I I f:S" t It f.:1:: I
BATTLE EXPERIENCE
SOLOMON ISLANDS AND ALASKAN AREAS BOMBARDMENTS MAY & JULY 1943
CAU Tl OH THIS BULLETIN AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN MUST NOT FALL INTO THE HANDS OF THE -ENEMY
llTED STITES FLEET HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER lfl CHIEF
SECR ET .t:D ~ 1 .. 1 c:3 F LEE T Hl::\DQU,\RTI R~ Of lllF. C0\1~1A:-DFR I:\ ClllH "A\\ DFl'\Rf\:I :\T l\Asltl:\CTO\, !> l:
1 Octcb r 1943 .
Th ee bu!letins on "Batt:!. Experience " are issued for the gen. ral ir.1ormati::>r.. of officer s .
T~ y are p!ar..ned to promu!gnt r liable infor mation concerning actual .rnr xperience. Any adver s e comment made, is not intended to r ef!ect c r :t1cism on an~ individual but to assist officer s i n appreci ating th_ b st line of action in m11ny circumstances.
It is inevitable that t here would be considerable dela y i f complete anB::.ysis we r e made befor e issue to t he Fleet. Comment s t hat are made in th~s bu::etins repr esent t hose expr salons of opinion from r e sponsible sources t hat wer e available at the time t he particu::.ar ope r a tion under discussion ~as completed.
Studies are conti nuing to t he e nd that diver gent views may be reconciled and complet e anal ysis made.
Encounter s with the enemy discussed i n these b ullet ins, are p r e sented in their chronological o r der. I t will be appa r e nt t hat " lessons lear ned" during t he e ar!ier part of the wa r wer e p ut to good a dvant age in s ub se~uen t enga gements.
Ai r combat act i ons , a nti submarine e xpe r iences, s ubmari ne patrol ex pe ri e ~ c. a , and t e chnical gunne ry exper iences are cover ed i n v a r ious Comi nch Information Bul l e t i ns i ssue d duri n g the pas t y ear . The s e include Bulletins Nos . 20, 22, 23 ; ~ ' TE' 211, 212, and 213.
~at e rial contai ne d i n t hes e bulletins was drawn l arge ly fro m war diaries, and battle reports of various commanders and 3hips.
The s e bulletins are SECRET and s hal l be safe guarded in accordance with the provisions of Article 76, U.S. Navy Re gulations, 1920. The y shoul d b e wide ly circulate d among c ommissio ne d p e rsonnel.
Yfh e n no longer r e quired they shall be d e stroye d by burning. No r e port of d e struction need be submitte d .
Transmission by register e d mail within the continental limits of the United States is aut horized.
~ R. S. k:U.\'ARDS , Chi e f of Sta f f.
I s::CRET
TABLE OF co:1T4..;rns
C!!AFTS'l 45 l'1 nine o f Black e t t Stral t by Task Group :::.6 . 5 - 6- 7 J.:a y 1 £14 3 • • • • • • • 45-1 c: 1;,fTl<.H 46 Co r~bined Eonbardmen t and l.'inin6 Operation - i.:unda-Vila-Ku la Gulf Area on the r:1cht 12-13 r.:ay 1943 • • • • 46-1
CHA PT!:n 47 Bombardmen t s of Enemy Installations on Ki s ka Dur l n g Month of July, 1943. • 47-1
LI ST OF EFFECTI VE PAGES
J r o::iulga t1 ng Letter. • I
Talle of Contents • •• II
List of ~ffective f a Ge s. II CHAPTER 45 • 45-1 to 45-5 inclusive CHAPTER 46 • • • 4G- l to 46-41 inclusive 4G - ~3 to 46-47 inclusive
C!!APTER 47 4 '/-l to 47-47 i nclusive
II SSC~ET
CHAPTER 45 MINING OF BLACKETT STRAIT BY TASK GROUP 36.5 6- ? MAY 1940
During the night 6-? May 1943, Ta~k Group 36.5 (RADFORD, PREBLE, GAMBLE, BREESE) laid a standard three row mine field extending fr~m 900 yards due west of Makuti Island northward to within 1000 yards of the shore or Kolombangara Island in the vicinity of Vangavanga.
Thie operation emphaei~ed the following points;
(1) The value or training and rehear~als for an oper ation Puch as this. (2) Value of shtp detection Radar for navigation in confined waters in low visibility as exemplified by the use of the USS RADFORD as guide for mine l~yers. (3) Need for adequate ship detection radar equipment in mine layers ae exemplified by the necessity or employing a modern equipped destroyer to lead the mine layer not equi9ped with radar. (4) The need for qualified radar technician, afloat. (5) The continued practice of friendly plan~e approach ing our surface forces on threatening bearings and failing to 9how I.F.F. Lack of accurate navigational charts caused by failure i n peace time to fully prepare for war. (?) Value of a well organized and trained C.I.C. team. (8) Importance of accurate station keeping under all conditions of visibility. (9) The value of weather in attaining cover and surprise. (10) Need for modern, reliable fast mine layers, with adequate cruising radius.
Commander Ta~k Group 36.5 reported ae follows on this operation: NARRATIVE Task Group 06. 5, consisting of RADFORD, PREBLE, GAMBLE and BREESE , depar t ed Espiritu Santo at 1?00 Love on 4 May, 1943 enroute Tu lagi Harbor, Florida Island, at l? knots. Held three rehearsal r une si~u l ating actual courses and mini ng
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formation to be taken for scheduled operation. Two runs were made at night and one during dayliGht. Last rehearsal run made at night proved highly satisfactory and all ships had perfect confidence that station keeping and maneuvers could be accomplished according to plan. On 3 May, 1943 a Raytheon Company representative accompanied by an officer radar representative made two alterations to the SG radar on RADFORD but were unable to tune the set properly in harbor due to land effect. During the passage from EApiritu Santo to Tulagi the SG radar fail ed to function properly in spite of the constant efforts of the chief radar technician tn improve performance. Finally as a last resort the "gaiting" alteration was removed and the set then functioned in a highly satisfactory mann~r. Since the succesR of the entire operation hinged on proper function ing of radar thiR incident caused the Commanding Officer unnecessary anxiety and concern. The Task Group arrived at Tulagi at 1000 on 6 May and fueled from the ERSKINE PHELPS. During fueling the condi tion was 11 Red" over the Russells but the condition remain ed "Green" at ~ulagi. The Approach Task Group 36.5 departed at 1330 from Tulagi and passed through initial point Lat. 09• 101 S., Long. 159• 35 1 E. at 1600 on course 244° T. at 26 knotA. At 1416 GAMBLE reported leaky boiler tube in one boiler but able to make 2? knots. At 1700 changed course to 284° T. at 1910 radar contact was ~ade on a olane with doubtful I.F.F., bearing 105° T., dlstance 27 miles. This plane paseed up starboard side or formation at 3600 yards distance. Positive I.F.F. was not obtained until tte plane passed ahead. It has since been established by c~nversation with cruiser spottere that this wae a Black Cat plane which dtd not become aware of presence of Task Group until practically overnead. It must again be emphasized that this practice or the aviators is disconcert ing to surfac~ forceA ann dangerous to themselves. At 21~0 changPd course to 324° T. At 2300 chang~d speed to 15 knotA. ~xee were obtained by radar enroute on New Georgia and Rendova Islands. Excellent results were obtained and Simbo I8land was clearly dietingui~hable at 58,000 yards on SG screen. EAtlimte of time schedule was five minutes slow. Speeds, howPver, were maintained according to plan to pre vent strag~lin~. At 2~2~ changed course to 034° T. At 232? changed course to 0~0° T. Radar indicRt~d that right hand
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reef off west end of Wanawana Island was approximately 500 to 700 yards further to the westward, making the entrance 2300 yards wide in~tead of 3000 ~·ardti as charted. '.Che passE..ge t~1rough the reef was made entirely by radar and sound plots. Right and left hand tengenta of the land mass on each side o: the paesage were Ubed in the case of radar and these were constantly checkeo ~Y the starboard an~ port ~ound gears ranging on the right and left reefa respectively. Intermittent view~ of the variou~ islands were seen from tne ~ridge and what visual bearine~ were poe~iblc were taken and passed to the Combat Intelligence CPnter. ThP fact that t~PPe few visual bearings checKed exactly with redar plot afforded the Commanding Officer and the E~ecutive Officer in C.I.C. some aeeurance that all was going well. At 2340 the Task Group entared squally weather with low to zero visibility. At 235e, while in center of Ferguson Passage, there was a deluge of rain with absolute zero vi~ib1lity. At 0004 with above zero vieibil1ty t~P following TSS tranem1eeione without preliminary call uos were mHde; 0004 BREESE 11 Requei:;t a mark 11 11 on commencement • 0004 RADFORD Wilco, Wilco 11 • 0004 GAMBLE 11 "Repeat Please • 0005 RADFORD 11 lfark, I am turning That le all 11.
The ' Ou At 0005 RADFORD changed to mining course OOQG T. with ~ekuti Ieland 900 yards on the starboard beam bearing 120° T. The PREBLE followed in the RADFORD's wake and as the PREBLE turned the GAMBLE and BREESE tu1•n ~d simultaneously with her to the mining course Mining ~as started in the turn and completed on time at the end of an 8400 yard run. Mining speed 15 knots, mining inte~val 12 seconds (100 yards), mining time 17 minutes. While in the initial turn to the m\ning course visibility cleared auf~ic1Pntly to show the formation and it WP~ hearten in~ to see that all ~hips were in perfect ~oeition, in spite of only intPr~ittent vieual contact for approximately 10-15 mtnute~. During the major portion of the run on mining course visioility was fair. At OG18 RADFORD changed courae to 340° T. in order to parallel the shore line of Kolombangara Island at 1000 yards. At OC19 RADFO:tD made sound contact on 315° T., distance 1500 yards. This contact could not be duplicated by radar nor could anythin~ be sePn visually The presence of a shoal was fP~red but this anxiety was eased when sound reporten the contact as a reciprocal echo from the beach on our st&rooard qua rter. Du ring the change t o oourqe 340° T. , t he PREBLE fo l lowec i n wake of RADFORD , wh i le GAMBL~ a nd BREESE ma i ntai ned appr oximate sta tion . 45- :3 SZCRE'T
Tht Retirement At 0020 RADFORD changed courae to 310• T. and simul taneously there was an intense squall with wind force ?. At 0022 increased speed to 2? knots and turned on ABE equipment to aid Task Force 18 in establishing recognition. All ships of Task Group 36.5 formed column. At 0022 radar shifted to long scale and made excellent radar contact on Task Force 18 bearing 346°, distance ?l,000 yarde SG scope showed exact formation and plot checked accurately on scheduled course to 050°. At 0102 changed course to 060°T. to commence easing in ahead of TaRk Force 18. At 0106 changed course to 0?0° T. At 0119 changed courAe to 090° T. At 0130 secured ABE. At 0210 sighted flare astern. At 0245 changed course to 120° T. and continued retirement on this course. At daybreak GABBLE and BR:ESE reported unable to make scheduled Rpeed and return to Espiritu Santo without fueline. At 0?58 Task Group was ordered oy Commander Tas~ Force 18 to proce~d to Tulagi for f~el and proce£ded independently to Tulagi. At 0948 arrived and fueled. At 1252 departed for Espiritu Santo via Lengo Channel. At 0555 contacted Task Force 18. RADFORD joined Task Force EIGHTEEN end PREBLE (ComTask Unit 36.5.2) with BREESE and GAMBLE proceeded independently for Espiritu Santo. COMMENTS
(a) Rehearsal rune wer~ found necessary and proved extremely hPlpful. (b) A great deal of worry and anxiety were experienced because of poor performance of SG radar after alteration and prior to repair. (c) SG radar worked splendidly when finally re-altered. (d) Continuous drill of C.I.C. in coordinating SG,FD and sound information was Aell repaid in the assurance that was obtainable from this infor~ation in the passage through Ferguson PasRagP and the close approach to Kolombangara, each of which was made under zero visi~ility. At no time did the Exe~utive Officer of the RADFORD, acting as coordinator, lack accurate and continuous information and assurance that "all was well". (e) No reports of enemy contacts were received from Black Cat planes furnishing reconnaissance for Task Group 36.5. (f) The mine layers kept excellent station in spite of the poor to absolute zero visibility. (g) The mine field was laid without a single premature explosion and, from Comairsols despatch to Comtaskgroup 36.5 of the daylight air report of reconnaissance, without a single ttfloatertt.
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(h) It is believed that the operation was accomplished in total ignorance tothe enemy prim~rily due to the extremely heavy and timely squalls. No action was necessary and none was taken by the Task Group that might have disclosed their presence The short TBS transmissions at 0004 were unauthori zed by the Operation OrdPr but are believed excusable under the adverse conditions of weather . (i) The success of the operation is conclusively evidenced by the reports of coast watchers whlch reveal that enemy ships of both combatant and non-combatant types have been sunk in the mine field within 48 hours of its laying. (J) It is felt that in 3pite of the fact that the operation was carried out "without incident" it was still a highly commendable performance. The anxiety, antic1~ation, and wo~ry preceding and during an operation of this type were all present Rnd the succes~!ul accomplie}lment under these etresees merely amplifies the good work that was done. Each ship and each officer and man did hie duty and are highly commended by th\s command.
45-5
SSC:iET
c.;HAPTER 46 COMBINED BOMBARDMENT AND MINING OPERATION
MUNDA-VILA-KULA GULF AHEA ON THE NIGHT 12-1~ MAY, 1943
Task Force 18 carried out a successful combined bom )a~amen t and mining operation in the Munda-Vila-Kula Gulf lrea of New Georgia Island on the night of 12-13 May, 194~ The ships participating in this operation were: VILA-STANMORE BOMBAEDMENT GROUP HONOLULU HELENA NASHVILLE 0 1 BANNON STRONG CHEVALIER TAYLOR NICHOLAS MUNDA BOMBARDMENT GROUP ST. LOUIS JENKINS FLETCHER
KULA GULF MINING GROUP - (TASK GROUP 36.5) RADFORD PREBLE CAMBLE BREESE By early May the Japanese had established a heavy concen tration of troops and supplies at the Vila and Stanmore plan tations on the southeast coast of Kolombangara Island. Air fields had been established here as well as at Munda. Rein forcements and supplies to these bases were being brought in at night oy small transports and barges, occaeionally es corted by destroyers and light cruisers. It was estimated that the enemy was now forced to bring these convoys in around the north of Kolombangara, in view of our mining opera tions in Blac~ett Strait. Aerial reconnaissance showed that there WPre approximately ten thousand troops plus search lights, anti-aircraft, artillery, radio, radar and numerous 46-1 SECRE'T
coast defense guns at Vila. In addition there were probably torpedo and patrol craft in this area. On the morning of ll May Task Force 18 departed from Espiritu Santo and proceeded to carry out its mission. During forenoon 12 May, the cruisers sent their planes with aviator spotters to Tu1agi. Spotters transferred to KBlack Cats" for the purpose of spotting for ships gunfire during thP bombardments. Rendezvous was made at 1700 with Task Group 36.5 north of Savo Island, where the ST. LOUIS, JENKINS and FLETCHER proceeded for the bombardment of Munda, and the other ships proceeded to Kula Gulf. Arrangements were made with Task Force 33 for the follow ing air support: 1. One or two 11Black Cats" to precede the Task Force and search the Shortlands and vicinity covering Kula and Vella Gulfs enroute. One or these planes to maintain watch in the vicinity of Vella Lavella to prevent the Task Force being surprised by enemy surface forces, while conducting mine laying and bo~bardment in Kula Gulf. 2. Two 11 Black Cats 11 to act as spotting planes for the bombardment, cruiser aviator spotters embarked. 3. T.F. 33 carry out raide or heavy air strikes on air fields in the Buin area to keep torpedo and bomping planes on the ground before and during the bombardment and retirement of the Task Force. These planes to go to the southward of New GE>orgia or to the northward of Santa Isabel during their approach and retirement, in order to keep clear of our Task Force. 4. Air cover for Task Force 18 anc. Task Group 36.5 during daylight on the 12th and 13th while within air striking distance of enemy air bases. In addition, anti submarine cover over Task rorce 18 while her planes are shore based at Tulagi. 5. A reconnaissance sweep to the north and Paet of Malaita on thP 12th to catch snoopers.
~ask Force 33 furnished this air support in a most satisfactory manner.
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NAVIGATION AND BOMBARDMENT PLAN I. T1me schedule and navigation plan. ALL TIMES IN THIS PLAN REFER TO TIME OR POSITION OF HONOLULU. OTHER SHIPS ADJU3TING INDIVIDUAL SCHEDULES ACCORDINGLY.
1825 TE1sk For('e paes through Latitude 8-50 S, Longitude 159-25 E 300 T., speed of advance 25 knots. Commander Destroyer Squadron TWENTY-ONE with NICHOLAS, JENKINS, and FLETCHER screening ahead; cruisers in single column; Comlliander Destroyer Division FORTY-ONE w1th Destroyer Division FORTY-ONE screening astern cruisers; Task Group 36.5 in column astern.
8325 Column left to course 270 T.
0000 Column left to course 225 T. Slow to 20 knots. Destroyers for~ in column ahead and astern of cruisers, distance 500 yards; double distance between van de stroyers and leading cruiser. 0030 Column left to course 180 T. Task Group 36.5 stand on and proceed independently on mining mission. 0100 (about) HONOLULU pass through initial point and commence firing. INITIAL POINT I~ POINT AT WHICH TANGENT AT MOUT:i OF VILA RIVER BEARS 230 T. and TANGENT ON TUNGIRILI POINT BEARS 190 T. Other ('ruisers open fire in turn as each passes through initial point. Leading destroyers open fire on searchlight~, batterie~, and other targets of opportunity. 0112 HONOLULU cease f1re main battery; column left to course 090 T. Leading destroyers, HONOLULU and HELENA bombard Enogai Inlet and vicinity with five inch batt~rie~ while on this course; NASHVILLE, ST. LOUIS, and rear destroyers bombard Balroko Harbor and vicinity wit~ flvP inch batteries. Deliver about five minutes of ~ire on these targets. 0115 Column left to course 030 T. While on this course each ship shift five inch fire to Rice Anchorage and deliver about three minutec 0f fire.
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0130 Increase speed to 28 knots. 0155 (about) Column right to course 090 passing not less than 3 miles north of Visµvisu Point. 'Nhen on thle course van and rear destroyers form screen ahead and astern of cruisers. Task Group 36.5 should be some what ahead of the formation, speed 2? knots, formed with RADFORD and GAMBLE in column; PREBLE on star board quarter, BR~ESE on port quarter of GAMBLE. When NICHOLAS is in position one thousand yards astern of GAMBLE, HONOLULU ae guide will adjust speed without signal to that of Mine Group. When formed, mine layers and van destroyers should be in follow ing approximate positions with reference to HONOLULU; RADFORD 4000; GAMBLE 3000; PREBLE 3020; BREESE 3340; van destroyers on circle 2. 0240 (about) When reaching Longitude 15?-45 E., change course to 120° T. 0?00 (about) Arrive at Latitude 8-50 S, Longitude 159-25 E. Task Group 36.5, l~ss RADFO~D, proceed inde pendently to Tulagi ror fuel; thence to Espiritu Santo. Remainder of task force column left on signal to course 090 T., thence via Indispensable Strait to arrive vicinity Nura Island about noon.
II. Bom~ardment Plan. HONOLULU: Main battery - grid squares E9 - 14 and F9 - 14 inc.usive. Point or aim for first salvos and reference point for air spots is mouth or Vila River. Concentrate last minute of fire on southern peninsula of Ringi Cove in vicinity or square I-3. Secondary battery - Fire in area around Enogai Inlet for five minutes after ship turns to 090 T., then shift to area around Rice Anchorage for 3 minutes when ship ls on course 030 T. HELENA: Main battery - Grid squares G? - 14 and H? - 14 inclusive. Point of aim and reference point for air spots is bight at lower right corner o~ square Gl4. Concentrate last minute or fire on southern peninsula or Ringi Cove in vicinity of square I-3. Secondary battery - Fire in area around Enogai Inlet for five minutes after ship turns to 090 T., then 46-4 SSCRET
shift to areR around Rice Anchorage for 3 minutes while ship ie on course 030 T. NASHVILLE: Main battery - Grid squares 17 - 14 and J? - 14 inclusive. Point of aim and reference point for air spots is bight of Disappointment Cove in lower left corner or square I-15. Concentrate last minute of fire on northwest shore of Ringi Cove in squares K-3, L-3, L-4. Secondary battery - Fire on area around Bairoko Harbor for five minutes after ship turns to 090 T., then shift to area around Rice Anchorage for 3 minutes while ship is on course 030 T. ST. LOUIS: Main battery - Grid squares KlO - 18, LlO - 18, Jl5 - 18 inclusive. Point of aim and refer ence point for air spots is bight of Disappointment Cove at the intersection of grid lines 610 and 890. Concentrate last minute of fire on northwest shore o! Ringi Cove in grid squares K-3, L-3, L-4. Secondary battery - Fire on area around Bairoko Harbor for five minutee after ship turns to 090 T., then shift to area around Rice Anchorage for three minutes while ship is on course 030 T. Van Destroyers. (a) Tasks in ord.er of priority (1) Screen cruisers against submarine, tor pedo or other craft during approach, bombardment, and retirement. Use toJ'9edoee ano guns against such targets, opening fire at disc~etion without orders. Be prepared to screen cruisers and mine layers by smoke, and to launch concerted torpedo at•ack against surface craft on order. While in K~l• Gulf be particularly alert for torpedo craft apnroaching from any small harbor and for destroyers or other surface craft approaching from Blackett Strait. (2) Silence shore batteries, destroy search lights and other targets of opportunity. (3) Destroy troop and logistic concentrations by ehore bombardment.
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(b) Bombardment objectives. Gun emplacements on shore in squares J-18, I-17. Causeway and peninsula bP tween the shore and Disappointment Cove. Vila Plantation house and adjacent area~ in squares D-11, D-12, rau10 tower on observation poet on Sasamboki Island. After turning to course 090 each destroyer deliver about five minutes of fire in the general area or Enogai Inlet; then shift to the vicinity of Rice Achorage for three minutes. EXCEPT FOR SURFACE CRAFT OR SHORE BATTERIES OR SEARCHLIGHTS, DO NOT OPF.N BOMBA..>m~ENT FIRE UNTIL HONOLULU FIRES ABOUT 0100.
Destroyers. rear~ (a) Tasks in order of priority. (1) Screen cruisers agalnst attacks by torpedo or other vessels. Use torpedoes, guns, or depth charges against such target~, opening fire at dis cretion without orders. Be prepared to screen cruisers and mine layers by smoke and to launch concerted torpedo attack on order Be particularly alert to observe and destroy any torpedo or other craft approaching on the disengaged side during cruiser bo~bardment. (2) Silence shore batteries, destroy search lights and other target~ of opportunity. (3) Destroy troop and logistic concentrations by shore bombardment to intersection north on bounda ry squareR "Mtt with shore line. (b) Bombardment objectives. (1) A str1o approximately one thousand yards in depth along the shore line in a northeasterly direction from Disappointment Cove. (2) Targets of opportunity (shore batteries, etc.) not apparently being covered by leading ships. (3) While headed on course 090 and 030 deliver about five minutes of fire on Baikoro Harbor, and two or three on Rice Anchorage.
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III. Spotting and Fire Control and Employment or Ammunition. 1. Ammunition allowances as follows: (a) 1000 rounds six inch H.C. per cruiser. (b) 500 rounds rive inch per cruiser. (c) 1000 rounds five inch per destroyer. 2. Cruisers and destroyers open !ire using rlashless powder. Continue ue~ or this powder against surface targets or bombardment objectives as long as the concealment afforded by its use ie warranted. Be prepared to shift with facility to smokeless powder and common projectileA on order. 3. One Black Cat will spot for HONOLULU and HELENA; another ror NASHVILLE and ST. LOUIS. No air spotting assignment can be made for destroyers. Spots will be made up and down in hundreds of yards; ~ight and left in increments or tens or yards; spotting will be to reference points.
4. \ ~hips ~ rP re r~~ edtete us~ o! all automatic weapons. 5. Black Cate be prepared to furnish illwnination by flares if ordered. Commander Task Group 36.5 issued the following instructions for the Mining Group:
"Thie Task Group will min~ western side or Kula Gulf in order to interfere with enemy surface craft approach ing Vila-Stan.more from the north. (a) TASK UNIT 36.5.1.(U.8.S. RADFOP.D) Provide radar and navigational guide and close support for Task Unit 36.5.2. Destroy any surface craft or aircraft which may attempt to interfere witn the mining operation or re tirement of TaGk Unit 36.5.2. During mining and initial retirement, act as rader picket vessel covering Task Force 18 while in Kula Gulf. Advise CoQl!Jander Task Force 18 of approach of enemy surface craft.
(b) TASK UNIT ~6.5.2.(Three DM 1 s) Lay standard three row mine field from the east coast of Kolombangara Island beginning in vicinity of mouth of Okopo River and ex tending in dirPction 110° True for 8 distance of four (4)
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miles. Commence mining at 0100 May 13. Mining speed 16 knots, mining interval 12 seconds. Distance between mine rows 400 yards. Upon completion of mining form column on RADFORD for retirement at 27 knots in company with Task Force 18. When directed by Command~r Task Group 36.5 at about 0700 13 May, proceed independently to Tul gi, fuel from Erskine Phelps and thereafter proce d Espiritu Santo to arrive during daylight 14 l~
Appro ~h Plan: About 1700 12 May Task Group 3b.5 in colum , order of ships RADFORD, PREBLE, GAMBLE, AND BRE SE, tak~ station 1000 yards astern of Task F0rce lo in vicinity of north of Savo Island on course 30C0 T. at 25 knots. At about 1900 pass through point Lat. 8°-501 s. Long.159°-25 1 E. Thereart~r proceed in accord ance with Commander Taok Fo~ce 18 Opc"~tion Order. At approximat ly 0030 Task Group 36.5 will proceed inde pendently at speed 20 knots to a point 1500 yards due east of Sesepi. At this point change course to 180° T. and decrea~e speed to 15 knots. Reraain on co~rse 180° T. for a period of 8 minutes at which time RADFORL will change course to 110° T. Task Unit 36.5.2 stand on for a period of one (1) minute at which tlwP chan~e course by cimultanP-oua turn to the mining ~ourse cf 110° T. Mining Plan: The RADFORD will turn to the mining course of llOQ T. one (1) minute ahead of the mine layers. When PREBLE, following in RADFORD ' s wake, changes to the mining course all mining vessels will execute a simultaneous turn to the mining course of 110° T. and will commence mining when ship has swung to within 20° of the new (mining) course . Mines will be laid in accordance with~ining Doctrine and as laid down in Com~ander Task Group 36 . 5 Operation Order. The above maneuver will place the mining veesele on a line or bearing of 250• relative to the PREBLE which ic the guide for the operation. The mining course or 110° T. will be held for 18 minutes. Retirement: Upon completion of mining operations increase speed to 2? kno t s, change co ur s ~ t o 041° T. and form column on RADFORD. Upon pa ssing thr ough point L at. 7-6~ S . Long. 15?-24 E. change course to 090° T. to pass Visuvieu Point three (3) miles abeam . W11en on course 090° T. t a ke s creening stations as f ollowe p r eparatory t o Ta sk Force joining from astern: 46- 8 S3CRET
RADFORD 4000, PREBLE 3020, GAJ.'..BLE 3000, BREESE 3340. Upon reach1ng Long. 15?-45 E RADFORD w111 change course to 120° T and m1ne layers will reorient axis to 120° T. In event of surface action by Task Force 18, either dur1ng approach or retirement this Task Group will maneuver to keep clear. In event or air attack, th1s Task Group will conform to movements of Commander Task Force 18. All un1ts be prepared to maneuver radically and to lay smoke."
This operation emphasi~ed the rollow1ng points: 1. THE VALUE OF UP-TO-DATE ACCURATE INTELLIGENCE. 2. THE VALUE OF THOROUGH PLANNING WITH PERSONAL CONFERENCES PRIOR TO AN OPERATION. 3. THE NECESSITY AND IMPORTANCE OF CLOSE CO ORDINATED AIR SUPPORT. 4. THE VALUE OF DETAILED NAVIGATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR NIGHT OPERATIONS TO AVOID UNNECESSARY SIGNALING 5. THE NECESSIT.! FOR HIGH S~EED RELIABLE MINE LAYING VESSELS WITH ADEQUATE ENDURANCE. 6. THE LIMITATIONS OF RADAR . ?. THE NECESSITY OF CAREFULLY CONSIDERING TOPOGRAPHY WHEN PLANNING AN OPERATION RE QUIRING DETAILED PILOTING BY RADAR. 8. THE IMPORTANCE OF WELL TRAINED INDOCTRINATED RADAR PERSONNEL, CAPABLE OF EVALUATING THE SCREEN ACCURATELY. 9. THE URGENT NEED FOR MORE SG RADARS IN SHIPS. 10. THE CONTINUED FAILURE OF MARK 29 FUZES.(MARK 29 MOD 1 FUZES WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO ELIMINATE BREAKAGE OF THE PLASTIC COVERS HAVE NOW BEEN ISSUED TO THE SERVICE.) 11. THE lARGE NUMBER OF BATTERY CASUALTIES OCCURRING DUE TO GRE~ PERgONNEJ... INADEQUATELY TRAINED. 12 SMOKE INTERFE~ENCE CAUSED BY Fl..ASHLESS POWDER. 13. VALUE OF "BLACK CATS" FOR SEARCH AND SPOTTING DURING NIGHT OPERATIONS. 14. THE CONTINUED FAILURE OF STEERING CONTROL IN OUR SHIPS . 15. THE IMPORTANCE OF FULLY I NFORMI NG PERSONNEL, PRIOR TO BATTLE OF THE BATTLE PLAN(SEE U S. NAVAL REn U LATIONS~ ARTICLES 8?3, ALSO U.S.S. HELENA'S COMMENTSJ.
46-9 SECREI'
16. THE URGENCY OF HAVING ACCURATE NAVIGATION AND HYDROGRAPHIC DATA. l?. THE EXISTENCE OF PHANTOM TARGETS DURlNG NIGitT OPERATIONS. 18. THE CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT IN AIR SUPPORT. 19. THE CONTINUED IMPROV™EN'P IN COM1:.UNICATIQNS, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN PLANES AND SHIPS. 20. TH::: IMPROVEMENT IN CONTROL OF OUR FIGHTER PATROL COVER. 21. THE ABILITY OF OUR SHIPS TO DELIVER A HIGH RATE OF FIRE. 22. THE CONTINUED HABIT OF AIRPLANES MAKING THREATENING APPROACqEs ON OUR SURFACE FORCES. 2~. THE NECESSITY OF' FLEXIBILITY IN AME:UNITION ARRANGEMENTS TO PERMIT INSTANT USE OF EITHER AP OR HC PROJSCTILES. 24. THE CONTINUSD FAILURE OF RADARS, DUE TO VIBRATION AND GUN BLAST. 25. THE CONTINUED PERFECTION OF C.I.C. IN OUR SHIPS. 26. THE REMOVAL OF SECRET AND OTHER CLASSIFIED MATERIAL NOT NEEDED FOR AN OPERATION FROM SHTPS, PRIOR TO OP~.ATING IN ~~S~PI~~~n WATERS mrnER THE CONTROL OF THE ENEMY. 2?. TJIE URGENT r;ESD FOR CARTRIDGE CASE EXTRACTOR FOR EACH 5 11/38 MOUNT.(AN IMPROVED CASE EX TRACTOR FOR EACH SINGLE GUN, OR HULTIPLE MOUNT, TOGETHER WITH SHORT 5"/38 CARTRIDGE CASES FOR CLEARING THE BORE, ARE NOW BEING PROVIDED). Weather: Wind 030 True, Force 1. Sea from 300 True, Forcel. Vislb~lity ~ood to excellP-nt - about ?-8 milPs . Barometer 28.89. Clouds - alto-cumulus from 030 True 5/10. Moon was bright during the approach. Moon set 0044. The Task Force Commander and the various commanding officf"rs made the following comments on this operation: COMMANDER TASK FORCE 18
Except for unfortunate battery casualties, th~ combined opPration WPS su~cessfully car·ried out exactly aa planned. Primary objectives of the bombardments were enemy troopA and shore inqtallations. Reports from ou~ spotting planea indicate that the bivouac areas and battery installBtlon ... '•erP thoroughlv covered. For the Vila bom bArdmP.nt 2,895 six-inch high.capacity projectiles and 4,340 -'G-Hi SSCRET
Five-inch shell were expended, and 970 six-inch and 1,648 five-inch were laid down on Munda; a total expenditure of 9,853 rounds in the two bombardments.
The mine detachment commenced laying mines at 0100, coincident with the first salvo of the bombardment from the HONOLULU. The field was laid precisely as planned and ex tends in three rows from a point 1,000 yards east of the Okopo River on KolombanEara Island on a bearing 110° for a distance of 8,400 yards. General Plan - Due to the combined mining operation, the general navigation plan used in all previous bombard ments of Vila was reversed; the approach and bombardment being conducted on a southerly course along the Kolombangara shore while entering Kul& Gulf. IT IS EXTREMELY ADVISABLE TO VARY THE NAVIGATIONAL PLAN WHEN OPERATING REPEATEDLY WITHIN ENEMY CONTROLLED WATERS. The mlne detachment, following the bombardment group in, were to close the Kolombe.ngara coast, lay the mine field and etand out, forming up ahead of the cruisers in the vicinity of Vieuv1su Point. This plan possessed the following advantages: 1. It.kept the Bombardment Group as far away from the mine field as possible during retirement. 2. It gave an excellent bombardment course, since late advices indicated large enemy troop concen trations in the bivouac areas between Lolu Lake and the north end of the landing strip. 3. It permitted a simple bombardment plan, hitting primary objectives at effective ranges first. 4. It provided the only sure element of surprise by keeping away from the enemy'e observation poet and searchlight on Visuvieu Point. 5. It utilized the RADFORD, leading the mine detach ~ent, ae a picket covering the close-in approaches to Kula Gulf . This approach and firing plan posseaPed the basic disadvantage of having the heavy ships open fire while heading into restricted waters. Should the enemy offer real opposition, particularly in the form of underwater attack, we might have trouble getting the ships out.
46-11 s::cnET
However, th~ ~uccess of the whole operation was prima rily dependent upon surprise, and our latest information ind1catea only nor~al increased enemy atrength. Reports indicate that our attack was again a complete surprise.
PREPARAT:ON - ~he photo£raphic lnt~rpretation unit on the staff o! Com~ander Aircreft South Pacific Force aRain furn1Fhed a complete layout of the area. The flri~g grid chart prepared by them covered prnct1cnlly the ~r.ole bivouac area, reaching ai far to t~e westward aA Ringi Cove, where th~ 1eruy wa~ reported to have landing facilities and some wnrehoures. Variou~ 1ntel11gence reportq and chartq prP cai·tc oy reconnaiA<'flnce uni ts 't•ere of the utrr.ost ve.lue in placil"lg n.e pos' tion of th<> bivouec areas and observati~n posts arrurat~ly, ~bile enlarged alr photo~raphe provided an al ost perfect scale layout of the enemy battery e=place .ente.
~he Chief of Staff nrd Operations Officer to Commander Alr Solomons flew down to Espiritu to confer with the Tas~ Force Co~ al"lder on air qu,oort operations. At t~is confer ence, held by AdmirPl Fitch at hiF headquarters, all detaile. regarain Black Cat eervlcea, fighter cover, and P.lr strikes on the Kahili-Ballale area were discussed and decided upon AIR COCPERATICU IN THIS AREA APPEARS TO Bf. Ill.PROVING CONTINUOUSLY. Later in the afternoon junt prior to the departure of th~ mine detachment, a conference of all commanding officers was held on board tr.e flagship of the TaRk 2orce Co~:ander , ~t which all e~ergency procedures nnn the general firin6 pl8n a~ embnd1ed in the Operation Order w0 re diecuesed.
PERSONO:.L co: 1FERENCES WITH ALL CCM ·~AK:.'ER.S PR.IO?. TO AN OPERATIC:: IS CF UTV.uST IMPORTANCE IF SUCCESS IR TO BE ACHIEVED. NAHRATIVE - Change in th"' directive issued by Com ander South Pacific Force to include a boir..bardment of Munda in th~ genera! plan presented no particular difficulties, aa complete plans had or0 v1ous"":,· been ~ede for this J.~und.11. bomoard~ent. A deepatch was sent in to Esoir1tu by olane, informing all har.ds concerned of the change ir. plan, .and a r 0 viRed operation order distributed to all ships by ~cssage drop.
FLEXIBILITY IN PLANS IS ESSENTIAL. 46-12 s::c:1ET
The rev1sed f1r1ng plan and gr1d coverage for the V1la bombardment, together w1th the rev1sed commun1cat1on plan, wnc taken 1nto Guadalcanal w1th our cru1~er plRnee on thP forenoon of the 12th. Reoorts from the individual ehios and from our Black Cat spotting planes ehow that the reviRed bo~bardment plan was followed perfectly and the fir1ng assign ment a thoroughly covered. a. The Approach - The heavy weather, squalls, and high winds occasioned by the front hang1ng over E~p1ritu were left to the eastward by dawn of the 12th, and c:ear weather prevailed throughout the entire Guaaalcanal-New Georgia area during the remainder of the operat1on. Task Force 18 and the mine detachment had eeparate fighter cover until the two forces joined near Savo Island in the late afternoon. FIGHTER COVER CONTINUES TO IMPROVE At this time Taek Group 18.? (ST.LOUIS, JENKINS , FLETCHER) were proceeding south of Savo for their expedition to Munda, and were given separate fighter and anti-submarine patrol. At n1ghtfall, the Vila bombardment group wes formed tn stendard anti-aircraft night cru1eing disposition, followed by the mine deta~hment in column led by the RADFORD, standing up the middle of Nthe slot" on course 300°, speed 25. The sky overhead was perfectly clear with moon in the last quarter As previou0ly stated, we planned to give Visuvisu Point a wide berth due to the reported searchl1eht and coast watcher stat1on the~e. Poer charts ann the low-lying land there rre.de navigation by 9G radar a bit difficult. WHEN PLANNING THIS OPERATION, THE LIMI TATIONS OF THE SG RADAR A~D THE INACCURACIES OF AVAILABLE CH.~TS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO CONSIDEF.ATICN.
By the time we got Kolombanga~e on the short scale of the SG screen, it wAe Apperent thet we were to the northwestward and ahe~d of position and had closed the coast too far. These n::i.v1gat1onal difficulties made changes in thP prescribed plan of epproach neceAeary; but all sh1ps had been cautioned to be Alert for Just such e contingency, and everyone followed the motions of the flagsh1p mak1ng all course and speed changes without signal. The moon set behind Kolombangara at 0030, giving us a black shadow along the coast during our final run into Kula Gulf. SECRE'T
b. Bombardment - The HONOLULU passed through the initial point on the firing course at prescribed speed and opened fire exactly at 0100 as planned. It will be noted that the wide separation of two miles between the lnitial spotting pointe ~f the HONOLULC and NASHVILLE gave these shipA sn opportunity to open fire together, and that the NASHVILLS commenced firing about 30 second after the HONOLULU. This was particularly important ss the NASH VILLE caught the whole northern end of the Japanese bivouac area in enfilade on her 11 open fire 11 bearing. The HELENA opened fire according to plan about 1-1/2 minutes after the HONOLULU, her initial objective being the battery emplace ment area just half-way between thP opening ealvos of the HONOLULU and the NASHVILLE er1d areas. The last one minute of fire for the main battery or each cruiser was lifted about fifteen hundred yards to place these batteries on the Rin~i Cove area As each ship, destroyer as well as cruiPer, turned to the eastward and then to the northwar~ for their retirement course, the 5- !nch bAtteries poured a heavy fire into Bairoku Harbor, Enogai Inlet, and the Rice Ancr.orage, in succession . Reporte indicate that the heavy smoke hampered the rear destroyers somewhat in finding the r~nEe to these objectives, a considerable amount of their fire falling short. However, the spotting planes report that this 5-inch fire on these objectives was, on the whole, very effective. OUR 5-INCH BATTERIES CONTINUE TO BE A MOS~ EFFECTIVE WEAPON.
TherP was practically no enemy oppo~ition. Indi vidual reports from destr~yers roPntion some splashes from enemy batteries falling over as well as short. The only fire observed by me personally was seen to come from a shore battery near the eoutr. shore or Enogai Inlet, and only a few feeble flRsheQ ·,~~re obsl"rved from here. That the enemy were taken completely by surprise is ~videnced by the fact that they turned on their searchlights to illuminate our planes just prior to the instant of opening fire. Five to seven searchlight beams were observed. The HONOLULU had three salvos in the air while these searchlights were still turnen on, but they went out ~lmost coincident with the landing of the first or second salvo.
THE ENEMY PROBABLY RAN TO THEIR SHELTERS WHEN THEY REALIZED A BOMBAPDMENT WAS TAKING PLACE.
46-14 'fuether or not our t•o10 J eadinp; destroyers were able to shoot out any of these searchlights is problematical. -he HO~!OLULU P>;:>ot ter in number One Black Cat was blindec by the searchli~hts and could not spot the first salvo but had no trouhle thereafter.
Tl1E USE CF SEARCHLIGHTS FOR ELBDI!\G PILOTS S:-!OI;LD BE EXPLOITED WH2NEVI:R OT>-!ER CONSDERATICKS PER1·1IT. Communication on the spotting circuits with t .• e Black Cat planPs was uniformly good. Voice transmission on the HOHCLULU clrc..iit ca'lle t'irough more clearly than on previous bombardments After the C0~pletion 0f ~he mP1n oattery f1r1nE, several spots were relayed to +rp Petroyer~ ovpr t~P TBS. First tests of all €p?tt1n~ c1rcu1tp were made five ~!nutes before the openin~ salvo, and all co~ Yni rations were eeta· liche satisfactorily
The USS s~q_,:·v. reported los of steering control about halfway throu· .. t .... o•roardr::ent, but re15ained er station almost immediately c.!'ter tht> turn.
A ioiCS~ DA~''tE?CU'=> CA3:JAL'I'Y ·:IT:":N RES:'RICT[J WAT:ns CON710L!...E:) BY "'~;: =~m.cr.
The NASHVILLE is to be cor:: .ended for the hi~h volume of accurate fire maintained ln s~lte of the very severe casualty to number thrPe turret. All otbPr t..irrets ex pended their full allowance of am~unit10n, anc the spotting plane ase~~ned the NASHVILLE reports tna+ the bivouac areas assigned th!lt vessel were thor u~hly covered.
~ The retirement was conducted without incident except for th~ NICHOLAS and CHEVALIER cnsunltles and the firing on a plane by thi> r:n.'HVILLE and STHON~. The Task Force Coci.:tnnder ls still of the opinion th~t this plane, showing runn1nE lights, ~Rq one of our own Liberators on 1t 1 s way home after ~a!'?' 46-15 SSCRET the plane WPr~ one of ours, he ha~ no bustness coming in over the formati0n, as daTm was just breaking and he could rardly fail to see us. He could certainly see both +he land ~asses of New Geor~ia and Santa Isabel Irlands, the course he wae sup }osed to~t~ke. The rninelayers were Elven orders to proceed to Tulagi for neceseary fuel shortly after sunri~e. T~e Munda detach ment did not join up until west cf Florida Inland. The anti-aircraft crui~ing disposition wa~ ma1nta1ner1. ouring the retire1nPnt thro11i:;h Indispensable Straits, and until e11nset, thP. for. .. ation zigz~r;r:1ng ~t hig-h speed. At 1245 ~alled all hands to General Quarters, Condition Red having been set at Gue1alcsnal and Tulagi incident to the air attack which developed in the vicinity of the Russells. !Crom "Recon" reporte, t:.is attac!t see!:led to be devPlop1ng e:Y.Rctl;r lt11.e the lPr~e-scale attacK on April ?th. 'lie tad left the eastern end of Indispensable Straits, practically th~ 11~it1ng radi~s for thp Jao dive bombers, bat we confi dently expected an attac~ wo~ld develop at thi~ ti~e. Com uniration ~aq i~ · e~iatPly estaolished with our eight fi htere overhead., anrl. we were ready for th.-m, but nothlng developed except thP v~ry satisfactory fighter oat-le nortr. cf 2uadalcanal ~nre than cne hundred mil•s dtstant from us. IT IS GRATIFYING 'T'O SEE T:IE MARKED IMPROV!:·.~T I~~ CUR FIGHTER COVER, PARTICULARLY IN Rt:SPECT TO C01·:·.UNIC;."'IONS. MINE DETACJ-0.~ENT - Fuel reouirements of the fast reine layers made it nece~sary for the Task Force Coln.'Lander to ch~nge the baeic operation plan. ThP GAMBLE still has four boilers and only carriPs 83,000 gallons of fuel compared to 135,000 for the PREBLE. ~ve dici not relish the idea of sending these fully loaded mine layers into Tulagi for fuel, but the maririn for the GA~/3LE was too thin to do otherwise. SimilRrly, the Task Force Com~ander ~ad hoped that the mine layers might remain concentrated with Task Force EIGHTEEN during the daylight hours of the l~th, fuelin~ the GAMBLE from one of the cruisers that night if neceAsary, but the fuel endurance of that vessel would not permit this. The resultant deci~ion to have all mine layers return to Tulagi turnec out very well, as both PREBLE and BREESE developPd machinery troubles during the retire~ent, the speed of both being reduced by these casualties. In expreeA1ng hi~hest nraiee for the handling of the 46-16 SZC~ET mine layers in both these recent offensive mining oper ationp, in enemy waters, the Task Force Commander cannot but feel that these fine old ships were extended beyond their utmost capabilities. ~hey have already given the oest of what they have. For operations of this charac ter we need scme new fast mine layers whose engines and fuel Pndurance wil: 9ermit them to get in and get out with their covering forces. Also in view of the limiting full-power speed of the mine layers, the initial point was passed thirty-five minutes in advance of the time specified in Commander Third Fleet's Ooeration Plan. This was done to allow for a spe~d of advance of twenty-five knots, which was fortu nate as the BREESE reported a blower caqualty which reduced ner speed to 25 knotA just as we passed through the initial point. AIR OPERATIONS - All air support assignments were perfectly carried out durinf, the entire operation. Harrassing strikes on the Kahili-Ballale airdromes were evidently perfectly timPd, the clear night materially aiding navigation. Our fighter cover was on station at all times and stayed with us until we were well to the eastward of San CristobAl in the late aft~rnoon. CASUALTIES - The Court of Inquiry in the case of the explosion in Turret III of thP. U. S. S NASHVILLE has completed it's investigation without determ1n1n~ the cause or causes ot this serious casualty. The record of proceedings is going forward im~ediately via the chain of com~and. ThP. casualties on the NICHOLAS and CHEVALIER were well handled, and the failure to clear the bores of these guns was 1n no way due to personnel. Steps have been taken to orovide an increased nu~ber of extracting tools on each destroyer, and special short cartridges will be kept at all guns to clear bores fouled by ja~med pro jec tileR. The high and well sustained rate of fire of all t atteries was very gratifyin~. The Taek Force Commander notes that the ST. LOUIS experienced six caqualtieA with four ja~~ed guns due to failures of the plastic nose caos of tne Mark 29 fuzes. The NASHVILLE also report~ casualties due to these fuzes. All 6-inch H.C. projectiles in this force are now fitted with Mark 29, Mod. l fuzes just received from the LASSEN, and All Mark 29 fu?.es with the old plastic nose caps have 46-17 s::::CRET been turned in. FLASHLESS POWDER is undoubtedly effective in preventing accurate ranging by enemy batteries. Hot the least part of its effectiveness is due to the dense whitish smoke produced by thiR powd~r. This Task Force had conducted preliminary tests of this powder both day and night; and the effect of this dense smoke, particularly on the rear ships, was dis cusePd in conference. Commanding Officers e:icperienc1ng any oarticular difficultv due to smoke were directPd to report thP fact. Also, cho~ld no particular opposition develop, ehips were instructed to shift to s~okelees powder at dis cretion. This procedure was also designed to conservP our supnly of flashJess powder, since in any case tne degtroyers would e~~end their tr.tlre allowance of flashless about ~id ¥.RY in the bombardment and be obliged to shift to smokeless. In the firot stages of the bombardment, the dull red fla he€ with accomuar.y1ng showers of sparks from the flash less powder could be observed for adjacent ships on:y. The Ta ~ Force Com ander checked on this ryer~onally and could not see the NASHVILLE fire beyond that of the HELE!JA. The spotting plane reported that he could plainly see the black s lps sllhouet+ed against P lle;ht r B1uoke background, but t e ob ervatione may have been ade after some smokelese pn1"ier h£C. been used A consensus of all observers leads to the cef1nite ooinion that the UCP of fleshless powder ls indicated 1n all radar control:ed night bombardment~ where enem~ oppo- ~i t '~n may be expected, particularly those in restricted waters with little or no breeze. The Task Force Commander feel~ certain t~Rt the enemy would find great difficulty in rangin on the flasres, and is of the opinion that the den£e r.ln...ids of s .. o~e 'oJould prPvent any effective illumination of our forces either by starshell or searchlight Several ships report 1ncree. ~ - The SPil Jforge radar again proved that these niEnt boJbardment and mine laying operations depend upon tn~ ef~icient operati0n of tnis instrument. The need fo~ two of thfse radRrA end additional PPI scopes, particularly vn flagships, waq de~onstrated during the latter portlon of the ~~rroach when this radar wes ln constant demand for nevlgation purposes to fix position accuratPly prior to ~6-18 SSC~ET opening fire. At the same time the gunnery officer needed an accurate bea1·ing of Sasamboki I~land to coach his fire control radar on, and a general sweep of the Kula Gulf area ahead for possible enemy contacts was alPO indicated. In accordance with the latest dlrective from Vice Chief of Naval Operations, tt.e SG radar was rerr.oved from U--e NASHVILLE prior to her depRrture from this area, and is now being installed on the mainnsst of tte HONCLULU . CONCLUSIONS - All operations, both bombardments and the mine layin~ operations, were well conducted by all hands. The Captains were alert to detect the cours~ and speed changea of the guide durin~ the approach, the station keep ing throughout beine exceptionally good. The bombardment fire, lasting scout 30 m' nutes from tte first gun until the rear destroyer co~pleted its bombardment of Rice Anchorage, was well directed and well sustained. Unfortunately ttere were no large fires or explosions such as the blg fire at Stanmore during our first bo~bardment here. However, tte enemy had spread his troops over a large bivouac area, and all indications noi~t to the fact that we covered these areas very thoroughly. · U. S. S. HONOLULU Great difficult~ waF. experienced in obtaining accu rate radar fixes due to the distance from land prior to the final aporoach. A9parent inaccuracies in the charts of this area were also noted. The final apnrcach made necessary by a well founded decision to apnroach from the north along a new track ~nd by the mining operation in conjunction ~1th the bombardment made accurate navigation by radar difficult. It is believed that tbe ship's position was never positively determined within 500 yards. It was unfortunate that Just prior to the bombardment, radar plot sent out four ranges and bearings on an object suppdsedly Sasa~boki Island. The Sasamboki ranges and bearings were used by the Navigator as the best information for the bom bardment as the ranges and bearings previou~ly received on Baffibari Haroor had been labelled both as Surumuni Cove and Barr.Dari Har~or. After about one minute of f1rin~, Radar Plot reported that its previous information wae in error, that the object was a ooir.t of land (Causeway) North of Sasa~boki. It then gent out two ranees and bearings on Tun~ulrili Point, from which the Navigator sent a corrected range and bearing to Plot, over a JB circuit rigfed for bombardment. purposes, but Fire Control reports that the correction was never received. For tte next seven minutes 46- 19 S~CRET no ranges and b 0 arings were received due to a :u~oosed shio contact in Blackett Strait. It was later dec1~ed that this and other contacts off Enogai Inlet and Rlce Anchorage were caused by shell splashes or reefs. The following comments on the d1ff1cultie~ en eountered in carrying out the operation are made for the purpoRe of nidtnr ships ecployed tn future operations of li~e npture: A. Co~bat Information Center- The lo~Rtion of the Combat Information Center in Flag Plot is believed to be th logical location for the station in this ship at this time. ~1th only one SG radar, however, this 1mposPs more ~orY. on the installation and organization than they can supoort. The 1 portance of the c~nduct of a tasc. force to its proper position far outweighA the need of the fle5- Rhlp for fire control data. A single SG radar cannot f~lf111 both require~ents in situations similar to that of this bombardment. B. Navibation - Navigation oy radar cannot be accurately ac omnlished by eir.gle ranges ana bearings on an object, t~cauce of tLe inaccuracy of the bearings obtainPd on the SG radar. RangPs and bearingR on at least two objectr. ~urt be obtained for each plot of the ship's position in Rn operation of this type. ·~nere a minimum ranBe to closest land le used, the other range and oearing must be to an object whoRe 1nentity has been positively ~qtabllshed. C. Radar - The radar ooerators and the offir,ere 1n Flag Plot had extreme nlfficulty in identifying the various navigational aide. The following points in Kula Gulf were the most easilv tdentified on the ~G ecreen as taken from HO Chart #2906: 3ambar1 Harbor Tunguirili Point Enoga1 Inlet ~dukonduko Point SuritPmbuna Point V1~uv1~u Point . Surumuni Cove, 9uk1 Harbor, and other inlets on KolombPneara did not show up on the screen. Sasa~bokl wP9 very difficult to locate the CauAewav ooint being mistaken for Saea~boki during the apJroach." 46-20 s::::c~ET Okopo River point is al~o prominent but it can be confused with other points unless identified by the ship's known position from other objPcts. The following recommendations are the result of the bombardment: A. A second SG radar be installed on the mainmast on a high priority basis for combatant ships, CL and abovP, that are to operate in the war zonP in reAtricted waters so that search ann navigation can be carried on simultane ously. (This is being accomplished in the HCNOLULU now). B. That the modernization of the suuerstructure or' the Brooklyn ClaRs CruiserR \nclude the instal~ation 0f a Co~bPt Intelligence Center, complete with DRT, TBX, radar des~gnation transmitters, and plotting tables in both the forwerd and after s~per'3tructures. AlE=O that these stati0ns be separate and distinct from any other activity such as, Co:itrol, Chart Hc•;se, Flaf?. Plo,., P.tc. C. Th~t PPI's bP ~ade a priority installation on ship's 1.n the combRtant areas. ':'hey should Ce located in the fol'owinf eta~ions: (l) Fi~hting Bri~ge, (2) ?ilot :1ouse, (3) Conrrol, (4) 9attle Two, (5) Plot, (6) Chart Bouse, (7) Control Aft, (8) Flag Bridge. AftPr cour~e was changed to 090 T. and firing had commenced on Enogai, a shRdow was seen on the port side apn aring abreast the NASHVILLE. The latter fired at it as it appeared to be a complete ship and at about 2500 yarcs distance. It only persisted a short while and disap9P.ared. It was clearly a shadow viewed fr0m the anEle of the HONOLULU and was so reported at the time. The flas~es from the guns and the shower of sparks fro;n the burnir.g cor~ from the powr,er caseEO made El very bright target. Smoke \IP e very noticeac;le also but it tended to hide the ship from the beach on the side to which we were firing. Battle II ~~ain demonstrated the desirability of having its lnRtrument~ lowered one level. "Jith the pr~sent arrangement t~Pre is not room to see out nor to move around on the level of the instruments. It is strongly rec~!'.1.'.:.Pnded that all ship controJ 1n~truments be rP.locate~ in thP preeent battery chs.reing st?tion in order the.t the Executive Officer may be immediately in 46-21 SECRET touch with ship control and be able to move freely from one side of the ship to the other for purposes of conning. It is believed that these changes are within the capacity of the forces afloat. Shortly afte~ turning to south an intermittently blink ing light was observed by lookouts and director crews on Kolombangara coast in the hills approximately midway between Seeepi and Okopo River. The blinking waR unintelligible and ceased after about one minute. NAVIGATION - Navigation was conducted entirely by SG radar ranges and bearings on points on Kolombangara and New Georfia Islands bordering on Kula G~lf. It was the pre arranged plan to establish the ship 1 s position by radar range and bearing observations of Okopo, Surinumi, 88.Illbari, Sasamboki, Tungurili, Enogai, Rice and succeeding points up the coast of New Georgia Island . From the navigationally fixed position of the ship, range and bearing to chosen reference point in the firing area was furnished by Ship Control to Fire Control for laying the battery in indirect fire. Combat Information Center, where the SG radar is located, comprises in this vessel both Flag Plot and Radar Plot. The station therefore serves as a radar information cent er to both the task force commander and the ship, the requirements of the latter being frequently relegated to a secondary cons1deration. From an organizational standpoint Radar Plot is a part of the ship but due to its location, operational control or the SG radar located therein quite frequently is directed or assumed by Flag Plot. Under such conditions systematic employment of the SG radar cannot be attained . During the approach Radar Plot provided separate navigational data to both Flag Plot and the ehip 1 s navigator and conducted intermittent search as well. The SG navi fational data up to the point of opening fire waq never definite due to the varied employment of the radar and difficulty experienced in picking out Okopo, Surinumi, and Bambari points. Surinumi was never picked up on the P.P.I. screen Sasamboki and Tungurili were picked up late. Acout two minutes prior to opening fire what was thouf-ht to be Sasambok l was picked up and a fix established at that time as tne most accurate data. Fire was opened on the basis of thiR fix. About two minutes after opening fire, this data on Sasamboki appeared to be false. At this time a new navigational fix wae established on Tungurili Point and it is believed that the Navigator tranAmltted a corrected bearing and range to the reference point to Plot but it was not received . Furthermore, in the meantime a "No change" spot had been received from the air spotter. During the next several 46-22 SSC~ET minutes, the SG radar was used to inve~tisate a possible ship target in Blackett Strait which proved to be false. Thereafter SG data was used to provide firing bearings and ranges on Ringi Cove, Enocai Inlet nnd Rice Anchorage. Radar nnviestion by points on New Georgia wes ~oneiderably more successful than tha.t on Kolombangara points during the approach. During the firing on New Georgia targets, SG indications of surface targets were observed in the en trances to inlets but it ls believed that they were indi ~atlons of splashes from gunfire falling short of the island The spotting plane was at an altitude of a,ooo feet. Thie is bellevPd to bP much too high for good night aerial obAervation and higher than necessary for safety of plane considering the fact that the entire area from which enemy anti-aircraft f1rP might ha.ve been expected was under bombardl!:ent. An altitude between 3,000 and 4,000 feet for the spotting plane would appear advisable. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT SPOTTING FROM AN ALTITUDE OF 8000 FEET AT NIGHT IS NOT VERY EFFECTIVE. The aviator spotter believes that after ran~ing salvos, continuous fire would be more easily spotted becau~e of definite stream of tracers. Flashless powder showed lees flash, but after a little firing it looked like a search light drill in the clouds. Had disadvantages of smokeless powder, flash was definitely visible, but lacked advantage of blinding effect. He could watch fire of HONOLULU and NASHVILLE. HELENA fire blinded him. Although he was not in n position to observe it, he imagined ships were silhou etted against smoke if observed from uneneaged side. He is against Black Cat spotting because the Elack Cats will not go low enough (HONOLULU, HELENA plane 8,000 feet, NASHVILLE plane 9,000 feet); and constant coachin~ is necessary to keep them in position. FLASHLESS POWDER - OBSERVATION..§_ FROM USE OF Thie bombardment was the first occasion on which this veeeel had fired any reasonable amount f flashlece powder. As planned, tha.t powder which was in t hoists at the co encement of the bo bard.~ent was fla lee ; all cuc ceeding powder cartridges were standar e okelese. In all a total of 146 rounds of flashleee 6"/47 powder index 33El nut up at Navy Ammunition Depot, Puget Sounc, was fired. These 146 rounds were equally distributed between the fiTe turrets. 46-23 SECRET Within the ship it was observed that considerably more smoke and choking, pungent fumes filled the turret chamber during the firing of flaehless powder than when using smoke less powder. No such fumes have ever been observed in the use of smokeless powder. For the amount of flashless powder fired the ventilation system was sufficient to keep the air within the turret chambers reasonably clear. However, if ventilation failure should occur, it ls believed that the excess smoke and the unpleasant fumes incident to the use of flaAhless powder would seriously reduce the efficiency of gun chamber personnel. Outside the ship it was observed that the flashlese powder created excessively more smoke than the smokeless powder. This smoke cloud appeared to be phosphorescent, luminous, filled with millions of sparks of unburned powder, and threw light upon the entire ship. Looking back toward the following ships after this vessel had turned from the bombardment course, they could be observed to be brilliant ly silhouetted againet a bright white cloud of smoke. It is concluded that silhouetting of firing ships from the unengagec aide ls much more distinct with flashless than with smokeless powder. FUZES Y.ARK 29, POI~~ DETONATING Due to break-up of Y.ark 29 fuzes in loading as ex perienced by other vessels on previous firings, resulting in numerous instances of jammed breech mechanisms and jammed powder caseq, etc., the Y.ark 29 fuzes for this bombardment were covered with fl•YlolP covers Mark 1 and taped with rubber tape under tension. No damaged fuzes were experienced. If any were broken in loading the combination of flexible covers and rubber tape prevented the broken parts from interfering with the operation of the guns. U.S.S. HELENA PRECAUTIONS TO PREVENT FUZE FRAGMENTS FROM INTERqUPTING FIRE The six inch high capacity projectiles with the Mark 29 fuzee were fitted with composition rubber covers over the fu1es, secured ~1th rubber cement. Tests conducted previously by loading projectiles so fitted into the loading tray resulted in usual cracking of the plastic but no 46-24 SZCRET particles were lost outside or the cover. During firing no difficulties were e.xperienced in loacHng as a result or the use of this fuze althou~h thPre were several instances of the cover being pulled off when the shellman lifted the projectile from the hoist to place it in the tray It is felt that we were moat fortunate in this respect because it is belteved that practically all of the fuzes are at least cracked during loading. As a result of experience to date, it i~ recommended that furthPr use of these ruzes be die continued until a more rugged and ~ore reliable fuze cover is perfected. BuOrd INSTRUCTIONS CALL FOR COVERING PLASTIC COVERS OF MARK :?9 FUZES WITH FRICTION TAPE. SHIPS WHICH FOLLOWED THESE INSTRUCTI ONS EXPERIENCED NO DIFFICULTY FOR BREAKING UP OF PLASTIC COVER?.. STOWAGES OF Ai'01UNITION The dietribution and "spotting in 11 of bombardment and se~vice ain=.unition prior to boffibardl!lent was the same as that ueed for previous bombardments and was effected in such manner as to enable a quick shift to service pro je~tile s in case surface tere~te were encountered. Service a::-.i::unition was kept in th~ hoists until a few minutes before opening fire. The shift waq reade after the van destroyers hRd hRc an opportunity to thoroughly sweep the inner area with their SG radars. OF 6 11 POWDER Si?iUENC:L OF FIRING. DIFFERENT TYPES Or.e thousand rounds of six inch flashless powder were avail~ble prior to the bombardment. It wae desired to re tain so~e of this powder for poseible uce againet surface or air targetq during retirement. Accordingly the dispo sition of powder was made and instructions issued for firing 100 rounds of flashless from each turret, then 50 rounds of smokeless, then 50 rounds of flashleEe. Thie 1ave the desired reimlt of having flashleRe powder in each hois~ upon coopletion of the bombard.::ler.t. Detailed instructions to ammunition parties included provision for continuing with flashlesR powder if ordered. becauee of opposition or for shiftinp to smokeless powder entirely if excessive and undesirable amount of en:oke resulted. from the use or flaeh leee powder. 46-25 SECRET SEQ,UENCE OF FIRING DIFFERENT TYPES OF 5 11 POWDER Four hundred rounds or five inch flashle:e powder was available prior to the bombardment. To insure that flash less r 0 ceined available after the bombardment for use aeainAt pos~ible surface or air targete during retirement 50 rounds were eet aside in each upper handling room and the guns served with flashlese (while it lasted) and smoke less from the uppe~ handlin~ room and hoietA. ~he ~bovP plans ~ere carried out in both the five inch and six inch firings. REM.ARKS Several observerF reported that they observed about four shots land between the HELENA and the NASHVILLE. The Gunner:,• Officer on seireral occasions thought he could distinguish shore batterie~ firing but after closer observa tion decided they were 5 11 bursts from our destroyer !ire. Flashlees powder greatly reduces flash but produces a much greater value of smoke. There wae a noticeablP in creaRe of E~~-P ~n the eun roo~R but not enough to cause discomfort. An un~avorab:e direction of apparent wind might cause unsatisfactory conditions in this respect particularly as 1t affects the automatic weapons and 5 11 mounts. Prior to the bombardment all turret officers, turret captains, 5 11 mount captains and automatic weapons personnel, as well a8 all eurf~ce lookouts were carefully instructed as to the procedure to be followed for the bombardment. Our o.m movements ae well as the movPn:ent s and firing of other units were explaine~ in order to avoid any confusion which might have resulted from so many units firing at targets in several directions. It is believed that this instruction resulted in a much morp intelligent performance by all of the pereonnel concerned. NAVIGATION PLAN AND RELATED MA'!'':'ERS. Factors: l. As the Task Force stood to the southward into Kula Gulf the waters would become more and more confined. 2. Entry and retirement would require exposure to S:SC:lET enfilade fire from shore batteries if and •.,r'u•n they were sblP to open f~re. 3. Maneuvers to comb torpedo trackR would be restrjcted owine to ship 1 £ ~rox imit~ to land. 4. Use of flashless powder could fill the bight with den°e smoke, making visual obAervAtion of ships of own for:natior. anC. lRndmarY-s difficult, hence 5. Radar obsern.tione w0uld have tc:. be relied upon heavily. 6. Readiness to tow or be towed. ?. Removal of e~pty cartridge cas€s to prevent chutes from chokin~ (Steel rake pa!"ties.) Ir. view of tr.e number of shius enra~ed, and in con ~ideration of the above factore, it ~es decided to have E>l: r.and~ meT.orize and digest as tr.oroucrhJ:· s.s oossible bot~ the Navi~et1on and Fire Plan of their own ship as well ac tnose of other sh1?E of the Task ForcP. Time in which to do t}ii 8 '"'RP li:ni 1::~d, Th~ rrleme adopted to accomulish the Above patd such (OCc:. !v~aenaP ·~Qt it 1e outlined in some detail below for ~osslw:e ~se by otter etips, particularly newly commiseioned shipE'!-- First step: ~ track er.art wa~ pre~ered in accordance with tr.e Navigation Plan. Second ste~: Of~icerR (Twelv~ more senior officers listed in "succession to Com~and Tabl~i plue other key position officers not eo senior were assembled for a short confer ence. Navi~ation Plan and Fire Plan were read aloud and referPnC€ made to Track Chart as aporopriate. Third stev: Zach officer present af~orded brief opportuni t~· to etresF important matters under r.ib c~~nizance and their relation shipr to Flre Control , Ship Control and Damabe Control. 46- 2? SZCRET Fourt~ step: VarlouA cont l nge n ~ l es , l isted under Factors we r e discussed. Cor.fer ence adjourned ln about l hour FollowlnR the conference , officers in "Success i on to Command" dissemlnated informati on through their echel ons (junior officers and enlisted personnel) at their earliest opportunity. In addltlon to officers in Successi on to Co~ .an1, thP. Senior Medical Offi cer, Supply Offi cer, Lo ok out Officer and Radio Officer, additional n'..Ullbers at the conferPnce, took oarallel action. As a result of the above: (a) All gurface Lookouts, particularly those who were to OF nn wnt~h in Condition I knew ~l) what own surface forces they m\ght see; (2) where thev might s ee them; (~) what they were sup:x>sen to te doinf; a!ld (4) when quch ob~ervations might be expected in thei r re spective Rectors. (b) All Sky LookoutP, oarticularly the section that woul~ be on watch 1n Condition 1 were instructed along Etimilar ::..ines. (c) N~ ~isinformation was originated oy lookouts, hence C.1.C. had less filterinf-out to do and more time ~o devote excluqively to cratters of preater imoortance. (d) All Fire Control, Shiu Control and Damage Control oerronnel had a co~plete Picture of the setup. There war- lesc tenqenes~ and greater ef~iciency evidenced in the perfor~ance of their duties. (e) Reports were concise and accurate. Com~unications were speeded uo. It was posQible to transmit and receive concise ordFrs throughout the ship during fUnflre. Although teleuhone talKerp were trained to speak clearly and dis tinctly unner stress, and to use standard phraseology, the ir1uinators of ~euorts were apparently able to express t~em ~~1vec wore conciselv as a result of their famillaritv with tnF tactical setup a~d fire plan. It has been found • necessary to train talkers who receive reports at exposed bat'le stations for delivery to officers at such stations, to pull thP officer by the arm to ~ain an exposed ear into w.ich he c~n dellver his messape from close proximity during gunfirr ·his :s best done ~n th€ dark by 9pot:in~-in t'ac:... nlk<>r a::· r"-1Alr\ne; r.lr.;. to OC'{'UPY hi<> Oi=-•Ot whe::eVP]' prac~1caule. SSCRET At 2049 the SC radar picked up an unidentified aircraft bearing 060° T, 21 miles and three minutes later this contact showed I.F.F. The target was tracked in and out and it came in to a minimum range of 6500 yards and then began to open, but waB never sighted. The mean course of this aircraft was 290° T, and from the 11 friendly" identification was assumed to be one of our Black Cats. Hie approach to our forces appears unnecessary and under the circumstances, a dangerous procedure. During the approach, bombardment and retirement both search radars were in full operation in Combat Information Center. The SG radar wne used for both navigation and search. The time devoted to navigation wa~ ke~t to a mini mum consistent with obtaining satisfactor~ aata. It is estimated that the SG was used for searching at least 1/2 to 2/3 of every minute which is considered a minimum search requirement when conducting operations in such restricted areas where targets might appear quite suddenly The SG radar had been continued in operation after sunset, but due to proximity of land masses, during the later part of approach, bombardment, and early part of retirement, was limited in its usefulness The nerformance of the SG radar was excellent throughout the operation. SC radar was out of order for a period of 8 minutes from 0103 to 0111, during bombardment, as a result of vloration and shock of ~un fire which "opened" the power circuit switch. The "open was internal and caused the 8 minute delay in restoring the SC to service. At 0118 after completion of the main battery bom bardment, and while firing on secondary targets on retirement word from spotting planes indicated a target coming out of Enogai Inlet. At 0119 this target was pickeJ up by the SG radar and was on the screen for approximately 1/2 to 1 minute; was a small target, bearing 103° T, 6,?00 yards. The main and secondary battery control stations were unable to pick up this target on either the FC 1 s or FD's radars. The target was on the SG radar too short a period for tracking. At 0103, Just before its failure, referred to above, the SC radar picked up contact of a friendly plane 260° True 35 miles. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1) On any bombardment approach, and particularly at night, sufficient time on a steady course to permit check of generated versus navigational bearings and ranges 46-29 s:::CRET to target is most desirable to insure accurate data on opening fire. This is considered particularly important should air spot fail. (2) When destruction of troops iR of primary, or equal importance with other shore objectives it appears desirable to keep spotting planes, and any other of our own olanee, away from tr.e area until bombarcment com: •. encee. On the night of tr:ie operation it is 11kely tr.at person nel were already \n their "Fox Holes" before and when fire wae opened, since the appearance of searchlight beams indicated the knowledge of, and a search for our planes wr.ich, according to olan, were in the area reaC.y to spot. (3) While this operation was executed according to plan it is considered oarticularly important to w.ention one additional point, in connection with surface ship operations in restricted ~aters which are dominated by the enemy. An exa~inntion of the chRrt for this oper ation reveals that the maneuverinr room is greatly restricted upon entering Kula Gulf, and particularly so from the point of opening fire, to a point abreast O~opo River (minefield) on retirement. The track for ttis part has the appearance of a "hairpin", with distances to the beach aoout 5- 6,000 yard~. To ~eet with a casualty, due either to internal material failures or enemy action, which in themselves ~ay be minor, (due to proximity of land, best described in this case as a "pocket") may prove disastrous, with resultant loss of the ship in shallow water, or stranding on enemy held territory While plans are ~ade for destruction of classified material time may not be sufficient, anc when such serious consequences may reGult fro~ so little it aooears sound that secret docu ~ente, codes, ciphers and other important classified ~ater1al not aosolutely necessary to the operations be left behind on sorr.e other naval vesrel when itnowingly undertaking operations in such restricted waters. Thie thought ls oresented with the realization that diversion from the as~iened task or reassignment to nev tasks may occur before returning to base to p1ch uo such publi cations and docureents. USS NASHVILLE Accurate navigation of the Kula Gulf area in darkness was difficult. Approximate oositions were obtained by sighting on questionable tangents ana mountain peaks and correlating these obse ·vations wl U. Sall George raC.ar ,.;~ • -."t ,.- SSC~ET ranges and bearings of nearest land. At ranges of ten to fifteen miles rrom land, positions could generally be depended upon to be correct within about two miles. As land was closed to six to eight miles the error was de creased to about one-half mile The accuracv of radar ranges and particularly sight bearings depend a great deal on the contour of the land at or near the water's edge. It was noted that best results were obtained where the land is sharply defined and rises rather steeply from the water. Rounding Visuvisu Point at a ranEe of about fourteen miles the radar gave ranges on what they believed to be nearest land but in reality it was a two to three hundred foot embankment which sets back one to two miles from the water's edge. On the other hand the radar ranges on Kolo~bangara Island shore line were quite accurate as this land rises abruptly from the Ahor~ line At about the time of the fifteenth salvo, approxi mately two minutes after commencing the main battery phase of the bombardment, a serious casualty occurred in Turret III. Two 6 11 /4? powder charges became ignited or were fired prematurely due to caus 0 s unknow~ at this time, producing an explosion in the gun chamber, damaging material and resulting in the im~ediat~ death of seven men and serious injury to twenty-t~o. This accident gave rise to many reports or fires in turret and handling room, hits, etc. Notwithstanding those reports of possible serious conse quences, fire was continued without interruption with the remainder of the battery. A Court of Inquiry convened by Commander Task Force EIGHTE~EN, is making a full and complete investigation of the accident. MATERIAL CASUALTIES OR FAILURES There were several minor casualties during the action which slowed down the rate of fire on the guns concerned. It is estiuated that the four (4) minor casualties resulted in the loss of about 15 rounds. Following are the detailed reports of casualties by turrets: TURRET II Casualty No. 1 (left gun) Occurrence: Brass tip of Mark 29 bombardment fuze jammed between lip of the powder case and rear of gun chamber on 10th salvo, preventing case from seating properly 46-~l SZCRET and thus preventing plug from closing. Cleared im ediately by well indoctri nated oersonnel who have had previous experience with this type of casualty. Lost two rounds. Casualty No. 2 (center gun) Occurrence: The extraordinary demand on the supply system of hydraulic power due to oper ation in continuous fire caused the case Atoo to function imoroperly - dropping due to loss of power. In thiA particular instance the case stop dropryed and an e~pty case hit it when being ejected, bouncing back part way into the cha~ber. When gun caotain tried to raise cnse stop the olug was inadvertently par~ly closea on the empty case. Lo~t 3 rounds. TURQETT III On about the 15th salvo, two oowder cases exol~ded ar.d burned in tne gun room of the turret. TumrnT IV Casualty No. l (left gun) Occurrence: Left gun on 60th salvo, became sluggish in returning to battery. Recoil liquid was bled from cylinder on two occasions and gun seemed to act normal afterwards, however, "cease firing" was sounded and a real test was not nossible. This stoppage accounted for a loss of about six salvos. GEHERAL CO'l.MENTS The general oerformance of the turrets was entirely satisfactory as regards material and er onnel No serious casualties occurred aside froc tne unfortunate casualtv to Turret III. All minor casualties were hand:iE'C. expeditiously oy well trained crews. The kark 29 suoer-sensitive fuze is still unsatisfactory s::::c~ET ror this type gun. The new synthetic rubber covers tend to vork loose in handling, and are especially bad when they tend to turn when the shellman takes hold to load. These ehells are dropped from a height or over a root into the tray and the ruzes musL be rugged, as hard, rast and accurate loading is the rule. We should not have to be concerned as to whether or not the ruze ls going to hold together until loaded - it should be built to hold together. FIRING AT PLANE During retirement or Task Force EIGHTEEN at about 0518 reports were received that there was a plane coming up directly astern or this vessel. Plane was reported by Sky Art and Machine Gun crews ae showing running lights, altitude about 2500 feet and having appearance or a flying boat. Plane was tracked in by radar from 11,000 yards to 5,900 yards at a speed or 80 knots and word was received from Radar Plot that bogey did not show identification. Word was sent from Sky Control to 40 MM Mounts #3 and #4 to train art on the plane and to •stand-byu. Plane was not visable to Sky Control because or interference from the after superstructure. Through misinterpretation or orders between 40 MM talker in Sky Control and Mount #3, six (6) rounds or 40 MM ammunition were fired at this plane at 0530 when it reached a radar range of 5900 yards. Plane was fully beyond range or the 40 Ml-1 bursts and no damaged was considered done to the plane. This pl~ne was considered to be an enemy plane inasmuch as he showed running lights, vas against a black background, was at an estimated altitude of 2500 feet, was approaching formation in NASHVILLE'S wake, and was not showing identification on the radar screen. U.S.S. 0 1 EANNON The western coast or Kula Gulf does not permit easy and accurate navigation as does the New Georgia side. The coastline has very few prominent indentations to use for establishing an accurate position and the New Georgia side vas too distant to be given predominant weight in obtaining a navigational position. As a consequence, the exact posi tion or this vessel was not established until about 0050 about ten minutes before the scheduled initial time or commence firing. Using the tangent at Bambar1 Harbor, Tungu1ril1 Point and Enogai Inlet a very good position was obtained and showed us slightly inshore of the expected track. Radar search had never been neglected, but during 46-33 SECRET this phase or the approach the establishment or a definite nav1gat1onal poa1t1on was cons1dered essential ana was given pr1mary conA1deration. During the ~ime the rear destroyers were fir1ng on Bambari Harbor a pip appeared on the P.P.I. directly in the center or the harbor entrance. Thia pip was observed closely for movement and fire was checked with a view to tak1ng it under f1re . F1re from ah1ps astern was observed visually to be falling at about this point . The Unit Commander directed that the fire of the astern ship be raised. When this was accomplished the pipe disappeared. Initially flashless powder was used by all ahlps. There was no wind. The usual night gunfire blinding effect was not experienced but after five minutes ot firing heavy smoke clouds filled the area so that ship handl.ing became somewhat of a problem. The ships astern were not always able to see the ships ahead because of the smoke. U.S.S. STRONG 0119 - Ceased firing in bivouac area and lost steering control on the bridge as STRONG was about to turn 90 degre~s to port to course 090 following astern of the 0 1 BA..~NON. Shifted steering control to the steering engine room . Stopped port engine, went ahead flank speed on starboard engine then stopped starboard engine until steering control was definitely shifted to the trick wheel in the steering eng1ne room Steering Gear Casualty Thie steering gear casualty was caused by a loose connection on the holding coil of the main line contractor in the aynchro t1e control panel located in the steering engine room . Th1a loose connection caused the contactora to open and resulted in loss of power to the synchro tie unit which in turn caused the loss of steering control on the bridge . Steering control was then shifted to the trick wheel. It 1a strongly recom~ended that this control panel be checked before operation and the contactora locked 1n closed position. It is further recommended th.9.t the shift ing of steering control be practiced during target nracticea . The STRONG took too long to shift control accompanied by ~oo much talking While steering control was lost for only about 30 seconds it seemed like about an hour part1cularly since the sh1p was 1n the lower end of Kala Gulf headed for Blackett Strait. 46-~4 SSCRET Firing at Aircraft At 0534, 13 May, when about 30 miles northeast or the Russell Island, while on course 120 True, one aircraft was tracked for 20 miles on the Sugar Charlie radar. No recog nition signals were picked up by the Sugar Charlie radar. The aircraft did have its red and green running lights turn ed on. It was too dark to identify the aircraft. It re mained on a steady course heading towards the STRONG which was stationed on the port quarter of the rear cruiser. Thie aircraft was reported on the T.B.S. When the range closed to 8000 yards, the STRONG reported to C.T.F. 18 over the T.B.S. that the aircraft had been tra'cked for 20 miles, that no recognition signals could be detected and that if it continued to close, fire would be opened unless other wise directed. C.T.F. 18 replied "wait" and shortly there after "do not open fire on plane". In the meantime the range closed to 4000 yards, the NASHVILLE opened fire with 40 mm and the STRONG fired 5 rounds or 5 11/38 caliber at the aircraft. The aircraft apparently was not hlt since it rapidly cleared the formation. U. S. S. CHEVALIIB Small shore batteries and anti-aircraft batteries were believed present and this force was fired on by at least one shore batterv. Numerous searchlights, approximately eight, were observed searching for our Black Cat just prior to opening fire, but were either turned out by the enemy or hit by our shells in the early salvos as they were extinguished immediately after firing commenced. 0101 - HONOLULU opened fire. Searchlights ex~1nguiahed and a siren alarm could be heard from shore. 010? - CHEVALIER checked fire in accordance wltn plan and made a thorough search with Sugar George and Sugar Charlie radars. At this point a small fire was noticed in our starboard whaleboat and on the fantail, both of which were caused by burning cork from the flashlees powder. Both fires were quickly extinguished with no damage being suffered. 0119 - Checked fire as it was time to change course to 090° True, but a s the STRONG had not turned followed in her wake. At this point pronounced turns had to be made to 46-35 SZCRET avoid STRONG, but continued to follow in her wake Due to the steering casualty of the STRONG, which had occurred at this time, the CHEVALIER went 1-1/4 miles further south on course 1809 True than was originally intended. Fire was blocked by STRONG during this period. 0130 - Two splashes about 600 yards on the port bow were noticed by all of the bridge personnel. A flash was observed as coming from either Bairoko Harbor or Enogai Inlet, so it is evident that one shore gun of about 4" cali ber was firing on the column and particularly on the rear slilp, CHEVALIER. Control reported that Guns #1 and #4 were out of com m1 ssion due to caeualties to the breech plug mechanisms. Both guns had shells in the guns with no powder and the plugs fully closed in each case. Order was given to keep water sprayed on the gun? to cool them off. 0215 - Changed course to 0909 True. Gun #4 went off with an explosion of the shell in the gun. Had a report of fire in the gun mount, which proved to be false. Several men on fantail received very minor fl&sh burns. The casualty to Gun #1 was as follows: After 53 rounds tad been fired the rammer on Gun #1 failed to function due to a breakage of the operating linkages. The next load was rammed by hand, but coult not be driven far enough in to allow the breech plug to rise. The cartridge was removed and thrown overboard. Attempts were made to seat the projectile further into the gun with a section handle; the distance was measured, thought suf rlcient, and another cartridge ramme~ by hand. Thie cartridge like the first, could not be rammed fully home and was extracted and thrown overboard. The gun was thoroughly cooled with salt water during the night. Rammer was operative again after the action, a cartridge was suc cessfully rammed and the gun unloaded through the muzzle the next morning. The caeus.ltv to Gun #4 was as follows: After 154 rounds had been fired, on the l55th load the breech plur stuck half-way up. Attempts were made to knock up the plug, none of which were successful, nor could the plug be open~d until two gunner's mates had arrived and worked on the mechanism. The cartridge was extracted and 46-36 SSCRET thrown overboard. Gun crew tried to close the plug, and though difficulty was experienced, finally succeeded. The gun was cooled with salt water. Plug was opened to try to load another cartridge, but the plug would not close rully on cartridge. Thie cartridge wae likewise extracted and thrown overboard, and breech plug closed. Shortly thereafter occurred a hissing sound followed by the ex plosion or the projectile in the gun. The gun remained about 1-1/2 inches out or battery and plug was jammed closed. The services or the tender were required in open ing the plug. LESSONS LEARNED Handling room crews and magazine crews will have to be drilled even more if the planned rate or fire is to be maintained. There is no substitute !or experience, although hard work and constant drill go a long way toward being a satisfactory substitute. U. S. S. TAYLOR Special Comments on Enemy Forces No enemy forces were encountered. The searchlight illumination on the shore, just prior to the commence ment of the bombardment was the only enemy activity observed, although two members or Gun #1 stated that they observed a splash near the starboard side or the ship, while on course 180° T. Just prior to the change or course to 090° T the executive officer observed a pip on the SG radar screen which·appeared to be some object standing out or Blackett Strait at high speed. It disapoeared close aboard to starboard. Combat Information Center reported it as a plane but later analysis indicates that it possibly was a combination of fall of shot from own forces 1n the water just sho?"t or Devil's Isle and fall of shot from shore batteries firing at th1s ship. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS The recommendations contained in TAYLOR oonfident1al Serial 013 or 16 March, 1943 (Action Report ror Night or 46-3? S... CRET 15-16 March, 1943), that the allowance of extractor tools be changed from one (1), for the entire battery, to one (l) for ch gun mount, is repeated in this report. Means ror extracting cartridges from hot guns must be immediately available THIS IS BEING DONE. U S. S RADFORD Task Group 36.6 departed Espiritu Santo at 1700 Love on 10 May, 1943, enroute Tulagi Harbor, Florida Island at 17 knots Held two rehearsal runs enroute, simulating actual courses and 1ning formation to be taken ror scheduled oper- tion One rehearsal run was made during daylight and one at night. At 2 10 May RADFORD made radar contact which proved on inveeti n to be small co etal vessel At 0610 12 May ontact d over&E!e 1n vicinit of Nura Island At 1000 d ul i and entire sk Gr up fueled from ERSKINE had bare in1mum ru availa 1 for Task ir ments At 1530 Ta k Group underway to Join I HT EN north or Sa I land Task Force vie or a ark l wh .e proceeding i 16~ r r ed co umn astern or Task ~orce 3 ° t 20 knots At 1708 ts A 18 BREESE reported blower spe d to 25 knots. At 1825 pa eed Lonp: 159° 5 1 E on course 300° T. at 25 Knots Approach wa u eventful except for numerous co tPcts made on friendly plan s considered to be Black Cats ring ap roach visibility was excellent with a new moon ni e the force too err ct1vely ror comfort. At O 18 oup 5 procee ed indepen ently on various courses an pee to r ach a point 10 ards off the mouth of the opo Riv r At 0066 sight d chli at Vila Airfield. t point 1000 yard f th Okopo River changed to 110° T at kno need mining operatio e cruiser e ced r 11 c n ed course o d incr d pe ot ning operations Mad r t1 ment n a rdance with plan At 0258 fir on IC LAS caused b aeualty to No . •'3 gun. 0525 d 1gh el1eved run i li t of plane, bearing 0 2 light ident1f d as fri n y pl n 0530 LU reported p ane a friendly. 534 STRONG commenced 063 TRON c aeed firing 05 8 Task Unit 36.5.2 on from Comtaekfor 18, left r rmation and proc ded 1 to Tulagi for fuel RADFORD {Task Unit 36 5.1) reen for ek re EIG TE~L 46-38 SZCRET The m1n1ng operat1on was executed exactly ae planned. No opposition was received from the beach, and there were no indications that the mine laying was detected by the enemy. U. S. S. ST. LOUIS Fire control radars were not employed in this action. MATERIAL DEFICIE~CIES Main Battery To prevent slow return to battery after recoil system became hot, one pint of recoil liquid was drained from each reco11 cylinder when cylinders were primed previous to firing Despite this precaution, f1ve gunR developed enough pr~ssure after f1r1ng seventy-f1ve rounds or more to cause them to be slow in return1ng to battery. The Mark 29 fuzes created several casualties, so~e or them of very serious nature, by breaking up dur1ng loading. All or the fuzes were covered w1th co~oos1t1on elastic covers cemented on w1th RD compound 1n.accordance w1th instructions in BuOrd Circular Letter No. Al8-42 . In order to reduce to a ~in1mum the extraneous material applied to and loaded with the projectiles, the fuze covers vere not taped on Previous to the bombardment each shell man was drilled thoroughly at handling and loading HC projectiles with fuze covers fitted ae described and no difficulty was experienced with the covering coming off. During the bombardment however, several covers came off and fuzes broke up resulting in numerous loading casu alties. Smoke left in gun rooms during eject1on or cases wh11 ~ firing flashles~ powder was excessive. In one turrtit f;h1s smoke became so thick shortly after commencing fire that the shellmen could not be seen from the turret officer's booth. In all turrets the blowers were oper ating normally and the gas eject1on air pressure was maintained at all times between 125 and 150 lbs. Air spott~rs reported that the show~r of sparks given off by flashleee powder salvos created a very pers1stant dull red glow which was plainly visible from the spotting 46-39 SECRET plane throughout the interval between aalvoa. Case ejection trom Turrets I and III is unsatisfactory and requires stationing ot Repair Party personnel outside the turrets to prevent cases trom piling up underneath the overhangs. One man was slightly burned about the face and legs while performing this operation. Endless chain type rear plate case ejectors should be installed in all low turrets or this vessel at the very first opportunity. Subsequent to the firing numerous primer extension tubes were round lying about on deck. These had broken otf in lengths or about ?-1/2 and 8 inches and were round in the waterways on the disengaged side indicating that that had been carried out or the turrets by the jected cases. A few primer ignition tubes also broke off near the base of the primer and were found on deck. In the caoe of some of the jams encountered in loading, personnel of the gun crews concerned stated that the projectiles had been very carefully loaded and that they were certain the fuzes had not broken and that the composition fute covers had not fallen off. It is possible that in these instances e broken primer extension tube left in the bore of the gun when the case vas ejected caused the projectile to jat:J short of its seated position. The primers that broke up were Mark 13, lots 80 and 85, manufactured in 1942, and used in flaehless cartridges, B.P.D. 3361, assembled by N.A.D. Puget Sound. Port Anchor When the anchor was sighted on leaving Espiritu Santo, it was found to have a full turn around the fluke. It vas not oelieved possible to clear the anchor without causing a long delay and so the anchor was secured close up against the hawse with the turn around the fluke. The stock was forward, lifted as high out of the water as possible and secured with two parts or two inch wire led rrom the eyes or the ship. A four by four render was placed between the anchor and the ship's side abaft the hawse. Internal shoring was placed inside of the hull in the wake of the anchor. During retirement, when the speed of the ship had increased to about thirty knots, the stock of the anchor must have dipped under the water, carried away the two inch wire, and flipped the anchor over, clearing it. The anchor then swung with a short radius of chain, hitting 46-40 SSC'.1ET the s1de and p1erc1ng 1t 1n four place~ near the f1rst deck level 1n the area around frame 12. As a result water entered into the Anchor Windlass Room and A-305-A quite rap1dly. A-303-A flooded. A-304-A made a slight a:r.ount of water from seepage fro adjacent compart... ents. The ship was slowed to secure the anchor and later to plug the holes, upon complet1on of which turns for thirty knots were rung up. The Anchor Windlass Room, A-305-A, and A-~04-~ were cleared of water im ediately; A-303-A was 1oolated. LESSONS LEARNED AND R COMMENDATIONS Due to jammed loads and hot recoil cylinders, th1s vessel had n1ne out of fifteen six inch guns temporarily out 0f comm1ssion at "cease firing". Five of these guns were placed back in co1Il!ll1ssion within five minutes by relieving the pressure 1n their recoil cylinders. The other four guns were back 1n co 1ssion within thirty m1nutes oy unloading the jam~ed projectiles, one through the breech an1 thrPe through the muzzles. In a previous boubardment this ves 0 el successful:y f1red about 80 rounds of Mark 29 fuzed 6" H.C with one turn of scotch cellulose tape around the top and one around the base of the plastic eection of the fuze. It 1s bel1eved that flexible fuze covers taped on w1th friction tape (MONTPELIER method) may be the best stop gap method pend1ng receipt of Mark 29 Mod. l fuzes It 1s reco ... r.tended that, except where troops are the JbjPct1ve, cons1deration be given to the plan of using steel nose plugs until the new type fuzes are available. U. s. S. FLETCHER The greater effect1vene~5 of flashless powder over that of smokeless for night engagements is clearly evident; all obse'.!""1at1ons of other vessels' fir~ng with flashlees powder conf 1rmed the fact that the flash of gunfire is grPatly reduced, but is still sl1~htly discernible. 46-41 SECTl2T KOLOMBONGARA . - , --""'.,.- :\ 0 '\ ,, " ~, J KT R C HA C A R T OF M I N I N G 0 F E R A T I 0 N 9 6 - ? !~ AY, 1S43 w ....l f.l :r. p.. 0005 AAOFORt ?Rr:BLE GA!o'.BLE BRE'.:9: 46- 13 SECRET 1s1· 10 ;eo· .s ~--'-~~~~~~~o_·_._~__, ~-r / <-- / / )f • / 60. ' / 0 0215 "~ _,5, j >J'I ...... 01!50 I •I 'Cl I ... oi..+5 ':: . NEW GEORGil\ Tra.cl'\ Cha.rt Bombardment Grovp 1i - 1.3 Ma.y 16-44 txl txl (/) 0 ::0 8 .VO (J -5.S Kt-S oqo·t r'l-.\4 2.Z Cl-ta~t 1.57.50 Ope-ra.hon.~ 12.-13 NEW TRack . 25 f"hnn1.g I GEORGIA I 04-1· I I 2~ ,_ . I I . 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