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Japan Under the DPJ

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Japan Under the DPJ Japan Center for International Exchange Vol. 4 No. 3 | September 2009 Japan under the DPJ Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIE Despite widespread predictions of a Liberal Demo- was primarily due to widespread voter dissatisfac- cratic Party (LDP) defeat, the result of the August tion with LDP rule. In other words, the election 30 general election in Japan was nevertheless stun- result does not necessarily indicate strong voter ning. Not only is the LDP no longer the dominant support for the DPJ’s policy platform or confi- party in the Diet for the first time since the party’s dence in its ability to govern. Since popular for- establishment in 1955, its seat total in the Lower mer Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi stepped House plunged from 300 (out of a total of 480) be- down in 2006, Japanese voters have become dis- fore the election to 119 after. In stark contrast, the illusioned with a series of ineffectual LDP prime Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)—the perennial ministers. Shinzo Abe and Yasuo Fukuda both opposition party in the Lower House—raised its resigned their posts less than a year after taking presence there by a remarkable 191 seats, for a total office, while outgoing Prime Minister Taro Aso is of 308. Together with its plurality (109 of 242 seats) not considered by many to be a solid leader. In ad- in the Upper House, this means that the DPJ now dition to an absence of strong leadership within controls 417 (or roughly 58 percent) of 722 seats the party, the LDP government was also seen as in the Diet. This paved the way for DPJ President beholden to vested interests and excessively de- Yukio Hatoyama to be voted in as prime minister pendent on the bureaucracy to formulate govern- on September 16. Such a dramatic change in the ment policy. makeup of the government after five decades of es- Whatever the reasons for the LDP’s fall from sentially single-party rule will undoubtedly have favor, the fact remains that the DPJ is now in important implications for Japan’s domestic poli- charge. In the coming weeks and months, the DPJ tics and foreign policy. will move to consolidate leadership around Prime Minister Hatoyama. It remains to be seen how the What is the significance of the DPJ victory DPJ will quell rumors about a possible dual pow- for Japan’s domestic politics? er structure between Hatoyama and former DPJ It is important to note that—generally speaking— President Ichiro Ozawa, who is now the party’s the LDP’s poor showing in last month’s election secretary-general. One of the DPJ’s chief priorities will be to What is the significance of DPJ President reform the policymaking process so that it is Hatoyama’s opinion piece published last controlled by politicians rather than the bureau- month? cracy. As part of this effort, the DPJ has pledged It is important to note, first and foremost, that this to establish a Bureau of National Strategy (kokka article, a partial translation of which appeared in senryaku kyoku) directly under the prime minis- the New York Times on August 26, 2009, was pub- ter. This bureau, which is expected to be staffed lished in the run-up to Japan’s most heated gen- with politicians, bureaucrats, and public intel- eral election in a generation. The piece originally lectuals, will be tasked with devising basic policy appeared in a Japanese-language journal and was outlines, determining the priority of budget al- not intended to be published for an overseas au- locations, coordinating macroeconomic policies, dience. Nevertheless, his critique of US “market and formulating a comprehensive foreign policy fundamentalism” and financial policy, together strategy and vision. There is no question that the with a clearly expressed interest in deepening Ja- DPJ’s objectives in this regard are ambitious; in- pan’s ties with its Asian neighbors, undoubtedly deed, a considerable amount of uncertainty re- gave rise to a great deal of concern overseas, par- mains as to whether the DPJ will succeed in its ticularly in Washington. effort to reform the traditional bureaucrat-cen- Hatoyama’s main objective was probably to tered policymaking process. draw a sharp contrast between DPJ policies and those of the LDP, and he chose the most What sort of political realignment can effective way to do so, vehemently criticizing be expected? What will the resulting the LDP’s management of Japan’s economy and distribution of power in the Diet mean for foreign affairs. He probably wanted to impress Japan’s foreign policy? upon the reader that the world is changing and The fact that the DPJ still lacks a simple ma- the traditional LDP policy line is obsolete. Spe- jority in the Upper House is significant. It will cifically, his remarks about “market fundamen- rule in coalition with its two small allies—the talism” were a response to widespread public Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the People’s concerns with social ills, in particular the wid- New Party. When it comes to foreign policy and ening gap between rich and poor. With regard national security issues, the policy differences to foreign affairs, Hatoyama also stressed in the between the DPJ and its allies—particularly the paper that excessive dependence on the United SDP—are substantial, arguably much greater States is an inappropriate path for Japan given than those between the DPJ and the LDP. The the increasingly multi polar nature of the inter- SDP, a scion of the defunct Japan Socialist Par- national system. ty—Japan’s main opposition party from 1955 Although the negative reaction in Washing- through the early 1990s—is a staunch defender ton to Hatoyama’s piece is perhaps understand- of Japan’s pacifist constitution. Not only will it able, concerns are largely overblown. One should be very reticent to give a green light to secu- understand that the DPJ has been the opposition rity cooperation with the United States, it may party throughout its existence and has plenty of even oppose any overseas dispatch of the Self- experience criticizing the government but no ex- Defense Forces (SDF). In short, despite its small perience actually running it. Furthermore, it is not size (the SDP only holds seven seats in the Low- just Japan whose policies are changing; it is impor- er House and five seats in the Upper House), the tant to point out that US policies are also evolv- SDP will undoubtedly “punch above its weight ing and the Obama administration’s economic class” in intra-coalition deliberations and thus and foreign policies can hardly be characterized as serve as a significant constraint on the DPJ’s “market fundamentalist” or “unilateralist.” Gener- foreign policy agenda. This situation is unlikely ally speaking, the policy platforms of the DPJ and to change until the 2010 election in the Upper the Obama administration have much about them House at the earliest. that is complementary. EAST ASIA INSIGHTS 2 Vol. 4 No. 3 | September 2009 The telephone conversation between Obama relationship. Rather, it presents a great opportu- and Hatoyama on September 3, 2009, in which nity. In the context of a rapidly changing security Hatoyama reaffirmed the crucial importance of environment in East Asia and with the 50th anni- the alliance to Japan, will hopefully help ease such versary of the US-Japan Security Treaty coming in concerns. Indeed, it was an important step toward 2010, it seems reasonable for the new governments reassuring the United States of the DPJ’s intentions. in Washington and Tokyo to sit down together be- The two sides should continue to hold regular dia- fore the end of next year and conduct an in-depth logue to prevent such public misunderstandings review of how the US-Japan alliance has evolved from occurring again in the future. over the past decade and jointly explore ways to strengthen and expand it in the future. How will the DPJ’s rise to power affect the US-Japan relationship? What will Japan’s policy toward East Asia In a meeting with its likely coalition partners ear- look like under DPJ leadership? lier this month, DPJ leaders cited an “equal US- Over the past several years, the DPJ has consis- Japan alliance” as the top priority on the national tently championed closer relations with Japan’s security agenda. Similar phrasing, namely “more East Asian neighbors. Not only is the DPJ mani- equal-footed relations with the United States,” also festo quite positive about the future prospects for appears in the DPJ manifesto. Such a statement is an East Asia community, DPJ leaders are also ar- not particularly surprising; after all, opposition guably more sensitive about issues of history than political parties in many countries allied with the their LDP colleagues. For example, Hatoyama United States often criticize the ruling party for has already pledged not to visit the controversial being excessively accommodating to Washington. Yasukuni Shrine. Under DPJ leadership, Japan However, several key items on the DPJ’s foreign should be expected to engage in more proactive di- policy agenda suggest that Japan’s policy toward plomacy toward the region, particularly as it con- the United States may be in for a substantive, cerns regional cooperation and its relations with though not necessarily negative, change. China and Korea. On the issue of North Korea, the First, the DPJ has called for a renegotiation of DPJ appears to adopt a pragmatic stance, calling the Status of Forces Agreement and a review of for international unity and serious and compre- programs related to the relocation of US forces hensive negotiations with Pyongyang as necessary (e.g.
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