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El Sistema Politico De China

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El Sistema Politico De China “El sistema político de China” Eugenio Anguiano Maestría en Economía Facultad de Economía UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTONOMA DE MEXICO Miércoles 4 de mayo de 2005 Today China has thirty-three administrative units directly under the central government. They consist of twenty-two provinces, five autonomous regions, four municipalities, and two special administrative regions. The names of most of these provinces have been used for many centuries. The government of the People’s Republic also claims the island of Taiwan. República Popular China 中华人民共和国 • Superficie: 9,561,000 kilómetros cuadrados • Población: 1.3 mil millones (fines de 2004) • División política, 33 entidades: • 4 municipios especiales, uno de ellos capital del país (Beijing 北京). • 22 provincias, más la “provincia rebelde” de Taiwan (台湾). • 5 regiones autónomas (自治区). Mongolia Interior (内蒙); Ningxia (宁 夏); Xinjiang (新疆); Tibet (西藏); Guangxi (广西). • 2 regiones administrativas especiales. Hong Kong (香港) y Macao (澳门). República de China 中华民国 • Taiwan e islas adyacentes. Superficie 31,179 kilómetros cuadrados REPUBLICA POPULAR CHINA ESTRUCTURA FORMAL DEL ESTADO ASAMBLEA POPULAR NACIONAL (Comité Permanente) ORGANIZACIONES CCPPC JUDICIALES PRESIDENTE Y Partidos Políticos VICE PRESIDENTE (PCC y 8 “partidos democráticos”) CONSEJO DE ESTADO (Primer Ministro; Consejeros de Estado y viceprimer ministros; ministerios y comisiones estatales) Provincias, Municipios especiales, regiones autónomas y regiones administrativas especiales Municipios, consejos y ciudades REPUBLICA POPULAR CHINA ORGANIZACIÓN FORMAL DEL ESTADO ASAMBLEA JEFE DE CONSEJO DE POPULAR ESTADO ESTADO COMISIONES MINISTERIOS REPUBLICA POPULAR CHINA ESTRUCTURA REAL DEL ESTADO PARTIDO COMUNISTA CHINO (Comité Central y sus órganos dirigentes) ASAMBLEA NACIONAL POPULAR (Formaliza acuerdos y renovación de cuadros) CCPPC PODER JUDICIAL PODER EJECUTIVO REPUBLICA POPULAR CHINA ORGANIZACION REAL DEL ESTADO PARTIDO ASAMBLEA JEFE DE COMUNISTA POPULAR ESTADO CONSEJO DE ESTADO COMISIONES MINISTERIOS REPUBLICA POPULAR CHINA ORGANIZACION REAL DEL ESTADO PARTIDO ASAMBLEA JEFE DE COMUNISTA POPULAR ESTADO CONSEJO DE ESTADO COMISIONES MINISTERIOS Constituciones política y cartas magnas de la República Popular China • Programa Común de la Conferencia Consultiva política del Pueblo Chino (29 de septiembre de 1949). 60 artículos en 7 capítulos. • Primera Constitución (28 de septiembre de 1954). Preámbulo y 106 artículos en 4 capítulos. • Segunda Constitución (17 de enero de 1975). Preámbulo y 30 artículos en 4 capítulos. • Tercera Constitución (5 de marzo de 1978). Preámbulo y 60 artículos en 4 capítulos. • Cuarta Constitución (4 de diciembre de 1982). Preámbulo y 138 artículos en 4 capítulos. REPUBLICA POPULAR CHINA ESTRUCTURA DEL PARTIDO CONGRESO NACIONAL DEL PCCH (Secretario General) COMISIÓN CENTRAL DE COMISIÓN COMITÉ CENTRAL DISCIPLINA E INSPECCIÓN MILITAR (Organización y control del CENTRAL PCCh.) POLITBURO COMITÉ PERMANENTE DEL POLITBURO REPUBLICA POPULAR CHINA PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE CHINA: ORGANIZACIÓN CENTRAL REAL (16 Congreso, noviembre, 2002) COMITÉ PERMANENTE DEL BURÓ POLÍTICO (9) COMISIÓN CENTRAL BURÓ POLÍTICO (15) MILITAR (CMC) 1 s (8) COMITÉ CENTRAL (198) 158 s SECRETARIADO DEL PCCh CONGRESO NACIONAL DEL PCCh DEPARTAMENTOS DEL COMITÉ CENTRAL La CMC tiene un presidente, 3 vicepresidentes y 4 miembros El Comité Central incluye a los miembros del Buró Político. Fue designado por el Congreso Nacional el 14 de noviembre de 2002. Al 16 Congreso del PCCh asistieron 2, 114 delegados que presentaron a 60 millones de miembros del Partido. La población de China era de 1, 284, a mediados de 2002. CÚPULA DEL LIDERAZGO: COMITÉ PERMANENTE DEL BURÓ POLÍTICO DEL 16 COMITÉ CENTRAL DEL P ARTIDO COMUNISTA DE CHINA 1. HU JINTAO (12, 1942) = Secretario general del PC, jefe de Estado y vicepresidente de la CMC 2. WU BANGGUO (7, 1941) = Presidente del Comité Permanente de la Asamblea Popular Nacional (APN) 3. WEN JIABAO (9, 1942) = Jefe de Gobierno (Primer Ministro) 4. JIA QINGLIN (3, 1940) = Presidente del Comité Nacional de la Conferencia Consultiva Política del Pueblo Chino (CCPPC) 5. ZENG QINGHONG (7, 1939) = Vicepresidente de la República; Presidente de la escuela central de partido 6. HUANG JU (9, 1938) = Viceprimer ministro (primero de 4) 7. WU GUANZHENG (8, 1938) = Secretario de la Comisión Central de Disciplina 8. LI CHANGCHUN (2, 1944) = Encargado de propaganda e ideología 9. LUO GAN (7, 1935) = Secretario de la Comisión Central de Ciencia Política y Derecho del PC REPUBLICA POPULAR CHINA ORGANIZACIÓN GUBERNAMENTAL CENTRAL PRESIDENTE VICE PRESIDENTE CONSEJO DE ESTADO Comité Militar Central PRIMER MINISTRO VICEPRIMEROS MINISTROS Y CONSEJEROS DE ESTADO COMITÉ PERMANENTE DEL CONSEJO DE ESTADO PRESIDENTES DE LA REPUBLICA POPULAR CHINA (1949 – 2005) 1. MAO ZEDONG Asumió el 27 de septiembre de 1954 2. LIU SHAOQI Asumió el 27 de abril de 1959 VACANTE Noviembre 1968- enero 1975 ABOLIDO Enero 1975 – diciembre 1982 3. LI XIANNIAN Asumió el 8 de Junio de 1983 4. YAN SHANGKUN Asumió el 8 de abril de 1983 5. JIAN ZEMING Electo por APN, 27 de marzo de 1993 6. HU JINTAO Electo por APN, 15 de marzo de 2003 Asamblea Popular Nacional • Primer congreso, 15-28 de septiembre de 1954 • Segundo congreso, 17 de abril de 1958 • Tercer congreso, noviembre de 1963 • Cuarto congreso, 13-17 de enero de 1973 • Quinto congreso, 26 de febrero-5 de marzo de 1978 • Sexto congreso, 6-21 de junio de 1983 • Séptimo congreso, 25 de marzo-13 de abril de 1988 • Octavo congreso, 15-31 de marzo de 1993 • Noveno congreso, 5-16 de marzo de 1998 • Décimo congreso, 5-19 de marzo de 2003 Congresos Nacionales del Partido Comunista de China en el poder 8° (15-27 de septiembre de 1956). Liderazgo (CP-BP-CC): Presidente (主席), Mao Zedong Vicepresidentes: Liu Shaoqi; Zhou Enlai; Zhu De; Chen Yun Secretario general: Deng Xiaoping 9° (1-24 de abril de 1969) Presidente, Mao Zedong Vicepresidente, Lin Biao Miembros: Chen Boda; Zhou Enlai; Kang Sheng 10° (24-28 de agosto de 1973) Presidente, Mao Zedong Vicepresidentes: Zhou Enlai; Wang Hongwen; Kang Sheng; Ye Jianying; Li Desheng Miembros (número d trazos): Zhu De; Zhang Chunqiao; Dong Biwu 2 11° (12-18 de agosto de 1977) Presidente, Hua Guofeng Vicepresidentes: Ye Jianying; Deng Xiaoping; Li Xiannian; Wang Dongxin 12° (1-11 de septiembre de 1982) Secretario General, Hu Yaobang Miembros: Deng Xiaoping; Zhao Ziyang; Li Xiannian; Chen Yun 13° (25 de octubre-1 de noviembre de 1987) Secretario General, Zhao Ziyang Miembros: Li Peng; Qiao Shi; Hu Pili; Yao Yilin 3 14° (12-18 de octubre de 1992) Secretario General, Jiang Zemin Miembros: Li Peng; Qiao Shi; Li Ruihuan; Zhu Rongji; Liu Huaqing; Hu Jintao 15°(12-18 de septiembre de 1997) Secretario General, Jiang Zemin Miembros: Li Peng; Zhu Rongji; Li Ruihuan; Hu Jintao; Wei Jianxing; Li Lanqing 16° (1-15 de noviembre de 2002) Secretario General, Hu Jintao Miembros: Wu Bangguo; Wen Jiabao; Jia Qingling;Zeng Qinghong; Huang Ju; Li Changchun; Luo Gan Maximato • Era de Mao Zedong, 1931-1976 • Era de transición, septiembre 1976-junio 1981 • Era de Deng Xiaping, c. noviembre de 1979-octubre de 1992 • Era de Jiang Zeming, c. octubre de 1992-c. noviembre de 2003 • Cuarta generación de líderes, c. noviembre de 2003.
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