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Fascist Italy's Aerial Defenses in the Second World War
Fascist Italy's Aerial Defenses in the Second World War CLAUDIA BALDOLI ABSTRACT This article focuses on Fascist Italy's active air defenses during the Second World War. It analyzes a number of crucial factors: mass production of anti- aircraft weapons and fighters; detection of enemy aircraft by deploying radar; coordination between the Air Ministry and the other ministries involved, as well as between the Air Force and the other armed services. The relationship between the government and industrialists, as well as that between the regime and its German ally, are also crucial elements of the story. The article argues that the history of Italian air defenses reflected many of the failures of the Fascist regime itself. Mussolini's strategy forced Italy to assume military responsibilities and economic commitments which it could not hope to meet. Moreover, industrial self-interest and inter-service rivalry combined to inhibit even more the efforts of the regime to protect its population, maintain adequate armaments output, and compete in technical terms with the Allies. KEYWORDS air defenses; Air Ministry; anti-aircraft weapons; bombing; Fascist Italy; Germany; radar; Second World War ____________________________ Introduction The political and ideological role of Italian air power worked as a metaphor for the regime as a whole, as recent historiography has shown. The champions of aviation, including fighter pilots who pursued and shot down enemy planes, represented the anthropological revolution at the heart of the totalitarian experiment.1 As the Fascist regime had practiced terrorist bombing on the civilian populations of Ethiopian and Spanish towns and villages before the Second World War, the Italian political and military leadership, press, and industrialists were all aware of the potential role of air 1. -
Fascist Italy's Aerial Defenses in the Second World War
Fascist Italy's Aerial Defenses in the Second World War CLAUDIA BALDOLI ABSTRACT This article focuses on Fascist Italy's active air defenses during the Second World War. It analyzes a number of crucial factors: mass production of anti- aircraft weapons and fighters; detection of enemy aircraft by deploying radar; coordination between the Air Ministry and the other ministries involved, as well as between the Air Force and the other armed services. The relationship between the government and industrialists, as well as that between the regime and its German ally, are also crucial elements of the story. The article argues that the history of Italian air defenses reflected many of the failures of the Fascist regime itself. Mussolini's strategy forced Italy to assume military responsibilities and economic commitments which it could not hope to meet. Moreover, industrial self-interest and inter-service rivalry combined to inhibit even more the efforts of the regime to protect its population, maintain adequate armaments output, and compete in technical terms with the Allies. KEYWORDS air defenses; Air Ministry; anti-aircraft weapons; bombing; Fascist Italy; Germany; radar; Second World War ____________________________ Introduction The political and ideological role of Italian air power worked as a metaphor for the regime as a whole, as recent historiography has shown. The champions of aviation, including fighter pilots who pursued and shot down enemy planes, represented the anthropological revolution at the heart of the totalitarian experiment.1 As the Fascist regime had practiced terrorist bombing on the civilian populations of Ethiopian and Spanish towns and villages before the Second World War, the Italian political and military leadership, press, and industrialists were all aware of the potential role of air 1. -
The Greek Quagmire
The Greek quagmire. Prologue. October, 26 th 1940, Saturday. In the hall of the Italian Embassy in Athens, the Italians and their Greek guests are commenting the performance of Puccini's Madame Butterfly finished recently. Suddenly, in the offices, the teletypes begin to tap. The officials are coming and going. They are trying to remain calm, but more than one of them, pale-faced, troubled and tense, is widening the collar of his shirt. The Italian Plenipotentiary Minister, Emanuele Grazzi, sees all that movement and breaks into a cold sweat. He knows what that movement means, or at least he understands this intuitively: from Rome the ultimatum to Greece is coming. He hopes in some hitch, in some difficulty of deciphering: he does not want to deliver to General Metaxas, Greek Prime Minister, a declaration of war right in the middle of an official reception. It would be extremely embarrassing, anyway. He is lucky, at least about this. It is late, the text is long: time is requested in order to decipher it . The Greek guests leave the Italian Legation; Metaxas is at his residence in Kefissià. He is not yet an enemy. "You are the strongest" He turns into an enemy at three a.m. of Monday, October 28th. The communication has been deciphered and translated. Grazzi accompanied by military attaché Colonel Luigi Mondini and by the interpreter De Salvo, gets into car and heads to the residence of Metaxas. The guard at the door confuses the colours of the flag on the fender of the diplomatic car , he mistakes the green for blue and announces to the Greek Prime Minister the visit of the French ambassador. -
20000000 Visit
Da “Time”, 16 maggio 1938 GERMANY-ITALY: $20,000,000 Visit "King by the Grace of God and the Will of the People" is what astute, courageous, popular Vittorio Emanuele III was long before Il Duce added the title of "Emperor." Last week His Majesty surprised casual foreign observers—not Italians—by making Adolf Hitler's visit to Italy the occasion for visibly demonstrating that Benito Mussolini is not the whole cheese in Italy—although he is of course The Big Cheese, as Neville Chamberlain is in England. Up to a few weeks before the 1922 March on Rome, Fascist Mussolini was an avowed Republican pledged to upset the Throne, and he came out as a Monarchist in a public speech only a few weeks before the March. Significantly the Fascist marchers on Rome were poorly armed, whereas His Majesty had mobilized powerful army units, held discreetly in barracks and side streets of Rome. Editor Mussolini remained at Milan 400 miles away until after the March, then accepted the telegraphed invitation of Vittorio Emanuele to come to Rome and form "His Majesty's Government" as Premier. In the recent Ethiopian war it was a Fascist, Marshal de Bono, who went out to begin a "Fascist conquest'' of this part of Africa. It was a prominent Monarchist, Marshal Badoglio, who, when the war bogged down under de Bono, was sent out, and ended the war as an "Italian victory." The King has always acted so as to give fullest scope to the energy and talents of II Duce, who has always acted with the greatest respect for Vittorio Emanuele III. -
SPITFIRE V C.202 FOLGORE Malta 1942
SPITFIRE V C.202 FOLGORE Malta 1942 DONALD NIJBOER © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com SPITFIRE V C.202 FOLGORE Malta 1942 DONALD NIJBOER © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com CONTENTS Introduction 4 Chronology 8 Design and Development 10 Technical Specifications 25 The Strategic Situation 36 The Combatants 41 Combat 49 Statistics and Analysis 67 Aftermath 75 Further Reading 78 Index 80 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com INTRODUCTION Long before the Spitfire V and Macchi C.202 Folgore (Lightning) ever met in combat over Malta, an aerial battle for air supremacy had been fought out between Britain and Italy over the peaceful waters of the English Channel. During the celebrated Schneider Trophy races, both R. J. Mitchell and Dr Mario Castoldi would design two of the most impressive aircraft the world has ever seen. Powered by the Rolls-Royce R engine, Mitchell’s Supermarine S 6B would claim the prize for Britain once and for all on The Spitfire’s ancestry can be traced directly to the Supermarine S 6B Schneider Trophy winner of 1931. Creating the seaplane, powered by a Rolls-Royce R engine, provided both Supermarine and Rolls- Royce with a sound grounding for the future development of both the Spitfire and the Merlin engine. This particular example, S1596 (the second S 6B built), broke the world air speed record on 29 September 1931 when Flt Lt George Stainforth reached 407.5mph whilst at the controls. 4 (Crown Copyright) © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 13 September 1931 when the floatplane achieved a top speed of 380mph. Unfortunately for the Italians, their Macchi M.C.72 was not ready for the race and did not compete. -
Oliva 4043 Gabbia
A Samuele 4 Introduzione Il 10 giugno 1940 la voce energica di Mussolini annuncia dal balcone di Palazzo Venezia che «la dichiarazione di guerra è già stata consegnata agli ambasciatori di Francia e Gran Bretagna e di Francia»; l’8 settembre 1943 la voce rauca del maresciallo Badoglio annuncia per radio che «il governo italiano, riconosciuta l’impossibilità di continuare l’impari lotta, ha chiesto un armistizio al generale Eisenhower». Dal vitalismo aggressivo alla mestizia silenziosa: in mezzo, più di tre lunghi anni e mezzo infiniti, tra sconfitte al fronte, città bombardate, pane nero, alpini che non tornano dalla Russia e paracadutisti che muoiono a El Alamein. La guerra fascista 1940-43 è l’epilogo drammatico di una stagione dove la retorica della parola oscura la ragione: ultima arrivata tra le nazioni industrializzate, l’Italia degli «otto milioni di baionette» entra in conflitto contro il mondo, prima Francia e Gran Bretagna, poi anche Unione Sovietica e Stati Uniti. La disfatta è implicita nella sproporzione tra le ambizioni imperialiste del regime e le possibilità reali di un paese che dispone di tante braccia e pochi carri armati e che per produrre armi deve prima trovare chi gli venda ferro e carbone. Alleato con la Germania di Hitler in un rapporto sospettoso, inizialmente di competizione e subito dopo di subalternità, il fascismo ne segue la parabola, sprofondando la nazione e se stesso nella rotta: «non abbiamo alternative, vincere con la Germania o perdere con essa» afferma il duce nella primavera del 1943, quando gli angloamericani hanno ormai conquistato «Tripoli, bel suol d’amore» e stanno preparando lo sbarco in Sicilia. -
2015 1 MATTESINI Il Disastro Del Convoglio Duisburg 1
1 Il disastro del 9 novembre 1941 La 3a Divisione Navale e la fine del Convoglio «Duisburg» . di Francesco Mattesini 2 IL DISASTRO DEL CONVOGLIO «DUISBURG» 9 NOVEMBRE 1941 di Francesco Mattesini 1 4.000 ton. di gasolio, di difficilissimo reintegro, in caso di perdita, il cui rifornimento in A.S. è, in questo momento, urgentissimo per esaurimento quasi totale delle scorte Il rafforzamento dell’Isola di Malta tra il Giugno e l’Ottobre 1941 Dal giugno 1941 la maggiore preoccupazione per i Comandi italiani e tedeschi fu rappresentata, a livello strategico - operativo, dal rafforzamento delle basi britanniche a Malta deciso da Churchill con direttiva del 14 aprile per interrompere i rifornimenti dell’Asse in Libia, e intensificato dopo il ritiro dalla Sicilia del X Fliegerkorps tedesco, verificatosi nell’ultima decade di maggio. 2 Inviato in Italia in gennaio per riprendere il controllo del Mediterraneo centrale perduto dagli ita- liani, dopo la conquista della Grecia e di Creta il X FK era stato rischierato in Grecia, per operare nel Mediterraneo Orientale e in particolare, per battere la base della Mediterranean Fleet ad Ales- sandria, per insidiare con mine magnetiche il Canale di Suez e per colpire i principali obiettivi ne- mici in Egitto e Medio Oriente. 3 Il ritiro del X FK dalla Sicilia e il progressivo rafforzamento di Malta portarono ad un notevole incremento dell’attività bellica britannica contro i convogli dell’Asse diretti in Libia, che si con- cretò con attacchi di aerei e di sommergibili di base sull’isola, senza che da parte italiana, per la debolezza qualitativa dell’Aeronautica della Sicilia e per la insufficiente capacità antisommergi- bile delle scorte navali italiane, fosse stato possibile reagire adeguatamente. -
Chi Ha Condotto L'italia Al Disastro Militare E Politico?
Chi ha condotto l’Italia al disastro militare e politico? di: Alberto B. Mariantoni Se volessi esclusivamente portare acqua al mio mulino, potrei anch’io, come la maggior parte degli storici e/o dei cronisti della “restaurazione democratica”, limitarmi ad abbozzare un’unica, univoca e standardizzata risposta, “fascista” e, quindi, parimenti faziosa e partigiana. Una risposta, cioè, che, pur sostenuta da fatti, precise situazioni e documentati o documentabili avvenimenti, nonché abbondantemente arricchita di aneddoti, curiosità e particolari o personalizzate spiegazioni e/o interpretazioni, continuerebbe semplicemente a tralasciare o ad omettere ciò che io ritengo, invece, sia l’essenziale di ogni storia e, soprattutto, della Storia tout- court: vale a dire, la ‘tela di fondo’ e ‘l’ossatura’ degli accadimenti che si pretende descrivere e/o analizzare, nonché i fattori innescanti e/o scatenanti che li hanno realmente prodotti e da cui, in realtà, sono effettivamente derivati, emersi o scaturiti. Nel caso che ci riguarda: l’effettiva ‘tela di fondo’ e ‘l’ossatura’ di quel particolare periodo della nostra storia che va dal 1922 al 1943, nonché gli autentici e concreti fattori innescanti e/o scatenanti che, oltre ad essere stati realmente all’origine di quei super conosciuti ed ufficialmente assodati e scontati effetti storici che tutti conosciamo (cioè, l’entrata in Guerra dell’Italia e l’impreparazione militare delle sue Forze armate; la disastrosa Campagna di Grecia; la perdita dell’Africa Orientale e Settentrionale; l’incapacità della -
Anglo-American Bias and the Italo-Greek War of 1940-1941 Sadkovich, James J
4/24/2014 search.proquest.com.ezproxy.une.edu.au/printviewfile?accountid=17227 Back to previous page document 1 of 1 Anglo-American bias and the Italo-Greek War of 1940-1941 Sadkovich, James J. The Journal of Military History 58.4 (Oct 1994): 617. Find a copy http://gr6md6ku7c.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF- 8&rfr_id=info:sid/ProQ%3Amilitary&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Military+History&rft.atitle=Anglo- American+bias+and+the+Italo-Greek+War+of+1940-1941&rft.au=Sadkovich%2C+James+J&rft.aulast=Sadkovich&rft.aufirst=James&rft.date=1994- 10-01&rft.volume=58&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=617&rft.isbn=&rft.btitle=&rft.title=The+Journal+of+Military+History&rft.issn=08993718&rft_id=info:doi/ Abstract (summary) The scant attention that Anglo-American historians have paid to the Italo-Greek conflict of Oct 1940-Apr 1941 is discussed. By ignoring the struggle between Greece and Italy, the myth that the UK stood alone from the fall of France until the US's entry is perpetuated. Full Text Most Anglo-American historians have paid scant attention to the Italo-Greek conflict of October 1940-April 1941, perhaps because the British played a minor role in Greece and the Americans none at all. Nonetheless, to ignore the struggle between Greece and Italy is to perpetuate the myth that Britain stood alone from the fall of France until the U.S. entry into the war; to distort the roles of the major belligerents, who included Italy as well as Germany and Britain in late 1940 and early 1941; and to misunderstand why World War II took the course that it did.(1) It is therefore worth examining the literature on the Italo-Greek conflict available to the reader of English. -
Zacharias N. Ts Irpan Lis the Italian View of the 1940-41
ZACHARIAS N. TS IRPAN LIS THE ITALIAN VIEW OF THE 1940-41 WAR COMPARISONS AND PROBLEMS Quae sit Ubertas, quaeris? Nulli rei servire, nulli necessitati, nullis casibus, fortunam in aequum deducere. Sen. Ep. 51,9 The Argument The intention of this article is to examine the Italian historical sources, to compare them with the Greek viewpoints and thus arrive at an understanding of the truth. The period concerned, as far as I am aware, has yet to be properly researched1. Using scientific evidence as accurate as possible and by a comparative examination of the rel evant testimonies, it is, I think, a worthwhile exercise to assess the attitude of Fascist Italy’s political leaders towards Greece before and during the hostilities; how the Italian generals and soldiers viewed the Greek soldier; how Italian historians view these events today, to whom they attribute responsibility for the war, and how generally they justify Italy’s wrongful actions against Greece. Do they distort the truth, do they recognise it or simply adapt it to accommodate their shortcomings, thereby obscuring or belittling the Greek victory? It must first be said, however, that numerous Italian sources on the war against Greece have been published, and to study, classify and evaluate them all is a task which requires an enormous amount of time. Such sources include diplomatic documents published by the national printing-house of Italy, diaries of political and military leaders, memoirs of diplomatic officials, attempts at reconstructing events by chroniclers, journalists, and other people who took part in the war, letters from ordinary soldiers, dispatches from the various military units, operational plans and documents of the Italian General Army Staff, and even the songs sung by the soldiers (though not, of course, those imposed by the Fascist party). -
Airpower in 20Th Century Doctrines and Employment National Experiences
OMMISSIONE NTERNAZIONALE DI TORIA ILITARE Commissione C I S M Italiana Storia INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF MILITARY HISTORY Militare COMMISSION INTERNATIONALE D’HISTOIRE MILITAIRE CIHM MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA Airpower in 20th Century Doctrines and Employment National Experiences RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI STORIA MILITARE • INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF MILITARY HISTORY • REVUE INTERNATIONALE D’HISTOIRE MILITAIRE • INTERNATIONALE ZEIT- SCHRIFT FÜR MILITÄRGESCHICHTE •89REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE HISTORIA MILITAR COMMISSIONE INTERNAZIONALE DI STORIA MILITARE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF MILITARY HISTORY COMMISSION INTERNATIONALE D’HISTOIRE MILITAIRE Airpower in 20th Century Doctrines and Employment National Experiences RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI STORIA MILITARE INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF MILITARY HISTORY REVUE INTERNATIONALE D’HISTOIRE MILITAIRE INTERNATIONALE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR MILITÄRGESCHICHTE REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE HISTORIA MILITAR 89 N° 89 - Roma - 2011 © 2011 ICMH International Commission of Military History CIHM Commission Internationale d’Histoire Militaire All rights reserved. This book is published under the initiative of CISM - Commissione Italiana di Storia Militare Joint forces and general Coordinator: Col. Dr. Matteo Paesano Scientific supervisor:Prof. Dr. Massimo de Leonardis Armed forces Coordinator: Col. Dr. Angelo Piccillo Edited: Stato Maggiore Aeronautica - Ufficio Storico (Lt. Col. Dr. Giancarlo Montinaro - M.llo Gaetano Pasqua, Ph. D. - Dr. Marina Salvetti) Contribution: SMD C.F. Fabio Serra Graphic design, printing and typeset: Litos Roma ICMH International Commission of Military History C/O Netherlands Institute of Military History Alexanderkazerne, geb. 203 PO Box 90701 2509 LS The Hague The Netherlands Telephone: +31 70 316 58 36 Fax: +31 70 316 58 51 RI V I S TA INTERNAZIONALE DI STORIA M I L I TA R E , N. 89 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF MILITARY H ISTORY , N° 89 REVUE INTERNATIONALE D’H ISTOIRE M I L I TA I R E , N° 89 INDI C E / INDEX Presentazioni • Presentations Matteo Paesano p.