Civil Religion in Russia a Choice for Russian Modernization? by Elina Kahla
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56 peer-reviewed essay Civil religion in Russia A choice for Russian modernization? by Elina Kahla his essay addresses aspects of the cultural traditions by virtue of its history and as the religion of the ethnic majority, and practices of Russian Orthodox believers and bear- has dominated other confessions. As a result, cultural and politi- ers of that church’s legacy in contemporary society, cal Orthodoxy formed the modus vivendi that in the public sphere especially in the gray area between the secular and of symbols, legislation, and practices, ruled not just over its own religious spheres of life. The theoretical basis of the present study adherents but over non-Orthodox, non-Russians, and non-be- is rooted in Jürgen Habermas’s understanding of the “post-sec- lievers as well. By inertia, the ROC and the Kremlin today aspire ular”, by which is meant the regaining of religion by individuals to revive the prerevolutionary tradition of symphony, while si- and societies. Habermas proposes a new “third way” for a social multaneously admitting the multiconfessional and secular status contract, one that requires an equal dialog between religious and of the state. Given this controversy, it is safe to posit that a better secular citizens.1 My aim here is to elaborate on the improvement analysis of the Russian model of civil religion is urgently needed — of the relationship among the church, the state, and society in the even more so today, when the conflict in Ukraine is drawing two contemporary Russian situation by comparing it with the West, Orthodox nations into fratricide. where secularization has been seen as a key component of mod- ernization. I call for a dialog between the Western social theory TODAY, A SELF-IDENTIFICATION with the spiritual and historical leg- of civil religion and Russian statements on its own cultural tradi- acy of Russian Orthodoxy unites the majority of ethnic Russians tion. The guiding research question is: to what extent are cultural and/or Russian speakers.4 Adherence to “cultural Orthodoxy” traditions — such as the shared value of symphony,2 or practicing is to some extent also shared by non-Orthodox citizens, due to forms of theosis and collective, circular control (as discussed by its ubiquity and intangibility, which helped it to transform and Oleg Kharkhordin3) — still at the core of self-identification and survive 70 years of communism. Because of this combination of ingroup communication in Russian cultural Orthodoxy? My hy- shared tradition, ubiquity, and intangibility, it seems that prac- pothesis is that such cultural traditions and practices are crucial, tices of symphony, theosis, and circular control apply to both and therefore they should be openly integrated into societal the Orthodox Christian (pravoslavnye) and the non-Orthodox dialog and form the key components of Russia’s unique model of (inovernye, inoslavnye) citizens, and even those rossiiane living civil religion. I also posit that, due to Russia’s Orthodox legacy, abroad in “Greater Russia”5. My point is that the ubiquity of cul- its potential for civil religion is fundamentally different from the tural Orthodoxy lies in the fact that it relates deeply to the public Western (here: American) model, and therefore should be ana- sphere and therefore creates a potential realm for agency and lyzed in its own, non-Western context. What is vital is that Rus- choices, and ultimately for an updated contract between church sian political tradition emphasizes symphony between secular and state and between church and civil society. Due to its ubiq- and sacred authority, and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), uity, it forms an organic part of political culture as well. Accord- peer-reviewed essay 57 PHOTO: VOICES FROM RUSSIA FROM VOICES PHOTO: Today, a self-identifi- cation with the spiritual and historical legacy of Russian Orthodoxy unites the majority of ethnic Russians and/or Russian speakers. ing to White6, the USSR incorporated eight features of Russian its contemporary forms, and its potential as a positive force in tradition that characterize political culture: low public participa- modernizing Russian society and in the global environment is tion in politics, and hence the weak articulation of representative understated. institutions; authoritarianism and an unusually broad scope of government; personalization of the population’s political attach- IN THIS ESSAY I revisit Robert N. Bellah’s classic work “Civil Reli- ments; centralization; bureaucracy; a strong sense of commu- gion in America” (1967) and his subsequent “Religion and the Le- nity; suspicion towards outsiders; and a reliance on face-to-face gitimation of the American Republic” (1980). In these works, Bel- relations rather than anonymous procedures.7 I would agree with lah discusses the contract between secular and religious author- White and Richters and stress that these features are still preva- ity. My aim is to point out the similarities and differences between lent today. the American contract, as analyzed by Bellah, and the emerging It is generally held that, even though personal attendance at Russian one, although I also argue that there exists just now a worship is low and even though the ROC is widely criticized for momentum towards formulating a new kind of contract of civil its corruption, authoritarianism, and conspicuous compromises religion in Russia. Specific traits of this situation should be exam- with secular authority and nationalist groupings, Orthodox iden- ined, since together they may represent threats or opportunities, tity and the ROC as its promoter have made a permanent come- inertia or open choices for a modus vivendi. “Russian cultural Or- back in modernizing society, for both good and ill.8 The public thodoxy” denotes here not only the ROC as a formal hierarchical duumvirate of secular and ecclesiastical authority, referred to as organization, but also lay networks, brotherhoods, monasteries “symphony”, simfoniia, has taken a stronger hold on daily life and foundations, and even informal and untraditional civil agen- (Channel 1 broadcasts on Russian TV offer sufficient evidence). cies such as the pro-Putin musical group Buranovo Babushkas The ROC has regained much of its property and privilege; it acts and the anti-Putin group Pussy Riot. as a supra-national body in “Greater Russia” (including Ukraine, Belarus, and Estonia) and is a viable soft power player once more. The Russian Orthodox Church and The church enjoys trust. It is seen as the upholder of national the challenge of modernization values. Whether it is because of a post-Soviet backlash, or inertia, In light of the ROC’s incapacity to deal with any civil protest, it or the authorities’ efforts to maintain social cohesion inside Rus- seems that there is an evident need for a revised contract be- sia and in “Greater Russia” or to resist anti-Western tendencies, tween the secular and religious authorities over their societal the fact is that the presence of cultural and political Orthodoxy, roles. Renegotiating a new civil religion contract would allow with all of its practices, has strengthened. Yet cultural Orthodoxy Russia to avoid antagonistic situations in which accusations of as a set of beliefs and practices is still insufficiently studied in “blasphemy” are treated in secular courtrooms as “hooliganism” 58 peer-reviewed essay PHOTO: IGOR MUKHIN IGOR PHOTO: PHOTO: UPI/STRINGER PHOTO: Left: Russian Orthodox believers attend an Easter service in the Christ the Savior Cathedral in Moscow on April 24, 2011. Above: Members of the anti-Putin band Pussy Riot. or as a “crime against the state”, as in the scandalous Pussy Riot Doctrine debate has shown that modernization of the ROC is trial.9 That trial exposed, more than any other example, the un- truly in progress: preparedness of the ROC or the state to deal with the antagonistic sphere between the Orthodox authority and the modern, a priori The ROC recognizes that modern society has become secular civil agency whose openness and globalism are evident in the natural living environment for the majority of Ortho- social media.10 It is worth noting that without social media, espe- dox believers, and while the ROC criticizes the excesses cially YouTube, no scandal would ever have taken place. Howev- of modern society it also responds to the legitimate er, social media are not only a threat but also an opportunity: the desire of the Orthodox believer to be part of that society. Pussy Riot case also pointed to potential affirmative agency by ... I would argue that the changes in the human rights revealing taboos that cannot be dealt with in formal institutions.11 debate actually stand for an ideological renewal, and not Given the huge challenges, self-reflection is a must. It is crucial only for strategic-political adaptation16. that the ROC, within the frame of its specific traditions and his- toric trajectory, takes up the challenge of self-reflection posed by With this in mind, one would conclude that Orthodox faith and post-secularity, and accepts the existence of competing denomi- practice in Russia are not per se obstacles to the country’s demo- nations, the autonomy of secular knowledge from sacred knowl- cratic development. If peace prevails, openness will grow and edge, and the institutionalized monopoly of modern scientific human rights debates will gradually contribute to an ideological expertise. Meanwhile, the ROC needs to develop an epistemic renewal. On a closer look, the ROC is neither a monolith nor a stance