 Ibid., Dallas Morning News, December 15, 1904. 62 "The sxobstitute was received with laughter," 72 The convention soundly rejected both propositions. Later, Robert R. Poole, conunissioner of agriculture in Alabama, admitted that part of his reason for supporting the resolution was that it would mean good prices for cotton in his state. Competition from Texas and Louisiana would be eliminated for the time being. 73 The Shreveport convention, like those to follow, produced no innovative, concerted action. Simultaneous and complementary legislation by the various state legislatures was a mere dream. Voluntary abandonment by farmers dependent on cotton for a livelihood was incompre- hensible. All hope rested on the experimental work of the state and federal scientists.

72 '^Ibid. 73 Ibid., Montgomery Advertiser, December 20, 1904. CHAPTER III

NO EASY SOLUTIONS

The advent of the boll weevil was accompanied by a flood of devices proffered by American ingenuity to solve the problem. Wide divergence marked the sources as well as the motivation of the abortive cures. Entomologists and farm machinery manufacturers worked along with the scientifically ignorant but sincere farmer. The flim- flam men offered quick remedies in search of a quick dollar and, like the boll weevil, migrated cross-country. The charlatans left areas where they had been discredited, only to ply the fertile fields of desperate farmers newly acquainted with the weevil and eager to grasp at any offer of salvation. The results were generally the same. Many remedies proved to be somewhat helpful but so expensive as to be prohibitive, or of such little success as to be impractical. Any number of substances will kill the boll weevil, and niomerous other insects, under ideal conditions. Individuals observing the weevil's destruction often concluded that the substances would be efficacious. They ignored whether the remedy was economically feasible

63 64 or practicable under actual cotton growing conditions. W. D. Hunter and his entomologists had the primary responsibility for testing these proposed panaceas no matter how ridiculous. Performing experiments gave credence to their public statements in opposition to the remedies. They did not want to reject prematurely any remedy which might have significance, regardless of how impractical it might sound. As it turned out, contra- dicting the regularly recurring and sensational proclamations of cures in the newspapers was a task for which their scientific training left them ill-prepared. Red paint or mineral paint (oxide of iron) was the first panacea to gain widespread attention. According to an account in the Houston Post, newspapers all over the state proclaimed the solution's efficacy. Hunter, noting the statewide newspaper coverage, ordered experiments and discovered that the proposed remedy was slightly more effective than road dust. He also located the rumor's source: a man in Washington County who owned a mineral paint mine. The discoverer based his conclusions on killing the boll weevil in a closed bottle. I. F. Orton of Galveston, promoting his cure "Bollene," proved more

Houston Post, June 11, 1902, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 2 Hunter to Howard, JuneJ 15, 1902, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA 65 persistent than the mineral paint mine owner. He carried samples to Hunter at his headquarters at Victoria. When the substance failed to kill the boll weevil in experiments, Orton suggested that the samples were "spoiled" and brought additional "Bollene" to Victoria. The same results accrued. Finally, the third solution of the mystery potion killed the cotton plants themselves. At least Orton failed to secure the much-desired endorsement of the Department of Agriculture to enhance the sales of his product. The boll weevil's importance to the livelihood of Texas farmers was so evident that many needed no incentive to undertake independent experiments. Even so, the Galveston News helped swell the plethora of suggestions by offering a $250 prize for the best article on con- 4 trolling the boll weevil. Another r\imor which gained currency in Texas in 1902 was that Egyptian cotton was immune to the boll weevil. C. H. Tyler Townsend, in his early investigations, observed the boll weevil damaging Egyptian cotton. Conse- quently, the Department of Agriculture was dubious of the reports of immunity. Egyptian cotton was not unknown in

3 Hxinter to Howard, October 7, 1902, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 4 Galveston News, January 3, 1903, SFCII, RG 7, NA. Townsend to Howard, November 7, 1897, Letters Received from C. H. Tyler Townsend, RG 7, NA. 66 Texas when the boll weevil arrived. The cotton spinning industry in the united States supplemented the long-staple Sea Island cotton by importing Egyptian cotton. The Office of Experiment Stations imported Egyptian cotton seed in 1893 and distributed it to state experiment stations for test plantings. Throughout most of the 1890s, the Department of Agriculture continued to import seed. The difficulties lay in the late maturing nature of the cotton, and the difficulty of getting the cotton picked on a per-pound payment basis. One Texas agrarian iterated the objections: "The most of the farmers are disgusted with the cotton on account of the boll. ... It is almost impossible to get pickers even when the usual 'day wages' were offered. The Mexicans seemed suspicious of it."^ The brief flurry of newspaper accounts noting that the boll weevil did not injure Egyptian cotton apparently arose in conjunction with experimental plantings of the cotton near San Antonio by the Bureau of Plant Industry. The fact was that Egyptian cotton, due to the requirement for a longer growing season, was more susceptible to weevil damage than American short-staple, upland varieties.^

g A. W. Harris to Samuel M. Tracy, March 13, 1893, Mississippi, State Correspondence, Records of the Office of Experiment Stations, RG 164, NA. 7 Ibid., J. H. Connell to Alfred C. True, December 19, 1896. g Hunter to Frank H. Chittenden, September 14, 1902, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 67 Hunter used the good offices of the Farm and Ranch magazine g to dxspel the rumor. The cotton tree received something of a boom, with some people believing it immune to the weevil's attack. The Department of Agriculture sent Austin W. Morrill to the cotton growing region around Monterrey, Mexico, to study the relationship of the weevil and the cotton tree. After the disappointment of the cotton tree bubble, W. D. Hunter felt it wise to quell enthusiasm for any supposedly immune plant. On one occasion he wrote Beverly T. Galloway, chief of the Bureau of Plant Industry, protesting a Plant Industry statement which read: "Observations made and experiments conducted on a small scale during the last two years indicate that it may be possible to breed varieties which will actually resist the weevil." Hunter insisted that the statement "arouses hopes which may very likely prove false and lay the Department open to criticism." 12 The proffering of a monetary reward by the Texas legislature brought numerous suggestions. Delegates to

9 Frank P. Holland to Hunter, October 10, 1902, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. Kansas City [Missouri] Star, May 29, 1904; Boston Transcript, June 6, 1904, SFCII, RG 7, NA. Ibid., Monterrey [Mexico] News, September 21, 1904 12 Howard to Beverly T. Galloway, November 18, 1903, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 68 the Boll Weevil Convention in Dallas in late 1902 discussed the possibility. Henry D. Lindsley, chairman of the Commercial Club of Dallas, said, "The stupendous folly of the Legislature, when they refused the suggestion of the United States Government to check the northward sweep of the weevil, has already cost the State of Texas $30,000,000. ""^-^ He further suggested initiating a fund of $10,000 to reward anyone formulating a cure. C. H. Jones of Galveston believed that "when the concentrated brains and money go, thenceforth its days are numbered." The convention at Dallas passed a resolution supporting a $50,000 reward to anyone inventing an effective, inex- pensive machine. The state legislature in March 1903 passed a bill stipulating a $50,000 reward to anyone developing a remedy not costing more than one dollar per acre, per annxom. Working quietly in concert with Albert S. Burleson, an influential member of Congress from Texas and legislative benefactor of the Bureau of Entomology, the Depart- ment of Agriculture opposed the reward. The only hope now

13 Galveston Daily News, December 21, 1902, SFCII, RG 7, ÑA. ■^'*Ibid., December 16, 1902. ■^^Ibid., February 4, 1903. 16 Ibid., Austin [Texas] Statesman, July 18, 1903; Albert S. Burleson to Howard, March 26, 1903, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 69 lay in a gubernatorial veto. Burleson met with the Governor of Texas, Samuel W. T. Lanham, who agreed to veto the bill provided that Burleson could present convincing arguments for doing so. Burleson had previously discussed with Hunter and Howard the possibility of their supplying him with an account of previous rewards to solve entomological problems. He now met with Hunter and solicited his help in preparing the arguments. He provided assurances to Hunter that his and the Bureau of Entomology's role in the opposition would not be revealed. 17 The document Hunter presented to Burleson reviewed some of the well-known failures in other countries deriving from award offers. It was further observed that no incentive was needed to promote investigations since the commercial value of any cure far exceeded the $50,000 reward. Holding out to farmers the possibility of a panacea, the reward inhibited the universal adoption of such proven control methods as the USDA-recommended "cultural method." Finally, Hunter added that it would embarrass the work of the scientists of the Department of Agriculture and State of Texas engaged in boll weevil 18 work. The argiiments did not prove persuasive. The law went into effect in July 1903.

17 Hunter to Howard, March 26, 1903, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter; Albert S. Burleson to Howard, ^Kovci^iC;» General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. Rû5 18 Hunter to Albert S. Burleson, April 4, 1903, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 70 The announcement that followed provoked a "storm of letters asking the conditions of the reward. ""^^ The legislation called for a commission to investigate the proposed remedies. During 1903, the commission examined about two hundred methods and received numerous others by mail. In their report to the governor the commission failed to endorse any method examined; instead, the com-^ mission planned to resiome the work in 1904.^° Evidently many informed persons had little faith in the idea from the beginning. Jefferson Johnson, chairman of the committee on investigations, confided to Hunter shortly after the act's passage that the committee would not recommend any of the proposed remedies for the reward and that the report of the commission would call attention to the recommendations of the USDA as the only possible solution.^"^ Congressman Scott Field was not impressed by the suggestions brought forth by the reward. Testifying before the House of Representatives Committee on Agricul- ture in late 1903, he assessed the impact of the reward: "This large reward has developed all the cranks there are in Texas, and there are a good many there. Every fellow who knows how to put two pieces of paper together is trying

19 Houston Chronicle, July 17, 1903, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 20 Texas Farmer, September 19, 1903, p. 8. 21 Hiinter to Howard, August 4, 19 03, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 71 to get up some plan to destroy the boll weevil and get the $50,000." 22 One inventor was not content to let his creation be judged on its merits. He wrote to one of the commissioners offering him one-half the prize if he would "push the thing." In a bit of cornfield hximor the commissioner replied, inquiring as to the weight of the particular machine. So numerous were the proposals that the chairman considered hiring a stenographer and three or four typists to answer the correspondence. 23 When the commission concluded its work in the fall of 1904, more than three hundred persons had filed claims for the reward. The only recommendation the commission made was that the state legislature should establish a fixed date, depending on the geographical region, to destroy the cotton stalks. They concluded that there was little hope of exterminating the boll weevil completely. 24 The recommendations brought about by the boll weevil reward were only a fraction of those proposed during the first thirty years of the boll weevil in the United States. The Department of Agriculture, well into the 1920s, continued to receive these suggestions. Perhaps southeastern farmers discounted the more ridiculous suggestions

22 Hearings, Boll Weevil, 1904, pp. 38-39. 23 Galveston Daily News, August 24, 1903, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 24 Ibid., Vicksburg Herald, December 13, 1904. 72 more rapidly than had Texas fanners during these early years, but the popular notion continued to persist that a simple remedy could be found. Several agricultural pests feed on more than one plant. In these cases it is possible to make some use of trap plants. With the boll weevil the notion most often suggested was interspersing plants to repel the boll weevil. Arthur Herbert, described in newspapers as an English scientist making boll weevil investigations at Batesville, Arkansas, stated that tobacco grown among the cotton proved effective against boll weevils. The results of three years' investigations had convinced him that the weevil could not live near tobacco. 25 William H, Tunnard, of Irma, Louisiana, believed that onions planted with the cotton produced the same effect. 26 Mrs. Lula C. Blades of Atlanta, Texas, noticed that cotton plants growing under walnut trees were exempt from insect attacks. She suggested the preparation of a walnut extract to spray the plants and repel the weevil. 27 The Galveston News reported that Mexicans used red pepper planted in the rows to attract the weevils. The Waco

25 Ibid., Fargo [North Dakota] Forum and Daily Republican, December 21, 1906. 26 Ibid., Shreveport Times, June 11, 1907. 27 Howard to Hunter, February 27, 1906, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 73 Herald reported on William J. Rau's suggestion that fanners place barrels of cotton seed hulls in the surrounding woods to attract weevils going into hibernation and then burn them. 28 The Atlanta Georgian received reports from Mississippi that the boll weevil had deserted cotton for okra. 29 Farmers also recommended sxibstances to be sprayed on the cotton plant based on either attraction or repul- sion of the weevil. "A Friend" wrote to L. 0. Howard proclaiming that parched ground coffee contained a "poisonous oil," whose odor would drive away the weevil. He claimed he was not "fond of notoriety," and thus offered his cure without thought of recompense. W. D. Hunter and his assistants tested numerous repellents. According to Hunter, the persons formulated their repellents "on the supposition that the viler smelling it could be made, the greater would be the prospect of driving out the weevils." Hunter's tests included cresylic ointment and assafoetida. Springer Goes,

28 Waco [Texas] Herald, August 30, 1904, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 29 Ibid., Atlanta Georgian, October 24, 1911. "A Friend" to Howard, January 8, 1904, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. Ibid., Hunter to Knapp, February 9, 1904. 74 one of Hunter's assistants, located a man near Corsicana, Texas, who believed that a mixture of crushed cotton leaves and some poison would attract and kill the weevil. Hunter, at the suggestion of one of his colleagues in the Division of Entomology, had previously tried this solu- 32 tion. A black tenant near Corsicana treated five acres of cotton with molasses to attract ants to kill the boll weevils and pronounced it a success. The experiment impressed his neighbors sufficiently so that 33 they determined to do the same. Hunter conceded that molasses would attract ants but doubted that the ants made any appreciable impact on the boll weevils. He predicted that the "molasses discovery will undoubtedly die in a very short time," as had others. 35 A number of suggestions were based on the premise that the cotton plant could be made unattractive to the weevil by treating the seeds prior to planting. A Pineville, Louisiana, man suggested soaking the seeds in 36 carbolic acid. Mr. S. E. Fleming of Jackson, Mississippi, had a poison which killed the boll weevils

32 Ibid., Springer Goes to Hunter, April 17, 1904; Hunter to Goes, April 19, 1904. 33 Ibid., Goes to Hunter, June 4, 1904. 34 Ibid., Hunter to Goes, June 6, 1904. ^^Ibid., June 9, 1904. Galveston Daily News, May 27, 1904; New Orleans Item, June 2, 1904, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 75 37 when he treated the seeds in the spring. Sam Ford, a black farmer from Clinton, Mississippi, had poisons which worked in a similar fashion. 38 When confined to individual cases, even with the attendant publicity, these seed-treating panaceas were of little concern. But Hunter thought that the Post Office Department should institute proceedings against Penn B. Thornton and his Texas Cotton Seed Company of Houston, Texas, for using the mails to promote his scheme to treat seed for a fee of $5 per bushel.^^ A Whitecastle, Louisiana, man had a compound which, when mixed with fertilizer and absorbed by the plant, made the plant unpalatable to the boll weevil. E. Fondi Wright, an Englishman, conducted experiments at Granger, Texas, using the boll weevil to prove his thesis that inducing plants to absorb iron causes them to resist insect attacks. At Hunter's request the Bureau of Chemistry analyzed some of the plants to determine the presence of excessive amounts of ferric oxide. One

37 Ibid., Jackson [Mississippi] Ledger, September 23, 1908. — 3 8 Ibid., New Orleans Item, August 22, 1910. 39 Hunter to Howard, April 16, 1910, General Correspondence, 1908-1924, RG 7, NA. 40 New Orleans Item, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 41 Hunter to Howard, September 8, 1904, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 76 Suggestion concerning the efficacy of avoiding boll weevil damage by putting various concoctions on the seed aroused Hunter's ire, mostly directed toward the paper for printing it. After discussing an editorial in a Texas newspaper recommending prayer as the solution. Hunter continued in his letter to F. H. Chittenden: But let me turn from this very sensible editorial to the most idiotic newspaper that has yet appeared. On the 5th of August, in the year of our Lord 1903 and the century of scientific knowledge, one of the principle Texas farm journals contained, absolutely without comment, a letter from a gentleman signing himself G. P. Hachenberry, M.D. from which an extract follows: "From the result of my observations I would recommend the following method to get rid of the boll weevil: Take your own home seed, even with the weevil in it, and soak it in human urine for twenty-four hours and then dry it in the shade." In the year 1639 John Parkinson wrote, "The canker is a shrewd disease when it happeneth to a tree. It must be looked into before it hath runne too farre—wet it with vinegar or cowes pisse or cows dunge and wine." Is it really true, after all, that the world do move?*^ There were, of course, numerous secret sprays designed to kill the weevil. The inventors usually wanted the USDA to test and then endorse the concoctions. Suspicion by the inventors that they might not reap the full benefit of their discoveries led them to avoid revealing their contents. Hunter dutifully sent his men out to investigate the new discoveries. In later years

42 Hunter to Frank H. Chittenden, September 8, 1903, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 77 t±ie department asked for full descriptions of the panaceas, diplomatically suggesting that the ideas had probably been tried before and rejected. The idea of keeping pigeons to eat boll weevils occurred to some people. Joseph Warford of Huntsville, Texas, kept a flock in his cotton fields and reported success. Hunter arranged to have some pigeons he kept at hxs experiment stations used in tests. A Karnes City, Texas, man with a herd of one hundred sheep offered his services, claiming that grazing sheep in cotton fields solved the weevil problem. He charged one dollar per acre and it was reported that the "sheepman is now sought by many."^'^ As the boll weevil became known outside the South, suggestions came in not only from other Americans but also from foreign countries. Parties in Algiers sent in a bacterial growth to test against the boll weevil. A Welshman, David Boardman, wrote to the Department of Agriculture several times with his particular scheme. The Worcester Telegram had by far the most ludicrous

43 Howard to Hunter, March 17, 1909; Hunter to Howard, March 23, 1909, General Correspondence, 1908-1924, RG 7, NA. 44 Dallas Daily Times Herald, SFCII, RG 1, NA. 45 Hunter to Howard, April 4, 1910, General Cor- respondence, 1908-1924, RG 7, NA. 46 F. H. Chittenden to Hunter, June 21, 1904, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 78 solution to the problem: "Texas has only one hope of saving its future cotton crop and that is by burning over the district that is inflicted by the boll weevil." Several dissenters from the views of the Department of Agriculture about boll weevil control methods proved to be persistent and vocal critics. The most avid critics championed the idea of late planting. The idea was that if the farmer delayed planting past a certain date the boll weevils emerging from hibernation would have nothing to feed upon and would thus starve. Hunter sent A. W. Morrill, one of his assistants, to inspect the fields of Clay Harpold of Cleburne, Texas, in 1902. Harpold claimed great success with the late planting method. He unsuccessfully appealed for financial assistance to carry out large-scale experiments in 1903. 48 By 1904, Harpold was writing to Hunter that he would file an application with the department and appeal to Congress if necessary, to obtain the funds to hire one hundred and fifty practical farmers. They would be paid $5000 per year to oversee his experiments on 35,000 acres of cotton and to educate southern farmers. 49 Failing to

47 Worcester Massachusetts Telegram, September 14, 1904, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 48 Hunter to Clay Harpold, July 12, 1903, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 49 Clay Harpold to Howard, July 1, 1904, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 79 secure any encouragement from the Bureau of Entomology, he appealed in 1904 to Secretary of Agriculture Wilson "in behalf of the helpless cotton raisers of the South" in an attempt to get departmental approval of his recommendations. In 1905, Harpold took the final step; he wrote to the district attorney at Dallas proclaiming that "I have discovered what seems to me a gigantic conspiracy to defraud the United States Government. "^■'" W. H. Wentworth of Floresville, Texas, had been known to the Department of Agriculture as one of those attempting to grow Egyptian cotton in the state. He also advocated late planting, and claimed to have known of this solution since 1895. He beseeched the Secretary of Agriculture not to regard him as "one of any army of 'cranks' on this subject." In contrast to Harpold's requests, he wanted only the cost of transportation to Washington and one dollar per diem to convince Secretary of Agriculture Wilson of the efficacy of late planting.^^ Neither of these critics proved as persistent as Fred Reinlein of Mt. Vernon, Illinois. He advocated a system of trap rows and late planting to kill the weevils

50 Clay Harpold to James Wilson, August 5, 1905, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. Ibid., Clay Harpold to Wilson H. Atwell, March 1, 1905, RG 7, NA. 52 Ibid., W. H. Wentworth to Howard, July 12, 1903; Wentworth to James Wilson, July 12, 190 3. 80 and sent out the gospel through a series of numbered circulars. He began as early as 1903 and continued his advocacy of this and other systems into the 1920s. The letters to the Bureau of Entomology came so frequently that they declined to answer each one, but decided frequently that it was time to reply to Reinlein again. Changes in administration and letters to congressmen not familiar with Reinlein's long crusade required the bureau to respond through the years. In 1911, Howard became so incensed at Reinlein's attacks against Hunter that he referred two of Reinlein's circulars to the solicitor of the Department of Agriculture and inquired about the possibilities of legal action against Reinlein. 5 "î Having dealt with Reinlein for some time, Hiinter believed that "unless some legal steps are taken Mr» Reinlein's attacks will continue indefinitely." 54 The solicitor thought that Hunter's only recourse was a personal suit, not a government suit. Hunter and Howard both considered the personal suit inadvisable. 55 Reinlein continued his campaign against the USDA's cultural system and the advocacy of his cultural system. He added L. 0. Howard to his list of enemies. Howard wrote to Hunter expressing

53 Ibid., Howard to Hunter, March 6, 1911. ^"^Ibid., Hunter to Howard, March 13, 1911. Ibid., Howard to Hunter, March 6, 1911; Hunter to Howard, March 13, 1911. 81 his exasperation and his advice on handling someone who had a "pathological" condition: Not content with calling you a liar and a scoundrel, he is now telling the Secretary that I am a liar too. I think you should read every one of his circulars and very carefully indeed, and once in a while write to him a moderate letter and never allow yourself to be angry.56

The next center of advocacy for late planting was Alexandria, Louisiana. J. W. Vogler, manager of the Sonja Cotton Oil Company and twelve gins in Avoyelles and St. Landry parishes, became an agitator for late planting in 1908. He had a number of followers in the Alexandria, Louisiana, region. Vogler likewise wrote and distributed his pamphlets. Failing to convince the ^ Dpeartment of Agriculture about late planting, he wrote to President Taft complaining about the "unprecedented and unpardonable crime perpetrated on the south and condoned by your partisan administration." 57 Vogler also sent to Taft "the first one of the ten thousand Pamphlets, I am going to broadcast all over your domain." 58 Then, having failed with Taft, he wrote to Woodrow Wilson imploring him to "eliminate the advice of that smug lot of experts that for decades has always fed and bred the

Ibid., Howard to Hunter, February 9, 1912. Ibid., J. W. Vogler to William H. Taft, August 8, 1911 58 Ibid., May 27, 1912. 82 59 weevxl up first." Vogler's proselytizing for late planting proved so effective in parts of Louisiana in 1909 that Hxmter felt compelled to refute the argument. He reviewed the subject and issued "an emergency statement necessitated by the continued agitation of late planting by certain oil mill men in Louisiana." I. F. Orton, having failed to get departmental approval for his "Bollene," formulated a bacterial disease to kill the weevil. Hunter and Howard visited his laboratory in Galveston, and when Howard returned to Washington he directed his assistants to conduct experiments with Orton's preparation. Nothing came of the cure. The Department of Agriculture also had difficulties with persons claiming to be employees of the department. Southern newspapers reported on the travels and discoveries of one R. L. Bennett. He claimed to have located the boll weevil in the Laguna, a section of Mexico where USDA and Mexican authorities had failed to find it. At that time the Bureau of Plant Industry had R. L. Bennett experimenting with early cottons at the agricultural college at 6 2 College Station, Texas. The San Francisco Examiner

59 Ibid., J. W. Vogler to Woodrow W. Wilson, May 22, 1913. Hunter to Howard, March 22, 1909, General Cor- respondence, 1908-1924, RG 7, NA. 61 Hunter to Howard, August 15, 1904, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 6 2 Hunter to Howard, March 26, 1907, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 83 reported on the visit of Henry Y. Hoffman, an entomologist in the Department of Agriculture, lodging at the Hotel Jefferson. Hoffman informed the newspaper that hè had discovered the common red ant and the larvae of a particular insect as the best destroyers of the boll weevil.^"^ A certain Worden travelled through the South selling an insecticide called "Professor Howard's Dis- infectant Powder." Although there is no evidence that the man claimed the powder killed boll weevils, any endorsement that L. 0. Howard's name lent to the sale of his product no doubt resulted from the department's work in the South. Howard, who had been "considerably exercised for nearly a year," by this imposter, wanted to wait no longer for the "slow action that comes from the inspectors in the Post Office Department and the Secret Service in the Treasury Department." Hvmter sent R. A. Cushman, one of his entomologists, to Lena, Mississippi, where Worden was last reported present, to obtain evidence that Worden was misrepresenting himself as an employee of the federal government, a criminal offense, and then to turn the evidence over to the U.S. District Attorney in Jackson, Mississippi. Cushman found Worden under arrest in Carthage, Mississippi, for

6 3 Ibid., Howard to Hunter, July 17, and enclosed newspaper clipping from the San Francisco Examiner, June 30, 1907. 64 Ibid., Hunter to R. A. Cushman, February 10, 1909. 84 peddling without a license. fi R The U.S. Attorney at Jackson agreed to prosecute Worden under an 1884 statute making it a crime to misrepresent oneself as a U.S. government officer. 6 fi Another man claiming to be a Department of Agri- culture employee was a Dr. Thomas W. McGann. Coming to Texas intent on solving the boll weevil problem, he visited the Dallas headquarters of Hunter and his Southern Field Crop Insect Investigations often and had experiments made with his insecticides. Hunter first tried to induce him to locate on a plantation in southern Texas, far from Dallas, where he would find weevils plentiful, and even offered to provide a letter of introduction. McGann first liked the idea, but returned to tell Hunter that he preferred to stay in Dallas because of the convenience of the USDA's laboratory facilities. Next, Hunter tried to encourage McGann's budding interests in cures for the cattle tick, suggesting that McGann relocate his activities at Fort Worth where the Bureau of Animal Industry had dipping vats. Hunter's only hope was that McGann seemed to begin to favor his patent medicine schemes over his boll weevil and cattle tick cures. Hunter declined the offer to become president of the

6 R Ibid., Hunter to Howard, February 23, 1909 6 fi Ibid., Howard to Hunter, March 2, 1909. 85 envisioned company, and his assistants resisted other positions offered by McGann. The office boy at the laboratory would be the secretary of the company.^^ Finally, McGann made some travels in northern Texas to investigate the green bug, an insect affecting wheat, and claimed to be a representative of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Hunter had to conclude that he was "a 6 8 crank of the worst order." As with many another who had failed with the Bureau of Entomology, McGann appealed go to the President. The most influential critic of the department's control methods was a Captain B. W. Marston. Marston recommended Paris green, an arsenical poison. Hunter tested Paris green when he first arrived in Texas and continued to conduct experiments. The department never denied that Paris green killed weevils, up to 30 percent if applied at the time the squares began to form. Officials merely stated that the meager reduction in damage did not compensate for the cost of labor and the poison. They set forth their findings in a Farmers'

67 Hunter to Howard, August 25, 1906, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 6 8 Hunter to A. F. Conradi, February 13, 1907, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 69 Hunter to Howard, February 28, 1907, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 86 Bulletin, "The Use of Paris Green in Controlling the Cotton Boll Weevil," in 1904. ° According to some reports, numerous Texas farmers held Paris green in high regard. These reports so impressed Seaman A. Knapp that he directed his cooperating farmers in the Farm Demonstra- tion work to conduct experiments. Marston arrived in Texas in the spring of 1904 proclaiming himself the discoverer of Paris green as a boll weevil panacea. Howard and Hunter met with Marston in Austin. From these discussions, the two officials believed that they had a public relations problem, that due to Marston's personality and plan, "the idea would gain great prominence in the press of the state."^^ In a calculated move (one not in the best scientific traditions) , Hunter and Howard immediately started experiments to counter Marston's influence through the Texas press. They particularly wanted to negate the contention that an acre of cotton could be successfully poisoned for ten cents. "Disprove it if possible" were Hunter's

Walter D. Hunter, The Use of Paris Green in Controlling the Cotton Boll Weevil, Farmers' Bulletin No. 211, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C,, 1904), pp. 21-22. Texas Farmer, April 30, 1904, p. 1. 72 Hunter to Charles L. Marlatt, May 7, 1904, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 87 instructions to his men visiting the fields of farmers using Marston's method. 73 Hunter happily reported to Washington on May 14, 1904, that "Captain Marston and his poison idea have now passed their zenith in Texas." Marston continued traveling to meetings in small Texas towns, hoping to gain adherents to Paris green well into July 1904. Hunter meanwhile sent his entomologists to investigate the fields of those using Paris green and gather material "to be used in a full statement I expect to make regarding Captain Marston's plan." Marston no doubt influenced a number of people, despite the failure with poisons in 1901. The farmers around Kerens, Texas, purchased 2,500 pounds of Paris 7fi green and were content with the results. The endorsement of the Texas Farmer, an influential farm paper, further convinced Hunter that the boon for Paris green would not be put to rest. 77 Hunter rushed to have his

73 Hunter to J. C. Crawford, May 18, 1904, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 74 Hunter to Charles L. Marlatt, May 14, 1904, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 75 Hunter to J. C. Crawford, May 18, 1904, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 76 Ibid., Springer Goes to Hunter, June 10, 1904. 77 Texas Farmer, July 2, 1904, p. 9; September 3, 1904, p. 8. 88 Farmers' Bulletin on Paris green ready for distribution at the upcoming Shreveport convention in December 1904 to ameliorate the influence of Marston. Not unexpectedly, at the convention Hunter and Marston engaged in a dispute. Seaman A. Knapp—destined to have many disputes with Hunter and who had, early in 1904, been enthusiastic for Paris green—supported Hunter. 78 According to newspaper accounts Marston assailed the "entomological trust of the United States government." 79 B. W. Marston continued to vex H\inter. Yet he became the more immediate concern of H. A. Morgan, head of the State Crop Pest Commission of Louisiana, and Morgan's successor, Wilmon Newell, when Marston became a member of the commission. Marston naturally wanted the commission to endorse Paris green. The futile plan of stopping the boll weevil at the Louisiana border occupied most of the 1904 season, but the commission conducted experiments in 1905. Marston could not have been more displeased with the results. The commission's report stated that not only did Paris green not kill any appreciable number of weevils, but that it also probably proved detrimental in that it killed the cotton caterpillar late in the season. The caterpillar often ate the foliage.

78 Proceedings of the Second Annual Meeting, Louisiana Boll Weevil Convention, Louisiana Crop Pest Commission Circular No. 2 (Baton Rouge, 1904), pp. 94-96 79 Emporia [Kansas] Republican, December 22, 1904. 89 including squares, which would not have an opportunity to develop into cotton but which provided breeding habitat for weevils that would go into hibernation. Thus, the caterpillar often served as a natural control on the number of hibernating weevils. 80 Furthermore, the commission found that when applied late in the season, Paris green proved not only uneconomical but actually reduced production by harming the cotton. The conclusions of the commission were a direct refutation of Marston's claims. That Marston had directed the experiments was a fact made known in the commission's pioblications. An entomologist of the commission, J. B. Garrett, kept the records of production of the treated and control plats. When the commission reported experiments showing that the "cultural method" produced twice as much cotton as the use of Paris green without the cultural controls, Marston signed the report, but included a disclaimer that he was "not satisfied with the general trend." The activities of Captain Marston did not abate, nor did the belief of farmers in Paris green. In 1907,

80 Wilmon Newell, The Work of the State Crop Pest Commission with the Boll Weevil, State Crop Pest Commission of Louisiana Circular No. 5 (Baton Rouge, January 1906), p. 13. 81 First Biennial Report of the Secretary for the and 1905 to the Governor, State Crop Pest Commission of Louisiana, Circular No. 7 (Baton Rouge, 1906), p. 11. 82 B. W. Marston, L. S. Frierson, and Wilmon Newell, Report of the Executive Commiteee upon the Paris Green 90 Hunter read newspaper reports that a meeting of cotton planters in Shreveport endorsed its use. 83 The boll weevil had been particularly destructive in the Red River valley, and the planters there grasped for any possible solution. The situation seemed to be exacerbated by Seaman A. Knapp's vacillating on the question and again advocating Paris green for early cotton. 84 Despite past experiments with Paris green, Hunter thought it advisable to reinvestigate the fields where Red River planters expressed satisfaction with the work of Paris green. He began to believe that propaganda started by Marston might threaten "to be the undoing of the Crop 85 Pest Coiranission." Although Hunter did not agree with all of the work of the commission and had his difficulties with Newell, he nevertheless respected its work. At a meeting of planters in Alexandria, Louisiana, in November 1908, Marston took occasion to criticize Hunter, Newell, and the rest of the "entomological trust." He vented his rage on Newell by walking out into the audience

Experiments Conducted Against the Boll Weevil During 1905, State Crop Pest Commission of Louisiana Circular No. 8 (Baton Rouge, May 1906), pp. 29-30. 8 3 Hunter to J. B. Ardis, May 8, 1907, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 84 Ibid., Hunter to Knapp, May 6, 1907. p c Hunter to Howard, September 5, 19 07, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 91 86 and shaking his fist in Newell's face» Marston also went into the commercial end of the war by marketing his "boll weevil destroyer." Newell thought that at twenty- five cents per box, it was probably the highest priced insecticide ever offered for sale. 87 Marston finally took his case to the state legislature in an attempt to have the State Crop Pest Commission abolished. Machines supplemented the various substances designed to kill the boll weevil. Many of the early inventions designed to save the South were crude con- traptions by enterprising farmers. Later, farm implement companies and various other manufacturers would enter the field, failing as had their technically ignorant and capital-poor predecessors. The machines fell into several categories. There were machines built to collect and destroy either boll weevils or infested squares, machines to distribute insecticides, machines to incinerate or otherwise destroy weevils, and machines which were adjuncts to the use of the "cultural system." C. H. Tyler Townsend examined several machines during his-years in Texas, particularly the Richter and Strouhall machines, and W. D. Hunter continued and expanded the work. By mid-1902, having been located at

86 Hunter to Howard, November 21, 1908, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 87 Hunter to Howard, March 3, 1909, General Cor- respondence, 1908-1924, RG 7, NA. 92 Victoria, Texas, a little over one year, Hiinter or his assistants had examined over one hundred machines, and the nvimber continued to increase. 88 At Howard's request Hunter photographed many of the machines and submitted the photographs to the Washington office. 89 As with various potions and other remedies, the Bureau of Entomology viewed skeptically proclamations of successful machines. Repeatedly received were such notices from the public, and invariably they requested descriptions of the devices. With the passage of time, the department became more reluctant to take entomologists away from experimental work to investigate new machines. Rather, entomologists requested the inventor to bring his machine to their boll weevil experiment station, successively at Victoria and Dallas, Texas, and then Tallulah, Louisiana. The bureau did not become jaded to the possibility that eventually some inventor might devise an economical and effective machine. L. 0. Howard expressed the bureau's view when he wrote to Ernest R. Barber, a former assistant to Hunter who was promoting a new discovery in 1924: "We always feel that big things such as you expect, while

88 Houston Post, July 18, 1902, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 89 Howard to Hunter, July 18, 1901, General Cor- respondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 93 not probable, may come from some element in the intelligent public."^° The first machine Hunter observed was that of B. F. Johnson of Oakville, Texas. 91 The Department of Agri- culture actually subsidized Johnson in the construction of his machine by hiring him at day labor wages. 92 His 9 3 machine had a suction pump which picked up fallen squares.

The manufacturers of this, the P. & O. boll weevil machine,

produced five machines and placed them with planters in il Texas for experimentation. The machine also picked up fallen squares, but its weight, 1,250 pounds, made it

impractical to use in wet fields when control measures

were most needed. The machine evidently became so well-

known that it attracted the attention of the American

Agriculturalist, a New York-based farm journal, and the House Committee on Agriculture. 94 M. W. Campbell, a plumber in Houston, constructed a suction machine to be mounted on an ordinary wagon and powered by traction.

90 Ibid., Howard to Ernest R. Barber, January 23, 1924 91 Ibid., Howard to Hunter, June 15, 1901. 92 Ibid., Howard to Hunter, July 22, 1901. 93 Hunter to Howard, June 7, 1904, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 94 Hunter to W. G. Johnson, editor, American Agri- culturalist, June 28, 1903, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA; Hearings, Boll Weevil, 1904, pp. 38-39. It is difficult to determine from the records that the P. & 0. machine and the Johnson machine are the same. 94

A black man from Oakwood, Texas, supplied the plans for the machine, which the Houston Herald described as "a 95 curious looking piece of machinery."

Several inventors utilized the opposite of the suction pump and constructed machines designed to blow the weevils from the cotton plant. William Mecke and

Daniel Brown of Seadrift, Texas, presumably patented a machine in 1906 which had a traction-operated fan that blew weevils onto a belt that carried them to extermination 9 6 trays. J. M. King of Wharton, Texas, designed a machine to blow fallen squares into two receptacles, one on either side of the row. The fans were situated to blow the squares in such a manner that if they were not collected on the first pass, they would be collected in the next row. J. C. Crawford of Hunter's staff investigated the machine and pronounced it "theoretically" sufficient but 9 7 deficient in practice.

Other machines shook the weevils from the plants and destroyed them. John McClusky of Brenham, Texas, constructed a machine of canvas, steel, and galvanized iron troughs that shook weevils into the troughs. He

95 Houston Herald, June 16, 1904, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 9 6 Ibid., Des Moines [Iowa] State Register-Farmer, December 7, 1906. 97 J. C. Crawford to Hunter, May 1, 1905, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 95 claimed to cover six acres of small cotton or four acres of large cotton in one day. 9 8 The contraption of a Plaucheville, Louisiana, man shook weevils off the cotton plant and then collected them by means of tar on canvas. 99 The proposed machine of T. M. Beaver of Platter, Indian Territory, would utilize brushes mounted on a wagon to knock the weevils to the ground and then drench them in a chemical solution. The five- to seven- hundred gallons of the solution required per acre was an obvious drawback. I. M. Holloway of Edna, Texas, did not reveal the particulars of his invention, merely indicating that it was attached to the plow or cultivator and did "its work in the ordinary course of cultivation." He reported making a quarter-bale more per acre than his neighbors. Buster South of Bryan, Texas, had a machine which shook weevils from the plants and crushed them. 102 Gas fumes and torches comprised the killing mechanisms in other machines. Farmers in the truck crop

^^Galveston News, SFCII, RG 7, NA. , A öJ^ 99 Connecticut Farmer, November 7, 1908, SFCII, RG 7, NA. Ibid., Denison [Texas] Herald, September 21, 1906. Ibid., Galveston News, September 30, 1901. 102 "^ Ibid., Houston Post, July 23, 1903. 96 growing sections of Texas used torches to destroy the harlequin bug. The idea of using them on the boll weevil naturally occurred, but Hunter believed that the labor required to cover the vast expanses of the cotton fields militated against any economical use in Texas, A. L. Jones of Llano, Texas, demonstrated his machine before a crowd in Austin. The machine blew the fallen squares into the furrows and then burned them. The Austin Statesman reported that the crowd "freely expressed" the opinion that this "was the solution to the weevil question." 104 In 1909, Dr. L. P. Furbush was in Shreveport, Louisiana, experimenting with a similar machine. After his eight- torch machine failed, he intended to construct a twenty- four-torch machine. The difficulty with such, machines was that they usually required at least one minute to kill the larvae in the green squares. 105 The machine of J. H. White, Ravia, Indian Territory, included a vat which emitted deadly gas fumes. 10 6 Charles Lee, a black Texas farmer from the vicinity of Houston,

Hunter to Howard, September 26, 1903, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 104 Austin [Texas] Statesman, June 14, 1904, SFCII, RG 7, NA. R. A. Cushman to Hunter, June 22, 1909; Hunter to Cushman, June 23, 1909, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 106 Paducah [Kentucky] Democrat, May 9, 1904, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 97 perfected a machine utilizing a process of burning chemicals, the fumes killing the boll weevil. 107 The Clayton Fire Extinguishing and Disinfecting Company of New York implored the department to test the operation of their f\imigating machine on cotton seed and seed cotton. Hunter evidently believed that the method had merit from his statement to the general manager of the company that "no success has attended my efforts to have your process inaugurated for the control of the cotton boll weevil." The quarantines of the southern states were proving effective in preventing the spread of the boll weevil by any means other than normal migration; thus, there was little support for fumigating cotton seed and seed cotton. 10 8 The Tarnok Company, based in New Orleans and headed by a former entomologist of Hunter"^s staff, Ernest R. Barber, developed a fumigating machine which they demonstrated at a large meeting of cotton men in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1924. Barber hoped to prove the machine's merits to entomologists before marketing it, which he thought he could do at any time with the support of nine millionaires who would supply the capital. 109

■"■^^Ibid., Salt Lake City News, October 4, 1908, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 1 OS J. H. Clayton to Hunter, October 23, 1907; Hunter to J. H. Clayton, October 28, 1907, General Cor- respondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 109 Ernest R. Barber to A. L. Quamtance, January 15, 1924, General Correspondence, RG 7, NA. 98 In conjunction with its investigations of insecticides, the Bureau of Entomology tested the coiranercially available knapsack and other spraying and dusting machines. One Texas invention that interested the bureau was that of F. L. Richter, a Brazos River planter. Richter patented his machine and the bureau examined it several times. The machine distributed Richter's secret poison which cost about one dollar per acre to apply. C. H. Tyler Townsend obtained a sample of the powder and sent it to Howard in Washington. The Division of Chemistry identified the powder as the well-known insecticide, London purple. 112 Several inventors and their supporters formed companies to manufacture machines. The Jones Boll Weevil Cremating Machine Company of Llano, Texas, obtained a charter and proposed a company with $100,000 capital 113 stock. The Houston Post reported in 1904 that the ' Texas Boll Weevil Machine Company of Dallas increased its capitalization from $10,000 to $20,000. A. L. Jackson, a lawyer from Fort Worth, Texas, told L. 0. Howard that

Hunter to Howard, August 6, 1904, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. Texas Farmer, October 29, 1904, p. 9. 112 Hoawrd to Townsend, June 7, 189 8, Letters Sent, RG 7, NA. 113 Dallas Herald, June 30, 1904, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 99 the Dallas manufacturers of the Farrington-Doak boll weevil machine had three hundred machines in operation in Texas in 1904, and had 1200 ready for sale in 1905."'"^'^ According to Jackson, the sales were so lucrative that the company would not apply for the $50,000 award offered by the state, believing that they could profit more by selling the machines. Hunter reported that the company had sold a "good many" of the machines at a "good margin of profit," but that the machine collected only 10-20 percent of the weevils from cotton. Two gentlemen from Conroe, Texas, manufactured and sold the Dwyer & Willett boll weevil machine. Through Hunter, the Bureau of Entomology purchased one of the machines for testing; the price was $25. E. A. McFarland from Los Angeles had an idea which predated the sterile male technique, a successful method on several insects in recent years. He believed that Roentgen rays (X-rays) could be used to sterilize insects. McFarland went to Dallas in the spring of 1911 and tested his machine on several insects. Hunter then arranged for

114 Ibid., Houston Post, September 15, 1904. 115 Howard to Hunter, October 10, 1904, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. Ibid., Hunter to Howard, October 14, 1904. Hunter to Charles L. Marlatt, May 15, 1904, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 100 McFarland to conduct experiments at Audubon Park in New Orleans where Hunter had some of his staff located.^"""^ The boll weevil was among the insects treated with the rays, apparently unsuccessfully. The idea of using X-rays did not die immediately. One Franklin S. Smith was installing an X-ray machine in Tampa, Florida, in 1913 and desired tests by the Bureau of Entomology .'^■'■^ In 1914, the Patent Office made inquiries to the Bureau of Entomology about apparatuses for destroying boll weevils by using X-rays.120

The majority of inventions had as the main object the capture or otherwise killing of weevils. Some inventors attempted to supplement the cultural method and thereby lessen the damage by the weevil. The Bureau considered the early picking and then destruction of cotton stalks the most important step in controlling the weevil. If the farmers could derive some income from the stalks, then the same object of removing the plants from the field would be attained. W. H. Croll of Pine Mountain, Georgia, wanted to form a stock company with capital of $10 million to operate 1,500 paper mills to

118 Hunter to Howard, April 25, 1911, General Correspondence, 1908-1924, RG 7, NA. 119 Ibid., W. Dwight Pierce to Hunter, June 23, 1913. 120 Ibid., R. S. Clifton to Hunter, April 30, 1914. 101 121 convert cotton stalks into paper» The bureau thought enough of the concept to send several bags of cotton stalks to the Forest Service's wood products laboratory 122 m Boston for testing. Nothing came of the idea. A Hartford, Connecticut, man, Burdette Loomis, had an experimental paper plant and wood-gas factory in Waycross, Georgia. He envisioned using the wood-gas to destroy the cotton stalks in the fields. Hunter sent one of his men, A. C. Morgan, to Waycross to investigate. Other devices designed to simplify and hasten the destruction of stalks in the fields were less ambitious. Hunter learned that the Spalding Tilling Machine Company built an implement that reputedly turned under more vegetation than any other machine in general use. He wanted to arrange to have one of the machines sent to the Tallulah cotton insects station to test the effects of deep burial as opposed to the effects of burning as a method of weevil control. A two-row riding stalk cutter had been introduced into Texas in the 18 80s, but it did not come into universal use iintil World War I.

■Si. M. Bamberge to Hunter, February 10, 1906, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 122 Hunter to Howard, April 8, 1907, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 123 Ibid., Howard to Hunter, May 12, 1911; Hunter to Howard, June 7, 1911, General Correspondence, 1908- 1924, RG 7, NA. 124 Hunter to R. A. Cushman, August 29, 1910, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 102 Hunter envisioned better results with the utilization of cheaper, home-made stalk cutters. One of the simpler and more effective constructions was a "cheap wooden frame with knives attached to turners so that two rows of stalks are cut at the same time." Local blacksmiths could easily devise such a stalk cutter. Hunter wanted to publicize the device by having the Department of Agriculture issue a descriptive circular, but wondered if the patent rights of the inventor would be infringed. The solicitor of the department thought that such a circular would not infringe on the patent rights but that the circular would lead individuals who constructed the machines into infringing on the rights of the patentee. The State Crop Pest Commission of Louisiana issued a circular describing a V-shaped drag stalk cutter which any farmer with a forge could construct. The cost varied from $2.20 to $4.30. The circular recommended old cross- cut saws for the blades. A farmer pulling the cutter with two horses could cut down ten to fifteen acres of Stalks per day. 1 2ft The Bureau of Entomology actually participated in the development of one machine. Experiments revealed

126 Hunter to Howard, September 2, 1909, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 127 Ibid., Howard to Hunter, September 10, 1909. 128 Wilmon Newell and M. S. Dougherty, The "V" Stalk Cutter—How It Works and How to Use It, State Crop 103 that when infested squares fell in the middle of the rows and were exposed to the sun, most larvae in the squares died. In 1907, Dr. W. E. Hinds of Hunter's staff developed a chain drag device that swept about 90 percent of the squares in the middle of the rows, exposing them to the sun. Hunter was so enthusiastic that he wanted the Department of Agriculture to obtain a patent on the 129 device. Yet he did not want to endorse and publicize the machine until extensive tests had been made. Hunter arranged to have a Dallas company manufacture four or five of the machines and distribute them to farmers cooperating m Bureau of Entomology experiments. 131 At the end of the 1908 season. Hunter felt confident in endorsing the machine. Farmers' Bulletin No. 344, published in 1909, included instructions on building one 132 of the machines. The B. F. Avery Company of Louisville, Kentucky, marketed a similar machine, but because the USDA developed its machine independently there was no difficulty in making construction recommendations to farmers.

Pest Commission of Louisiana Circular No. 30 (Baton Rouge, September 15, 1909), pp. 151-52. 129 Hunter to Howard, August 6, 1907, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. Ibid., Hunter, March 19, 19 08. Hunter to F. C. Bishopp, March 2, 1908, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 132 Hunter and Hinds, Mexican Cotton-Boll Weevil, 1912, p. 151. 104 Hunter's group experimented with the Avery chain drag machine in 1909 and made suggestions for improving it. F. C. Bishopp of Hunter's staff found that "this machine has many distinct advantages over our model." The department could not publicly endorse the product of a company, but R. A. Cushman, head of the Southern Field Crop Insect Investigations at the Tallulah, Louisiana, station arranged to have the machine demonstrated before a group of Louisiana planters. This "was the quickest way in which we can reach the planters as a whole on this proposition." 134 Hunter approved of the propagan- dizing, 135 which was tantamount to an endorsement. Machinery never proved to be the solution to the boll weevil problem, although the USDA and implement companies did develop effective insecticide distribution machinery. The two steps in cotton production which required the most labor were separating the lint from the seed and separating the cotton locks from the boll. The Whitney cotton gin rectified the former, and the mid- twentieth century saw the introduction of an economical and effective cotton picker. Therefore, there was progress in solving the two greatest labor-intensive bottlenecks

133 F. C. Bishopp to B. F. Avery and Sons, January 21, 1909, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 134 Ibid., R. A. Cushman to Hunter, November 3, 1909. Ibid., Hunter to R. A. Cushman, November 5, 1909. 105 in cotton production, but the boll weevil still resists any mechanical solution. CHAPTER IV

GOVERNMENT RESEARCH

The boll weevil was probably the most serious entomological problem ever to confront agriculturalists in the United States. Such an interpretation involves the economic importance of the crop involved and the potential damage to the crop. The Bureau of Entomology and its successor agencies, in addition to the state experiment stations and private industry, have worked on the problem since its inception. Since Leland 0. Howard sent Walter David Hunter to Texas in 1901, the Department of Agriculture has maintained one or more research stations in the South, dedicated primarily but not exclusively, to research on the cotton boll weevil. The state experiment stations, beginning especially with the passage of the Adams Act in 1906, which increased funding, conducted numerous experiments which supplemented the work of the department. The Division of Entomology (later Bureau) in its publications in the late nineteenth century recommended a nvimber of ill-advised and hasty control practices. The recommendations were based more on observations than

106 107 on experimental control and test plots of cotton. The bureau later turned conservative, in the best sense of the term. Promising results based on a single experiment were not advertised; the bureau experimented two to three more years to make certain that the first experiment had not been a mere aberration. The one continuum in the experiments was a thorough knowledge of the life history of the weevil and an identification of any changes in it, particularly whether climatic and geographical conditions dictated changes. In 1909, after the Department of Agriculture had already published the details of the weevil's life history several times, Walter D. Hunter advised one of his assistants not to neglect "the strictly entomological features of the work" in favor of experiments tailored toward testing control methods: "Any substantial advance in our knowledge of fighting the weevil will come from such projects." The bureau was not unimaginative in its work. Its personnel remained willing to accept and try, money and time permitting, any reasonable proposal from both within and outside the department. Leland 0. Howard, who had ultimate control in establishing policy

Hunter to R. A. Cushman, July 29, 1909, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 108 on experiments, set the tone early in the investigations. He advised C. H. Tyler Townsend on the attitude he should take toward the innovative, if not successful, methods being tried by Texas farmers: "All these experiments are interesting and have a value as setting at rest popular notions; follow them up. Show the greatest inclination to try everything suggested unless it is absolutely 2 absurd." The bureau not only tried new ideas, but continually investigated control measures, which it had initially rejected. The staff did so partially because of a sincere desire to make sure they had not been premature in their rejection. More often, it resulted from persistent practices of certain control methods that the department did not recommend or the advocacy of previously rejected ideas by departmental scientists and state experiment station investigators. Hunter arrived in Texas in March 1901 to conduct his investigations. During the season of 1901, Hunter received his pay from the general funds of the Division 3 of Entomology. Specific appropriations of $20,000 for the fiscal years 1902 and 1903 enabled the division to

2 Howard to C. H. Tyler Townsend, June 10, 1898, Letters Sent, RG 7, NA. 3 "Report of the Entomologist," Annual Reports of the Department of Agriculture for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1901, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 1901), p. 146. 109 carry out large-scale experiments. Hunter selected Victoria, Texas, as his headquarters and arranged for experiments and demonstrations of the cultural methods 4 on two plantations of 200 and 125 acres each. The large appropriation of 1904 enabled the bureau to increase its entomologists and consequently the breadth of its experimental work. The method devised called for the department to sign a contract with the individual stating the exact experiments to be conducted. The department tried to determine the average amount of production expected depending on the type of land and the normal weather and cultivation practices. Should the cotton production fall below the anticipated return, the department reimbursed the planter for the deficit at current cotton prices. The cotton planter, in turn, followed the instructions of Hunter in planting, variety of seed planted, spacing of plants, cultivation, destruction of plants after picking, and any other practices th.e bureau requested. The arrangement obviated the necessity to purchase or rent land and hire labor. The planters selected to carry out the experiments were in most cases successful and intelligent planters accustomed to planting large

4 "Report of the Acting Entomologist for 1902 by C. L. Marlatt," Annual Reports of the Department of Agri- culture for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1902 (Washington, D.C., 1902), p. 196. lio acreages. Their attention to detail and control over the labor force made them ideal for the bureau, which required that specific instructions be followed in the experiments. The bureau wanted experiment farms in different geographical regions for scientific purposes, but there was also a political reason for locating the farms throughout the state. Each congressman could state that research was being done in his district, a fact that usually gained the bureau another supporter. The representatives were given a large part in selecting the plantations upon which the department conducted the experiments. Hunter and Howard paid particular attention to members in selecting the planters for cooperative experiment contracts, especially members of the Agricultural Committee. When it was learned that Congressman Scott Field of Calvert, Texas, would be on the Agricultural Committee, L. 0. Howard wrote to Hunter: ... we must be on the best of terms with him if we expect to do what we deem best to do in the state of Texas. Find out thoroughly his opinion of and relations with whom we have had close relations in his district, and in this year's operations try to follow his views in so far as you can do so without hurting the work.5 Consequently, experiments on the farm of Colonel E. S. Peters were dropped because the colonel was persona non

5 Howard to Hunter, March 6, 1905, General Cor- respondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. Ill grata with Congressman Fields. Peters protested but to g no avail. Hunter never explained to Peters the reason for dropping him from the experimental agreements, merely offering the explanation that the need to locate experimental farms in newly infested sections of Texas and Louisiana made it "absolutely necessary to discontinue 7 some of the older ones." The department set aside a part of its appropriation sufficient to cover the obligations under the contracts, although they never had to pay the full amount. The department obligated $11,315 in 1904, but estimated that g it would have to make payments of only $3,619.61. In 190 3, the experiment farms at Victoria, Pierce, Austin, Calvert, San Antonio, Wills Point, and Hetty comprised 9 556 acres with an obligation of $8,425.75. The department had $14,020 in obligations on 1,077 acres under fourteen contracts in 1904 and had to make payments on eight of the contracts. Other planters entered into cooperative agreements allowing Hunter and his staff to supervise the

g Ibid., Hunter to Howard, March 9, 1905. 7 Hunter to E. S. Peters, March 14, 1905, Cor- respondence Relating to Experimental Work, SFCII, RG 7, NA. g Hunter to Howard, September 16, 1905, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 9 Hunter to Howard, April 8, 1903, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 112 cultivation of the cotton crop on 800 acres, without any monetary obligation on the part of the USDA.''-^ After the initial boost supplied by the large appropriation in 1904, the extent of the experimental work, measured in acreage, declined somewhat. The acreage under contract declined to 892 in 1905 with obligations of $10,000 .■^•'■ The attitude of Secretary of Agriculture James Wilson influenced the decline in experimental work on a contract basis. He suggested that there should be more planters willing to cooperate without financial obliga- txons xmposed on the department. 12 Hunter and Howard doubted the altruism of some of their planters and cooperators, believing that some favored the contractual arrangement with the department not as a means of furthering scientific knowledge but as a guarantee on their cotton crop. They even went to the extent of stipulating that in testing the productiveness of varieties of cotton, that planters sell the seed cotton rather than gin the cotton and sell only the lint. As Hiinter explained to one cooperator, the system, outlined in the contract, "was designed to prevent planters that might possibly be unscrupulous about such matters from getting possession

Hunter to Howard, March 5 and 14, 1905, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. ■'•■'■Ibid., March 20, 1905. 12 Ibid., Howard to Hunter, March 10, 1905. 113 of seed which they might advertise as Government or Government grown seed." 13 Secretary Wilson also had a mistaken impression of the purpose of the experiments. He ass\amed that the Bureau of Entomology's mission, through the use of this experiments arrangement, was to demonstrate to farmers "how to raise cotton." 14 Likewise, some of the planters became dissatisfied with results of the experiments. They did not fully understand that the purpose was not to produce an abundant crop but to gain a better understanding of the life history, and thereby possible control measures, of the boll weevil. The views of the secretary finally prevailed. Although the department continued to supply seed and fertilizer for acreage under contract, the bureau severely limited the number of contracts obligating them to any guaranteed production with attendant deficit payments. Out of the contracts on the experimental work in 19 07, only two had clauses obligating the department to monetary payments. Hunter made arrangements with at least twelve other planters where the department incurred no expenses

13 Hunter to W. H. Leckie, August 15, 1904, Cor- respondence Relating to Experimental Work, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 14 Howard to Hunter, March 15, 1905, General Cor- respondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 15 Hunter to J. E. Routt, November 1, 1904, Cor- respondence Relating to Experimental Work, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 114 other than providing personnel to direct the experiments. Even if the bureau supplied only seed and fertilizer, Hunter preferred that the planter sign an agreement. The agreement had a "moral effect upon the planter" and averted confusion about obligations. Furthermore, since the department released money for these supplies, it spared the department from being investigated for misuse of funds. 17 The experiments largely confirmed the bureau's faith in its cultural system of control, although they did make some revisions in the system. Weather, of course, was the most important factor in the number of weevils surviving hibernation and in the number of weevils bred during the summer. The main hope for non-mechanical or chemical control was to reduce the number of weevils entering hibernation through the early destruction of the cotton plants. Hunter found that of weevils collected in the field, only those collected after November 10, 1902, survived hibernation in jars to the spring of 1903. To Hunter, this was "an exceedingly neat demonstration of the efficacy of the fall destruction of cotton plants.""'"^ Hibernation cages in the fields that approximated actual

16 Hunter to Marlatt, June 5, 1907, General Cor- respondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 17 Ibid., Hunter to Cushman, May 28, 1910. 18 Ibid., Hunter to Howard, April 29, 1903. 115 conditions were constructed to test the importance of fall destruction and to make counts of the percentage of weevils emerging in the spring. Hunter believed that the tests using bottles and cages did not fully reveal all that the department needed to know about the effects of fall destruction on emergence He wanted an experiment "upon the large scale which all 19 Its importance seems to justify." He envisioned using a neighborhood or a whole county, where there was isola- tion from other cotton growing areas, to compare the results. One of Hunter's employees, J. D. Mitchell, a local naturalist of some renown, located a section in lower Calhoun County of 446 acres in cotton, relatively isolated from other cotton fields. The colony of Swedish farmers cultivating the crop there met with Mitchell at Olivia and agreed to a payment of fifty cents per acre for destroying the stalks. The farmers would also receive the market price for the unpicked cotton destroyed. A committee of Mitchell; Mr. Cavallin, the leader of the community; and the landowner would determine the appropriate amount of payment. Mitchell attempted to arrange a similar experiment in Cameron Parish, Louisiana, but found it impossible to

19 Hunter to Howard, July 6, 1906, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. ^°Ibid., July 24, 1906. 116 get the cooperation from those farmers that the Swedish farmers exhibited. 21 The farmers began destruction of the plants on October 1. 22 After the results of the 1907 cotton crop came in, the officials of the department were suitably impressed. The area where the plants had been destroyed early in the fall of 1906 yielded six hxindred pounds more seed cotton per acre than had the test field thirty miles away. This experiment remained for many years the department's prime example as they tried to persuade farmers to destroy their stalks early after 23 picking the cotton. The system required community action. Otherwise, the effects of early destruction would be nullified in large part if one's neighbor failed to carry out the same practice. To the author's knowledge, no states ever enacted laws requiring plant destruction by a specified date. The Southern Field Crop Insect Investigations staff also tested the effects of the various methods of stalk destruction on the percentage of weevils surviving hibernation. They paid particular attention to results from burial of the stalks as opposed to burning. Partially

21 Hunter to Howard, October 29, 1906, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. ^^Ibid., October 2, 1906. 23 Hunter and Hinds, Mexican Cotton~Boll Weevil, 1912, pp. 157-58. 117 this was a response to critics such as Fred Reinlein, who championed burial, and an attempt to vindicate the methods advanced by the USDA. 24 More important in initiation of plowing-under experiments was the attitude of farmers in the eastern cotton belt. In sections of Texas where farmers seldom used commercial fertilizers there was little objection to burning stalks. Many farmers east of the Mississippi demurred, not wanting to lose the possible nutritive value of the decomposing foliage. Burying plants in the fall severely reduced the number of weevils emerging from hibernation in the spring, but because the method was less effective than burning, the Bureau of Entomology 25 recommended burning. By 1912, after the boll weevil had migrated to portions of the eastern cotton belt, the bureau, in a major publication, described burning the cotton plants as "a bad agricultural practice," and recommended burying the plants in the fall. 2 fi The recommendations of any bureau within the Department of Agriculture constituted a recommendation of the whole

24 Hunter to Cushman, October 16, 1909, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 25 Walter D. Hunter and Warren E. Hinds, The Mexican Cotton Boll Weevil, Bureau of Entomology Bulletin Bulletin No. 51, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 1905), pp. 121-23, 155. 26 Hunter and Hinds, Mexican Cotton-Boll Weevil, 1912, p. 160. 118 department. Each, bureau reviewed the prospective publications of the others and offered objections. The Bureau of Plant Industry, responsible, through the Farmers Cooperative Demonstration Work of Dr» Seaman A. Knapp, for fostering good agricultural practices in the South, objected to recommendations which they perceived as undermining their work. Such objection, no doubt, influenced the change in the recommended cultural practice of burning cotton stalks. Since the department now planned to recommend burying plants, the Southern Field Crop Insect Investigations turned its attention to experimenting with machines to improve the effectiveness of the process. The question of hibernation also figured into the persistent advocacy by people outside the department for late planting. The idea was to let the weevils emerging from hibernation perish before planting time. Of more importance was the advocacy of the idea from within the department by Dr. Orator F. Cook, a cotton expert in the Bureau of Plant Industry. Hunter in 1906 pointed out to Cook the results of experiments conducted near Victoria, Texas, published in Farmers' Bulletin No. 216 in 1905 as demonstrating the inadvisability of farmers trying late planting. Cook contended that it was not a true test because the weevils attacking the late-planted 119 field could be migrating from other fields. That the Bureau withheld payments in its reserve fund from contract experiment farms in 1905 freed funds to test what Hunter considered "the falsity of Mr. Cook's contention." To demonstrate the fallacy of late planting required isolated fields. "I have had the State of Texas pretty well ransacked for isolated fields that could be used in this work," wrote Hunter.^^ He selected scattered sites in Kerr, Llano, Robertson, and Wood counties. The one experiment in Louisiana was in Calcasieu Parish in a cotton field isolated from other cotton by several miles of long-leaf pine forest. Farmers who had no intentions of planting cotton but did so after failing to obtain a stand of corn made it difficult to be assured that the fields would be isolated, but Hunter directed that the experiments be carried out. The experimental fields suffered infestation, "proving the mistake about the late planting idea." Yet the results did not settle the question. The continued advocacy of the idea by J. W. Vogler and others in the Alexandria, Louisiana,

27 Hunter to Howard, July 19, 1906, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 28 Ibid., Hunter to Marlatt, May 21, 1906. 29 Hunter to Howard, June 13, 1906, General Cor- respondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. Ibid., Howard to Hunter, August 3, 1906. 120 region led Hunter to arrange another experiment in 1909 near Bunkie, Avoyelles Parish, in a heavily timbered section. Additional recommendations of the Bureau of Entomology encountered the opposition of Dr, Seaman A. Knapp and others in the Bureau of Plant Industry who asked for further research. It was observed that larvae of boll weevils in fallen squares had a high mortality rate when exposed to direct sunlight. Acting on this information, the bureau recommended the wide spacing of cotton rows to allow the sun's rays to reach the squares which fell in the middle of the rows. The Bureau of Entomology in its early recommendations was rather general about wide spacing. The practice was recommended, but exact measurements for row separation were not given. The implication was that the rows should be wider than previously and wide enough to leave the middles unshaded. "^^ Differing conditions in the eastern cotton belt led to a réévaluation. There the climate was more humid and the foliage more luxuriant than in Texas, Plants would have to be spaced increasingly farther apart to expose the middles of the rows to the sun's rays. The use of fertilizer also contributed to the problem. It was

31 Ibid., Memorandxam for Mr. Clifton by Hunter, June 6, 1909. 32 Hunter and Hinds, Mexican Cotton Boll Weevil, 1905, p. 163. 121 logical that spacing should be closer to utilize the fertilizer. Even when the fallen squares were exposed to the sun's direct rays, the mortality rate in the East was considerably less than in Texas because the humidity of the soil lowered the ground temperature. 33 Wilmon Newell and his fellow workers with the State Crop Pest Commission of Louisiana, in their experiments independent of the ÜSDA, probably first recognized that the method devised for Texas was less productive in more hiimid Louisiana. He called to Hunter's attention "the unexpected results from the experiment in the close versus wide planted cotton" in 1908. Hunter, ever the cons\ammate scientist, was willing to reexamine his own recommendations, and arranged for experiments in Texas 34 in 1908. He had similar experiments in the Red River valley of Louisiana and at Willow Bayou, Louisiana, in 1909.^^ The 1910 plan of experiments included four tests of spacing in the Mississippi delta of Louisiana. The Bureau of Plant Industry also objected to the indiscriminate recommendation of "wide spacing." Eventually

33 Hunter and Hinds, Mexican Cotton-Boll Weevil, 1912, p. 123. 34 Hunter to F. C. Bishopp, March 7, 1908, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 35 Ibid., Cushman to Hunter, July 2, 1909. ^^Ibid., July 20, 1910. 122 the department came to recommend a system that totally rejected the idea of wide spacing and concentrated on intensive cotton culture, in the use of land. Farmers' Bulletin No. 1329, designed for general distribution to farmers, stated that "the nxomber of plants per acre has a very definite relation to yield, especially under 37 weevil conditions." Observing that proper spacing of the rows would vary depending on the particular season, soil, cotton variety, and other conditions, the Bureau of Entomology concluded: Station tests and practical farm experience have indicated the value of thicker spacing under weevil conditions than had been the rule before. Spacing from 9 to 12 inches in the drill or row with two or more plants to the hill has usually given the highest yields in station tests conducted during the past few years, and it is believed that this spacing may be safely recommended for general use. Width of rows should be no more than necessary for proper and easy cultivation.^8

Although the Bureau had completely reversed its earlier recommendation, the previous policy had not necessarily been wrong. Yet if it were the correct practice for Texas, it was unproductive for the other cotton states. The recommendation of hand picking weevils and infested squares proved to be another vexing problem for

37 Hunter and Coad, The Bo11-Weevil Problem, Farmers' Bulletin No. 1329, p. 22. 38^..,Ibid. 123 the Bureau of Entomology. Except for the picking time, the cultivation of cotton was easier than for many crops, especially food crops. To suggest that farmers should either coax their families or hire labor to examine laboriously each plant for weevils and inspect each square for infestation marks would make cotton culture a highly laborious exercise. At least cotton's non-perishable quality meant picking could be accomplished with migratory labor, paid on a production basis, over an extended time. Controlling the boll weevil through hand picking weevils and squares required a constant and large labor force. The department in its early publications indicated hope for machines designed to knock infested squares from the plant and then collect them. Yet it evidently never completely endorsed the idea of hand labor to perform this function. But the publicity granted the method by various merchants' associations in Texas in offering rewards for weevils fostered development there. The Texas Herdsman in 1903 maintained that "handpicking is now regarded as one of the most economical, widely applicable, and generally practicable methods of making the best fight against the pest." 39 The acceptance of the practice by even a small number of farmers merited

39 Texas Herdsman, July 23, 1903, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 124 the bureau's attention. When Hunter arrived in Texas in 1901, handpicking weevils became one of his early experi- 40 ments. Farmers could undoiibtedly produce some cotton that might otherwise be lost, but did the increased production compensate the farmer for the cost involved? Hunter designed experiments that "will give us the exact expense involved." 41 He concluded that where farmers raised cotton on a "small scale" with an "abundance of labor," the method proved advantageous. In the vicinity of Victoria, where he located for the season in 1901 and where small farmers predominated. Hunter found that the small farmers by "their energetic work in hand picking, induced by the offer of a bounty by the merchants, largely aided in causing a very fair crop to be made this season." 42 The major publication in 1905 summarizing the results of Hunter's work was more specific. He still conceded the possible efficacy under "favorable labor conditions," but advised against handpicking on extensive plantings: "Nothing could be more out of place than to suggest hand picking upon large plantations. Even with

40 Howard to Htinter, May 31, 1901, General Cor- respondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 41 Hunter to Howard, May 14, 1902, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG,7, NA. 42 Walter D. Hunter, "The Present Status of the Mexican Cotton Boll Weevil in the United States," Yearbook of the Department of Agriculture, 1901, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C. 1902), p. 379. 125 convict labor it has been found entirely impracticable." This was still another area where the Bureau of Entomology differed with Seaman A. Knapp and his demonstration workers in the Bureau of Plant Industry. It was a classic example of Knapp•s contention that results secured in purely scientific experiments had little relevance to the realities of small-scale farming in the South. As with wide planting, the Bureau of Entomology conceded that recommendations having validity in Texas might not apply to the East. R. A. Cushman, after locating an experiment station in the Mississippi delta at Tallulah, Louisiana, became convinced of its economic feasibility "on tenant farms where it can be done by small children at no 44 expense." Recognizing that conditions in the delta might merit a change in recommendations and "on account of the universal recommendation of this practice by the Plant Industry people," Hunter authorized Cushman to test the idea. The 1909 experiments were the first since 1905. Experiments proved inconclusive, merely revealing that "square picking may be profitable in some seasons and not in others." But the acceptance of the practice by some

43 Hunter and Hinds, Mexican Cotton Boll Weevil, 1905, p. 163. 44 Cushman to Hunter, July 11, 1909, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 45 Ibxd., Hunter to Cushman, July 15, 1909. 126 fanners dictated that experiments finally resolve the question. According to Hunter, a complete refutation of the practice would be "worth at least a hundred thousand dollars a year to the planters of the State of Mississippi alone." 46 Agitation for the method was so persistent that the Bureau of Entomology continued experiments until it issued its final statement on the benefits of square picking in 1916. Actually, the recommendations changed very little. Were the work to be done at all, the farmers should use the bag-and-hoop method of "sweeping" the cotton rather than picking the weevils. Even so, the 23 percent increase in production brought by five square picking at seven-day intervals did not cover the cost of wages. With the "shortage of labor in the Delta" the bureau saw few instances where this work would not interfere with "regular plantation work." 47 The bureau also changed its method of disposing of weevils and infested squares. In the system developed under Texas cotton growing conditions, the bureau advised placing the weevils and squares in wire cages (near the cotton field) of sufficiently small gauge to prevent the

46 Hunter to Howard, February 26, 1912, enclosure "Entomological Work on the Cotton Boll Weevil Which Remains to Be Done," General Correspondence, 1908-1924, RG 7, NA. 47 Bertram R. Coad, Cotton Boll-Weevil Control in the Mississippi Delta, with Special Reference to Square Picking and Weevil Picking, U.S. Department of Agriculture 127 weevil's escaping. In theory, this would enhance parasite breeding in the cages. The parasites, in most cases smaller than boll weevils, could escape and attack boll weevils in the field. But parasitic control of weevils in the delta was so low that the practice did not warrant the cost of supplies nor the danger and unpreventable reality that some weevils would escape. 48 Hibernation experiments played a basic role in the attempts to trace the life history of the boll weevil. Even so, scientists oriented the research toward modifications and innovations in control methods. Workers constructed hibernation cages in or near fields. Some experiments attempted to simulate actual hibernation conditions; others provided artificial and conducive hibernating quarters, depending on the objects of the experiments. Day labor was employed to collect the weevils for the experiments. Hunter, in instructing his field staff about travels during the winter months, wanted to know "exactly where hibernating weevils might be found and exactly what conditions were most favorable for them." The answer was that forest usually provided the best

Bulletin No. 382 (Washington, D.C., July 8, 1916), p. 9 48 Ibid., p. 5. 49 Hunter to Howard, March 11, 1907, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 128 protection; in fact, it was one of the elements that gave the plains and prairie areas an advantage over the forested southeastern cotton belt. In this connection the Southern Field Crop Insect Investigations staff compared the results from a hibernation cage in a timbered area and one in nearby fields. In addition to these observations, field tests on hibernation cages tested the "emergence of every weevil under the different conditions in different compartments." 50 Experiments that determined the survival rate of weevils deprived of food at various times during the fall enhanced the argument for early fall destruction. The department began keeping records on the longevity of weevils surviving hibernation with and without food. 52 The survival rate had some relationship to determining the prospects for the upcoming season. The results proved of great utility in countering the proponents of late planting. Counts of weevils surviving hibernation on differing soils showed that soil texture was of little consequence

^°Ibid., March 20, 1907. Cushman to Hunter, September 17, 1909, enclosure "Instructions for Hibernation Work at Tallulah and Mansura, 1909-1910," General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 52 Hunter to Howard, March 20, 19 07, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA; Hunter and Hinds, Mexican Cotton-Boll Weevil, 1912, p. 114. 129 53 xn survival rates. Other regional differences were of importance, particularly temperature and moisture. The department had hibernation cages in various sections of the South to provide statistics on winter survival. In other cases, staff members supervised the collecting and shipment of field trash and forest mulch to one of the experiment stations where the percentage of survival 54 was determined. Survival statistics not only reflected regional differences but determined seasonal differences in survival due to climate. By publishing the survival results early in the spring, the department attempted to induce farmers to prepare to combat the weevil, particularly if survival percentages indicated a severe impending summer. Primarily the department hoped to persuade individual farmers to prepare to plant early and to restrict acreage to a level that each could successfully cultivate under the recommended "cultural method." The publication of statistics on hibernation survival and time of emergence became a source of controversy. The Bureau of Plant Industry contended that the indiscriminate recommendation of early planting led farmers to plant before the threat of frost had passed and resulted in

53 Hunter to Howard, April 22, 1910, General Cor- respondence , RG 7, NA. 54 Cushman to Hunter, February 4, 1910, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 130 unnecessary expenditure for replanting. Also, the statistics began to be reflected in the price of cotton futures. Suspicions, both unfounded and real, of southern fanners toward cotton buyers in a chronically depressed market resulted in criticism of the department for releasing such information. The possible effects of late summer defoliation on the size of the population surviving winter also attracted attention. Entomologists observed that in years following severe infestation of the cotton leaf worm (Alabama argillacea), the next spring there was a reduced weevil population. The cotton leaf worm during its worst years stripped the plant of green foliage including squares. Before the boll weevil arrived, farmers regarded this worm as the most destructive cotton insect, considering it with the anxiety now reserved for the boll weevil. The leaf worm performed the same function, but without expenditures, as early fall destruction: it deprived the boll weevils of a breeding culture for young larvae that would enter hibernation. Depending on the time of the worst leaf worm destruction, it did not cut production significantly. Young squares would not matiire into bolls and produce cotton before frost in many cases. The discovery of Paris green as an effective and economical controlling agent had relegated the leaf worm 131 to a minor status as a cotton pest. Planters, prodded by agents of the USDA, who recognized the cotton leaf worm's role in controlling the boll weevil, abandoned spraying with Paris green. The cotton leaf worm had one deficiency; by depriving the weevil of its food supply, it caused earlier and more widespread migration. This became of little import after the boll weevil completed its migration throughout the cotton belt, but prior to that the severe years of leaf worm infestation hastened the spread of the boll weevil. Most experiments with chemicals revolved around the proposition of killing the weevils directly, not indirectly reducing the number entering hibernation. The Bureau of Entomology tested numerous substances, both those recommended by its staff and those suggested by individuals outside the scientific commxinity. The results generally fell into three categories. The prospective insecticide had little or no effect on the boll weevil, severely damaged the cotton plant while controlling weevils, or proved to be too expensive in relationship to the weevils killed. That the boll weevil developed within the squares prevented the effective destruction of the larvae. 55 Unlike the recent poisons which attack

55 Hunter and Hinds, Mexican Cotton-Boll Weevil, 1912, pp. 149-50. 132 the insect through the nervous system and can be absorbed externally, the early poisons depended on being ingested. Hunter initiated insecticide experiments during his first summer in Texas in 1901. In conjunction with this work he also gathered valuable information on the efficiency of commercially available poison distribution apparatuses. L. 0. Howard particularly wanted to know if the scale of the experiment had an influence on the results. 57 Did experiments conducted on a large scale show different results than those conducted on a few plants or a small field? In all cases, the department eliminated the insecticides that showed some degree of control on other cotton insects. Paris green attracted the most attention. After experiments the department discounted it as an effective control agent. According to the Department of Agriculture their advice against the use of Paris green, in addition to poor results obtained by farmers, caused a cessation in its use: "the uselessness of Paris green was quickly discovered by planters. Since 1904 practically none has been used in the warfare against the pest." 58

Howard to Hunter, June 18, 1901 and July 10, 1901, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. ^"^Ibid., June 10, 1901. 5 8 Hunter and Hinds, Mexican Cotton-Boll Weevil, 1912, p. 154. '■ 133 The Southern Field Crop Insect Investigations staff made thorough tests on over forty compounds by 1912, of which "none proved worthy of even passing consideration 59 for field use." In at least one case the surplus and resultant cheapness of one commodity made it ideal as a source of speculation for a possible remedy. The Beavunont oil field "blew in" at Spindletop on January 10, 1901.^° Newspapers in Texas immediately expressed the hope that the new source of wealth, oil, would save the established 61 source of wealth, cotton. Soon after Hunter arrived in Texas, L. 0. Howard directed him to experiment with the crude oil, commonly known as Beaumont oil, "since 6 2 it is so cheap out there now." In working with various insecticides, entomologists tried to determine if they killed enough weevils to make it economical; scientists also wanted to know exactly the physiological effect of 6 "3 the poison on the weevil.

^^Ibid., p. 150. 6 0 John Stricklin Spratt, The Road to Spindletop; Economic Change in Texas, 1875-19 01 (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1955; rpt. ed., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970), p. 274. 61 Hunter to Knapp, July 9, 1904, General Cor- respondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. ^^Ibid., Howard to Hunter, May 21, 1901. 6 3 Hunter to Howard, June 8, 1904, and October 2, 1906, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 134 One insecticide did bear some promise, but ironically the Southern Field Crop Insect Investigations did not first discover its possible effectiveness. George D. Smith, under the direction of Wilmon Newell, head of the State Crop Pest Commission of Louisiana, conducted experiments in the spring of 1909 in killing boll weevils with pow- 64 dered arsenate of lead. The total of the experimental plats yielded 71 percent more than the untreated plats. After deduction of the cost of the insecticides and labor, the net profit on the various plats ranged from twenty- seven cents to $23.54 per acre. On only one plat was there a net loss. 65 Newell and Smith published a bulletin under the name of the commission asserting that "never before has the boll weevil been poisoned with profit." But they did not give the poison a universal endorsement, admitting that "it cannot solve the boll weevil problem." It might prove useful in the "hands of careful, painstaking planters," but they theorized that nine out of ten planters would "fail in the use of the powdered arsenate at the first attempt, simply because of failure to apply it at the

64 Wilmon Newell and George D. Smith, Experiments with Powdered Arsenate of Lead as a Practical Boll Weevil Poison, State Crop Pest Commission of Louisiana Circular No. 33 (Baton Rouge, December 1, 1909), p. 251. 6 5 Hunter and Hinds, Mexican Cotton-Boll Weevil, 1912, p. 150. 135 time, in the manner or in the amount recommended."^^ While not conclusive, the results were the most promising yet obtained. The Bureau of Entomology hired George Smith to conduct experiments the next year. The experiments of 1910 at three points in Louisiana and one in Texas showed a profit on twenty plats and a loss on twelve plats. The Bureau of Entomology conducted experiments for several years, but never felt confident in recommending the use of powdered arsenate of lead. The margin of profit was just too slim and unpredictable to give the poison a universal endorsement. Good results depended on timely applications and the penurious application of the poison in order not to negate the financial benefits of increased production. Profitability also depended largely on the season. Yet the experiments on powdered arsenate of lead started the entomologists in the direction of developing calcium arsenate, which did prove economical. Another line of research involved the identification and propagation of boll weevil parasites and predators. Because naturalists had long realized that insects constituted a considerable portion of birds' diets, the Bureau of Entomology sought to determine the effectiveness of birds as controlling agents. The method utilized was to

Newell and Smith, Experiments with Powdered Arsenate of Lead as a Practical Boll Weevil Poison,~p. 252 6 7 Hunter and Hinds, Mexican Cotton-Boll Weevil, 1912, p. 150. : 136 shoot or capture various species of birds and to examine the contents of their stomachs. During the cotton season of 1904-05, Hunter's staff collected approximately one thousand bird stomachs for examination. The examination extended into 1905 with J. C. Crawford of Hunter's staff and the eminent entomologist Eugene A. Schwarz doing most of the work. In many cases, the work was done in Washington, until Schwarz decided in late 1905 that enough information had been gathered and that no .further examinations were required. The Bureau of Entomology extended the examinations a little longer, particularly in the case of quails, "on account of the wide spread popular notions about this bird, and the published statements of the Biological Survey. ..." 71 Presumably the popular notion of the benefits of quail were exaggerated in the view of Hunter. The Bureau of Biological Survey, the precedessor agency of the Fish and Wildlife Service, was then located in the Department of Agriculture. One of its staff, Vernon Bailey,

6 8 Howard to Hunter, May 5, 1905, General Cor- respondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 69 Hunter to Howard, February 18, 1905, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. Howard to Hunter, April 24, 1905, General Cor- respondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. Hunter to Howard, April 28, 1905, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 137 traveled to Texas to identify the birds which feed on 72 weevils. He and A. H. Howell published bulletins in 1904 and in 1906, respectively, on control of boll weevils by birds. Several birds did consume weevils, but not in sufficient quantity to be an effective check on the boll weevil. The concentration on birds as a possible control measure had some benefit for nature lovers by heightening concern over game laws. The Texas Farmer reported in 1901 that farmers in the southern part of Texas were attempting to."enact vigorous laws against the killing of quails at any time of the year. They are regarded as the solution of the boll weevil question." 73 A Texas game law of April 1903 specifically cited the boll weevil as the object of control. The Waco Audubon Society contended that a year under the new law had resulted in an increased number of birds in the state. 75 The prime protagonist of protection for birds as a possible threat to the boll weevil was Isaac W, Brown. "Colonel" Brown, also known

72 Navasota [Texas] Daily Examiner, December 14, 1904, RG 7, NA. 73 Texas Farmer, June 29, 1901, p. 8. 74 Texas, General Laws (1903), p. 222. San Antonio Light, December 18, 1904, RG 7, NA. 138 76 as the "hoosier schoolmaster" and the "Indiana bird and 77 bee man," solicited the financial support of Helen 78 Gould so that he could travel to Texas to promote his theory that "every bird has its bug." 79 Predictably his four days' travel south of Dallas in September 1904 suggested "no better remedy for the cotton curse than 80 to let the birds alone." Brown also went to the

Shreveport convention in December 1904, and won a place on the resolutions committee and the resultant passage 81 of a resolution favoring strict game laws. Prior to the development of effective insecticides, entomologists lavished much attention on the possibility of "natural control" through parasites and predators.

The increasingly effective systematization of numerous insecticides tailored to particular insects resulted in decreased emphasis of parasitism. Environmental concerns over the long-range dangers of pesticides have brought a

76 Ibid., Washington [D.C.] Evening Star, September 13, 1904. 77 Ibid., Indianapolis News, November 1, 1904. 78 Helen Miller Gould, philanthropist and daughter of financier Jay Gould. 79 Indianapolis News, November 1, 1904, RG 7, NA. 80 Ibid., Washington [D.C.] Evening News, September 13, 1904. 81 Ibid., Fort Worth Register, December 14, 1904. 139 rebirth of sorts to the entomological specialty of para- sitology. Parasites live in or on the boll weevil, while predators attack the larvae or boll weevil. Leland 0. Howard's interest in parasitic control, along with the failure to discover an effective insecticide, dictated that the Southern Field Crop Insect Investigations' staff devote considerable time to experiments with parasites. As with the various machines and insecticides, they investigated the nximerous exaggerated accounts concerning various enemies of the boll weevil. A report from Waco about an enemy of the boll weevil prompted Hunter to send an entomologist to secure specimens. Hunter then sent the specimens to Washington for a 82 scientific determination, an act typical of the thoroughness of the Southern Field Crop Insect Investiga- tions in checking out all possibilities. Usually the entomologists played a more activist role in the matter of parasites. From the earliest days of C. H. Tyler Townsend in Texas the representatives tried to identify and breed parasites of the boll weevil. Methods attempting to increase parasitism showed a considerable degree of ingenuity. Besides trying to

82 Hunter to Howard, May 12, 1905, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 140 locate parasites in the areas where the boll weevil had existed previously—Cuba, Mexico, and other Latin American countries—the entomologists sought to identify which indigenous Texas insects would attack the boll weevil. They concentrated on discovering Texas parasites of boll weevils' brethren in the genus Anthonomus to determine if they would also attack the boll weevil larvae. In 19 04, the Southern Field Crop Insect Investigations induced USDA personnel outside the South to ship parasitized northern species of Anthonomus to the South to observe whether the parasites would attack the weevil larvae.T 84 Howard sent one of his agents from Washington to Cordoba, Mexico, to collect and breed various species of beetle parasites for shipment to Texas,^^ Hunter and his men discovered the interesting phenomenon that they could increase the parasitism of boll weevils by destroying the host plants of numerous other weevils in the areas sur- 86 rounding cotton fields. Coincident with the establishment of an experiment station in Tallulah, Louisiana, in 1909, Hunter's staff began making shipments of parasitized

83 Hunter to J. C. Crawford, April 3, 1905, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 84 Ibid., Hunter to Marlatt, March 27, 1906. 85 Ibid., Howard to Hunter, November 25, 1907. 86 Hunter to Howard, August 20, 1907, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 141 cotton squares from Texas to Louisiana. The scientists wanted to establish the parasites in Louisiana. There were insects that destroyed boll weevils but never showed any promise of being important in control. An insect was discovered at Gurley, Louisiana, which attacked boll weevils, but whose distribution was limited and never occurred in large numbers. 87 Similarly, some spiders destroyed weevils but would never be present in sufficient numbers to be effective. In the case of the Argentine ant, the Southern Field Crop insect Investiga- tions staff explored the possibility of its being a boll weevil predator. Previously entomologists had seen it as a household pest. 88 Enthusiasm by entomologists for parasitism and its relative importance in the overall research program vacillated from time to time during the early years but never died. One staff member, W. Dwight Pierce, devoted most of his time to work on parasites and produced the major Department of Agriculture publication on the subject, Leland 0. Howard encouraged the effort, believing, in the words of W. D. Hunter, that "parasites might eventually control the weevil sufficiently for practical purposes."^^

87 Hunter to J. H. Connell, July 25, 1906, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 88 Ibid., Hunter to Ernest R. Barber, January 2, 1912 89 Hunter to Howard, October 19, 1908, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 142 Entomologists found that the weevil migrated eastward faster than its parasites, and establishing previously identified parasites in the newly infested territory was considered necessary. They also found that the weevil attracted previously unknown parasites as it migrated northward and eastward. 90 During the first decade of the twentieth century, the prospects for a high degree of natural control seemed promising. Hunter wrote to a Mexican colleague in 1906, "From the work done up to this time it seems to me that the parasites of the boll weevils are becoming more and more important." 91 .The movement of the boll weevil into a new climatic and physiographic region, the humid Mississippi delta, spurred the bureau to investigate the possibility of increased parasitism there. Natural control was a major item in the research program of the Tallulah, Louisiana, station, established in 1909 to study the boll weevil under Mississippi delta conditions. By 1910, Hunter reported having "many thousands of specimens of parasites bred from the boll weevil" in need of mo\inting and labelling. 92 The entomologists reached several important conclusions from all the research. Barring unforeseen

90 . Birmingham Herald, November 14, 1906, RG 7, NA. 91 Hunter to A. L. Herrera, August 24, 1906, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 92 Hunter to Howard, February 22, 1910, General Correspondence, 1908-1924, RG 7, NA. 143 developments, climate would continue to be the major factor in boll weevil control and would not be replaced by manipulative parasite inducement programs. The possibility of introducing an effective parasite to all the cotton regions had always existed, but it seemed to the entomologists that the larger degree of control would be derived from indigenous insects of each locality. By destroying the host plants of these parasites, farmers could increase parasitism on the weevil. Infested squares still hanging from the plant exhibited higher percentages of parasite control than fallen squares. The difference suggested the possibility of encouraging farmers to develop and adopt cotton varieties with a tendency to retain infested squares. 93 Staff members made observations on outstanding local examples of insect control. An examination made near Athens, Texas, on August 1, 1907, revealed that insects killed 96.11 percent of weevils in squares. Halletsville, Texas, had 92 percent control as of August 1, 1908. Other outstanding examples of parasitic control were, of course, local aberrations, but the average parasitism for the years 1906-09 deemed parasites a "factor of importance" in boll weevil control. 9 4

93 Hunter and Hinds, Mexican Cotton-Boll Weevil, 1912, pp. 144-45. ' ~ 94 ^^Ibid. 144 The "great encouragement" 95 from these observations induced entomologists to continue giving "natural control" a prominent niche in their research programs, at least until the development of effective insecticides threw emphasis to incremental advances in insecticide efficacy. One predatory control plan merits special attention because of the attendant publicity given to it. Supported by the Department of Agriculture, the project was on a large scale. The USDA initiated various importation schemes of various insects thought to be of potential control value on American agricultural pests. Through the years, the department became increasingly circumspect because a supposedly beneficial imported insect could prove to be an agricultural pest. The predator in this case was the kelep or Guatemalan ant, Ectatomma tuber- culatum. Orator F. Cook, botanist in charge of Investiga- tions in Tropical Agriculture for the Bureau of Plant Industry, discovered the ant and promoted its introduction into the United States. Cook traveled to Guatemala and other Central American countries in 19 02 to study coffee and rubber plantations and in the course of his investigations transmitted specimens of the boll weevil and some cotton plants back to Washington. The absence of boll weevils from the plants suggested further investigation.

^^Ibid., p. 144 145 Cook returned to Guatemala in 1904 and located an ant 9 6 predator of the weevils. The Secretary of Agriculture authorized a plan to import ant colonies to the Souths no doubt at the behest of Beverly T. Galloway, chief of the Bureau of Plant Industry. The Bureau of Entomology objected less to importing ants than to the publicity given the latest panacea. Galloway released information to the press about the plan before Cook collected the colonies. Hunter reported sarcastically to Howard about the public response in Texas to the latest plan: The very sanguine accounts of the ant discovery in Guatemala, sent out by Dr. Galloway, are attracting a great deal of attention in Texas. . . . One result of this has been that at least half a dozen persons in Texas have suddenly discovered that their fields have been cleared of weevils by ants.^^ Cook embarked for New Orleans with eighty-nine ant colonies on the steamer Olympia in late June 1904.^^ Public knowledge of the impending arrival provoked speculation that the kelep ant might become an insect 99 pest. Newspaper accounts related that Ross L. Clark,

96 Orator F. Cook, An Enemy of the Cotton Boll Weevil, U.S. Department of Agriculture Report No. 78 (Washington, D.C., 1904), pp. 2-3. 97 Hunter to Howard, June 1, 1904, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 98 Howard to Hunter, July 1, 1904, enclosure Beverly T. Galloway to 0. F. Cook, June 30, 1904, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 99 Ibid., Howard to Hunter, June 8, 1904. 146 a planter of Houston, fearful that th.e carnivorous insects might eat the cotton, planned to file for an injunction to prevent bringing the ants to Texas. Clark suggested that the ants would sting the cotton pickers' feet, making it impossible to harvest the crop. Proponents of the project, mainly Cook, held that since the Central Americans did not wear shoes, the argument was invalid. According to newspaper accounts. Senator Joseph W. Bailey of Texas also opposed the plan. Mindful of some well- founded criticism, Howard ordered Hunter to construct an "absolutely impervious receptacle" for the insects at Victoria.-"-^-^ After Cook arrived at Victoria on July 11, 1901, the workers established several colonies and began distributing colonies to other Texas points where the USDA had facilities. 104 Cook temporarily became an employee of the Bureau of Entomology. The interest in the new

Wichita [Kansas] Eagle, July 16, 1904, SFCII, RG 7, NA. Ibid., Houston Post, July 6, 1904. 102 Ibid., Charlotte [North Carolina] Observer, July 24, 1904. Howard to Hunter, June 8, 1904, General Cor- respondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 104 Hunter to Howard, July 11, 1904, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. Howard to Hunter, July 29, 1904, General Cor- respondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 147 insect was such that one staff member at Victoria devoted most of his time to showing the ant colonies to visitors. According to newspaper accounts, many Texas farmers requested colonies for their farms, but the department wanted to keep them under observation. The San Francisco Bulletin urged the World's Fair management to hold a magnified exhibition of a battle between the ant and the boll weevil. "The whole world at the fair might gaze spellbound at such an encounter and applaud its outcome—for the little brown ant is always the victor, and his victory means that the world's cotton crops are hereafter to be harvested for man's use."'^^^ The Guatemalan ant received attention, not only in the southern press. It was the type of publicity that the Bureau of Entomology did not want. Although Orator Cook was enthusiastic about the experiment's prospects, he cooperated with Hunter in trying to quell overzealous claims. He informed newspapers that the project was "but an Experi- ment," and the bureau "would not have the farmers of Texas hold false hopes of relief through this means."

Ibid., Hunter to Howard, July 25, 1904. 107 Elgin [Illinois] Daily News, July 28, 1904, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 108 Ibid., San Francisco Bulletin, July 17, 1904. 109 Ibid., Corsicana [Texas] Daily Sun, July 19, 1904. 148 The experiment's main object was to determine if the ants could survive the winter. In March 1905, Hunter and J. D. Mitchell examined the fields at Victoria and could find no living kelep or Guatemalan ants. Never enthusiastic about the project, Hunter asked hopefully of Howard, "Doesn't this about settle the whole ant business?" The "whole ant business" was not settled. 0. P. Cook contended that a lack of food and the location in poorly drained areas, not cold weather, resulted in the ants' demise. Cook, probably through the influence of Beverly T. Galloway with the Secretary of Agriculture, succeeded in importing colonies in 1905, 1906, and 1907. The North American climate proved victorious in each instance, and yet another hope of the cotton farmer perished. The Lake Charles American indulged in anthropomorphism in its obituary for the Guatemalan ant: "The boll weevil is picking his teeth and notifying the authorities that if they have any more Guatemalan ants to send 'em on."112

The Bureau of Plant Industry undertook cotton variety development as another area of research for the Department of Agricultxire. Unlike the work on life history

Hunter to Howard, March 2, 1905, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. mibid. , April 4, 1905. 112 Lake Charles [Louisiana] American, September 17, 1906, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 149 and control measures (where the Department of Agriculture carried most of the burden during the early years), state experiment stations, seed companies, and individuals made significant contributions. The monetary rewards to be garnered from farmers' acceptance of a superior variety dictated that private enterprise would play a large role in"cotton development. The selection and breeding of cotton in the South had a distinguished history. It began long before the influence of the boll weevil on cotton culture led to a boom in federal and state research activities. Cotton planters on the eastern seaboard, with little knowledge of genetics or plant breeding theory, developed expertise in observing, sorting, and selecting. The result from the native stock obtained in the late eighteenth century from the Bahamas was the various strains and varieties of Sea Island cotton. To one expert on cotton varieties, these strains constituted some of the "finest cotton the 113 world has ever known." The quality of the long-staple cotton made it desirable for spinning; that the lint could be separated from the smooth black seeds mechanically by roller gins made it a commercial reality. The plantation system with its large labor force and the prospect

113 J. 0. Ware, "Plant Breeding and the Cotton Industry," Yearbook of Agriculture, 19 36, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C,, 1936), p. 658. 150 of increased income for better quality prompted planters to undertake the labor-consuming process of developing and refining varieties. The plantation system in the Natchez district was the next center of cotton improvement. Planters of the lower Mississippi produced a Siamese variety, known locally as Black Seed or Creole cotton. The strain had qualities similar to the Sea Island cotton, notably the long staple and white coloration desired by spinners. More importantly, roller gins could separate the lint from the seed, making it a viable plantation staple. By the time the cotton disease known as the "rot" seriously hampered the Creole cotton industry, the Whitney cotton gin had transfoirmed the upland cottons from a home industry to a commercial crop. Replacing Creole cotton was a cross between the upland Georgia Green Seed cotton and a variety imported from Mexico by Walter Burling of Natchez in 1806. The hybridization retained the best qualities of both and became the parent for southern cottons. The capital and labor of the plantation system combined with the tendency of hybrids to deteriorate on inferior lands supported a considerable breeding and selling industry in the Natchez region during the antebellum period.

114 John Hebron Moore, Agriculture in Ante-Belltim Mississippi (New York: Twayne Pxiblishers, Inc., 1958; rpt. ed.. New York: Octagon Books, 1971), pp. 27-36; "Cotton Breeding in the Old South," Agricultural History 30 (July 1956): 95-104. 151 There is some speculation that the disruption of the plantation system led to a deterioration in cotton quality. Nevertheless, certain varieties with qualities conducive to their particular geographic regions became established. Staple length bore some rough relationship to the length of the growing season. The legf^h and ^ uniformity of the staple were the primary market considerations in determining price. Farmers concerned themselves with finding a long staple cotton that would mature the bolls before frost. Cotton left hanging from bolls for several weeks during the cold and rain of late fall and winter was damaged in quality, but it was not a prime consideration. The boll weevil disrupted the axioms upon which farmers based the selection of a cotton variety. It soon became obvious that the expansion of the weevil population through the summer placed a premium on obtaining an early crop. Early planting was one answer, early maturing varieties another. Farmers looked to the northern portions of the cotton belt where natural selection and breeding produced earlier cottons than those in south Texas. Farmers began to search for a suitable substitute. Many farmers near Hearne, Robertson County, bought seed from north Texas for the 1901 season. 115

■'■■'■^Galveston News, April 16, 1901, RG 7, NA, 152 The work of the Dallas Boll Weevil Convention in fostering the shipment of early cotton seed to Texas has been mentioned previously. The state entomologist of Texas, E. Dwight Sanderson, advised farmers through an article in the Texas Farmer to purchase seed "from as far north as Virginia, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Kansas, or Missouri, if possible, as seed from the north will mature a crop two or three weeks earlier than local seed." The Dallas Jobbers' Cotton Seed Association had an agent in North Carolina in early 1904. By mid-February, he had shipped nineteen carloads to Texas. Most of the seed came from reputable cotton breeders in the eastern cotton belt who sold "pvire" seed of uniform quality and variety. Yet the rush to buy northern seed in Texas and the high price led to some unscrupulous selling of "common" seed. Varietal experiments under boll weevil conditions became a natural part of any research program. W. D. Hunter ordered many well-known varieties from the northern and eastern portions of the cotton belt in his early years in Texas. His goal was to determine their relative productiveness under the boll weevil's attack. With the passage of large appropriations for the season

E. Dwight Sanderson and Wilmon Newell, "The Mexican Cotton Boll Weevil," Texas Farmer, March 21, 1903, p. 2. 117 Texas Farmer, February 20, 1904, p. 12. 153 of 1904, investigations into cotton varieties became a province of the Bureau of Plant Industry. The Bureau of Entomology continued to utilize several varieties in their experiments, but R. L. Bennett, working in cooperation with the Texas Agricultural Experiment Station, became the main cotton researcher and expert on the varieties under boll weevil conditions. Both Bennett and Hunter early saw problems with the indiscriminate planting of early varieties. Hunter voiced his objections when Beverly T. Galloway notified him in November 1903 of a movement in Congress. The plan was to direct the Department of Agriculture to buy and distribute one thousand tons of early cotton seed for emergency distribution in Texas. After leaving the Dallas convention of late 1903, Galloway and Secretary of Agriculture Wilson encountered a number of men prepared to buy large quantities of seed from the Indian Territory for sale in Texas. The secretary acquiesced. In fact, the department had already purchased four thousand bushels of Parker seed, four thousand bushels of King seed, and two thousand bushels of Shines for distribution in Texas. The members of the Texas congressional delegation wanted to purchase a much larger amount, one thousand tons, not for variety tests, but to increase the state's cotton production under boll weevil conditions. Common seed bought at gins in north- Texas 154 and the Indian Territory cost fourteen to fifteen dollars per ton while commercially produced King and Parker seed cost sixty dollars per ton. The members wanted to distribute common gin seed in large quantities. Galloway wanted the information kept confidential so as not to boost cotton seed prices, and requested Hunter's opinion of the plan. 118 Hunter replied. Have experimented with and observed much north Texas and Indian Territory seed planted in southern and central Texas. Do not consider it half as good as King, Shine, or Parker for weevil purposes. Would consider it unwise for Department to become concerned in distributing such seed.119 Evidently, Hunter's views prevailed. Even the supposedly pure seed that the department purchased was not of the best quality. One of Seaman A, Knapp's agents sent Hunter a sample of the Parker seed distributed by the USDA. It consisted of about half lint and damaged bolls, and the quality was so poor that it clogged machines in planting. The King seed was of more uniform quality. The department had sent out warnings to be ptoblished in the press about the purchase of impure seed, but by distributing some itself, the department did nothing to enhance its reputation with Texas farmers. Hunter stated that "the Department has taken a very

118 Beverly T. Galloway to Hunter, November 19, 190 3, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 119 Ibid., Hunter to Beverly T. Galloway, November 23, 1903. 155 definite stand to prevent the sale of fraudulent seed— in fact a secret service agent was sent to North Carolina 120 to look into the matter." The department had little or no statutory authority to take any action; pure seed laws came later. R. L. Bennett conducted variety tests in 1904. He published his findings on the factors that control early fruiting, rapid fruiting, and productiveness. Bennett advised farmers to use his instructions in selecting bolls of early cotton from their "native Texas big boll cotton." Although Bennett probably objected to the inferior quality and staple of the early imported seed, he emphasized to farmers the need to avoid "importing 121 seed at great expense." He also claimed that farmers did not gain anything in planting short staple cottons. They brought a lower price and did not produce any earlier or more prolifically than the native "big boll" varieties."^^^ The experiences of farmers with the short staple cottons and the response of cotton buyers were more influential than the recommendations of the USDA experts.

120 Hunter to W. M. Bamberge, March 26, 1904, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 121 R. L. Bennett, Cotton Breeding, Breeding an Early, Rapid Fruiting and Productive Cotton, Texas Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin No. 79 (College Station, October 1905), p. 1. 122 Texas Farmer, October 22, 1904, p. 8. 156 The imported seed lacked the quality bred into Texas cottons over several decades that gave them a high resistance to shedding locks of fiber during strong winds. "Stormproof," not only referred to this quality, but was often used to designate native Texas cotton. Cotton pickers, paid on a per-pound basis, could pick more of the other varieties than they could of the King variety. Thus, some of Hxinter's cooperative farmers had difficulty in getting the King cotton picked while other cotton was available for picking. 123 Cotton buyers objected to the quality. One of Hunter's staff encountered a cotton buyer from Liverpool, England. He reported on the conversation: I had a talk with a Liverpool cotton buyer who said that they were told not to take King staple if they could avoid it, as it is weak, short & lacks spinning qualities. King staple here he says averages 5/8 inch, which as I remember is greatly under what it is represented. He suggested that maybe the extensive use of fertilizer in the east kept up the length. He seemed certain that King would yield a much lower price. Lastly that they were avoiding San Antonio cotton because there was so much King there.^24 The several objections had an effect on businessmen and particularly on cotton buyers in Texas. The Texas Farmer in 1904 reported the disbanding of a group of Dallas

■^^■^J. C. Crawford to Hunter, September 23, 1906, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 124 Ibid., August 26, 1904. 157 businessmen formed in 1903 to import seed. The group was probably the aforementioned Dallas Jobbers' Cotton Seed

Association. The organization came to the "general opinion that selected early Texas seed is better."

The Galveston Cotton Exchange passed resolutions objecting to the early cottons because they merited a lower price I2fi due to the short staple. Eventually the cotton varieties that predominated in Texas were derivatives of the native cottons. The Texas Agricultural Experiment

Station, the Department of Agriculture, and private breeders concentrated on short-jointed, big-boll, stormproof, and high lint yield qualities, with the added 127 dimension of early fruiting. Even so, the process of getting farmers to buy or select uniform quality seed was a long and slow one. In 19 07, Hunter estimated that

75 percent of the cotton planted in Texas was of common 12 8 "gin seed" variety.

The boll weevil caused dislocation in cotton production in other areas of the South where fine long staple cotton predominated. Particularly, this was the case in the Mississippi delta where the long growing season.

125 Texas Farmer, November 5, 1904, p. 9.

■"■^^Ibid., October 22, 1904, p. 8. 127 Ware, "Plant Breeding and the Cotton Industry," p. 702. 128 Hunter to Howard, March 24, 1907, General Cor- respondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 158 moisture, and fertile alluvial soil produced excellent long staple cottons. The varieties also produced tall, heavily foliaged or "rank" cotton, especially conducive to supporting large weevil populations. Newspapers reported considerable shifting from long staple to short staple cotton in the Mississippi and Yazoo deltas."^^^ Cotton breeders succeeded in developing several strains of cotton that retained some of the better characteristics of the standard cottons of the area. Early C. Ewing and Harry B. Brown, both of the Mississippi Agricultural Experiment Station, and later with Delta & Pine Land Company and the Stoneville Pedigreed Seed Company, respectively, made important contributions."^"^^ Ewing discovered and refined the first widely adopted substitute in the delta. D. N. Shoemaker, a USDA employee, developed Express cotton, which, the department hoped would be tailored to Texas. Ewing, then a USDA employee, observed the trial plantings in Texas in 1909 and 1910. The department was ready to abandon the variety, when Ewing, having moved to the Mississippi Agricultural Experiment Station, decided Express might be the parent of a good delta cotton. Express soon supplanted

129 Jackson [Mississippi]Evening News, March 24, 1909; Atlanta Morning Journal, February 18, 1912, RG 7, NA. Ware, "Plant Breeding and the Cotton Industry," p. 670. 159 the older varieties in the alluvial lands of the Mississippi valley. Ewing refined the original Express, and these new strains soon became accepted in the delta. Harry B. Brown contributed Stoneville, a cotton appropriate for several physiographic areas, including the delta. His Delfos strains eventually replaced Ewing's Express in the 132 Mississippx delta. David R. Coker and his Coker's Pedigreed Seed Company at Hartsville, South Carolina, developed many of the varieties planted in the upper and piedmont South. There were innumerable cotton breeders at other state experiment stations and seed companies who made contributions as they sought to match a particular cotton to soil type and climate, and yet lessen the damage by the boll weevil. Prior to the boll weevil's arrival on the Atlantic seaboard, many suspected that the Sea Island cotton industry, with its requirement for a long growing season, was doomed. They were correct. The Department of Agri- culture sought a substitute variety of cotton. A breakthrough seemed possible in a variety developed by Roland M. Meade of Clarksville, Texas. From a plant selected in 1912, a large black seed produced one and one-half inch lint, more like Sea Island cotton than any upland cotton yet

■'■^■'■Ibid., pp. 703-4. ■"■^^Ibid., pp. 673, 704-5. 160 developed. The experimental planting of Meade cotton on James Island, South Carolina, in 1916 prompted USDA officials to try it throughout the old Sea Island cotton area. There were more than ten thousand acres planted between 1920 and 1922, but by 1925, the variety was largely abandoned. Inattention to the mixing of seed and pollination with other upland varieties deteriorated the once-superb cotton, and buyers rejected it. 133 Attributes of the cotton plant other than early maturity were possibilities in boll weevil control. Cotton breeders sought to attain these qualities. Less foliage in relationship to the number of bolls where cotton tended to grow "rank" would decrease the amount of shade that protected weevils from the sun. Where parasitism was higher on hanging than fallen squares, plants. with an ability to retain infested squares were desirable. 134 The development of plants with hairy limbs to impede the movement of weevils on the plant received some attention. Plant pathologists have studied the structure and growth rate of the buds and squares in resisting weevil attacks. Orator F. Cook, the importer of the Guatemalan ant, also imported Kekchi cotton from Guatemala. The growth of the bud was evidently so rapid

■"■^■^Ibid., pp. 690-91. 134 Hunter to Howard, October 19, 1908, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA, 161 that it closed over the punctures, killing the larvae. The cotton did not become competitive with united States varieties when imported.

The cotton boll weevil was directly responsible for greatly increased research and development of cotton varieties, designed for particular soil and climate types The farmers' increasing tendency to purchase commercially produced seed rather than planting "gin seed" can also be seen as an improvement. The detrimental effects of the boll weevil were more preponderant. Breeders and cotton farmers, over several decades, had arrived at the cotton most desirable for a particular area. The shift to short staple cottons resulted in the irretrievable loss of many of the earlier long staple cottons. The USDA's expert on the history of cotton varieties wrote in 1936 that "many excellent varieties of long-staple upland cotton and practically all the better types of medium-staple were lost within a comparatively short time.""*""^^ Varieties became badly mixed, and American long staple upland cottons lost their preferred place in the world market. Robert L. Hunt in his recollections of farm life in east Texas capsulized the deterioration of cotton

135 Ware, "Plant Breeding and the Cotton Industry," pp. 687-88. 136^, ., Ibid., p. 661. 162 quality. Commenting, on farmers who resorted to the infamous and universally rejected Half and Half variety of very short staple but productive cotton. Hunt wrote: Another type of disaster struck East Texas about 1905 when the Mexican boll weevil hit the area. At first farmers resorted to every method of control they knew but with no luck. They tried switches tied to the singletrees on their plows, plowed cotton in the summer months and tried new varieties. It was the latter that made the half- and-half variety so popular in East Texas as farmers thought it produced earlier and would make more cotton. When buyers learned this half-and- half produced a short staple and spinners docked it because of short staple, farmers would plant one row of half-and-half and one row of Powden or some other variety that would produce a longer staple and would mix the two varieties by mixing the cotton when picking cotton. No wonder the spinners of the world started complaining about the quality of Texas cotton.137 It was a scene repeated across the South. Cotton experts'- protestations against varieties such as Half and Half and their rejection by cotton buyers made some inroads against their use, but the damage had been wrought. 138

137 Robert L. Hunt, Sr., Recollection of Farm Life (San Antonio, Texas, 1965), pp. 66-67. ■"■•^^E. R. Lloyd to Alfred C. True, April 12, 1915, Mississippi, State Correspondence, RG 164, NA. CHAPTER V

KNAPP OR HUNTER: WHO SHOULD SPEAK TO THE FARMER?

The work of the Department of Agriculture on scientific solutions to the boll weevil problem comprised only a part of the agency's effort. The department sought to promote diversification of southern agriculture and the acceptance of better agricultural methods, both in terms of agricultural and business practices. Throughout its history, the department attempted to improve agriculture by providing statistical information, investigating plant and animal insects and diseases, and importing plants, In the early twentieth century, the USDA moved to the role of advocate for agricultural change by improving the methods of the individual farmer. The work in the South involved questions larger than the boll weevil problem, mainly those of reliance on one crop and poor agricultural methods and business practices. But there is no doubt that the cotton boll weevil provided the impetus for the department's new role in the South. The authorization and funding for the work came in the boll weevil appropriation act of 1904. William J. Spillman of the Bureau of Plant Industry had responsibility for demonstrating to southern farmers the feasibility of

163 164 operating a farm profitably, without total dependence on cotton. The process involved studying the most successful farms in operation to determine the desirable ratios of acreage devoted to particular crops in relationship to the size of the farm. Next came the attempt to induce farmers to diversify their operations. Spillman made a few farm surveys as early as 1902, primarily in the North and West. With the passage of the appropriation act of 1904, he received funds to establish a series of demonstration experiment farms in the South. The Spillman solution to agricultural change in the South would be a long, evolutionary one. Like the scientific studies in the Bureau of Entomology, his work required time for study by a limited nxomber of academically trained experts. His few model demonstration farms would attract the attention of the informed agricultural intelligentsia, but of few struggling farmers. The concept of studying farm methods and demonstrating the better ones was well conceived. It has been of considerable import, but mainly over an extended time. The education of the southern farmers on changing their farming system to accommodate the boll weevil's presence came from the work of the most successful and

Gladys L. Baker, et al.. Century of Service; The First 100 Years of the United States Department of Agri- culture, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington. P.C., 1963), p. 43. 165 lauded propagandist American agriculture has yet seen. Seaman Asahel Knapp. Knapp's system of instructing farmers relied on a large group of agents with practical farming experience who visited and instructed individual farmers. The dearth of college-trained agriculturalists and the demand for their talents meant that a large nxomber of agents were non-college types with farming experience. Knapp envisioned a system of farmer-operated demonstration farms under his supervision, spaced in communities so as to make.them accessible for viewing to a large number of farmers. The "extension" concept of disbursing the knowledge of the scientific agricultural community—the land grant colleges in most cases—had its antecedents in farmers' institutes, correspondence, services to 2 farmers, and college-operated correspondence courses. Knapp added the element of localized supervision on a continuous basis, and provided the movement that resulted in its institutionalization as the Extension Service. Seaman A. Knapp was born at Schroon Lake, New York, in 1833. After graduation from Union College, he taught at the Troy Conference Academy until a serious accident interrupted this career. He then moved to Big Grove, Iowa, and successively operated a farm, served as the

2 For a discussion of agricultural extension work prior to the Smith-Lever Act, see Roy V. Scott, The Reluctant Farmer; The Rise of Agricultural Extension to 1914 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970) . 166 minister of a Methodist church, superintended the state school for the blind, and edited the Western Stock Journal and Farmer. In 1879, he began a second teaching career as professor of agriculture at Iowa State College and became the institution's president in 1884. Knapp's restlessness, combined with the land development scheme of Jabez B. Watkins, a Lawrence, Kansas, banker, resulted in a move to southwest Louisiana in 1885. He utilized a series of demonstration farmers, usually one to a township, to induce midwestern farmers to migrate to the prairies of southwestern Louisiana. The discovery by some midwestern immigrants that rice prospered on the prairie soil and an adjustment in the Deering Twine Binder launched the Louisiana rice industry there. Knapp was off to a new career. The selection of an old Iowa State College colleague, "Tama Jim" Wilson, as secretary of agriculture brought several appointments for foreign plant exploration, beginning in 189 8. In the summer of 1902, Wilson appointed Knapp "Special Agent for the Promotion of Agriculture in the South." The "promotion" of agriculture revolved primarily around the introduction and acclimatization

3 Dumas Malone, ed.. Dictionary of American Biography (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933), 10: 452-53. 4 Joseph C. Bailey, Seaman A. Knapp; Schoolmaster of American Agriculture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), pp. 109-32. 167 of plants on farms in the South's various geographical sections. It was not a new crop, but the southern staple, cotton, and its relatively new pest, the boll weevil, that afforded Knapp the opportunity to prove his contention that the "demonstration technique" was the vehicle for improving American agriculture. Knapp's first project in an area infested by the boll weevil was at the Terrell, Texas, farm of Walter C. Porter in 1903. Knapp's biographer, Joseph C. Bailey, contends that the experiment was not designed to illustrate improvement under boll weevil conditions. He cites the Bureau of Plant Industry's statement that the objective was to show "marked financial advantage" from the "better methods of soil culture" and "growing diversified crops." From the use of diversified crops and the Bureau of Entomology's "cultural method," Porter claimed to have garnered $700 more than would have been the case with an area farm of similar size devoted totally to cotton cultivation under g existing methods. Whatever Knapp's intent, the Porter demonstration farm of 1903 would be regarded by county agents as their point of origin, and commonly associated with the attempt to control the cotton boll weevil.

^Ibid., pp. 133-48. ^Ibid., p. 175, 168 Beverly T. Galloway, chief of the Bureau of Plant Industry, assigned $40,000 of the 1904 appropriation to Knapp. He established the headquarters of the Fanners' Cooperative Demonstration Work in Houston, Texas,, in January 19 04. The appropriation act, designed specifically to combat the boll weevil, essentially limited Knapp to establishing demonstration farms in the boll weevil areas. Knapp promoted his plan through meetings with merchants, bankers, railroad presidents, and other prominent citizens of the southern towns. He hired twenty-three agents for 1904, all for Texas, except three for Louisiana and one for Arkansas. The agents travelled the railroad lines, stopping in the small towns to enlist demonstrators. The operators of "demonstration farms" originally grew a single crop under supervision. Later, the term referred to a farm on which all crops were grown under the supervision of one of Knapp's agents. A farmer visiting a "demonstration farm," and viewing the system favorably, might sign up to be a "cooperator." He agreed to cultivate his crop by the prescribed method. Time permitting, the agent would visit his farm. The agent's primary responsibility was to supervise the "demonstrators" and spread the gospel wherever and whenever possible. During the first year. Knapp reported 7,000 farmers agreeing to use his recommendations, and over 1,000 meetings held. During the formative period, the Farmers' Cooperative Demonstration Work experienced steady increases 169 in its funding, number of agents, and territory covered. The financial support of the General Education Board, a philanthropic-educational institution founded by John D. Rockefeller, beginning in 19 06, led to the expansion of the number of agents. The support of the board enabled Knapp to send agents in advance of the boll weevil to educate farmers. The federal authorization permitted work only in the boll weevil-infested areas. It also permitted Knapp to supplement his traveling agents with men attending to the needs of one community or county. Knapp believed a county would provide financial support to an agriculturalist who would devote full time to its specific interests. Smith County, Texas, made such an offer, and W. C. Stallings became the first "county agent" on November 12, 1906. The enlistment of the counties to support agents continued apace. Knapp also 7 added black agents to his staff. White agents, likewise, worked with black farmers. The education system among farmers by the utilization of local agents gained permanent status with the passage of the Smith-Lever Act in 1914. The life of the early traveling agents was far different from that of the later sedentary county agent

7 Alfred C. True, A History of Agricultural Extension Work in the United States, 1785-192 3, U.S. Department of Agricultural Miscellaneous Publication No. 15 (Washington, D.C., 1928), pp. 60-64. 170 situated in an office at the county seat. Hunter became a frequent correspondent and supplier of entomological bulletins to one of Knapp's agents, W. M. Bamberge. Bamberge went to Mississippi in late 1905 to educate farmers about the "cultural method" prior to the boll weevil's arrival there. He wrote to Hunter in January 1906 from Jackson, Mississippi: For the next forty to fifty days I can use from 25 to 100 [bulletins] per day. You see I am now making my school house campaign, and making from 3 to 4 talks each day. I am of the opinion that the literature I give to the farmer after my talk, has more attention paid to it than bulletins broadcasted through the mail. I have now 42 Demonstration farms and 22 co- operatives, and I am just starting into the co-operator hustling. I will average three talks a day next week, and fully two a day until planting time.° Later, Bamberge and the other agents devoted the summer months to supervising the demonstrators. The reception of the agents evidently varied with the locality. Bamberge went to Oklahoma in November 1907 to conduct again his "school house campaign" but received less attention than in Mississippi. The Ardmore Ardmorite reported in December that "farmers do not seem to care whether the boll weevil eats them up or not next year." They failed to attend the meetings. Bamberge advertised several meetings in Marshall County. He drove twenty-four g W. M. Bamberge to Hunter, January 20, 1906 General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 171 miles to one but was greeted by not a single farmer. Either the spectre of the boll weevil or Bamberge's energy stirred farmers later. By mid-February 1908, he reported having made speeches at ninety-one localities and securing 2,504 cooperators. Agents such as Baraberge essentially served as interpreters and conduits of information from the scientific b\ireaus of the Department of Agriculture to the farmers. Previously, each of the semi-autonomous bureaus communicated its findings through scientific bulletins and articles in farm journals. The common complaint, even directed toward Farmers' Bulletins designed for general distribution, was that they were too technical for average farmers. The size of the agricultural scientific community was too small for any degree of personal contact with dirt farmers. Their position as an elite, having not only college but graduate-level training, ill-equipped them to proselytize among the masses. It was up to the county agents, then and today, to translate recent findings by scientists to practices on the farm. When Seaman A. Knapp and his colleagues believed that recommendations were impractical on the average-size farm, problems arose. Such was the case between Beverly T. Galloway and Knapp

9 Ardmore [Oklahoma Territory] Ardmorite, December 12, 1907, SFCII, RG 7, NA. Ibid., February 9, 1908. 172 on one side, and Walter D. Hunter and Leland 0. Howard on the other. The Bureau of Entomology quickly came to feel.that Knapp was agitating questions long since resolved by experiments. Soon after the establishment of Knapp's office at Houston, the Texas Farmer reported that some trials by Knapp's assistant, George W. Curtis, with trap rows showed promise for boll weevil control. Denials by Knapp and Curtis as the source of the story resolved that problem quickly. 12 The question of recommending Paris green on early cotton resulted in a clash on the questions of coordinating the department's efforts and the semi-independent status of Knapp. Curtis sent an April 14, 1904, circular to the agents, stating that many farmers had requested information about the efficacy of Paris green on early leaves and buds. He asked the agents to direct the use of Paris green by demonstrators and to observe the results. On April 22, the former lieutenant governor of Texas, George T. Jester, showed the circular to Hunter» The incident occurred simultaneously with the Bureau of Entomology's efforts to counteract the influence of

Texas Farmer, February 20, 1904, p. 12. 12 Hunter to Howard, February 23, 1904, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. Ibid., George W. Curtis to "My Dear Sir," April 14, 1904. 173 Captain B. W. Marston and his promotion of Paris green. Hunter believed that it involved the Farmers' Cooperative Demonstration Work in "strictly entomological" efforts, the province of the Bureau of Entomology .'^"'^ Hunter traveled to Houston to meet with Knapp. According to Hunter's account of the conversation. Knapp stated that he did not have to submit his statements to the Bureau of Entomology or to his superior. Galloway, for approval. Hunter informed him that it was departmental policy to submit publications to other bureaus when two or more bureaus were involved in the work: Dr. Knapp's rejoinder to this was that he was placed in independent charge of the making of a cotton crop by 5000 cooperative farmers in Texas, and that, regardless of recommendations by the Department or any individuals, he was determined to try anything that seemed to him to be promising.15 Coincidentally, Knapp's superior, Beverly T. Galloway, was in Houston to visit Knapp. Hunter outlined the problem of the "hyper-independence" of Knapp. Galloway replied that he had come to Texas "to bring Dr. Knapp into closer touch with his office." On the point of scientific research and recommendations. Galloway had some disparaging remarks about the "traditional cocksure- ness of the Division of Entomology." Thereafter, Hunter

14 Ibid., Hunter to Howard, May 16, 1904.

■^^Ibid. ^^Ibid, 174 and Knapp exchanged a few cordial notes. Knapp sent out a circular advising his agents not to recommend Paris green and citing previous publications of the Division of Entomology on the subject. Reports of Knapp's interviews in the press on the subject of Paris green particularly pleased Hunter. 17 Harmony existed, if only for a very short time. The Houston newspapers in late May 1904 included an interview with Knapp about a new insect predator of the boll weevil discovered in Oklahoma. Evidently the news^ papers made great claims about the possible value of the insect. Hunter commented ruefully to Howard: "It is this propensity to talk before he has a sound basis in fact that is the cause of the expression now becoming quite a by-word in Texas that the Government seems to be attempting 18 to kill the boll weevil by means of 'hot air.'" Knapp explained that the reporter "manufactured" the story. 19 Hunter accepted the matter as "laughable" but added that "the unfortunate feature [was] that a great many people believe implicitly in what they see in the newspapers."

17 Seaman A. Knapp to "Dear Sir," April 30, 1904; Seaman A. Knapp to Hunter, April 29 and May 2, 1904; Hunter to Seaman A. Knapp, April 26, May 3, and May 7, 1904, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 18 Hunter to Howard, May 30, 1904, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 19 Seaman A. Knapp to Hunter, June 1, 1904, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 20 Ibid., Hunter to Knapp, June 2, 19 04. 175 Meetings between Howard and Galloway in Washington brought out some of the complaints of their representatives in the field. Howard and Hunter wanted all entomological questions referred to them. On the side of the Bureau of Plant Industry, Doctor Knapp complains that you [Hunter] are too ready with your opinions about methods of cultivation of crops, and that other people in Texas told Doctor Galloway that in their opinion you should " confine yourself to entomological matters, and not express ex cathedra [sic] opinions on crop cultivation matters.21 But the Bureau of Plant Industry had some opinions on entomological questions. Galloway believed that Hunter had given the coup de grace to Paris green prior to sufficient testing: "He thinks that you have no right to express your opinion so positively on the subject of poisoning and mechanical methods without further large- scale field experiments." 22 Howard defended Hunter: "I told him I did not think he was competent to judge such matters." 23 Further consultatxon between Knapp and Hunter suggested itself, and Hunter promised, in talking with Knapp, to "lay aside studiously any personal feelings that may have been engendered by recent occurrences, and 24 start at the beginning again with Dr. Knapp."

21 Ibid., Howard to Hunter, June 2, 1904. 22 23 Ibid. "ibid. 24 Hunter to Howard, June 10, 1904, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 176 The convention of Knapp's cooperative farmers in Houston in October 1904 provided the next source of friction. Knapp did not invite Hunter, but Howard directed him to attend anyway. 25 According to Hunter, "Dr. Knapp entered upon a considerable eulogy of Dr. Galloway as the sole person in the Department who has helped Texas in the weevil fight; but 'Howard,' arid 'Bureau of Entomology' were terms that were not heard at all." Hunter found the treatment he received "humiliating, to say the least."^^ Knapp's remarks at the convention led to a controversy over the origin of the "cultural method" of boll weevil control. Hunter wrote to him, "As you are aware, the present cultural system is the result of nearly ten years' work by the Bureau of Entomology." 27 Knapp responded that "the present cultural system mainly in use in Texas is the one we have promulgated." To Knapp, the cultural methods, "with slight modifications, . . . were known as well fifty years ago as today." 28 Such questions were seldom resolved, merely lying in abeyance.

25 Ibid., Hunter to Howard, October 18, 1904. ^^Ibid., October 20, 1904. 27 Hunter to Seaman A. Knapp, October 24, 1904, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. . 28 Ibid., Seaman A. Knapp to Hunter, November 2, 1904 177 The recommendations of the two bureaus were not always the same, especially on the questions of handpicking weevils, method of fall destruction, wide spacing of rows, and the use of Paris green. As Hunter pointed out, "To have such disagreement in the Department naturally has the tendency to injure it in the minds of the public." 29 Where the two parties differed. Knapp usually contended that the recommendations of the entomologists had little relevance to farming on a small scale. The demonstration agents recommended burning fallen squares rather than placing them in screened cages to allow parasites to breed and escape. They contended that they worked mainly with "ignorant" tenant farmers who would not follow these instructions. Hxinter contended that in the Delta the large plantations had intelligent overseers with strict supervision of the workers: "No chance is left for the stupidity of negroes [sic] to interfere with their work." In the case of "small independent planters, either white or black . . . natural stupidity has full sway." 31 On the questions of recommendations, the views of Knapp reached the farmers, except for the few who read the

29 Ibid., Hunter to Seaman A. Knapp, November 8, 1904 Ibid., Seaman A. Knapp to Hunter, April 20, 1912. 31 Hunter to Howard, April 24, 1912, General Cor- respondence, 190 8-1924, RG 7, NA. 178 Bureau of Entomology's publications. In a niimber of instances state experiment station officials sided with the entomologists, and were free to state their views publicly. The state commissioner of agriculture in Alabama believed that Knapp's raen were incompetent due to lack of training. 32 Indeed, one of Knapp's workers, W. F. Proctor, displayed his ignorance that there were parasites of the weevil during a public meeting. Hunter found him "incompetent and unfitted to represent the Department in any way," and at least wanted to protest to the Bureau of Plant Industry. 33 "Ninety-nine ordinary farmers out of a hundred now know that there are parasites of the weevil and that they are doing good work." The Bureau of Entomology had some supporters among state agricultural officials in their view of Knapp's work. At a meeting in Natchez in 1908, Hunter found that all the agricultural officials of Mississippi and a number of large planters "were looking to the Bureau of Entomology for assistance in their struggle with the weevil. They all said that experience with Doctor Knapp's branch had convinced them no help would come from that quarter."

^^Ibid., July 27, 1909. 33 Hunter to Howard, November 30, 1908, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. Ibid. 35 Hunter to Howard, November 28, 1908, General Correspondence, 1908-1924, RG 7, NA. 179 In a few instances, suggestions to the Bureau of Plant Industry brought results. J. A. Evans came to Louisiana as Knapp's main propagandist. Hunter appraised him an "excellent talker" with influence among farmers, but he emphasized early planting as the primary weapon in combatting the boll weevil. A communication to Galloway resulted in Evans' emphasizing fall destruction of the 36 plants as the main ingredient in boll weevil control. Knapp sought to further his educational campaign, not only through the demonstration projects, but also through the press. The entomologists cringed at what they read. Knapp often claimed he was misquoted, but the general tenor and repetition of his statements were constant. The entomologists did not agree with Knapp's assessment of the importance of the boll weevil in southern agriculture. The Shreveport Times quoted Knapp in 1904 as saying, "So far as the government is concerned, the boll weevil problem has been solved." 37 Three years later, the Galveston News reported: "The boll weevil itself, Dr. Knapp said, is conquered. Any farmer who follows the plan of the department will make just as good a crop with the boll weevil in his field as he could

36 Howard to Hunter, November 11, 1908, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 37 Shreveport Times, December 12, 19 04, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 180 38 without it." The statements were definitely misleading. Knapp saw part of his mission as allaying panic and restoring morale, thus the optimistic statements. Panic or not, the scientists believed that the statements could only prove detrimental to the reputation of the Department of Agriculture and to agricultural science in general. Neither the department nor agricultural science was universally accepted in the South. In another instance, Hxonter believed that Knapp's agents, particularly J. A. Evans, exacerbated already panicky conditions in the Mississippi delta by saying that the boll weevil would necessitate a revolution in agriculture . Hvmter related his observations on the actions of Knapp's agents in the Mississippi delta during the panic: With reference to this panic I may add that while Doctor Knapp and his men are, of course, not wholly responsible for it, they have greatly exaggerated it. Mr. Evans talked at a score of places up and down the Mississippi Valley last fall in a much more pessimistic tone than I have ever assumed. He told me himself that he believed in scaring the planters to put them in a frame of mind to take up his recommendations the more strenuously. Of course, there would have been much disturbance in the valley without Doctor Knapp or his men but I am certain that the present unrest was, to a considerable extent, due to the talk of Mr, Evans and other of Doctor Knapp's men. These men come face to face with the loss suffered by cotton planters. Last fall they saw thousands of acres of cotton in

38 Ibid., Galveston News, September 17, 1907. 181 Louisiana not producing enough to seed the land again. Doctor Knapp obtains his appropriations on the plea that he can teach the farmers how to raise cotton anywhere and cries, "there should be no panic,"^Q while his men know there is good reason for it. Knapp also encouraged the cotton planters by combatting the idea of the Bureau of Entomology that the boll weevil damage would be more severe in the hxomid regions of Louisiana and Mississippi and that the present control methods would not prove sufficient there. 40 The instances of disagreement were too numerous to be detailed here, or for Hunter to protest. He wrote, resignedly, "We are having the usual trouble with the Bureau of Plant Industry." 41 By 1909, he stated, and probably believed much earlier, that "the demonstration work on the boll weevil should have been under the Bureau of Entomology." 42 Not being the p\ablicity arm of the department, the Bureau of Entomology was at a loss to combat Knapp in the press, nor did it want public airing of intra-departmental disputes. But Hunter suspected Knapp of being the

39 Hunter to Howard, March 12, 1909, General Cor- respondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 40 Hunter to R. S. Clifton and Memorandum, June 22, 1909, General Correspondence, 1908-19 24, RG 7, NA. 41 Hunter to Howard, July 20, 19 09, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 42 Hunter to R. S. Clxfton and Memorandum, June 22, 1909, General Correspondence, 1908-1924, RG 7, NA. 182 instigator of newspaper accounts that lauded the demonstration work and disparaged the entomologist. 43 The Bureau of Entomology did not fare well before the congressional appropriations committee where Knapp's contention that his men taught farmers to raise more cotton under boll weevil conditions than prior to its arrival impressed the representatives^ According to Hunter, the result was an "unfavorable attitude of the Committee" toward the work of the Southern Field Crop Insect Investigations. 44 Beverly T. Galloway, Knapp's superior and supporter, had long had the responsibility of compiling and presenting the department's budget requests to Congress. 45 There was no doubt where Galloway placed the emphasis in boll weevil control. Hunter complained to Howard that "the demonstration work appears to have put us so into the eclipse that there have been almost unsurmountable [sic] difficulties in impressing the committee and others with the importance of what we have been doing."

43 Ibid., Hunter to Howard, February 22, 1910. 44 Hunter to Howard, November 5, 1907, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 45 Beverly T. Galloway, "Plant Pathology: A Review of the Development of the Science in the United States," Agricultural History 2 (April 1928): 57. 46 Hunter to Howard, February 11, 1912, General Correspondence, 1908-1924, RG 7, NA, 183 Hunter believed, and hoped, that the demonstration work as constituted under Knapp would expire with his death in 1911: "The growth of the demonstration work has been due largely to the personality of the late Doctor Knapp. In my opinion the structure he erected will fall to pieces." 47 Congress passed the Smxth-Lever Act three years later. On Seaman A. Knapp's death Hunter foresaw more harmonious relations with Knapp's son and successor, Bradford. The Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Willet M. Hays advised him that Bradford Knapp lacked "entirely the very qualities which in his father caused the trouble." 48 Disagreements over farming practices continued, but the strife lessened thereafter. Partially Seaman Knapp's differences with the scientists revolved around the low opinion he held of their impact on agriculture. Fond of homilies, he asserted in speeches that "eyes were placed top of the shoulders to see things." 49 To Knapp, the scientists showed the farmers nothing but a few publications, often too technical and theoretical for practical application. The criticism had validity to a measure, especially in the South. John A. Craig of the Texas Agricultural

^^Ibid., April 6, 1911.

Ibid. 49 Oscar B. Martin, The Demonstration Work (San Antonio, Texas: The Naylor Company, 1941), p. 2. 184 Experiment Station wrote in 1904 that "our fanners are getting ahead of us in certain lines of work such as the growing of alphalfa and the production of pork and other features." 50 In response to a question about the impact of his station's work on agriculture, the director of the Mississippi was even more candid: It seems that the farming population in this state is as conservative, and, perhaps more so, than that of any state in the union. Unquestionably there are thousands of farmers in this state that the Station, up to this time, has had precious little influence with. We have all told 200,000 farmers. About 150,000 of these are negroes, and, as far as I know, the Station perhaps has had no c, appreciable influence on their farming practices. The Farmers' Cooperative Demonstration Work and its successor provided valuable service. It wrought what thousands of USDA Farmers• Bulletins and experiment station bulletins broadcast over the South could never accomplish.. The South, appreciative of stxamp oratory from its politicians, found the loquacious Knapp to its liking. The good advice he gave probably outweighed the bad. Knapp, not Hunter, received whatever credit there was in the boll weevil fight. On Knapp's death, Leland 0. Howard tried to correct this. He complained privately to a Washington Star reporter about his lack of a balanced

50 John A. Craig to Alfred C. True, March 14, 1904, Texas, State Correspondence, RG 164, NA. Ibid., W. L. Hutchinson to Alfred C. True, September 18, 1902, Mississippi. 185 view on the main participants in the boll weevil crusade: . . . I am going to tell you that you have fallen naturally enough into the almost universal error of overdoing the glorification of the late Dr» Seaman A. Knapp. Every one seems to be attributing the entire credit for the successful fight against the boll weevil to him, whereas as a matter of fact a great share of the credit belongs to this Bureau and to its Special Agent in charge of Southern Field Crop Insect Investigations, Mr, W. D. Hunter. Doctor Knapp came into the field only after the problem had been solved by us, and, by following the methods already advised by this Bureau in print, and by the aid of large appropriations from Congress and later by the help of money from the Southern Relief Fund, was able to teach the southern farmers to do what we had already been advising them to do. And he did this in a singularly unfair way from the viewpoint of scientific credit; he rarely mentioned Mr. Hunter's work or the other work of this Bureau. Some time I may publicly call attention to this matter, but it would create a bad impression just now owing to Doctor Knapp's recent death and to the extraordinary praise which his work has received. There is no doiibt about the value of his work. We admit that almost as strongly as Walter Page, Albert Shaw and yourself have expressed it. It would not detract much from his glory if he were shown to have adopted our views and made them popular and effective, and such treatment of the subject would be simple justice.52 The balanced view never came. Hunter and Howard remain little-known scientists. An army of county agents revere and propagate the memory of Seaman A. Knapp. His name graces several buildings of southern agricultural college campuses and one of the two arches leading from the department's Administration Building to its South Building, As in many another case, it was the triumph of the generalist, the propagandist, over the reticent specialist.

52 Howard to Hunter, June 9, 1911, enclosure Howard to Frank G. Carpenter, June 6, 1911, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. CHAPTER VI

TROUBLE IN TEXAS

The citizens of Texas were the first to feel the influence of the cotton boll weevil. The state whose popular image is associated with cattle and the cowboy- was, in the late nineteenth century, assuming several characteristics common to the other southern states. The prime characteristic was an economy based largely on the growing of cotton. Between 1879 and 1889, the acreage devoted to cotton production in Texas almost doubled, an 80 percent increase, while the cotton states east of Texas increased their acreage only 46 percent. From 1889 to 1895, the acreage in Texas increased 77 percent, while the eastern cotton states exhibited a decline of 12 percent. Texas farmers found cotton to be the crop most likely to offer a monetary reward for their labors. The pattern of increased cotton acreage was inexorably tied to the extension of railroad lines southward and westward. In conjunction with declining cattle prices, farmers shifted from cattle and grain production

1 Sanderson, A Statistical Study of the Decrease in the Texas Cotton Crop Due to the Mexican Cotton Boll Weevil and the Cotton Acreage of Texas 1899 to 1904 Inclusive, p. 20.

186 187 to cotton, as railroads began to supply an economical means of transportation. The prospective profits from hauling cotton in fact inspired entrepreneurs to undertake rail- 2 road construction. Thus the boll weevil appeared in Texas during a period when the state had not yet reached its fullest potential as a cotton-producing state. As late as 1909, the Texas commissioner of agriculture estimated "that not more than 25 per cent of the land in Texas suitable for cotton culture is being utilized in the growing of this 3 crop." Even discounting the aspects of local boosterism and state pride, it was true that Texas was an agricultural frontier. In this the boll weevil's impact on the state differed from the southeastern cotton states. The Texas farmer had the option of moving to uncultivated fertile lands not yet infested by the boll weevil. The economy of eastern Texas, firmly wed to cotton production when the boll weevil arrived, keenly felt its impact. Brazoria, a coastal county where the Brazos River enters the Gulf of Mexico, produced 6,888 bales of cotton in 1899. Floods, storms, and the cotton boll reduced the output to 1,314 and 1,535 bales, respectively.

2 Spratt, The Road to Spindletop, pp. 61-62. 3 Yearbook, 1908, Texas State Department of Agri- culture Bulletin No. 8 (Austin, 1909), p. 42. 188 in 1900 and 1901. The cotton trade of Columbia and Brazoria suffered correspondingly. Frank Bennett and Grove Jones visited the county to conduct a soil survey for the U.S. Department of Agriculture in 1901 and reported that the lands formerly producing one and one-half bales of cotton to the acre now produced one-fourth to one-half bales to the acre due to the cotton boll weevil.^ "For this reason," they concluded, "very few of the cotton gins that were destroyed by the flood and storm have been rebuilt, as the product would be too small to supply the great number of gins the county once had." Robertson County included some of the fertile bottom lands of the Navasota and Brazos river valleys. The Brazos bottoms were especially known for their capacity to produce cotton. There a farming system characterized by large land holdings and black sharecropping predominated. The county averaged 32,2 65 bales during the years 1899-1902. The first year of heavy boll weevil infestation in 1903 saw a drop to 14,379 bales. The county that had averaged almost one-half bale to the acre for 1887-95 produced .16 bales to the acre in 19 03

4 Frank Bennett, Jr., and Grove B. Jones, Soil Survey of Brazoria Area, Texas, Bureau of Soils, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 1902), p. 362; Quantity of Cotton Ginned in the United States, Bureau of the Census Bulletin No. 10, U.S. Department of Commerce (Washington, D.C., 1904), p. 38. ^nnett and Jones, Soil Survey of Brazoria Area, Texas, p. 362. 189 and .29 bales to the acre in 1904. The fanners in late 1902 already had an indication of the coining problem. They sought a decrease in railroad "rates on seed corn, in view of the disaster from floods and boll weevils."^ After the first two or three bad years, the adoption of some of the cultural methods and early maturing eased cotton production toward former levels, but there had been considerable impact on agriculture. Robertson County, containing bottom land as well as hill land, presented a particularly interesting case. The reaction of farmers to the boll weevil necessarily depended in part on geographical conditions. W. D. Hunter relied on his corps of trained entomologists for assessments of crop damage by the boll weevil, but when he sought information on the changes in agriculture he often consulted a small number of local Texans in his employ. W. H. Gilson provided the most detailed and analytical reports. Responding in 1906 to Hunter's questions about the boll weevil's impact on Robertson County, Gilson wrote: I interviewed a few of the post oak farmers in reference to the abandonment of the post oak lands on account on [sic] the boll-weevil. The crop per acre in the postoaks this year was greater than ever it was known to make. Some fields of this land made more per acre than it ever has since been [sic]

Sanderson, A Statistical Study, p. 11; Bureau of the Census Bulletin No. 10, p. 41. Texas Farmer, November 15, ,902, p. 9^ 190 put in cultivation. Last year the uplands or postoak made a good crop. The three years previous to last year that is 1902-03 and 04 made almost total failures in the postoaks. A great deal of this land was thrown out on account of the weevil ravages, but no more in comparison to the no [sic] of acres thrown out in the stiff bottom lands. The weevil hurt the richest or stiff bottom lands equally as bad, if not worse than it did the post oaks. I know of one case, the Barton farm had three hundred acres of this stiff bottom land planted in cotton and did not drag a sack through it. Another place the Wayland farm 550 acres, only made fifty seven bales. Both of these places made nearly a bale per acre this year. During the boll-weevil years the stiff bottom lands were planted in corn, but the postoaks were not because postoaks do not make good corn. The main reason the stiff bottom lands were sometimes planted in cotton and the postoaks were not, diiring these years, was because the postoaks were settled up by white communities nearly all the farmers of which had become indépendant [sic] and when the weevil became so bad they either left or quit farming. The stiff bottom lands were owned by white people and worked by negroes [sic]. The bottom farmers did not loose [sic] as much per acre as did the postoak farmer because he only lost what it took to feed the negro [sic] and the negro [sic] lost his work while the postoak farmer lost what it took to feed himself and his own work. Mr. Sam Guyers one of our richest farmers and ginners here has made cotton every year in the postoaks. He says he farms about two thousand acres in the postoaks and about a thousand in the bottom. His upland made more per acre than did his bottom. He says he would much rather farm and take his chances in the postoak than in the bottom. Mr, Fulton farmed in the bottom the first two bad years of the weevil, but moved to the uplands and has made very good crops since his move. Mr. Sam Prirce farmed about two hundred acres in the bottom and five hundred in the postoaks this year. He says that the next year he will not farm the bottom, but will increase his acreage in the postoaks as he regards his change [sic] in the postoaks as better. During the boll-weevil years the only land that was thought to stand any chance to make a crop was the sandy or mixed bottom lands. Even with the better crop on the other land, the last two years the mixed land is much more the choice land. The average postoak is considered safer than the stiff bottom lands. The only advantage the stiff bottom land has over the postoak lands is 191 that when the caterpillar comes in numbers he distroys [sic] all the folliage [sic] in the bottom, but does very little damage in the postoaks. Rent on all places is about the same if not a little higher than it was before the weevil. The contents of this letter is [sic] the opinion entertained generally by the residents of Robertson county.^ Evidence of the disruption of the cotton economy in Robertson County remained. Hugh H. Bennett, beginning a career with the USDA that would culminate in his being regarded as the father of soil conservation, visited the area in 1909. He reported that a "considerable nximber of deserted farmhouses bear evidence of the uneasiness that existed in the earlier years of the ravages of the boll weevil. Many renters and laborers, and even landowners, Q migrated to west Texas and Oklahoma." One 2,500-acre farm near Calvert reportedly remained abandoned for five years during the adjustment to boll weevil infestation. Limestone County averaged 53,902 bales of cotton during 1899-1902, but production dropped to 17,025 bales in 190 3, the first year of heavy boll weevil infestation,

o W. H. Gilson to Hunter, December 3, 1906, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 9 Hugh H. Bennett and Charles F. Shaw, Soil Survey of Robertson County, Texas, Bureau of Soils, U.S. Depart- ment of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 1909), p. 12. Manford Eugene Jones, "A History of Cotton Culture Along the Middle Brazos River" (M.A. thesis. University of New Mexico, 1939), p. 76. Bureau of the Census Bulletin No. 10, p. 40. 192 The effect on the economy was obvious. The boll weevil so destroyed the cotton crop that it altered the traditional practice of suspending school during the cotton picking season. Elvira Thompson of Mexia explained her father's plight and her new educational opportunities in the "Young Folks" section of the Texas Farmer; I have plenty of time for writing this, although it is cotton-picking time; for the boll weevil and boll worm picked all of our cotton for us. We are no worse off than our neighbors though, for everybody in our section of the country lost their cotton in the same way. There is one lady near us who had one hundred acres in cotton and she will not make more than one bale from all of it. We felt awful bad about it, of course,, but mamma said, "What can't be cured must be indured" [sic], so we are trying to make the best of it. We made a good corn crop, and have plenty to eat, but we will have to wear old clothes a while longer. I am going to school now and am studying hard. I never have had an opportunity to go to school this time of year before.12

Neighboring Freestone County explained the abandonment of 12,000 acres of crop land during the period 1899-1921 as due to the boll weevil and a decrease in the productive- 13 ness of the land. W. B. Bond of Pin Oak, Freestone County, believed that the arrival of the boll weevil occasioned "the most serious times we have ever met."

12 Elvira Thompson, Mexia, Texas, to the editor, "Young Folks" section, Texas Farmer, November 7, 1903, p. 10. 13 H. W. Hawker, et al.. Soil Survey of Freestone County, Texas, Bureau of Soils, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 1921), p. 13. 14 Letter from W. B. Bond, Pin Oak, Texas, November 2, 1903, Texas Farmer, November 8, 1903, p. 1. 193 Lee County in the coastal plain produced a yearly average of 13,766 bales between 1899 and 1902. In 1903, the production dropped precipitously to 5,266 bales. The American ideal of the small owner-operated farm was the standard agricultural system in Lee County, but all was not well. USDA soil surveyors James L. Burgess and W. S. Lyman summarized the economic conditions in 1906: "While a majority of the farmers own their farms, the farming class as a whole can not be called prosperous, and many of the farms are mortgaged. This condition is due mainly to decreased profits in cotton growing since the advent of the boll weevil. "■'■^ The third year of the boll weevil's presence usually proved to be the first destructive one. A few would arrive during the fall migration, too late and too few to do much damage. With a small nxjmber emerging from hibernation, the population expanded during the stammer but were still too few to be very destructive. The third year, the farmers observed the full effects of the weevil on cotton production. T. 0. Plunkett, one of Seaman A. Knapp's agents, observed the reaction in Harrison County in 1907, the boll weevil having first arrived in 1904:

Bureau of the Census Bulletin No. 10, p. 40. 16 James L. Burgess and W. S. Lyman, Soil Survey of Lee County, Texas, Bureau of Soils, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 1906), p. 24. 194 Coming as I did, from the prairies of central and west Texas, where the farmers no longer dreaded boll weevil, but went ahead with the best cultural methods and made successful crops, I found the farmers in east Texas in almost abject terror, fearing all they had at stake would be lost. Early in the spring of 1908, the weevils appeared in great nximbers in Harrison County, and frightened many of our farmers into the belief that no cotton could be made. A number of our farmers who had men working on shares and were furnishing their tenants, called in their teams and put the men to cutting cross-ties for railroads and timber for the saw mills. Some of the tenants abandoned their crops and sought pioblic works. 1^ In promoting their work. Knapp and his men frequently overemphasized the reaction to the boll weevil to demonstrate better the salutary effects of their preachments in restoring confidence. But the situation described by Plunkett where farmers cut cotton acreage prior to any measurable destruction by the boll weevil came to be common practice. The most striking example of this phenomenon would occur two years later in the Mississippi valley, especially around Natchez. The real impact of the boll weevil can better be demonstrated by a comparison of per-acre production, rather than total production. Even discounting other factors in reducing production, the figures are impressive. Bee County in southern Texas averaged .43 bales per acre during 1887-95 and a meager .13 in 1904. Another south Texas county, Kames, averaged .42 bales per acre, 1887-95,

17 T. 0. Plunkett, "Fighting the Boll Weevil in Texas," Southern Farm Gazette, April 17, 1909, p. 13. 195 but only .22 in 1904. Matagorda County, on the Gulf Coast, dropped from an average of .56 bales to .11 in 1904. Colorado County in central Texas saw its production cut in half from the base 1887-95 period to the year 1904.'''^ State entomologist E. Dwight Sanderson estimated that cotton production in the infested areas had been cut by 4 3 percent, nearly one-half, in 1904. Of course, many of these areas had not adopted the "cultural methods" that would gradually move cotton production toward former levels. Monetary losses are even more difficult to estimate. Sanderson estimated a loss of ^1,725,000 bales valued at ^ $10 million for the six years, 1899-1904."'"^ W. D. Hunter estimated a yearly average of $22.5 million between 1902 and 1907, a total of $135 million.^° Most everyone who claimed to know anything about cotton had some opinion as to the monetary loss. Even federal officials had conflicting opinions. W. D. Hunter estimated the loss of

18 Sanderson, A Statistical Study, p. 11. The Bureau of the Census published yearly county statistics on quantity of cotton produced for the first years of the twentieth century. Bureau of the Census acreage statistics, by county, are available for this period only for census years. Sanderson computed his information on acreage from statistics supplied by railroads, newspaper crop reports, and unpublished material collected by the Texas state statistical agent of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 19 Ibid., p. 27. 20 W. Dwight Pierce to John S. Phillips, The American Magazine, May 2, 1910, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 196 the 1903 crop at $15 million. By way of contrast, the Bureau of the Census estimated a $49,272,9 89.61 loss, over three times as much. Hunter contended that the collectors from the Bureau of.the Census "are naturally persons who are not able to discriminate between damage done by the boll weevil and that done by other insects." Likewise they paid insufficient attention to unfavorable weather. 21 Regardless of haggling over total monetary losses, the farmer knew his income had been drastically reduced. What was his reaction? There was clearly some movement to avoid the problem temporarily by migrating to areas as yet unaffected by the weevil. The movement seems not to have been as drastic as that which would occur when the boll weevil reached the Mississippi valley and hardly compared with the World War I exodus. But the boll weevil clearly provoked some farmers to seek a new agricultural setting. The Texas Farmer reported over one hundred black farmers departing Milam County for Arkansas and Louisiana in late November and early December 1903. The farmers cited restrictions in the new primary election law, the poll tax, and the boll weevil as reasons for emigrating. 22 The Fort Worth Register quoted W. D. Hunter as saying that

21 Hunter to Howard, June 10, 1904, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 22 Texas Farmer, December 5, 1903, p. 12. 197 the boll weevil "had the effect of driving large numbers of negroes [sic] from the cotton lands of the state." Hunter believed and continued to believe that black farmers were practically incapable of making the adjustments necessary in cotton cultivation to produce a profitable crop. Cotton would, therefore, increasingly become a white man's crop. There was evidence that blacks who left south Texas to pick cotton in north Texas simply remained there. Cotton always required more labor to harvest than to plant or cultivate, especially in the more arid regions of Texas. Therefore, the producers in newer cotton areas of north and west Texas relied on the population density of south and east Texas for their cotton pickers. Texas had a migratory labor system unknown in the eastern cotton belt. Black farmers and tenants from the bottom lands of the Brazos River constituted part of the labor force. The Galveston News in the spring of 1901 reported that "many thousands" of acres in the Brazos bottoms would not be planted to cotton due to the scarcity of labor. The newspaper judged that "not more than one-half of the negroes [sic] who left South Texas last fall to pick cotton in North Texas returned to their former homes."

23 Fort Worth Register, December 14, 1904, RG 7, NA, 24 Ibid., Galveston News, May 25, 1901. 198 The estimate seems high, but during good cotton years the demand for labor exceeded the availability. The San Antonio Light described the situation near Waco in Falls County when the crop came in in 1904: It is said that farmers up and down the Sap railway, in towns like Rosebud, Lott and other places, almost pull to pieces negroes [sic] who happen to get off trains there. The negro [sic] is at once surrounded by an eager throng of farmers anxious to hire him to pick cotton, and each one grabs a part of his clothing to that he is in danger of being disrobed.25 That failing, the local police stood willing to use extralegal means to secure the labor. As the report noted, "The officers will co-operate with the farmers to the extent of making it warm for idlers." 2 6 Blacks were not quite so welcome in the farther reaches of west Texas. Cowboys in Hale County, north of Lubbock, forced the owner of a cotton field to plow it up in 1900, believing that blacks inevitably populated cotton growing territory. 27 Whatever the extent of black migration during the first destructive years of the boll weevil, the traditional geographical-racial patterns remained the same. By the mid-1920s, white farmers predominated in west-central and north Texas, although many were now reduced to tenancy. Most black tenants populated south, east, and east-central

25 Ibid., San Antonio Light, September 1, 1904. 2^Ibid. 27 Mary L. Cox, History of Hale County, Texas (Plainview, Texas, 1937), p. 52» 199 Texas. The bottom lands of the rivers remained the domain of the large landowning white planter and his numerous black tenants, despite the views of W. D. Hunter and others about the boll weevil forcing out blacks. Those who stayed in east, south, and north Texas turned to other means of replacing the income lost to the boll weevil. They sought to "diversify," as proponents of a southern agricultural economy based on a number of crops other than cotton termed the process. To some, the term implied that the farmers should provide the maximum of his food and feed stuffs possible. More often, the term implied regional production of a number of commercial crops, but with individual farmers specializing in some crop other than cotton. The cotton boll weevil certainly provided the impetus to try other crops, according to the contemporary evidence. The soil surveyors of Wilson County reported that prior to the boll weevil, cotton and corn were the exclusive crops. In 1908, cotton and corn still constituted the main source of income but farmers were now growing peas, sweet potatoes, sorghum, Johnson grass for hay, peaches, pears, and some vegetables to a limited extent. A considerable quantity of peanuts 2q grown was devoted to pork production.

28 William Bennett Bizzell, Rural Texas (New York: Macmillan Company, 1924), p. 394. 29 W. S. Lyman and Frank C. Schroeder, Soil Survey of Wilson County, Texas, Bureau of Soils, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 1908), p. 9, 200 Soil surveyors Carter and Kocher observed many peach orchards in Anderson County in 1904. Having been planted in response to the weevil's effect on cotton production, the trees were not yet of bearing age» Anderson County fanners shipped sixty carloads of truck crops from Palestine, fifty-one from Elkhart, twenty-six from Neches, ten from Frankston, and twelve from Salmon in 1904. The carloads contained tomatoes, Irish potatoes, watermelons, canteloupes, peaches, and other vegetables. New settlers in Robertson County in the first decade of the twentieth century seemed disposed to move right into truck farming; in fact, a group of men from Michigan purchased considerable land in Robertson County with a view to promoting the growing of truck and fruit crops. 31 By 1905, farmers near Mexia, where Elvira Thompson lived, were "diversifying and reducing acreage and going out of cotton. ""^^ But the millenium for the truck and fruit industry in Texas had not arrived. The Truck Farmer in 1903 credited the boll weevil with giving the boost to truck farming, saying "if it hadn't been for his persistent

30 William T. Carter and A. E. Kocher, Soil Suirvey of Anderson County, Texas, Bureau of Soils, U.S. Depart- ment of Agriculture (Washington, D.C,, 1905), p. 26. 31 Hugh H. Bennett to Milton Whitney, November 18 and December 24, 1906, Robertson County, Texas, Reports on Soil Surveys, RG 54, NA. 32 Springer Goes to Hunter, March 1, 1905, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 201 attacks on the cotton patches the fruit and truck business would never have been tried." 33 By 1906, the same journal reported "whole communities as having gone out of the truck business on account of ten-cent cotton." The rise in cotton prices was not the only problem the truck industry encountered. In contrast to a marketing system for cotton, derived over several decades, the marketing systems for perishable truck and fruit crops were characterized as "chaotic." 35 Exorbitant railroad rates for commodities not shipped in carload quantities hampered the incipient truck and fruit industries in small 36 localities. One of the most striking examples of for- saking truck and fruit crops for cotton was Nueces Covínty in the Corpus Christi area. The county was presumably an ideal area for truck crops. There was little competition from cotton in the years immediately following the arrival of the boll weevil. Yet, between 1909 and 1919, the acreage devoted to cotton expanded from 21,000 acres to 119,000 acres.^^

33 The Truck Farmer, February 1903, p. 16. ^'*Ibid., February 1906, p. 10. 35 Evans, "Texas Agriculture, 1880-1930," p. 151. 36 Hugh H. Bennett to Milton Whitney, December 1, 19 06,.Robertson County, Texas, Reports on Soil Surveys, RG 54, NA; J. 0. Martin, Soil Survey of the Willis Area, Texas, Bureau of Soils, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 1901), p. 618. 37 Evans, "Texas Agriculture, 1880-19 30," p. 2. 202 Another typical response of the farmer first confronted by boll weevil destruction was to cut cotton acreage drastically and to increase corn acreage, a crop he was long accustomed to growing. R. A. Cushman examined the area around Denison, Texas, and Durant, Oklahoma, in the Red River valley. Out of eight fields at the two places which had been planted in cotton the previous year, only one was in cotton in 1908. One was unplanted, and the others were in corn. Cushman concluded that "everybody seems to have been scared out by the weevil and put all the land into corn." 38 Corn offered a suitable substitute where farmers also developed the attendant livestock industry, but as a commercial crop for export it had little chance of success. Government entomologists and Knapp's force advised a reduction in cotton acreage and more intensive cultivation of that remaining, rather than a complete abandonment of cotton. The leading farm journal in Texas, the Texas Farmer, advised the complete abandonment of cotton and may have been partially responsible for some farmers not planting the crop for one or more years. Not only did the journal advise giving up cotton, but it also ridiculed those who continued its cultivation, calling them foolish.

38 R. A. Cushman to Hunter, May 19, 1908, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 39 Texas Farmer, December 6^ 1902, p. 8. 203 Any farmer who persisted in planting cotton "ought to suffer for his unmitigated folly." 40 The South had a share of sagacious farm paper editors, but the attitude of the Texas Farmer was all too indicative of the poor advice the southern farmer received from agricultural journalists. The experience of Texas in adjusting to the boll weevil and diversifying agriculture was repeated throughout the South with variations. The initial damage led to experiments and often ill-advised ventures into other crops. Adjustments in cotton cultivation coupled with disappointments in the new endeavors caused a reversion to cotton. Texas differed in that it had a greater percentage of suitable agricultural land .as yet untapped for expansion. Climatic factors dictated that controlling the boll weevil did not affect the cost of production as much as it did in the East. Thus cotton in Texas had a better competitive advantage over other crops. Cotton remained the preeminent crop, but the cotton boll weevil effected some changes in its cultivation, varieties, and quality. Undoubtedly the recommendations to plant early varieties gained adherents among most farmers. One observer noted that formerly cotton planting dragged on throughout the spring, being delayed either by

40 Ibid., June 20, 1903, p. 8. Other issues of the Texas Farmer containing the same advice are March 7, 1903, pp. 8-9; and March 12, 190 4, p. 9. 204 the weather or "that tired feeling," experienced by lacka- 41 daisical farmers. F. C. Pratt, a member of the Southern Field Crop Insect Investigations staff, noted conditions near Taylor, Texas, where cotton exhibited a uniform growth and surmised that "it had practically been planted all about the same time." 42 A noticeable change in planting times occurred rapidly when the boll weevil arrived. The weevil migrated to Robertson County in 1901 and first damaged the crop in 190 3. As early as the season of 1905, farmers began planting about March 20, whereas previously they had started about April 10.'*^ ~ The crop of 1907 was already "up" by March 24, ^'^ The Texas Cotton Seed Company, a Houston-based company that made exaggerated claims for the weevil-averting powers of its cotton seed, sent out an advertisement in April 1910. The April 19 reply from New Braunfels stated that "with few exceptions, all the cotton in this territory has been planted." 45 Every field near Kerrville, Texas, was

41 W. M. Bamberge to Hunter, July 2, 1905, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 42 Ibid., F. C. Pratt to Hunter, August 16, 1909. 43 Ibid., W. H. Gilson to Hunter, February 4, 1906. 44 Hugh H. Bennett to Milton Whitney, March 24, 1907, Robertson County, Reports on Soil Surveys, RG 54, NA. 45 S. V. Pfeuffer, Pfeuffer Hellman & Co., to Texas Cotton Seed Co., April 19, 1910, enclosed with J. F. B. Robinson, Texas Cotton Seed Company to Hunter, April 20, 1910, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 205 plowed and ready for planting by March 10, 1906. The farmers were anxious to "put in" the crop "as early as possible." 46 Weather conditions in the spring of 1909 prevented early planting. The state statistical agent in reporting to the Washington office observed that "since the advent of the boll weevil in the state many of the planters in middle, south, and south-west Texas have been m the habit of planting cotton early." 47 The rapid adaptation of earlier maturing and shorter staple cottons has previously been discussed. The cotton farmers who first utilized these found a curious development in the system of harvesting the crop. Cotton pickers, paid on a poundage basis, could pick more of the native big-boiled cotton in the course of a day, and naturally preferred these. W. H. Leckie of Runge, Texas, raising cotton on an experimental basis for the Bureau of Entomology, explained his problem: I am having serious trouble getting pickers to pick the small boiled cotton. King and Parker. Last year the general crop being scarce—pickers were glad to get it, and no objections were offered. This year on the other hand the general crop is large, and pickers scarce. In consequence they only want to pick in the big-boll varieties, and won't have anything to do with small boiled cottons at any reasonable price.^^

46 Ibid., F. C. Pratt to Hunter, March 10, 1906. 47 Jefferson Johnson, State Statistical Agent, Austin, Texas, to Victor H. Olmstead, November 27, 1909, Comments on General Crop Conditions, Records of the Bureau of Agricul- tural Economics, RG 83, NA. 48 W. H. Leckie to Hunter, August 23, 19 05, Cor- respondence Relating to Experimental Work, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 206 The prevailing price for picking big-boiled varieties was sixty cents per hundred pounds, and Leckie thought an offer of eighty-five cents per hundred pounds necessary to entice pickers to the King and Parker varieties. The passing problems of getting a crop picked were inconsequential compared to the long-term effects of a reliance on short staple varieties. Here the all- important issue was the price of Texas cotton. Prior to the cotton boll weevil, cotton buyers in the area of central Texas between Bryan and Dallas assumed that the cotton averaged one and one-eighth inch staple. In effect, the cotton buyer did not have to "select" the staple cotton, By 1912, the buyer of one and one-eighth inch cotton had to conduct a careful search to find it. The black lands north and northeast of Dallas still produced one and one- eighth inch cotton, but the sandy and clay soils east of there produced only five-eighths to seven-eighths inch cotton. 50 The idea of importing cotton seed from the East died hard among some quarters. In 1917, long after cotton experts had decided that relying on strains of native Texas cottons offered greater remuneration than eastern cotton, the county agent in Ellis County imported a

49 Ibid. T. S. Miller, Sr., Cotton Trade Guide and Student's Manual (Austin, Texas: E. L. Steck Company, 1925), p. 425.

O 207 carload of seed from the Southeast. That black land county still produced good Lone Star and Triumph cotton, even with the boll weevil present. The USDA's Office of Markets and Rural Organization had representatives in the area trying to encourage farmers to improve and maintain the quality of their cotton and advised against such intro- ductions that would result in mixing and lessening the grade.^-^ The use of fertilizers to hasten maturity gained fewer converts than early planting and early varieties. There was little fertilizer used in Texas in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Its use was so scarce that W. D. Hunter reached the unequivocal conclusion that "not a pound of fertilizer is used upon cotton in Texas." 52 To suggest that Texas soils needed such enrichment would label one as a "book farmer." 53 The arrival of the boll weevil and the subsequent desirability of hastening the crop to maturity gave impetus to experimental uses. Even so, one early advocate of fertilizers in his community discovered that it was

Charles J. Brand, Chief, Office of Markets and Rural Organization, to Bradford Knapp, March 12, 1917, Texas, Miscellaneous, General Correspondence, RG 33, NA. 52 Hunter to Howard, September 1, 190 3, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, 1902-1908, RG 7, NA. ^•^Galveston News, December 18, 1904, RG 7, NA. 208 "uphill work educating the masses." 54 The process of adopting the use of fertilizers was gradual. Farmers in Morris County used fertilizers a few years preceding 1910, but still gave more attention to the other methods of control. 55 The farmers in Robertson County by 1907 had made some of the adjustments to the boll weevil, but only a few had experimented with fertilizers, and then in small quantities—not applying it to entire fields. The attempts in 1906 appear to have been the first use of commercial fertilizers in the county. Hugh Bennett thought that "it appears the success of the experiment is going to extend the practice of fertilizing in conjunction with early seeding and cultivation of cotton as a means of lessening the damage done by the wevil [sic]." But the farmers had little knowledge of what ingredients specific soils needed. It was, in fact, the purpose of the then- burgeoning soil survey program of the USDA to provide that information. Though the use of fertilizer to produce an earlier crop did not gain as rapid acceptance as early planting and earlier varieties, the latter two changes in cotton

William H. Leckie to Hunter, January 31, 1905, Correspondence Relating to Experimental Work, SFCII, RG 7, NA. E. B. Watson and Risden T. Allen, Soil Survey of Morris County, Texas, Bureau of Soils, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 1910), p. 10. ^^Hugh H. Bennett to Milton Whitney, January 27, 1907, 209 growing methods obviously meant earlier crops. William H. Leckie of Runge, Texas, reported on July 25, 1905, that "cotton picking and marketing will begin in a few days." 57 Leckie was trying to produce an early experimental crop under contract to the Department of Agriculture, and this incredibly early date was by no means typical. Springer Goes, one of Hunter's staff, wrote from Navarro County in late August 1904: "Cotton is coming in fast now at Corsicana much earlier than last year and people generally now concede the crop made is due to early planting & good cultivation and early varieties. Weevils will take nearly 58 all the late cotton." Cotton markets in Corsicana received two hundred bales in August of 1903. By August 20, 1904, farmers had already shipped three hundred bales to Corsicana. 59 Opening of the bolls prevented further damage by the weevils; farmers could then proceed with picking as the availability of labor permitted. The entomologists considered the rapid gathering of the cotton and the destruction of the plants as the most essential step in weevil control. Farmers generally did not follow the

Robertson County, Texas, Reports on Soil Surveys, RG 54, NA, 57 William H. Leckie to Hunter, July 25, 1905, Cor- respondence Relating to Experimental Work, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 58 Springer Goes to Hunter, August 25, 1904, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. Ibid. 210 recommendations of the Bureau of Entomology. W. D. Hunter assessed the limited impact of such advice: As you are aware the planters in Texas and Louisiana are taking up very slowly with our recommendations of fall destruction of stalks after all the emphasis that has been placed on this matter. It seems that there is only one thing more certain than the desirability of the destruction of the stalks and that is that planters are not going to do it. In the central and eastern part of the cotton belt where the weevil damage is likely to be greater than it is in Texas, planters may be forced to follow the recommendations, but in Texas the climatic conditions give a large crop just often enough to obscure the necessity of fall destruction in the popular eye.^O Practically no farmers near Cleburne, Texas, destroyed the stalks in the fall of 1905. They were just beginning the work in late February 1906. W. W. Yothera, traveling for Hunter near Wharton, Texas, was "unable to find a single instance where the stalks were destroyed in the fall or winter" of 1905-06.^'^ The farmers around Calvert and Austin, Texas, usually waited until January or later before cutting and burning the cotton stalks. W. C. Welborn of the Texas Agricultural Experiment Station estimated that less than 1 percent of Texas farmers

Hionter to Howard, October 30, 1906, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. J. C. Crawford to W. E. Hinds, February 24, 1906, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 62 Ibid., W. W. Tothers to Hinds, February 27, 1906. y o+^^^k. r^ 6 3 Ibid., W. H. Gilson to Hunter, February 21, 1906; F. C. Pratt to W. Dwight Pierce, February 19, 1908. 211 destroyed stalks in the fall as a means of control. 64 unlike early planting, the fall destruction involved extra work. The plants, still green, were more difficult to uproot or cut than after a few months of being subjected to frost. One of Hunter's contract experiment farmers used a sled with side knives to cut the cotton stalks because none of the available plows would uproot the green stalks as well. Springer Goes concluded that the farmers of the Corsicana did not know "how to uproot the stalks at this season of the year." 65 Furthermore, in areas of small farms, the benefits of fall destruction depended on participation by all farmers. Not infrequently a farmer who tried the practice became discouraged because of a lack of cooperation from his neighbors and dropped the method of control. 6 fi The sharecropping system militated against the general adoption of fall destruction. Having closed accounts with their landlords at ginning time, those tenants and croppers planning to move had no incentive to stay and clean up the stalks. Even when planning

64 W. C. Welborn, "Two Years' Experience with Boll Weevil," Southern Farm Gazette, November 28, 1908, p. 2. 6 5 Springer Goes to Hunter, November 11, 1904, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 6 6 Welborn, "Two Years' Experience with Boll Weevil," p. 2. 212 to stay or being compelled to, the tenants regarded it as extra work. Fred Mally, state entomologist, came to regard the "baneful peculiar labor and tenant system in vogue among land-owners and planters" as the main restraint to the adoption of the cultural method recom- 67 mendations. A tendency to want to gather every boll possible led to a reluctance to destroy the plants still holding green bolls. There was some evidence that prosperous agricultural areas populated by freeholders adapted more of the cultural method, including fall destruction, than the plantation areas. W. D. Hunter believed that was the case with the farmers just north of 6 8 College Station. The movement for legislation to compel fall destruction continued. As late as 1905, Jefferson Johnson was still lobbying fellow members of the state legislature to pass such an act, although with no success. 69 The state entomologist E. Dwight Sanderson "devoutly [prayed] that he be allowed to wash his hands entirely," from enforcing a compulsory fall destruction act.

6 7 Frederick W. Mally, The Mexican Cotton-Boll Weevil, Farmers' Bulletin No. 130, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 1901), p. 23, 6 8 Hunter to A. F. Conradi, September 9, 19 07, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 69 Ibid., J. C. Crawford to Hiinter, February 23, 1905. The Cotton Boll Weevil in Texas, Entomological Circular No. 8, Texas Agricultural Experiment Station, p. 164. 213 Texans had one means of decreasing the nvunber of weevils entering hibernation. Cotton culture and cattle raising existed jointly in areas of Texas where ranchers were making the transition to cotton farmers. The "usual custom to turn the cattle in the fields as soon as cotton is picked out" found at Wharton also existed in other Texas localities, including Terrell and Harvester. 71 It seems to have been the custom where sufficient cattle existed, mostly in west Texas. 72 Despairing of ever getting complete acceptance of fall plant destruction. Hunter endorsed the grazing practice, stating that it would "obtain exactly the same effect as would follow by uprooting the plants." 73 Grazing cotton was not a complete answer due to the scarcity of cattle in most parts of the Southeast. Sheep served the same purpose where they were herded in west Texas, F. C. Pratt observed this practice at Junction, Texas, 74 Despite many problems, Texas remained a cotton state, Climatic factors and virgin soils gave it an advantage over the East. That the boll weevil did not

71 W. W, Yothers to W. E. Hinds, February 27, 1906, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 72 Ibid., Springer Goes to Warren E. Hinds, October 17, 1904; F. W. Thurow to Howard, October 28, 1905, enclosure with Howard to Hunter, November 14, 1905. 73 Ibid., Hunter to D. and S. C. Humphreys, September 30, 1909. 74 Ibid., F. C. Pratt to Hunter, October 27, 1903. 214 completely stop cotton production heartened southeastern farmers. Farm periodicals noted the increased total production in Texas, but often the ameliorating factors, increased acreage in areas little affected by the boll weevil and a decline in the quality of the staple, were ignored. Stories about the western border of boll weevil infestation where the weevil actually lost ground in some years created an impression that the boll weevil severely restricted cotton production for several years, then passed away to be a nuisance no longer. Harris Dickson remembered later that "every man-jack of them who had a creek or rail fence between himself and destruction, plugged along in blind security, deriding the idea that the pest would ever reach his acres." 75 If this was true, then southern legislators were atypical of their constituents, for they acted to exclude the boll weevil from their states, at least by means of transportation. Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina enacted laws designed to prevent the transportation of the boll weevil to their state. 76

75 Harris Dickson, The Story of King Cotton (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1937), p. 96. 76 Hunter and Hinds, Mexican Cotton-Boll Weevil, 1912, pp. 164-68; Hunter to Howe Grain & Mercantile Company, Howe, Texas, October 7, 1904, Correspondence Relating to Cotton Boll Weevil Quarantines, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 215 The law passed by the Louisiana legislature on December 15, 19 03, creating the Louisiana Crop Pest Commission, authorized the commission to promulgate rules and regulations to prevent early introduction of the weevil. The commission at its first meeting of February 6, 1904, established rules prohibiting virtually all farm products from infested portions of Texas, Hunter immediately recognized the impact of such a move on trade between the two states. Shreveport alone received annually one thousand carloads of Texas hay, and the entire state probably imported five thousand carloads. Furthermore, truck and fruit products were included in the ban. Hunter met with the commission's executive committee in March 1904. When the committee agreed to accept garden and fruit products provided the Bureau of Entomology inspected the shipments. Hunter requested permission from Washington. 77 Congress considered, but rejected, legislation in late 1903 and early 1904 to prevent the shipment of commodities that might disseminate the boll weevil. 78 The agreement arrived at with Louisiana and later with other states made the USDA the inspector while the legal authority rested with the states. Secretary of Agriculture

77 Hunter to Howard, March 24, 1904 and enclosed "Rules and Regulations of the State Crop Pest Commission," Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 78 Hunter to Wilmon Newell, June 8, 1904, Cor- respondence Relating to Cotton Boll Weevil Quarantines, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 216 James Wilson acceded to the plan and issued a circular on April 4, 19 04, stating the department's position. 79 The system developed was not based mainly on inspection of shipments but on certifying that the shipments originated in counties not affected by the boll weevil. 80 These were primarily grain shipments from west-central and north Texas. Conveniently, by certifying that the boll weevil did not exist in those counties, the USDA obviated the necessity of inspecting each shipment. One of Hunter's men, A. W. Merrill, ran the operation from the Oriental Hotel in Dallas, in closer proximity to the grain district than the Southern Field Crop Insect Investigations headquarters at Victoria. 81 The grain dealer submitted notarized affidavits stating the commodities to be shipped and the counties where grown. Merrill then issued authorizations to the dealers to accompany the shipments. As the boll weevil spread to additional areas. Hunter and Morrill withdrew the shipment authorizations issued for the counties affected.

79 "Cxrcular of Information in Regard to Inspection of Farm Products from Regions Infested by the Mexican Cotton Boll Weevil Designed for Shipment into the State of Louisiana," L. 0. Howard, approved by James Wilson, April 4, 1904, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 80 Hunter to Wilmon Newell, June 8, 1904, Cor- respondence Relating to Cotton Boll Weevil Quarantines, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 81 Ibid., Hunter to Wichita Mill & Elevator Co., Wichita Falls, Texas, June 23, 1904. 217 The system operated on a great deal of trust. Nevertheless, it seems to have worked well. Many grain dealers were appreciative, realizing that without the cooperation of the Department of Agriculture, they would completely lose their markets in the Southeast. There were, however, charges of avoidance by some dealers. Moore & Company, brokers and commission merchants in grain and hay at Savannah, Georgia, learned of one such scheme. Texas grain dealers in boll weevil-infested territory could ship grain unencumbered to Memphis and Nashville; Tennessee had no quarantine restrictions. Thence the grain was shipped to the southeastern states as originating in Tennessee. 82 Hunter reached agreements with most of the other southern states. The problem was that restrictions varied. Also, unlike Louisiana, where the State Crop Pest Com- mission could revise the regulations, other states such as Georgia had the regulations enacted into law. Hunter advised Wilmon Newell, the state entomologist of Georgia, on what he considered the model quarantine law. Newell then presented the recommendations to the state legislature—but they were not followed in all instances. Newell, in his capacity as state entomologist of the

82 Ibid., Pittman & Harrison, Sherman, Texas, to Hunter, November 16, 1904, and enclosure Moore & Company, Savannah, Georgia, to Pittman & Harrison, November 12, 1904 218 State Board of Entomology, had the responsibility of enforcement but no power to revise the list of guaran- go tined commodities. Hunter assiduously avoided any public criticism of the various state quarantines. 84 He favored quarantines on cotton seed, seed cotton, baled cotton, and cotton seed hulls, but believed that the likelihood of transporting the boll weevil in other farm commodities was not "any greater than in 99 per cent of the articles of ordinary 85 commerce." There were aspects of the quarantine laws he sought to have changed, and he worked quietly through the state entomologists to effect the revisions. He called a meeting of the entomologists of the southern states to meet in Jackson, Mississippi, on August 2, 1904. Those present agreed to modify their regulations to accommodate Hunter's recommendations. This move required action, in a few instances, by state legislatures. The most important revision was to allow the unrestricted

83 Ibid., Wilmon Newell to Hunter, August 16, 1904; and Newell to Howard, June 2, 1904, General Correspondence, SFCII, Hvinter to Newell, June 8, 1904, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 84 Hunter to A. W. Morrill, June 27, 1904, Cor- respondence Relating to Cotton Boll Weevil Quarantines, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 85 Hunter to Wilmon Newell, June 8, 1904, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 219 movement of hay, straw, sacked wheat, sacked oats, sacked shelled corn, sacked cow peas, and a few other articles from infested counties during July, August, and September. The new regulation would relieve the department of its inspection and authorization responsibilities. 86 The fall migration of the boll weevil actually relieved Hunter's staff from certifying grain shipments from uninfested territories. By mid-November 1904, the weevil had spread to "practically all the grain-producing counties m North Texas," according to Htmter. 87 The inspectors ceased issuing certificates for shipments from these newly infested counties and began recalling those 88 outstanding. Gradually Hunter won the trust and compliance of the southern state entomologists. The state quarantines accomplished their purpose. With the one exception of intentional introduction at Audubon Park in Louisiana, there were no "isolated go colonies far beyond the territory reached by flight."

86 Hunter to Howard, August 5, 1904, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter; Hxinter to J. H. Connell, August 11, 1904, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. The meeting at Jackson and subsequent annual meetings evolved into the formation of the Association of Cotton States Entomologists. 87 Hunter to Howe Grain and Mercantile Company, November 11, 1904, Correspondence Relating to Cotton Boll Weevil Quarantines, SFCII, RG 7, NA. Ibid., November 19, 1904. 89 W. D. Hunter, "Quarantine Against the Mexican Cotton Boll Weevil," Journal of Economic Entomology 7 (April 1914): 240. 220 Ironically, the original idea for suggesting this "unique" role for the USDA was to "alleviate hardships caused by 90 State quarantines." " The system alleviated, but did not negate, the effects on commerce., Louisiana purchasers found themselves paying three to four cents more per bushel of grain in 1904, because the uninfested areas of Texas had a monopoly on the Louisiana grain trade. Eventually Hunter came to believe that even the disruption of the grain trade, which he did not consider essential, was not too high a price to pay. He concluded that "the value of the quarantine far overbalanced the temporary interferences 9 2 with shipping that they have caused." Collective action by the states did not spare them, but it effectively delayed the disruption that was to come to their economy.

90 A. W. Morrill to Belew and Pondrom, June 28, 1904, Correspondence Relating to Cotton Boll Weevil Quarantines, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 91 Ibid., A. W. Morrill to Hunter, June 25, 1904. 92 Hunter, "Quarantine Against the Mexican Cotton Boll Weevil," p. 240. CHAPTER VII

TO THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER AND BEYOND

Agricultural prospects in Louisiana seemed bright just as the boll weevil entered that state. Coininissioner of Agriculture J. G. Lee surveyed developments of the past two years and predicted halcyon days for 1904: "Our fainners are free from debt, and nearly all have small bank accounts to begin the new season with." Even the spectre of the boll weevil did not dampen his enthusiasm. He placed inordinate faith in the State Crop Pest Com- mission's ability to halt the boll weevil in western Louisiana, concluding that it was not "likely that we can have any spread of the boll weevil in the State.. "^ Then Lee saw the prosperity vanish. The drastic change was noted by A. L. Smith of Sterlington, Louisiana, on a trip from Monroe to Natchitoches by way of Shreveport late in the first decade of the twentieth century: I passed through one of the finest farming sections of the South, and it made my head ache to see

Biennial Report of the State Board of Agriculture and Immigration (Baton Rouge, 1904), p. 12. 2 Crop Report of the Louisiana State Board of Agriculture and Immigration for the Month Ending June 30, 1904 (New Orleans, 1904), pp. 3-4.

221 222 magnificent cotton plantations, thoroughly equipped, lying idle, all of its tenants gone, weeds and saplings growing on land as fertile as any in the South.3

The pattern of heavy infestation the third year continued in Louisiana. Sabine Parish, the first area infected, averaged 11,902 bales during 1899-1904. In 1905, the third year of infestation, fanners produced only 4^498 bales. The average for 1905-11 was 4,945 bales."^ As with other parishes and counties, the reduction was due not only to boll weevil damage but also to a reduction in acreage planted.

Sabine Parish was a minor cotton parish compared to Bossier and Caddo in the state's northwestern corner. The rich bottom lands of the Red River formed their contiguous border. Bossier Parish averaged 35,680 bales between 1899 and 1906, and Caddo Parish averaged 42,137 bales for the same period. In contrast, Bossier produced 16,303 bales in 1907, 8,943 in 1908, and 9,753 in 1909. Caddo produced 17,680 bales in 1907, 16,228 in 1908, and 18,229 in 1909.^ The economy of Shreveport, trade center for the region, suffered correspondingly. The loss of income

3II"Lespedeza or Japan Clover," Louisiana Agricul- tural Experiment Station Bulletin No. 130 (Baton Rouge, September 1911), p. 32. 4 Bureau of the Census Bulletin No. 10, p. 28; Bulletin No. 100, p. 30; Bulletin No. 114, p. 36, Bureau of the Census Bulletin No. 10, p. 27; Bulletin No. 100, p. 29; Bulletin No. 114, p. 35.. 223 affected all manner of conunerce. W. P. Taylor, like many southern planters, combined cotton planting with other business ventures. The latter might be more lucrative, but as a vestige of antebellum days the former assured social standing. Among Taylor's other ventures was a grocery-distributing firm. After two disastrous seasons of cotton failures, the W. F. Taylor Company went into receivership in late 19 08. Taylor cited losses to the boll weevil in his bankruptcy petition. Without do\ibt, other Red River planters experienced similar calamities. August Meyer, a Red River planter, usually gathered 550 bales. When the boll weevil arrived, he reduced the acreage slightly, to an amount that should garner 450 bales. Yet his totals for 1907 and 1908 were 140 and 160 bales, respectively. The former mayor of Shreveport, Andrew Queries, owned the adjoining 1,100- acre plantation that under good conditions produced 500 bales. The crop of 1907 was 63 bales.. By December 1908, he had not even attempted to gin his prospective crop of 25 bales. Another of Meyer's neighbors loaned money to 'owners of Red River lands. Eventually he was obliged to foreclose lands on which he had loaned $126,000. His borrowers, as well as others before them, despairing of ever making enough money growing cotton to retire their debts, abandoned lands to their creditors. Meyer estimated that land values dropped more than one-half and marveled 224 that one Red River holding with a railroad depot sold for $12 an acre. Some planters, including former mayor Queries, still owned land but resolved not to plant cotton again.

Planters who could formerly borrow money in the thousands had neither money nor credit. Meyer's summation V7 0 was that "you have an idea of the distress we all are in."^ The Red River planters, in many cases men of considerable business and agricultural acumen, knew about the methods advocated to lessen the boll weevil's initial impact. Meyer felt this knowledge had been of little value: "In spite of all the teachings we are not prepared to resist the shock of the boll weevil."^ Credit restrictions for large planters in the alluvial valleys were less severe than the problems of small farmers dependent on the crop lien system. Small farmers, especially blacks, in the hill sections of Bossier Parish "could not get supplies on account of th.e boll weevil, and went where they could do day work," according to the Louisiana Board of Agriculture and Immigration. There was, according to contemporary

August Meyer to Hunter, December 6,, 1908, enclosure with Hunter to Howard, December 9, 1908 General Correspondence, 1908-1924, RG 7, NA. ^Ibid. p Crop Report, Louisiana State Board of Agriculture and Immigration, July, 1909, p,~IT. 225 reports, a considerable exodus of blacks from Bossier Parish. The majority went to Oklahoma. The crop report explained that due to the boll weevil the ratio of corn planted to cotton planted would be far greater in 1909 than in 1908. But the total acreage would be less than in 1908, due to the exodus of black farmers. Despite the migration, the parish did not have a labor shortage. Planters so reduced acreage that less labor was required, especially when planters shifted to crops other than 9 cotton. Bureau of the Census statistics substantiate the observation. After two decades of steady increase. Bossier Parish's black population dropped from 18,890 to 16,735 inhabitants, a decrease of 11.4 percent between 1900 and 1910. The decrease is even more startling considering the normal population increase. The rationale for emigration observed in Bossier Parish occurred throughout the South. If the destruction, or prospect of it, by the boll weevil might induce a cotton tenant to move, a landlord's decision to reduce the cotton crop practically compelled the tenant to move. Where the economic prospects were so dim that merchants would not "furnish" tenants or small farmers, the farmer

9 Ibid., March and April 1909, p. 5; Annual Report of the Agricultural Statistics and Crop Report for the Year 1910 of the Louisiana State Board of Agriculture and Immigration, p. 4. Negro Population, 1790-1915, Bureau of the Census (Washington, 1918), p. 782. 226 had little choice but to move on. This disruption of the traditional credit system caused some to view the boll weevil as a "blessing in disguise" for bringing about diversification. Without the merchant's support the farmer would be compelled to plant food and feed crops. Aside from the increase in com, the diversification crops tried in Bossier Parish were rice and peanuts. One farmer planted rice in 1909 and piimped fresh water from a nearby bayou to irrigate the field. The few successful experiments in 1909 encouraged others to plant rice crops in 1910. The parish raised its first commercial peanut crop in 1910. Before the crop came in, a peanut crushing plant had been completed at Bossier City. 12 Its availability augured well for increased plantings the next year. Elsewhere, throughout Louisiana, the reaction to the boll weevil was the same as in parts of Texas. The main difference seems to have been the increased rapidity of the change. Farmers came to recognize the heavy emergence from hibernation in the third year of infestation, or had taken to heart the preachments of the entomologists. The spring of 1908 was the third year of infestation for the western portion of Catahoula Parish.

Crop Report, Louisiana State Board of Agriculture and Immigration, July, 1909, p. 12; Ibid., Annual Report, 1910, p. 4. 12 Ibid., September 1910, p. 4. 227 The parish crop reporter estimated that during June 1909, Catahoula farmers abandoned or plowed up one-half of the cotton acreage planted in April and May. 13 They substituted peas and corn. 14 Farmers in St» Martin Parish had already cultivated their young cotton when the boll weevil appeared in large numbers in June. Many proceeded to plow up the cotton and plant corn. Washington Parish farmers did likewise. 15 Thomas H. Hewes of Point Coupée Parish had little faith in the cultural method. He considered his acquaint- ances who tried it men of "energy and intelligence." Were it efficacious, they would have succeeded. When the boll weevil arrived, Hewes ceased planting cotton, planted eighty acres of rice, and induced his neighbors to try rice on small experimental fields. Concordia Parish farmers acted precipitously in believing that the boll weevil would totally destroy the cotton crop. After they had plowed up the cotton and planted corn, the weevil turned out to be less destructive than had been assumed.

■"■^Ibid., July, 1909, p. 6. ^Ibid., June, 1908, p. 5. Ibid., May and June, 1910, pp. 5-6. 16 Thomas H. Hewes to the Editor, Southern Farm Gazette, October 23, 1909, p. 15. Crop Report, Louisiana State Board of Agriculture and Immigration, July, 1909, p. 6, 228 The tendency to abandon cotton completely was so pronounced that the commissioner of agriculture felt constrained to advise against it. While he favored diversification, the commissioner's conversations with farmers convinced him that all too often they believed diversification meant abandoning cotton completely and becoming truck farmers. He implored them to "hold our hilltops and valleys, and not be baffled by an enemy, even though it be an insidious one."^^ Those who did not completely give up cotton quickly turned to the early-maturing varieties. Farmers in the rich low lands of the Red River valley near Alexandria formerly disparaged short staple cotton as "buzz-fuzz" cotton. They soon decided that the boll weevil would not permit the long growing season necessary to produce long staple cotton and planted short staple cotton. 19 The work of Seaman A. Knapp's agents in advance of the weevil influenced some farmers to adopt new varieties. The boll weevil did not appear in East Feliciana Parish until the fall of 1908; yet several farmers in that parish planted early varieties of cotton in the spring. 20 Comparisons

18 "Address of Col. Charles Schüler at the Packing House Convention at Baton Rouge in January, 1909," Crop Report, Louisiana State Board of Agriculture and Immigra- tion, October, 1909, p. 9. 19 W. C. Hudson, "Growing Cotton Under Boll Weevil Conditions," Progressive Farmer and Southern Farm Gazette, April 29, 1911, p. 435. 20 Crop Report, Louisiana State Board of Agriculture 229 to neighbors' fields convinced others to try new varieties. Sabine Parish farmers who used early varieties and fertilizer in 1906 made 1,000 pounds of seed cotton to the acre, while other farmers using the standard seed got only 300-400 pounds per acre. 21 Large planters in Madison, Tensas, and Concordia, delta parishes all, began planting early varieties in 1909. That season marked the first planting of King cotton near Vidalia. Farmers near Waterproof, Louisiana, generally substituted King, Simpkins, Toole, and Excelsior for traditional varieties. Some farmers planted old varieties and early- maturing ones on the same farm during the early years. John Cammack of Newellton, Louisiana, planted two-thirds of his 275 acres in Hawkins and one-third in the earlier- 22 maturing King variety. There were, of course, advertisements for cotton seed proclaiming special weevil-resistant merits. The state agricultural experiment station tested as many as possible to be able to advise farmers. In Louisiana and the other southeastern states the boll weevil and Immigration, June, 1908, p. 6, 21 Ibid., September, 1906, p. 5, 22 "Report on Trip through a Portion of the Mississippi Delta, July 22-29, by R. A. Cushman," enclosure with Hunter to Howard, August 5, 1909, General Correspond- ence, 1908-1924, RG 7, NA. 23 Twenty-First Annual Report of the Agricultural Experiment Stations of the Louisiana State University and Mechanical College for 1908 (Baton Rouge, 1909), p. 14. 230 added another element in trying to control cotton wilt. Dixie and Dillion, two varieties bred for resistance to cotton wilt, did not do well in boll weevil conditions. Farmers also planted early. The preparation of land for planting in 1909 was about a month earlier than usual, and the New Orleans Democrat predicted the crop would be the earliest ever planted in Louisiana. 25 For those who opted to try new crops, rice was particularly alluring. The successful mechanized prairie rice industry in southwestern Louisiana encouraged others to try it. The flat lands of the Mississippi delta seemed a likely place for mechanized rice growing. The transformation in Concordia Parish was particularly startling. The first fields of rice were planted in that parish in 26 1909, and a traveler noted that between Ferriday and Vidalia, "cotton has given way entirely to rice." 27 The transformation of thousands of acres to rice was so complete that the two cotton oil mills established at Vidalia in the 1890s were dismantled. By 1910, the rice industry supported a rice mill established at Vidalia.

^^Ibid., p. 21. 25 New Orleans Democrat, February 15, 1909, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 26 Crop Report, Louisiana State Board of Agriculture and Immigration, July, 1909, p. 5, 27 "Report on Trip through a Portion of the Mississippi Delta, July 22-29, by R. A. Cushman," enclosure with Hunter to Howard, August 5, 1909, General Correspondence, 1908-1924, RG 7, NA. 231 But cotton remained more lucrative than rice, even with the boll weevil. After making adjustments in cotton growing, the farmers moved to abandon rice, and the rice mill closed. Of particular importance in giving an economic advantage to cotton was the development of early- maturing long staple varieties. Short staple varieties of King, Simpkins, Triumph, and others predominated in 1920. The Delfos early-maturing, long staple strains and the adoption of calcium arsenate as a means of boll weevil control returned cotton to prominence in this delta parish. 28 Numerous other parishes tried rice. There were approximately 1,000 acres planted near Jonesville in 1909, the first planting in Catahoula Parish in memory. 29 Having no previous experience with observing rice growing, the crop reporter for the parish confessed his ignorance and his inability to assess the crop's condition. There were 2,500 acres of rice planted in another delta parish, 31 Tensas, m 1909, none in 1908. That same year, 1909, marked the first rice crop in Caldwell Parish. Other

28 Robert Dabney Calhoun, "A History of Concordia Parish, Louisiana" (Eighth Installment), Louisiana His- torical Quarterly 16 (October 1933): 604-5. 29 Crop Report, Louisiana State Board of Agriculture and Immigration, April, 1909, p. 5. •^°Ibid., July, 1909, pp. 6, 11. ^■"■Ibid., April, 1909, p. 6. 32 Ibid., Annual Crop Report, 1909, p. 5^ 232 parishes such as Vermillion had previously planted rice, but increased the acreage in 1909 due to the boll weevil. There were approximately 2,9 00 acres of rice in East Carroll Parish in 1908, compared to approximately 10,000 acres in 1909. Wherever cotton growing existed in conjxinction with other commercial crops, there was a tendency to increase the acreage of the other crops to the detriment of cotton. St. Martin Parish in southern Louisiana traditionally grew both cotton and sugar cane. The crop reporter observed that the cotton crop there was only one bale to every twelve acres in 1910. He predicted a reduction of cotton acreage by one-half, that acreage to be planted in sugar cane. His report in 1911 confirmed his prediction. 34 Other areas reverted to sugar cane. The Red River valley had produced quantities of sugar cane but had gradually shifted to cotton. After the arrival of the boll weevil, farmers there returned to sugar cane, but did not completely abandon cotton. 35 Sugar cane required investment capital for a processing plant. To this end, citizens near Erath in Vermillion Parish met and subscribed $22,000 toward the construction

■^■^Ibid., July, 1909, p. 8. 34 Ibid., Annual Crop Report, 1909, p. 7; Third Quarterly Report, September, 1911, p. 6» ^Ft. Worth Telegram, August 11, 1909, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 233 36 Of a $60,000 refining plant. Farmers and businessmen

of St. Landry Parish met at Opelousas in 1906 to consider

establishing a suger refinery. This move was made not

from the boll weevil's effect but in response to its 37 "impending ravages." A group broached the Board of

Trade of Baton Rouge with the idea of building a sugar 38 refinery. Sugar cane—like the other diversification

crops of potatoes, corn, and peanuts—was long known to

southern farmers for home consiomption. It need not be

refined. The Monroe Star reported that in 1909, farmers

in several northern Louisiana parishes would plant sugar

cane for the first time. They would not refine sugar,

but would produce molasses for local consumption.

The acreage in peanuts increased especially in

northern Louisiana. They were often grown in conjunction

with hogs. J. Lee Hester was illustrative of the shift.

Hester had grown peanuts for fattening hogs, but after the arrival of the boll weevil, began to raise peanuts 40 for market. In 1909, the acreage planted in peanuts in

Hester's neighboring parish of Claiborne increased fivefold

36 Ibid., New York Journal of Commerce, October 25, 1909 37 Ibid., New Orleans Picayune, October 4, 1906. 38 Ibid., December 1, 1908. 39 Ibid., Monroe [Louisiana] Star, May 12, 1909. 40 J. Lee Hester to the Editor, Progressive Farmer and Southern Farm Gazette, March 11, 1911, p. 255. 234 41 over the previous year. Winn Parish reported a 500-fold xncrease m peanuts. 42 The boll weevil awakened interest in truck, fruit, and vegetable farming. The Louisiana Agricultural Experi- ment Station had established a branch station in northern Louisiana in 1892 to specialize in fruit and vegetable crops. Initially, the station contented itself with identifying varieties suitable for home gardens. With the prospective arrival of the weevil the Calhoun station began experiments in 1904 to promote a commercial truck and fruit industry. Early successes concentrated mainly around railroad lines at Calhoun, Ruston, and 44 Haynesville. The Kansas City Southern Railway had by the end of 190 3 promoted the establishment of thirty-four growers' associations and the planting of one and one-half million fruit trees along its line north and south of Shreveport. The railway company purchased forty acres

41 Crop Report, Louisiana State Board of Agriculture and Immigration, October, 1909, p. 4. 42 Ibid., September, 1910, p. 6. 43 E. J. Watson, Summary of Results with Vegetables and Fruits at the North Louisiana Experiment Station from 1892 to 1907, Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin No. 90 (Baton Rouge, 1907), pp. 3-4. 44 D. N. Barrow and E. J. Watson, Results of Experi- ments in Production and Marketing Fruits and Vegetables and Canning Fruits and Vegetables on a Small Scale at the North Louisiana Experiment Station, Calhoun, Louisiana, Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin No. 81 (Baton Rouge, 1905), p. 3. 235 between Noble and Zwolle for a demonstration farm specializ- mg in tomatoes and potatoes. 45 The boll weevil's presence caused increased interest in such projects. One report for 1909 listed the increased acreage of Irish potatoes at 71.5 percent over previous years, a 32.5 percent increase in sweet potatoes, and an increase m garden crops of 42 percent. 46 At the end of 1909, eighteen parishes judged their new ventures in truck farming a success, while nine parishes believed 47 otherwise. Some individual farmers claimed to have succeeded very well. J. C. Brown of the Ruston vicinity wrote that he would have been willing to sell his farm for $12.50 an acre when the boll weevil arrived. However, after producing successful truck crops, he valued it at over $100 an acre. His revenues from potatoes, peanuts, and hay in 1911 were $115 per acre. Additionally, he raised tomatoes, cabbage, turnips, snap beans, and cucxambers. The tomato canning factory, established at

45 A. V. Swaty, "Transportation of Fruits and Truck," in Proceedings of the Second Annual Meeting of the Louisiana State Horticultural Society held in Shreveport, Louisiana, January 12 and 13, 1905, issued by the State Board of Agriculture and Immigration (Baton Rouge, 1905), p. 72. 46 Monroe [Louisiana] Star, May 12, 1909, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 47 Crop Report, Louisiana State Board of Agriculture and Immigration, October, 19 09, p. 3^ 236 Ruston in response to the boll weevil, purchased the tomatoes. Dairy and cattle farming received some attention. After the destructive year of 1910, farmers in East Baton Rouge Parish started dairies. They envisioned New Orleans as their major market. 49 Louisiana was the scene of activity, especially during 1908, as farmers' organizations met in local towns to discuss the boll weevil situation. The Farmers' Pro- tective Association of Lafayette met in late October 1908, and the farmers of Milton had met a month earlier. Alexandria hosted a large convention on November 20, 1908, at which state entomologist Wilmon Newell and W. D. Hunter spoke. Also speaking was H. C. Stringfellow, who visited Texas in late September and early October 1908 at the behest of Ouachita Parish planters and businessmen to investigate the boll weevil's impact on Texas farming. 52

48 Beaumont [Texas] Journal, November 12, 1911, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 49 Annual Crop Report, Louisiana State Board of Agriculture and Immigration, 1910, p. 5, Lafayette [Louisiana] Advertiser, September 29, 1908; New Orleans Picayune, November 1, 1908, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 51 Hunter to Howard, November 21, 1908, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 52 Dallas News, September 1908, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 237

Stringfellow returned with the encouraging report that Louisiana, as had Texas, could adjust to the boll weevil. But it was already too late for one financial institution in his home parish, the Ouachita Valley Bank located at Monroe. The bank went into liquidation in early January of 1909 with $50,000 capital and deposits of $9,000. President E. C. Drew assured depositors that the bank was solvent and would return investments, but he saw no reason to continue. In a public statement Drew laid major blame to the boll weevil: Owing to the effect of the boll weevil in the country in general and the recent damaging onslaughts made upon the bank, which has crippled the institution beyond recovery except by long and tedious work, the Board of Directors has decided that there is no course open but the liquidation of the bank.^^ Eastward, in the delta parish of Tensas, W. J. Steen, a St. Joseph merchant, went into receivership with liabilities of $72,591.74 and a stock of $20,000-25,000. The explanation passed to the newspapers was that the "boll weevil visitation caused the embarrassment." 54 As late as 1914, conditions in Tensas Parish were still being regarded as "fearful."

53 Ibid., New Orleans Democrat, January 3, 1909. 54 Ibid., Ardmore [Oklahoma] Ardmorite, December 23, 1908. 55 Dr. E. Dunbar Newell to B. H. Wade, December 13, 1914, Battaille Harrison Wade Papers, Mississippi Depart- ment of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi. 238 The weevil was so destructive during 1908 near Plaucheville in Avoyelles Parish that school attendance 56 was expected to be larger in the fall. Little labor was required to pick the small crop. Avoyelles Parish was one where weevil infestation was traditionally high. Centers could vary from year to year, but southern Louisiana frequently had high weevil infestation. An August 1910 survey showed a 40-80 percent infestation in the Florida parishes of East and West Feliciana. East of the Mississippi River, East Baton Rouge, Point Coupée, and Concordia parishes were similarly infested. Concordia Parish, containing some delta land, had higher infestation than other delta parishes to the north. 57 The production in West Baton Parish averaged 6,958 bales between 1899 and 1908. The 1909 production dropped drastically to 275 bales, and in 1910, the Bureau of the Census ceased listing the parish in its annual production statistics. East Baton Rouge Parish had another year of grace. Between 1899 and 1908, the parish had averaged 24,838 bales. The drop in 1909 to 6,810 bales was severe, but the next year production was only 864 bales. During 1912,

New Orleans Picayune, September 16, 1908, SFCII, RG 7, NA. W. Dwight Pierce to Howard, August 25, 1910, and attached "Report on the Second Boll Weevil Status, 1910, August 1-20, 1910, by W. Dwight Pierce, August 24, 1910," General Correspondence, 1908-1924, RG 7, NA. 239 only five of the twenty-eight gins in the parish operated. The cotton oil mills in the area of Baton Rouge closed. W. R. Dodson, director of the Louisiana Agriculture Experiment Station, could not even comply with a request to furnish by-products of cotton oil mills for the 1911 International Exposition at Turin, Italy. He explained to A. C. True, director of Office of Experiment Stations, that the "cotton crop in this vicinity was so short that the mills have closed down and if we were to get samples, we would have to have them shipped in from some other part of the state."^^ East and West Feliciana parishes suffered an equal, if not worse, fate. West Feliciana picked an annual average of 17,288 bales between 1899 and 1908. The year of 1909 was the third year of infestation for most of West Feliciana, and production dropped to 1,235 bales, followed by years of 405 bales, 717, 831, 661, and 1,103, and an average of 908 bales for 1910-15. By 1912, twenty- four of the twenty-nine gins in the parish lay idle. fin

58 Bureau of the Census Bulletin No. 10, pp. 27-28; Bureau of the Census Bulletin No. 100; pp. 29-30; Bureau of the Census Bulletin No. 107, p. 39; Bureau of the Census Bulletin No. 116, p. 35. 59 W. R. Dodson to A. C. True, January 17, 1911, Louisiana, State Correspondence, RG 164, NA. Bureau of the Census Bulletin No. 10, p. 28; Bureau of the Census Bulletin No. 100, p. 30; Bureau of the Census Bulletin No. 116, p. 36; Bureau of the Census, Cotton Production, Crop of 1915, p. 12. 240 The state prison farm located at Angola in the western part of the parish had an ample, if not altogether willing, supply of labor to try any control method. The boll weevil in 1908 halved the normal crop with the state, and the authorities announced that in 1909, a "large part" of the 61 acreage would be in cane. Among other methods the farm managers tried Marston's Paris green remedy. Nothing seemed effective. The 1,300 acres normally produced 2,000 bales, and during periods of good cotton prices the state received about $100,000. After 1909, the State Board of Control reported that it would plant all 1,300 acres m cane. 62

East Feliciana Parish produced 26,2 69 bales between 1899 and 1908. The crop years 1909 through 1915 were 5,232; 1,977; 3,123; 3,872; 5,131; and 2,694 bales, 6 3 respectively. Destruction by the boll weevil accounted in large part for the drop in production, but another reason was reduced cotton acreage in favor of other crops. By 1909, the state crop reporter of East Feliciana Parish could justifiably issue a terse statement, "The boll weevil

Monroe [Louisiana] Star, September 25, 1908, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 62 Ibid., Opelousas [Louisiana] Clarion, September 4, 1909. 6 3 Bureau of the Census Bulletin No. 10, p. 28; Bureau of the Census Bulletin No. 100, p. 29; Bureau of the Census Bulletin No. Ill, p. 31; Bureau of the Census, Cotton Production, Crop of 1915, p. 11. 241 simply ruined this parish." 64 Thereafter, reduced acreage constituted a prime reason for low cotton production. Nearly all East Feliciana farmers began raising hogs and cattle for commerce and home supplies. They would continue to plant some cotton, but only "in a small way." The destruction of the boll weevil in 1910 proved the sagacity of the move. Another reason for the reduced acreage was the exodus of blacks from the parish to the delta during late 1908 and 1909. In 1910, the exodus decreased but did not entirely subside. The crop reporter believed that the small farmers of the parish had become "independent," due to a reliance on diversification. Farmers raised hogs, cattle, vegetables, hay, lespedeza seed, poultry, and corn and dairy farmed. All told, 6 7 diversified farming was "now the rule," proclaimed the crop reporter. Despite the loss of labor, there was no shortage of farmhands because less land was cultivated. The parish encompassed a "large area of idle lands in 68 1911." The crop reporter gained the impression that the farmers were hopeful and were coming to regard the boll

64 Crop Report, Louisiana State Board of Agriculture and Immigration, October, 1909, p. 7.. ^^Ibid., p. 4. 6 6 Ibid., Annual Crop Report, 1910, p. 5. Ibid. 6 8 Ibid., Third Quarterly Report, September, 1911, p. 5. 242 weevil as an "indirect blessing." One wonders. The U.S. Congressman for the parish, Lewis L. Morgan, saw little reason to regard the boll weevil as a blessing in disguise, as it was often called. He appealed for a demonstration agent in 1914, explaining that "several years of awful hard times caused by the advent of the weevil has just about torn things to pieces." Cotton was no longer the reliable crop of the Louisiana farmer that it had once been. The per-acre lint production in 1909, 130 pounds, was the lowest since the aftermath of the Civil War in 1866 and 1867. Only 1919, with a 109-pound lint production per acre, ranked worse in the history of Louisiana cotton production. Louisiana produced over 200 pounds of lint cotton per acre in thirty-one of the thirty-nine years between 1870 and 1908. A corresponding amount was produced in only four of the 71 next twenty-two years, 1909-30. Cotton alone among field crops decreased in acreage from the 1900 census to the 1910 census. The decline from 1,376,254 acres in 1899 to 957,011 in 1909 represented a 30.5 percent change. Not until 1918 did the state reach the 1899 acreage level again.

^^Ibid. Lewis L. Morgan to Bradford Knapp, January 29, 1914, Louisiana, General Correspondence, Records of the Extension Service, RG 33, NA. 71 Cotton and Cottonseed, Statistical Bulletin No. 164, 243 During the first decade of the twentieth century the acreage of corn increased, but corn already commanded the largest percentage of agricultural lands of any field crop. The acreage in rice expanded from 201,685 acres to 317,518 acres. Sweet potato and yam acreage more than doubled but occupied only 1.5 percent of the improved land in 1909. Sugar crops increased about 20 percent and occupied about 6 percent of the acreage. Peanut acreage increased sevenfold but occupied less than 1 percent of improved land. Large increases occurred in hay and forage crops and the attendant livestock industry. Those who abandoned cotton farming to work at sawmilling contributed to the 150 percent increase in the value of forest products sold. The decade from 1910 to 1920, as noted, saw a return to cotton. Certain elements of the diversification inspired by the boll weevil went into decline; others continued. Sugar cane declined, having fewer acres in 1919 than in 1899. The peanut acreage declined, as did that of oats. Fruit production declined while rice continued on the upswing. Notably the strides made in cattle and hog production in the first decade continued in the second. In Louisiana the most significant success to be claimed

Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Department of Agri- culture (Washington, D.C., June 1955), pp. 16, 31. 244 for diversification due to the boll weevil lay in rice and livestock. 72 Those familiar with the boll weevil foresaw some of the effects on cotton production. What no one could foresee was the panic that occurred among blacks in Louisiana and Mississippi in late 1908 and early 1909. The boll weevil had prompted an earlier migration in Texas, and there would be later migration. What made the 1908-09 phenomenon unique was its intensity over a short period of time. There were several causes. The activities of Seaman A. Knapp's men in attempting to prepare the farmers to meet the weevil may have been contributory. The speakers, quite naturally, included tales of the potential destructiveness in fostering diversification and the cultural methods of cotton production. There was an element of scaring farmers into adopting the methods. Part of the migration came in fact from across the Mississippi River where the weevil had as yet exerted little influence. But many migrants were from Louisiana, then very familiar with the weevil.

72 Agriculture, Thirteenth Census of the United States, Bureau of the Census (Washington, D.C., 1913), 6:662-97; Agriculture, Fourteenth Census of the United States, vol. 6, pt. 2, Bureau of the Census (Washington, D.C., 1922), pp. 585-616. 73 Hunter to Howard, March 12, 1909, General Cor- respondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 245 The panic began with the closing of the picking season. Louisiana had already suffered, but 1908 was more disastrous financially than previously. The crop of 470,000 bales in 1908 followed a season of 675,000 bales. Worse still, the price of cotton dropped from that of 74 1907. As the planters and croppers went about settling up accounts and preparing for the next year, the tenuous financial condition of the cotton economy became evident. It was this "bad showdown" described by one newspaper correspondent that touched off the panic. The announced policy of merchants in some Mississippi counties not to continue the practice of supporting the importation of various feed and food products was also a contributing factor. According to one newspaper account, creditors in Amite, Pike, and Franklin counties in southwestern Mississippi demanded promises that farmers grow their own food. No longer would the farmer borrow money on a farm devoted exclusively to cotton. According to the correspondent, "this policy is becoming general—not advance a dollar to any farmer, who does not raise his 76 own supplies." The boll weevil, for a brief period.

74 Cotton and Cottonseed, Statistical Bulletin No. 164, p. 16. Charleston [South Carolina] News and Courier, January 18, 1909, SFCII, RG 7, NA. Ibid. 246 seemed to be accomplishing what farmers' protective associations in the area could not accomplish through coercion—restricting credit to blacks. The prior movement was not based on the laudable goal of reforming the "furnish" system, but on expelling blacks or controlling them. The "whitecappers" wanted to loan only to Negroes who worked for whites and in no cases to black landowners. 77 The main recipients of the migration were Oklahoma, Arkansas, and the Yazoo-Mississippi Delta. On January 5, 1909, sixty Negroes departed Shreveport bound for Arkansas in a railroad car assigned to them. They sought a land of no boll weevils, no floods, and no crop failures. The mode of transportation varied. The New Orleans Item reported that "carloads and caravans of men, women and children, and mules, with household goods piled in chaotic confusion on carts, freight trains, and steamboat docks" 79 were exiting from Louisiana. Biblical allusions came easily in descriptions of the scene. To one correspondent, the "wild exodus" in Louisiana resembled the "exodus of 80 the Israelites from Egypt." The motto of the day,

77 . William F. Holmes, The White Chief; James Kimball Vardaman (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), pp. 134-45. 78 Shreveport Farms, January 6, 1909, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 79 Ibid., New Orleans Item, December 25, 1908. 80 Ibid., Memphis Scimitar, December 13, 1908. 247 the journalist explained, was "Cross de Jordan, brothers, and find de promised land." 81 The weevil had driven blacks from Louisiana in previous years, but not in number to compare with the 1908-09 exodus. Planters accepted much of the earlier migrations with equanimity; they planned to reduce acreage in any event. The new movement was a different matter. Attempts to stem the tide took several forms. There were appeals to Negroes. A white speaker on one of the special diversification trains attempted to draw upon the reverence reserved for preachers: "As your old preacher would tell you in his simple but expressive language— 'Stay longer what you is an' stay out of debt.'"^^ Appeals to reason failing, perhaps fear of the unknown would overcome fear of the boll weevil. Newspaper articles appeared with horrid tales of conditions in Arkansas. The New Orleans Item printed a story that "conditions little short of slavery are reported in 8 3 Arkansas." White men armed with shotguns met blacks on arrival in Arkansas and compelled them to work under armed guard. The reward for a month's work was a little food and a pair of overalls. Whatever the veracity of the

81 Ibid., New Orleans Item, December 25, 1908. 82 Ibid., Memphis Appeal, December 16, 1908. 83 Ibid., New Orleans Item, December 22, 1908. 248 story, the source seemed impressive—Negroes recently returned to Shreveport from Arkansas. 84 The solidarity of the southern states on the race issue cracked when economic considerations were concerned. The indebtedness of many blacks kept them attached to the plantation, but even for those free to move, there was an attempt to prevent emigration. Besides Negroes, the other objects of vigilante activities were the labor agents. Citizens• groups in Concordia and East Carroll parishes adopted resolutions against labor agents. Migration had taken place from Caddo Parish, in north.- western Louisiana, across the state line to Arkansas for several years. The migration continued in late 1908, until the planters became alarmed in early 1909. There were mass meetings at Shreveport and Zachary in Caddo Parish and at Lecompe in Rapides Parish in early 8 S January 1909. One labor recruiter in Shreveport had offered to close his bureau for $500 in December 1908. Now the meetings at these places determined that the labor agents must go. To accomplish their goal, the meetings appointed committees that were to tell the agents to leave

84 Ibid., and December 25, 1908. 85 Ibid., Charleston South Carolina News and Courier, January 18, 1909. 86 Ibid., New Orleans Item, December 22, 1908. 249

and to inspect trains for Negroes departing the state.

There seemed to be little opposition to the labor agents

in Morehouse and other parishes in northern Louisiana,

where the people appeared confident that their faith in 8 7 diversification would be vindicated.

While Arkansas and Oklahoma were the destinations

for many Negroes from northern Louisiana, the Yazoo-

Mississippi area was the main object of blacks from south-

western Mississippi, the Louisiana delta, and the Florida

parishes. Many opted to migrate by boat. The steamer

Falls City was reported on December 11, 1908, to have

delayed its departure to transport 500 Negroes northward.

They were in search of an area not yet invaded by the

boll weevil.

Planters and merchants of Natchez acted quickly

to quell the tide. Labor agents for the Birmingham

steel industry had been recruiting in the city, presumably

unimpeded. Then in mid-December 19 08, the steamer America

docked, "laden to the guards with negroes [sic] and their 89 plunder." In addition to blacks waiting at the Natchez

wharf to go to the Yazoo delta, there were groups at

Sycamore Point and other landing points up the river.

87 Ibid., Charleston South Carolina News and Courier, January 18, 19 09. 88 Ibid., Little Rock Gazette, December 12, 1908 89 Ibid., Charleston South Carolina News and Courier. cio>^ 250 According to the newspaper reporter, the "money interests" of Natchez and Adams County met and organized the Bankers' and Merchants* Labor Agency to prevent the migration. They vowed to accomplish their purpose "peaceably if we 90 can, forcibly if we must." " Threats resulted in the departure of the fifteen labor agents, thirteen white and two black. The methods employed at the wharf were "so emphatic that the negroes [sic] concluded to abandon their ideas of leaving and to remain in Natchez." 91 The labor agent in charge of the group promised to leave town, and the officers of the America agreed not to take on any additional passengers waiting upriver. The planter and merchant group at first ordered the editor of the black newspaper in town to leave. Eventually they con- sented to his continued residence in the city once he agreed "to argue against the emigration of the negroes [sic] and urge them to remain at home." 9 2 These vigilante methods probably stopped the movement of large numbers by river traffic. But many had already departed, and even though the panic subsided momentarily, there would be future migrations as the boll weevil racked southwestern Mississippi.

90,,Ibid. ., Ibid. 92 Ibid. 251 The main recipient in Mississippi was the Yazoo- Mississippi delta, "that promised land of the African." 93 The fertility of the lands was legend. All that was required to expand the cotton kingdom there were labor and land drainage. The labor agents put to flight in Louisiana were in some instances employed by planters of the region. The owner of the Glendora Plantation recruited one thousand Negroes in central Louisiana, in early December 1908. 94 The New Orleans Times-Democrat editorially criticized the act. 95 But the desire for labor in the delta was such that the plantation owner paid all the laborers' debts to the planters and merchants in Louisiana on their departure. 96 The scene of arrival in the delta was equally as striking as the scene of departure. Alfred H. Stone, a Washington County planter and writer on race relations, had never seen anything like it: Not in all my experience have I seen anything to equal the "moving" which went on in our territory between October and January. In riding six miles along a public road one day, I co\inted thirty-six wagon loads of household effects, the owners seated on top, shifting from various plantations to various

93 Ibid., Monroe [Louisiana] Star, December 19, 1908. 94 Ibid., Memphis Scimitar, December 13, 1908. 95 Ibid., reprint in Monroe [Louisiana] Star, December 19, 1908. 9 6 Ibid., Charleston [South Carolina] News and Courier, January 18, 19 09. 252 other plantations. Yet we had no boll weevil. We had simply made an early crop, and with nothing to attach them through the winter to the places on which they had lived for the season, they had a longer period than usual in which to travel about and find new homes, and more of them took advantage of it. During the same time there was an exodus of negroes [sic] from the boll weevil districts of Louisiana and Southwest Mississippi. They poured into the Yazoo-Mississippi Delta regions by hundreds. We have more labor than we have had at any time since the war. But of what permanent value is it to the section. They fled from Louisiana like rats from a sinking ship; what warrant have we to imagine that they will not similarly desert us when we are attacked—and resume the childish effort to find a country to which the weevil will not come—where conditions have not changed—where cotton growing remains the same old process, and where "living" is still the easy thing it has always been.^^ Having secured the labor, the planters did not wish to lose it. The boll weevil was not yet in the delta. The Illinois Central Railroad, a contributor and bene- ficiary of developments in the region, thought it well to run a boll weevil demonstration train through the region, preparatory to the weevil's arrival. Planters objected to the lantern slide presentation of the boll weevil. "If my negroes [sic] saw a magnified photograph of a boll weevil they would bolt for the North next morning," 9 8 explained one planter. The planters did not allow the train to stop at certain points, The newspaper writer found an analogy between the suppression of knowledge of the weevil and reactions during once-dreaded epidemics:

97 Alfred H. Stone, "Negro Labor and the Boll Weevil," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social History 33 (March 1909): 170-71. 98 Charleston [South Carolina] News and Courier, 253 This attitude was much in line with the policy pursued of old in regard to the yellow fever—keep the news out if you cannot keep the fever out." 99 Census statistics bear out contemporary accounts of migration. The Louisiana statistics reflect not only the 1908-09 migration, but also that of earlier years. The Bureau of the Census established a figure of 10.4 percent as the average natural increase of the black population from 1900 to 1910. Any lower figure represented a loss of population. Twenty-six of Louisiana's sixty parishes showed a gain over the expected increase. Many of these were in south Louisiana's sugar country. Of the remaining thirty-four parishes, nineteen had a net increase in black population, but had emigration. Fifteen parishes had a loss of population. Catahoula Parish had the largest percentage decrease, 23.5 percent. West Feliciana lost the largest number of people, 2,769. One center of migration was the delta, where Madison, Tensas, and Catahoula parishes all lost over 10 percent of their Negro population. Point Coupée and West Feliciana, divided by the Mississippi River, suffered likewise. Another center of migration was northwest

January 18, 1909, SFCII, RG 7, NA. ^^Ibid.99 254 Louisiana, on the banks of the Red River, where Bossier and Red River parishes lost black residents. Negroes were not the only ones to migrate, but the movement was predominantly black. Only two parishes, Catahoula and Bossier, had a loss of white population during the years 1900-10. Percentage loss of white population by parish was generally lower than that for blacks. The state became more predominantly white in the first decade of the twentieth century as the black portion dropped from 47.1 to 43.1 percent. The heaviest migration of blacks came generally from the highest density area of Negroes. Despite the migration, Negroes still constituted 75 percent of the population in the parishes of Bossier, East Carroll, Madison, Tensas, Concordia, and West Feliciana. The figiires for Mississippi also confirm the newspaper accovmts. There was heavy emigration from certain counties, notably Perry, Noxubee, and Oktibbeha, They did not fit the pattern caused by the boll weevil scare of 1908-09 in southwest Mississippi. In the tier of counties along the Mississippi River, descending from Warren County, the pattern was well established. From

Negro Population, 1790-1915, Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce (Washington, D.C., 1918), pp. 782-83. Population, 1910, Thirteenth Census of the United States, Bureau of the Census (Washington, D.C., 1913), 2:757-94. 255 1900 to 1910, Warren lost 4,363 people; Claiborne, 2,650; Jefferson, 2,983; Adams, 4,760; and Wilkinson, 3,165. The latter two, Adams and Wilkinson, lost the highest percentage of their black residents, 20.1 and 18.5 percent, respectively. There was a loss, but less severe, of white population for all the counties. Natchez, the trade center of the area, lost population and was to lose more. The boll weevil damaged some of the cotton crop in southwest Mississippi in 1908, but much of the emigration was in fear of the expected damage by the weevil. The best argximent for the boll weevil being the pre- dominant factor in the migration was that the farmers did not go to the northern industrial cities. They planned to continue growing cotton, but without the boll weevil, in the Yazoo-Mississippi delta. Statistics revealed the extent of migration to the delta» The black inhabitants of Quitman County numbered 1,785 in 1900 and 4,68 7 in 1910, an increase of 112.2 percent. The Sun- flower County Negro populace almost doubled, from 5,220 to 11,211. Not quite in the same category but with impressive gains were Tallahatchie with a 51.9 percent increase; Leflore, 45.6; Bolivar, 37.1; and Coahoma, 31.ll°2

102 Negro Population, 1790-1915, pp. 783-84; Population, 1910, Thirteenth Census ,~~pp. 1021-62. 256 Thus the delta continued to increase its percentage of black population. The boll weevil scare of 1908-09 was a prime influence, one of several during the history of the region. The topography, soils, and climate made it a suitable setting for the plantation system. The prevalence of malaria and the concentration of Negroes deterred whites who believed that only blacks could withstand the heat, moisture, and malaria. The belief, not the reality, was a significant factor in the population pattern. Harry Hairanond, a nineteenth-century writer on cotton regions in the South, discounted the validity of the belief. The preponderance of Negroes "was effected solely by economic influences, and has been maintained by a race prejudice which has deterred white immigrants from occupying many of the most fertile sections of the south."103

The immigrants could not have picked a better area for growing cotton in the presence of the boll weevil. Many contemporaries recognized the value of delta land over hill land. Where well drained, the fertile delta soil produced more fruit, offsetting the weevil's destruction. John Sharp Williams, demonstrating the

103 Harry Hammond, "Culture of Cotton, Geography of the Cotton Belt," The Cotton Plant, Office of Experi- ment Stations Bulletin No. 33, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 1896), p. 253. 257 sagacity that made him a leader of southern Democrats in Congress, early recognized the delta's geographical advantages over hill lands. Although determined to retain ownership of his ancestral home in the Yazoo hills, he did not want to take on any other ventures. He responded to a suggested purchase from his brother Christopher Harris Williams: I do not want any hill land in Talahatchee [sic] Co. at any price. I don't believe the boll weevil is going to do the South any harm in the long run. I think it will be a blessing in disguise, [sic] also it will put everybody in "the Dickens of a Fix" for four or five years. My observation of the boll weevil out in Texas bears out this conclusion.104 As the boll weevil was severely restricting cotton pro*- duction elsewhere in Mississippi, the Yazoo-Mississippi delta more than held its own. Acreage in cotton increased, while it decreased elsewhere. Production between 1909 and 1915 increased from 376,042 to 452,064 bales in the delta. In 1915, the delta counties produced one-half of the state's crop. Estimates by the National Cotton Council showed a loss from full production of one- half to one percent. Only a few Arkansas and Missouri delta counties compared favorably. Without any control

104 John Sharp Williams to Christopher Harris Williams, January 21, 19 09, John Sharp Williams Papers, Mississippi Department of Archives and History. 105 Robert L. Brandfon, Cotton Kingdom of the New South; A History of the Yazoo Mississippi Delta from Reconstruction to the Twentieth Century (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 123. 258 measures the estimate would be 30 percent reduction from expected yield. Even this figure ranked well for the Southeast, but it was not comparable to the semi-arid regions of the West. 106 Unlike the delta, Adams and Wilkinson counties acquired an accurate if undesired reputation for what the boll weevil could do to a community. "Boll weevil district" was an appellation sometimes used for south- 107 western Mississippi. By 1910, there were several large plantations for sale around Lessley and Woodville in Wilkinson County. The advertiser of the lands definitely believed the prospective buyer from the delta 1 no could buy a "cheap place for a stud farm." John Täte Wade, speaking of another town at a later time,, compared the conditions to Port Gibson, Claiborne County. The time would have been about 1910, three years after the weevil arrived: "The business conditions here look about like they did in Port Gibson the third year the boll weevil was there—plenty [of] negroes [sic] in town; but all of them on the streets—none inside the stores—no money. "■'■^^

Boll Weevil Losses; Value and Location of Losses Caused by the Boll Weevil (National Cotton Council, 1974), pp. 11, 23-24, 27. John Davis to B. Poor, October 4, 1910, John C. Burrus Papers, Mississippi Department of Archives and History. Ibid. 109 John Täte Wade to Battaille Harrison Wade, 259 Despite the migration from Adams County there was still sufficient labor. With demand decreased, wages actually dropped. Day wages were seventy-five cents in May 1909. The going rate in 1908 had been one dollar per day. Merchants restricted credit to Negro tenants, causing a further reduction in the cotton acreage. Those who had not succ\ambed to the panic the previous year were now faced with the prospect of moving due to a lack of credit. E. S. Tucker, one of Walter D. Hunter's staff, reported that some planters around Natchez were "caring for negro [sic] families on their places," ^ Yet it was the "furnish" system and the actions of landlords that Alfred H. Stone saw as the main culprit in the panic and decline of Natchez as a cotton growing region. Most landowners lived in Natchez and rented out their lands in small tracts, exercising little control over cropping practices. Merchants in Natchez supplied the tenants with credit, and when the boll weevil proved destructive, withdrew the credit. Stone contrasted the situation with other plantation areas, particularly the Red River area, where planters "carried" tenants through several difficult years. The Natchez planters made no attempt to

October 11, 1914, Battaille Harrison Wade Papers, Mississippi Department of Archives and History. E. S. Tucker to Hunter, May 3, 1909, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 260 ameliorate the tenants' difficult situation with the supply merchant. Small wonder that when representatives of delta planters arrived offering to pay their debts in exchange for a pledge to move to the delta, many went. The verdant hibernating places, especially the Spanish moss, the humidity, and the depleted soil were also important. But Stone saw them as secondary reasons for the decline of Natchez. Adams County presented one of the more definitive examples of cotton's decline. Between 1904 and 1908, the county averaged 18,928 bales. Between 1909 and 1915, the production averaged 1,391 bales. Nineteen of the thirty cotton gins in the county were idle in 1912, and at least five more were dismantled by 1915. By 1920, there were only twelve gins in the county, with two of them idle. Cotton production remained in the 1,000-4,000 bale range until about 1925, when the county could normally produce over 5,000 bales.. 112 Much of the cotton acreage reverted to woodland. Cotton money financed the construction of the stately mansions in Natchez. Henceforth the considerable cost of maintenance necessarily relied on another source of wealth. Later,

Alfred H. Stone and Julian H. Fort, The Truth About the Boll Weevil (Greenville, Mississippi: First National Bank, Greenville, 1911), n.p. 112 Bureau of the Census Bulletin No. 100, p. 30; Bureau of the Census Bulletin No, 116, p. 36; Cotton Production in the United States, Crop of 1920, p. 16. 261 as Adams County experienced the depression with the rest of the nation, stands of eight- and ten-inch-diameter trees stood on many sites once occupied by cotton. 113 Wilkinson County met a similar fate. The county produced 21,393 bales in 1907; 16,442 bales in 1908; and 4,161 bales in 1909. Production was \inder 2,000 bales in 1910 and 1911, and under 1,000 bales in 1912 and 1913.■^■'•'* Large landowners who enjoyed the profits of cotton to pursue other careers found themselves without the additional income and in danger of losing their land. The former superintendent of schools at Vicksburg, a Professor Kempee, owned a plantation in Wilkinson County. By 1914, a friend appealed to Senator John Sharp Williams to secure a presidential appointment for Kempee. As the friend related the story, "Their plantation in Wilkinson County which used to bring in a rent of about $6,000 is tenantless owing to the Boll Weevil—and it is hard to raise money to keep up Taxes." Aside from the old cotton growing region of southwest Mississippi along the river, much of south Mississippi

113 Source Material for Mississippi History, Adams County, Roll A791, Works Progress Administration, Mississippi Department of Archives and History. 114 Bureau of the Census Bulletin No. 114, p. 37; Bureau of the Census Bulletin No. 125, p. 41. 115 Belle Cowan Gray to John Sharp Williams, March 25, 1914, State Correspondence, John Sharp Williams Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 262 was not developed agriculturally when the boll weevil arrived. Lumber companies had cut much of the piney woods, and those long dependent on the linnbering industry were without work. They naturally tried cotton in the cutover sections, and their experience illustrated the difficulties of growing cotton in the coastal plain of the Gulf. In Pearl River County, the army worm destroyed th.e foliage on cotton in the fall of 1911. The damage resulted in a decreased weevil population in 1912. The crop of 1912 encouraged more people in the area to plant cotton, but unfortunately, the boll weevil was again destructive in 1913. The Mississippi Agricultxiral Experi- ment Station had established a branch station at McNeill. The station did not have experimental plantings in 1914 or 1915, hoping that several years' absence might make a difference in weevil infestation. The results with the 1916 crop were disastrous. Station director E. B. Ferris saw little hope for cotton in the coastal plain as a profitable crop for the liimber industry employees: "The fact is that growing cotton here before the coming of the boll weevil was always done on a very narrow margin

Cotton Experiments, 1913, Mississippi Agricul- tural Experiment Station Bulletin No. 164 (February 1914), pp. 9-10; E. B. Ferris, A Report of Work at McNeill Branch Experiment Station from 1912 to 1917 Inclusive, Mississippi Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin No. 188 (Agricul- tural College, December 1920), p. 10. 263 of profit/ . . . When ... we have the boll weevil to fight, it is a practical impossibility to grow cotton." 117 It was not impossible to raise cotton throughout the other sections of Mississippi, but the weevil had a detrimental effect on the economy, particularly on land prices. Yazoo City was a trade center for both the delta and the hill sections. As president of the Bank of Yazoo City, Christopher Williams was in a position to observe and judge. Before the arrival of the weevil, he speculated that he and his brother, John Sharp, would have "opportunities with the menace of the boll weevil to buy lands at very much less than either of us would take for ours, or else to lend money on good security. ..." 118 Actually there was little in the way of panic selling in 1911, nor was there much borrowing. The farmers were not willing, with the weevil present, to tax their reserves by p\irchasing more land. Essentially they retrenched, attempting to hold on to their land, rather than to expand. The urge to increase holdings came to a halt. E. R. Holmes explained the phenomenon to his father-in-law, John Sharp Williams, in 1911:

Cotton Experiments, 1913, Mississippi Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin No. 164, p. aO. 118 Christopher H. Williams to John Sharp Williams, September 29, 1910, John Sharp Williams Papers, Mississippi Department of Archives and History. 264 There are fewer applications for loans this year than I have ever known. Mr, Campbell tells me it is the same with him, and [he] has been in the business about 20 or 25 years. I have been at it 10 years, myself. And the banks say the same thing. There is a double reason for it. In the first place the people are in better fix, the banks have a larger line of deposits, but the main reason is that people are not spreading out any this year, on account of the boll weevil. They are rather contracting their operations. The fellow with a tract of land is not buying another tract adjoining his and mortgaging both tracts for the purchase money. I have not made a single loan this year to a man to buy land.119 There was also a tendency not to foreclose on lands With reduced prospects for profitable cotton crops, the value of the loan was seen by the lender to exceed the value of the land. John Sharp Williams had considerable money invested in lands on which he did not wish to foreclose . On one overdue note he advised his banker that "I had rather carry the debt and the interest than to take 120 the land right now." " It was obviously hill land because he complained that the owners had let it "wash away until it isn't worth" more than ten dollars per 121 acre. Wxlliams considered lending money to a Negro landowner who was heavily in debt. His son-in-law, E. R. Holmes, finally turned down the offer, although in other times he would have considered the land sufficient collateral: "The land is located right on the railroad, and

119 Ibid., Edwin R. Holmes to John Sharp Williams, January 24, 1911. 120 Ibid., John Sharp Williams to H. M. Love, Bank of Yazoo City, January 6, 1912. Ibid. 265 but for the boll weevil should be a cheap piece of property at $11,000.00 or $12,000.00."-^^^ Despite the planters' studied attention to protecting their property from the boll weevil's devastations, they had to undergo a period of adjustment. Crop production in Yazoo County dropped from 40,884 bales in 1910 to 23,790 bales and 16,421 bales in 1911 and 1912, respectively. It climbed back to 30,409 bales in 1913.'^'^"^ Though hopeful, Christopher Williams wondered whether the increase was "an indication of what we can do in spite of the boll weevil or not." The several preceding crop years had been poor and had already had an impact on the financial situation of farmers around Yazoo City. Doubting the ability to overcome the weevil, Williams anxiously awaited the heavy boll weevil infestation in July 1914, He confessed his doubts to his brother John Sharp: I wish you would tell Sister that I got her letter enclosing proxy for the Stockholders Meeting of the Producers Cotton Oil Mill, and asking me in regard to selling her stock, and tell her that I dont [sic] know how to answer the question as to what price to put on the stock. The trouble with this stock has been that while it has paid a good dividend, on the average, it has been an irregular dividend payer, some years making a magnificent profit, and then other years losing

122 Ibid., Edwin R. Holmes to John Sharp Williams, January 25, 1911. 123 Bureau of the Census Bulletin No. 125, p. 41. 124 Christopher H. Williams to John Sharp Williams, May 5, 1914, John Sharp Williams Papers, Mississippi Department of Archives and History. 266 money. The company is in good shape, and the stock ought to be worth at least 110, but as to the price it can be sold for, I am as much at sea as Sister is. Of course you know it is a local stock, and the trouble locally is that no one has money to invest in stocks of any kind, and a great many who have stock, want to sell, so I dont [sic] think this is the time to offer the stock for sale. You can see that the boll weevil directly affects the value of this stock, and the boll weevil is a citizen that is mighty hard to make any predictions about. You, who have not been here since the boll weevil com- menced his raves, can hardly know how' it has affected the sale of all kinds of property; not because the property is not worth the value placed on it, but because there are so few with money to buy it. In other words, just right now, there are more sellers than buyers, and of course it is no time to offer anything for sale, and if I were in Sister's place I wouldn't undertake now to sell the stock at all. If this year proves to be as successful as last, in the fight against the boll weevil, I think values of all will go up materially; but the trouble is that what the boll weevil does will largely depend upon the weather this month. At the present time, the prospects for a good crop, outside of the con- tingency of the boll weevil, are away yonder better than they have been for years. I have had to wrestle with this problem in trying to value securities, in a way that would be safe, and to avoid a panic such as they had in Adams, Wilkinson and other counties, which would simply break the country. . . . I am glad to say that all of us are in pretty good health, except that I am rather nervous, and will be until the next thirty days passes, when I see what the boll weevil will do; not nervous because of any risk of my own, or the bank, but because of what it will mean to the whole community.125 John Sharp Williams was one of those determined to turn his Yazoo hill farm into a diversified farm. But he had difficulty convincing his son, John Sharp, Jr., to restrict cotton acreage. The revenues in 1913 from the farm were disappointing under the old system of large

■"■^^Ibid., July 4, 1914 267 cotton plantings and little else. He resignedly wrote to his brother "Kit" that "if he [the son] had obeyed my injunctions last year he would have come out much 126 better." John Sharp wanted diversified crops and an earnest attempt to follow the recommendations of the entomologists and Knapp's force for reduced acreage with intensified cultivation. Williams tried again in 1914, by suggesting to his son, "The more share hands and the more renters you get the worse off you will be unless you do what I told you to do long ago: Don't under any circumstances permit any negro [sic] to put in over six acres 127 of cotton to the mule." The elder Williams acknowledged that the black tenants had good cause to be discouraged with the weevil depredations. He was not concerned about their exhibiting their disappointment by leaving the farm, and advised his son not to attempt to keep them. The prosperity of the farm would be better in the long run for the transition. But Williams had no intention of forcing the tenants to leave. They should simply recognize that the days of farming devoted solely to the production of cotton were over and that they could participate in the new system.

126 Ibid., John Sharp Williams to Christopher H. Williams, May 19, 1914. 127 George C. Osborn, "Plantation Letters of a Southern Statesman: John Sharp Williams and Cedar Grove," Agricultural History 21 (April 1947): 125. 268 He instructed his son to inform the tenants that he would accept the diversified crops, peas, corn, and numerous others in payment, just as cotton had been accepted in the past. Other farmers in the area were selling and preparing to leave, but John Sharp Williams had faith in the new system of diversified farming in the South. He encouraged his son not to be disheartened, nor to consider giving up farming. Rather, if his son followed his instructions, the Senator would support him. 128 Not all landowners who made the fight succeeded. The owner might succeed longer than the tenant, but the cumulative effects of several disastrous years were the same—a decision to try cotton growing in a more prosperous clime. One of those was the father of noted folklorist Arthur Palmer Hudson. The younger Hudson recalled a childhood in Attala County of trying to force the crop to maturity, poisoning and picking the weevils, and then "disappointedly gathering the sparse crop of bolls. My father was an intelligent and industrious farmer; he was progressive. But the fight in the long run proved too much for him." 129 The father bought a small farm in the delta.130

•■■^^Ibid., pp. 117, 125. 129 Arthur Palmer Hudson, "A Attala Boyhood," Journal of Mississippi History 4 (July 1942): 145. Ibid. 269 The pattern of potential weevil destruction in Mississippi consisted essentially of concentric circles emanating eastward from the delta. The counties of Coahoma, Bolivar, Washington, Sunflower, and Leflore were those most resistant to weevil infestation in the South. Only a few cotton counties in Missouri compared favorably. The next ring consisted of Tunica, Quitman, Humphreys, Sharkey, and Issaquena. Next was a belt with terminal points of DeSoto in the north and Warren at the lower end. Yalobusha, Montgomery, Madison, Rankin, and Hinds formed the next, non-contiguous band. The National Cotton Council recently estimated that the remainder of the state would have an 80 percent reduction from full production without any control measures. By 1913, all but the very northern portion of the state had been infested three years. The state lost 33 percent of the crop to the boll weevil that year. From that date to 1923, the destruction dropped below 20 percent in 1918 only. The percentage loss in 1916 was 32 percent. There were four disastrous years beginning in 1920 with the percentages of 32, 30, 28, and 31 to 132 192 3. The highest state yield prior to heavy weevil destruction had been 1908, with 1,656,000 bales and a per- acre lint production of 230 pounds. These levels would

131 Boll Weevil Losses, pp. 23-24, 27-28. 132 Statistics on Cotton and Related Data, Statis- tical Bulletin No. 99, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 270 not be surpassed until 1925. 133 The initial heavy emigration of blacks came from areas of large holdings and tenancy. The landowners' decision to reduce acreage virtually forced them to move. The small farmer, both black and white, could withstand one or two years of reduced crops, but the cxomulative effect reduced his financial reserves and placed his continued ownership in jeopardy. At the same time, the economy of the whole community was affected. The state director of cooperative extension work in Mississippi, R. S. Wilson, had difficulty in getting the counties to pay a share of county agents' salaries in 1914. In a letter he complained that with "the distressed financial conditions that exist it is going to be very difficult to raxse money from the counties for any purpose whatever." 134 When a crisis arose such as the disruption of trade with the beginning of World War I, farmers already in a weakened financial situation were certainly in difficulty. The war brought a drive to increase food and feed production. It was hoped by some that the combination of the boll weevil and the war would break the cycle and lead to

United States Department of Agriculture (Washington, 1951), p. 73. 133 Cotton and Cottonseed, Statistical Bulletin No. 164, pp. 14, 29. 134 R. S. Wilson to H. E. Savely, September 17, 1914, Mississippi, General Correspondence, RG 33, NA. 271 permanent diversification. At least the need to fill foreign and domestic needs provided the farmer with an opportunity that did not always exist. Such was the hope of a former Mississippi resident for his relatives in Tensas Parish, Louisiana: This war will be a fine thing for Tensas, as it will force them as well as give them an opportunity to give up cotton for grain, hay & cattle. Those people can't realize that cotton raising for them is a thing of the past; that scarcity of labor, bole-wevils [sic] & diminished fertility of their lands have made it only a memory and not a realization that they can expect "next year."135 Diversification often required considerable finances. To state extension agent Wilson, the severe financial depletions of several years from the boll weevil was the prime deterrent to diversification for small farmers in central and south Mississippi. He wrote his explanation in 1917: Though not altogether due to faults of their own, their condition at this time is a serious one. They have lost their cotton crop; and, in fact, have not been able to depend on it for years; and the difficulty in getting them adjusted to the proposition is they have not the means to finance any other business on a sufficient scale.136 One means of temporary relief for the landowner was to go into lumbering. Planters in Natchez, Adams

135 E. Dunbar Newell to Battaille H. Wade, December 13, 1914, Battaille H. Wade Papers, Mississippi Department of Archives and History. 136 R. S. Wilson to Bradford Knapp, March 15, 1917, Mississippi, General Correspondence, RG 33, NA. 272 County, who had forested lands began cutting and selling the timber. According to one planter, "timber and cattle pulled us through" the early boll weevil crisis. 137 If there are to be any claims for diversification in Mississippi, they lay in the area of cattle, dairy farming, and hogs. Soon after the boll weevil arrived in his section, D. Humphreys of Ingleside opted to try cattle before being ruined financially. He still grew cotton but concentrated a portion of the land on cattle: "I have partly hedged on cattle & hogs, and if I can make a good crop of corn, where I now have cotton, I may arrange to break even." 138 The state government aided the prospective cattle grower by beginning a program of cattle tick eradication. The State Livestock Sanitary Board adopted regulations for tick eradication work on May 7, 1910. By June 1911, there were six to seven hundred dipping vats in the state. Holmes County alone dipped 20,000 head of cattle each two weeks. 139 The cattle tick was the main barrier to the development of

137 Allison Davis, Burleigh and Mary Gardner, Deep South; A Social Anthropological Study of Caste and Class (Chicago; The University of Chicago Press, 1941), p. 260. The authors used the fictitious names Old City and Old County. The description of the town and a comparison of the census statistics convinces this author that the town is Natchez, Mississippi. 138 D. Humphreys to Hunter, June 9, 1910, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 139 Financial Report, September 30, 1909-June 30, 1911, Mississippi Department of Agriculture and Commerce 273 a prosperous beef cattle and dairy industry, followed closely by a secondary reason—the lack of sufficient pasturage. 140 There was little incentive to buy pure bred stock and to develop herds with the tick present. The dipping and quarantine method of tick eradication had been known for several years, but its successful implementation necessarily involved using the state's police powers. Such action was not taken lightly in the South. In Mississippi and other states the boll weevil's arrival seemed the ultimate argument for finally starting tick eradication plans. The following figures illustrate the steady growth of cattle and hog raising in Mississippi during the early part of the 1910s. These columns indicate the number of Mississippi hogs and cattle received at the National Stock. Yard of St. Louis:

Year Hogs Cattle 1906 3,294 1909 37,040 1913 3,641 98,035 1914 5,455 86,229 1915 6,556 127,740 ,., 1916 41,234 135,754 ^^^

(Nashville, Tennessee, 1911), pp. 12-14. 140 Rupert B. Vance, H;iman Geography of the South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1935), p. 16 3. 141 Bradford Knapp to A. C. True, February 14, 1917, Director's Office, General Correspondence, RG 33, NA. 274 In addition to shipments on the hoof, some Mississippi towns established packing houses. 142 Such was the case in Natchez. The number of beef cattle in Mississippi increased 88.4 percent from 1910 to 1920. The milk sold increased from 1,966,097 gallons in 1909 to 4,093,806 gallons in 1919. The establishment of a creamery at the state agricultural college helped train young men and promote the dairy industry. Not surprisingly, the acreage of hay and forage crops represented a twofold increase from 231,056 acres in 1909 to 483,544 acres in 1919."'"^"^ Unlike Louisiana, Mississippi did not have lands suitable for an expanded sugar industry. Nor did Mississippians, to any extent, try to grow rice. There seemed few commercial crops that the state could convert to. In fact, by 1913, the Montgomery Advertiser reported that Mississippi farmers were pessimistic because "they had failed on practically every crop that had been substi- 144 tuted for cotton." The peanut never reached the eminence in Mississippi that it was to hold in Georgia and Alabama. There were 13,997 acres harvested in 1909."'"^^

142 Houston Post, January 19, 1911, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 143 Agriculture, Fourteenth Census of the United States, vol. 6, pt. 2, Bureau of the Census (Washington, D.C., 1922), pp. 516-20. 144 Montgomery Advertiser, January 15, 1913, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 145 Agricultxire, Fourteenth Census, vol. 6, pt. 2, p. 520. ~~ ~~- 275 A convention of men engaged in the vegetable oil business met at Jackson and estimated that there were 150,000 acres planted in peanuts in 1911, and that several factories engaged in cotton seed crushing had installed machinery for crushing peanuts. Mississippians became dis- enchanted with the experiment in commercial peanut growing. The crop of 1919 was 16,933 acres, not quite 3,000 acres more than in 1909. 147 The other great hope was the truck crop industry. Again Mississippi was less successful than Louisiana. State authorities who saw south Mississippi as a potential garden established a branch of the state experiment station at McNeill. Even with experienced farmers the transition to specialty crops was extremely difficult. It was exceedingly difficult to accomplish with people of limited agricultural experience. After a decade of experiments, station director E. B. Ferris assessed the problems of converting denuded south Mississippi to the truck crop industry: The growing of fruits and vegetables on the cutover lands of South Mississippi should at some future time reach enormous proportions. The soils of this section of the state are naturally suited to this class of farming, being sandy loams that

146 San Antonio Express, February 17, 1911, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 147 Agriculture, Fourteenth Census, vol. 6, pt. 2, p. 520 276 drain well, dry out, and warm up early in the spring. . . . However, this section of Mississippi is the most underdeveloped portion of the state, with a citizenship composed largely, up to this time, of people who have followed other pursuits, such as lumbering and kindred industries, and have taken up agriculture only since the timber has been so largely removed. It is not to be expected that people so trained should from the beginning be very successful in any branch of farming, particularly in such a specialized business as the growing of truck for northern markets.148

148 E. B. Ferris, Truck Crops for South Mississippi, Mississippi Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin No. 163 (Agricultural College, 1913), p. 2, CHAPTER VIII

MIGRATION AND DIVERSIFICATION

Throughout the years 1914-19, the boll weevil continued its migration eastward across the Southeast. The pattern included a more rapid conquest of the country along the Gulf Coast than the northern portions of the Gulf Coast states. The weevil migrated across Alabama in roughly concentric circles emanating from the southwestern corner of the state to the northeastern corner» At the conclusion of 1914, the weevil was almost to the Georgia border. The migration in the fall of 1915 was one of the most extraordinary yet observed. Along Georgia's southern border, the weevil migrated well over halfway to the Atlantic coast—to Echols County. The siommer and fall of 1916 witnessed a further dramatic jump to the Atlantic Ocean and up the coast almost to the South Carolina line. As the United States entered the first World War and industrial job opportunities expanded in the North, there was a major exodus from the South in 1916 and 1917. Alabama and Georgia furnished large numbers of migrants. Even before the great migration of the war years, the boll

277 278 weevil had forced some Alabamians to leave. Other portions of Alabama were just experiencing the first years of heavy destruction from the weevil. Southwest Georgia, infested in 1915, was likewise ready to suffer damage in 1916 and 1917. As previously noted, the migration of 19 08-09 in Mississippi centered on Arkansas and the Yazoo-Mississippi delta. The migration continued through the 1910s, a considerable portion of it to other agricultural areas. By 1916, southeastern and eastern Mississippi had experienced three or four years of serious weevil infestation. R. H. Leavell surveyed the causes for the heavy migration from those sections in 1916 and 1917 for the Department of Labor's division of Negro economics. He saw the depressed financial condition of the farmers as a major factor. The farmers, after several seasons of losses, could no longer "carry" black tenants through the fall and winter of 1916 and 1917. A destructive storm and flood in the summer of 1916 reduced the farmers' ability to continue operations at the same level in 1917. By not furnishing supplies through the winter months, the farmers did not attempt to persuade tenants to remain another season. 1

Negro Migration in 1916-1917, Division of Negro Economics, U.S. Department of Labor (Washington, D.C., 1919; rpt. ed.. New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), p. 21. 279 There were, of course, well-founded social and economic grievances by blacks against racial discrimination. Opportunities for solving both problems existed in the North to a degree that had not existed previously. At least some of Leavell's Negro informants recognized that blacks tolerated the injustices for decades without migrating. Some event had to occur in the local community to prompt migration. Among those mentioned was the arrival of the boll weevil. Leavell paraphrased th.e attitudes of his three black sources in Memphis: There has been for many years widespread unrest among the Negroes; but there was no obvious outlet. Now the high wages in the industrial North afford such an outlet. But even under these circumstances some local exciting cause is necessary to start the migration. This exciting cause varies. It may be the advent of the boll weevil, or the coming of a destructive storm, the substitution of live stock and pasture in the place of cotton under the old cultural system, or it may be a lynching. Once the movement has started, it grows like a snowball; for everybody is inclined to do what everyone else is doing.^ One of the best argioments to be made for the influence of the boll weevil in promoting emigration, not just for 1916-17 but for the decade, is to compare South Carolina and Mississippi. In 1910, the two states had roughly the same percentage of black population, both heavily dependent on the cotton economy. Presumably Negroes in both states had access to the same opportunities

2 Ibid., p. 37, 280 in the North. South Carolina's black population increased from 1910 to 1920; Mississippi's declined. The weevil was not yet in South Carolina. Again in Georgia, with only a portion of the state heavily infested, the percentage of black population dropped; yet the total for 1920 was above that of 1910. Comparing Mississippi and Alabama presents an ideal case for the cumulative effects of boll weevil depredations on migration. By 1917, the major portion of Mississippi had been infested six years. By way of contrast, not until 1915 was most of Alabama infested for the first time. During the decade 1910-20, the black population of Alabama declined from 908,282 to 900,652, a reduction of 7,630. Mississippi's Negro population declined from 1,009,487 to 935,184, a drop of 74,303."^ The distressed financial condition brought on by the weevil in Mississippi seems the decisive factor in greater emigration from Mississippi 4 than from Alabama. Tipton Ray Snavely appraised the migration from Alabama for the Division of Negro Economics. Speaking of the considerable exodus from Alabama during the 1910s

3 Population, 1920, Fourteenth Census of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1923), 3:53, 202, 528, 924. 4 For a quantitative study which holds that the boll weevil "was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition underlying the Great Migration," see Robert Higgs, "The Boll Weevil, The Cotton Economy, and Black Migration," Agricultural History 50 (April 1976): 350. 281 prior to 1916, he concluded that "their going was largely due to the presence of the boll weevil and the consequent surplus of labor in the transition from cotton to other crops." For the earlier migration Snavely gave the boll weevil full credit; for the 1916-17 migration, the reduction of cotton acreage stood as "one of the principal causes." He also recognized the "underlying social causes," but saw the weevil and the opportunities in the North as the main reasons. The greatest movement took place from November 1916 to May 1917. The time period extended from the end of cotton picking season to before the next planting—the period when the farmer had to secure his provisions for the next year. The reaction of the planters to the weevil varied. It was in part the decisions of the owners that played a substantial role in the migration. Snavely observed that those who made the decision to provide for tenants through the winter "suffered less from the recent shortage of labor than have those who did not adopt similar o measures." But many owners did not choose to continue. One Dallas County planter in Alabama's black belt normally had 250 plows in his fields during the summer.. The flood of 1916 which destroyed his tenants' crops followed several

Negro Migration, 1916-1917, p. 51. 6 7 8 Ibid. Ibid., p. 58. Ibid., p. 61. 282 years of heavy losses to the weevil. He decided he could not advance provisions for the winter months. In the spring of 1917, he recruited only fifty families to farm 1,500 of the 7,000 acres on the plantation.^ Georgia was the best example of the boll weevil as a prime cause of the migration of 1916-17. Only the southwestern portion of the state had been infested long enough for the boll weevil to do any extensive damage. Fortunately, Thomas Woofter has provided a contemporary account, combined with historical observations, on the migration of Georgia Negroes. His studies indicated that blacks had been migrating to this land of "agricultural opportunity" from the old plantation black belt of piedmont Georgia. Wages in the southwest surpassed those in other agricultural areas of postbellum Georgia. On the eve of the first World War, Woofter regarded southwest Georgia as the area "where the old plantation system IS most firmly established." 12 The process of new arrivals from the black belt ceased and migration outward started with the arrival of

^Ibid., p. 71. Thomas Jackson Woofter, Jr., Negro Migration; Changes in Rural Organization and Population of the Cotton Belt (New York: W. D. Gray, 1920; rpt. ed., New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), p. 120. •^•'"Negro Migration, 1916-1917, p. 76, 12 Woofter, Negro Migration, p. 12 0. 283 the boll weevil. Planters began to reduce cotton acreage, supplanting it with, crops that required less labor. Woofter's conversations with tenants, owners, businessmen, and county agents convinced him that the major migration of 1916-17 came from the boll weevil area. The state crop reporter Z. R. Pettet concurred: The Negro exodus has been greatest in the territory that has been infested long enough to make it difficult to grow a paying crop of cotton. The reported acute labor-shortage line coincides closely with the line of third-year infestation, except along the southern state line.^^ Many joined the exodus to the North. Traditional outstate migration had been to Florida and westward to other cotton states. Now the boll weevil "blocked" their path and "this movement had, perforce, to turn northward." 14 Such interstate movement of blacks intent on continuing the agrarian life was now eastward to escape the weevil. There were, in fact, black tenants in the southwestern counties who had arrived there from Alabama where they had experienced several years of difficult times. As with previous and later migrants, the largest numbers were the share tenants and wage laborers. South- west Georgia was an area of large plantations, but there were a share of black landowners and independent renters.

•^•^Negro Migration, 1916-1917, p. 79. 14 Woofter, Negro Migration, p. 135, •'•^Negro Migration, 1916-1917, p. 80. 284 16 Neither left in large numbers. The black landowner, like the white, did not completely despair when the weevil arrived, though several years of destruction might bring his departure or retrogression to sharecropping. Woofter saw the social injustices in the South as a secondary reason for migrating, coming to prominence only after the boll weevil or some other force caused Negroes to move. Woofter observed the phenomenon of the weevil's impact on social conditions in Georgia: The beginnings of the movement of 1916-1917 may, therefore, be characterized as an intensification of the shift of Negro population which has been taking place for the past 50 years, accelerated by the boll weevil and abnormal conditions of northern industry. Since the movement started, however, it has induced a great amount of discussion among the Negroes themselves. This discussion has emphasized the social grievances of Negroes in the South, and since a distinct public opinion has been created, even among the masses of Negroes, the social causes have been playing a part in the migration. 1*7 As the migration from Alabama indicated, the fight against the weevil there had been no more successful than in the states westward. The state enacted a quarantine law against the boll weevil in 1903 and had hired Hunter's principal assistant. Warren E. Hinds, as state entomologist, Hinds first located the weevil at Wilmer, Mobile County,

Woofter, Negro Migration, p. 120. •"-^Negro Migration, 1916-1917, pp. 76-77. 285 on September 3, 1910. 18 The state legislature responded by passing the Local Experiment Law, popularly known as the "Boll Weevil" bill in February 1911. This was the first time the state had supplemented the funds the Agri- cultural Experiment Station in Alabama received from the national Congress. The fiinds provided for experiments on a local basis to test new crops, fertilizer requirements, plant breeding, farm machinery, land drainage, and poultry. State entomologist Hinds received $2,300 to enforce the quarantines on an intrastate basis, to experiment with weevil control, and to disseminate information. 19 The funds were quite meager for the task at hand, but it was a beginning nonetheless. Alabama had even less coordination among its agricultural forces than other southern states. The result could be disagreement, if not open conflict. The net result was deleterious to the farmers, the people the agencies purported to serve. Warren E. Hinds, at the experiment station at Auburn, generally followed the recommendations of the USDA's Bureau of Entomology, his former employer. He had written some of the pioneering tracts

18 W. E. Hinds, "Report of Entomologist," Twenty- Third Annual Report of the Agricultural Experiment Station of Alabama Polytechnic Institute, Auburn, Alabama, January 13, 1911 {Opelika, 1911), p. 19. 19 Annual Report of the Alabama Department of Agri- culture and Industries, 1911 (Montgomery, 1911) , p. 161; ibid., 1913, pp. 32-33. 286 on the topic, and if there existed a class of "experts" on the boll weevil. Hinds was assuredly one of them. Yet when a fanner from Hayneville appealed to the Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries for a remedy, he received a reply over Commissioner Reuben F. Kolb's signature but written by Chief Clerk J. C. Chaney: "We have no expert in this office, nor do we believe that there is an expert in the United States as far as the Boll Weevil is concerned, but we stand ready at any time to aid you in any way possible." 20 The Department of Agriculture and Industries made control recommendations without conducting any experiments. Chief Clerk J. C. Chaney traveled to Anding, near Yazoo City, Mississippi, in June 1914 to investigate the remedy 21 of G. M. Manor. Reuben F. Kolb, Commissioner of Agri- culture, stated at one time that due to the numerous remedies suggested, the department did "not care to recommend any particular one until they have had a fair test of its availability to rid cotton of the boll weevil." 22 But the department sent out suggested recommendations,

20 Reuben F. Kolb (Chief Clerk J. C. Chaney) to E. Farrior, Jr., Papers of the Commissioner of Agriculture and Industries, Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, Alabama. 21 Ibxd., L. F. Bell to Reuben F. Kolb, June 10, 1914; Reioben F. Kolb to L. F. Bell, June 11, 1914. 22 Ibid., Reuben F. Kolb to J. B. Gerrard, June 19, 1914. 287 particularly a concoction of coal oil, moth, balls, and kereosene to be applied by way of a bag suspended from the single tree when cultivating. 23 Kolb, or more probably his assistant Chaney, even endorsed the old idea of late planting: "Early planting of cotton is but furnishing the weevil a nesting place. ..." 24 The job of head of the state department of agriculture was'elective, and often a step to higher political office. The department's main functions were to collect statistics, promote the state's development, inspect fertilizer, and provide politicians a platform for advancement to higher office. When confronted with a crisis, the departments in the South usually did not have the scientific personnel to respond effectively; nevertheless, they could avoid disseminating faulty information. Kolb had been the leader of Alabama's populist movement and had an illustrious career. 25 But the performance of the Department of Agri- culture and Industries when the weevil arrived was all too typical of giving advice without first investigating the problem.

23 Ibid., Reuben F. Kolb to M. Johnston, June 25, 1914 24 Ibid., Reuben F. Kolb to G. T. Danelly, January 10, 1914. 25 For an account of Kolb's career, see William Warren Rogers, The Old-Gallused Rebellion; Agrarianism in Alabama, 1865-1896 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970). 288 One of Kolb's correspondents informed him in 1914 that the boll weevil was "playing the devil" in Conecuh County. 26 Indeed it was. The county averaged 15,851 bales between 1910 and 1913. The year of 1914 had not been disastrous with a crop of 16,901 bales. But there followed crops of 4,784; 1,9 75; and 4,261 bales in the years 1915 to 1917. In Covington County, to the east, crops of 6,419 and 3,027 bales followed the 1914 crop of 32,133 bales.^"^ Cotton was the main crop for southern Alabama, but it was the south central region, the famous black belt, that was the heart of Alabama's cotton country. It was here that a plantation society based on cotton reached its height in Alabama. Montgomery County, the seat of the former Confederate capitol, produced 56,457 bales in 1914. Only Dallas, a nearby black prairie county, exceeded Montgomery in production with 64,253 28 bales. The ravages of the boll weevil combined with the precipitous drop in prices at the conclusion of the 1914 season conspired to reduce the crop. 29 Dallas County

26 Reuben F. Kolb to M. Johnston, June 25, 1914, Papers of the Commissioner of Agriculture and Industries, Alabama Department of Archives and History. 27 Bureau of the Census Bulletin No. 125, p. 35; Bureau of the Census, Cotton Production, Crop of 1916, p. 14; Cotton Production, Crop of 1918, p. 11. 2 8 Bureau of the Census, Cotton Production, Crop of 1916, pp. 14-15. 29 Rupert B. Vance, Human Factors in Cotton Culture; 289 had crop years of 17,134 and 7,755 bales in 1915 and 1916, while Montgomery had years of 31,890 and 7,393 bales for the same period. Even alluring higher prices could not restore the former production levels. During the period 1917-19, Dallas County averaged 19,056 bales and Montgomery County averaged 11,199 bales.^° The particular disadvantage of the black belt in combatting the boll weevil was that the soil, productive though it was, warmed up later in the spring than other southern soils. The net effect was to negate one of the primary means of control— early planting. The reduction of cotton production in the black belt counties from 1910 to 1920 was 70 percent, while the reduction in the remainder of the state was 32 33 percent. By the late 1940s, the black belt produced only 20 percent of Alabama's cotton. At one point in the state's history, this prairie area produced 60 percent of the^u crop. 33

A Study in the Social Geography of the American South (Chapel Hill: university of North Carolina Press, 1929), p. 137. Cotton Production, Crop of 1917, p. 11; Cotton Production, Crop of 1919, p. 11. 31 Harold C. Hoffsomer, "Dallas County, Alabama: Cotton Growing Area of the Old South," State Reports on Rural Problem Areas, Division of Farm Population and Rural Life, Records of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, RG 83, NA. 32 Glenn N. Sisk, "Agricultural Diversification in the Alabama Black Belt," Agricultioral History 26 (April 1952): 42 33 J. Allen Tower, "Alabama's Shifting Cotton Belt," Alabama Review 1 (January 1948): 35. 290 The area best able to withstand the weevil was along the Tennessee River in northern Alabama. Its fertile soil, combined with the northerly latitude, made it the section of Alabama least susceptible to the weevil. In the early twentieth century, the area ranked behind the black belt and the wiregrass region and produced only 9 percent of the cotton. By the late 1940s, its production of over one-fourth of the crop placed it as the state's leading cotton region. 34 A recurring problem for those attempting to diversify crops was the lack of markets. The period when Alabama needed to diversify corresponded with the World War I need for food and feed products. This coincidence may in part explain the great strides the state made in establishing diversification on a permanent basis. The black belt provided ample forage crops for livestock, and Dallas County led the area in advancements in dairying. The creamery operations of the Selma Creamery and Ice Plant occupied only one room in the company's building when first established in 1915. The creamery, claiming to be the first in the state, initially filled only local needs. Two years of successful operations and the consensus of meetings to discuss adjustment to the boll weevil problem prompted a decision to build a creamery

34 Ibid., p. 37 291 large enough to supply outlets for local milk. "Since the broad minded people had realized that the boll weevil had come to stay, this company found no trouble in securing necessary funds to install the fully equipped plant. . . ."^^ The new plant cost one million dollars, and, by 1924, was purchasing $350,000 worth of milk from local dairymen. The products went to five states. It was a case where local initiative started an industry rather than having an established national company start the movement. The experiment proved so successful that another creamery was built at Selma. By 1924, there were four creameries in Montgomery, all serving the black prairie section. The prairie half of Lowndes County shifted heavily to dairying. By 1924, there were twenty-one cream shipping stations in the county and a pre-cooling station at Lownesboro. 37 The existence of a creamery was an absolute necessity, but businessmen needed some assurance of supplies of milk before investing in equipment. The dairy industry of Lee, an eastern covinty, did not increase

35 W. M. Cannon, "What the Creameries Have Done for Dallas County," Agricultural Bulletin, July 1924, p. 7, John Judson Brown Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. Ibid. 37 Ibid., "Cows and Bees in Lowndes County," Agri- cultural Bulletin, July 1924, p. 10. 292 at the same pace as the industry in the black belt, although a creamery established at Opelika in January 1924 augured

50 well for the adoption of dairying. ■ Pure bred stock and the elimination of the cattle tick were also essential to a thriving dairy industry. Tick eradication began in Alabama in 1906 when all counties were under quarantine. By December 1, 1919, only four counties remained under quarantine. Advocates of the dairy industry thought that a 1919 state law providing for prosecution of those who dynamited dipping vats had the greatest influence in ridding the state of ticks."^^ Elimination of cattle ticks made it economically feasible to pay large prices for breeding stock. Before, the investment might be lost to the tick. Those who could not afford a pure bred bull to upgrade their herd might join a cooperative bull association. There were two such associations in Alabama in 1919. 40 In some covmties the county agent aided prospective buyers by keeping information on dairy cattle for sale. Wherever markets existec the southern dairyman could compete successfully, simply

38 Ibid., L. T. Wells, "New Cash Crops Mean Greater Prosperity," Agricultural Bulletin, July 1924, p. 6. 39 Alabama Farm Facts, December 6, 1919, p. 3. 40 Ibid., November 22, 1919, p. 7. ^-■■Ibid., February 21, 1920, p. 11. 293 because the transportation costs of milk shipments eliminated competition from outside areas. The emphasis on upgrading stocks was such that G. C. Parsons of Ruther- ford won the prize for the Grand Champion cow in the Angus category (a beef class) at the International Livestock 42 Show at Chicago in 1919. The largest milk producing counties in 1909 were, not surprisingly, Jefferson, Mobile, and Montgomery, the locations of the state's three major cities. All showed increased milk production in 1919. The largest percentage increase was in the black belt counties that had not formerly participated to any extent in the milk trade, Lowndes County, adjoining Montgomery, sold only 9,917 gallons in 1909. The figure for 1919 was 236,745 gallons. Farmers in Dallas County sold 26,558 gallons in 1909 and 339,841 gallons in 1919. From 1909 to 1919, the number of Alabama farmers selling milk doubled, yet represented less than 4 percent of all farms. The number of gallons sold in the state nearly doubled, from 3,397,426 to 6,408,962. 43 Admittedly, it was hardly a revolution in agriculture, but for a number of counties, especially in the black belt, it was a significant shift.

^^Ibid., December 13, 1919, p. 13, 43 Agriculture, Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910 (Washington, D.C., 1913), 6:39-45; Agriculture, Fourteenth Census of the united States, 1920, vol. 6, pt. 2 (Washington, D.C., 1922), pp. 484, 495-501. 294 Beef cattle received more attention in the black belt than dairy cattle. Drought conditions in the southern Great Plains afforded Alabamians the opportunity to upgrade their herds at cheap prices. The drought of 1916-18 was particularly severe in the west Texas plains where "stock glutted the markets, and prices for these lightweight cattle fell drastically."'*'* Alabama farmers sold their "fat grade Jersey, natives and scrubs,"^^ and purchased Hereford and Shorthorn cattle from the market in Ft. Worth or directly from the Texas cattlemen. An estimated 8,000 head came into the state in 1918, mostly to the black belt. Marengo and Hale counties led the list of purchasers. 46

The development of cattle raising in the black belt was rapid enough in the World War I years to support a stock yard at Montgomery, which opened in 1918. During 1919, the Union Stock Yards conducted over ten million dollars in business. The president of the Montgomery Chamber of Commerce, I. H. Dewees, believed that the increased prosperity of the city rested almost entirely on the cattle business. He lauded the efforts of the

44 John T. Schlebecker, Cattle Raising on the Plains, 1900-1961 (Lincoln: university of Nebraska Press, 1963), p. 62. 45 Frank Curtis, "Movement of Texas Cattle into Ala," Alabama Farm Facts, November 29, 1919, p. 6^ 46,,Ibid. ., 295 Southern Cattlemen's Association in promoting cattle raising in the South: Montgomery has been a large cotton market for years. It has also brought money here, but never in its history has the cotton interest of Montgomery amounted to over fifteen million dollars. . . . In 1915 the sum of fifty-two million dollars passed through our clearing house. The year 1919 the svun of ninety-eight million dollars passed through our clearing house. . . . The increase is due entirely to the Union Stock Yards and to the many dollars in business that it has directly or indirectly brought to our city.**^ The census of 1920 revealed the extent of the commercial beef cattle industry. The number of farms reporting cattle actually dropped, but the number of cattle in the state increased from 146,354 to 322,434 in the years from 1910 to 1920. The increase in the quality and value of the herds was more important than the total numbers. Even taking inflation into consideration, the figures were impressive. While the number of cattle represented almost a threefold increase, the value of the cattle went from $1,691,238 to $8,895,187.'*^ Aside from the marketing facilities, the other important ingredients in cattle and hog production were processing plants. Here the growth was a combination of local initiative, followed by long-term investment by established meat packing concerns. Harry Snow, manager

47 I. H. Dewees, "Montgomery's Welcome to Cattlemen," Alabama Farm Facts, January 21, 1920, p. 8, 48 Agriculture, Thirteenth Census, 6:23; Agriculture, Fourteenth Census, vol. 6, pt. 2, p. 483. 296 of the Union Stock Yards since 1919, also organized a processing company, the Montgomery Abbatoir. The Swift do company eventually purchased the facility. The Swift company also operated another locally promoted packing plant at Andalusia in southeast Alabama. The acquisition came under the scrutiny of the Federal Trade Commission for a possible violation of the Clayton Act. The incident was interesting for what it revealed about local action in responding to the boll weevil and the problems involved in embarking on a new enterprise. The experiment, which the originators realized might be temporary, proved so successful that a major company became interested. J. G. Scherf of the Andalusia Chamber of Commerce defended the purchase and recounted the origins of the company: The business men of Andalusia and surrounding territory realized that the raising of cotton at that time was made practically impossible by reason of the invasion of the boll weevil and that the promotion of this enterprise was thought necessary to prevent bankruptcy in Southwest Alabama. The Andalusia Packing Company engaged in the meat packing industry not by choice, but by stern necessity, with the idea of encouraging the raising of live stock to the extent that it might be made an industry to take the place of the cotton industiry which had been ruined. It was not organized nor was it contemplated at the time of its organization, as a competitive business enterprise in the meat packing industry. The sole purpose of its organization being one of development of a new industry for the reason named above. 49 Alabama Journal, March 17, 19 36, Snow Family, Biographical File, Alabama Department of Archives and History. 297 None of the men interested in the business knew anything about the meat packing industry nor any of its branches, and very soon after its organization, realized that on account of their lack of knowledge of the industry and the rapid expansion of business, which was far greater than they had anticipated, it could not take care of the constantly increasing production of live stock. The stock of the company was held largely by small stock holders scattered over a wide territory and it took considerably more money to operate the plant than was expected in the beginning, . . . Several efforts were made to dis- pose of the properties of the company and finally it was sold to Swift and Company.^^ Other packing plants sprang up at Birmingham and Macon, Georgia. In addition to the Andalusia plant, other packing houses at Moultrie and Tifton, Georgia, and Chipley, Florida, served the hog-peanut complex developing in the vertex of Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. The development that inspired the citizens of Enterprise, Alabama, to dedicate a monument to the weevil seemed in danger when the high cotton prices during World War I lured farmers back to cotton. Another complicating factor was that hogs fed on peanuts produced an oily or soft pork that did not compete favorably with midwestern pork. The combination of factors was such that by 1921, several of the packing houses had closed, but Swift still maintained its Andalusia and Moultrie plants although they operated at a loss for several years.

J. C. Scherf, "Andalusia Packing Plant Benefits Section," Alabama Farm Facts, September 1, 1921, p. 4. Ibid., and February 7, 1920, pp. 3-11. 298 Men interested in making the development permanent hoped to establish markets for the soft pork, including trade names. The hog industry continued, but never reached the heights of the midwestern industry. The sustenance of hog raising had been the peanut.^^ The soils of the region were admirably suited to its production, and the proponents of the industry had the foresight to get the federal peanut acreage and price support programs enacted into law as permanent legislation. Most federal commodity programs had a terminal date. Various diversification plans in the South foundered, but developments in southeastern Alabama and southwestern Georgia became established on a permanent basis. The successful transition required several elements: climate and soil ideally suited to the "diversification" crop, local leadership, the sustaining resources of established businesses, and the beneficence of federal legislation. The utilization of peanuts in a plethora of products also meant that it was no longer linked to hog production. The peanut became popularly associated with southeastern Alabama, southwestern Georgia, and the region's representative in the White House, Jimmy Carter» His eminence challenged the boll weevil statue at Enterprise as a symbol of the area's devotion to the goober pea.

Ibid, 299 The averages of yearly losses from full production due to the boll weevil were comparable in Mississippi and Alabama. Mississippi lost an average of 26 percent of its crop to the weevil during 1913-23, while Alabama lost about 28 percent for the period 1916-23.^"^ On the average, Alabama's diversification efforts seem to have succeeded to a greater extent that Mississippi's^ Geographical considerations were part of the cause. The black belt soils provided good pasturage for cattle and the southeastern section was suitable for peanut production. Yet, geographical determinism did not account for all the difference . In the area of local initiative and imagination, Alabama clearly had the edge in branching off into other areas of profitable agriculture.

53 Statistics on Cotton and Related Data, Statistical Bulletin No. 99, pp. 68, 73. CHAPTER IX

A NEW PEST FOR THE OLD COTTON BELT

For fanners. World War I was one of those sylvan periods of high cotton prices. Such eras have historically proved fleeting, but they always raise hopes that a permanent plateau of high prices has been reached. Cotton sold for an average of twenty-seven cents per pound in 1917, twenty-nine cents in 1918, and thirty-five cents in 1919. Then the fall began. The price for the residue of the 1919 crop was thirty-eight and one-half cents per pound in April 1920. One year later, April 1921, the price was nine and one-half cents. Georgia had the misfortune of having its disastrous years from the boll weevil coincide with the low prices. In 1921, the state recorded the worst yearly average of boll weevil destruction for any state—45 percent. Cotton sold for seventeen cents per pound that year. The price in 19 22 was better, twenty- three cents, but the destruction of the weevil was almost the same—44 percent. The years 1920-23 were the zenith for weevil destruction throughout the South. Louisiana,

Statistics on Cotton and Related Data, Statistical Bulletin No. 99, pp. 68, 71, 73, 130.

300 301 Mississippi, and Alabama had regions of profitable production even with the weevil present, namely the fertile lands of the Red, Mississippi, Yazoo, and Tennessee rivers. Georgia had no similar regions. In fact, most of the state had long been dependent on commercial fertilizers to produce profitable crops. Georgia was considered better prepared than other states to meet the boll weevil without suffering the disastrous first few years. The legislature passed a quarantine act in 1904 and provided for the employment of a competent entomologist for the State Board of 2 Entomology. The state's quarantine seemed of dubious value when a rumor circulated in 1911: someone was intentionally attempting to transport 5,000 weevils to Georgia. The idea was to affect the price of cotton and thereby benefit from the futures market."^ Senator Hoke Smith compared the scheme to matricide: "Any man who would plant boll weevils in a territory free of them would murder his own mother." The "plot" turned out to be only a rumor, reminiscent of a similar incident in 19 07.^

2 E. Lee Worsham, Crop Pest Law of Georgia and Regulations of State Board of Entomology, Georgia State Board of Entomology Bulletin No. 33 (Atlanta, October 1912), pp. 3-4.

Montgomery Advertiser, February 15, 1911, SFCII, RG 7, NA.

Ibid., Granville TNew York] Sentinel, February 17, 1911. Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture of the 302 The state also supported experiments by the Georgia State Board of Entomology on cotton varieties best suited to weevil conditions. The series of experiments began in the first decade of the twentieth century, ten years before the weevil arrived. The high incidence of cotton wilt in southern Georgia and the concern over the future of sea island cotton were factors to be considered—not merely which varieties matured earliest. The work of the state entomologist and cotton breeders in Georgia impressed Walter D. Hunter, The board proudly quoted his statement that "Georgia is better prepared for the coming of the boll weevil than any State that has yet become infested on account of the work conducted by the State 7 Board of Entomology." Yet E. Lee Worsham, state entomologist, conceded that "better prepared" did not amount to total preparedness. "Georgia is not prepared for the g weevil," he wrote. The state extension service was also at work. In 1915, State Director, J. Phil Campbell, sought the

State of Georgia for the Year Ending December 31, 19 07 (n.p., n.d.), pp. 3-4. A. C. Lewis, Cotton Wilt in Georgia, Georgia State Board of Entomology Bulletin No. 40 (Atlanta, March 1915) , pp. 3-4; Ira W. Williams, How to Grow Cotton in Spite of the Boll Weevil, Georgia State Board of Entomology Bulletin No. 47 (Atlanta, February 1917), pp. 3-4. 7 Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Georgia for the Year Ending December 1913 (Atlanta. 1914), p. 44. Sibid. 303 Services of an extension agent experienced in boll weevil work with fanners. The duties assigned would be to educate the farmers and county agents in southwestern Georgia, 9 where the weevil was expected to enter the state. When the weevil arrived in August 1915, the state entomologist and extension forces went into action. A storm deposited the boll weevil much farther into the state than expected. Representatives of thirty-four counties met at Thomasville and developed plans for an extensive educational campaign in the region. Two tours of speakers in T-model Fords canvassed the area giving lectures. The Southern Bell telephone company participated by directing their telephone operators to call all rural telephone subscribers giving the time and place of meetings.. Despite the well-intentioned preparation, the result was all too similar to the reaction in points westward. The state entomologist estimated damage in certain southwestern Georgia counties at 25-75 percent in 1917, and by 1919, he upped it to 50-75 percent in south Georgia. The cultivation of sea island cotton

9 J. Phil Campbell to Bradford Knapp, December 24, 1915, Georgia, General Correspondence, RG 33, NA. Annual Report of the State Entomologist for 1915, Georgia State Board of Entomology Bulletin No. 45 (Atlanta, 1916), pp. 5-6. E. Lee Worsham, Boll Weevil Regulations, Georgia State Board of Entomology Circular No. 25 (Atlanta, January 1918), p. 2; A. C. Lewis, Annual Report of the State Entomologist for 1919, Georgia State Board of Entomology Bulletin No. 58 (Atlanta, May 1920), p. 12. 304 in the region accounted in large part for the extra- ordinarily high percentage of destruction. The worst prophecies for the future of the sea island cotton industry were well-founded. The requirement of a lengthy growing season limited the staple to areas of the South with the most frost-free days. The staple derived its name from its introduction and propagation on the sea islands off the coast of South Carolina. In the early twentieth century, only Beaufort and Charleston counties in South Carolina produced the staple to any extent. The real center of the twentieth-century sea island cotton industry was the inland counties of southern Georgia and northern Florida. Lowndes and Berrien covmties in Georgia traditionally vied for first place. Lowndes County produced 14,508 bales in 1916; 6,048 bales in 1917; and a paltry 986 bales in 1918. Berrien's production declined from 15,091 bales in 1916 to 436 bales in 1918."^^ The crop for Georgia was 77,9 81 bales in 1916; it was but 13 611 bales in 1921. After the boll weevil reached the coast of South Carolina the roller gins stopped turning. The few southern farmers who marketed the eleven bales in 1924 and the eighteen bales in 1925 deserved awards for persistence. 14

12 Cotton Production, Crop of 1919, p. 10. ■'■^Ibid., Crop of 1921, p. 2, ■'■'^Ibid., Crop of 1925, p. 3. 305 The boll weevil continued northward through Georgia into the old plantation piedmont. There erosion, excessive and exclusive cotton planting, and reliance on fertilizer had already reduced the farmers' ability to compete with the western states. Boll weevil destruction combined with reduced acreage sent waves through the whole economy. A Putnam County, Georgia, resident recalled that in the winter of 1922-23, Negroes who had not become part of the exodus north "went hungry and barefoot through the winter." 15 For lack of customers, one of the motion picture theaters closed. The other theater operated on Saturday nights only. Clerks lounged in the doorways of their former places of employment. Loss of faith in the ability to continue growing profitable crops undermined the credit system. "We Sell for Cash Only" signs went up in Putnam County stores. 16 With the economy of Georgia so heavily dependent on cotton, merchants and bankers took as much interest in the progress of weevil infestation as did the farmer. Prior to the weevil's arrival in Georgia, Ben Fletcher, a Columbus dealer in mules and horses, planned a trip to Alabama "to learn what effect it has had on the merchants.

Raleigh [North Carolina] News and Observer, February 1, 1923, Cotton Insects Research Station, Tallulah, Louisiana. The Tallulah station has closed since the author researched the newspaper clipping file there in 1969. ^^Ibid. 306 mule dealers, and bankers that extend credit in boll 17 weevil districts." After several difficult years merchants were understandably cautious. A traveling shoe salesman and supporter of Georgia's Commissioner of Agriculture John J. Brown offered to do some politicking for the commissioner. Times for the salesman were idle: "My shoe business is nearly over as I am nearly through selling oxfords and the merchants will not buy fall shoes In until they see what the boll weevil will do." Coopera- tive community projects went wanting. One resident of Hartwell appealed to Commissioner Brown for assistance in furnishing her church: "Our church (Cokesbury) burned in the fall, and on account of being 'hit' so hard by the boll-weevil, it has been such a struggle to replace it."19 Brown was hardly the person to appeal to for money. His farming operation in nearby Baxley in Appling County continually ran a deficit. Brown lost an estimated five hundred dollars to the plow in 1920 and 1921, when he had 20 ten to fifteen horses at work. The Bank of Toccoa

17 Ben Fletcher to Commissioner of Agriculture, July 7, 1914, Papers of the Commissioner of Agriculture and Industries, Alabama Department of Archives and History, 18 C. N. Bond to John J. Brown, April 17, 1922, John Judson Brown Papers, Southern Historical Collection. 19 Ibid., Mrs. W. A. Chapinan to John J. Brown, January 29, 1923. 20 Ibid., John J. Brown to Carl E. Teasley, July 14, 1922. 307

directed its attorneys to bring suit against Brown for 21 debts, but Brown managed to escape foreclosure. Evi-

dently he lost money in a bank failure, a phenomenon not uncommon during the weevil years. All told, he owed

$20,000 in 1925.^^ Brown wrote the attorney of a fer-

tilizer company which he owed money that he was "almost

financially ruined on account of the deflation, the ravages of the boll weevil, and some mismanagement of my farm the 23 year the fertilizer was used." Commissioner Brown became

an ardent believer in calcium arsenate and constantly belabored his sons to make sure that the tenants applied it 24 frequently. He implored them to "fight the boll weevil 25 Ixke hell." He still had the farm in 1925 but was nego-

tiating to sell it. Florida real estate looked like a 26 better investment than fighting weevils. So preoccupied

21 Ibid., Fermer Barrett to John J. Brown, April 30 1924. 22 Ibid., John J. Brown to Bertie Taylor, March 24, 1925. 23 Ibid., John J. Brown to Thomas U. Cooley, March 26, 1925. 24 Ibid., John J. Brown to J. Polk Brown, July 3, 1922; John J. Brown to S. V. Brown, July 11, 1922. 25 Ibid., John J. Brown to Carl E. Teasley, Jiine 28, 1923. 26 Ibid., John J. Brown to W. Y. Carter, March 2, 1925. 308 was Brown in his attempt to "save the farm" that his son Walter remonstrated him and added, "You are a pviblic official and the public demands a few things from you as 27 Commissioner of Agriculture." The credit system in Georgia diminished during the heavy years of weevil infestation. Brown had feared an increased acreage in 1922, but early in the year he observed that credit for supplies and fertilizer were being withheld by planters and merchants. While Brown approved 28 this move as beneficial in keeping the acreage down, T. S. Mason berated the banks at Washington, Georgia, for their harsh treatment of the farmers. The banks "would not lend the farmers a cent last summer 19 22 to buy Arsenic to fight the boll weevil, and refused hundreds of farmers of the county money to help them make a crop." 29 Without money to buy poison or fertilizer to hasten the growth, farmers watched helplessly as their crops were exposed to weevil injury. When there was insufficient fertilizer or poison the crop often was not worth the cost of picking or of continued cultivation. Farmers abandoned

27 Ibid., Walter Brown to John J. Brown, December 8, 1925. 28 Ibid., John J. Brown to A. P. Brantley, February 11, 1922. 29 Ibid., T. S. Mason to John J. Brown, November 30, 1922. 309 practically 4 percent of the cotton acreage after it had been planted in 1922 and 6 percent in 1923."^° When Georgia's land did not return a profit on cotton, land values and farm loans dropped. Investors, especially large national companies, preferred a return on money—not foreclosed land that might, in turn, have to be sold at a loss or operated in absentee fashion. As news of Georgia's plight spread northward, investors grew hesitant about advancing loans secured by farm lands, 0. A. Coleman, vice president of the Georgia Loan and Trust Company at Macon, experienced difficulty with. New England backers. He explained to Commissioner John J. Brown that "because reports unfavorable to conditions in Georgia have gone out to the world, . . . our creditors in New England are hesitating about accepting any more farm loans." Martin Calvin, statistician for the state department of agriculture, tried to reassure Coleman and investors. Yet the figures Calvin marshalled to buttress his case were more distressing than reassuring. The value of all property in Georgia dropped 6.7 percent between 1921 and 1922. Martin also saw the 14.2 percent drop of

Ibid., John J. Brown, "Georgia's Wonderful Opportunities," September 17, 1923; Cotton and Cottonseed, Statistical Bulletin No. 164, p. 25, 31 O. A. Coleman to John J. Brown, July 6, 192 3, John Judson Brown Papers, Southern Historical Collection. 310 merchandise in stock between 1921 and 1922 as an accurate bellwether; it reflected the faith of country merchants and retail merchants, men "cautious to the point of timidity." Not surprisingly, land prices fell. While land prices throughout the united States declined an average of 7 percent from 1920 to 1921, the cotton states affected by the weevil experienced an even more precipitous reduction. Plowland in Georgia that sold for $46 an acre in 1920 sold for $36 in 1921, a 22 percent decline. South Carolina farm land dropped from $61 to $50—a 20 percent reduc- 33 tion. With farmers planting less cotton, few were in the market for more land. Commissioner Brown saw a direct link between the weevil and land prices. He advised a potential buyer from New York that, "due to the ravages of the boll weevil during the last two years, . . . highly developed land and well improved tracts are being offered at extremely low prices." The buyer from New York was among the "other persons ... in the market"^^ for lands, since farmers were making few purchases. Still, n\imerous northern interests invested in Georgia

32 Ibid., Martin V. Calvin to 0. A. Coleman, July 10, 1923, 33 Ibid., Moultrie [Georgia] Observer, April 12, 1921. 34 Ibid., John J. Brown to Henry J. Neca, October 3, 1923 35 Ibid., Martin V. Calvin to S. G. McNeil, November 22, 1924. 311 and other southern states. They did so for speculative purposes or for winter resorts, and to take advantage of low land values flowing from the difficulties of growing cotton and the general farm depression. The conversion of several large cotton plantations in south Georgia and north Florida to game preserves by wealthy northern industrialists even inspired the novel' title by one author of From Cotton to Quail.^^ Greene County, Georgia, was typical of those areas where land prices dropped. Arthur Raper in his study of Greene and Macon counties. Preface to Peasantry, has provided the best account of social and economic disruption by the boll weevil. Greene County was almost totally dependent on cotton. Raper viewed the weevil, not as a single causal factor in the county's decline, but as one aspect in the undoing of an outdated social and economic system whDse foundations—slavery and fertile land—had long since vanished. Nevertheless the emphasis Raper gave to the weevil in administering the coup de grace was considerable. The weevil first reached Greene County in 1916, doing some damage. The production of 12,387 bales in that year was not disastrously below the 1910-15 level 37 of 18,170 bales. Then an unusual, but not unknown.

Clifton Paisley, From Cotton to Quail; An Agri- cultural Chronicle of Leon County, Florida, 1860-1967 (Gainesville: university of Florida Press, 1968). 37 Bureau of the Census Bulletin No. 125, p. 38; Cotton Production, Crop of 1916, p. 18. 312 phenomenon occurred. The intensity and extension of the weevil infestation abated in central Georgia for a time. Greene County produced good cotton crops in 1917 through 1919, during a period of high cotton prices. The speculation that at last a "weevil-proof" 38 area had been reached led to increased land prices. Those seriously affected by the weevil in southern Georgia rushed to buy land, as did natives of Greene, including black tenants. The boll weevil brought the fairy tale to an end. The crop of 1920—13,414 bales—was below the prewar average but did not entail huge losses. Planters prepared to plant the same acreage in 1921, the year the weevil reduced the crop to 1,487 bales. Many were financially unable to plant in 1922. The reduction in acreage plus the boll weevil resulted in a 333-bale crop in 1922. Land sold at "distress prices," 39 and the two largest banks in the county and numerous smaller ones failed. Peanuts and peas were substituted for cotton but could not sustain the sharecropping system based on cash crops. Sawmilling, as it had in many other parts of the South, provided some employment to tenants and income to

38 Arthur F. Raper, Preface to Peasantry; A Tale of Two Black Belt Counties (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1936; rpt. ed., New York: Atheneum, 1968), p. 204. ■^^Ibid., p. 205. 313 the landowners, but it was a temporary move. It terminated with the denuding of the marketable timber land. As in other sections of the South, the blacks best able to remain in the community were the small landowners. Tenants, no longer able to secure food and planting supplies from bankrupt landowners, left. Raper saw whatever grievances Negroes had against the racial system operating there as minimal in the exodus that took place. The "croppers had no choice but to leave the county to secure the bare necessities of physical existence. . . . Many of the migrants left Greene County only upon the pinch of hunger."^° The population of the other county in Raper's study, Macon, remained stable compared to the flow away from Greene County. He saw this disparity as being directly linked to the weevil's effect on cotton production: "It seems clear that Macon's cotton output is the most important reason why her population remained relatively stable between 1920 and 1930, while Greene's decreased so much." 41 Land prices also indicated a difference in the weevil infestation. By 1928, land prices in Macon County had dropped 30-50 percent since the weevil's arrival. Correspondingly the decline was 80-90 percent in Green County. 42

"^^Ibid., p. 206. "^^Ibid., p. 209. 42 Ibid., p. 216. 314 The migration of black tenants from Greene County in the early 1920s was part of a general movement from the South. The agricultural depression of the 1920s underlay the movement. Even so, the boll weevil was a significant factor. The states hardest hit by the emigration were Georgia and South Carolina, portions of which were experiencing heavy losses to the weevil for the first 43 time. Martin Calvin of the department of agriculture in Georgia believed the movement was decidedly an agricultural one; "Veiry few urban negroes [sic] are leaving the State. That, at least, is the consensus of opinion [sic]." Estimates of the extent of the migration varied, but all conceded it was a serious detriment to southern agriculture's labor supply. Senator William J. Harris of Georgia estimated that his state lost one-sixth of its farm laborers. Planters complained about the lack of farm labor. Furthermore, there were complaints about the quality of labor remaining in the South. The young and able-bodied predominated in the movement. There were suggestions that

43 . Higgs, "The Boll Weevil, the Cotton Economy, and Black Migration," p. 350; Edward E. Lewis, The Mobility of the Negro (New York: Columbia University Press, 1931), p. 129. 44 Martin Calvin to Pearson-Taft Company, March 1, 192 3, John Judson Brown Papers, Southern Historical Col- lection. 45 Ibid., "Speech of Hon. William J. Harris of Georgia in the Senate of the United States, April 7, 1924." 315 the character of the migration was seriously affecting the age distribution of the South's black population. One contemporary observer wrote that "old men and children constitute the cotton labor supply to a large extent in the eastern cotton belt." 46 He overstated the case, but an early authority on the subject found a high incidence of fourteen- and fifteen-year-old youths doing the work normally left to their fathers. Their elders in the city were trying to secure the family's livelihood. 47 Those who remained apparently succeeded in obtaining a small number of concessions due to the demand for their labor. A. C. Moreland of Forsyth, Georgia, lamented, "You can scarcely correct ... a negro [sic] farm hand unless he quits you." 48 Yet, even the white landowners conceded that deplorable conditions led necessarily to departure. Moreland recognized this in a communication to Commissioner Brown: "There are many farms not being operated—but the vacant houses are usually in bad repair. I have some myself and don't blame even a negro [sic] _ . 49 for not wanting to live m them." Brown also had a

46 C. A. Whittle, "Negro Migration and the Future of Cotton," Manufacturers' Record, July 19, 1923, Cotton Insects Research Station, Tallulah, Louisiana. 47 John William Fanning, Negro Migration, Bulletin the University of Georgia, vol. 30 (Athens, June 1930), p. 15. 48 A. C. Moreland to John J. Brown, June 3, 1920, John Judson Brown Papers, Southern Historical Collection. 49 Ibid. 316 number of tenant houses in bad repair and experienced difficulty in attracting and keeping tenants. A local attorney advised his son Walter to "make some concessions and spend a little money each year for repairs," lest Brown lose the tenants. The migration of the early 1920s made clear the poor state of the cotton economy in the South and the scant returns to tenants. The migration moved some people to admit the poor living conditions of blacks, if it did not move them to action to improve the conditions. Com'- missioner Brown concluded that "the tendency of leaving the country for the city will continue until the financial returns for labor [are] attractive." He further cited the deficiencies in housing, schools, roads, and churches, 52 Provide these and the "attractive rural life" would stem the tide to the cities. A more caustic critic of the system wrote that the profits of the landowners had "been made possible only through the wretched living conditions of those who perform the labor in making the 53 crops." The new mobility of the blacks,, to this writer, meant that henceforth planters and the world cotton markets

Ibid., J. Quinn West to Walter Brown, November 12, 1926. 51 Annual Report of the Georgia Department of Agri- culture, 1919 (Atlanta, 1920), p. 8. Ibid. 53 W. W. Morrison, "Concede Labor Rights in Cotton," Alabama Farm Facts, February 14, 1920, p. 7, 317 must compensate the worker at a decent living wage, or there would be no supply of cotton. 54 Laudatory as the translation of this theory into reality would have been, the latter 1920s and the depression revealed its weak- nesses. The migration from South Carolina coincided with that state's worst years of weevil depredations. The state lost 31 percent of its crop in 1921, 41 percent in 1922, and 27 percent in 1923. As in Georgia, authorities had hoped to avoid some of the disastrous consequences of the first years by study and education. Clemson College's board of trustees appointed a South Carolina Boll Beevil Commission in 1915 to visit the cotton states to the west» The commission advised an early beginning in diversifying crops on a small scale rather than a complete shift to other crops. From interviews, the commission concluded that the main cause of farmers' financial distress was an attempt to raise "one crop of cotton too many" under the old methods after the boll weevil arrived. When the boll weevil arrived in South Carolina, the scenario was a familiar one. The state's crop had been 1,623,076

54,,Ibxd. -^ 55 Statistics on Cotton and Related Data, Statistical Bulletin No. 99, p. 77. Report of the South Carolina Boll Weevil Com- mission, U.S. Congress, Senate, Document No. 701, 64th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C., 1917), p. 20. 318 bales in 1920. It was 492,400 bales in 1922 when the weevil destroyed an estimated 41 percent of the crop. 57 The cotton oil mills in South Carolina produced $39,633,000 worth of products in 1919, but only $10,500,000 in 1922 when several of the state's mills were closed.^^ As in Georgia, the sea island cotton industry received the severest shock. The total output was minor compared to the upland cotton production, but the weevil ended production rather than reducing it. Thomas J. Woof ter studied the black community on St,. Helena island where black farmers owned and farmed land once cultivated by their slave forefathers. His assessment of the weevil's impact on the community left little room for other factors: "The advent of the boll weevil in 1920, however, removed sea island cotton, the keystone of the farm arch, with the result that the whole system went to pieces. It was an economic revolution which penetrated all phases of island life."^^ Between 1920 and 1925, crop land on the island decreased 8,000 acres—a drop of 54 percent. The cotton

57 Cotton Production, Crop of 1922, p. 18. 58 Fourteenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture, Commerce, and Industries of the State of South Carolina, 1922, Labor Division (Columbia, 1923). p. 6 59 Thomas J. Woofter, Jr., Black Yeomanry; Life on St. Helena Island (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 19 30), p. 32. 319 acreage dropped by one-half between 1919 and 1924. Those who were still planting cotton in the mid-1920s were raising short staple, not sea island cotton. The fields of short staple cotton were not the low wet lands that had produced the finest sea island cotton but the ridges. Black owners in general held small parcels of land. The value of the long staple sea island cotton had helped overcome the disadvantage of not having large acreages for planting. Now the farmers had to produce the upland cotton like others in the South but on an even more reduced acreage. Florida attempted to cash in on the destruction of the sea island cotton industry in Georgia and South Carolina. The boll weevil had infested Florida from the north, moving south in succeeding years. After the weevil struck the sea island crop of Georgia and north Florida, farmers in the citrus-growing region undertook the cultivation of sea island cotton. One reporter estimated that all the counties on the east coast as far south as Bade County would have fields of sea island cotton in 1918. When there were insect attacks on citrus crops by previously unknown insects in 1918 and 1919,

^°Ibid., pp. 138-42. 61 Leon M. Estabrook to Bradford Knapp, March 28, 1918, District of Columbia, Crops Estimates, General Correspondence, RG 33, NA. 320 the state entomologist surmised that the introduction of cotton into the region accounted for the phenomenon. The northern reaches of the cotton belt benefited for a long period of time from the ravages of the weevil in the South. Its absence further north inspired increased cultivation in some areas and attempted cultivation where it had not existed previously. The farmers of southeastern Missouri increased their production almost continuously from the late nineteenth century onward. There were 49,000 acres planted in the state in 1900 and 360,000 planted in 1929. Freedom from the weevil inspired the extension of cotton. Missouri's per-acre production of 350 pounds in 1922 was the highest of all the eastern cotton states. Among the other eastern cotton states, only Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee, along the edge of the infestation line, produced more than 200 pounds per acre. Scenes at picking time began to resemble the deep South. Bank lights burned where tellers kept shop to accommodate the business generated by the local gin. The rural school districts adopted a tradition of the deep South and had a six-week hiatus in the fall

62 Report for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1919, University of Florida Agricultural Experiment Station (Gainesville, 1919), p. 56R. 6 3 Cotton and Cottonseed, Statistical Bulletin No. 164, pp. 6, 21. ^^Ibid., pp. 21-33. 321 of 1922 to allow children to pick cotton. Not all the migrants of the early 1920s went to northern cities. A considerable number who had experienced the years of heavy cotton losses started arriving in southeastern Missouri in September 1922 in search of land to rent or buy.65

The bale of cotton gathered near Cairo, Illinois, in 1923 was reputedly the first grown in the state in 66 fifty years. After publication of the news, three hundred farmers from Alexander and Pulaski counties met at Cairo and pledged to plant 12,000 acres in 1924.^^ The expansion of cotton production along the northern edge of the cotton belt was of little signifia canee when compared to the expansion in the weevil-free West. Nonetheless, a considerable number of farmers took advantage of the sylvan days of high prices and no weevils.

65 Missouri Year Book of Agriculture, 1922 (Jefferson City, n.d.), pp. 366-68. 6 6 New Orleans Item, January 26, 1924, Cotton Insects Research Station, Tallulah, Louisiana. 67 Ibid., Memphis Commercial Appeal, March 3, 1924. CHAPTER X

FIGHTING BOLL WEEVILS

The federal entomologists had long realized that the weevil would be more destructive in the Southeast than in the arid portions of the West. They also observed that the weevil adapted quickly to new climatic conditions, and that what obstacles there might be in the way of climate would be overcome. The idea of establishing a research station at some point east of Dallas naturally occurred. The damage wrought by the weevil in the Red River valley prompted Congressman Joseph Ransdell of Louisiana to seek a new experiment station in that region in 1908.■•• Wilmon Newell, the state entomologist of Louisiana, propagandized for an experiment station in the Mississippi delta. Newell had his difficulties in Louisiana as secretary of the Louisiana Crop Pest Commission. Like the federal entomologists, he was not a believer in the Paris green remedy espoused by fellow commission member B. W. Marston. As a vocal critic of the commission.

New Orleans Democrat, February 8, 1909, SFCII, RG 7, NA.

322 323 Marston suggested its abolition. Newell held little hope that the state would support financially a worthwhile and long-term research project in the delta. He favored a USDA station at Vicksburg—a central point between the deltas of Louisiana and Mississippi—and went on record in the Vicksburg Daily Herald in support of the laboratory.^ Bolton Smith, a Memphis, Tennessee, owner of large plantations in the Louisiana and Mississippi deltas, also undertook to lobby for the establishment of a station at 3 Vicksburg. LeRoy Percy, soon to be U.S. senator, also informed Hxinter that he and other planters near Greenville. "would leave nothing undone" in carrying out thorough "entomological work" in the delta.^ The Bureau of Entomology recognized the desirability and necessity of an additional station. Chief Leland 0. Howard was sensitive to maintaining good relations with Congress and to taking its desires into consideration in conducting his bureau. But, unlike others in government

2 Hunter to Howard, December 9, 1908, and enclosure Wilmon Newell to Hunter, December 5, 1908, General Cor- respondence, 1908-1924; Hunter to Howard, November 16, 1908, and enclosed clipping Vicksburg Daily Herald, May 8, 1908, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 3 Hunter to Howard, November 2, 1908, Letters Received from W. D. Hunter, RG 7, NA. 4 Hunter to Howard, December 9, 1908, General Cor- respondence, 1908-1924, RG 7, NA. 324 service, he had no taste for using outside groups to increase his empire. He cautioned Hunter about becoming too closely allied with individuals seeking the new station: We do not wish to be placed in the attitude of stirring people up to make demands on Congress. I have insisted upon this with other branches of the Bureau work, and it is a fixed policy of the Bureau. The House Committee on Agriculture is competent to make up its own mind as to the necessity for certain investigations, after hearing the testimony of the experts of this Bureau, and that body is the only one to which we can properly appeal. If our appeal is supported by intelligent growers and other people interested, it must be voluntairy support and not instigated by us.5 The appeals proved sufficient, and Hunter sent R. A. Cushman on a tour to select a suitable location. The boll weevil had not yet infested the Mississippi delta sufficiently to make it a good place for experiments. Cushman selected Tallulah, Louisiana, across the river from Vicksburg, in the delta. Other Louisiana towns were "much more desirable as towns than Tallulah, but are much handicapped by lack of railroad facilities," he wrote.^ After there was sufficient infestation in Mississippi, Hunter planned to move the laboratory to Greenville, Mississippi. The station was still at Tallulah. in 1969

Howard to Hunter, November 7, 1908, General Cor- respondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. Ibid., R. A. Cushman to Hunter, May 2, 1909. 7 Hunter to Howard, April 4, 1909, General Cor- respondence, 1908-1924, RG 7, NA. 325 when the author spent a summer there making infestation counts and researching the station records. Hunter believed that some control measures other than the cultural method would be needed in the delta: "We have maintained that in certain situations in the Delta cotton cultivation is no longer possible until better means of fighting the weevil have been devised." The situation demanded new ideas, and Hunter hoped that the man he placed in charge of the Tallulah station, R. A Cushman, could supply them. The bureau had faith that its cultural methods were far superior to any known insecticide or weevil-gathering machine. But Hunter's instructions implied that the cultural system had been developed about as far as possible. The instructions carried the realization that the southeastern cotton growers and their congressional representatives would demand more. He advised Cushman to try almost anything possible: I should like to have you exercise all the ingenuity you can in taking up ideas that have never been tested or investigated insufficiently. We should make a continued fight against becoming too conservative. I realize of course that novel ideas about control of the boll weevil are very scarce. This should only increase your efforts towards progress along new lines.^

o Ibid., September 6, 1909. 9 Hunter to R. A. Cushman, February 14, 1910, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 326 The new station conducted experiments into parasite control and for a time raised hopes that control in the East would be more beneficial than in the West. Hunter also hired George D. Smith to continue the experiments in using powdered arsenate of lead he had started with the Louisiana Crop Pest Commission. Smith took over the operations of the station work when Cushman tired of the small town atmosphere and left. Smith continued his work with arsenate of lead, and for a brief period the Bureau of Entomology was on the verge of recommending its use. Over 50 percent of the experimental plantings showed financial gains over control f/^^^^lats. To show a profit required strict attention to the amount and timing of the applications, something the Bureau of Entomology was not certain the average farmer would do. The entomologists hoped for an insecticide with a wider margin of profitability, whereby practically all farmers would show an increase in production to cover the cost of poisoning. Planters in the Louisiana delta grew restive with only the cultural methods to fight the weevil. They complained that "nothing had been accomplished"

"Conference in re Boll Weevil Conditions in the South, with a View to Establish More Effective Means to Fight the Boll Weevil Than Heretofore, July 24, 1913," pp. 9-10, Insects—Boll Weevil, General Correspondence, RG 16, NA. Ibid., p. 1. 327 scientifically in several years and that the entomologists employed at Tallulah had too little experience and enthusiasm for the job. 12 Concern over the depredations of the weevil and the lack of a breakthrough resulted in a major conference of southern senators and congressmen with department officials in the Secretary's office in July and August 1913. Leland Howard defended his men. Furthermore, he reminded the congressional delegation that not all problems are susceptible to panacean solutions—especially entomological ones: We cannot expect to be absolutely successful in our fight against every evil. This is the worst evil that ever came to our attention. It changes its habits and methods of life as it gets into new territory. We are following those changes up, trying to find something better than we have all ready [sic].13

The funds allocated to the Bureau of Entomology had increasingly shrunk relative to those appropriated for the demonstration work. This was Howard's chance for an increase if he desired such, but, evidently, he did not. He replied negatively when Senator James Vardaman asked if he needed more money and scientists. Should major discoveries be made, they would be through the orderly process of yearly experiments by a small number of

Ibid., p. 7. ■'•^Ibid., p. 6, 14 Ibid., pp. 5-7. 328 scientists. There would be no crash program to solve the boll weevil problem. The other major item on the conference agenda was Senator "Cotton Ed" Smith's plan of cotton abandonment along the edge of the infestation line to stop the weevil's progress. Then there would be succeeding non- cotton strips moving westward and southward until once again the weevil could properly carry the appellation "Mexican cotton boll weevil." The idea was not newly born with Smith; he had advocated a similar action during the earlier Shreveport convention, long before he was elected to Congress. Nor did it die easily. Smith continued to advocate the plan as the final solution to the boll weevil problem. He made his pitch to fellow senators and congressmen: "I have not come here with some wild fantastic dream." He extracted from Hunter the admissionImj that "a zone of sufficient width would be effective. „16 Smith did not neglect to point out that the Department of Agriculture had previously endorsed a similar proposal during the early days in Texas, 17 Scientific considerations and the opinions of Department of Agriculture officials were, of course, not the major impediments to implementing the plan. The

Ibid., "Conference, August 4, 1913," p. 31. ••■^Ibid., p. 15. ■'■^Ibid., p, 14. 329 opponents capable of killing the idea were Smith's colleagues and their constituents—the southern farmers. The cost of compensating farmers was one barrier, but the more important obstacle was the fact that compulsion would be necessary. Congressman Henry Clayton of Alabama did not believe the United States Government could compel farmers to stop growing cotton. 18 Congressman Thomas Sisson of Mississippi did not absolutely doxabt the plan's constitutionality but did not consider it "practicable from a legal point of view." 19 At the very least, it would occasion "endless litigation." 20 Smith never got his plan enacted. Wilmon Newell, state entomologist of Florida, wrote in 1918 supporting Smith's idea. He believed that the experience of World War I would substantially alter Americans' view of governmental intervention into agriculture. After the war was over the people would have become "accustomed to federal regulation of our industries, activities and even personal habits to a degree heretofore undreamed of." 21 Although the World War I experience led

•"•^Ibid., p. 26. -^^Ibid., p. 27. 20,,Ibid. ., 21 Wilmon Newell, "Eradicate the Boll Weevil," The Quarterly Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 2, State Plant Board of Florida (January 1918), p. 137. 330 to government involvement in agricultural marketing and 22 price regulation, not until the depression was the American farmer challenged on his right to plant what, where, and when he chose. If there was a consensus at the conference, it was to continue supporting the scientific investigations and the demonstration work as lavishly as the southern congressmen could get their northern and western colleagues to agree to. One person who sought to have a major breakthrough was Assistant Secretary of Agricultiire Beverly T. Galloway. He circumvented the bureaucratic channels and directly requested George Smith's ideas on experiments "to determine definitely whether it is practicable to control the weevil in the Delta section, where it has been so destructive 23 the last two or three years." Smith replied with suggestions, including a mammoth weevil-picking experiment. George Yerger, a Tallulah area planter, complained to Senator Ransdell that even if the methods controlled the weevil, the cost of labor would be unremunerative. Galloway wanted Smith to report directly to Howard,

22 Gladys Baker et al.. Century of Service, pp. 88-91; John T. Schlebecker, Whereby We Thrive: A History of American Farming, 1607-1972 (Ames: Iowa State University 1975), pp. 210-11. 23 Beverly T. Galloway to Howard, January 24, 1914, Insects—Boll Weevil, General Correspondence, RG 16, NA. 24 . Ibid., and George Yerger to Joseph Ransdell, February 10, 1914. 331 circumventing Hunter. Furthermore, there were plans to call in outside experts. Galloway requested that William M. Wheeler of the Harvard University's Bussey Institution spend some time in the South during the summer of 1914 investigating the problem. Wheeler replied that he would not undertake the task except at Howard's request and that a single season in the field would not be sufficient to study control methods profitably.^^ All told, Galloway's initiatives were a striking lack of faith in Hunter's progress in the work on the weevil. The major development in weevil control came, not under Smith, but under his successor at the Tallulah station, Bertpem Raymond Goad. Goad continued experiments with lead arsenate and numerous other insecticides. He n^. started experiments with calcium arsenate about 1916. He endorsed both lead arsenate and calcium arsenate in 1918, giving the edge in effectiveness to the latter. The calcium arsenate was to be applied in dust form, and the secret to success was keeping a fine powder on the plant. The calcium was the element that supplied the adhesive quality previously lacking. Also the new mixture was better suited to application by machine than previous xnsecticides that utilized arsenic. Growers purchased

25 Ibid., Beverly T. Galloway to William M. Wheeler, January 22, 1914; Wheeler to Galloway, February 3, 1914, 26 B. R. Goad, Recent Experimental Work on Poisoning Cotton Boll Weevils, U.S. Department of Agriculture 332 over three million pounds in 1919 and ten million pounds in 1920.^^

News of Goad's apparently successful experiments became known prior to the Bureau of Entomology's willingness to endorse publicly the insecticide. Planters near Clarks- dale, Mississippi, beseeched Senator John Sharp Williams to have Goad or one of his assistants instruct them in 28 the new poisoning method. Bradford Knapp of the Office of Extension Work in the South also felt that his organization should be brought up to date. He complained to the Secretary's office that "the Bureau of Entomology ought 29 to be made to square up with us." The Bureau of Ento- mology at first preferred the straightforward answer that the "Department is not willing at this time to disclose [the results] because of the fact that they have not been given a sufficient trial to justify the annovmcement of the results." Secretary David Houston finally begged the

Bulletin No. 731 (Washington, D .C., July 19, 1918), pp. 1- 15; B. R. Goad and T. P. Gassidy, Gotten Boll Weevil Control by the Use of Poison, U.S. Department of Agriculture Bul- letin No. 875 (Washington, July 20, 1920), pp. 2-26. 27 U. G. Loftin, "Living with the Boll Weevil for Fifty Years," Annual Report of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution, 1945 (Washington, 1946), p. 283. 2 8 R. S. Wilson to Bradford Knapp, July 14, 1917; J. W. Gutrer to John Sharp Williams, July 12, 1917; Williams to David F. Houston, July 13, 1917, Insects—Boll Weevil, General Gorrespondence, RG 16, NA. 29 Ibid., Bradford Knapp to F. R. Harrison, July 16, 1917. 30 Ibid., David F. Houston to John Sharp Williams, 333 issue by saying that none of the Tallulah staff could go to Clarksdale because of a reorganization of the work of the Bureau of Entomology. 31 When the recommendations were announced, the delta planters became some of the first siabscribers to the method. The Delta and Pine Land Company tested and approved the economic benefits of the poison. 3? On fertile land, as in the delta, the poison had a higher rate of return on the cost because expenses were the same regardless of the land's productiveness. Also, the highly organized commercial operations were better able to apply the poison at the proper interludes: correct application occurred when infestation reached 10-15 percent. Thus, the farmer had to make careful and repeated counts of the punctured squares. Manufacturers attempted to meet the demand for calcium arsenate and dusting machinery, but the rapid adaptation outstripped the supply. By 1922, there were about thirty companies manufacturing the insecticide and an equal number manufacturing machinery. Yet the supplies of both poison and machinery were not maintaining pace

July 16, 1917 (Letter Not Sent) 31 Ibid., David F. Houston to John Sharp Williams, July 16, 1917. 32„ Progressive Farmer (Eastern ed.). May 20, 1922, p. 10; J. W. Fox to Franklin Sherman, February 10, 1922, Division of Entomology, Department of Agriculture, North Carolina Division of Archives and History, Raleigh, North Carolina. 334 with the demand, especially since the early 1920s were the worst years of weevil infestation. Even with the demand exceeding the supply, there had not yet been a "general adoption of poisoning the cotton boll weevil." It was basic economics that the demand was sufficient to cause an increase in the price, occasioning an investigation by the Federal Trade Commission into the calcium arsenate industry. Southern congressmen began wrangling with their protectionist Republican colleagues over putting calcium arsenate and its component white arsenic on the free list. Discussions began about building processing plants in the South, and the Geological Survey, at the behest of Congress, investigated the potential supplies in the United States. Georgia carried out the most innovative program to assure her farmers an adequate supply of calcium arsenate. The legislatiare in 19 21 authorized the Georgia State Board of Entomology to buy and sell calcium arsenate at cost, and provided a revolving fund for the transactions. The board in 1922 sidetracked its "Peddler Cars" at towns

33 A. L. Quaintance, Memorandum for the Secretary, June 3, 1922, Insects—Boll Weevil, General Correspondence, RG 16, NA, 34 Atlanta Constitution, January 22, 1923; Memphis Commercial Appeal, December 1, 1923, William J. Harris to John J. Brown, February 29, 1924, John Judson Brown Papers, Southern Historical Collection. 335 and sold calcium arsenate. The program gained acceptance, and in 1923, Ira Williams, state entomologist, estimated that 38 percent of Georgia's farmers used the poison as compared to 6 percent southwide. 35 After the disastrous years of the 192 0s, Georgia eased out of the business of purchasing calcium arsenate. The state had proved herself more flexible and innovative in an agricultural crisis than her neighbors. By southern standards of the functions of the state government, it was a remarkable program. Other private and industrial interests were active in accommodating the farmers in the purchase of calcium arsenate. Some merchants in Georgia claimed to have sold the poison at cost during the desperate years of the 36 early 19 20s. According to one accoiint, all railroads operating in Georgia reduced the freight rate on calcium arsenate 50 percent. 37 The Sea Board Air Line conducted demonstrations in applying the poison. 38 Likewise, implement companies established demonstration plots in the South.

35 Georgia Agriculture; State and County, Quarterly Bulletin of the Georgia State Department of Agriculture, Serial Number 96 (June 1924), p. 109. 36 A. E. Gibson to John J. Brown, October 29, 1923; R. E. McDowell and Company to Brown, November 15, 1923; Agricultural Bulletin, July 1924, p. 11, John Judson Brown Papers, Southern Historical Collection. 37 Vicksburg Herald, February 16, 19 23, Cotton Insects Research Station, Tallulah, Louisiana. 38 Ibid., "A Railroad's Work in Fighting Boll Weevil," Manufactiarers Record, April 10, 1924, p. 88. 336 Their actions were not entirely altruistic; the merchants and railroads had a large financial stake in profitable cotton crops, and the implement companies reaped the rewards from selling and distributing machinery to the farmers. However, only a serious threat to the cotton economy could have inspired such innovations. The implement companies produced a plethora of calcium arsenate-distributing machines. There were hand- turned blowers that a man carried down the row, or a saddlebag variant with the operator riding on the back of a mule. Traction-powered dusters came in one- and two-mule 39 varietxes. While not endorsing particular manufacturers, the Department of Agriculture made information available on the various types, manufacturers, and prices. The department advised the farmer of the type most suitable for his farming operation. The daily dusting capacity, measured in acreage, depended on the type machine. The motion picture medium then coming into vogue was one means the department used for instruction. In the summer of 19 22, there were several copies of a movie about poisoning in daily use in the South. The Extension Service's county agents carried the main burden for disseminating information

39 Progressive Farmer (Eastern ed,). May 20, 1922, p. 4 . 40 J. A. Evans, Memorandum for Dr, True, June 8, 19 22, Insects—Boll Weevil, General Correspondence, RG 16, NA. 337 on cotton dusting operations. The American Cotton Asso- ciation had two or three instructors in each state. The Department of Agriculture also pioneered in the use of the airplane for crop dusting. Airplanes for dusting had been used before, but their successful utilization at the Tallulah station portended the first major use of the airplane on individual farms. 41 The airplane was first employed extensively in the level expanses of the delta but gradually moved eastward, not incidentally providing a source of entertainment for many southern children. The recommendation of calcium arsenate dust had one fundamental limitation. The land should be capable of producing one-half bale to the acre; othean^rise the poisoning might well not be profitable. 42 Since the recommendation was not for every farmer, the Bureau of Entomology preferred a "slow steady grow" in the use of the method. The officials did not want "nationwide propaganda which might inevitably result in serious financial loss to those who were not familiar with the

41 For a discussion of the developments in airplane dusting at Tallulah, see Eldon W. Downs and George F. Lemmer, "Origins of Aerial Crop Dusting," Agricultural History 39 (July 1965): 123-35. 42 Henry Wallace to William J. Harris, December 12, 19 22, Insects—Boll Weevil, General Correspondence, RG 16, NA. 43 Ibid., Henry Wallace to J. S. Wannamaker, July 13, 1922. 338 method and easily fail in some important detail." In some seasons climatic conditions controlled the weevil to the extent that poisoning was unremiinerative, On poor, unfertilized land or during dry seasons the additional production might not pay for the cost of the poison. The Bureau of Entomology feared that in such instances there might be a rejection of the method as unprofitable. The farm journals generally exercised restraint in endorsing the method, and the agricultural experiment stations undertook tests of their own. 45 Alternative methods of using calcium arsenate were trumpeted. Wilmon Newell greeted the recommendation of calcium arsenate with a protest. Newell contended that he and George Smith had not been given full credit for their work in Louisiana with lead arsenate as the ante- cedent to the method. Though W. D. Hxinter disagreed with some of Newell's claims, the department was, in the future, careful to mention the earlier work when discussing the history of insecticidal use on cotton. Newell and his colleague, George Smith, began experimenting with calcium arsenate in Florida. In October 1922, they annovmced the results of what came to be known as the "Florida Method" of weevil control. Smith proposed stripping the young

44 Ibid. 45 Progressive Farmer (Eastern ed.). May 24, 1919, p. 18. 339 cotton plants of all squaires and as many weevils as possible after the peak of spring emergence. Then the farmer was to give the crop one thorough dusting with calcium arsenate. Fred Mally, state entomologist in Texas, had offered a similar plan of denying the weevil food and squares for reproduction in 1901. When the plan was brought to Newell's attention he carefully noted it in 46 his next publication. The new method received wide publicity and was tried extensively by entomological investigators and informed farmers. One or two years' experience was sufficient to convince most entomologists and farmers that it was not superior to regular applications of calcium arsenate, and the brief infatuation with the "Florida Method" ended.^^ The more serious challenge to the dust method came from those who favored mixing the calcium arsenate with, molasses. The idea of mixing an insecticide with molasses was by no means new. The Division of Entomology had tried

46 Clarence Ousley to Wilmon Newell, October 26, 1918; Hunter to Newell, September 4, 1918; E. D. Ball to Alfred D. Flinn, December 26, 1922, Insects—Boll Weevil, General Correspondence, RG 16, NA; Wilmon Newell, "Credit Where Credit Is Due," Quarterly Bulletin, vol. 7, no. 3, State Plant Board of Florida (April 1923), pp. 172-74. 47 Interview with George L. Smith, Tallulah, Louisiana, August 4, 19 69; interview with Dwight Isley, Fayetteville, Arkansas, June 30, 1969. 340 a concoction of molasses and arsenate of lead at Victoria m 1902. 48 Farmers believed that the molasses attracted the weevils. 49 It was a difficult question to resolve scientifically, but the belief was an important factor in the adoption of sweetened poisons. Other advantages were obvious. The sticky mixture stayed on the plant longer—presvimably necessitating few applications. The amount of calcium arsenate required to treat an acre of cotton was reduced. No expensive machinery was required, only a broomstick and an old fertilizer bag. Admittedly, the molasses cost less per acre, but did it make a better return on investment in poison than the dust method? The old saw about being penny wise and pound foolish characterized the Bureau of Entomology's attitude toward farmers using the sweetened poison. The most influential advocate of the molasses mixture was David R. Coker. He tried the mixture on his seed breeding farm at Hartsville, South Carolina, and pronounced it a success. Many farmers took Coker's advice. He was most influential in North and South Carolina where his Coker's Pedigreed Seed Company had a

48 Charles L. Marlatt to Hunter, August 1, 1902, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 49 Interview with T. Roy Helms, Marshville, North Carolina, August 29, 19 77. Ibid. 341 large share of the planting seed market. The federal and state entomologists were no match for Coker in this territory. Bruce Mabee, an entomologist in charge of North Carolina's Boll Weevil Field Station at Dunn, summed up his frustration at trying to induce farmers to use the dust method: Why is it we can not have more influence in our work than we do? The word and belief of one man (D. R. Coker) has caused many more men to poison according to his plan throughout North and South Carolina than all the work of the U.S. Dept. and all the Southern Experiment Stations,52 The state authorities had a decision to make. The state experiment stations made comparison tests and most favored the dust method. Clarence Poe, editor of the Progressive Farmer, came down in favor of the dust method, but the controversy continued. 53 The Association of Southern Agricultural Workers in 1924 began to advocate one pre-square poisoning with dust or molasses. A federal official familiar with the deliberations observed that the action was taken as a concession to Coker» 54 The successful seed breeder was by no means a dilettante.

"Report of The Committee On Boll Weevil Control, February 8, 1923," Meeting of the Southern Agricultural Workers, Memphis, Tennessee, Insects—Boll Weevil, General Correspondence, RG 16, NA. ^. Bruce Mabee to Franklin Sherman, July 12, 1923, Division of Entomology, Department of Agriculture, North Carolina Division of Archives and History. 53 Progressive Farmer (Eastern ed.), July 22, 1922, p. 8. 54j. A. Evans to Charles L. Marlatt, April 26, 1928, D.C., Board of Entomology, General Correspondence, RG 33, NA, 342 One contemporary southern entomologist recalled that Coker thought he was doing a service to his native South. He hoped to convert the Department of Agriculture through A. F. Woods, Director of Scientific Work. Coker persuaded W. W. Long, director of Extension Work in South Carolina and a believer in the molasses mixture, to ask Woods to come to Hartsville, South Carolina, for a conference. In appealing to Woods, Long lamented the confusion caused to the southern farmer by the conflicting recommendations, and requested a conference to "settle this unfortunate situation for all time." The matter was not settled, although the Bureau of Entomology did relent partially in recommending poisoning with the mixture for weevils 57 emerging from hibernation. When the Department of Agriculture surveyed the methods in use in 1935, they found that the dust method predominated in eastern Texas and the delta portions of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. In fact, most of the calcium arsenate used in the United States was distributed in this area. Eastward there was some dusting, but the molasses mixture

55 Interview with Dwight Isley, Fayetteville, Arkansas, June 30, 1969. W. W. Long to A. F. Woods, July 6, 1928, Insects— Boll Weevil, General Correspondence, RG 16, NA. 57 J. W. Folsom, Insect Enemies of the Cotton Plant, Farmers Bulletin No. 1688, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, July 1932), p. 3. 343

er Q predominated—especially in South Carolina. There were certain hindrances to the iiniversal use of calcium arsenate in either form. Several of the objections were well-founded. There were reports from all over the South of farm animals dying from ingesting the poison. Usually these were work stock—mules. But other farm animals died from the poison also. Georgia's commissioner of agriculture, John J. Brown, lost eleven head of cattle to arsenic poisoning in 1925. There were complaints that the calcium arsenate was severely damaging the bee industry by killing the bees or poisoning 61 the honey. One amateur bee keeper in Georgia wrote to the governor suggesting that the use of sweetened poison 62 be prohibited in the state. The danger to human health was not entirely ignored. One writer on the s\ibject attributed blacks* reluctance to use the poison to their

58 R. W. Harned and Ü. C. Loftin, "A Survey of Methods Now Used for Boll Weevil Control with Comments on Certain Methods," pp. 4-6 (n.d., processed). National Agricultural Library, Beltsville, Maryland. 59 Progressive Farmer (Eastern ed.), July 8, 1922, p. 10; Minutes of the State Board of Agriculture, June 29, 1922, p. 52, North Carolina Division of Archives and History. 6 0 John J. Brown to Fermer Barrett, December 15, 1925, John Judson Brown Papers, Southern Historical Collection. Ibid., John W. Cash to John J. Brown, July 11, 1921; A. F. Lever to Mr, Bains, May 29, 1922, Insects—Boll Weevil, General Correspondence, RG 16, NA, 6 2 M. L. Callaway to T. W. Hardwick, July 9, 1921, John Judson Brown Papers, Southern Historical Collection. 344 past experience with Paris green, which burned the skin.^"^ Distributing the poison with the hand-turned blowers was hard work. B. R. Coad observed that many blacks objected to walking down the dew-drenched cotton rows—the precise time when the cotton should be dusted so that the powder would adhere to the plants. Coad put their objections 64 into the category of superstition. The molasses mixture was even more unpleasant. One would conclude the day encrusted with sticky molasses. According to a relative of the author, one's "overalls would stand up at night" after a day of mopping cotton. Additionally, there were reports that calcium arsenate poisoned the soil. Farmers in the sandy sections of South Carolina experienced difficulties in growing legume crops on cotton lands treated with calcium arsenate the previous year. Other reports cited the adverse effects on the taste of potatoes grown following a crop of cotton.^^

63 Elmer Johnson and B. R. Coad, "Dusting Machinery for Cotton Boll Weevil Control," Alabama Farm Facts, /x^o k«- February 21, 1920, p. 5. V ^^^ ^O^^'-^- 64,, ., Ibid. n, 65 / ' Interview with Parvin Helms, Marshville, North Carolina, August 29, 1977. 6 6 Harned and Loftin, "A Survey of Methods Now Used for Boll Weevil Control," p. 6; Forty-Third Annual Report of the South Carolina Experiment Station of Clemson Agricultural College for the Year Ended June 30, 1930 (Clemson College, December 1930), p. 111. 345 Cost seemed the primary objection of most farmers 67 who did not use calcium arsenate. It added another burden to a credit system that was being continually restricted. The farmers in Adams County, Mississippi, ignored fertilizer and poison for the most part during the 1930s, not from any ignorance of their value, but from an 6 8 inability to pay for them. For those using the molasses mixture poison, the cost advantage over the dust method was a primary inducement. In the Southeast the poison requirement was just an additional expense on top of the increasing fertilizer bill. B. R. Coad observed that many farmers felt that they could not afford the cost of poisoning if they purchased fertilizer or vice versa. Since the method's profit factor required land capable of producing one-half bale to the acre, the farmer should do both. On poor land the farmer had to do both. To Coad, the idea of poisoning and not fertilizing was economic lunacy. Poor land farmers who poisoned but did not fertilize were "likely to save a crop from the weevil that [was] not worth saving." Many continued planting

67 Interview with T. Roy Helms, August 29, 1977. Mr. Helms, the author's uncle, in response to a question as to why farmers in the area did not use the dust form of calcium arsenate as the Department of Agriculture advised, replied, "My God, who could afford it?" Davis et al.. Deep South, p. 269. 69^ Cotton Farmer, May 20, 19 22, Cotton Insects Research Station, Tallulah, Louisiana. 346 without purchasing either fertilizer or poison. The sea island cotton fanners that T. J. Woofter observed used neither and went through "much head-scratching" each year as to how many acres to plant. Methods had to be devised within the landlord- tenant arrangements to accommodate the cost of poisoning. The cash renter did as he pleased and bore the expense of the poison if he chose to use it. In most other instances, the cost of purchasing the poison seems to have been treated like the cost of the fertilizer. A popular system operated in Union County, North Carolina. The tenant at the top of the ladder who could supply his own stock, feed, and equipment might work the crop oh fourths or fifths. The landlord supplied one-fifth the cost of the seed, fertilizer, and poison. The tenant supplied the remainder. The proceeds from the crop were divided on the same basis. When the tenant supplied the stock, but the landlord supplied all the seed, fertilizer, and poison, the crop was divided equally, each partner receiving half the crop. Another system of farming on halves existed when the landlord supplied all the stock and feed, but the tenant bore half the cost of the fertilizer and poison.

70 Woofter. Black Yeomanry, p. 142. 71 Davis et al.. Deep South, p. 331. 72 Interview with T. Roy Helms, Marshville, North Carolina, August 29, 1977. 347 Despite the endorsement of calciiom arsenate as an effective control measure, the entomologists still considered fall destruction of the plants a prime ingredient in successful weevil control. Officials tried to spur action by press releases and publicity in farm journals during the picking season. Walter D. Hunter wanted to place placards in post offices to spread the word. Local groups held meetings in small towns to promote the idea, and a gathering at Tallulah, Louisiana, in November 1908 was typical. ^ The idea of mandatoiry fall c destruction persisted but never fully took hold. G. H. ' Alford suggested that the Mississippi legislature enact such a law in 1909, but the compulsory nature of such a law never appealed to any southern legislature. Several factors hindered the adoption of the method. The idea of destroying foliage in the eastern cotton belt, long dependent on fertilizer, rankled farm editors intent on improving farming methods. Editors of agricultural journals had long fought the tendency of farmers to burn over fields before planting time. To endorse fire was heresy. The Southern Farm Gazette relented and approved

73 Hunter to Howard, August 17, 1909, General Cor- respondence, 1908-1924, RG 7, NA. 74 Vicksburg Herald, November 8, 1908, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 75 G. N. Alford, "Some Laws the Next Legislature Should Give Us," Southern Farm Gazette, October 16, 1909, p. 16. 348 of burning the stalks, but added that "it is the duty of the entomologists to bend his [sic] efforts to the finding of some other way of fighting the boll weevil other than by the destruction of this organic matter which 76 our soils need most." The Department of Agriculture finally endorsed plowing under the stalks. Yet there was not general acceptance of even turning under the stalks. There was other important work 77 to be done on the farm in the fall. Hog killing time would be near and there were other crops to be harvested. Firewood must be cut for the winter. Tenants and small farmers fortunate enough to have a source of income other than farming looked to winter work, especially sawmilling. Unless the farmer planned to plant winter cover crops, there was little reason to clear the fields expeditiously. The task could be accomplished so much easier during the winter months. Many a southern farmer sent his children running along the cotton rows on a freezing or damp winter morning to knock down the brittle stalks with sticks.^^

76 Southern Farm Gazette, October 23, 1909, p. 15. 77 For a discussion of the activities at the end of the cotton picking season and a refutation of the myth that cotton growing was only a half-year job, see Davis et al., Deep South, pp. 324-27. 78 Interview with Marvin Helms, Marshville, North Carolina, September 5, 19 77; interview with Samuel W. Lee, Davidson, North Carolina, September 5, 1977. 349 The tenant system constituted another major deterrent to the general practice of fall destruction. Land- lords, especially those living on or near the farms, exercised a high degree of supervision over control methods during the growing season. But the close of the picking season ended the obligation between landlord and tenant if all debts were paid. Tenants planning to move had no reason to turn under the stalks. A system of "long term contracts and leases" would "facilitate" the adoption of the system, as one agriculturalist termed it. But such a system did not develop in the South. The situation in Gwinnett County, Georgia, in the mid-1920s illustrated the mobility of southern tenant farmers. Though the farmers might remain in the same county, there was considerable movement within the county. Of those farming as croppers in 1925, 64 percent had taken up residence there since January 1, 192 4. Forty-six percent of the renters had farmed elsewhere before January 1924,^° The lack of concerted action also hindered the adoption of fall destruction. The belief prevailed that if one farmer failed to destroy the stalks, then it was

79 C. K. McClelland, "October Work in Georgia," Progressive Farmer (Eastern ed.), October 2, 1920, p. 28. 80 Howard A. Turner and L. D. Howell, Condition of Farmers in a White-Farmer Area of the Cotton Piedmont, 1924-1926, U.S. Department of Agriculture Circón lar Mn. 78 (Washington, September 1929), p. 35. 350 I useless for his neighbor to undertake the task. Although community action was certainly preferable, demanding it deterred many from deriving the benefits of individual practice. Factors other than prospective weevil damage led to fall destruction of the plants. Implement companies invented roller-type riding stalk cutters. The arrival of the tractor made the task less laborious. In fact, some tractor companies used the added advantage in their 81 advertisements. The increase in the use of chemical defoliants to assist in cotton picking reduced the amount of foliage available for food and living quarters in the fall. But the increase in crop rotation in sections where small farms predominated did more than any other move to implement fall destruction. In the early 1920s, farmers in Union County, North Carolina, began to grow more winter grain and clover to build up the soil. The cotton field that was allowed to "lie out" of cotton for a year had to be plowed and planted in the fall. Before the general rotation of crops, the farmer "done [sic] sort of as you pleased," in regard to plowing under the stalks.^^

81 Alabama Farm Facts, November 15, 1919, p. 10. 82 Interview with T. Roy Helms, Marshville, North Carolina, August 29, 1977. 351 Southern farmers did not totally neglect the idea of destroying the boll weevil during the fall and winter months, but one could hardly endorse the methods used. Fire had been used as a method of clearing forests and later to provide forage. Now farmers employed it to kill boll weevils. The boll weevil was only one of several factors resulting in the fires that depleted southern forests, nor was the weevil the only insect that was the object of destruction. In Louisiana the boll weevil and disdain for the large lumber companies prompted fires. People too poor to afford firecrackers for Christmas celebrations substituted forest fires. The practice was particularly widespread in the coastal plain where the weevil was most destructive. One retired Forest Service employee recalled that in the 1920s "woods workers and other rural residents in every Coastal Plains State mentioned boll-weevil control as one reason or excuse 84 for woods-burning." The extension forester in the Forest Service described the practice as being "widespread through the South."^^ In 1923, some cotton growers

83 Philip C.Wakeley, "F. O. (Red) Bateman: Pioneer Silviculturalist," Journal of Forest History 20 (April 1976): 92. ~ ^ 84 Philip C.Wakeley to the author, April 17, 1977. 85 W. R. Matten to Mr. Barrett, June 12, 1926, Georgia, Miscellaneous, General Correspondence, RG 33, NA. 1.^.1.

352 in the coastal plain of North. Carolina continued the prac- 86 tice. The U.S. Forest Service became the main partici- pant in the movement to get the practice stopped» The use of fire in the spring to clear land for planting and to kill the weevils was particularly prevalent in Georgia, or at least the best account of it comes from that state. The farmers burned stacks of cotton stalks, the overgrown terraces, hedgerows, and even the pine woods. The wood fires burned for days, consuming farm buildings and houses in their paths. So common was the loss of farm houses in Greene County that for a time in the mid-1920s, insurance companies would no longer write fire policies for rural homes. Arthur Raper estimated that throughout the 1920s, fires scarred more acres than were cultivated in Greene County. The time of "plow and smoke"^^ formed the backdrop for the demise of Jeeter in Tobacco A Road. Nostalgia seized Jeeter as the smell of the burning woods reminded him that once again it was planting

86 Fred B. Merrill, "Forest Fires and the Boll Weevil," North Carolina Geological and Economic Survey, Circular No. 7 (Chapel Hill, 1923), p. 2; also for a reference to woods burning in eastern North Carolina to control the boll weevil, see Joseph Hyde Pratt, Letter to the Editor, "Don't Burn the Timber," Alabama Farm Facts, May 15, 1923, p. 7. 87 Arthur F. Raper, Tenants of the Almighty (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1943), p. 164, ^^Ibid. 353 time. He had no mule or cotton seed and no one to provide the fertilizer. Yet he resolved to plant one last cotton crop. The fire he started one afternoon destroyed 89 the house and Jeeter, just as meager returns from cotton farming in the 1920s had effectively destroyed the lives of many once-independent cotton farmers. The direct method of weevil control, manually removing them from the field by one or more means, spread across the South with the insect. The tactic consisted of picking the live weevils off the plant, opening up the bracts, picking off the infested squares, and gathering up the infested squares. Industrious farmers in most parts of the South tried one or a combination of the methods when first confronted^„by the weevil. Planters in the Mississippi delta of Louisiana were 90 carrying out the practice extensively in 1909. G. h. Smith, who became director of the Tallulah station, recalled picking the infested squares during his youth 91 in the Yazoo hills in the 1910s. The practice was reported as common in southern Alabama in 1914, One of

89 Erskine Caldwell, Tobacco Road (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 19 32), pp. 228-34. 90 "Report of trip thro Miss. Delta, July 29, 1909," Report No. 1208, Reports Concerning Investigations, Division of Cotton Insect Investigations, RG 7, NA. 91 Interview with George L. Smith, Tallulah, Louisiana, August 4, 1969. 354 the Alabamians who sent his children out into the fields to gather up the squares was Nate Shaw, the fictitious name assigned to Theodore Rosengarten's informant in All 92 God's Dangers. Greene County, Georgia, citizens undertook community action to retard the weevil. Merchants closed shops on Thursdays so as not to distract people from the task and offered prizes in 1921 to the pre- 9 3 seventeen-year-old who brought in the most boll weevils.

The practice spread with the weevil across the South.

Franklin Sherman, state entomologist of North Carolina, 94 described it as "well-nigh universal," in Union and Anson counties in 1922. The method of disposal varied. Most farmers burned the squares, but occasionally other means of destruction were devised. Some farmers in Covington County, Mississippi, boiled the squares in the family wash pots to kill the 95 larvae. Two black cab drivers in Starkville, Mississippi, informed the author that as children they would dust calcium arsenate on fallen squares one day and then plow

92 Theodore Rosengarten, All God's Dangers; The Life of Nate Shaw (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), p. 222. 93 Raper, Tenants of the Almighty, p. 163, 94 Franklin Sherman, "Fighting Boll Weevils in North Carolina," Progressive Farmer (Eastern ed.), August 19, 1922, p. 5. 95 Interview with G. F. Vaughn, Jackson, Mississippi, August 6, 1973. 355 under the squares the next. 96 The practice of gathering squares, where it existed, added another element to tenancy arrangements and the supervision of croppers. The arrangements varied with the type of farming operation and tenancy involved. Hunter, from his years in the South, observed that on most large plantations "the negroes [sic] are worked \inder strict supervision by white overseers." If the owner ordered the squares to be picked, then the task was done. Occasionally there would be an agreement in the contract between tenant and planter that the infested squares be picked from the plant. Hunter noted such a case in Madison Parish, Louisiana, in 1910. Where absentee ownership persisted on smaller tracts of land there was less direct supervision. Such was the case in the hilly areas of Adams County, Missis- sippi, where there was a high degree of absentee owner-^ ship and tenants worked mostly in family xinits. This contrasted sharply to the nearby delta lands of Louisiana where the owner personally directed much of the work. Cash renters made more decisions than the half-renters

96 Interview with two black cab drivers, Starkville, Mississippi, August 15, 1973. 97 Hunter to Howard, April 24, 1912, General Cor- respondence, 1908-1924, RG 7, NA. 98 Hunter to D. Humphreys, June 13, 1910, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 356 99 about how the crop should be raised. Essentially the type supervision exercised often depended on the owner's stake in the crop and supplies. Nate Shaw recalled that although the landlords he rented from in Alabama did not visit the field each day, they took an interest in having the infested squares picked, and had informants relaying the news on the activities of each farmer. The owners used the threat of withdrawing the "furnish" to compel tenants to pick up squares. Shaw was offended by the patronizing attitude that he did not have the ability to recognize his own self-interest. Shaw recalled paying his children to pick up squares. Other fathers were not so generous. It was, in fact, the basis of the Extension Service's recommendation regarding square picking on small farms: women and children could perform the task with no additional expense to the farmer. Just as the practice spread eastward with the weevil, disenchantment with the task followed quickly. Where farmers had to pay for the work, the reward at the end of the season seemed not to compensate the expense. The small owners found the work not worthwhile. B. L.

99 Davis et al.. Deep South, pp. 330-31. 100„ Rosengarten, All God's Dangers, p. 222 Ibid., p. 223. 357

Moss, a frequent writer for the Progressive Farmer, pronounced the practice dead in the coastal region of Alabama 102 in 19.21. Most of the farmers at a meeting in Concord, Georgia, in March 1917 considered square picking "too 103 much work." The Union and Anson County farmers in North Carolina had been encouraged by their results in the early summer of 1922. Yet the heavy infestation of August cast doubt on the value of square picking. Several years, or even one season, of picking and burning squares disillusioned many. Nate Shaw's verdict on the matter was that "it weren't [sic] worth, nothin' [sic]."'^^^ The matter of square picking continued as a bone of contention between the Bureau of Entomology and the Extension Service. B. R. Coad cited the abandonment of the practice after one or two years in each newly infested area as the populace's endorsement of the bureau's

102 B. L. Moss, "Making Cotton Despite Boll Weevil," Progressive Farmer (Eastern ed.), December 3, 1921, p. 5. 103 Editorial by G. F. Hunnicutt, Southern Cultivator, March 15, 1917, p. 3. 104 Franklin Sherman, "Fighting Boll Weevils in North Carolina," Progressive Farmer (Eastern ed.), August 19, 19 22, p. 5; interview with T. Roy Helms, Marshville, North Carolina, August 29, 1977. The author was reared in Union County about seven miles from Marsh- ville. A vestige of boll weevil picking remained. I once was requesting money for candy when my uncle offered me the opportunity to earn the money by collecting boll weevils. After a brief visit to the cotton field, I lost interest in the candy. Rosengarten, All God's Dangers, p. 223. 358 premise that it was uneconomical. The Extension Service, especially J. A. Evans, believed the methods practicable on small owner-operated farms and wanted them included in the USDA movies to illustrate calcium arsenate poisoning methods. Coad could only pronounce himself "tired and weary of being confronted with this recommendation . . . . " A few farmers dabbled with panaceas that had been tried in points westward, such as crude oil, and discarded them. Reece Helms remembered that a few farmers in Union County, North Carolina, tied a kerosene-soaked rag on the end of a stick attached to the single tree to drag over the young cotton plants. The purveyor of nostriims and machines continued to ply his trade across the South. There were several varieties of weevil-catching devices for sale in Alabama in the 1910s. Georgia agricultural authorities believed that the farmers of their state had spent thousands of dollars on "useless devices and fake 108 nostrums." Franklin Sherman, entomologist in North Carolina, tried to counteract the influence of

B. R. Coad to Hunter, March 22, 1922, enclosure with Howard to J. A. Evans, April 7, 1922, D.C., Bureau of Entomology, General Correspondence, RG 33, NA. 107 J. A. Evans, Memorandum for Dr. True, February 8, 1917, Director's Office, General Correspondence, RG 33, NA. 108 R. P. Bledsoe, Methods of Boll Weevil Control, 359 advertisements in the North Carolina newspapers by pub~ Ixshed statements denouncing the items for sale. 109 W. W. Long, state director of the Extension Service in South Carolina, was the most energetic in countervailing the advertisements. He designed a poster warning against weevil-exterminating devices and secured the cooperation of the railroad officials and the Postmaster General in having the posters placed in the state's railroad depots and post offices. The most prevalent items for sale were liquid or viscous mixtures containing some calcium arsenate. The commercially prepared mixtures cost more than the ingredients any industrious farmer might purchase and prepare. But the mixtures met the standards established by state authorities for insecticides. Among the preparations for sale were Hill's Mixture, Weevilnip, Boll-We Go, and Wee-Vo or Wee-Vo-Food. That the Bureau of Ento- mology and state experiment stations felt the necessity to test the profitability of the mixtures attests to

Georgia Experiment Station Circular No. 78 (Experiment, February 1924), p. 8-a. 109 Franklin Sherman, "Cotton Farmers Beware!" Farmers' Market Bulletin, North Carolina Department of Agriculture (February 1923), p. 1. W. W. Long to the fTonorable Postmaster General April 28, 192 2; Hubert Work to Henry C. Wallace, May 6, 1922; J. A. Evans, Memorandum for Dr.. True, May 10, 1922; Henry Wallace to Hubert Work, May 16, 19 22, Insects—Boll Weevil, General Correspondence, RG 16, NA. John J. Brown to 0. B. Bishop, March 29, 192 3, 360 their popularity. Several showed a profit over cost, but did not compare favorably with the dust method of poisoning. Manufacturers invented numerous machines to apply these patented poisons. The Progressive Farmer termed some of the machines "absolutely comical." Georgia's state commissioner of agriculture, Eugene Talmadge, was not content to protest against the commercial mixtures. He ordered one liquid arsenate factory at Shady Dale closed, but the owners won the right in court to continue selling their product. Not everyone was satisfied with the progress made by federal and state authorities in solving the boll weevil problem. The American Cotton Association sponsored the National Campaign For Boll Weevil Control and held large conventions in Atlanta and New Or leans. "^"'"^ The association had men in the field, usually two or three in each state, demonstrating poisoning methods.

John Judson Brown Papers, Southern Historical Collection; Alabama Farm Facts, June 1, 1923, p. 13, 112 Progressive Farmer (Eastern ed.), June 3, 1922, p. 19. 113 Atlanta Journal, June 3, 19 30, Cotton Insects Research Station, Tallulah, Louisiana. 114 Miller R. Hutchison to Henry C. Taylor, February 2, 1923, File No. 97233; Alfred C. Newell to Henry C. Taylor, February 7, 1923, File No. 93817, General Correspondence, 1922-192 3, RG 83, NA; Harry D. Wilson to John J. Brown, August 2, 1923 and August 15, 1923, John Judson Brown Papers, Southern Historical Collection. Interview with George L. Smith, Tallulah, Louisiana, August 4, 1969. 361 Farmers and those involved in the cotton trade in the southeastern states were no longer content to be taught control methods developed in Louisiana. They wanted full« fledged research stations in the Southeast. Perhaps there was a secret to the control of the weevil in the East that required on-the-spot research. The Department of Agriculture gradually complied with the request. 116 The decreased infestation in the late 1920s to the 1940s mitigated the criticism. Also, the acreage restrictions during the New Deal resulted in one of the aspects the entomologists had been advising—more attention to a smaller acreage of cotton planted on the best land. Many farmers, especially on the northern fringe of the

The Tallulah station would send out men each summer to the southeastern cotton states to conduct some experiments, but mainly to give instructions on poisoning operations. The men returned to Tallulah for the winter. (Interview with G. L. Smith, Tallulah, Louisiana, August 4, 1969.) Elmer D. Ball, Director of Scientific Work for the department, made this notation on a letter which referred to the temporary headquarters as "stations": "These 'stations' are a joke. They are only headquarters for men to supervise cotton spraying. The name is unfortunate and has caused much trouble with state authorities." (Charles W. Pugley to Elmer D. Ball, November 25, 1921, Insects—Boll Weevil, General Cor- respondence, RG 16, NA.) The department eventually established permanent stations at several locations in the South. 362 cotton belt, went through the 1930s and 1940s without 117 even poisoning the cotton. The boll weevil remained a threat, as North Carolina farmers discovered in 1950. Per-acreage production dropped from 466 pounds in 1949 to 181 in 1950, before returning to 542 pounds in 1951."^"^^ There were not even supplies of calcium arsenate available in counties such as Union in 1950 because the farmers had become accustomed to surviving without it.

Interview with T. Roy Helms, Marshville, North Carolina, August 29, 1977. 118 Statistics on Cotton and Related Data, 1920- 1973, Statistical Bulletin No. 535, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, October 1974), p. 74. 119 Interview with T. Roy Helms, Marshville, North Carolina, August 29, 1977. CHAPTER XI

"MR. BILLY BOLL WEEVIL"

Mack Calvin, a professional basketball player, was traded to his eighth team in eight seasons in 1977. Calvin's laconic statement on the vagaries of employment in professional sports was, "I feel like a boll weevil, always looking for a home." The reference, of course, was to the often-recorded "Ballad of the Boll Weevil." The boll weevil has become one of the symbols associated with the South. The folksong probably accounts for the fact that most Americans at least recognize the term, though they may be ignorant of its part in southern agriculture. Succeeding generations of Americans of differing musical tastes have been treated to recordings of the song. Blues versions existed during the early days of the proliferation of phonographs in the United States. 2 "Tex" Ritter, one-time student at the University of Texas,

Sports Illustrated, March 14, 1977, p. 10. 2 Bill C. Malone, Country Music U.S,A. (Austin: Published for the American Folklore Society by the University of Texas Press, 1968), p. 159.

363 364 recorded a version for the country music fans, many of whom were already familiar with the t;ane. The Weavers introduced the song to the urban folk music movement, and Teresa Brewer had a popular version for the 1950s audience. The teenage rock and roll generation of the late 1950s could listen to Brook Benton's version from his native state of South Carolina. The ballad had an auspicious beginning in American folklore and became one of the subjects of discussion on the nature of American folklore. Texas blacks sang the 3 song as early as 1897. John A. Lomax, noted folklorist, proclaimed it one of the best examples of indigenous American folksong. To Lomax, the boll weevil song might not meet the standards prescribed by folklorists for European ballads, but it "caught the spirit of the old ballads.""^ The earliest versions were clearly of Negro origin. In some Texas versions the singer clearly identifies himself at the end of the ballad:

3 Gates Thomas, South Texas Negro Work-Songs; Col- lected and Uncollected, Publications of the Texas Folk- Lore Society, No. 5 (Austin: Texas Folk-Lore Society, 1926) , p. 175. 4 John A. Lomax, "Some Types of American Folk-Song," Journal of American Folk-Lore 27 (January-March 1915): 2. For a discussion which contends that the boll weevil song does not meet the definition of a ballad, see G. Malcolm Laws, Jr., Native American Balladry; A Descriptive Study and a Bibliographical Syllabus (Philadelphia, Pa.: American Folklore Society, 1964), p. 92. 365 If anybody axes you who wuz it writ dis song. Tell 'em it wuz a dark-skinned nigger Wid a pair of blue duckins on.^ Lomax saw a parallel between the sympathy and identification with Brer Rabbit in his attempts to escape Brer Fox and the boll weevil's resisting the white man's attempts to destroy him. Similarly, another folklorist detected a note of social protest in the idea that "the despised boll weevil, like the Negro, lived off cotton and was always 7 looking for a home." In addition to the social commentary, the boll weevil songs included references to the weevil's life history, control attempts, and economic effects. The information varied with the time and place, indicating that each community fashioned the song to fit its experience with the weevil. Two versions from Texas made the boll weevil an ally g of the sharpshooter, another Texas cotton pest. Most southeastern versions omitted the reference. Lomax's Texas variant mentioned the insecticide Paris green.

^Ibid., p. 15. ^Ibid. 7 Richard M. Dorson, American Folklore (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 182. o Thomas, South Texas Negro Work-Songs, p. 173; John A. and Alan Lomax, American Ballads and Folk Songs (New York: Macmillan Company, 1934), p. 115. The reference to the sharpshooter survived in a few southeastern versions. See Arthur Palmer Hudson, Folksongs of Mississippi and Their Background (Chapel Hill: university of North Carolina Press, 1936), p. 200. 366 which was in vogue in Texas and Louisiana but was later 9 largely neglected. Other Texas versions referred to a mixture of sugar and turpentine, one of the homemade concoctions used ineffectually for weevil control. Interestingly, most versions did not include any reference to insecticides, but one version collected in 1940, after the advent of calcium arsenate, mentioned "pizen." Defiance of the farmer's poison was only one mani- festation of the weevil's ability to survive practically all direct control methods. The pestiferous little bug survived the hot sand, ice, fire, the frying pan, and a balloon trip. Tales of the weevil's invincibility circulated independently of the folksong and in advance of the weevil. The unlettered folk of the South were not the only ones susceptible to such tales. A resident of Gunnison, Mississippi, queried Walter D. H\inter about tales circulating in the community that the weevil could

9 Lomax, American Ballads and Folk Songs, p. 114; Hudson, Folksongs of Mississippi and Their Background, p. 200; Glen Rounds, The Boll Weevil (San Carlos, Calif.; Golden Gate Junior Books, 1967), n.p. Dorothy Scarborough, On the Trail of Negro Folk- songs (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 19 25; rpt. ed., Hatboro, Pa.: Folklore Associates, Inc., 1963), p. 78; De Boll Weevil, Texas File, Folklore Collection, Work Projects Administration, Archive of Folk Song, Library of Congress. Henry M. Beiden and Arthur P. Hudson, The Frank C. Brown Collection of North Carolina Folklore, vol. 3: Folksongs from North Carolina (Durham, N.C.; Duke University Press, 1952), p. 245. 367 be frozen in a block of ice, survive, and fly away after thawing. 12 The president of the Pilot Cotton Mills in North Carolina reported that "people who are familiar with the weevil in Texas" informed him that the weevil could survive freezing in ice. 13 Concern about the future supply of cotton no doubt prompted the man to seek the advice of experts. The request came from an area that was not to be seriously affected by the weevil until ten years later. In tales the weevil's ability to survive heat was no less impressive. A South Carolina farmer reportedly placed a weevil on the eye of a stove and put a pan on the weevil. After the stove glowed red the farmer removed the pan, whereupon the "weevil flew out the window and set fire to the barn." 14 Tales of the weevil surviving a lighted match placed against its proboscis until the snout turned "red hot" still circulated in North Carolina in the 1950s. The rapid expansion of the weevil population inspired the phrase wherein the farmer would first see

12 K. V. Green to Hunter, January 1, 1909, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 13 Ibid., William H. Williams to James Wilson, December 22, 1909. 14 New York Times, March 2, 1924, section ii, p. 13, 368 the weevil on the square and then he would find him "everywhere" or observed "all his family there. ""^^ Likewise, the local songsters chronicled the weevil's movement eastward. First seen on the western plain, the weevil was next seen on a Memphis train. In Charley Patton's recorded Mississippi Bo Weevil Blues from the delta the weevil "left Texas" and was "going down to Mississippi, going to give Louisiana hell. ..." Later, ,the weevil was "leaving Louisianeer and go to Arkansas." A Florida version had the boll weevil looking "away over yonder in Georgia" the pondering "the cotton we got to eat. "18

The boll weevil was not alone in taking up a new residence. In several variants, the refrain "just looking for a home" pertained not to the weevil, but to the farmer. The farmer's wife concluded, "We' 11 have no horae,""^^ and

15 Carl Carmer, America Sings (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942), p. 171; Thomas, South Texas Negro Work-Songs, p. 174; Scarborough, On the Trail of Negro Folk-Songs, p. 78; James L. Allhands, Boll Weevil; Recollections of the Trinity & Brazos Railway (Houston: Anson Jones Press, 1946), pp. 9-10; Mister Boll Weevil, Folklore, Works Progress Administration, Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi. 16 Lomax, American Ballads and Folk Songs, p. 113; Hudson, Folksongs of Mississippi and Their Background, p. 119; Rounds, The Boll Weevil, n.p. 17 John Aloysius Fahey, "A Textual and Musicological Analysis of the Repertoire of Charley Patton" (M.A. thesis. University of California, Los Angeles, 1966), pp. 130-31. 18 Alton C. Morris, Folksongs of Florida (Gainesville: university of Florida Press, 1950), p. 190. 19Scarborough, On the Trail of Negro Folk-Sohgs, p. 79. 369 another balladeer lamented, "Ain't got no home."^° In a few cases, the farmer revealed the location of his new home. Just as some Texas farmers moved westward in advance of the boll weevil infestation, the farmer in the song said, "Come on, old woman, and we will travel 21 West. "^-^

The weevil's impact on the farmer's livelihood was manifested in several ways. Most often, the farmer would have no money to buy gasoline for his Ford. But the prosperous farmer would have to suffer with his less affluent neighbors. The boll weevil told the farmer, "When I get through with your cotton. You'll sell your 23 Cadillac eight." Typically, the farmer's wife had only one old cotton dress—and it was full of holes.^^ There was a recognition that some farmers gave up planting cotton, if only briefly. "Just bundle up yo '

20 Benjamin A. Botkin, The American People in Their Stories, Legends, Tall Tales,"Traditions, Ballads and Songs (London: Pilot Press Ltd., 1946), p. 340. 21 Hudson, Folksongs of Mississippi and Their Back- ground , p. 200. A similar phrase is in Rounds, The Boll Weevil, n.p. 22 Morris, Folksongs of Florida, p. 190; Rounds, The Boll Weevil, n.p. 23 Jerry Silverman, Folk Blues (New York: Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 15; see also Morris, Folksongs of Florida, p. 189. 24 . Mister Boll Weevil, Folklore, Works Progress Administration, Mississippi Department of Archives and History; Lomax, American Ballads and Folk Songs, p. 116. 370 cotton sack and th'ow away yo' plow," was the admonition 25 m one Texas version. The terse summation of the weevil's impact on the farmer was found in another Texas version where the singer introduced the subject as the insect "whut caused me to lose mah home." When the income of the farmers in a predominantly agricultinral community faltered, the local economy suffered. The doctor was advised to bottle up all his pills 27 or to throw them away. The boll weevil advised the preacher, "Better shet your church house door; when I get thru with the farmer/He can't pay the preacher no more."^^ The relationship between the merchant and farmers and the denial of credit was evident in more versions. Usually the merchant refused to advance credit because the farmer had boll weevils in his fields.^^ The banker refused to loan money because the boll weevil "might eat

25 Thomas, South Texas Negro Work-Songs, p. 175. 26 Scarborough, On the Trail of Negro Folk-Songs, p. 78; De Boll Weevil, Texas File, Folklore Collection, Works Project Administration, Archive of Folk Songs, Library of Congress. 27 Rounds, The Boll Weevil, n.p.; Morris, Folksongs of Florida, p. 189; Beiden and Hudson, Folksongs from North Carolina, p. 246. 28 Beiden and Hudson, Folksongs from North Carolina, p. 246. 29 Morris, Folksongs of Florida, p. 190; Rounds, The Boll Weevil, n.p. 371 that too." In one variant the merchant had a mortgage on the farmer's mules and told the farmer to be "taking them out," and bring Beck and Kate to the merchant."^"^ Seldom was there any sympathy for the merchant. One verse collected in Houston, Texas, was unique: Said the merchant to the famtier,. We're in an awful fixl If things go on in this way, , You'll have me in the sticks. Without a home, without a home! More often, the antagonism between the merchant and the farmer was revealed through this oral tradition. Not only did the merchant refuse a furnish in an Alabama version, but added, "Go way from here, you dirty fajnner/ You got boll weevils in your fields." ^ The defiant farmer who had made only one bale of cotton vowed not to turn it over to the merchant. He would fight and go to jail

Rounds, The Boll Weevil, n.p. Hudson, Folksongs of Mississippi and Their Back- ground, p. 200. ~~ 32 A common term for a rural area. The author recalls hearing his great grandmother use it frequently with the implication that the "sticks" were far superior to towns. Interestingly, the phrase is used with different meanings in the ballads. In one version the boll weevil left the farmer only "sticks," cotton plants stripped of bolls and squares (Lomax, American Ballads and Folk Songs, p. 115). Gates Thomas explained that in one Texas version, "sticks" referred specifically to the "postoaks" as distinguished from the mesquite flats or the bottom lands of the river valleys (Thomas, South Texas Negro Work-Songs, p. 174). 33 Scarborough, On the Trail of Negro Folk-Songs, p. 79 34 Newman I. White, American Negro Folk-Songs (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1928), p. 352. 372 first. Another Alabama fanner threatened to abandon his crop before it opened and was picked^ The merchant already had a financial stake in the crop but did not want to advance additional supplies because the weevils had appeared. The farmer wanted meat and meal: "If you don't let me have it,/ Down the road I'm gone.""^^ Apparently the boll weevil never inspired a plethora of superstitions and folktales. One saying collected by Paul Green, the North Carolina playwright, held that "hot weather kills boll weevils; wet weather fattens 37 them." But the effect of the climate on the weevil population was a fact known to practically all farmers. More in the vein of a superstition was the notion that a cotton picker of tender years would have a short and tragic life if he found a weevil feeding on a cotton boll. 38 Variations on the theme of the irascible old boll weevil demanding greater effort from his family existed in Mississippi. The farmer who had just laid by his cotton

35 Lomax, American Ballds and Folk Songs, p. 115; Botkin, The American People, p. 340; Thomas, South Texas Negro Work-Songs, p. 175. " 36 White, American Negro Folk-Songs, p. 352. 37 Wayland D. Hand, The Frank C. Brown Collection of North Carolina Folklore, vol. 7: Popular Beliefs "and Superstitions from North Carolina (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1964), p. 549. 38 Mary Daggett Lake, "Superstitions About Cotton," Southwestern Lore, in J. Frank Dobie, Pv±>lications of the Texas Folk-Lore Society, No. 9 (Dallas: Southwest Press, published for the Texas Folk-Lore Society, 1931), p. 149. 373 crop heard a racket in his back yard. "A big boll weevil had a little one across the wood block and was giving it a beating with an ax handle because it couldn't strip more than one row of cotton at a time." 39 In another tale the remonstrations occurred in the cotton patch: "Right there, in front of his eyes, was old Mister Boll Weevil. He was whipping the stuffing out of his wife and young'uns because they couldn't take two rows at a time." Contravening scientific knowledge was the popular belief that the boll weevil was merely one form of an insect previously known in the South. A Mr. W. Williams of Benchley, Texas, maintained that the acorn weevil, "candle-fly," and boll weevil were all different stages of the same insect and that the insect had always been in 41 Texas. Ernest Pillman of Sweet Home, Texas, believed that the boll weevil transformed to the coffee weevil in 42 December. Edward Lawrence of Hail, Texas, thought the boll worm was the larval stage of the boll weevil.'*"^

39 Frank E. Smith, The Yazoo River (New York: Rinehart Company, 1954), p. 233. 40 Raymond Cole, "Bale to the Acre," p. 13, Folklore, Works Progress Administration, Mississippi Department of Archives and History. 41 Hunter to Howard, June 18, 1904, General Cor- respondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 42 Ibid., Ernest Pillman to Howard, March 25, 1905. 43 Ibid., Edward Lawrence to J. H. Connell, January 18, 1904. 374 Wilmon Newell found similar beliefs coiiunon in Louisiana. The "popular fallacy" Newell heard was that there was only one species of weevil. The eggs produced the boll weevil, acorn, and pecan weevil depending on which plant hosted the insect. 44 The entomologists attempted to determine whether the boll weevil fed on plants other than cotton. Were there other host plants, perhaps the fact could be utilized in control measures. The scientific corps found none. Many of the boll weevil ballads depicted the weevil warning the farmer that after the cotton the corn would be destroyed. 45 Probably the verse was included to illustrate the destructive capacity of the weevil rather than because of any belief that the boll weevil would become a pest of corn. The entomologists also had to contend with the notion that the boll weevil infested a territory for a few years and departed. Sea island cotton farmers in Florida heard dire predictions about the future of their crop. Many chose to believe that the weevil would not attack their long-stapled crop. 4fi

44 Wilmon Newell, The Boll Weevil; Information Con- cerning its Life History and Habits, State Crop Pest Com- mission of Louisiana Circular No. 9 (Baton Rouge, 1906), p. 7, 45 Carl Carmer, America Sings, p. 171; White, American Negro Folk-Songs, p. 353; Lomax, American Ballads and Folk Songs, pp. 115-16. " 46 J. R. Watson, "The Boll Weevil in Sea Island Cotton," Press Bulletin No. 286, University of Florida 375 Confusion about the nature of the boll weevil abounded in areas not yet infested. Many fainners in Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Mississippi intermingled the terms boll worm and boll weevil without realizing there 47 was a difference. Etymology proved a further source of confusion. Separate tales about the Mexican and the Texas cotton boll weevil left many Mississippi farroers with the conviction that there were two species. Newspaper reporters in Washington heard congressional discussions on the novel pest and mistakenly dubbed it 49 the "cotton-ball" weevil. A North Carolina farmer in 1909 sent insects from his cotton field to the U.S. Department of Agriculture and inquired whether the specimens were the "Weaver of Texas." The Columbia State of South Carolina, years and miles removed from the pest, jocularly opined that the "boll weevils of Mississippi

Agricultural Experiment Station, December 10, 1917. 47 Hunter to Howard, October 5, 1903, General Cor- respondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA; R. W. Hamed, Boll Weevil in Mississippi, 1909, Mississippi Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin No. 139 (Agricultural College, March 1910) p. 41. 48 Harned, Boll Weevil in Mississippi, 1909, p. 8. 49 Houston Post, December 18, 1901, Scrapbook of Newspaper Clippings, Albert Sidney Burleson Papers, Library of Congress. C. M. Hall to U.S. Department of Agriculture, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 376 are said to be much superior to the boll weevils of Texas. "^-^ The southerner had to accommodate the boll weevil to his religion. That all living things were God's handiwork was a tenet of the fundamentalist sects of the South. The layman need not be concerned in any religious sense with most insect life around him. But what was one to make of an insect that appeared and threatened his livelihood? Some farmers, not surprisingly, compared the weevil to the biblical story about plagues on Egypt. It was not man's place to question the decisions of an omniscient God or even to understand. But some people thought they knew the reason. A man from Gunter, Texas, believed the weevils were "sent by divine power to show 52 man that he can't control all things." The Natchez Record editorialized that the fanners were "growing fatter and oilier every year and . . . the Lord put the boll weevil, and other so-called pests into the world with a comparatively accurate idea of what he [sic] was doing. "^"^ What the Lord hath wrought only He could rend asunder. In many rural churches prayer had been the response

Columbia [South Carolina] State, February 4, 1910, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 52 A. L. L. Denison to the editor, Texas Farmer, March 5, 1904, p. 3. 53 Natchez Record, November 7, 1908, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 377 to drought. Prayer became a weapon against the weevil. The phenomenon occurred in numerous localities in Texas and there were those who favored a statewide period of fasting and prayer. One of the applicants for Texas' reward recounted a revelation from God that a period of fasting and prayer would suffice to remove the weevil. W. D. Hunter read about the offering of prayers from numerous Texas communities, but saw little "sentiment which will be likely to result in a period of fasting and prayer." 54 But the idea that a period of prayer inveighed against the boll weevil would be efficacious continued. Evangelist Billy Sunday told a group of five hundred assembled at Jackson, Tennessee, that "if the South would get down on its knees the boll weevil could be routed from the cotton fields by prayer." 55 At least one southern state governor acceded to a request for a day of fasting and prayer. Governor Thomas McLeod responded to a petition from the Salem Church of Black River, South Carolina, and proclaimed June 10, 1923, a day of fasting and prayer. The governor declared the boll weevil "a judgement on our people, not only for their sins, but as

54 Hunter to F. H. Chittenden, SepteitÜDer 8, 19 03, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 55 Sterling Tracy, "Boll Weevil Could Be Conquered by Prayer," unidentified newspaper clipping, Cotton Insects Research Station, Tallulah, Louisiana. 378 a means of bringing them to Him." The governor left the means of retribution to the Lord; either "direct supernatural intervention" or the "working of natural 57 causes" would be acceptable. The latter category included guidance of the people to discover a better means of control. The mere idea of controlling the weevil conflicted with the religious beliefs of many. A Limestone County, Texas, man told one of Seaman A. Knapp's demonstration agents that the Lord sent the weevil as a punishment for the people's sins. To attempt to control it would be palpably wrong. At that, the demonstration agent

CO changed the sxibject to seed improvement. The aversion to controlling the weevil probably never existed among the majority of farmers, but it persisted and increased with the introduction of an effective insecticide—calcium arsenate. The thought of direct poisoning rankled more than the adoption of early maturing seed, early planting, or any of the other cultural methods. Arthur Raper noted a religious reluctance to poison among a "few farmers, particularly some of the smaller ones," 59 in Greene County, Georgia. Thomas Woofter found the idea

New York Times, June 8, 1923, p. 21. Ibid. 58 W. M. Bamberge to Hunter, March 27, 19 04, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 59 Raper, Tenants of the Almighty, p. 163. 379 still "prevalent" on St, Helena Island in the 1920s.^° One Georgia farmer who objected to poisoning the weevil was Henry Simon. As tender on part of Commissioner of Agriculture John J. Brown's farm, Simon felt that he could not buy calcium arsenate to destroy an insect that God "put in the world . . . just like [sic] we come [sic] 61 in the world." Realizing that ridicule would be to no avail. Brown appealed to Simon's religious instincts: "God loves a smart and industrious people, and it may be he [sic] has sent all these pests and grasses just to 6 p make us work."

A relative of the author remembered the opposition to poisoning among a few farmers in Union County, North Carolina, when the boll weevil arrived. He wryly observed that the weevil left two courses open to them. Two or three destructive years brought an adoption of poisoning or an abandonment of cotton. Those charged with fostering control measures who attempted to contradict the religious objections por- trayed the weevil as an instr\iment of the devil. W. D.

Woofter. Black Yeomanry, p. 142, Henry Simon to John J. Brown, June 27, 1922, John Judson Brown Papers, Southern Historical Collection. 62 Ibid., John J. Brown to Henry Simon, June 27, 19 22 6 3 Interview with T. Roy Helms, Marshville, North Carolina, August 29, 19 77. 380 Hunter reportedly delivered an address to a black congre- gation in Texas on "Anthonomous grandis, the evil spirit that dwelleth amongst us." A. F. Woods, director of scientific work for the Department of Agriculture in the 19 20s, thought the advocates of control should find some way of "convincing superstitious farmers that the devil, not God, is responsible for boll weevils." Whereas farmers saw the weevil as a visitation from the Lord, journalists and pviblic speakers saw an invader and compared his movement to that of an army. When Seaman A. Knapp embarked on the demonstration work, he envisioned the "shadow of the weevil . . . with its hind feet bathed in the beautiful Gulf of Mexico, and its fore paws resting on Oklahoma." But having observed the situation. Knapp concluded that victory was near. Southern farmers could "gather up the spoils."^^ The St. Louis Dispatch wondered if the Mississippi River would prove the "bulwark of defense against the hitherto triiimphant legions of the boll weevil," just as the English Channel stayed Napoleon's army.^^

64 Loftin, "Living with the Boll Weevil for Fifty Years," p. 273. Ethel Moody to A. F. Woods, September 18, 19 27, Insects—Boll Weevil, RG 16, NA. Texas Farmer, February 20, 1904, p. 1. Ibid. 68„ St. Louis Dispatch, October 21, 1906, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 381 Given the anthropomorphism exhibited in songs and editorials, it is not surprising that southerners had several hxoman appellations for the boll weevil. "Billie Boll Weevil" was a term sometimes used in the Southeast. A newspaper editor described the statue at Enterprise, Alabama, as having been dedicated to "Billy Boll Weevil." One Georgia farmer referred to it as "Mr, Billy Boll 71 Weevil." Citations to Mr. Weevil or Mr, Boll Weevil were not uncommon. Even F. C. Pratt, one of W. D. Hunter's educated staffers, felt an affinity with the little insect that he was supposed to learn to destroy. He wrote from Sabinal, Texas, that "poor Mr. Boll-weevil will have a poor show in thxs prairie country." 72 Pratt observed 70 one weevil "taking a sun bath." A local resident with a boll weevil panacea was a "B. W. crank." A Georgia man noted for his lectures on weevil control was known as

69 Year Book and Sixteenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture, Commerce, and Industries of the State of South Carolina, 1919 (Columbia, 1920), p. 323. John C. O'Connell, "S\±>jects of Current Interest," Alabama Fainn Facts, December 20, 1919, p. 3. 71 Letter to the editor from C. S. B., Graymount, Georgia, Southern Cultivator, March 1, 1917, p. 20. 72 F. C. Pratt to W. Dwight Pierce, December 20, 1909, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 73 Ibid., F. C. Pratt to Hunter, December 21, 1906. 74 Ibid., December 27, 1909. 382 75 "Mr. Bollweevil Burley," just as Senator "Cotton Ed" Smith had once been "Boll Weevil" Smith for his advocacy 1 of the cotton-abandonment plantV , The boll weevil did not escape the southerner's penchant for political hyperbole. Diehard supporters of William Jennings Bryan were "boll weevil democrats" because they were so numerous. 76 Another newspaper reported that southerners used the same term for backers of William Randolph Hearst because boll weevils were the "meanest thing known in that section." 77 Politicians added boll weevil to their vocabulary of slanderous monikers for opponents. A state official in Mississippi was called the "greatest boll weevil" that state ever spawned. One irate Texas farmer and supporter of the Farmers' Union took issue with a newspaper editor who criticized that farmers' organization. To him, the weevil and the editor were much the same. The editor "produces nothing and gets his living off the farmer like the boll weevil." 79

75 Southern Cultivator, June 15, 1917, p. 2. "^Sirmingham Herald, July 30, 1906, SFCII, RG, NA. 77 Ibid., Boston Transcript, quoted in Des Moines Capitol, July 24, 19.06. 78 Leland 0. Howard, "Striking Entomological Events of the Last Decade of the Nineteenth Century," Scientific Monthly 31 (July 1930): 17. 79 Texas Farmer, February 18, 1905, p. 16. 383 The Ft. Worth Record suggested that the Department of Agriculture induce the editor of the Texas Farmer, "Farmer Bill" Shaw, "to try his venom on the boll weevil."^° Shaw replied that the editor of the Record had been both a greenbacker and a Republican. "As an evil the boll evil is not in it with the Record [sic]."^"^ Yet the most exaggerated use of the boll weevil in politics came from the Newman Independent in Illinois. There was a simple explanation of the Department of Agriculture's inability to solve the weevil problem during a Republican administration. "It is the old story of Republican oppression of the South."^^

People with a taste for the humorous named objects and organizations for the boll weevil. Edward M. House, who later served President Woodrow Wilson, initiated the construction of a railroad between Mexia and Cleburne, Texas. One of the construction company employees jocularly dubbed the new line The Boll Weevil. The railroad operated under that name for several years. The "Boll Weevil Minstrels" were performing their "Boll Weevil Overture"

^°Ibid., June 25, 1904, p. 5. Ibid. 82 Newman [Illinois] Independent, September 2, 1904, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 83 Allhands, The Boll Weevil, pp. 9-10. 384 84 m 1904. The orchestra leader at Shreveport, Louisiana, a Professor McCann, welcomed delegates to the 1904 boll weevil convention to the city with a recent composition, g c "The Boll Weevil Retreat." Some citizens of Baton Rouge organized a burial association, the Boll Weevil Benevolent Society, in 1909. The officers had titles appropriate to the name of the society, such as Past 86 Grand Worthy Boll Weevil. W. W. Yothers conducted experiments at Calvert, Texas, involving the use of large field hibernation cages. One day as Yothers was returning from the field a Negro asked for a ride and inquired, "Say Boss, are you captain of that there Boll weevil 87 penitentiary?" Thereafter, Yothers sometimes signed his letters "In Charge of Boll Weevil penitentiary," as a play on Hunter's title "In Charge of Cotton Boll Weevil Investigations." 88 The arrival of the weevil served as a benchmark, just as a war or local natural disaster might. In Greene County, Georgia, the decrepit mule was a before-the-weevil

84 Monroe [Louisiana] Star, January 22, 1909, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 8 S Proceedings of the Second Annual Meeting, Louisiana Boll VJeevil Convention, 1904, p. 131. 86 Baton Rouge Times, March 16, 1909, SFCII, RG 7, NA 87 W. W. Yothers to Hunter, March 11, 1907, General Correspondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 8 8 Ibid., W. W. Yothers to Warren E. Hinds, March 8, 1907. 385 mule and the frayed quilt a before-the-weevil quilt. The term indicated not only the date of origin and unsightly condition, but also the economic conditions associated with the weevil that prevented replacement. In a similar vein, cheap cigars were known as boll weevils during the early days of infestation in Texas. The migration of farmers and the shift to other livelihoods, resulting from the weevil, occasioned other uses of boll weevil to distinguish people or devices. In the slang of the oil field, "roughnecks" were q 1 experienced workers and "boll weevils" novices. Typically, the "boll weevil" was a recent refugee from the farm. What better moniker for him was there than the reason for his leaving? The oil field sages had other innovations. Carelessness by an inexperienced "boll weevil," particularly if it resulted in injury, was

89„ Raper, Tenants of the Almighty, p. 165.. 90 Howard, "Striking Entomological Events of the Last Decade of the Nineteenth Century," p. 17. 91 Mody C. Boatright and William A. Owens, Tales from the Derrick Floor; A People's History of the Oil Industry (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1977), pp. 154-56; A. R. McTee, "Oil Field Diction," in J. Frank Dobie, Happy Hunting Ground, Publications of the Texas Folklore Society, No. 4 (Austin: Texas Folklore Society, 1925; rpt. ed., Hatboro, Pa.: Folklore Associates, Inc., 1964), p. 64; John Lee Brooks, "Paul Bunyan: Oil Man," in J. Frank Dobie, Follow de Drinkin' Gou'd, Publications of the Texas Folklore Society, No. 7 (Austin: Texas Folklore Society, 1928; rpt. ed,, Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1965), p. 46. 386 a "boll weevil stunt." 92 A simple, but essential, device in oil drilling was a "boll weevil." 93 Anyone should have had the foresight to invent it. Anyone could operate and maintain the device. Years later and miles distant from the Texas oil fields, experienced coal miners in the Birmingham, Alabama, region used boll weevil to identify recent arrivals to the mines. The industrial activity of World War I prompted coal operators in Kentucky, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Virginia to recruit the experienced Birmingham miners. "Boll Weevil" Negroes from the pest-ravaged black belt replaced the departed workers in the Birmingham mines. 94 There was in the South a fascination with the boll weevil. In any agricultural area, the weather always dominated conversation. In the South the weevil ranked second and sometimes first in the conversation of farmers. Farmers were so preoccupied with the weevil that purveyors of entertainment activities offered their goods as a distraction from the hard reality of growing cotton with the pest rampant in the cotton field. Theater owners posted signs advising farmers to "forget the boll weevil

92 Boatright and Owens, Tales from the Derrick Floor, pp. 155-5 6. 93 Ibid., p. 155. 94 Negro Migration in 1916-1917, p. 63. 387 and come to [the current] show." 95 Pamphleteers and journalists filled the popular literature of the region with information about the bug. When T. E. Grafton of Rome, Georgia, published a tract promoting the development of the electric generating capacity of the Coosa River, he subtited it Some observations in which the Boll Weevil IS not discussed. 96 Travelers moving eastward across the South carried specimens of the boll weevil and displayed the bugs in small towns. The owner of a guano distributing business in Dothan, Alabama, feared that the practice might lead to an earlier infestation of his region than necessary. He wrote to Commissioner of Agriculture Reiiben F. Kolb, "It is getting to be not uncommon to see travellers and others with live boll-weevil specimens in this territory." The gentleman wanted to know whether there were any laws that could be enforced against the curiosity peddlers. 97 Outside the South, people learned of the weevil through the songs, newspapers, and gimmicks in which the weevil was the central character. The 1904 World's Fair at San Francisco staged a daily microscopic battle between

95 Howard, "Striking Entomological Events of the Last Decade of the Nineteenth Century," p. 17. 9 6 T. E. Grafton. Asleep at the Switch, Insects— Boll Weevil, General Correspondence, RG 16, NA. 97 E. R. Malone to Reuben F. Kolb, September 24, 1913, Papers of the Commissioner of Agriculture and Industries, Alabama Department of Archives and History. 388 a boll weevil and the recently imported Guatemalan ant. 98 A New York university scientist tested a sound microscope in 19 35 at ten billion times the normal sound level. The sound that reverberated throughout the university building was naturally a boll weevil munching a cotton square. 99 The treatment of disasters in a humorous fashion, be they weather-induced or human tragedy, was by no means uncommon in folklore. The boll weevil was not the only pest to receive such treatment. The mouse and the house fly have received their share, but as a strictly agricultural pest, the weevil was unique. Unlike the locust, the weevil restricted his activity to the field and did not become meddlesome to those about him. Perhaps that accounted, in part, for the special place the boll weevil gained in American folklore.

^^San Francisco Bulletin, July 17, 1904, SFCII, RG 7, NA. 99 Montgomery Advertiser, January 13, 19 35, p. 1. CHAPTER XII

A BLESSING IN DISGUISE?

Like journalists in many other southern communities, the editor of the Waterboro Press and Standard in Colleton County, South Carolina, approved the activities of his region's businessmen and farmers in combatting the boll weevil. The Colleton Products Association in 1919 devised plans for a grain elevator, three potato storage houses, and other marketing facilities for farm produce. Editor W. W. Smoak believed the boll weevil was not merely a catalyst but that there was little recourse left to the farmer. "Even rats will desert a sinking ship," he noted. Those like Smoak who thought the weevil's influence ultimately bénéficient, termed it a "blessing in disguise." Farmers contending with the weevil more often thought the blessing was indeed well disguised. The test of the blessing would be whether the weevil brought that transformation of southern agriculture long advocated by agriculturalists and other proclaimants of the New South.— diversification.

Year Book and Sixteenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture, Commerce and Industries" of the State of South Carolina, 1919 (Columbia, 1920), p. 334

389 390 One must dispense with the notion of the monolithic South before attempting to assess the degree and resiliency of changes brought by the weevil. Local weather, soil type, and physiography were major factors in the degree of devastation and the options available for other crops. Equally important in the effect of the weevil and diversification were the extant labor system, credit system, land holding patterns, and flexibility of the local leadership in responding to a crisis. Within the South, where cotton was the cash crop of most farmers, there were recognized areas of high pro- ductivity. After the boll weevil spread across the South, some of the centers of production remained. Others were eclipsed by newer areas. As the weevil migrated toward the Atlantic seaboard, the states to the east of the infestation line reaped the benefit from reduced cotton production in the south-central states. The long-tended lands of the Carolinas and Georgia garnered greater profits for the farmers than the less depleted soils of the infested territory. The semi-arid portions of Texas and Oklahoma came to the fore as major cotton producing areas. There the weevil was less destructive and less labor was required to produce the crop. After the weevil had totally infested the South, the permanent adjustments became obvious. The developments were not at all encouraging to the older cotton states of the Southeast. 391 The fertilizer requirement already put the southeastern farmers at a disadvantage relative to the farmers on newer land westward. Under conditions caused by the boll weevil, the necessity of fertilizer to hasten the crop to maturity became even more imperative. So essential was fertilizer to continued cotton growing in the Southeast that there was little wonder that Jeeter in Tobacco Road thought it should be part of God's bounty: "He put the land here, and the sun and rain. He ought 2 to furnish the seed and the guano, somehow or other." By 19 30, South Carolina farmers purchased a ton of fertilizer for ever 2.2 bales of cotton, and Arkansas farmers needed a ton for ten bales, Texas and Oklahoma farmers required only a ton for every 32 and 143 bales, 3 respectively. The introduction of calcium arsenate placed an even greater reliance on fertilizer and enhanced the advantage of the more fertile areas. The entomologists estimated that the prospective output of an acre, with or without fertilizer, must be one-half bale before the cost of purchasing and distribution was remunerative.

2 Caldwell, Tobacco Road, p. 2 30. 3 Arthur F. Raper and Ira De A. Reid, Sharecroppers All (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941) , p. 29. 4 Henry C. Wallace to William J. Harris, December 12, 19 22, Insects—Boll Weevil, General Correspondence, RG 16, NA. » 392 The cost of treating an acre was generally the same everywhere, but the rewards from expenditures were far greater on fertile lands. Thus, the introduction of an effective insecticide placed an additional premium on fertile lands. The center of cotton production would no doxibt have shifted westward regardless, but the weevil accelerated the process. From 1910 to 19 30, Texas and Oklahoma doubled their combined cotton acreage. There was a combined 40 percent increase in acreage in Mississippi, Arkansas, and Louisiana. The acreage in Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina increased only 5 percent. While fertile soils and less weevil damage due to a drier climate were advantages of the West, the lower winter temperatures of the cotton belt's northern fringe helped keep down the weevil population. The Tennessee Valley in northern Alabama ranked ninth out of ten farming areas in per-acre production in that state in 1904-14. The valley ranked third during 1914-24. Just above the valley in per-acre cotton production was the Sand Mountain area that came to the fore as a cotton producing area after the weevil's arrival.^ When one

Thomas J. Woofter, Jr., Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation, Research Monograph 5, Division of Socxal Research, U.S. Works Progress Administration (Washington, 1936), p. xxiii. Agriculture of Alabama, Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries (Montgomery, 19 30), p. 64. 393 divides the state into halves the shift is even more obvious. The fifty counties in central and southern Alabama produced an average 1,078,000 bales during 1905-14, but only 415,000 bales in 1939-48—a decrease of over 61 percent. For the remaining seventeen northern counties the increase during the same period was 84 percent—from 222,000 to 498,000 bales.^ The intrastate shift in cotton production in Mississippi surpassed Alabama's. The twenty-seven delta and adjoining coimties of northwestern Mississippi doubled average production from 1905-09 to 1943-47, from 585,000 to 1,156,000 bales. The state's remaining production decreased one-half, from 718,000 to 350,000 bales for the same period. Where possible, some shifting of cotton fields took place on the individual farm or within a community. Farmers along river valleys concentrated their cotton acreage on the "front lands," the fertile alluvial soils fronting the river or streams. Well-drained fields were utilized more than poorly drained ones that hindered early maturity. Thomas Woofter observed farmers on St. Helena

7 H. P. Todd, "Shifts in Cotton Production Among and Within States, and Some Related Factors, 1800-1940," in W. B. Andrews, ed.. Cotton Production, Marketing and Utilization (State College, Mississippi: By the Editor, 1950), p. 9. ^Ibid., p. 12. 9 John H. Moore to the author, April 26, 1977; 394 Island making this shift, and substituting short staple for sea island cotton. ° The agriculturalists of the South had long preached small cotton plantings on the best lands with more attention to its cultivation. The boll weevil and the acreage restrictions of the New Deal farm programs hastened these adjustments on the individual farm.

Land values pliimmeted as the weevil took the South. Although many areas did not soon return to pre-weevil levels of production, land values were more rapidly restored. One authority estimated that five years was "a minimxjm time for country real estate to get back to pre-weevil levels. "•'•^ Regardless of the time limit, the cyclical movement of land prices with the spread of weevil infestation was recognized by practically everyone who made observations on the subject.'^''^ * The weevil struck hardest those areas characterized by a high degree of tenancy and absentee ownership.

Hunter to T. C. Barber, October 1, 1915, General Cor- respondence, SFCII, RG 7, NA. Woofter. Black Yeomanry, pp. 140-41. John L. Fullmer, Agricultural Progress in the Cotton Belt Since 19 20 (Chapel Hill: university of North Carolina Press, 1950), pp. 3-4. 12^ ^ r, E. C. Branson to A. W. McAlister, January 24, 1922, E. C. Branson Papers, Southern Historical Collection, university of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. 13 Southern Cultivator, February 1, 1917, p. 6; 395 The least damage occurred on small farms where the South came closest to emulating the ideal of the yeoman farmer who produced much of his food and feed needs. The incidence of black migration was greatest among tenants. The black owner of a small farm, like the white owner, tended to reduce acreage and attempt to hold on. The credit restrictions practically compelled black tenants to migrate. Enlightened planters tried to accommodate the production of food and provender into the plantation system, but most chose to survive or fail with the exclusive cash crop system.

The plantation system faltered most frequently in the old southeastern piedmont sections, especially in Georgia. There the boll weevil was one factor, in many cases the decisive one, in the undoing of what Arthur Raper termed "propped-up plantations.""*"^ The cumulative effects of soil erosion, competition with other Americans, and expanding foreign production increasingly reduced the prospect of the small farmer's son entering farming as a tenant and emerging as a land owner. Farm owners were lapsing into tenancy. Of 211 tenants interviewed in Gwinnett County, Georgia, in 1925,

Fred Taylor, Memorandum for Mr. C. W. Thompson, October 16, 1916, File No. 1189, Numerical General Correspondence, 1912-1922, RG 83, NA. 14 Raper and Reid, Sharecroppers All, pp. 29-46. 396 40 had once been landowners. The boll weevil reduced the likelihood of having the one "big crop" that would garner the down payment towards ownership of a moderate- sized farm. More and more southern farmers reached the same state of despair as Jeeter, who "could not understand why he had nothing, and would never have anything. . . ."^^ Nothing better illustrated the sad state of expectations for the South's young farmers than the Department of Agriculture's proposals for southern agriculture. Bradford Knapp succeeded his father as director of the cooperative demonstration work in 1911. He continued the advocacy of producing as many of the necessities of life as possible and the hope of a moderate income from reduced cotton acreage. Knapp ceased using the often misunderstood term "diversified farming" and substituted "safe farming." In 1915, Knapp traveled to New Orleans and won the approval of the Conference of Cotton States Bankers for his program of "safe farming." Thereafter Knapp published an annual safe farming bulletin."'"^

Turner and Howell, Condition of Farmers in a White-Farmer Area of the Cotton Piedmont, 1924-192 4, p. 46. Caldwell, Tobacco Road, p. 229. Bradford Knapp, Memorandum for Dr, A. C. True, December 20, 1915, Director's Office, General Correspondence, RG 33, NA. 18 Ibid., Bradford Knapp to Andrew M. Soule, December 11, 1915, Georgia; Alabama Farm Facts, February 7, 1920, p. 10. 397 Under Knapp's plan, the farmer, through hard work, would have a small income and retain ownership of his land. The enterprising young Irishman in W. J. Cash's Mind of the South who, with limited finances, carved a plantation out of the Carolina up-country, would have been appalled at the limited vision Knapp held up to the southern 19 yeomanry. Both were probably right for their time. The backwoodsman-turned-planter saw opportiinity when it existed; Knapp saw that it no longer existed. There remained the prospect for wealth in lumbering, extractive industries, and non-agricultural pursuits. A few favored localities still held the promise of wealth from cotton. But for the mass of southern farmers "safe farming" was the only way to remain in agricultural as both a tiller of the soil and the owner of it. Those who did not heed the advice of safe farming often joined their black countrymen in northern industrial centers. The plantation owners were not entirely exempt from the realities thrust upon southern agriculture. The scion of a plantation owner who retained the impec- cable social graces of his class while lamenting the loss of the old homeplace was not uncommon.. The boll weevil's arrival prompted a discussion about its effect on the efficiency of southern farmers.

19 Wilbur J. Cash, The Mind of the South (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941), pp. 14-17. 398 particularly Negro farmers. A common assertion held that cotton was too easy to raise. The unskilled and improvident could grow a crop as well as the attentive, industrious farmer. The boll weevil would change all this. Those who did not adopt the methods of cultivation requiring more intensive labor methods would suffer crop failure upon crop failure until they were out of agriculture. The seers took it as an article of faith that the white man would prove able to adjust; but what about blacks? One axiom of the day held that Negroes were capable of growing only one crop—cotton. They would be unable to participate in the shift to "diversified" agriculture. No longer could they grow cotton because of the complexities of production under the boll weevil's reign. For those who wanted to see the South an all-white agricultural area in the mode of the Midwest and East, the boll weevil became the linchpin in the theory and the hope.

Assuredly, the pest occasioned greater effort and thought to growing the crop. But the results did not bear out the advocates of a homogeneous South. That more blacks migrated from the South than whites is attributed less to any disparate ability to adjust than to the preponderance of blacks in the tenant system. The acreage reduction and credit contractions were often compelling reasons for the tenant to move. 399 A number of blacks remaining in the South, actually benefited from the disruption. The weevil's visitation to Adams County, Mississippi, led to cotton acreage reduc- tions, merchants' hesitance to finance crops, and a diminishing of black tenants through migration. So shaken was the system that black farmers in the 1930s looked back on the boll weevil's arrival as the death knell of /-^ebt> peonage that had existed around Natchez.^"^ The entomologists believed that much of the panic, migration, and loss of income was unnecessary. Farmers too often attempted to grow that last "big crop" after the boll weevil arrived and with the old methods of 21 growing cotton. The resulting financial loss further reduced the farmer's ability to shift into other crops. The entomologists asserted that farmers did not follow instructions and that they might have avoided some of the dislocation during the first years. Leland 0. Howard complained that the farmers had not "at all generally followed our recommendations."^^ The director of extension work in South Carolina, W. W. Long, believed a great many farmers were "looking for some reason

20 Davis and Gardner, Deep South, p. 373. 21 Southern Cultivator, December 1, 1916, p. 2. 22 Howard, Memorandiom for the Secretary, September 20, 1922, Insects—Boll Weevil, RG 16, NA. 400 satisfactoiry to themselves for not adopting the methods 23 recommended." R. W. Leiby of North Carolina thought the farmers of that state "seem[ed] averse to follow control directions." 24 On several points, and one in particular, the criticism seems valid. Repeated experiments demonstrated the importance of early fall destruction in reducing weevil damage the following year. The practice was not generally employed. Long after the weevil's initial impact, census statistics continued to reveal that cotton, although "sick," was still king in the South. The surface impression can be that no permanent developments occurred. Certainly, there had been no revolution in southern agriculture, but there were ample signs in the 1920s that, as one historian put it, "diversification was beginning to leave the verbal stage." 2'î The rush to other crops that accompanied the initial impact of the boll weevil often proved temporary. Farmers

23 Ibid., W. W. Long to W. M. Jardine, June 12, 1925. 24 . Biennial Report of the North Carolina Department of Agriculture from December 1, 1926 to November 30, 1928 (Raleigh, 1929), p. 43. Two other entomologists who were active in boll weevil research expressed similar sentiments that some of the disruption caused by the weevil could have been avoided had more farmers heeded the recommendations. Interview with Dwight Isley, Fayetteville, Arkansas, June 30, 1969; interview with George L. Smith, Tallulah, Louisiana, August 4, 1969. 25 George B. Tindall, The Emergence of the New South 1913-1945 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1967), pp. 124-25. 401 devoted abandoned cotton acreage to crops with which they were familiar. Many such crops had already been auxiliary to the production of cotton and were unable to sustain the tenant system. Unless developments in cattle and hog production paralleled increased corn and forage crop production, then the "diversified" crops were doomed. In other areas, such as Alabama's black belt, southeast Alabama, and southwest Georgia, the boll weevil fostered concrete developments. Where progress occurred, soil and climate were of course important. Just as important were local leadership and farmer cooperation. The Alabama and Georgia ventures stand in stark contrast to southwestern Mississippi, where for years fields lay abandoned with little alternative agricultural activity. Even when there were failures the impact of the pest benefited future developments. The ventures into other crops made farmers and businessmen aware of the elements necessary for success. Growth could not be spontaneous. Markets and transportation facilities had to be created as production grew. People investing in packing and processing plants needed some assurance from local farmers that produce was to be supplied. The financing system had to adjust to accommodate new crops. The assertion that cotton was the only crop "CLOTHED WITH THE DIGNITY OF COLLATERAL,"^6 contained more truth

26 Martin V. Calvin to Tobert E. Stowers, January 3, 402 than error. Even so, there were indications prior to the depression of a greater willingness to finance other crops. The editor of the Memphis Commercial Appeal/ C. P. J. Mooney, campaigned through his paper for diversification. He compared the progress of the South to that of a frog ascending a well wall. "Our people jump three feet, then fall back two. ..." 27 For our purpose, the allegory of the boll weevil's spread into west Texas and the northern fringe of the cotton belt is more apt. It was a story of advance one year, retreat the next, but of overall progress for the weevil. From the beginning of the research on this topic through the writing of this dissertation, the prospect of making an assessment of the boll weevil's effect on the South loomed. The pressure exists in any historical work to take a causational approach, to prove a point or thesis. In this case, the research and writing have resulted in the idea that the real story associated with this agricultural pest is not what necessarily qualified statements we can make on the long-term effect, but is in

1925, John Judson Brown Papers, Southern Historical Col- lection, university of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. 27 James W. Silver, "C. P. J. Mooney of the Memphis Commercial Appeal, Crusader for Diversification," Agri- gultural History 17 (April 1943): 89. 403 the disruption of the southern economy during those initial years in each community. The immediate depriva- tion of farmers and even their migration loom larger than statistics on acreage planted in cotton relative to other crops.

Harry Hopkins grew restive listening to one plan for relief during the Roosevelt administration. The plan's author assured Hopkins that it would be beneficial in the long run. "People don't eat in the long run," was Hopkins' terse rejection of the plan."^^ Had Hopkins been a southerner and observed the scene in any number of communities after the weevil arrived, he no doubt would have had a similarly acerbic statement about the notion that the boll weevil was a blessing in disguise. The blacks who departed for what Thomas M. Campbell called the "great 29 mysterious North," could not wait for the long run. Nor could Ambroz Landry of Code, Louisiana, who became "despondent by boll weevil ravages on his cotton plantation . . . [and committed] suicide by shooting. ""^^

28 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins; An Intimate History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948) , p. 52 29 Thomas M. Campbell, Report of Investigation on Negro Migration, November 11 to December 15, 1923, Negroes, General Correspondence, RG 16, NA. Campbell, officially titled Field Agent in Negro Work, was a leader in the extension work among blacks. Baton Rouge State, September 6, 1908, SFCII, RG 7, NA. APPENDIX A PERCENTAGE REDUCTION FROM FULL YIELD, 1909-1930'

Crop Percentage Av. of Season Va. N.C. S.C. Ga. Fla. Mo. Tenn. Ala. Miss. La. Tfex. Okla. Ark. 13 States

1909 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 42 12 3 6 6.1 1910 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 15 40 7 1 7 5.1 1911 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 11 1 0 2 1.3 1912 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 18 14 3 1 2 3.5 1913 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 4 33 25 7 0 3 7.5 1914 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 6 24 18 8 1 3 6.1 1915 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 16 25 20 16 3 5 10.2 4^ 1916 0 0 0 3 21 0 1 28 32 24 19 4 7 14.2 O 1917 0 0 0 9 27 2 2 29 22 12 7 4 10 8.6 1918 0 0 0 11 24 7 0 12 10 10 4 1 3 5.4 1919 0 0 3 19 40 0 0 29 20 25 14 1 5 13.0 1920 0 0 13 31 32 0 1 36 32 26 20 9 9 19.7 1921 0 4 31 45 28 0 7 32 30 35 34 41 22 31.2 1922 0 13 40 44 32 0 9 26 28 25 16 26 18 23.3 1923 0 13 27 37 33 4 21 33 31 23 10 19 16 19.2 1924 0 7 16 15 28 0 2 12 7 5 8 4 4 8.1 1925 0 8 12 7 6 1 0 5 3 10 2 2 2 4.1 1926 0 3 4 5 4 2 2 3 6 9 11 8 3 7.1 1927 2 16 27 18 9 0 3 15 16 12 20 31 11 19.4 1928 10 12 15 14 9 0 2 12 14 18 12 26 15 14.1 1929 4 21 18 15 14 0 2 14 16 17 13 11 6 13.3 1930 3 17 13 7 14 0 1 4 3 3 4 3 2 5.0

Taken from Statistics on Cotton and Related Data^ Statistical Bulletin No. 99, PP 67-80. APPENDIX B

O U1

Taken from Yearbook 1921, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 1922), p. 350. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

The National Archives and Records Service has accessioned and preserved a large body of records docu- menting the Department of Agriculture's involvement with the boll weevil infestation of the South. The records created by the Division of Southern Field-Crop Insect Investigations in the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine have been of primary research value. The correspondence of Walter D. Hunter and his staff (located first at Victoria and later at Dallas, Texas) covers communications with the bureau's Washington office, state officials, staff members in the field, and the interested public. In addition, there are a series of correspondence and reports relating to experiments and to USDA cooperation in enforcing state quarantines. The correspondence bewteen Leland 0. Howard, chief of the Division of Entomology, and C. H. Tyler Townsend docximents the USDA's boll weevil investigations prior to the establishment of a permanent field station in Texas. The newspaper clippings, provided to the division by a commercial clipping service, contain invaluable information on the effect of the weevil in Texas and Louisiana that only extensive research in numerous newspapers could duplicate.

406 407 The general correspondence of the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine supplemented the information in the Southern Field-Crop Insect Investigations records. The records of the Extension Service include the correspondence of Farmers'Cooperative Demonstration Work. The author researched the correspondence with state officials and extension workers in the southern states. Of great value were the subject files under "Boll Weevil" and "Insects—Boll Weevil" in the general correspondence of the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture. The records include letters addressed directly to the secretary and intra-departmental communications on matters deemed important enough to be brought to the secretary's attention. Records of the Office of Experiment Stations and of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics have also been of some value. The staff of the USDA's Cotton Insects Research Station at Tallulah, Louisiana, maintained several scrapbooks of newspaper clippings relating to the boll weevil. The clippings, which the author read there in the s\ammer of 1969, were useful for the 1910s and 1920s. The southern states have a reputation for initiative in the establishment of state archives. Unfortunately, the archival documentation of the activities of their state departments of agriculture is scant. The papers of Alabama's commissioner of agriculture, Reviben F. Kolb, 408

in the Alabama Department of Archives and History include information on the Department of Agriculture's reaction to the weevil's arrival in that state. The John Judson Brovm Papers at the Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, revealed Brown's activist guidance of Georgia's department of agriculture in combatting the weevil. His correspondence has also been extremely valuable in recounting the economic effects of the weevil in Georgia. The correspondence of Senator John Sharp Williams with family members in the John Sharp Williams Papers at the Mississippi Department of Archives and History were excellent in describing economic and social conditions attendant to the weevil's arrival in the Yazoo City area. Other useful collections at the same archival institution were the papers of Battaille Harrison Wade and John C. Burrus. Folksongs and folktales collected by the Works Progress Administration and now deposited in the Archive of American Folksong at the Library of Congress and in the Mississippi Department of Archives and History provided information for the chapter on folklore. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's extensive publications policy during the first half of the twentieth century provided technical, experimental, and scientific data of great value. The annual reports of the department and its constituent bureaus included 409 information on all department activities. The various series of bulletins, circulars, and statistical reports cover, in detail, research findings and departmental recommendations to farmers. The comprehensive character of the earlier publications was such that they not only provide s\abstantive information, but are a valuable guide to the researcher for further research in archival sources. In addition to the holdings of USDA publications, the department's library, the National Agricultural Library in Beltsville, Maryland, has collected the publications of the various state agencies involved in agriculture. The author researched the annual reports, yearbooks, bulletins, circulars, and other publications of the southern states' departments of agriculture, entomological boards, and state experiment stations. The National Agricultural Library also collected numerous farm periodicals. The author read a continuous run of farm periodicals from the mid-1890s to the late 1920s. The method used was to select a journal for the period immediately prior to the weevil's arrival and the first years of infestation. The farm journals researched, moving east with the weevil's advance, were the Texas Farmer, Southern Farm Gazette (later the Southern Farm Gazette and Progressive Farmer), Alabama Farm Facts, Southern Cultivator, and Progressive Farmer (Eastern ed.). 410

The author researched the state historical journals for the period since the weevil's arrival in each state» The notable aspect of the research was that not only were there few specific references to the boll weevil, but also that there was a dearth of articles on twentieth- century agriculture in the South. As yet, no one has produced a sequel to Lewis C. Gray's History of Agriculture in the United States to 1860. Two works by Rupert B. Vance provided the best information on southern agriculture in the twentieth century and cotton production in particular—Human Geography of the South and Human Factors in Cotton Culture» Sociologists provided the best accounts of the weevil's impact on the community. The studies were undertaken several years after the weevil's arrival, but the signs remained. The authors' analyses of the boll weevil's influence have been invaluable. The studies are: Thomas J. Woofter. Black Yeomanry; Allison Davis and Burleigh B. and Mary Gardner, Deep South; and Arthur F. Raper's Preface to Peasantry and Tenants of the Almighty♦ Time and opportunity to conduct extensive interviews could have provided more instances of the weevil's impact on communities and individuals than are present in this study. The author benefited from the recollections of two entomologists present in the South at the boll weevil's arrival, George L. Smith and Dwight Isley. I have also been 411 fortunate to have at my disposal the recollections of my uncle, Roy Helms. His memory, keen powers of observation, and a life of farming provide insights that one is hard put to discover in written sources, if indeed one could discover some of them.