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Home , Chief Cabinet Secretary, Hatoyama Cabinet, Yukio Hatoyama

Center for International Exchange June 2010

Hatoyama’s Resignation and Japan’s Foreign Policy

HITOSHI TANAKA, Senior Fellow, JCIE

Less than nine months a!er he assumed o"ce in will remain the governing party. Further, Kan has an atmosphere of jubilation on the back of the retained many of the ’s ministers. Democratic Party of Japan’s (DPJ) historic electoral 'erefore, few analysts expect any substantial policy victory over the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), changes as a result of this change at the top. However, fell from grace and resigned as the causes behind the fall of the Hatoyama govern- prime minister. , the former #nance min- ment may have a far-reaching impact on future for- ister, was o"cially sworn into o"ce on June $ as the eign and national security policy. new . Hatoyama’s fumbling over the Futenma issue, and the money scandals Causes behind the Fall that hit both him and DPJ Secretary-General Ichiro While some analysts have focused on Hatoyama’s Ozawa, drove Hatoyama’s approval rating down rap- personality and his inability to deliver on promises, idly to as low as %& percent. With an Upper House there are two more critical reasons that explain his election looming large next month, this change of fall from the top job. government was motivated by the desire of the DPJ First, the Hatoyama government failed to formu- to take action against widely predicted heavy elec- late a solid foreign or national security policy. 'is toral losses. was mainly due to fundamental di(erences with Given these recent events, the question must be one of its coalition partners, the Social Democratic asked, what implications will the fall of Hatoyama Party (SDP), which has strong paci#st tendencies. and the establishment of the new Kan government 'e main issue is that Hatoyama spoke of the need have on Japan’s foreign and national security policy? for a more equal US-Japan alliance, but he never 'e DPJ controls the Lower House, so regardless de#ned this rough concept or his expectations for of the results of the Upper House election the DPJ the future of the alliance in concrete terms. In fact, DPJ policy toward the United States can be ex- traditional powers—the United States and Japan—to plained more simply as an “anything but the LDP” newly emerging powers, particularly China and policy. For instance, Japan’s contribution to the “war India. Given the continuing economic growth an- on terror” was changed when the Maritime Self ticipated in China and India, this shi! in the balance Defense Force was pulled out of its refueling mis- of power is only expected to intensify. Further, as sion in the Indian Ocean, where it was supporting the emerging powers’ economies grow, interdepen- US-led activities in Afghanistan. (In place of this, dence between the traditional and emerging pow- the DPJ decided to provide a substantial aid pack- ers is set to deepen, meaning that we will be more age.) Also, the DPJ had made a campaign promise dependent on their markets. 'erefore, there is a to move the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma pressing need to manage foreign and national se- outside of Okinawa. However, Hatoyama publicly curity policy and the US-Japan alliance so that this set an unrealistic deadline for himself to achieve a interdependence can proceed smoothly without an resolution on the relocation by the end of May. 'e excessive feeling of threat. To facilitate discussions critical point here is that once the Futenma reloca- between the United States and Japan toward this tion became such a high pro#le issue, coming to a end, a joint wisemen’s commission on the future of resolution required making agreements with the US the US-Japan alliance should be established, com- government, the people of Okinawa, and the DPJ’s prised of government o"cials, politicians, public coalition partners. 'is proved impossible in such a intellectuals, and business leaders. short timeframe, and consequently Hatoyama was At the domestic level too, de#ning the importance forced to go back on his promise, issuing a May )$ of the US-Japan alliance in the future will help gar- joint statement that prioritized the conclusion of an ner support and understanding from the Japanese accord with the United States. people, and critically the Okinawans. 'e Futenma Second, there was a lack of expert input in formu- agreement, however incomplete it may be, will have lating policy. Foreign and national security policy to be implemented in a timely manner. Even though must be based on a very realistic assessment of the the prime minister has changed, this is an agreement international situation and the intentions of other made by a DPJ government, and Prime Minister Kan countries in the region. However, looking at the per- will have to honor it. At the same time, given the sonnel in the Hatoyama government and the Prime heightened expectations of the people of Okinawa as Minister’s O"ce, it is apparent that this expertise a result of Hatoyama’s *owery rhetoric, implementa- was lacking. Furthermore, as part of the DPJ’s cam- tion has become more di"cult, and we can expect paign promise to reduce excessive dependence on strong opposition from a(ected localities. Given the the bureaucracy, the lines of communication for bu- objective of a politically sustainable US-Japan alli- reaucrats to make policy recommendations to the ance, it would be preferable to have the agreement political leadership were almost entirely cut o(, and of—or at least some degree of understanding from— bureaucrats were, on the whole, routinely ignored. a(ected localities regarding government decisions concerning the Futenma relocation. Lessons for the DPJ Over the long term, both the United States and Japan realize that the alignment of forces in the re- New future-oriented thinking on the alliance gion should be gradually adjusted as the security sit- 'e DPJ must recognize that there is an urgent need uation evolves. To that end, strong diplomatic e(orts for consultations and discussions with the United should focus on reducing tensions, and a safer region States to formulate new thinking and de#ne the should provide the basis for corresponding changes US-Japan alliance in terms of the changing realities to US military levels in the region. However, in the in the region. A change in the balance of power in current context, a continued US presence in the re- East Asia is taking place, with power shi!ing from gion remains necessary. 'erefore, formulating new

EAST ASIA INSIGHTS 2 June 2010 future-oriented thinking on the US-Japan alliance, were politicians and members of the parliament and explaining to the people of Japan—especially and one of whom was a senior person from within Okinawans—why it is so important in the context the bureaucracy who had the role of coordinating of the changing international situation, is a critical among the di(erent ministries. 'eir coordinating stepping stone toward gaining public support for roles were instrumental. and understanding of alliance policy. 'ere was machinery in the governing party as well. In particular the LDP had the seimuchosakai, Policymaking process or Policy Research Council. 'is council facilitated 'e DPJ should also recognize the importance of intense consultations and discussions on all impor- the policymaking process in shaping foreign and na- tant policy matters between the cabinet members on tional security policy. In the era of LDP rule, there the one hand and the rest of the governing party and were three main elements of the policymaking pro- coalition parties and the bureaucrats on the other. cess: expert input from bureaucrats, coordination In the less than nine months since the establish- by the and his deputies, and ment of the Hatoyama government, these three intensive consultations and discussions among the central policymaking mechanisms were completely relevant actors in the Policy Research Council. done away with. To begin with, there has been a 'e bureaucracy was tasked with providing infor- signi#cant reduction in consultation with the bu- mation, intelligence assessments, and policy recom- reaucrats. A quick analysis of Hatoyama’s daily ap- mendations directly to senior political leaders and pointments as prime minister reveals that not many the prime minister. I recall when I was in charge of bureaucrats came to report to him directly. 'is negotiations with during the prime was part of the DPJ’s election campaign promise to ministership of . In a period of eliminate excessive dependence on the bureaucracy. one year I went to see the prime minister $$ times, At the same time, the chief cabinet secretary did not and each time I reported the state of a(airs of the play a substantive coordinating role whatsoever; he negotiations directly to him, discussed possible poli- merely played the role of a government spokesman. cies and approaches, and tried to obtain his input Illustrative of this is the fact that many high- ranking and endorsement. Every aspect of the negotiations government o"cials did not even meet with the was discussed intensely between the bureaucracy chief cabinet secretary during the eight and a half and the political leaders, not just the prime minister months of Hatoyama’s reign. but also the foreign minister, the chief cabinet sec- Given Ozawa’s declaration that policymaking retary, and so on. While the DPJ has been critical of power should be concentrated in the hands of the the LDP for its excessive dependence on bureaucrats, cabinet, and that the political party should not in- sometimes instructions did come from the top. 'e terfere in the policymaking process, input from DPJ )++, agreement on the reversion of Futenma and backbenchers and coalition partners was e(ectively the willingness of Koizumi to visit Pyongyang are shut out. A dual power structure was established examples of this. However, the bureaucracy always whereby Hatoyama was in charge of the govern- made sure that this happened with su"cient prepa- ment, which was mandated with carrying out policy- ration and expert input. making, and Ozawa was in charge of the party, 'ere was also machinery in the Prime Minister’s which was mandated with dealing with the Diet and O"ce for the coordination of national security elections. But, many policies have signi#cant im- policy. In particular, the chief cabinet secretary had plications for the DPJ’s coalition partners too, and two very important roles of coordinating among the the Futenma relocation issue is a case in point. 'e government and with the governing parties and act- DPJ agreed to the Futenma Accord with the United ing as a government spokesman. Further, there were States without due input, consultations, or negotia- three deputy chief cabinet secretaries, two of whom tions with its coalition partner the SDP. Further, the

EAST ASIA INSIGHTS 3 June 2010 DPJ expected that the SDP would simply sign o( on whether this is part of current DPJ plans or not re- this. In this way, the DPJ did not give adequate con- mains unclear. Nevertheless, in the absence of other sideration to the maintenance of the coalition, cre- foreign and national security policymaking mecha- ating a scenario in which the SDP was le! with no nisms, the NSB should be established as a bona #de alternative but to exit. bureau, substantiated in terms of sta( numbers, and It is, therefore, evident that there is an urgent and given a broad mandate in relation to foreign and immediate need for the new government to establish national security policymaking to allow for the for- appropriate mechanisms for the making of foreign mulation of solid, coordinated, and future-oriented and national security policy. 'ere are two possible foreign and national security policy with appropri- ways forward for the DPJ to resolve this policy- ate expert input. making process dilemma. 'e #rst way is to revive the LDP-era policy- ◆ ◆ ◆ making mechanisms. 'is would involve allowing expert input from bureaucrats, reestablishing the 'e resignation of Hatoyama has exposed the DPJ’s coordinating role of the chief cabinet secretary, and lack of solid foreign and national security policy. engaging in intensive consultations, discussions, However, the emergence of Kan as the new prime and negotiations among political leaders, the party, minister o(ers the DPJ a chance to learn important coalition parties, and bureaucrats. However, going lessons and correct these shortcomings. Soon a!er back to the LDP-era mechanisms may not be politi- the establishment of the new government, Prime cally viable for the DPJ given its reformist campaign Minister Kan and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshito promises and need to distance itself from the LDP. Sengoku started restructuring their relationship 'e second possible way to revitalize the foreign with the bureaucracy, calling for a new alliance and and national security policymaking process is to cre- bringing in additional bureaucrats as aides. 'e DPJ ate a new department within the Cabinet O"ce. In also reinstalled the Policy Research Council to allow the lead up to the Lower House election and upon better coordination of policies between the political taking power last year, the DPJ spoke of establish- party and the cabinet. 'is is a good start, but it will ing a National Strategy Bureau (NSB). 'e #rst step not be until a!er the Upper House election set for toward this was taken with the creation of a National July %% when we can see if substantive policies will Strategy O"ce. However, the legislation required to emerge from the Kan government. upgrade it to a full-*edged bureau is still under re- view as foot dragging continues. Under the DPJ’s original plans, the NSB was to be mandated with for- Hitoshi Tanaka is a senior fellow at JCIE. He previously eign and national security policymaking. However, served as Japan’s deputy minister for foreign a!airs.

East Asia Insights East Asia Insights is an occasional newsletter focusing on East Asia community building from the Japanese perspective. Published by: , President, JCIE Please direct any comments or questions to [email protected].

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