Battle Experience
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I I f:S" t It f.:1:: I BATTLE EXPERIENCE SOLOMON ISLANDS AND ALASKAN AREAS BOMBARDMENTS MAY & JULY 1943 CAU Tl OH THIS BULLETIN AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN MUST NOT FALL INTO THE HANDS OF THE -ENEMY llTED STITES FLEET HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER lfl CHIEF SECR ET .t:D ~ 1 .. 1 c:3 F LEE T Hl::\DQU,\RTI R~ Of lllF. C0\1~1A:-DFR I:\ ClllH "A\\ DFl'\Rf\:I :\T l\Asltl:\CTO\, !> l: 1 Octcb r 1943 . Th ee bu!letins on "Batt:!. Experience " are issued for the gen. ral ir.1ormati::>r.. of officer s . T~ y are p!ar..ned to promu!gnt r liable infor mation concerning actual .rnr xperience. Any adver s e comment made, is not intended to r ef!ect c r :t1cism on an~ individual but to assist officer s i n appreci ating th_ b st line of action in m11ny circumstances. It is inevitable that t here would be considerable dela y i f complete anB::.ysis we r e made befor e issue to t he Fleet. Comment s t hat are made in th~s bu::etins repr esent t hose expr salons of opinion from r e sponsible sources t hat wer e available at the time t he particu::.ar ope r a tion under discussion ~as completed. Studies are conti nuing to t he e nd that diver gent views may be reconciled and complet e anal ysis made. Encounter s with the enemy discussed i n these b ullet ins, are p r e sented in their chronological o r der. I t will be appa r e nt t hat " lessons lear ned" during t he e ar!ier part of the wa r wer e p ut to good a dvant age in s ub se~uen t enga gements. Ai r combat act i ons , a nti submarine e xpe r iences, s ubmari ne patrol ex pe ri e ~ c. a , and t e chnical gunne ry exper iences are cover ed i n v a r ious Comi nch Information Bul l e t i ns i ssue d duri n g the pas t y ear . The s e include Bulletins Nos . 20, 22, 23 ; ~ ' TE' 211, 212, and 213. ~at e rial contai ne d i n t hes e bulletins was drawn l arge ly fro m war diaries, and battle reports of various commanders and 3hips. The s e bulletins are SECRET and s hal l be safe guarded in accordance with the provisions of Article 76, U.S. Navy Re gulations, 1920. The y shoul d b e wide ly circulate d among c ommissio ne d p e rsonnel. Yfh e n no longer r e quired they shall be d e stroye d by burning. No r e port of d e struction need be submitte d . Transmission by register e d mail within the continental limits of the United States is aut horized. ~ R. S. k:U.\'ARDS , Chi e f of Sta f f. I s::CRET TABLE OF co:1T4..;rns C!!AFTS'l 45 l'1 nine o f Black e t t Stral t by Task Group :::.6 . 5 - 6- 7 J.:a y 1 £14 3 • • • • • • • 45-1 c: 1;,fTl<.H 46 Co r~bined Eonbardmen t and l.'inin6 Operation - i.:unda-Vila-Ku la Gulf Area on the r:1cht 12-13 r.:ay 1943 • • • • 46-1 CHA PT!:n 47 Bombardmen t s of Enemy Installations on Ki s ka Dur l n g Month of July, 1943. • 47-1 LI ST OF EFFECTI VE PAGES J r o::iulga t1 ng Letter. • I Talle of Contents • •• II List of ~ffective f a Ge s. II CHAPTER 45 • 45-1 to 45-5 inclusive CHAPTER 46 • • • 4G- l to 46-41 inclusive 4G - ~3 to 46-47 inclusive C!!APTER 47 4 '/-l to 47-47 i nclusive II SSC~ET CHAPTER 45 MINING OF BLACKETT STRAIT BY TASK GROUP 36.5 6- ? MAY 1940 During the night 6-? May 1943, Ta~k Group 36.5 (RADFORD, PREBLE, GAMBLE, BREESE) laid a standard three row mine field extending fr~m 900 yards due west of Makuti Island northward to within 1000 yards of the shore or Kolombangara Island in the vicinity of Vangavanga. Thie operation emphaei~ed the following points; (1) The value or training and rehear~als for an oper ation Puch as this. (2) Value of shtp detection Radar for navigation in confined waters in low visibility as exemplified by the use of the USS RADFORD as guide for mine l~yers. (3) Need for adequate ship detection radar equipment in mine layers ae exemplified by the necessity or employing a modern equipped destroyer to lead the mine layer not equi9ped with radar. (4) The need for qualified radar technician, afloat. (5) The continued practice of friendly plan~e approach ing our surface forces on threatening bearings and failing to 9how I.F.F. Lack of accurate navigational charts caused by failure i n peace time to fully prepare for war. (?) Value of a well organized and trained C.I.C. team. (8) Importance of accurate station keeping under all conditions of visibility. (9) The value of weather in attaining cover and surprise. (10) Need for modern, reliable fast mine layers, with adequate cruising radius. Commander Ta~k Group 36.5 reported ae follows on this operation: NARRATIVE Task Group 06. 5, consisting of RADFORD, PREBLE, GAMBLE and BREESE , depar t ed Espiritu Santo at 1?00 Love on 4 May, 1943 enroute Tu lagi Harbor, Florida Island, at l? knots. Held three rehearsal r une si~u l ating actual courses and mini ng 45-1 SECRET formation to be taken for scheduled operation. Two runs were made at night and one during dayliGht. Last rehearsal run made at night proved highly satisfactory and all ships had perfect confidence that station keeping and maneuvers could be accomplished according to plan. On 3 May, 1943 a Raytheon Company representative accompanied by an officer radar representative made two alterations to the SG radar on RADFORD but were unable to tune the set properly in harbor due to land effect. During the passage from EApiritu Santo to Tulagi the SG radar fail ed to function properly in spite of the constant efforts of the chief radar technician tn improve performance. Finally as a last resort the "gaiting" alteration was removed and the set then functioned in a highly satisfactory mann~r. Since the succesR of the entire operation hinged on proper function ing of radar thiR incident caused the Commanding Officer unnecessary anxiety and concern. The Task Group arrived at Tulagi at 1000 on 6 May and fueled from the ERSKINE PHELPS. During fueling the condi tion was 11 Red" over the Russells but the condition remain ed "Green" at ~ulagi. The Approach Task Group 36.5 departed at 1330 from Tulagi and passed through initial point Lat. 09• 101 S., Long. 159• 35 1 E. at 1600 on course 244° T. at 26 knotA. At 1416 GAMBLE reported leaky boiler tube in one boiler but able to make 2? knots. At 1700 changed course to 284° T. at 1910 radar contact was ~ade on a olane with doubtful I.F.F., bearing 105° T., dlstance 27 miles. This plane paseed up starboard side or formation at 3600 yards distance. Positive I.F.F. was not obtained until tte plane passed ahead. It has since been established by c~nversation with cruiser spottere that this wae a Black Cat plane which dtd not become aware of presence of Task Group until practically overnead. It must again be emphasized that this practice or the aviators is disconcert ing to surfac~ forceA ann dangerous to themselves. At 21~0 changPd course to 324° T. At 2300 chang~d speed to 15 knotA. ~xee were obtained by radar enroute on New Georgia and Rendova Islands. Excellent results were obtained and Simbo I8land was clearly dietingui~hable at 58,000 yards on SG screen. EAtlimte of time schedule was five minutes slow. Speeds, howPver, were maintained according to plan to pre vent strag~lin~. At 2~2~ changed course to 034° T. At 232? changed course to 0~0° T. Radar indicRt~d that right hand 45-2 SSCRET reef off west end of Wanawana Island was approximately 500 to 700 yards further to the westward, making the entrance 2300 yards wide in~tead of 3000 ~·ardti as charted. '.Che passE..ge t~1rough the reef was made entirely by radar and sound plots. Right and left hand tengenta of the land mass on each side o: the paesage were Ubed in the case of radar and these were constantly checkeo ~Y the starboard an~ port ~ound gears ranging on the right and left reefa respectively. Intermittent view~ of the variou~ islands were seen from tne ~ridge and what visual bearine~ were poe~iblc were taken and passed to the Combat Intelligence CPnter. ThP fact that t~PPe few visual bearings checKed exactly with redar plot afforded the Commanding Officer and the E~ecutive Officer in C.I.C. some aeeurance that all was going well. At 2340 the Task Group entared squally weather with low to zero visibility. At 235e, while in center of Ferguson Passage, there was a deluge of rain with absolute zero vi~ib1lity. At 0004 with above zero vieibil1ty t~P following TSS tranem1eeione without preliminary call uos were mHde; 0004 BREESE 11 Requei:;t a mark 11 11 on commencement • 0004 RADFORD Wilco, Wilco 11 • 0004 GAMBLE 11 "Repeat Please • 0005 RADFORD 11 lfark, I am turning That le all 11.