ABSTRACT Animals Now and Then Allison Krile Thornton, Ph.D. Mentor
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ABSTRACT Animals Now and Then Allison Krile Thornton, Ph.D. Mentor: Alexander R. Pruss, Ph.D. One aim of this dissertation is to remove ambiguities that have impeded a clear discussion and adequate evaluation of animalism. To that end I develop a taxonomy of different varieties of animalism and argue that there are substantive differences between them. In earlier debates about animalism, the previously elided distinctions that my taxonomy makes clear create unnecessary confusion and disagreement. My taxonomy resolves some of that confusion and provides the parties to the debate with a conceptual framework for importantly distinct accounts of personal identity. I also evaluate animalist arguments in light of the distinctions my taxonomy tracks. Specifically I identify which arguments support which varieties of animalism. The most popular varieties, I argue, are critically under-supported. All rely on a tacit presupposition that ‘animal’ is a natural kind term or a substance sortal, a supposition that animalists are under some pressure to reject. Thus, my evaluation prompts a refocusing of the standard defenses of animalism to prioritize defending the tacit presupposition. Finally, I defend a hylomorphic variety of animalism from two objections: first, from the objection that if animalism is true, then human persons cannot survive death, or at least they cannot exist in an intermediate, disembodied state between their deaths and resurrections (if indeed they are to be resurrected). I do this by arguing that given hylomorphism, animals can become immaterial, and that this is less an affront to intuition and mereology than it might seem. Second, I defend a hylomorphic variety of animalism from the objection that if it is true, we are not the primary thinkers of our thoughts. The criticism is that if hylomorphism can solve certain puzzles (for example, the problem of temporary intrinsics), the resolving of which is one of the main points in hylomorphism’s favor, the view implies that our contingent mental properties primarily characterize something other than us. I argue that this criticism turns on a misunderstanding of how the hylomorphism at stake solves the relevant puzzles and that it can do so without major modification. Animals Now and Then by Allison Krile Thornton, B.A., M.A. A Dissertation Approved by the Department of Philosophy Michael D. Beaty, Ph.D., Chairperson Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Baylor University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Approved by the Dissertation Committee Alexander R. Pruss, Ph.D., Chairperson Charity Anderson, Ph.D. Todd Buras, Ph.D. Trent Dougherty, Ph.D. Jonathan Tran, Ph.D. Accepted by the Graduate School May 2018 J. Larry Lyon, Ph.D., Dean Page bearing signatures is kept on file in the Graduate School. Copyright © 2018 by Allison Krile Thornton All rights reserved TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................... viii DEDICATION .................................................................................................................... x CHAPTER ONE ................................................................................................................. 1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1 2. A Left-branch View: Locke’s Account ................................................................. 13 3. Special Components Views .................................................................................. 21 4. Right-branch, Non-animalist Views ..................................................................... 24 5. Animalism: Two Initial Objections and Two Replies .......................................... 34 6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 37 CHAPTER TWO .............................................................................................................. 40 Varieties of Animalism ................................................................................................. 40 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 40 2. The Taxonomy ...................................................................................................... 43 3. The Essentiality Question ..................................................................................... 45 4. The Persistence Question ...................................................................................... 54 5. The Matter Question ............................................................................................. 58 6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 60 CHAPTER THREE .......................................................................................................... 62 How to Argue for Animalism ....................................................................................... 62 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 62 2. The Thinking Animal Argument .......................................................................... 66 3. Animal Ancestors Argument ................................................................................ 75 4. The Association Argument ................................................................................... 81 5. A Thomistic Argument from Sensation ................................................................ 84 6. Arguments for AHA ............................................................................................. 93 7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 97 CHAPTER FOUR ............................................................................................................. 99 Disembodied Animals ................................................................................................... 99 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 99 2. Hylomorphic Animalism ...................................................................................... 99 v 3. On Whether We Survive Death and an Argument against the Claim That We Do ..................................................................................................................... 103 4. A Reply to the Argument for Corruptionism ...................................................... 105 5. The Afterlife Puzzle ............................................................................................ 114 6. Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 123 CHAPTER FIVE ............................................................................................................ 124 If I’m a Hylomorphic Compound, Who Thinks My Thoughts? ................................. 124 1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 124 2. The Accusations .................................................................................................. 125 3. Modifications to Hylomorphism ......................................................................... 130 4. Hylomorphism is Compatible with the Priority Principle .................................. 133 5. Hylomorphism is Compatible with the Single Thinker Principle ....................... 137 6. Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 138 CHAPTER SIX ............................................................................................................... 140 Final Thoughts ............................................................................................................ 140 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 144 vi LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1. Theories about Personal Identity ...................................................................... 9 Figure 5.1. Brower’s Model ............................................................................................ 130 vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Many have made writing this dissertation an enriching experience, and I am very grateful to each of them. I thank in particular the members of my committee: Alex Pruss, my committee chair; Charity Anderson; Todd Buras; Trent Dougherty; and Jonathan Tran. I am deeply grateful to parents, Jeff and Missy Krile and Larry and Teresa Thornton, especially for their steadfast support of my early education and their unwavering championship of my continued pursuit of philosophy. I could not have completed this project without their support. The probability of having even two decent parents is very low; I am daily grateful for the miracle that I have four great ones. This dissertation saw substantive improvement during