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China: Relaciones Internacionales CHINA:CHINA: RELACIONESRELACIONES INTERNACIONALESINTERNACIONALES EUGENIO ANGUIANO Formación de negocios en China Mexico, D. F. 21 de febrero de 2007 Today China has thirty-three administrative units directly under the central government. They consist of twenty-two provinces, five autonomous regions, four municipalities, and two special administrative regions. The names of most of these provinces have been used for many centuries. The government of the People’s Republic also claims the island of Taiwan. RepRepúúblicablica PopularPopular ChinaChina 中华人民共和国中华人民共和国 ¾ Superficie: 9,561,000 kilómetros cuadrados ¾ Población: 1.3 mil millones (fines de 2004) ¾ División política, 33 entidades: ¾ 4 municipios especiales, uno de ellos capital del país (Beijing 北京). ¾ 22 provincias, más la “provincia rebelde” de Taiwan (台湾). ¾ 5 regiones autónomas (自治区). Mongolia Interior (内蒙); Ningxia (宁 夏); Xinjiang (新疆); Tibet (西藏); Guangxi (广西). ¾ 2 regiones administrativas especiales. Hong Kong (香港) y Macao (澳门). República de China 中华民国 ¾ Taiwan e islas adyacentes. Superficie 31,179 kilómetros cuadrados ConstitucionesConstituciones polpolííticatica yy cartascartas magnasmagnas dede lala RepRepúúblicablica PopularPopular ChinaChina ¾ ProgramaPrograma ComComúúnn dede lala ConferenciaConferencia ConsultivaConsultiva polpolííticatica deldel PuebloPueblo ChinoChino (29(29 dede septiembreseptiembre dede 1949).1949). 6060 artartíículosculos enen 77 capcapíítulos.tulos. ¾ PrimeraPrimera ConstituciConstitucióónn (28(28 dede septiembreseptiembre dede 1954).1954). PrePreáámbulombulo yy 106106 artartíículosculos enen 44 capcapíítulos.tulos. ¾ SegundaSegunda ConstituciConstitucióónn (17(17 dede eneroenero dede 1975).1975). PrePreáámbulombulo yy 3030 artartíículosculos enen 44 capcapíítulos.tulos. ¾ TerceraTercera ConstituciConstitucióónn (5(5 dede marzomarzo dede 1978).1978). PrePreáámbulombulo yy 6060 artartíículosculos enen 44 capcapíítulos.tulos. ¾ CuartaCuarta ConstituciConstitucióónn (4(4 dede diciembrediciembre dede 1982).1982). PrePreáámbulombulo yy 138138 artartíículosculos enen 44 capcapíítulostulos.. PRESIDENTES DE LA REPUBLICA POPULAR CHINA (1949 – 2005) 1. MAO ZEDONG Asumió el 27 de septiembre de 1954 2. LIU SHAOQI Asumió el 27 de abril de 1959 VACANTE Noviembre 1968- enero 1975 ABOLIDO Enero 1975 – diciembre 1982 3. LI XIANNIAN Asumió el 8 de Junio de 1983 4. YAN SHANGKUN Asumió el 8 de abril de 1983 5. JIANG ZEMIN Electo por APN, 27 de marzo de 1993 6. HU JINTAO Electo por APN, 15 de marzo de 2003 AsambleaAsamblea PopularPopular NacionalNacional ¾ Primer congreso, 15-28 de septiembre de 1954 ¾ Segundo congreso, 17 de abril de 1963 ¾ Tercer congreso, noviembre de 1963 ¾ Cuarto congreso, 13-17 de enero de 1973 ¾ Quinto congreso, 26 de febrero-5 de marzo de 1978 ¾ Sexto congreso, 6-21 de junio de 1983 ¾ Séptimo congreso, 25 de marzo-13 de abril de 1988 ¾ Octavo congreso, 15-31 de marzo de 1993 ¾ Noveno congreso, 5-16 de marzo de 1998 ¾ Décimo congreso, 5-19 de marzo de 2003 CongresosCongresos NacionalesNacionales deldel PartidoPartido ComunistaComunista dede ChinaChina enen elel poderpoder 8° (15-27 de septiembre de 1956). Liderazgo (CP-BP-CC): Presidente (主席), Mao Zedong Vicepresidentes: Liu Shaoqi; Zhou Enlai; Zhu De; Chen Yun Secretario general: Deng Xiaoping 9° (1-24 de abril de 1969) Presidente, Mao Zedong Vicepresidente, Lin Biao Miembros: Chen Boda; Zhou Enlai; Kang Sheng 10° (24-28 de agosto de 1973) Presidente, Mao Zedong Vicepresidentes: Zhou Enlai; Wang Hongwen; Kang Sheng; Ye Jianying; Li Desheng Miembros (número d trazos): Zhu De; Zhang Chunqiao; Dong Biwu 22 11° (12-18 de agosto de 1977) Presidente, Hua Goufeng Vicepresidentes: Ye Jianying; Deng Xiaoping; Li Xiannian; Wang Dongxin 12° (1-11 de septiembre de 1982) Secretario General, Hu Yaobang Miembros: Deng Xiaoping; Zhao Ziyang; Li Xiannian; Chen Yun 13° (25 de octubre-1 de noviembre de 1987) Secretario General, Zhao Ziyang Miembros: Li Peng; Qiao Shi; Hu Pili; Yao Yilin 33 14° (12-18 de octubre de 1992) Secretario General, Jiang Zemin Miembros: Li Peng; Qiao Shi; Li Ruihuan; Zhu Rongji; Liu Huaqing; Hu Jintao 15°(12-18 de septiembre de 1997) Secretario General, Jiang Zemin Miembros: Li Peng; Zhu Rongji; Li Ruihuan; Hu Jintao; Wei Jianxing; Li Lanqing 16° (1-15 de noviembre de 2002) Secretario General, Hu Jintao Miembros: Wu Bangguo; Wen Jiabao; Jia Qingling;Zeng Qinghong; Huang Ju; Wu Guanzheng; Li Changchun; Luo Gan MaximatoMaximato ¾¾ EraEra dede MaoMao ZedongZedong,, 19311931--19761976 ¾¾ EraEra dede transicitransicióón,n, septiembreseptiembre 19761976--juniojunio 19811981 ¾¾ EraEra dede DengDeng XiapingXiaping,, c.c. noviembrenoviembre dede 19791979--octubreoctubre dede 19921992 ¾¾ EraEra dede JiangJiang ZemingZeming,, c.c. octubreoctubre dede 19921992--c.c. noviembrenoviembre dede 20032003 ¾¾ CuartaCuarta generacigeneracióónn dede llííderes,deres, c.c. noviembrenoviembre dede 20032003 RPC:RPC: RELACIONESRELACIONES CONCON ELEL EXTERIOREXTERIOR 19491949--19601960 China surge de la Guerra Mundial II como potencia global. Establecimiento del la RPC: posición de EE UU y primeros reconocimientos internacionales. Inclinación a un solo lado: Tratado sino-soviético (1950). Guerra de Corea 1950-1953. Línea de Bandung 1954-1959: coexistencia pacífica. Debate sino-soviético 1956-1960. La Guerra Fría en Asia: contención del comunismo chino. China y el Tercer Mundo CHINA:CHINA: RELACIONESRELACIONES CONCON ELEL EXTERIOREXTERIOR 19611961--19761976 Distanciamiento y confrontación sino-soviética 1961-1969. Ruptura y guerra fronteriza con la India 1959-1962. Fin de la línea de Bandung y diplomacia revolucionaria china 1962-1969. Aislamiento de China comunista: fricciones regionales. Intervención de EE UU en Indochina. Guerra de Vietnam y sus consecuencias geopolíticas. Acercamiento sino-estadounidense 1969-1972. Regreso de China a la diplomacia pragmática 1971-1976. Relaciones México-China en contexto regional y global. CHINA:CHINA: RELACIONESRELACIONES CONCON ELEL EXTERIOREXTERIOR 19771977--20072007 Apertura política de China y su conflicto con la URSS 1971-1979. Diplomacia multilateral china en década de los 80. Las 4 modernizaciones e inicio de la apertura económica 1980-1990. El derrumbe del “socialismo real” y la reacción de China 1989-1992. Posicionamiento de China en la geopolítica mundial 1993- 2007. Relaciones México-China en contextos regional y global 1977-2007. CHINA’SCHINA’S POSITIONPOSITION ININ THETHE WORLDWORLD ¾ First place by population ¾ Fourth place by territory (third if Taiwan is included) ¾ Sixth place by size of total GDP at market exchange rates valuation ¾ 107TH Place by GDP per capita at market exchange rates valuation ¾ Third place by exports of goods and commodities ¾ The country has registered the fastest GDP growth on a sustainable basis (Last 20 to 25 years) 10 years averages, total real GDP (IMF): 1987-1996 = 10.0 % 1997-2006 = 8.4 % LINELINE--UPUP OFOF CCPCCP LEADERSLEADERS Hu Jintao Dec. 1942 SG, head of state, chairman CMC Wu Bangguo Jul. 1941 Chairman 10th SC-NPC Wen Jiabao Sep. 1942 Head of Government Jia Qinglin Mar. 1940 Chairman 10th NC-CPPCC Zeng Qinghong Jul. 1939 Deputy head of state Huang Ju Sep. 1938 1st deputy head of government Wu Guangzheng Aug. 1938 Secretary CC for discipline insp. Li Changchun Feb. 1944 Head publicity & ideological work Luo Gan Jul. 1935 Secretary Political Science & law ECONOMIC PROWESS COUNTRY PARTICIPATION IN AGGREGATE GDP, EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES, AND POPULATION, 20041 (Percent of world total) WORLD WORLD WORLD GDP EXPORTS POPULATION U. S. 20.9 10.3 4.7 CHINA 13.2 5.9 20.7 JAPAN 6.9 5.7 2.0 INDIA 5.9 1.1 17.0 GERMANY 4.3 9.5 1.3 BRAZIL 2.6 1.0 2.9 MEXICO 1.8 1.2 1.7 1 The GDP shares are based on the purchasing power parity valuation. Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2005, p. 198. COMPONENTS OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2004 COMPONENTS OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2004 % OF TOTAL Private consumption 41.4 Government consumption 11.6 Gross fixed investment & inventory changes 44.2 Exports of goods and services 38.1 Imports of goods and services -35.3 Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, December 2005. CHINA, p. 5. RealReal GDP,GDP, annualannual percentajepercentaje changechange (IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2005) 19871987--9696 19971997--20062006 WorldWorld 3.33.3 3.93.9 AdvancedAdvanced economieseconomies 3.03.0 2.72.7 DevelopingDeveloping economieseconomies 3.83.8 5.75.7 DevelopingDeveloping AsiaAsia 7.87.8 6.76.7 ChinaChina 10.010.0 8.48.4 IndiaIndia 5.95.9 6.06.0 LatinLatin AmericaAmerica && CaribbeanCaribbean 2.72.7 2.82.8 BrazilBrazil 2.12.1 2.42.4 MexicoMexico 2.52.5 3.53.5 PRC:PRC: 11TH11TH FYP,FYP, 20062006--1010 ¾ Double GDP per-head between 2000-2010. It requires real growth of under 7% a year from 2006 to 2010 ¾ Attain a GDP of US$4 trillion, and a per-head GDP of $3,000 by 2020 ¾ GDP ¾ Higher value-added industries and expanding services sector ¾ “Constructing a harmonious society” ¾ 218 billon yuan (US$ 26.6b) to be spent on rural education Reduce by 20% amount of energy consumed per unit of ObstaclesObstacles toto thethe goalgoal ofof reachingreaching “harmonious“harmonious society”society” ¾ To move around 300 million peasants to urban centres in the coming 15 years ¾ While accounting for 4% of global GDP, China accounted in 2005 for 12% of global consumption of energy resources, 15% of water, 28% of steel, 25% of aluminium, and 50% of cement ¾ Of the more then 700m employees, only 124m have medical insurance. ¾ 45% of urban and 80% of rural population do not have medical
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