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Robert Helbig

NATO-Brazil relations: Limits of a partnership policy

Professor Michelle Egan, School of International Service

University Honors in International Studies

Fall 2012

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Abstract

The purpose of this capstone project is to assess the potential of a partnership between NATO and Brazil, based on interviews with over twenty high-level experts on Brazilian foreign policy and the application of international relations theory. Because building international partnership has become a vital task of NATO and Brazil is trying to increase its influence in global politics, senior NATO officials have called for the Alliance to reach out to Brazil. The paper argues that

Brazil, as a regional middle power, has taken on a soft-balancing approach towards the US, thereby following adversary strategies to NATO, including global governance reform and South-

South cooperation. The theoretical debate on alliance formation and international regimes leads to the conclusion that NATO is unlikely to succeed in reaching out to Brazil, which is why

NATO should develop different approaches of increasing its influence in South America and the

South Atlantic.

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Outline

I. Introduction

II. Brazil as an actor in international relations II.I. Brazil’s mindset III.II. Global aspirations vs. regional supremacy II.III. Bilateralism, multilateralism and global governance geform II.IV. Brazil’s role on the global stage II.V. Brazil’s stance on the United States – From Rio Branco to soft-balancing II.VI. Brazil’s stance on nuclear proliferation – an example of opposing the established world order II.VII. Brazilian security – the green and the blue Amazon II.IIX. Upgrading Brazilian military forces II.IX. NATO in the light of Brazilian foreign and security policy II.X. Opposing NATO in practice – the case of Libya

III. NATO’s Partnership Policy

IV. Theory of NATO-Brazil relations IV.I. Classical and Structural Realism IV.II. Liberalism IV.III. Constructivism IV.IV. Assessing the potential of a partnership based on theory

V. Policy of NATO-Brazil relations V.I. NATO’s three main challenges in reaching out to Brazil V.II. Possible Cooperative Initiatives

VI. Beyond Brazil: Possible alternatives to gaining a foothold in South America and the South Atlantic VI.I. NATO reaching out to Unasur VI.II. NATO reaching out to IBSA VI.III. Encouraging a South Atlantic Treaty Organization VI.IV. NATO reaching out to other South American states VI.V. Redefining the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance VI.VI. Just let the Europeans do it alone

VII. Conclusion

Annex

Bibliography Helbig 4

I. Introduction

After NATO’s April 2012 Chicago Summit, the organization declared that “NATO is committed to building cooperative security with partners – finding global solutions to deal with global problems.”1 Secretary General Rasmussen proclaimed that “there is great potential to enhance [NATO’s] political dialogue and [...] practical cooperation.” At the same time as NATO seeks new partnerships outside the North Atlantic region, rising powers like Brazil try to establish themselves in international organizations and take on new responsibilities as part of gaining more influence in international relations. This is why some have called for NATO to reach out to Brazil, such as Admiral James Stavridis, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe.2

While this is a possibility, NATO’s outreach is limited by the potential partner’s foreign policy strategy. Brazil has increasingly manifested its position as a leader in South America and among developing countries, thereby shown ambivalence towards Western institutions.

However, the country adheres to the democratic principles which NATO stands for, making

Brazil a great fit in the eyes of NATO policymakers who seek to expand the Alliance’s reach internationally. Is a partnership between the NATO and Brazil possible on these grounds?

Which factors of Brazil’s rising power strategy limit an alliance formation with NATO? Given

NATO’s grand strategy to increase its influence in international security, is it worth for Brussels to reach out to Brasília?

1 NATO. “NATO Chicago Summit meets its goals.” May 21, 2012 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_87603.htm (accessed October 16, 2012). 2 “Worth exploring NATO partnership with India: Pentagon” The Hindu March 2, 2012 http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article2953264.ece (accessed October 16, 2012). Helbig 5

In the following paper, I will assess the potential of a partnership between NATO and

Brazil. My results are based on interviews with experts on Brazilian foreign policy and NATO, including former and current Brazilian foreign policymakers. My conclusions are confirmed by drawing on international relations theory. The paper is structured as follows: After the

Introduction, Section II gives a detailed analysis of Brazil as an actor in international relations based; Section III touches upon current developments of NATO partnership policies; Section IV looks at NATO-Brazil relations from a theoretical perspective; Section V assess the potential of a partnership between NATO and Brazil from a policy perspective; Section VI provides further alternatives for NATO to enter South America and/or the South Atlantic. The paper concludes that NATO is unlikely to succeed in reaching out to Brazil because Brasília engages in soft- balancing against the US, NATO’s leading member state. Brazil’s foreign policymakers envision a world order different of that for which NATO stands for and the actors share too little security concerns in order to overcome their competing strategies and form an alliance. This is why

NATO is well served to consider different approaches to gain a foothold in South America and the South Atlantic.

II. Brazil as an actor in international relations

II.I. Brazil’s mindset

In order to understand the context of NATO-Brazil relations, it is worth exploring

Brazilian foreign and security policy. Brazil is set to become the world’s 5th largest economy.

Even though the economic growth slew down to less than two percent in 2012, Brasília can point to numerous achievements over the past years, such as lifting up over 30 million people Helbig 6 into the middle class just between 2003 and 1010. As Helga Jung of Allianz points out, Brazil is young and dynamic with half of its almost 200 million citizens is in the years between 15 and

64.3 Brazil, traditionally known for its biodiversity and commodity exports, expanded its financial and diversified its service sector. The country invests massively into research and development as it is trying to tap the newly discovered oil reserves under the 2000-meter-thick pre-salt layer under the bottom of the ocean off the coast of Rio de Janeiro which is likely to establish Brazil as one of the main global oil producers. Although the country still fights with corruption, drug trafficking and social disparity, Brazil is arguably better off than the other

BRICS4, a category of emerging economies which Brazil is often being affiliated with. This is why

Brazil wants to step up to the top of global governance to reform the current world order. With this goal in mind, Brasília has adapted a more assertive foreign policy which is likely to result in diplomatic differences with Europe and the US. What is unclear, however, is where Brazil will shift its foreign policy focus in the future.

II.II. Global aspirations vs. regional supremacy

Many scholars point out the Brazil is the leading actor in South America and a force for regional integration.5 With over half the continent’s population and GDP, Brazil takes on a

3 Jung, Helga. “Brasilien kann noch viel mehr.” Financial Times Deutschland October 22, 2012 http://www.ftd.de/politik/international/:gastkommentar-von-helga-jung-brasilien-kann-noch-viel- mehr/70107937.html (accessed October 26, 2012). 4 A group of emerging countries including Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 5 Puntigliano, Andrés Rivarola. “Going Global’: An Organizational Study of Brazilian Foreign Policy” Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. Vol. 51, No. 1 (2008), 28-52 http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S0034- 73292008000100002&script=sci_abstract (accessed November 14, 2010), 29; Amorim, Celso. Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview” Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. Vol. 53, Special Edition (2010), 214-240 http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S0034-73292010000300013&script=sci_arttext (accessed November 14, 2010), 227; Saraiva, Miriam Gomes. “Brazilian foreign policy towards South America during the Lula Administration: caught between South America and Mercosur.” Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. Vol. 53, Special Edition (2010), Helbig 7 natural leadership position in South America. This is why Brasília emphasizes the importance of regional multilateral bodies. Brazil is member of Mercosul6, a regional free trade agreement between Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. Today, Mercosul is a full customs union headquartered in Brazil’s financial center São Paulo. Brazil has also been a driving force of

Unasur, established in 2008 with the goal of regional political integration and coordination with similar aspirations as the European Union. Thereby, Brasília has shown genuine leadership in

South America.

By working closer with its neighbors, Brazil can increase its strength and influence in global affairs.7 However, Brasília does not want to be perceived as a regional hegemon in a traditional sense. Sean W. Burges relates Brazil’s role to his concept of consensual hegemony.

Without using force, Brasília leads the subordinate South American states through dialogue, interaction and consensus-building to approve Brazil’s hegemony. Thereby, Brazil exerts hegemony through cooperation and coordination. Referring to the country’s post-Cold War strategy, Brazil uses the collective strength of South American states to advance its national influence on global stage.8

In addition to its regional engagement, Brasília has expanded its focus internationally. It was under President Henrique Cardoso when Brazil changed its basic strategic model to establish Brazil as a medium power with great power aspirations. While some in the diplomatic

151-168 http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S0034-73292010000300009&script=sci_abstract (accessed November 14, 2010).. 6 The Portuguese version of “Mercosur” 7 Amorim, 227. 8 Burges, Sean W. “Consensial Hegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War.” International Relations Vol. 22, No. 1 (2008), 54-84 http://ire.sagepub.com/content/22/1/65.full.pdf+html (accessed November 14, 2010), 81. Helbig 8 circle opposed the new model perceived to be unnecessarily risky for Brazil’s image, the then

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim tried to move forward with Cardoso’s intentions. Amorim, who now serves as Defense Minister, believed that Brazil should not be aggressive to gain a greater global role, but take on more responsibility in the global community.9

Brazil, which has the largest population of African descent outside of Africa, focuses on building ties with its African neighbors across the Atlantic. It is striking that the distance between Recife in the northeast of Brazil and Africa is less than between Recife and many regions within Brazil’s borders. Beyond geography, Brazil has cultural ties to Africa because of the slave trade which took place between the 16th and 19th century. Brazil is also connected to

Lusophone countries through their common Portuguese language and culture, many of which are located in Africa, including Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Together, they form the “Community of Portuguese Language Countries.”

Illustratively, Brazil has opened more than thirty new embassies in Africa during the past years, bypassing the UK in regards to diplomatic representation on the continent.10 These ties lead

Brail to engage in investments and development projects in Africa. For example, Brazil provided major aid to Namibia to build up the countries navy. Other development projects include fighting AIDS in Mozambique and infrastructure investment in Nigeria.

In contrast to Brazil’s relationship with Africa in the past, Brasília does not primarily engage with Africa to display cultural solidarity coupled with the belief that Brazil takes on a

9 Assessment based on an interview with Jospeh Tulchin, April 1, 2012, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 10 Spektor, Matias. „Why Brazil is a Broker with Iran.” Council on Foreign Relations May 17, 2010 http://www.cfr.org/brazil/why-brazil-broker-iran/p22139 (accessed October 16, 2012). Helbig 9 natural place in Africa. Today, Brazil’s relations with Africa are designed to foster the agenda of sustainable development.11 Thereby, Brazil also uses its relations with its eastern neighbors to drive its own international agenda.

In addition to Africa, Brazil is involved in a number of other South-South initiatives, such as the Group of 77 in the UN. Brazil is also an observer in the non-aligned movement, an organization of mainly Southern developing countries. In 2001, Brazil hosted the first World

Social Forum in Porto Alegre, a summit of developing countries countering the annual World

Economic Forum which brings together global business, government and academic leaders in the Swiss Alps. By the end of President Henrique Cardoso’s second term in 2003, cooperation with developing countries gained significant momentum. The “strategy of autonomy through diversification with its South-South foreign economic policy” became especially prevalent under the Lula administration, which served until 2010, tying to bring Brazil closer to its allies in the

Global South.12 Brazil wants to become a leader of the developing world, which is why the past administrations have prioritized policies and actions which would enhance this perception.

Unlike Chile and Mexico, for example, Brazil rejects the OECD as an organization which serves the interests of the developed countries.13 Amorim admits that Brazil’s focus on South-South cooperation is a strategy to exercise solidarity which helps Brazil to expand its weight in world

11 Saraiva, Jose Flavio. “The new Africa and Brazil in the Lula era: the rebirth of Brazilian Atlantic policy.” rev. Bras. Polít. Int Vol. 53, Special Edition (2010), 169-182 http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S0034- 73292010000300010&script=sci_arttext (accessed November 14, 2010), 180. 12 Grau, Albert. “From Isolationism to Regional Hegemon: Understanding Change in Brazilian Foreign Policy from 1990 to 2010.” Atlantic Community August 19, 2011 http://www.atlantic- community.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/BrazilFP.pdf (accessed October 16, 2012), 19. 13 Brazil’s foreign policy outlook in regards to international development is mainly based on dependency theory which assumes that the Global South (periphery) is exploited by the developed countries (core). This is why Brazil chose import substitution industrialization policies as a means of developing and why Brazil is generally suspicious of institutions created by “the West.” Helbig 10 affairs. 14 Through “cooperation among equals,” Brazil found a way of engaging other states to cooperate with Brazil to reform global governance.15

Brazil is also increasingly engaged in relationships with emerging economies, such as the

BRICS and IBSA16. While these forums have Global South components, they should be seen in a different light as they reflect the aspirations of states whose aim is to shape the future world order and gain a significant role in international relations, not simply to escape poverty as most poor countries of the Global South. Brasília uses these forums as vehicles for Brazilian power.

The term BRIC, formed by economist Jim O’Neill in 2001, puts Brazil into a category in which it is perceived as one of the great emerging economies, even though it is quite different from the other BRICs.17 Not just is it the only Western one, but also the only non-nuclear power. Brazil’s economic growth dropped significantly under this of Russia, India and China even though none of these countries were able to sustain double-digit or high single-digit growth rates after 2010.

Brazil could even fall behind Mexico’s economic performance in 2020 if the Brazil’s growth rates remain staggeringly low.18 Brazilians like to portrait themselves within the group of rising economies which makes them noteworthy in the global economy, and thus more interesting for investments. This is why being affiliated with a group of countries which are expected to become, or even remain, the global economic drivers is a fortunate position for Brazil.

14 Amorim, 231. 15 Ibid. 16 A dialogue forum between India, Brazil and South America 17 Note that the original grouping of BRIC countries invited South Africa to join in 2010, making the grouping called BRICS. 18 “Mexico could pass Brazil as top LatAm economy in 10 years-Nomura” Reuters August 9, 2012 http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/08/08/latam-economy-idINL2E8J8AGR20120808 (accessed October 18, 2012).

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It is not clear whether Brasília will continue to reach out to the Global South, will build closer ties to emerging economies or simply strengthen its leadership position in South

America. Since Brazil is investing in greater diplomatic initiatives, these options are not exclusive of each other. What is important to note is, however, that no serious Brazilian foreign policy expert foresees Brazil to sign on to the North Atlantic’s agenda countries even though the vast majority Brazilian foreign policymakers continues to consider itself part of the Western camp.19

II.III. Bilateralism, multilateralism and global governance geform

The regional and global initiatives pointed out above also reflect Brazil’s firm belief in the importance of multilateralism. One cannot underestimate the importance of shared decision-making in Brazilian foreign policy as it is a vital component of Brasília’s world view.

Under President Lula De Silva, Brazil set up diversified strategic partnerships driven by political coordination and agendas, such as energy, sustainable development, trade and investment.20 Thereby Brazil used the formation of partnerships as a tool for political convergence and economic cooperation, as part of Brazil’s strategy to strengthen its ability to act independently.”21

As mentioned above, Brazil would like to see itself on the top of global governance.

Logically, Brasília turns to the UN for global governance. The structure of the UN, however,

19 Assessment based on interviews with senior Brazilian diplomats. 20 Lessa, Antônio Carlos. “Brazil’s strategic partnerships: an assessment of the Lula era (2003-2010)” Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. Vol. 53, Special Edition (2010), 115-131 http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S0034- 73292010000300007&script=sci_arttext (accessed October 16, 2012), 120. 21 Ibid, 129. Helbig 12 does not reflect genuine international representation as any of the five permanent members of the Security Council have a veto power over the rest of the world. Brasília attempts to overcome the unfair institutional set-up by lobbying for an increase of the council with a seat for itself.

Brazil has been hoping to become a member of the Security Council since World War II which Brazil joined on side of the Allied Forces with the prospects of becoming one of the global powers in the new world order. Today, Brazil, along with Germany, Japan and India, is calling to receive more power in the UN Security Council. Brazil’s foreign policymakers project a new image of their country as a responsible regional power and emerging economy which adheres established political and economic values which qualifies Brazil to play the great power game.22 Thereby, Brazil hopes to reform global governance to turn the international institutions, originally formed mainly by the US and Europe, into regimes which also reflect the interests of the emerging countries.

To put Brazil’s demand into a larger context, one may ask why Brasília rejects the unipolar world order which allows it to free-ride on what the established powers, led by the US, pay for international security. After all, while Brasília may claim the whole South Atlantic and

West-African coast to be its sphere of influence, the country barely has the naval capabilities to guard its own coast. This is why some argue that it may be most beneficial for Brazil to remain just short of becoming a permanent UN Security Council member since it allows Brasília to

22 Ibid, 120. Helbig 13 portrait itself as an outspoken leader of the Global South while not having to pay the costs of becoming a global power.

Important to point out is that Brazil already has taken on global responsibility by participating in 33 UN peacekeeping operations with over 27,000 troops since the Suez Crisis in

1956. 23 Most notably, Brazil has been leading the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti UNSTAMIH since 2004 and Brazilian Admiral has been leading the UN naval operation UNIFIL in Lebanon since February 2011.24 As Mônica Hirst and Maria Regina Soares de Lima point out, the

UNSTAMIH mission, which was the first one in which Brazil took leadership, has initiated a discussion within Brazil about the costs associated with the responsibilities, and about the justification of such policy in the lights of vast security problems at home.25 This shows that

Brazil, at least to a certain extent, is willing to take on more responsibilities abroad, which it is expected to in the light of its demand for a greater say in international relations.

Peacekeeping is not all that Brazil can offer, however. As Antonio Ramahlo points out, in the light of Brazil’s limited military capabilities, the country can aide political expertise which can help to prevent conflict.26 This, again, reflects Brazil’s approach to diplomacy routed in peace and the policymakers’ belief in the prevention of war through negotiations in international forums.

23 Viotti, Maria Luiza. “Brazil in the Security Council.” United Nations February 2011 http://www.un.int/brazil/book/conselhoSecuranca_index.html (accessed October 16, 2012). 24 Ibid. 25 Hirst, Mônica and Maria Regina Soares de Lima. “Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power: action, choice and responsibilities.” International Affairs 82,1 (2006) 21-40 http://disciplinas.stoa.usp.br/pluginfile.php/43103/mod_resource/content/1/Brazil%20as%20an%20intermediate %20state%20and%20regional%20power%20-%20action,%20power%20and%20responsabilities.pdf (accessed October 16, 2012), 18. 26 Ramalho, Antonio. “Brazil’s Take on Iran and NPT.” Council on Foreign Relations May 19, 2010 http://www.cfr.org/brazil/brazils-take-iran-npt/p22160 (accessed October 13, 2012). Helbig 14

II.IV. Brazil’s role on the global stage

The academic discussion of Brazil’s role in international relations revolves around the concepts of middle power and regional power. Andrés Malamud provides an overview of different perceptions on what constitutes a middle power and a regional power, referring to concepts developed by Eduard Jordaan, Detelf Nolte and Robert Keohane.27 According to

Jordaan, a middle power is neither great, nor insignificant in terms of hard power capabilities and influence. He explains that a regional power is a subtype of a middle power, a role which is mostly taken on by emerging middle powers.28 Nolte conceptualizes a regional power similarly, as a middle power which exerts leadership within its region.29 Keohane defines a middle power to be state which determines that it cannot act alone effectively, and thus prefers to increase its impact through forming partnerships and acting through international institutions.30

Constructivists like Hurrell et al. indicate that the status as a middle power may be a self- created construct rather than a geopolitical or geo-economic result.31

Since Brazil does not have the capabilities to back up its global claims, it uses its neighbor countries to project power and build international coalitions, thereby legitimizing its

27 Malamud, Andrés. “A Leader Without Followers? The Growing Divergence Between the Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign Policy.” Latin American Politics & Society Vol: 53, No. 3 (2011), 1-24 http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Researchers/malamud/laps_53_3_Malamud.pdf (accessed November 14, 2010), 2,3. 28 Jordaan, Eduard. The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing Between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers.” Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies Vol. 30, No. 2: (2003), 165–181 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0258934032000147282 (accessed November 14, 2010), 165. 29 Malamud, 3. 30 Keohane, Robert O. “Lilliputian Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics.” International Organization Vol. 23, No. 2 (1969) 291–310 https://www.zotero.org/shapib/items/itemKey/32486W7W (accessed November 14, 2010), 295. 31 Hurrell, Andrew et al. “Paths to Power: Foreign Policy Strategies of Intermediate States.” Woodrow Wilson International Center Latin American Program Working Paper No. 244 (2000) http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACF14A1.pdf (accessed November 14, 2010), 1. Helbig 15 claims.32 This is why Brazil has steadily advanced its relations with its neighbors since the 1970s.

Although Malamud argues that Brazil was unsuccessful to build the kind of leaderships it imagined, Brazil’s outreach policy clearly fits into a regional middle power strategy.33

II.V. Brazil’s stance on the United States – From Rio Branco to soft-balancing

When analyzing factors of Brazil’s foreign policy which affect the country’s stance on

NATO, it is crucial to consider the relationship between Brazil and the US, NATO’s leading member state. Brazil has been a close partner of the US the beginning of the 20th century when

Brazil aligned with the US under the leadership of Foreign Minister Baron of Rio Branco.

Thereby, Brazil hoped to gain support for settling border conflicts, foster Brazilian exports, and receive military and economic aid from Washington. Most recently, U.S. President Obama’s visit to Brazil in March 2011 confirmed the countries’ long-standing relations marked by massive trade, development cooperation and human exchange.

Serious tensions over specific policy and suspicion of U.S. global leadership, however, remain. Brazilian policymakers are worried about U.S. presence in South America, as they view the US a competitor for the preeminent influence on its continent. Some Brazilian policymakers even interchange foreign presence and occupation, which touches on Brazil’s sensitive understanding of sovereignty. This is why Brasília is concerned about U.S. activities in its sphere of influence. For example, Brazil opposes the US to use Colombian air bases to engage in joined

32 Malamud, 6. 33 Ibid 18. Helbig 16 anti-drug operations.34 Brazil was also among one of the states which blocked the US’s efforts to establish a free trade area in the Americas with could have included 34 states throughout the

Western Hemisphere.35 The opposition to foreign influence in Brazil’s sphere of influence holds also true in regards to the increasing relations between Russia and Venezuela as well as the

UK’s presence in the South Atlantic. For example, in 2011, the British Falkland patrol vessel

HMS Clyde was declined to board in Rio de Janeiro.36 The US stands out, however, because it simply has much closer relations to South America than any other state.

Brazil’s attitude against U.S. presence in South America is in alignment with Brazil’s opposition to the overarching U.S. power extension around the world. Brasília knows that its country is seen as a source for diversifying American oil imports away from the Middle East, and that Washington hopes to gain from free trade agreements with several South American states, such as the most recent one with Colombia which went into effect in 2012. This is why

Brazil sees itself in a position of power in which it tries to soft-balance the US.37

Soft-balancing, as T.V. Paul points of McGill University out, “involves tacit balancing short of formal alliances [...] often based on a limited arms buildup, ad hoc cooperative

34 “Brazil, Spain question US Colombia bases.” The Sydney Morning Herald July 31, 2009 http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world/brazil-spain-question-us-colombia-bases-20090731-e3dq.html (accessed October 16, 2012). 35 Wingfield, Brian. “Roney Backs Latin American Free Trade Zone, Advisors Say.” Bloomberg August 22, 2012 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-22/romney-backs-latin-american-free-trade-zone-adviser-says.html (accessed October 16, 2012). 36 “HMS Clyde refused entry to Brazil.” BFBS January 11, 2011 http://www.bfbs.com/news/falkland-islands/hms- clyde-refused-entry-brazil-42836.html (accessed October 16, 2012). 37 Albrecht, 6. Helbig 17 exercises, or collaboration in regional or international institutions [...].”38 Taking Brazil’s adversary position to U.S. leadership ambitions in South America, one can conclude that Brasília is using its involvement in multilateral forums to balance the US’s influence in the region.

II.VI. Brazil’s stance on nuclear proliferation – an example of opposing the established world order

Under Brazil’s military dictatorship in the 1970s, the country initiated a secret nuclear program, which led to a nuclear competition with Argentina. It was not until 1990 that Brasília and Buenos Aires stopped their nuclear programs and until four years later that the countries ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco which established South America as a zone free of nuclear weapons. Brasília did not sign on to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which theoretically limits any state, which was not in the possession of nuclear weapons by the time it was initiated in 1970 to acquire new ones.

Brazil’s stance on the international non-proliferation regime is just another way of rejecting the Western regimes through which Brasília assumes the established powers to hinder the emerging states. As Matias Spektor of Fundação Getúlio Vargas points out, Brazil shares the view that the NPT has become a tool for the strong against the weak.39 Otherwise, why would one allow Israel and India to allow access to nuclear weapons, but deny the same right to Iran?

As Ramalho points out, many in the Brazilian foreign policy cycle were against signing the

38 Paul, T.V. “The Enduring Axioms of Balance of Power Theory.” in Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, eds., Balance of Power Revisited: Theory and Practice in the Twenty-first Century, 1-25, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004. 39 Spektor, Matias. „Why Brazil is a Broker with Iran.” Council on Foreign Relations May 17, 2010 http://www.cfr.org/brazil/why-brazil-broker-iran/p22139 (accessed October 16, 2012). Helbig 18 treaty, not because they wanted to obtain nuclear capabilities, but because the NPT is discriminatory. Brasília eventually signed on to the treaty to gain greater access to peaceful nuclear technology and the fear of diplomatic isolation.40

In the case of Iran, Brazil, along with Turkey, took initiative in 2010 to broker a deal with

Iran to exchange low-enriched uranium with nuclear fuel for Teheran’s nuclear research. Brazil and Turkey enjoyed more legitimacy among Iranian negotiators because both are developing and non-nuclear weapon states.41 While Brasília’s and Ankara’s intention may have been good, it is hard to overlook that these actions have not undermined the efforts of the UN and the

P5+1 which have been negotiating with Teheran since 2006.

In this regard, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Tom Shannon stated that Brazil has become more assertive and that the country collides with US interests on new issues.42 Former CIA official

Graham Fuller points out that Brazil and Turkey “challenged the guiding hand of Washington in determining nuclear strategy towards Iran.”43 At the same time, Iran was more inclined to come to an agreement with peer mid-sized powers than with the superpowers. This is how both

Brazil and Iran made a point about their outlook on international relations and the resulting ineffectiveness of the P5+1 negotiation. The case can also be taken as a measure of soft- balancing against the US and opposing the established world order. Brazil sided with a NATO

40 Ramalho. 41 Amorim 224,225. 42 Dombey, Daniel and Jonathan Wheatley. “Brazil asserts role on Iran.” Financial Times May 14, 2010 www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9e109534-5ede-11df-af86-00144feab49a.html (accessed October 12, 2012). 43 Fuller, Graham “Former CIA officer on Iran: Brazil and Turkey are vital checks and balances.” Christian Science Monitor May 24, 2010 http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Global-Viewpoint/2010/0524/Former-CIA- officer-on-Iran-Brazil-and-Turkey-are-vital-checks-and-balances (accessed October 16, 2012). Helbig 19 state to offset the P5+1’s negotiations which shows that Brazil is not opposed to build ad-hoc alliances with states out of the Global South to further its interests.

II.VII. Brazilian security – the green and the blue Amazon

Brazil is a peaceful state without enemies which is why Brasília does not face traditional military threats. Although Brazil has become diplomatically more assertive, the country is very peaceful. Brazilian diplomacy, as Hirst and Soares point out, revolves around negotiation and the pacific resolution of disputes.44 The country has not been in an armed conflict against another state since the Paraguayan War in 1870 except for its involvement in World War I and

II. Brazil became a committed member of non-proliferation regimes and the country’s leadership traditionally does not seek international recognition by advancing its military capabilities.

A study by the Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI) shows that global warming, international drug trafficking and trade protectionism rank among three most serious threats in the eyes of Brazil’s foreign policy community.45 In terms of traditional defense, however, Brazil is especially concerned about two regions: the Amazon and the coastal strip where Brazil’s oil reserves are located, which stretches from Santos in the state São Paulo through Rio de Janeiro to Vitória in the state of Espírito Santo.46

44 Hirst and Soares, 29. 45 De Souza, Amaury. “Brazil’s International Agenda Revisited: Perceptions of the Brazilian Foreign Policy Community.” Brazilian Center for International Relations Executive Summary, May 2009 http://www.cebri.org/midia/documentos/brazil's_international_agenda_revisited_-_cebri.amaury_de_souza_- _may2009.pdf (accessed October 15, 2012). 46 Annex I. Helbig 20

The Amazon plays a surprisingly large role in Brazilian security policy is surprising. As

Brazilian Colonel Gelio Fregapani depicts in his book “Amazon: A large international greed,”47 the international community supposedly uses environmental protection and the protection of local tribes as a false pretense to hinder Brazil to exploit its biodiversity and mineral deposits in the Amazon. Fregapani especially points out international non-governmental organizations to be agents of the West. By complying with these organizations’ demands, Brazil compromises its sovereignty and national integrity in the light of international competition for resources. Almost half of the policymakers interviewed for the CEBRI study believe the internationalization of the

Amazon to be a threat. This is why the sovereignty of the Amazon is among the most important components of Brazil’s National Strategy of Defense from 2008:

“Prioritize the Amazon region.

The Amazon region represents one of the most important points of focus for defense purposes [...] Brazil will be watchful to the unconditional reaffirmation of its sovereignty upon the Brazilian Amazon region. It will repudiate, by means of actions of development and defense, any attempt of external imposition on its decisions regarding the preservation, development and defense of the Amazon region. It will not allow organizations or individuals to serve as instruments for alien interests – political or economic – willing to weaken the Brazilian sovereignty. It is Brazil that takes care of the Brazilian Amazon region, at the service of mankind and at its own service.” 48

As a result, Brazil’s military stations over 27,000 troops, or more than 12.4% of the total troop size, in the region.49 While Amazon has been always been a concern for Brazilian security policymakers due to its vulnerable location and its abundance of resources, it was not until the

47 Fregapani, Gélio. “Amazônia: a grande cobiça internacional.” Brasília: Thesaurus Editora, 2000. 48 Brazilian Ministry of Defense. “National Strategy of Defence.” 2008 http://www.defesa.gov.br/projetosweb/estrategia/arquivos/estrategia_defesa_nacional_ingles.pdf (accessed September 12, 2012), 14. 49 Republic of Brazil. “White Book for National Defense.” 2012 http://www.camara.gov.br/internet/agencia/pdf/LIVRO_BRANCO.pdf (accessed November 7, 2012), 236. Helbig 21 newly discovered oil resources that Brazil’s coastal region gained significant attention from the country’s military.

A specific security concern arose with the installation of the 4th U.S. fleet in the South

Atlantic in 2008, just after discovery of large oil fields off the coast of Rio de Janeiro in 2006 and

2008. As Kellie Meiman of McLarthy Associates and David Rothkopf of Foreign Policy point out, the reinstatement of the fleet, which was inactive since 1950, was announced without prior diplomatic consultation with the allies in the region. This surprise led to large negative reactions in the Brazilian government. The authors argue that the US missed the opportunity to highlight collateral benefits, and instead created suspicion among the Brazilian security community.50

Next to the reinstallation of the 4th fleet, the fact that the US has never signed the UN

Convention on the Law of the Sea raises concerns among Brazilian foreign policymakers who look out to protect their sovereignty off the country’s coast. Former Brazilian Defense Minister

Nelson Jobim pointed out that “Amazonia Azul” belongs to Brazil. The term stands for the “blue

Amazon” and refers to the exclusive economic zone off the coast of Brazil with an area of

963,000 km².51 As the Brazilian Navy explains, that after the recommendation to the UN

Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to extend the coast limits beyond 200 nautical miles have been excepted, the Brazilian maritime spaces could reach approximately 4.5 million km², an area larger area than of the green Amazon or over twelve times the area of

50 Rothkopf, David and Kellie Meiman “The United States and Brazil: Two perspectives on dealing with partnership and rivalry.” Center for American Progress March 2009 http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/pdf/brazil.pdf (accessed October 20, 2012), 8. 51 See Annex I for a graphic of Brazil’s offshore oil. Helbig 22

Germany.52 Jobim points out that the U.S. does not recognize the “legal status of countries like

Brazil, which has 350 miles of its continental shelf under its sovereignty.”53 Brazil’s serious concerns about its oil reserves are also reflected in Brazil’s National Strategy of Defense: “Brazil and its Armed Forces should be ready to take measures to protect the [country’s] sea lines of trade and oil platforms.”54

II.IIX. Upgrading Brazilian military forces

Since the Brazilian government believes in the necessity to defend its newly discovered oil fields, much attention has been drawn to the Brazil’s Navy, which is the branch in the

Brazilian military responsible for all naval operations because the Brazilian military does not have a coast guard. This has resonated in a call for modernization and build-up of the navy.

German Commander Sascha Albrecht points out that Brasília plans to double the number of its battle ships by 2030.55 Especially noteworthy is the procurement of nuclear-powered submarine from France for $5.7 billion which includes a technology transfer in order for Brazil to gain the capability to build the submarines’ nuclear component itself.56 Albrecht believes that a nuclear-powered submarine is not necessary, however, for the aspired mobility because

52 Marinha do Brasil. “Amazônia Azul: definição.” http://www.mar.mil.br/menu_v/amazonia_azul/html/definicao.html (accessed October 20, 2012). 53 Antunes, Claudia. “Ministro da Defesa ataca estratégia militar de EUA e Otan para o Atlântico Sul” Folha de S.Paulo November 4, 2010 http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/825261-ministro-da-defesa-ataca-estrategia- militar-de-eua-e-otan-para-o-atlantico-sul.shtml (accessed October 16, 2012). 54 Brazilian Ministry of Defense, 17. 55 Albrecht, Sascha. “Seemacht Brasilien? Maritime Ambitionen einer aufstrebenden Macht im Südatlantik.“ Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik September 2011 http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/publikationen/swp-studien- de/swp-studien-detail/article/maritime_ambitionen_brasiliens_im_suedatlantik.html (accessed October 12, 2012), 5. 56 Taylor, Paul D. “Why Does Brazil Need Nuclear Submarines?” Proceedings Magazine Vol. 135/6/1,276, June 2009 http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2009-06/why-does-brazil-need-nuclear-submarines (accessed October 12, 2012). Helbig 23

Brazil could instead acquire several conventionally-powered submarines for the same level of investment.57 This is why U.S. Ambassador Paul D. Taylor and Albrecht, for example, argue that

Brazil’s plan to install nuclear submarines is a way to gain international prestige.58 If Taylor and

Albrecht are correct, seeking recognition through acquiring military technology would be a new development because, according to Hirst and Soares, Brazilian policymakers traditionally do not view military strength as a source of prestige.59 Former director of the German Ministry of

Defense’s planning staff Hans Rühle even go as far as making the case that could use the procurement of nuclear submarines is a Trojan Horse for Brazil’s attempt to build a nuclear bomb.60

In addition to increasing the country’s military capabilities, Brazil attempts to build a military-industrial complex. National Strategy of Defense states that “Brazil’s defense requires the reorganization of the national defense industry.” The latest version of the first Brazilian

White Book, which is currently under review at the Brazilian congress, also takes on the importance of building independent capabilities, explaining that the Navy prioritizes strategic projects in order to gain increasing independence. Thus, projects, such as the nuclear-powered submarine, have the main objective of strengthening Brazil’s industrial defense base.61

Brazil’s ambition to increase its naval capabilities, however, should not be considered a threat for Brazil’s neighbors. Given the sheer size of its territory as well as its global ambitions,

57 Ibid, 22. 58 Albrecht; Taylor. 59 Hirst and Soares, 38. 60 Rühle Hans. “Is Brazil Developing the Bomb?” Der Spiegel July 5, 2010 http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nuclear-proliferation-in-latin-america-is-brazil-developing-the-bomb- a-693336.html (accessed October 15, 2012). 61 Republic of Brazil, 192-193. Helbig 24 the country needs to modernize its armed forces to protect its borders and take on more responsibility abroad. The National Strategy of Defense also states the need to build the

“[c]apacity to join international peacekeeping operations outside of the territory and the

Brazilian jurisdictional waters, under the aegis of the United Nations or other multilateral organizations in the region.”62 Whether or not Brazil intends to use its newly built capabilities to take on a greater role in international peacekeeping, the country is far from becoming a military power considering its very limited capabilites.

Hirst and Soares point out that Brazil’s defense budget compared to the country’s population is significantly smaller than that of other South American countries, including

Venezuela, Colombia and Chile.63 Internationally, Brazil cannot match the defense capabilities of other regional and emerging powers including India, Indonesia and Egypt. The same holds true when comparing Brazil to most Western countries. Take Germany, for example, which spends about twenty percent more on defense than Brazil, while its population is about 60 percent less than Brazil’s. This makes the average German spend over three times more on defense as the average Brazilian.

It is also noteworthy, that over 75% percent of Brazil’s defense budget is spent on personnel, including retirement.64 This leaves even less money for the modernization of the forces and prevents Brazil from even sustaining an arms race or acquiring and sustaining

62 Brazilian Ministry of Defense, 20. 63 Hirst and Soares. 38. 64 Republic of Brazil, 227. Helbig 25 nuclear capabilities, as pointed out by retired Brazilian Ambassador José Botafogo.65 In terms the development of Brazil’s military, it is also noteworthy that the Brazilian Ministry of Defense was just founded 1999 to integrate the Army, Navy and Air Force, with the aim of reducing costs, advancing coordination between the branches and increasing civilian control within the forces.

II.IX. NATO in the light of Brazilian foreign and security policy

As noted above, NATO-Brazil relations do not exist (yet) and neither one of the parties have officially reached out to one another. In its partnership policy from April 2011, the Alliance states that it is prepared to develop a dialogue with any state which shares the Alliance’s interest in “peaceful international relations.”66 Since the Alliance pursues a strategy of building a network of and close relations with states which share NATO’s values, the possibility of building relations with South America has gained notice within NATO. The NATO Defense

College in Rome plans to put on a NATO-South America conference in May 2013 in Rio de

Janeiro.67 Other conferences have already given the parties a chance to observe the relations to each other, such as the annual “Forte de Copacabana” conference on international security co- organized by CEBRI and the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

65 Landertinger Forero, Josephine. “Copacabana, Samba und... Nuklearmacht?” Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation May 11, 2011 http://www.kas.de/brasilien/de/publications/22767/ (accessed October 15, 2012). 66 NATO. “Active engagement in cooperative security: A more efficient and flexible partnership policy.” VII: Wider engagement http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_04/20110415_110415-Partnership-Policy.pdf, (accessed October 16, 2012). 67 Kamp, Karl-Heinz. “Challenges and Opportunities for strategic cooperation between South and North.” Speech at the IX. Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference, September 19, 2012, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Helbig 26

The most notable contribution in regards to NATO-Brazil relations occurred in

November 2010 when Jobim expressed his opinions on NATO in a debate with German four- star General and former NATO official Klaus Naumann. Jobim underlined Brazil’s stance that security can only be accomplished on the basis of the nation state, thereby denouncing NATO’s commitment to collective security. He continued to say that it is necessary to note that Europe and South America are different regions with different concepts of security. He also noted that the security of South America is the sole responsibility of the South Americans and critically asked Naumann why it is that he thinks that there would be no security in Europe without the

US. Naumann stated that Europe is the US’s preferred partner and that Washington needs to maintain its role in the world, to which Jobim responded that Brazil will not be a U.S. ally in order for Washington to keep its role in the world.68 Jobim clearly positioned himself against the US when he asked “How can we talk about the South Atlantic with a country that does not recognize the titles referred to by the UN?”69

Jobim’s tone during the heated discussion was very critical of NATO. But this was not the first time when he noted his negative sentiments of NATO. Speaking in April 2010 at the

Lisbon National Defense Institute, he pointed out that it would be “inappropriate” for NATO to exert influence in the South Atlantic and that NATO would be no substitute for the UN.70 Jobim

68 Antunes, Claudia. “Ministro da Defesa ataca estratégia militar de EUA e Otan para o Atlântico Sul” Folha de S.Paulo November 4, 2010 http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/825261-ministro-da-defesa-ataca-estrategia- militar-de-eua-e-otan-para-o-atlantico-sul.shtml (accessed October 16, 2012). 69 Fischer-Bollin, Peter. „Sicherheitskonferenz mit Verteidigungsminister Jobim und General Naumann.“ Konrad- Adenauer-Foundation November 7, 2010 http://www.kas.de/brasilien/de/publications/20984/ (accessed October 16, 2012). 70 Jobim, Nelson. “Palestra do ministro da Defesa do Brasil, Nelson A. Jobim no Encerramento da Conferência Internacional - “O Futuro da Comunidade Transatlântica” Helbig 27 also used his trip to Washington in October 2010 to bring up his concerns about NATO when he met with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Arturo Valenzuela.71

Jobim’s views are not unique in Brazil. Based on the interviews conducted for this paper, many senior diplomats and administration officials have denounced NATO’s legitimacy because they see the organization as a tool for American power projection. In addition, many believe that there is no compelling case for the survival of NATO after the Cold War. Instead of expanding its role, they argue, NATO should dissolve and pass on its role to UN. It is clear that

Brazil’s foreign policy circle has a very suspicious and overall negative view of NATO.

II.X. Opposing NATO in practice – the case of Libya

In addition to Jobim’s statements, Brazilian policymakers have turned their back on

NATO in practice. In March 2011, NATO started its air campaign in Libya under UN Security

Council resolution 1973 with the goal of enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya to protect Libya’s civilian populations. Brazil, at the time a non-permanent Security Council member, abstained from the decision because Brasília argued that the resolution gives NATO too much leeway to use its “responsibility to protect” to achieve its own interests, such as overturning the Gaddafi government.

Instituto de Defesa Nacional September 10, 2010 https://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/File/2010/mes09/o_futuro_da_comunidade.pdf (accessed October 16, 2012). 71 Seabra, Pedro. “South Atlantic crossfire: Portugal in-between Brazil and NATO.” Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security November 2010 www.ipris.org/php/download.php?fid=304 (accessed November 7, 2012), 3. Helbig 28

Since Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff’s was part of the rebellion against the Brazilian dictatorial regime in her twenties, one may assume that she would have supported the uprising against Gaddafi. As Spektor noted, however, suggesting her opposition against the NATO campaign to be hypocritical is wrong. By taking a stance against the NATO intervention, she denounced the risks which arise with humanitarian interventions under the policy of

“responsibility to protect.” Specifically, the Brazilian government noted that humanitarian intervention might be misused for purposes other than protecting civilians.72 In response, Brazil developed the “responsibility while protecting” policy, which sets limits on the interveners, in order for them not to use humanitarian intervention as a tool for power projection.

The case of Libya also shows a clash of narratives between Brazil and NATO. While

Brazilian Foreign Policy Advisor Antonio Patriota pointed out that the developments in Libya confirmed Brazil’s concern about NATO, U.S. Representative to NATO Ivo Daalder argues that

Libya is a model for future intervention.73 The example shows how Brazil’s foreign policy results in practical and narrative differences with NATO.

III. NATO’s Partnership Policy

As pointed out above, building partnerships has become a key activity of NATO. And

Brussels is successful. While NATO seeks to enhance its operational capabilities in partnering

72 Viotti, Maria Luiza. “Letter dated 9 November 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.” United Nations, point 10. November 9, 2011 http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/opinion/iht-pdf/latitude-blog-20112212-UNpaper.pdf (accessed November 1, 2012). 73 Daalder, Ivo and James Stavridis. “NATO’s Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an Intervention.” Foreign Policy March/April 2012 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137073/ivo-h-daalder-and-james-g-stavridis/natos- victory-in-libya (accessed October 16, 2012). Helbig 29 with states which are willing to support NATO operations, the Alliance also seeks to support its network to enhance its legitimacy and coordination with global partners. Partnerships thereby serve as vehicles for NATO to become as a genuine international security organization. They also support NATO to promote its interest based on cooperation and shared norms in a time of relative Western decline.74

As Jamie Shae, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges points out, “[n]o other regional organization has such a global support and outreach network.”

Given the importance of reaching out to new potential partners, NATO reformed its frameworks to make partnerships more flexible and open. In addition to regional forums like the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, the Alliance has introduced the 28 (all members) +N (potential partners) format where NATO offers specific options tailored to its partners, including consultations, operational support and educational cooperation. These reforms opened NATO’s outreach to potential partners without any ambitions for membership.75 James Appathurai, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy, explains that the new policy establishes a bilateral framework for cooperation. Examples include NATO to be a hub for dialogue and specific projects, such as supporting English language training in the Mongolian forces.76

74 Shae, Jamie. „Keeping NATO relevant.“ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace April 2012 http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/19/keeping-nato-relevant/acl9# (accessed October 20, 2012). 75 Reisinger, Heidi. “Rearranging Family Life and a Large Circle of Friends: Reforming NATO’s Partnership Programmes.” NATO Defense College Research Paper No. 72 (January 2012) http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/current_news.php?icode=351 (accessed October 16, 20120), 7. 76 Pertusot, Vivien. „Partnerships Should Be Incentivized.” Atlantic Community March 20, 2012 http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/articles/view/Partnerships_Should_Be_Incentivized (accessed October 16, 2012). Helbig 30

While the Alliance has clearly defined its new approach to partnerships, different factions within NATO foresee different goals in regards to international cooperation. After all,

NATO cannot reach out everywhere since partnerships require resources in times of continuing austerity. Eastern European NATO members still value NATO as deterrence against the Russians while Western Europeans and the US may be more inclined to use NATO in their engagement in global security. Different member states see a post-Afghanistan NATO to pursue varying roles, ranging from returning to European territorial defense to taking on genuine global commitments. Varying opinions on NATO’s future also lead to varying views about the

Alliance’s partnerships policy.

Therefore, factions within NATO may take initiative to shape the policy debate towards reaching out to the South Atlantic. Portugal and Spain could be the drivers of this development.

Because if their historic, linguistic and geographical ties, they could drive the policy planning discussions towards the South Atlantic, just like France did in regard to the Mediterranean and

Germany did in regard to Eastern Europe. In fact, countries such as Portugal have already been lobbying to extend the Alliance’s look to the South Atlantic, what Petro Seabra of the

Portuguese Institute of International and Security Relations calls “the strategic square that connects Lisbon to the US, Brazil and Angola.”77 In assessing the potential of genuine transatlantic partnership, both south and north of the equator, Ian Lesser of the German

77 Seabra, 2. Helbig 31

Marshall Fund points out that forming an Atlantic community among traditional and emerging powers across the Atlantic may be a way of overcoming competing identities and interests.78

IV. Theory of NATO-Brazil relations

Having discussed the background necessary to understand to evaluate the potential of a partnership between NATO and Brazil, it is important to look at the puzzle of whether or not

NATO will form a partnership with Brazil from a theoretical standpoint. Hereby, one needs to consider the premises under which international relations theories view the formation of alliances and regimes. By considering a broader academic debate on alliance formation and international regimes outlined below with focus on realism, liberalism and constructivism, it becomes clear that different schools of international relations have different predictions for a partnership between NATO and Brazil.

IV.I. Classical and Structural Realism

The realist school of international relations is based on three basic assumptions: States are the sole actors in international relations, the international system is anarchic, and rational states calculate their interests in response to the power structure of the international system.79

Realism can also be referred to as an alliance theory since is concerned with the formation of alliances based on the balance of power.80 In its more scientific form, referred to

78 Lesser, Ian O. “Southern Atlanticism: Geopolitics and Strategy for the other half of the Atlantic Rim.” German Marshall Fund of the US (March 2010) http://www.gmfus.org/brusselsforum/2010/docs/BF2010-Paper-Lesser.pdf (accessed October 16, 2012), 8. 79 Risse-Kappen, Thomas. “Cooperation Among Democracies.” Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995, 14. Helbig 32 as structural realism or neorealism, the theory follows the principle that states act according to the distribution of capabilities. Structural realists would argue that in the current unipolar world order, states other than the US, the sole global hegemon, have two options: either they form alliances to balance the US, or they can bandwagon with the US to ensure their survival by preventing hostile action from the US and free-ride on American capabilities.81 Classical realists, such as Hans Morgenthau, who base their arguments on the self-interested and unchanging nature of human beings, base their assessment of national interest and alliance formation on broader terms than material capabilities, whatever states can do to ensure their survival in the anarchic international system and fulfill their drive for power.

Considering that alliances form due to outside threats, why is it that NATO exists twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union which was the principle reason for the Alliance’s existance? And why is NATO actively engaged in reaching out to potential partners which may or may not adhere to the same value system as NATO claims to stand for its treaty?

Structural realists argue that NATO should have resolved after the end of the Cold War, but their prediction has failed. In regard to NATO-Brazil relations, neo-realists would argue against a potential partnership because the actors lack the grounds of forming an alliance – a common threat.

Classical realists explain the existence of NATO by pointing to the member states’ calculations based on their broader understanding of national interest. It is assumed that the

80 Ibid. 81 Risse-Kappen, 22; Walt, Stephen M. “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power.” International Security Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring 1985), 3-43 http://www.christoph-rohde.de/waltallianceformationandbop1985.pdf (accessed November 14, 2012), 5. Helbig 33 hegemon is committed to creating regimes to serve its own interest. John Ikenberry points out that NATO can be considered an example of how the US “plant[ed] institutional seeds” to advance its influence.82 This explains why many Brazilian foreign policymakers view NATO, along with other international organizations formed after WWII, as a tool for .U.S grand strategy.

The US has an interest in NATO because the Alliance provides reliable partners which support U.S. actions thereby aiding legitimacy for U.S. foreign policy. Europeans mainly gain security by bandwagoning the US which allows European NATO states to free-ride on U.S. defense spending. Therefore, NATO is mutual beneficial to all of its members.

From a realist’s perspective, the formation of a partnership between NATO and another state depends on whether a partnership is in the mutual interest of the parties. By forming a new partnership, NATO states would gain support for their actions because they would gain a potential partner in combat and because a partnership would formally endorse NATO’s legitimacy.

Brazil has two principle choices: to stand with the US or against it, which would manifest itself in the decision whether Brasília joins NATO as a formalized alliance which reflects US interest. Whatever Brazilian foreign policymakers chose in the long term depends on their calculations of how Brazil can advance its national interest by increasing its relative power.

82 Ikenberry, G. John. “After Victory.” Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001, 235. Helbig 34

Brazil can chose to bandwagon with the US, as the sole superpower, and NATO, as the formal superpower’s net of allies, thereby free-riding on the US’s capabilities and increasing its power by influencing the Alliance as a stakeholder. However, Brazil chose to balance against the

US, as underlined by the examples above. After all, a partnership with NATO would lead Brasília to give up its whole foreign policy strategy. As pointed out above, Brazil wishes to reform the international order into one in which Brazil has more power. Brasília chose not to depend on

U.S. military capabilities by joining a US-led alliance because Brazil is already free-riding on the global powers’ leadership, considering that Brasília raises its claims a whole region of the world even though the Brazilian military is barely capable of patrolling the country’s border and coastline. In response to the U.S. safeguarding the South Atlantic, Brazil condemns Washington and raises suspicion about the US’s hidden agenda. Thereby, Brasília can stir up sentiments against the US, especially among its allies in the Global South, and portrait itself as a country embracing legitimacy and sustainability. This is how Brazil can raise its international profile relative to the US without having to spend a single Real more on defense.83

IV.II. Liberalism

Another argument is that states ally because of ideological solidarity which fits into context of liberalism. Liberals differ from realists in that they believe in the influence of domestic politics, law and organizations in international relations. Liberal theory argues that values and norms affect states’ definition of interests.84 Since shared values can also lead to

83 Realism is concerned with the distribution of relative power because realists believe that the amount of power is finite. 84 Risse-Kappen, 34 Helbig 35 shared interests, states form political regimes to achieve their mutual goals. Regime theory, stemming from a liberal tradition, explains that demand for institutions arises when unilateral action leads to suboptimal results.85 Regimes may be formal alliances or less institutionalized groups of states. Stephen Krasner defines regimes as "institutions possessing norms, decision rules, and procedures which facilitate a convergence of expectations."86

Liberals believe that obstacles for cooperation, such as the fear of cheating, the orientation towards relative gains and the uncertainty of each other’s motives, can be overcome.87 According to the democratic peace theory, democracies do not go to war with each other, thus naturally viewing each other as peaceful.88 This removes obstacles of cooperation because it reduces the security dilemma, a realist spiral model in which one state one state intends to increase its security through increasing its military capability and thereby provoking a similar response by another state.89 Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin argue that international cooperation can be increased through transparent behavior of regime members, reduced transaction costs through institutionalization, and raised expectations of cooperation among the members.90

85 Risse-Kappen, 29. 86 Krasner, Stephen. “International Regimes.” New York City: Cornell University Press, 1983, 2.. 87 Risse-Kappen, 30. 88 Doyle, Michael. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs." Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 12, No. 3 (1983), 205-235 http://www.politics.ubc.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/poli_sci/Faculty/price/Debating_the_Democratic_Peace__Doyl e.pdf (accessed November 14, 2012), 207–208. 89 Herz, John H. “Political realism and political idealism.” Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951. 90 Keohane, Robert O. and Lisa L. Martin. "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory." International Security Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1996), 39-51 http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Reed-POL-240-2012- S1_IP/Syllabus/EReadings/03.2/03.2.KeohaneMartin1995The-Promise.pdf (accessed November 14, 2012). Helbig 36

Because of their common values and interests, liberalists argue that democracies should work together to help establish a more democratic world order.91 Some have pointed out the potential of NATO to become an international club of democracies. James Goldgeier and Ivo

Daalder encourage NATO to expand its membership globally to states which share the

Alliance’s values, based on the assumption that it would be in the NATO states’ interest to empower democracies around the world to join an institutionalized regime with the aim of spreading democracy.92 Thus, liberals also have a positive outlook on the potential of a NATO partnership with Brazil, considering Brazil to be a natural partner of NATO.

IV.III. Constructivism

A third major school of international relations theory is based on the belief that the international system is inherently undefined and constructed by actors not limited to states, a theory which Nicholas Onuf termed constructivism. Alexander Wendt, considered the founder of constructivism, argues that when trying to explain international relations, one should consider history and social context, rather than states’ material capabilities.93 Constructivism also differs from realism and liberalism in that states’ actions are not predetermined by factors, such as the balance of power and economic/political organization, but that relations between actors are a result of socially construction.

91 Daalder, Ivo and James Lindsey. "Democracies of the World, Unite.” The American Interest Vol. 2, No. 3 (2007), 5-15 http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=2&did=1194302121&SrchMode=1&sid=2&Fmt =4&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1251415353&clientId=31806 (accessed November 14, 2010). 92 Daalder, Ivo and James Goldgeier. "Global NATO.” Foreign Affairs Vol. 85, No. 5 (2006), 105-113 http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/fa/fa_septoct06/fa_2006_0910_i.html (accessed November 14, 2012). 93 Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics." International Organization Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), 391-425 http://labmundo.org/disciplinas/WENDT_anarchy_is_what_states_make_of_it.pdf (accessed November 14, 2012). Helbig 37

Since constructivists believe that occurrences, such as the formation of partnerships, depend on the interaction of actors, one may view Brazil’s colonial history and historically ambivalent relationship with the US as the root of Brazil’s stance on NATO. In addition, constructivists would consider concrete events which confine the relationship between NATO and Brazil as of today. Since the very limited amount of official and unofficial contact between the parties has been rather neutral from NATO’s side and hostile from Brazil’s side, NATO is not off to a good start to form a partnership with Brazil. The fact that NATO is still reaching out to

Brazil, even though Brasília’s policymakers signaled aversion to the Alliance, however, can be considered a sign of hope for the ones who wish the parties to form a partnership.

IV.IV. Assessing the potential of a partnership based on theory

The three international relations theories predict different potentials of a partnership between NATO and Brazil. Realism is principally open for the possibility that the two actors form a relationship, depending on the Brazilian policymakers’ determination what serves

Brazil’s national interest most: balancing against or bandwagoning with the US. As pointed out above, Brazil has chosen to (soft-)balance against the US. According to realism, a shift in Brazil’s behavior, which could lead to a partnership between NATO and Brazil, would only be possible only if the international balance of power altered. Different scenarios are imaginable, including a development of a bipolar world with the US and China on top or a multipolar world in which

Brazil may or may not constitute one of the poles. In any case, the international system would need to undergo genuine changes in order for Brazil to side with the US and partner up with

NATO. Helbig 38

Liberals would argue that Brazil will overcome its opposition to NATO after the realization that it is more beneficial to join a regime to change the world order in favor of its long term interest by spreading democracy. Liberals would therefore predict that NATO and

Brazil enter an alliance.

Operating under the parameters of constructivism, the question whether NATO and

Brazil will form a partnership is rather unpredictable since one cannot foresee the effects of the changing world order and any unforeseeable events which may impact NATO’s and Brazil’s nature and perception of each other.

Considering the three international relations theories, realism is most likely to be able to predict Brazil’s strategy regarding a relationship with NATO. Liberalism simply cannot explain

Brazil’s actions, such as the state’s current outreach to China and numerous autocratic African and South American states without an agenda of democratic reform. The continuing resistance to endorse Western regimes also falls in the realm of realist behavior, which is unlikely to change until the international balance of power foregoes major shifts. Thus, the assessment of international relations theory in regards to alliance formation and regimes implies that Brazil will not enter into a relationship with NATO.

V. Policy of NATO-Brazil relations

V.I. NATO’s three main challenges in reaching out to Brazil Helbig 39

Based on the response of senior Brazilian foreign policymakers and given the assumption that NATO seeks Brazil as a partner, NATO faces the three main challenges which make it very unlikely for NATO to enter a partnership agreement with Brazil from a policy perspective:

1. Brazil’s strategic objectives do not allow Brazil to enter a relationship with an

organization which resembles old power structures because international governance

reform is one of Brazil’s highest strategic priorities.

Considering Brazil’s wish to play a larger role in international politics, based on genuine multilateral engagement, leads Brazilian policymakers to call for global governance reform, most notably a rearrangement of the UN Security Council. Brasília would denounce the current world order if signed on to organizations which present the traditional world order tilted towards the interest of “the West.” Therfore, Brazil rejects the legitimacy of NATO as an international organization viewed to be biased towards the interest of old powers, which does not include Brazil as a former colony.

2. Brazil’s security interests, which mainly evolve around internal security as well as the

protection of its sovereignty in the Amazon and its costal region, vastly differ from

NATO’s stakes in international security.

The absence of common regional security challenges makes overcoming ideological difference on the basis of shared challenges difficult. In the case of India, for example, Indian policymakers, who still denounce NATO in the light of their belief in nonalignment, consider working with NATO in Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean. If NATO was fighting a war in Brazil’s Helbig 40 backyard, Brasília might be more inclined to work with NATO. Since this is not the case, it is hard for NATO to make the case for practical cooperation.

3. The adverse relationship between Brazil and the US hinders substantial cooperation

with NATO

Since the Brazilian policymakers are actively soft-balancing the US’s presence in Brazil’s sphere of influence, it would counter their strategy to enter an agreement with an Alliance led by the US. Since Brazil often fear that the US touches upon its sovereignty, making the case for cooperation in maritime security in the South Atlantic, such as the Gulf of Guinea, is also rather unlikely.

V.II. Possible Cooperative Initiatives

Even though the chances of a partnership between NATO and Brazil are slim, it is worth considering possible approaches. The list of potential benefits of being a NATO partner is long, ranging from gaining expertise in military issues like force transformation, cyber security, terrorism and counter-piracy to becoming part of a diplomatic inner circle with the most powerful states on the table. One needs to keep in mind, however, that Brazil already is a close partner of a number of NATO states from which Brasília can gain similar benefits. One thing

Brazil seeks, for example, is military equipment and technology which NATO cannot offer, but its member states, such as France, can. Therefore, it is not easy to find possible areas of cooperation from which Brazil can benefit due to NATO’s unique setup. Helbig 41

Fighting piracy in the Gulf of Guinea would be a regional example. The Gulf of Guinea, located in West Africa is not just within what Brazilian policymakers consider their sphere of interests, but also includes São Tomé and Príncipe, which has close ties to Brazil because of their shared Portuguese colonial history. In addition, the region is a large oil exporter which depends on the protection of the sea lanes of communication. Piracy in the region is on the rise and is considered to cost $2 billion per year, compared to $7 billion per year in Somalia.94 The

UN has already called for technical and logistical help from the international community. Since the US currently imports 15 percent of its oil from this region, a number which is projected to increase, the U.S. African Command Africom is already engaged in supporting the local forces through joint training exercises.95 This is where Brazil could step in to take responsibility for its

African neighbors. NATO, which is already engaged in similar operations off the coast of

Somalia, could serve as a coordination platform between the parties. Lesser notes that a possible cooperation could include maritime surveillance, search and rescue, and environmental security missions.96

To take a functional example, Brazil could work together with NATO to protect the cyber space. Cybercrime is an upcoming threat which poses unforeseeable consequences. The

Alliance has built up vast capabilities to protect its member states’ cyberspace and works

94 Baldauf, Scott. “Next pirate hot spot: the Gulf of Guinea.” Christian Science Monitor February 28, 2012 http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2012/0228/Next-pirate-hot-spot-the-Gulf-of-Guinea (accessed October 12, 2012). 95 Ibid. 96 Lesser, 22. Helbig 42 together with partners around the world to share best practices and coordinate legislation.97

Brazil, which also has an interest to protect its cyber space, already cooperates on this issue with the UK, for example. Brasília would be able to benefit by sharing best practices with NATO and develop joint solutions on a truly uncontroversial issue without having to fear about its intelligence security. After all, Brasília can monitor its own cyberspace, but it may be interested in how to defend its cyberspace more efficiently, assuming there is space for improvement.

However, Brazil does not seem to be interested in cyber security cooperation. As a European diplomat noted, Brazil is not even remotely interested in joining the Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe, which is the only international apparatus on cyber security with the goal of developing anti-cybercrime legislature and fostering cooperation between its members on the matter.98

VI. Beyond Brazil: Possible alternatives to gaining a foothold in South America and the

South Atlantic

Considering the hurdles above, even if NATO which portraits itself as genuinely cooperative and does not represent the Western world order, the Alliance is likely to fail to successfully reach out to Brazil, which, given its influence on its continent, would serve as a logical entrance point into South America. Assuming that it is NATO’s goal to establish new partnerships in the South Atlantic and/or South American region, it is worth considering the

Alliance’s alternatives to reaching out to the region.

97 For an in-depth discussion on NATO’s cyber defense, see: Joubert, Vincent. “Five years after Estonia’s cyber attacks: lessons learned for NATO?” NATO Defense College Research Paper No. 76 (May 2012) http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/series.php?icode=1 (accessed October 12, 2012). 98 45 states have signed on to the convention, many of which are not members of the Council of Europe, such as South Africa, Australia and Japan. Helbig 43

VI.I. NATO reaching out to Unasur

Instead of reaching out to further countries, NATO could also reach out to further organizations. The Alliance has a terrific working relationship with the UN, the EU and the

OECD. As of yet, NATO has not build any formal relations with regional organizations in which its members are not represented. Unasur, the Union of South American Nations, was established in 2008 and includes all major South American states. The organization engages in continental integration, which also includes defense to a low level. In 2008, the Brazilian government submitted a proposal which led to the establishment of a South American Defense

Council (SDC) with the goal of strengthening regional cooperation in defense issues. Experts do not believe that Brazil looks at Unasur and the SDC as a vehicle to reach outside of its region, but as a consultation forum to focus on overcoming regional differences. Brazilian historian

Amado Luiz Cervo, for example, believes that the establishment of the SDC is a way to keep external powers out of South American security.99 However, UNASUR in fact invited the United

States to a dialogue on “the strategic matters of defence, peace, security and development.”100

Since the US never took on this invitation, NATO may be able to step in, reach out the Unasur and to get a foothold in South America.

VI.II. NATO reaching out to IBSA

99 Cervo, Amado Luiz. “Brazil’s Rise on the International Scene: Brazil and the World.” rev. Bras. Polít. Int. Vol. 53 (special edition): 7-32 (2010) http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S0034-73292010000300002&script=sci_arttext (accessed October 16, 2012). 100 UNASUR. “Extraordinary Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense of the UNASUR Resolution.” September 15, 2009 http://www.unasurcds.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=163%3Aextraordinary-meeting-of- the-ministers-&catid=58%3Aingles&Itemid=189&lang=es (accessed October 17, 2012). Helbig 44

If NATO wants to increase its relations with leading democratic states in the continents of both sides of the South Atlantic, IBSA would be an ideal partner (also because NATO has expressed its interest in working with India). What could stand in the way of a partnership, however, is that IBSA is not yet a coherent body. As a dialogue forum, IBSA has facilitated cooperation in areas like international development and coordination in foreign policy among its members. The organization’s members have carried out joint military exercises under an

IBSA mandate. However, the organization is far from engaging in any mission or creating an organizational structure beyond its annual summits.

VI.III. Encouraging a South Atlantic Treaty Organization

The establishment of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO) could serve NATO’s interests just as much as creating partnerships in the region if the development of a SATO is steered in the right way. SATO could benefit NATO if the organization takes on genuine commitments in the South Atlantic region thereby contain South Atlantic countries from free- riding on NATO’s capabilities. However, it were the adversaries of NATO, Venezuelan President

Hugo Chavez and then Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi, who have called for a creation of

SATO in 2009.101 When thinking of establishing a collective defense body in the South Atlantic, it is also important to note the restraints from the disposition to give up sovereignty, such as in the case of Brazil, as explained above. The formation of SATO is rather unlikely, but in case of an

101 Bodzin, Steven and Daniel Cancel. “Chavez, Qaddafi Seek Africa-South America NATO, Bank (Update1).” Bloomberg September 27, 2009 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aCPmfLXmPP48 (accessed October 16, 2012). Helbig 45 establishment, NATO should be prepared to steer SATO away from anti-American rhetoric toward taking responsibility in the region.

VI.IV. NATO reaching out to other South American states

Brazil could serve as an entry point into South America, but it is by far from being the only option. The US has working relations in defense with Colombia. Why not using NATO to help

Bogotá fight narcotrafficking (in case NATO is interested to invest in these matters)? NATO also already has a history of working with Argentina since Buenos Aires fought along the NATO forces during the SFOR operation in the Balkans. It may also just be easier to reach out to small countries south of the equator. As Lesser suggests, these states may seek help with transnational problems and strategic reassurance, which big countries may see as an attack to their sovereignty.102 If NATO successfully entered an agreement with a South American country,

Brazil may be more inclined to enter a partnership with the Alliance as Brazil may rather lead the partnership between South America and NATO itself than leave it to its neighbors.

VI.V. Redefining the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance

As early as 1947, Brazil entered into the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio Treaty and TIAR103, a treaty between countries across the Americas (including the US) based on common defense. This means that an attack on one is to be considered an attack on all, resembling NATO’s article V. Since its establishment, the treaty has been invoked several times, but the South American states have rarely committed troops, for example in the

102 Lesser, 18. 103 Abbreviation from Spanish “Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca” Helbig 46

US’s War on Terror after September 11, 2011. Most notably, during the Falkland Wars, the US did not side with Argentina against Great Britain because Washington is part of both NATO and

TIAR; Great Britain was not able to invoke Article V because the Falklands is Great Britain’s external territory and thus does not fall under NATO’s article V. Other countries, including Chile and Colombia did not favor Argentina either because they saw Buenos Aires as the aggressor.

This was seen as the failure, but did not lead to the resolution, of TIAR. NATO, under the leadership of the US, could revive TIAR and lead the Inter-American alliance into a partnership with NATO.

VI.VI. Just let the Europeans do it alone

Since NATO is a “nonstarter,”104 as Alfredo Valladão calls it, European NATO states may have a better chance approaching Brazil without the US, as Europe is slightly less controversial than the US among Brazilian foreign policymakers. The EU has already reached out to Brazil through its Collective Security and Defence Policy apparatus. As of right now, the EU’s proposal is under review at Brazil’s Ministry of External Affairs. The potential agreement may include joint summits, peacekeeping and crisis management operations.

VII. Conclusion

NATO has a success record of reaching out to states outside of the North Atlantic region considering that NATO even has official relations with rising powers which are non-democratic,

104 Interview with Alfredo Valladão, September 18, 2012, Rio de Janiero, razil. Helbig 47 such as Russia and China.105 As the Alliance arguably constitutes a non-neglectable international security network, a non-NATO state practically has the choice to join the regime, stay neutral or position itself against it. Depending on what international relations theory one takes into account, these options may diminish to either being with or against NATO, such as in the case of realism, or the range of options expand depending on social construction, such as in the theory of constructivism.

Brazil, being a regional middle power, chose to soft-balance the US hegemon, which is why Brasília denounces the US’s primary international security organization. Responses of senior Brazilian policymakers and academics concerning NATO are uniformly negative. The antipathy is unlikely to change because NATO simply does not fit into a world system which

Brazil desires. Thus, both policy and theory suggest that Brazil will not become a partner of

NATO.

An important take-away for NATO is that even though NATO is an attractive partner for many states around the world and itself has a waiting-list, the Alliance needs to be aware of the limits of its global outreach, even among states which share the Alliance’s democratic values.

The case of Brazil proves the limits of international democratic regimes and depicts how rising power strategy can conflict with regimes dominated by the sole global hegemon.

NATO should therefore carefully consider whether it should spend its very limited resources to try altering Brazil’s policy towards the Alliance or whether Brussels should seek

105 NATO has an institutionalized relationship with Russia through the NATO-Russia council and the Alliance has staff-level contacts with China. Helbig 48 different ways to achieve its goal to increase its influence in international security. After all, a partnership with Brazil does not constitute an end in itself, but rather a means for NATO to stay a relevant actor two decades after it lost its raison d’etre

Helbig 49

Annex

Annex I106

Brazil’s “Blue Amazon” is the region highlighted in blue off the country’s coast:

Pre-salt oil reserves discovered in 2006 and 2008

106 Republic of Brazil, 43. Helbig 50

Annex II107

Pre-salt structure off Brazil’s coast

107 Ibid, 42. Helbig 51

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