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How Effective Was Thailand's G20 Summit Diplomacy

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How Effective Was Thailand's G20 Summit Diplomacy How Effective was Thailand’s G20 Diplomacy? Laura Prieto The University of Sheffield Executive Summary important economy by 2030, ASEAN has a lot to offer to foreign investors. Thailand was invited to the G20 in 2019 as the representative of the Association of Amid strong economic growth amongst its Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and this membership, ASEAN is now trying to form was a long-awaited return to the the Regional Comprehensive Economic international stage after years of political Partnership (RCEP), a trade deal which instability. This policy brief discusses the would also comprise China, Japan, India, long-term goals of Thailand and ASEAN New Zealand, South Korea and Australia. and highlights how they are influenced by Accounting for more than 3.4 billion the ongoing tension between China and people, the RCEP would cover 30% of the Japan. It argues that Thailand, plagued by world’s economy with a combined GDP of its own domestic problems, was unable to US$21.4 trillion. Advancing talks on this fully convey the aims of ASEAN and could free trade agreement (FTA) was one of the not make the most of the opportunities main goals for the Thai government at the presented by the Osaka Summit. G20. In its 50-year lifespan, ASEAN has become a serious political and economic force in The Aims of Thailand and ASEAN Asia. Meeting just days before the Osaka Thailand is one of the founding members Summit, it held its own summit (its 34th) of the ASEAN. It has assumed this year’s in Bangkok. The newly ‘democratically’ Chairmanship, and been invited to the elected Thai Prime Minister has this year G20 to represent the association. Formed put the focus on ‘Advancing partnership of ten countries, the bloc aims to ensure for sustainability’. Key points on the political cooperation, economic growth agenda included maritime pollution, a and security in the region, and has the sustainable digital economy, and a focus motto ‘One Vision, One Identity, One on the Sustainable Development Goals Community’ which has helped bring peace (SDGs) and their feasibility in South East and social change to Southeast Asia. With the SDGs at the heart of this Asia. Expected to be the fourth most year’s G20 summit, it was crucial for G20 Summit, Osaka, June 2019 ASEAN to demonstrate they are also looking at the South China Sea dispute working towards achieving these goals. which has heightened tensions in the region and pushed ASEAN to publish the Significant progress has been achieved in outlook. implementing the SDGs. For instance, the opening of the ASEAN Centre for Sustainable Development Studies and What Role can the G20 Play in Southeast Dialogue this year has provided Asia? institutional capacity and helped to facilitate collaboration. ASEAN and the Being seen as a legitimate global actor is a United Nations (UN) have cooperated to major challenge for Thailand, and chairing produce a report on the ASEAN may ultimately prove to be ‘complementarities’ between the ASEAN controversial. It is seen as a country community’s Vision 2025 and the UN’s embroiled in controversy, with more than 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 12 coups d’état since 1932. The latest, in Development, and the European Union 2014, installed a military regime, with the (EU) has contributed €170 million to acting Prime Minister (PM) General achieving the SDGs in ASEAN countries. Prayuth Chan-O-Cha. This led to the imposition of sanctions by the EU, which Having four of the worst maritime have only recently started to be eased off. polluters in the world amongst its This is due to the fact that, after five years members, ASEAN needed to take actions of military rule, the junta allowed to show their commitment to the SDGs. elections for the first time. As such, it released its first Framework of Action on Maritime debris which goes However, there has been rising criticism in hand in hand with the agenda of this the country about them. The Constitution year’s G20 summit. This shows ASEAN’s made during the military regime left determination to contribute to the SDGs Parliament and elected members of and be seen as a leader and driver of parliament with little power as the Senate change in the region with a lot more to members are picked by the regime. This offer in the future. further increases divisions in society by not putting an end to years of political Aware of their distinctive geopolitical instability. However, the Thai government situation, ASEAN countries have agreed does not seem phased by this hurdle, and on an outlook on the Indo-Pacific. It seeks the expectation was that G20 members to implement networks to increase would look past this last scandal and give cooperation and dialogue in the Asia- Thailand a free pass on democracy to Pacific and Indian Ocean regions to focus on trade talks in Osaka and beyond, promote peace and stability by upholding placing the country in a theoretically sovereignty and non-intervention, which strong position to negotiate on behalf of are two primordial concepts of the bloc. ASEAN with other G20 countries. This is of particular relevance when G20 Summit, Osaka, June 2019 However, all ASEAN’s long-term plans are Chairman of the association was likely to be overshadowed by short-term strategically very important for Japan. economic problems. During the Bali-IMF Indonesia, a member of both the G20 and Summit in 2018, the UN Secretary-General ASEAN, is also present at this year’s Antonio Guterres highlighted that national summit. As Thailand and ASEAN orbit debts in ASEAN could endanger the ability towards China, Japan is trying its best to of the association to fulfil the objectives in catch up by attempting to counterbalance the UN’s 2030 Agenda for sustainable the increasing power of China in the development. ASEAN is made up of region. For example, having a special countries in the developing stage which relationship with Thailand has always are showing significant gaps in been of great interest to Japan. It was the infrastructure. Developing infrastructure only country in the G7 that did not projects such as roads, housing, sanction Thailand after the 2014 coup healthcare, and education would require d’état and has acted ‘as a source of 7% of ASEAN’s GDP, presenting difficulties legitimacy for the Thai military regime’. It for members to provide adequate funds, was the second-largest importer and time and energy to promote the SDGs. third-largest exporter to Thailand up until 2015 and offered generous loans to create Due to its geographical location, there are a railway project showing the importance various economic opportunities available of this relationship for Japan. to ASEAN. The bloc is at the centre of geopolitical disputes between important The G20 summit in Osaka was a crucial world actors which are competing for the moment for Thailand to be seen as a attention of these South East Asian leader in Southeast Asia. The challenges countries. Japan and China are trying to here, though, were two-fold: Thailand impress ASEAN countries for investments simultaneously needed to be seen as a by taking a leadership role in Asia that was legitimate actor in the international previously dominated by the US. It is system while also representing the estimated that Japan has been leading the interests and goals of ASEAN for a race against China in terms of sustainable region. Thailand and ASEAN infrastructure as it has backed more than had a genuine opportunity: by playing 237 projects in the region whereas China their cards right, they could have been the has supported 191. However, China is true winners of this year’s G20 as China keen to get its One Belt, One Road and Japan competed to draw Thai Initiative across ASEAN. The rise of China attention. has been closely watched by ASEAN members as they see it as a great economic power with various strategic Making the Most of the G20? Thailand benefits. Drowned by the Crowd Inviting members of ASEAN (Vietnam and In meetings with the Japanese Prime Singapore) along with Thailand as the Minister Abe Shinzo, Thai Prime Minister G20 Summit, Osaka, June 2019 General Prayut Chan-O-Cha stressed that Southeast Asia, Indonesia has established the domestic political situation had itself as a vital player in international stabilised in a bid to show world leaders relations. As a result of the strong that Thailand is now available for serious relationships it has built with other G20 political discussion. The efforts on members, Indonesia can now easily sustainability made by ASEAN also did not contribute to pressing international go unnoticed as they were mentioned in issues. the ‘G20 Ministerial Meeting on Energy The G20 represents 64% of the world’s Transitions and Global Environment for population living in the largest economies. Sustainable Growth’ which recognised the The lack of representation of small and importance of research and policy to developing countries demonstrate the advance the SDGs. However, ASEAN was ineffectiveness of G20’s summits to not mentioned in the official Leaders’ encourage their growth. The different declaration and talks on the RCEP have experiences between Thailand and not seemed to advance. Thailand seemed Indonesia could reflect wider problems almost non-existent during the summit, a with the G20 which does not passive actor with few allies to turn to at accommodate discussion with developing the G20. countries. Arguably, Thailand was held In terms of communication, only one back by its domestic problems and did not team of embedded Thai journalists were have the mandate to assertively pursue present at the summit. There was a clear diplomatic relations at the summit.
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