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AppmedFoniumear2nhAmotmlft-Rnoq17117290mooll000l-8 25X1 Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence DIA AND DOS HAVE NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION 6046, 1 July 1952 AND RELEASE. DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN I. Military Operations Action flared on a new sector of the front as North Korean elements in battalion strength attacked positions of the US 25th Divisionin the eastern sector near the "Punchbowl." The enemy attack, supported by almost 1,300 rounds of mortar ant artillery fire, was repulsed. Minor activity occurred along the rest of the front. Lien UN naval aircraft on the west coast flew 12 combat sorties againstenemy targets as weather closed down carrier operationson the east coast. Naval surface craft maintained the blockade and attackedenemy troop, supply and industrial installations on both coasts. Air UN land-based aircraft flew 339 sorties, ofwhich 185 were combat. Medium bonbers attackeda railroad bridge in north central Korea. II. Military Intelligence No significant reports have beenreceived during the past 24 hours. General Situation Cease-fire On 28 June two North Korean Army soldiersdeserted to the UN near Panmunjom. They stated upon preliminary interrogationthat their former unit was the "4451st Headquarters Company, Temporary PW achange Unit." (This is the first indication that the Communistshave carried their cease-fire planning to the extent of organizinga "PW exchange unit.") Paitical The Dutch and Australiandelegates to the UN Commission for the Unifica- tion and Rehabilitation of Koreawere warned confidentially that the UN delegates DIA and IDaS review(s)cornpleted. SECRET 25X1 THE C.I.A.NASBO OBJECtiON TO THE DECIASSIFICATION OF Approved For Release 2004/09/01 :CIA-RDP911-644kidtn4000I-8 25X1 No. 0 6 JUL M78 For info on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org Approved Foraplease 2004/0M5JA-RDP91T0117111000200110001-8 25X1 "who play a prominent part in UNCURK's activities" should leave Korea as soon as Possible or beware of assassination. Home Minister Yi Pom-sok's reaction, on being informed, was that he considered the threat not serious. He made the safety of UNCURK members his personal responsibility. Ambassador Muccio, in Comment on the story that Rhee plane to appoint Yi Pom-sok as Defense Minister and pro-Rhee youth corpe leader An Ho-sang as Home Minister, states that this is one of the current rumors in Pusan. While the President is trying to find a replacetent for the present Defense Minister and may be considering Yi among others, Muccio does not believe Rhee would push these appointtents.Yils appointment as Defense Minister could be disastrous, in the Ambassador's opinion, from the point of view of maintaining the non- political nature of the ROK armed forces, SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/09/01: CIA-RCIP91T01172R000200110001-8 For info on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org Approved Foraidease 2004/09/gia-RDP91T01178W00200110001-8 25X1 Central. Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 6047, 2 July 1952 DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN I. Military Operations A raiding party from the ROK let Division in the westernSangnyong area fought a seven-hour engagementagainst Chinese defenders before objective. capturing their The Chinese counterattackedwith three platoons in capture the position, an effort to re- In the east central sectornear Tuchonother Chinese defenders forceda raiding party from the US 7th Division fierce 45-minute engagement. to ;:ithdrew after a Nan Naval air sorties were flown in western Korea from thelight carrier "Bataan," againstenepy troop and supply targets. the east coast Carriers of Task Force 77on were engaged in resupply. UN naval surface craft bombarded ' enemy shore installations. Air UN land-based aircraftflew only 376 sorties, of Medium bombers attacked which 125 were combat, a vital railroad bridge in northwesternKorea. Military Intelligence No significant reports have been received duringthe past 24 hours. III, General Situation Political A Korean Amy general court martial convictedleading opposition Assembly- man So Min-ho on 1 Julyof murdering a Korean Arpy captain on 24 Apriland sentenced him todeath. The sentence is subject opposition is reported to review by Rhee.The Assembly to be considerablyaroused. (The recently deposed ing officer at thetrial, Brigadier General presid- Commander Won originally Choe, has reported thatMartial Law ordered him to completethe trial in two or three and to producea death sentence.) days SECRET THE C IA. HASNO OBJECTION 25X1 LCIASSIFICATION OF fioSISHDE 0;11MENT Approved For Release 2004/0943 : ClA-RDP91T011721B010200110001-8 25X1 For info on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org Approved Fonaglease 2004/09,anc.,1A-RDP91T01172$980200110001-8 25X1 President Rhee confided to AmbassadorMuccio on 28 June that he is under pressure from representatives of local assemblieswhich will compel him to take action soon, since the Assemblytsdelaying tactics havegone far enough. Rhee mentioned in the conversation that Prime Minister Chang Taek-sanghad come to him for money. The Ambassador replied that he hopedRhee would nevertheless disr cuss the situation calmly with 15or 20 "rensonable" Assemb1ymen. once to the Prime Minister presumab37 (Rhests refer.- was intended-as Preof of the linehe has taken for the past'10 dgys that he must rid the AsseMblyof the corrupt members, about 80 in number. To date the President has remainedadamant on the score of compromising with the "reasonable"members of the opposition.) SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/09M3 : CIA-RDP91T01172R0002001100014 For info on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org Approved Foraliaase 2004/0witaA-RDP91T0117thR8g0200111:1001-8 25X1 Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 6048, 3 July 1952 DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN I. Military Operations kat Action along the front was limited toa few enemy-initiated probes and routine patrol contacts. LIAM Naval aircraft from Task Force77 on the east coast flew 183 sorties against enemy supply, transportation and troop installations. Heavy weather in the west limited operations of the light carrierBataan. UN naval surface craft bombarded enemy coastal installations on both coasts, Air UN land-based aircraft flew 379sorties, of which 159 were combat. Medium boMbers flew 32 sorties againsttwo vital rail bridges in north central Korea. No enemy MIG-151s reportedlywere encountered. II, Military Intelligence 25X1 The North Korean Armyon 1 June designated the IV Corps ea the "West Coast Special Task Force" and the V Corpeas the "East Coast Special Task Force."n 25X1 mow' corps are reported to be completely mobileand, while charged primarily with a defensive mission are capable of "supportingoffensive action." The IV Corps aggregates 3 infant;y, 1 armored, and 1 mechanized division, in addition toa mechanized artillery brigade, The V Corpe comprises 3 infantry divisions,1 mechanized division, and twoartillery brigades. (The current deployment of these corps suggests a mission muchas des- cribed in this report, although this cannot be completely confirmed. Organiza- tionally, the report creditsthe IV Corps with one too mamy infantry divisions and the V Corps with a mechanized division whose existence also cannot becon- firmed. If this new organization is correct,presumably the North Korean VII Corps in the Wonsan area isnow available for combat duty.) THE C. I. A. HAS SECRET NOOBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION 25X1 OF THIS DOCUMENT. Approved For Release 2004109183 : CIA-RDP9111161/121408u120M0131-8 25X1 For info on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org ow Approved Raramiease 2004/W6fiEICIA-RDP91T011,291100200110001-8 25X1 General Situation Ambassador NUccio comments that the death sentence for opposition Assemblyman So has come as a surprise to most informed Koreans in view of the weakness of the case. There is evidence that the sentence is arousing mounting indignation not only in the opposition but also among those elements heretofore considered neutral in the struggle between the President and the Assembly, 25X1 SECREF 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/09A3 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000200110001-8 For info on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org Approved For %Lease 2004109/03 : ClA-RDP91T01172Q16100200110001-8 SECRET 25X1 Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 6049, 5 July 1952 DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN I. Military Operations Army Chinese forces in west central Kbrea carried out an hour long probe in platoon-strength against an outpest of the US 45th Division for the most significant ground action of 4 July.Similar probes by battalion-strengh Chinese forces in the same sector of the line on the previous day were repulsed. Also on 3 July, a raiding part from the US 1st Marine Division in western Korea met stiff resistance from a well-emplaced enemy battalion north of Panmunjom. Navy Naval aircraft from Task Force 77 off eastern Korea flew 168 sorties on 3 July. No report has been received on 4 July's operations. In the west, naval aircraft from the US light carrier Bataan and the British carrier Ocean attacked enemy installations on 3 and 4 July. Naval Emr- face craft bombarded enemy shore installations and maintained the block- ade. Air On 4 July, UN land-based aircraft flew 909 effective sorties, of which 540 were combat.Two medium bomber missions were flown. Communist jets were much in evidence, as 84 MIG-15's and 2 Type-15's were ob- served in flight. Of those observed, 47 were encountered with 10 definitely destroyed,
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