The State of Conflict and Violence in Asia 194 | Violence and Regimes in Asia Pakistan, and Nepal Has Been Accompanied by the Escalation of Large-Scale Violence

Home , 2002 Gujarat riots, Communal violence, Free Aceh Movement, Nellie massacre, Tripura (princely state)

Essays on The State of Conflict and Violence in Asia 194 | Violence and Regimes in Asia Pakistan, and Nepal has been accompanied by the escalation of large-scale violence. However, violence. large-scale of escalation the by accompanied been has Nepal and Pakistan, Philippines, the Myanmar, Indonesia, in liberalization political literature, the in predicted As in ademocracy,whetherdemocracyasoldIndia or asyoungTimor-Leste. regime and potentially again under Rodrigo Duterte—and where Marcos political settlements Ferdinand break the down under Philippines the in authoritarianism—as to married is incapacity on rests peace democratic change. Furthermore, Asian countries show that transitions to democracy provide exceptional provide democracy to transitions that show countries Asian Furthermore, change. democratic preceded that rule authoritarian to back traced be can violence contemporary centerof the at organizations rebel the of formation initial the and conflicts these of roots the in Asia:CapableStates Violence andRegimes but for different reasons. Most simply put, authoritarian peace rests on rests peace authoritarian put, simply Most reasons. different for but of matter a as First, Asia. across violence and regimes linking patterns striking some discern still can one Nevertheless, exists. actually violence and type regime between correlation absolute definitive, at leastuntildemocracyages,consolidates,andmatures. violence, increase to itself—tends democratization of process rocky the democracy—especially such examples give rise to the opposite conclusion: authoritarianism generally fosters peace, while collective freedoms. Trumpeted as they always are by autocrats and their most vocal champions, and individual not if security, physical for desires human basic fulfilling at adept seemed least at have that dictatorships as well as violence, in increase an with associated be to appeared has democratization where countries of Asia in abound Examples violence. and peace volume: this in attention our occupy that outcomes the to regard with especially connection, causal blunt a observer of Asian politics—whether East, Southeast, serious South, or no Central—would But ever propose opposites. such negative their all with associated be should authoritarianism while equality, and law, of rule development, peace, as such outcomes, positive with correlated be should democracy that assume or argue to circles policymaking and academic in common is It and DurableSettlements Dan Slater Sana Jaffrey Second, no that suggests coexist plausibly can perspectives opposing these of both that fact The regime type regime transitions

, democracies and dictatorships can both be either peaceful or violent, or peaceful either be both can dictatorships and democracies , durable settlements can create a range of outcomes with regards to large-scale violence. . The greatest dangers therefore lie where state where lie therefore dangers greatest The . capable states , while , to their younger counterparts such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Bangladesh in both levels doubt on this claim. Two of the region’s oldest democracies, India and Sri Lanka, are quite similar democracies. consolidated or autocracies harsh to compared violence experience to likely most are “anocracies,” or semidemocracies, that argued have Some olence. its manydifferenttypes—canbeascertained. no clear association between regime type and violence—even when we disaggregate violence into here, covered cases Asian 14 the in that see to techniques estimation sophisticated employ not need One axis. vertical the along cells violent) (more darker from separate would cells violent) (less lighter which in visible be would pattern clear a versa, vice or dictatorships, than violent score. Polity country’s each with them correlates and chapters, country volume’s this in discussed outcomes conflict the color-codes and compiles 1 necessary foreconomicgrowthandsocialstability. oped societies, it has been suggested that authoritarian rule can bring the institutional strength democracies. in conflict armed of likelihood the increases that sentiment nationalist of mobilization to leading resources, of tion processes. through negotiation and compromise by allowing for differences wider participation their in the resolve decision-making to elites political incentivize can institutions representative to ment structuring fair contestation over diverse preferences through inclusive participation. Commit by societies diverse in conflict violent reduce to tend institutions democratic that argue theory peace” democratic “domestic the of Proponents claims. theoretical competing with engaging Regime typeandviolence whose standinginanation’sfoundationalpoliticalsettlementisleastsecure. democracies rest on durable settlements, vigilantism is typically directed against those minorities large-scale riots and a rise in localized vigilante violence. Affirming the key lesson that peaceful and Indonesia shows that democratic consolidation is associated with a concurrent decrease in form of violence, especially with the regards in to communal shift conflict.a Evidence by from India,accompanied Bangladesh, often is it However, violence. of levels lower to lead necessarily in maturing democracies. Counterintuitively, a higher level of democratic consolidation does not not be perceived as readily available in long-standing democracies such as India and Sri Lanka. may peace for opportunities Such conflicts. these of settlement negotiated for opportunities Table 1 Table Empirical evidence from Asia does not lend consistent support to either of these claims. Table for setting ideal an provides Asia within violence and type regime in variation great The Finally, 1 Others claim that electoral competition can generate deep contention over distribu also presents some clear surprises for perspectives that link regime link that perspectives for surprises clear some presents also regime evolution over time affects the forms of violence that predominate, particularly 2 Especially in ethnically diverse and economically less devel less economically and diverse ethnically in Especially 3 4 If democracies were systematically more systematically were democracies If 5 A glance at Table 1 casts 1 Table at glance A quality with vi with - - - -

195 | Violence and Regimes in Asia 196 | Violence and Regimes in Asia Despite having undergone similar regime cycling between military-led interventions and short and interventions military-led between cycling regime similar undergone having Despite the region, Pakistan and Thailand, it is clear that they differ vastly in their experience of violence. more peacefulthancountrieswithfarexperienceindemocraticgovernance. and varieties of violence. Intriguingly, Timor-Leste and Mongolia are new democracies that are In Pakistan and Sri Lanka, on the other hand, the state has developed higher levels of coercive of levels higher developed has state the hand, other the on Lanka, Sri and Pakistan In Timor-Leste. and Mongolia in case the been has as unimpressive, is capacity state when even groups across settlements peaceful forge can democracies However, consent. electoral limited relatively of setting a in order maintain to capacity state require indeed regimes Authoritarian cies such asIslamicState(IS)thanwillIndonesia. provide more sites of stateless sanctuary for sympathizers of transnational terrorist organizations the likelihood of violent counter-mobilization. mass-surveillance systems that could engage in more targeted repression of dissidents, reducing challenges. popular multiple subdue to violence of levels high deployed that capacity coercive fragmented under Marcos and Myanmar under military rule serve as examples of authoritarian regimes with bloodshed. without and legally cases, many in and, precisely more enemies their target can that states authoritarian stronger than violence” ships with fragmented and poorly organized coercive apparatuses engage in more “high-intensity historically possessedhighlycapablestates. democracies such as Asian South Korea and either Taiwan or authoritarian cover regimes like Singapore to that have need no sees region, the across violence analyzing on focused volume, of violence are a function of variation in violent conflict across cases compiled in this volume? In any political system, levels ruling partyfordecades. in Cambodia and Malaysia, both of which have been consistently dominated by an authoritarian observed currently as tensions, national rising in result cumulatively may measures repressive contrary, the To outcomes. peaceful increasingly yields necessarily regimes authoritarian of consolidation long-term the that mean not does well—this as democracies of true is arguably displacements. forced and torture, assassinations, arrests, by characterized repression state of levels high in engage they violence, mass committing avoid to manage regimes authoritarian where Even munist campaign in which the military and citizen militias killed perhaps half a million people. anticom massive a of back the on power to came regime Order New Indonesia’s while people, by autocrats in Asia. The Khmer Rouge’s systematic genocide led to the death of at least a million belied by the fact that some of the worst acts of mass violence in the world have been committed of armedconflict,includingterrorism,nationalpoliticalandsectarianviolence. categories all virtually on Thailand than worse much fares Pakistan rule, democratic of periods . Statebuilding does not have to precede democratization for peace and stability to take hold. Recent research suggests that authoritarianism is no panacea for social violence. Dictator violence. social for panacea no is authoritarianism that suggests research Recent Regime type is thus not a good predictor of violence in Asia. What then explains the observed also is order political and peace societal cement helps authoritarianism that argument The in instability regime most the experienced have that countries two compare we when Even This does not mean, however, that high state capacity is the only route to peace 8 In contrast, the New Order regime in Indonesia developed highly sophisticated highly developed Indonesia in regime Order New the contrast, In 6 Although autocracies tend to be most violent during their founding years—as founding their during violent most be to tend autocracies Although state capacity more than regime type. It is no coincidence that this 9 All else equal, the Philippines should enduringly 7 Among cases considered here, the Philippines the here, considered cases Among in democra in 10 - - -

Regime changeandviolence development orinequality. under economic of effect side predictable a as or type regime of product direct a as violence of levels portray that perspectives existing on improvement an is it settlements, political of result tal of features the polity.Althoughit might flirt to say withtautology thatdemocraticpeaceis a these countries have been marred by turmoil due to a lack of durable settlements on fundamen of both in politics democratic Yet decades. for foes internal and external fighting after capacity restrictions onpublicgatheringsandthemedia,signaling deeperdemocraticreforms. competitive elections were held, but after political prisoners were freed and the regime softened fully before was This 2011. in zones trouble long-standing some in escalate to began Myanmar in violence separatist and ethnic Similarly, monarchy. powerful country’s the on constraints the after ground gained only insurgency Maoist the Nepal, In mobilization. violent trigger also can liberalization ical polit at attempts initial that shows countries Asian additional two from evidence place, taken (see countrychapterinthisvolume). terrorist-related attacks and escalation of separatist violence in the restive Balochistan province day. Even the current regime transition that commenced in 2009 has been met with an increase in independence in 1971, and then by a surge in sectarian violence since 1989 that continues to this ments with democratic governance were marked by a separatist war that resulted in Bangladesh’s that collectivelyclaimedanestimated22,552livesbetween1998and2003. Aceh, Papua, and East Timor, as well as communal violence across multiple parts of the country recent democratization process was also beset with escalation of three preexisting insurgencies, in pendent Indonesia convened its first democratically elected parliament in 1955. Indonesia’s most periods of violence. Multiple rebellions erupted across the archipelago soon after a newly inde extraordinary with coincided always has change political momentous example, for Indonesia, In violence. mass for risk high of moments are democratization following immediately periods it experiencesmorecaseswheredemocracyandviolencecoincide. transitions than breakdowns in recent years. When a region births more democracies, naturally than transitions to authoritarianism, but simply because Asia has experienced more democratic section focuses on violence in transitions to democracy, not because they tend to be more violent bodia and Indonesia produced some of the deadliest mass violence Asia has ever witnessed. This to and from democratic rule. transitions of timing the to respect with onset conflict armed of likelihood the assesses erature regime of feature bounded temporally a as conflict armed Let us now turn our attention to another common claim: one that depicts vulnerability to vulnerability depicts that one claim: common another to attention our turn now us Let While most of the literature emphasizes the risk of violence of risk the emphasizes literature the of most While Pakistan’s turbulent history follows a similar trajectory. The country’s two, short-lived experi that finding the with correspond volume this in discussed countries several surface, the On Jana Andolan 11 As noted above, transitions to new authoritarian regimes in Cam movement successfully managed to place constitutional place to managed successfully movement change after . This largely quantitative lit quantitative largely This . a regime transition has transition regime a 12 ------

197 | Violence and Regimes in Asia 198 | Violence and Regimes in Asia tives for political elites to fan nationalist sentiments. By defining a clear “other” in ethnic terms, ratization and violence. Scholars have often claimed that transitions to democracy create incen liberalization. Yet they also challenge the most commonly proposed causal link between democ on rebelgroupsandpolitical dissidents. crackdowns state-led with correspond often takeovers authoritarian Instead, rare. relatively is Thailand, and Pakistan in frequently observed those as such coups, military after mobilization coup-makers try to time their intervention for when they expect resistance to be limited—popular because higher—and is repression state of risk the and rule authoritarian to transitions during cessions from the process. Because opportunities for this kind of renegotiation are more limited incentivize preexisting rebel organizations can to they use violence First, in effect. order to dual obtain more a favorable have con to appear openings structural These policies. redistributive state’s the and relations, center-periphery forces, armed the of influence the as such polity, the as violentstaterepressionabatesfollowingademocratic transition. escalation of violence in these separatist conflicts indicates rebels’ increased ability to fight back elites, electoral by instigation instrumental than More rule. authoritarian under infrastructure organizational necessary the amassed have who rebels, by violence of use the of risk perceived retreat. coercive state’s the of context the in occurs often hand, other the to mobilize high levels of repression to suppress challengers. The process of democratization, on zation process is not entirely surprising given that, by definition, authoritarian regimes are able of authoritarianrule. Myanmar typically began during, continued throughout, and persisted after protracted periods island of Java. that shifted a large proportion of natural resources from these regions to the densely populated strategy governance centralized highly a developed regime Order New the when character ular pop more a on took provinces these in domination Jakarta’s with discontent elite initial This rule. authoritarian under state Indonesian the to annexed forcefully were provinces these after during the ‘70s and the ‘80s. Similarly, armed rebellions in Papua and East Timor were launched province the in wars guerilla unsuccessful two waged had GAM 1998, in transition democratic province that evolved into the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in 1976. about the role of Islam in the newly independent state prompted a nationalist movement in the disagreements but struggle, nationalist Indonesian the in role pivotal a played Acehnese The regime. Order New the by adopted policies economic and social discriminative the as well as that resource-rich provinces of Aceh, Papua, and East Timor were integrated into the nation-state, rebel organizationslongpredatedemocratictransitions. of formation initial the and conflicts these of heart the at grievances actual the liberalization, mentalist perspective. While violence may have escalated in the immediate aftermath of political for armed conflicts. communal hatred for instrumental reasons after a transition can also lead to mass mobilization Stoking elections. win to needed support popular gathering of chances their improve can elites Moments of democratization also provide opportunities to renegotiate structural features of The fact that the intensity of violence in these conflicts only escalated during the democrati For example, the causes of three separatist civil wars in Indonesia can be located in the way political of periods in rise can conflict armed of risk the that claim the support cases These 15 As in Indonesia, regional rebellions in Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and 13 The history of armed conflicts across Asia problematizes this purely instru 16 This can reduce the reduce can This 14 Long before the ------to be navigating a similar path towards regional autonomy in a fledgling electoral democracy. electoral fledgling a in autonomy regional towards path similar a navigating be to elite support for rebel organizations. Although it is quite early in the process, Myanmar appears after the democratic transition have prevented a serious escalation of the conflict by undercutting Indonesia’s restive Papua province, a and series of Mindanao local-autonomy of and revenue-sharing island concessions Philippine the as such resolved, fully been not has conflict separatist where Even Nepal). (in federalism full-blown even and rebels, former of participation political negotiated peace agreements that include extraordinary autonomy concessions, guarantees of free tably Nepal and Indonesia (Aceh), have made concerted efforts to resolve these conflicts through movements, mostno separatist with long-standing groups. Indeed,transitioncases with rebel settlements negotiated reaching for opportunities unique provide to appear also they conflicts, conflicts often take the form of riots that cause large-scale loss of human life, economic damage, with thelevelofdemocratic competition. run through virtually all Asian countries, the mode in which they are expressed seems to evolve particular the in time over shift perceptible a create to appears consolidation democratic However, violence. of Regime evolutionandviolence likely toreducemilitarydeploymentandseekanegotiated settlementforpreexistingconflicts. serve to reduce the overall perceived risk of future separatist demands. This makes leaders more mands. de similar make to groups other encourage not will group rebel one to concessions making for a negotiated settlement for protracted armed conflicts once they are sure that their “reputation” democracies may very well run through decentralization. Political leaders are more likely to seek renegotiation. for up longer no are polity the of features fundamental where democracies, long-standing in parties different between concessions of horse-trading for opportunities provide they such, As table. the on life political about questions fundamental a mutuallyagreeablesettlement. accumulate the necessary negotiation experience to engage in dialogue on difficult issues to reach rebel groups, and with very violent consequences. In contrast, elites in transitioning democracies over victory military outright sought have they consequence, a As order. constitutional of rules the follow to refuse who rivals with negotiating in practice little have democracies older that democracies, andwhetheritisthecaseinotherregionsaswell. been more effective at negotiating peace agreements with rebel groups than have long-standing negotiations. More research is needed to understand why transitioning democracies in Asia have sides use more force while they can to help them establish a more favorable fait accompli for the agreements with rebels. They also heighten the risk of violence in the short term, however, as both Lanka, havemostconsistentlysoughtmilitarysolutionstosettletheirinternalconflicts. In contrast, it is striking that Asia’s two oldest and least interrupted democracies, India and Sri While democratic openings can provide incentives for escalation of violence in long-standing In developing democracies, where electoral competition is beginning to open up, communal levels on bearing direct a have Asia in transitions regime nor type regime neither Overall, new in settlements peace reaching for pathway political reliable most the finally, and Third put transition democratic of Moments matters. also environment structural the Second, is explanation behavioral a First, thoughts. preliminary three are here point, starting a As Democratization processes in Asia have clearly opened opportunities for arriving at political 18 Given that it often goes hand in hand with democratic reform, devolution of power may forms of violence used in these conflicts. Although ethnocommunal fault lines fault ethnocommunal Although conflicts. these in used violence of 17 in ways that may not be available be not may that ways in - -

199 | Violence and Regimes in Asia 200 | Violence and Regimes in Asia gradual decline in the incidence and impact of riots. But it is also correlated with the emergence in determiningsubnationalpatternsofviolence. multiparty democracy. In India as in Indonesia, local electoral considerations played a key role genuine a towards dominance Party Congress of decades from transitioning was country the power. ical of polit deck the reshuffle might decades three in time first the for elections free of advent the how about anxieties local in rooted much very were provinces eastern country’s the in months for lasted that riots Christian-Muslim centers. urban its in minority Chinese ethnic the against and displacement. In its early transition period, Indonesia experienced multiple communal riots offenses that vigilantes seek to punish. Violent punishment of beef eaters in India has spurred has India in eaters beef of punishment Violent punish. to seek vigilantes that offenses often manage these fears by appeasing vigilantes with stricter regulation and enforcement of those religiously charged vigilantism create fears of escalation into larger conflagrations. State agents of episodes frequent violence, communal of history long a with countries In ways. two in work can lobbying This reforms. “liberal” these of some on back push to lobbying violent of form a making large-scaleriotsariskystrategyforreasserting dominance. agents, state of oversight judicial growing and scrutiny society civil greater with associated are rights. minority of extension the reject and resist who increase violence against these newly protected groups by conservative elements in the majority countability for government officials in terms of protecting vulnerable groups. This can, ironically, an improvement in the rights of ethnic and social minorities as well as a heightened level of ac in riots and rise in vigilante violence. First, strengthening of democratic institutions brings about behavior, bypunishingindividualinfractionsofadominantcommunalorder. their adjust to minorities forces hand, other the on Vigilantism, population. Rohingya nority groups as a collective, as most tragically seen in recent pogroms against Myanmar’s Muslim-mi regime. Order these groups are often denounced as colonial accomplices and beneficiaries ofthe repressive New country, Muslim-majority the in rights constitutional equal guaranteed being Despite stigmas. confrontations with Pakistan. military multiple during and Kashmir in insurgency protracted the to reference with Muslims Congress Party, they have continually and vociferously called into question the “loyalty” of Indian Hindu nationalists in India did not win their initial constitutional battle against secularists in the get groups that lack clear political standing in foundational political settlements. large-scale violencesuchasriotsandgroupclashes. of forms other from casualties than higher times three be to estimated is violence vigilante of victims of number the phase, consolidation democratic current Indonesia’s During violence. vigilante of targets frequent also are homosexuals and sorcerers, alleged suspects, Criminal “deviant.” deem they that Islam within sects of activities on crackdowns deadly and worship of houses non-Muslim on attacks violent through boundaries communal police to sought ingly vulnerable Muslimminority. beef and the sale of cows for slaughter, in effect most of its victims have been members of India’s 2010. since individuals accused of eating beef by members of “cow protection groups” have been on the rise on attacks vigilante India, In violence. communal of form prominent more a as vigilantism of Second, the increase in electoral competition can create incentives for using vigilantism as vigilantism using for incentives create can competition electoral in increase the Second, Democratic consolidation produces two sets of changes that explain this concurrent decline Vigilantism in these consolidating democracies is similar to riots in the sense that both tar increas have groups vigilante where Indonesia, Muslim-majority in mirrored is trend This a with corresponds cases these in democracy multiparty competitive, of consolidation The 19 21 Likewise in India, Hindu-Muslim riots peaked during the mid-to-late ‘90s when ‘90s mid-to-late the during peaked riots Hindu-Muslim India, in Likewise Although the immediate issue in these attacks is to prevent the consumption of consumption the prevent to is attacks these in issue immediate the Although 25 Riots contest these political settlements by eliminating or displacing minority displacing or eliminating by settlements political these contest Riots 24 Indonesia’s Christian and Chinese minorities have faced similar 20 22 26 At the same time, these developments these time, same the At 23 Even though - - - - - vigilante organizations exist and electoral competition is high, vigilantes can provide a coercive multiple where situations in However, bloc. voting conservative a of wing extreme the resent against atheistsandallegedblasphemers,makingfuturereformdifficult. governments to reevaluate religious ( sexual preferences. Even in Bangladesh and Pakistan, and recent attempts code by dress democratically elected as such behavior social regulates and worship to freedom minorities’ restricts that legislation issue to continue politicians national and local both as era, transition the from achievements rights human key the of many back rolled has action vigilante rising Indonesia, in Similarly, consumption. for cows of sale the ban that regulations government local of host a riots becomerelativelyrare. large-scale as even vigilantism, as such violence of forms quotidian to vulnerable increasingly become to seem also they consolidate, democracies As constitution. democratic a of aegis the a lack of recent experience at negotiating with rebels and bringing them out of the cold and into settlements’ terms. those shape to tactics violent for and settlements new for both opportunities opening violence, given electoral consent. Furthermore, democratic transitions have double-edged implications for capacity necessary state to govern of through kind a mix the of inherited performance and or coercion built instead of either through have freely they because but se, per dictatorships are they because stability impressive attain sometimes not do dictatorships Similarly, peace. sustaining and establishing for necessary settlement political of kind the by accompanied always not are most importantfactorsinshapingviolentvs.peacefuloutcomes. correlation between levels of democracy and levels of conflict. Nor are these regime features the simplistic any to reduced be cannot these Yet violence. of patterns on effects identifiable have regime that argued have we report, this In features. regime to connected be way some in not would violence of patterns that unthinkable Conclusion have beenenactedbyelectedofficialsfrommainstreamratherthanIslamistparties. Indonesia in regulations moral and religious new of majority a why explain helps This agenda. ideological their serve that ways in policy public shape to them allows also It resources. state with elected representatives, especially local chief executives, enables vigilante groups to access “insurance” against possible use of violence by other candidates. Maintaining strategic alliances issues. religious on mobilization mass through others damage and religious identity is a factor, vigilante organizations can boost the credentials of certain candidates parties. mainstream major, from candidates to advantage Vigilante groups often lack the numerical strength to affect electoral outcomes, as they rep Finally, older democracies might, counterintuitively, become more violent over time due to they because but se, per democracies are they because violent become not do Democracies One of the most significant political features of any country is its regime type. It is therefore sharia ) regulations have triggered a spate of vigilante attacks types , regime , transitions 28 During election campaigns where campaigns election During 29 In others they can provide can they others In , and regime and , 27 evolution 30 all -

201 | Violence and Regimes in Asia 202 | Violence and Regimes in Asia Table violenceandconflictinAsia typesandlevels 1.Regime of Afghanistan Timor-Leste Bangladesh Philippines Cambodia Indonesia Sri Lanka Myanmar Mongolia Malaysia Pakistan Thailand Nepal India High Medium Low Democracy- open Recent PolityIV Full democracy Full democracy Open anocracy Open anocracy Open anocracy Open anocracy open anocracy open anocracy open anocracy classification Democracy - Democracy - In transition In transition Democracy Democracy Democracy Democracy Democracy Democracy Regime characteristics anocracy (6-4) (6-4) (-88) (6-4) (10) (8) (8) (6) (6) (5) (8) (9) (2) (2)

Military-dominant Military-dominant Military-dominant independence personalistic personalistic authoritarian Single party Single party Single party Single occupation- None since theocracy Monarchy Military- Military Military Military Type of Type of regime Soviet party- party None None civil war National National/transnational National political conflict terrorism national Trans and autonomy Separatism Subnational Large-scale Large-scale ideological communal conflicts and * Rankingsare basedonthelast 15 yearsandare relative toother Asian countries. Local political conflict and electoral electoral violence resources and resources Local conflict community Local rights over and violence Urban crime

203 | Violence and Regimes in Asia 204 | Violence and Regimes in Asia Authoritarian Leviathans Authoritarian in SoutheastAsia book His Chicago. of University the at faculty the on years twelve spending after Michigan, of University the at (WCED) Democracies Emerging 2013). Herpublicationscanbefoundat: of the National Violence Monitoring System program at the World Bank’s Jakarta office (2008- sub-national patterns of order and disorder. argues that legacies of authoritarian state-building interact with democratic politics to produce she Indonesia, in fieldwork extensive and data quantitative original on Drawing democracies. new in vigilantism of entrenchment and rise the investigates project dissertation Her Asia. Southeast in violence political and democratization comparative in interested is She Chicago. authoritarianism onTwitter at@SlaterPolitics. Fiji, and Pakistan. He comments regularly on the contemporary global politics Ethiopia, of as democracy and such cases in demilitarization and democratization to related challenges on work consulting international done has he Asia, Southeast Beyond 2010. in series Politics parative Dan Slater is Professor of Political Science and incoming Director of the Weiser Center for Center Weiser the of Director incoming and Science Political of Professor is Slater Dan of University the at Science Political of Department the in candidate PhD a is Jaffrey Sana https://chicago.academia.edu/sjaffrey

Previously, Sana led the design and implementation was published in the Cambridge Studies in Com in Studies Cambridge the in published was Ordering Power: Contentious PoliticsandContentiousPower:Ordering Sana Jaffrey Dan Slater . - 3 2 1 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 Notes Societies Huntington, P. Samuel 20, no.1(1995):5–38. War,” of Danger the and tion Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratiza (London andNewYork:Routledge,1993). Conflicts Ethnic Protracted of Studies Case lation: eds., O’Leary, Brendan and McGarry John 1985); Press, California Conflict Horowitz, L. Donald 1977); Press, Comparative Exploration Lijphart, Arend 401–25, doi:10.1177/0022002708315594; Lars-Erik doi:10.1177/0022002708315594; 401–25, Resolution Conflict of Journal Anocracy,” Unpacking War: Civil on Regime cal Politi of Effect “The Vreeland, Raymond James jod.2007.0002. of Democracy Thomas Carothers, “The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy,” 161–76; 2007), Peace, of Institute States United DC: (Washington, Aall Pamela and Hampson, Osler Fen World agement in a Divided Century,” in Emerging Democracies Go to War in the Twenty-First Why Transitions: “Turbulent Snyder, Jack and field Mans D. Edward Carothers. and Snyder and field See especially the “sequencing debate” between Mans (Clayton, Victoria:MonashAsiaInstitute,1990). and CivilSociety inIndonesia gence Organisations in the Indonesian State,” in Intelli Ambition: Totalitarian “The Tanter, Richard Press, 2010). in SoutheastAsia Leviathans andAuthoritarian Politics Contentious Slater, Dan 2003); Press, versity Building in Burma Callahan, P. Mary (New York:CambridgeUniversityPress,2010). Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War 2016); Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, print ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, ViolencePolice:StateCoercive and Institutions Sheena Chestnut Greitens, 143216. (2007): 1–23, doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.101405. Order,” Political and Repression “State Davenport, Christian reissue ed. (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011), 155–92. Handbook of War Studies in War,” Civil and “Democracy Strand, Håvard and Hegre, Håvard Gleditsch, Petter Nils 33–48; (2001): 1992,” 1816– War, Civil and Change, Political Democracy, Peace? Civil Democratic a “Toward Hegre, Håvard polityproject.html 2017, 24, August accessed website, Peace Systemic for Center Project,” Polity “The see information, more For competition. ment, constraints on executive authority, and political recruit executive of qualities on based institutions governing in authority autocratic and quality cratic demo of measure used widely a is score Polity The American Political Science Review Science Political American (Berkeley, Calif., and London: University of University London: and Calif., (Berkeley, Annual Review of Political Science Political of Review Annual (NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1968). Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Man 18, no. 1 (2007): 12–27, doi:10.1353/ 12–27, (2007): 1 no. 18, The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regu Conflict Ethnic of Politics The Democracyin Plural Societies: A (New York: Cambridge University Cambridge York: (New . Making Enemies: War and StateEnemies:Warand Making http://www.systemicpeace.org/ (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Uni Cornell York: New (Ithaca, Political OrderinChanging (New Haven: Yale University Dictators and Their Secret Dictators , ed. Manus I. Midlarsky, I. Manus ed. , , ed. Chester A. Crocker, A. Chester ed. , International Security International , ed. Arief Budiman Arief ed. , 52, no. 3 (2008): 3 no. 52, Ordering Power:Ordering Ethnic Groupsin Competitive Competitive 95, no. 1 no. 95, 10, no. 1 no. 10, Journal Journal State , re , ------

16 15 14 13 12 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 Rule Violence: Indonesia’s TransitionfromAuthoritarian Yuhki Tajima, ington, DC:WorldBankPublications,2005),35–58. gions Analysis Indonesia,” in Aceh, in Rebellion and “Resources Ross, L. Michael Press, 2009). lion inAceh, Indonesia Edward Aspinall, Norton &Company,2000). Conflict Nationalist and tization Snyder, L. Jack 16, no.2(2016):191–217,doi:10.1017/jea.2016.6. Post-Suharto Indonesia,” in Violence of Flows and Ebbs The Subside: Conflicts Large “When Varshney, Ashutosh and Jaffrey, Sana tem (NVMS) and CAVR data, as cited in Patrick Barron, Estimates based on National Violence Monitoring Sys doi:10.1177/0022343310368336. Research Peace of Journal Evidence,” Empirical War: Civil and ratization “Democ Krebs, F. Lutz and Hug, Simon Cederman, forthcoming). Post-Apartheid SouthAfrica in of Democratic StateFormation the Contradictions Nicholas R. Smith, University Press,2004). Indonesia Jacques Bertrand, 3/4 (2010):26–41,doi:10.2307/41804075. isms,” National Compromised “Three Varshney, Ashutosh doi:10.1017/S0010417514000267. in SocietyandHistory Indonesia,” in Nationalism Godly Intolerance: “Productive Menchik, Jeremy tice-by-numbers/ 2017, 12, January Numbers,” by “Justice Jaffrey, Sana after-2014-2014 related-violence-since-2010-are-muslim-97-attacks- www.indiaspend.com/cover-story/86-dead-in-cow- Attacks After 2014,” 97% Muslim; Are 2010 Since Violence Cow-Related In Dead “86% Rao, Ojaswi and Abraham Delna UK: CambridgeUniversityPress,2006). India in Riots Ethnic and Competition Wilkinson, I. Steven S0007123415000423. Science ical Indonesia,” from Lesson A Transition: Democratic in Riots Ethnic and petition Oxon: Routledge, 2007); Risa J. Toha, “Political Com ratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars Klinken, van Gerry UK: CambridgeUniversityPress,2009). Separatist Conflicts Are So Violent Walter, F. Barbara Cambridge UniversityPress,2013). mocracy inIndonesia Horowitz, L. Donald (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2014). , ed. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (Wash India International Centre Quarterly Centre International India , vol. 2, vol. , (Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge 47, no. 3 (2017): 631–51, doi:10.1017/ 631–51, (2017): 3 no. 47, Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Understanding CivilWar: Evidence and The Institutional Origins of Communal Europe, Central Asia, and Other Re Other and Asia, Central Europe, . From Voting toViolence: Democra Islam Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebel . Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in http://www.newmandala.org/jus Resisting Rights: Vigilantism and IndiaSpend Communal Violence and Democ Communal Reputation and Civil War: Why War: Civil and Reputation Constitutional Change and De Constitutional (Cambridge, UK, and New York: Votes and Violence: ElectoralVotes andViolence: . (Stanford: Stanford University 56, no. 3 (2014): 591–621, (2014): 3 no. 56, Journal ofEastAsianStudies 47, no. 4 (2010): 377–94, (2010): 4 no. 47, (Oxford University Press, British Journal of Polit Comparative StudiesComparative , June 28, 2017, , 1st ed. (Cambridge, (New York: W. W. W. York: (New New Mandala (Cambridge, (Abington, 37, no. 37,

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205 | Violence and Regimes in Asia 206 | Violence and Regimes in Asia 29 28 27 Christian governor was indicted on blasphemy charges where the province’s first non-Muslim, ethnic-Chinese, As observed recently in Jakarta’s gubernatorial elections, and-electoral-politics-in-indonesia/ 2016, 5, Indonesia,” in politics electoral and power “Street Fauzi, Ali Ihsan and Jaffrey Sana speech-in-south-asia/a-38675677 blasphe Asia,” South in speech free muzzling of way new tions—the Shamil Shams and Arafatul Islam, “Blasphemy allega DW my http://www.newmandala.org/street-power- - , May 3, 2017, 3, May , allegations-the-new-way-of-muzzling-free- http://www.dw.com/en/ New Mandala New . . , April April , - 30 (Cambridge, UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2016). Activists andthe StateinDemocratizingIndonesia Michael Buehler, html?mcubz=1 asia/jakarta-election-ahok-anies-baswedan-indonesia. 2017, Election,” Tinged ligiously Re in Defeat Concedes Governor “Jakarta Cochrane, Joe see information, more For judiciary. the and police the including officials, law-enforcement sured pres that mobilization vigilante-led of months after https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/19/world/ . The Politics of Shari’a Law: Islamist New York Times York New , April 19, April , - -

208 | Conflict and Antiminority Violence Antiminority Violence Conflict and tremism, recognizing the danger of militancy to state security. Government forces killed L-e-J killed forces Government security. state to militancy of danger the recognizing tremism, and hasdeclinedto137in 2017. Anti-Shia violence peaked in 2012 and 2013, with 507 and 558 killed in each year, respectively, with al-Qaeda. affiliated groups jihadist international more and L-e-J as such groups focused domestically between links growing the and Afghanistan in many by gained training military-style the both reflected This attacks. of lethality and number the in rise a causing Afghanistan, from hedeen Shia. targeted have decade past the over incidents of majority the 1980s, and 1970s the in communities both affected gatherings other and processions of bombing the and mosques, against attacks assassinations, SSP. While of offshoot an (L-e-J), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi been has organization anti-Shia contemporary rious noto most the recently, More TJP). or Pakistan, (Tehrik-e-Jafaria Movement Shi’a Pakistan’s Pakistan’s Army of the Prophet’s Companions (Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, or SSP) and the (Shia) (Sunni) the been have perpetrators main The minority. Shia the and majority Sunni the tween The violence resources, andpoliticalcontestation. and land over competition ideologies, extremist legacies, historical areas: these in violence the societies to radicalism and communal violence. I find that four overlapping phenomena explain all of susceptibility the illustrating respectively, majorities, Buddhist and Hindu, Muslim, with in Myanmar, with additional cases cited for comparative purposes. in Pakistan, anti-Muslim violence in northeast India, and anti-Muslim (anti-Rohingya) violence protracted, antiminority violence, making particular reference to to three prone arenas: been anti-Shia have violence areas some why examine I follows, what In time. over and Asia of regions substantial variation exists in the incidence and lethality of communal violence across different political contestation, the vagaries of economic development, and extremist ideologies. As a result, have left some regions prone to violence, yet the incidence of attacks has waxed and waned with legacies historical other and Colonialism majority. national the represent to claiming izations continues to afflict many parts of Asia. In some areas, minorities face attacks by militant organ Introduction Chris Wilson There are signs that the Pakistani government is taking a more forceful approach to ex to approach forceful more a taking is government Pakistani the that signs are There be clashes sectarian numerous of scene the been has Pakistan decades, three past the In violence,” “communal called often communities, religious or ethnic two between Fighting 3 Sunni extremists have assassinated Shia professionals, bureaucrats, and judges. 4 2 Sectarianism increased markedly with the return of muja of return the with markedly increased Sectarianism 1 These three arenas are states - - - - - have have become internally displaced amid accounts of serious human-rights abuses by both soldiers began, approximately 65,000 Rohingya have fled Myanmar to Bangladesh, and another 25,000 2016 by a militant Rohingya organization named Harakah al-Yaqin (HaY). Since this operation launched a large-scale crackdown on the community after an attack against police posts in October Bangladesh. dred and displaced more than 130,000 Rohingya to camps in Rakhine hun or across the border several into killed have riots deadly of series a then, Since liberalized. politically country the Rakhine State has occurred periodically over the postcolonial era, and has surged since 2012 as Myanmar. but arefree,fornow,fromlarge-scaleviolence. vulnerable, remain areas Bodo in Muslims violence. use to incentive little have now militants former means Assam western in elections local in Front People’s Bodoland BLT-linked the of victory The 2016. August in Kokrajhar in market a against attack terrorist a launched it after since late 2014. NDFB–Songbijit remains at arms, but has been damaged by a security crackdown anti-state activityisabsent. as long so continue to violence communal allow to prepared appears government national The agreement, a 2003 since conflict insurgency-related in decline major a Despite fight. to continued has Songbijit, faction, NDFB one government, the with settlement a reached have factions NDFB (BLT) fought for a separate state within India or complete secession. While the BLT and several Tigers Liberation Bodo the and (NDFB) Bodoland for Front Democratic National the notably its roots in a Bodo insurgency against Assamese dominance. Several Bodo militant groups, most 1970s. late the of Movement Assam anti-foreigner the since indigenous tribe from the plains of Assam. Anti-Bengali sentiment has been prevalent in Assam an group, ethnic Bodo the from organizations militant been have perpetrators main The vasis. Adi as known laborers tea indigenous struck another and origin, Bengali of Muslims targeted have Two incidents). violent smaller numerous with (along 2012 since minorities of massacres and criminalkillings. violence, continues to lack effective policing and remains mired in high rates of sectarian, ethnic, SSP), charged with inciting violence against and killing Shias. renamed (the Jammat Wal Sunnat Ahle of leader the Farooqi, Aurangzeb as such free, remain leader Malik Ishaq in 2015 and arrested many extremist clerics. The current situation facing the Rohingya in western Myanmar is perilous. Security forces Security perilous. is Myanmar western in Rohingya the facing situation current The Buddhist-majority in Muslims Rohingya against violence is here discussed case third The killing mass communal large-scale no with stabilized, has Assam western in situation The Assam, one of the “Seven Sister States” of India’s Northeast, has been the site of three large 10 8 Violence between the Rohingya and the local Buddhist Rakhine (or Arakanese) in Arakanese) (or Rakhine Buddhist local the and Rohingya the between Violence 11 minorities, particularly Muslims, continue to suffer intimidation and violence. and intimidation suffer to continue Muslims, particularly minorities, 9 6 7 However, the recent violence has violence recent the However, Karachi, a leading site of anti-Shia 5 Yet, leading anti-Shia militants - -

209 | Conflict and Antiminority Violence 210 | Conflict and Antiminority Violence Partition, but as conservative Sunnis began to demand restrictions on Shia festivals and Mu and festivals Shia on restrictions demand to began Sunnis conservative as but Partition, faced thepoliticaluseofnewblasphemylaws. and government and service civil the from excluded were whom of many minorities, against discrimination institutionalized has This legitimacy. generate to Islam of strain conservative 1970. until election countrywide first its hold not did country The state. the unify to forces few left Bengal and Punjab between ethnolinguistic communities, in Pakistan, a lack of popular participation and a regional schism to devolution through ensured was unity and India, in legitimacy provided democracy Where authoritarianism. towards it pushed Pakistan in party political longstanding a of absence the in waiting,” the Congress fostered political stability and decentralized democracy in India, while the same could not be said of the All India Muslim League in Pakistan. in 1947. The Indian National Congress already possessed deeply entrenched roots in society, but ferent paths. This was partly a consequence of the different political situation of the two countries area, leading to tensions that embroiled the state with the onset of the Assam Movement in 1979. ment. the farms of Shia landowners, establishing the foundation of class on division and laborers economic became resent India from Sunnis unskilled many Punjab, Pakistani In displaced. people million 20 the of many for destination the became Gujarat) India’s (near Pakistan southern in areas. Locations such as Assam in India’s Northeast (near what is now Bangladesh) and Karachi religious minorities: the Partition of 1947. The legacy of Partition is felt most strongly in border nities allcreatedivisionsandtensionsthathelpexplaincontemporaryviolence. institutional decisions by the first independence-era leaders, and past violence between commu peoples, of movement the decolonization, and Colonialism Asia. in minorities against violence Historical legacies violence inAsia:historicallegacies,extremistideologies,landandresources,politics. next sections examine several factors that have played a central role in stimulating antiminority The Asia. in countries many in tensions majority-minority in involved sensitivities political the San Suu Kyi in Myanmar or Narendra Modi in India have failed to condemn attacks, illustrating and anti-Rohingya violence in Myanmar in 2012. Leading national political figures such as Aung cases they have actively participated, as during anti-Muslim rioting in Gujarat in India in 2002 back. stood sometimes have forces security other and police attacks, during victims protecting of Instead blurred. is action militant and state between line the cases many in lence, vio communal to party a not theoretically is state the While paltry. been often have sentences have, they when perpetrators; the against charges or cases pursued not have often authorities state and Local unharmed. groups other leaving community, particular a of children and en, wom men, attack perpetrators targeted: and indiscriminate both often is killing The civilians. main displaced, face the danger of further violence, and are being deprived of humanitarian aid. greater political mobilization and assertiveness on the part of Shia. The year 1979 was a turning common. In response, the government more put restrictions became on Shia processions, violence which led 1970s, in turn and to 1960s the in processions mourning) of month (the harram and Rakhine villagers. Rakhine and It was in this context that anti-Shia violence in Pakistan emerged. Attacks were rare before rare were Attacks emerged. Pakistan in violence anti-Shia that context this in was It Despite their common origins in Partition, within a decade India and Pakistan had taken dif against attacks contemporary to relevant history important an share India and Pakistan A range of legacies from the colonial and early independence eras play a role in contemporary are violence communal of casualties most demonstrate, chapters country individual the As 14 In Assam, the 1971 Bangladesh War of Independence drove many more refugees into the 12 Many of the approximately one million Rohingya still in Myanmar re Myanmar in still Rohingya million one approximately the of Many 16 Pakistani leaders were forced to turn to military rule and a and rule military to turn to forced were leaders Pakistani 15 Effectively a “government 13 In other In ------point in sectarian relations in Pakistan, as it was in much of the Islamic world. The success of success The world. Islamic the of much in was it as Pakistan, in relations sectarian in point goals for successive governments. Many became the leading sources of mujahedeen fighting mujahedeen of sources leading the became Many governments. successive for goals of proliferation The ideologies. nationalist and religious extremist of emergence the to contributed have stage, Ideology acting onbehalfofbenefactorsinPakistanandSaudi Arabia. extremists, Islamist as Muslims portrayed similarly have Myanmar and Assam in Nationalists border. the across infiltration terrorist of discourse political longstanding a and Pakistan to ity proxim state’s the by explained be partly can 2002 in Gujarat in riots anti-Muslim The states. rival of proxies are they that accusations to vulnerable minorities left have legacies Historical border intoEastPakistan(Bangladesh). the across pushed were thousands of tens and rebellion, low-intensity a fought State Rakhine in Muslims II, War World after years the In periodically. resurface that hatreds engendered have Myanmar western in Rohingya and Rakhine between massacres and clashes past kistan, to removethenamesoftensthousandsillegalimmigrantsfromelectoralrolls. the killing of 2,000 people in the 1983 Nellie Massacre, part of the Assam Movement’s campaign Assam have been the main victims of a series of insurgencies in in the Muslims state. Myanmar), This in was Rohingya epitomized the by (like Bangladesh from infiltrators” “illegal as Derided been caught up in a larger struggle of the Assamese, and then the Bodos, against the Indian state. both bitterness and proven repertoires of violence. In Assam, Muslims of Bengali origin have long have beenthemainvictimsofcontemporaryviolence. period. However, migrants who moved to the region during the colonial and postcolonial periods protested and fought against state political and economic repression for much of the postcolonial have elsewhere and Manipur, Nagaland, Assam, in groups indigenous where northeast, the in case the been particularly has This autonomy. further pursued have minorities and diversity, ities there have also faced violent persecution. State boundaries do not fully reflect the country’s occupation, andmanyofthesegroupswentontobecomeleadinganti-Shiamilitants. The Pakistani and Saudi governments provided support to jihadist militants fighting the Soviet also increased anti-Shia sentiment in Pakistan. 1979 also saw the Soviet invasion of Iran Afghanistan. of influence growing This funding. of sources new with organizations Shia local provided and identity, political and confidence renewed a Pakistan in Shia gave Revolution Iranian the Tensions between groups at the domestic level, as well as rivalries on the international the on rivalries as well as level, domestic the at groups between Tensions Ongoing interstate rivalry has also played its part in stimulating violence against minorities. Pa and India in violence later for precedents established Partition during killings as Just Past conflict continues toplay a causal role in contemporary attacks against minorities, leaving India’s reliance on ethnolinguistic federalism has also proved problematic, and many minor madrasas (religious schools) in Pakistan served domestic and foreign policy foreign and domestic served Pakistan in schools) (religious - - -

211 | Conflict and Antiminority Violence 212 | Conflict and Antiminority Violence resources, and unequal access have been just some of the phenomena creating tension between of extraction large-scale with associated abuses rights human land, communal of propriation ex the degradation, Environmental competition. and contact into communities brought have peoples of movement the and growth Population resources. and land over clashed have Asia in Land andresources “national races,”despitehavinglivedintheregionfor generations. Myanmar’s of one as recognized not are Rohingya law. national into written is discrimination claims to citizenship and rights of residence. Such claims are also made in Myanmar, where this other groups refer to Muslims in the region as Bangladeshi infiltrators so as to cast doubt on their and Bodos Many insurgency. and protest of decades after won region autonomous an to threat military repression that led to the violence. Bodo militants see Muslims as the main demographic it was the latter group’s desire for self-determination and freedom from Assamese hegemony and Despite the religious difference between Bengali-originMuslims andpredominantly Hindu Bodos, highly discriminatory legislation through the national parliament restricting interfaith marriage. push helped Tha Ba Ma population. the of percent 4.3 just comprising Muslims showed which point toa rising Muslimproportion of thepopulation,a claim undermined bythe2014 census, stance takenbygovernments andmigrantgroups. bureaucratic legalistic, more the and resources and land of ownership customary of standings under indigenous between disjuncture a from arisen also have Disputes Asia. in communities well-resourced madrasas.” Quetta. and Balochistan in bombings deadly including Shias, against violence contemporary worst the ganization and the emergence of the more radical L-e-J, which has been responsible for some of or the of splintering the to led factionalism Internal Union. Soviet the fight to Afghanistan to mujahedeen and sending ideology extremist of dissemination Arabia andinvolvedinthe Saudi the organizations with overt anti-Shia rhetoric emerged during the early 1980s. One leading group, extremist Several sectarianism. of driver a became also they Yet Kashmir. and Afghanistan in as a physical and cultural threat and dehumanizing them as “mad dogs.” “mad as them dehumanizing and threat cultural and physical a as identity of Myanmar. a advancing virulent anti-Muslim ideology. in role key a played have Wirathu, Ashin monk the by led Myanmar), of ciation carriage inGodhra. train a in immolated were activists VHP after Muslims, mostly 2,000, roughly another killed set off several months of violence, killing approximately 2,000 people. In 2002, riots in Gujarat demolition The Temple. Ram the of site old the on built been have to considered Ayodhya, in 1992, the VHP and RSS led thousands of activists in the destruction of the Babri Masjid mosque In areas. many in violence for climate a creates rhetoric This nation. Hindu the of integrity the to threat a and Pakistan of agents as Muslims portrays discourse Hindutva Muslims. and tion integrity of the Hindu nation, in practice this leads to strident rhetoric aimed at illegal immigra and strength the on focused apolitical, as itself describes RSS the While violence. communal in Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), has played a leading role Hindutva supremacism, associated with right-wing Hindu nationalist groups such as the Vishva

Similar to communal violence in other regions of the world, such as Africa, ethnic groups ethnic Africa, as such world, the of regions other in violence communal to Similar The violence in Assam has been driven more by ethnonationalism than religious extremism. Asso (Patriotic Tha Ba Ma and 969 Myanmar, in organizations nationalist Buddhist Two India, In countries. non-Muslim in violence in role a played also have ideologies Radical SSP, demanded that Shias be declared a non-Muslim minority. The group was funded by funded was group The minority. non-Muslim a declared be Shias that demanded SSP, 17 As International Crisis Group puts it, L-e-J has “umbilical links with [Karachi’s] large, 20 The movement has spread provocative propaganda casting the Rohingya 18 19 The two groups emphasize protecting the Buddhist culture and 21 Buddhist extremists Buddhist - - - - - been placed on other vulnerable minorities. In urban areas, competition for resources is no less sources of land expropriation lie with government, military, and corporate interests, blame has government assistance, ownership, and other land resources. to In both claims Assam and legitimate Rakhine, have therefore, while then the real will they races, national Myanmar’s of one as resources. and land traditional their on encroach Rohingya the Rakhine, many For State. Rakhine in Rohingya the against violence the to relevant are dynamics Similar violence. recent the to gave many support the explains migrants from Bangladesh and elsewhere in India. A desire to protect what remains of that land new of arrival the for and Guwahati, in capital the for plantations, for land traditional their of much of Bodos the stripped have state the and actors corporate independence, Since violence. politics in South and Southeast Asia. Politics middlemen, violentmilitias,andcriminalrackets. ethnic and religious communities compete for state services, a contest often conducted through numerous of violence—members anti-Shia frequent of site example—the for Karachi, In fierce. lationships with leading political parties. In some cases, there is little separation between the between separation little is there cases, some In parties. political leading with lationships vincingly, andperformingbestinareaswiththeworstviolence. the by led government, state the violence, anti-Muslim the after Immediately example. contemporary more a provide above, discussed riots, Gujarat 2002 The violence. to lead can outbidding” “ethnic such how of exemplar the as seen often is 1950s the in Lanka Sri in Tamils and Sinhalese between violence minorities often stem from competition for political power among factions of the majority. The by other means,” used to unite the majority and cow minorities into submission. Attacks against wealth andconnections,the traditionalroutesintopolitics. vehicle for Sunnis to challenge Shia political power. emerged deeply engaged in the political process. Militant groups such as L-e-J became the primary militant organizations have entered alliances with political parties. In Punjab, anti-Shia activism interests, theyhavenotfacedsuchlarge-scalekillings. to it. In other states in India, where Muslims have not formed political parties to represent their order police to protect minorities when they support the party in power or present no challenge to likely more are governments state India, in riots of study his from concluded has Wilkinson a political party predominantly representing Muslims of Bengali descent, the AIUDF. As Steven tonomous area. At the state level, the ruling party in Assam was facing a growing challenge from as itbecameclearthemilitants’partyhadlostalocal seatinthenationalparliament. first (and largest) of these killings occurred as preparations began for local elections, the second The Muslims. by led coalition a from dominance political this to challenge a quashed violence The end. an to insurgency group’s the bring to agreement peace a of part as established region autonomous newly a in power political hold leaders group’s That BLT. the of members and-file connections between the close BJP and the right-wing of nationalist organizations example such one as just the VHP is and case RSS. Gujarat The movement. a of wings political and militant The loss of traditional land was central to the Bodo insurgency and to their more recent more their to and insurgency Bodo the to central was land traditional of loss The Sectarianism has long been tied to national politics in Pakistan, where both Sunni and Shia Bodo au of the politics local the to not onlyconnected were attacks againstMuslims These In Assam, recent attacks against Muslims were carried out by ostensibly demobilizedrank- re beneficial mutually enjoy often minorities against attacks conduct that groups Militant An extensive body of literature has demonstrated the links between communal violence and

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) scheduled a state election, winning con winning election, state a scheduled (BJP) Party Janata Bharatiya 22 24 Many are concerned that if the Rohingya are recognized are Rohingya the if that concerned are Many For some, riots against minorities have become “politics 23 25 Religious rhetoric became a substitute for - - -

213 | Conflict and Antiminority Violence 214 | Conflict and Antiminority Violence the lack of democratic institutions and free media to provoke tension as a way of surviving the surviving of way a as tension provoke to media free and institutions democratic of lack the during years of dictatorship. The second, more compelling, explanation is that elites manipulate up pent been have that animosities on act to space the have finally groups that is first The this. democracy, and decline as the country stabilizes. There are various theoretical explanations for Political violence can peak as a country’s political system moves from authoritarianism towards to protestsbyBuddhistnationalists. leading cards”) “white (through rights voting temporary given been had Rohingya some 2010, again demonstrated when the group was disenfranchised in the lead-up to elections in 2015. was In Rohingya the against prejudice of nature political The state. the leave Rohingya the that demanded two The Party. Development Nationalities Rakhine the from politicians and ference saw meetings between militant Buddhist monks from the All-Arakanese Monks however, Solidarity Con violence, of outbreak serious more far and next the preceding months The Rakhine woman. a of rape a of rumors to reaction spontaneous a been have may violence 2012 June over decades of repressive and discriminatory treatment by the military regime in Yangon. The political parties. The easing of restrictions on dissent also enabled Rakhine to express frustration gence of a more militant strain of Buddhism and brought militants together with newly competing national politics in Yangon. The new space afforded by political liberalization allowed the emer their utilityforregionalgoalshasdeterreditfromfullycrackingdownonthem. While the government has disassociated itself from these groups’ sectarianism within Pakistan, gatherings. public of bombings by replaced were Assassinations fatalities. of number the in calization of sectarian relations that followed saw an increase in attacks against Shias and a rise Kashmir. Sectarianism in Pakistan increased as militants returned from Afghanistan. The radi of control Indian destabilizing and Afghanistan in influence retaining as such goals, regional of pursuit in assistance for return in groups militant to support provided ISI) Agency, ligence Sunni-Shia relations. that Shias were supported Sunnis by extremist Iran, led by to increased claims violence. The and Iran-Iraq mobilization, war further This polarized Shias. by protests large to led regulations, a of imposition around 2002. stabilized state the until democratization, rapid of onset the and Suharto President of nation transition. as a way of deflecting criticism of ongoing authoritarian rule. authoritarian ongoing of criticism deflecting of way a as The The anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar demonstrates the volatile nature of political transitions. and Rakhine in politics local both to linked is Rohingya the against violence Myanmar, In Intel Inter-Services the notably (most government Pakistani the of elements addition, In Haq ul Zia President by use its was Islam conservative of rise the to important Particularly 29 Indonesia saw a similar increase in communal violence following the 1998 resig 1998 the following violence communal in increase similar a saw Indonesia zakat tax (a Quranic tax, later abandoned), blasphemy laws, and sharia-related and laws, blasphemy abandoned), later tax, Quranic (a tax 26 Several policies, including the including policies, Several 28 27 - - - - -

interstate rivalry have helped provide the conditions for contemporary communal violence. Yet dominated byamajoritygroup. governments national and state of hands the at injustice faced both have Myanmar in Rakhine the and Assam in Bodo The discrimination. and repression long-standing of end receiving the on been previously have minorities against violence of perpetrators leading the of Some alized. margin politically and economically are which of both communities two between occurs often Conclusion namics simultaneously. dy reinforcing mutually these of all address that strategies local and national comprehensive require will violence communal in reduction Any difficult. exceedingly them against campaign quash the demands of minorities. The political connections of many militants to make intimidation any and effective violence of use the to leading lines, group along patronage by determined remains resources of distribution The society. of fabric the in extremism enmeshes further ers acquired political utility in the current day. The exploitation of these divisions by political lead have past distant the in origins with Divisions Asia. in intractable remains minorities against violence why reason one interconnected, closely contestation—are political and resources, and remain aperiodofheightenedrisk. campaigns Election campaigning. election or elections of backdrop a against place 2014—took Assam and 2012, Myanmar 2002, killings—Gujarat largest the of Some violence. communal of scale the determine can context political that demonstrate here discussed cases Several ism. extrem religious as important as been have power political and identity, land, over tensions for example, or violence against Muslims of Bengali origin in both Myanmar and Assam—ethnic by younger, more vocal actors. In some cases however—attacks against Hazara Shia in Pakistan, leaders. As time goes on, these religious leaders must of grow influence increasingly radical communal to avoid and being political superseded the increases but politicians, for useful just not is rhetoric extremist societies, divided religiously In India. in ideology Hindutva and Pakistan in Wahhabism of case the in as extremism, religious been has this Often here. discussed lence domestic legitimacyinPakistan. descent into authoritarianism and the cultivation of radical Islamic groups for regional goals and of violence against minority groups. Other factors have been influential, most notably the rapid Partition and ongoing state rivalry, but the latter has continued to experience much higher levels ironclad path dependencies. India and Pakistan are illustrative in this regard: both experienced the variation among states in the level of violence suggests these phenomena have not established The legacies of colonialism and decolonization, the large-scale movement of peoples, and peoples, of movement large-scale the decolonization, and colonialism of legacies The Several common patterns emerge in violence against minorities in Asia. Communal violence The four main phenomena—historical legacies, extremist ideologies, competition over land vio the of much for justification and tools mobilizing the provided has ideology Extremist 30 - - - - -

215 | Conflict and Antiminority Violence 216 | Conflict and Antiminority Violence [email protected] East Asia Research Violence in Indonesia Ethno-religious of author the is He Asia. in particularly conflict violent researches He gram. pro Studies Terrorism and Conflict of Master’s university’s the of coordinator and Auckland, Chris Wilson is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of University the at Relations International and Politics in Lecturer Senior is Wilson Chris , Indonesia, and andonTwitterat@ChrisWilson_NZ. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics Ethnic and Nationalism and articles in articles and Democratization . He can be reached at , Pacific Affairs Pacific Chris Wilson From Soil toGod: From , South chris. - 5 4 3 2 1 10 9 8 7 6 Notes tremism in Pakistan,” in tremism Ex Violent and “Insurgency Weinbaum, G. Marvin sect-killing.htm www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/ Asia Terrorism Portal, accessed June 26, 2017, South 1989–2017,” Pakistan: in Violence “Sectarian 30, no.1(2007):141. Violence,” Islamic of Face Ever-Changing the and Pakistan in Conflicts Sectarian of Evolution “The Grare, Frédéric See theaccompanyingchapteronPakistan. three countries. these in attacks violent face also groups other Many mar%E2%80%99s-rohingya csis.org/analysis/separating-fact-fiction-about-myan International Studies, February 13, 2014, and Strategic for Center the of website Rohingya,” Myanmar’s about Fiction from Fact “Separating ing, 15 the from Many Muslims lived in Rakhine’s Kingdom of Mrauk-U https://www.soas.ac.uk/sbbr/editions/file64276.pdf letin of Burma Research Spoken in the Burma Empire,” reprinted in “A Comparative Vocabulary of Some of the Languages Rooinga, or natives of Arakan.” See Francis Buchanan, themselves call who and Arakan, in settled long have who “Mohammedans, meeting reported Company, Trading India East the with surgeon a Buchanan, Francis 1799, In indigenous. considered be to groups before 1823, the Myanmar government’s cutoff date for Rakhine in lived Rohingya that evidence also is there 19 the during administration colonial Bengali laborers who moved to Burma under the British from descended are Many State. Rakhine Myanmar’s in concentrated minority Muslim a are Rohingya The 998–1020. Law,” of Northeast India: Local Ethnic Autocracy and the Rule in Stability Political of Problem “The Lacina, Bethany Liberation FrontofAssamandthesecurityforces. clude violence by non-Bodo groups such as the United ings.htm states/assam/data_sheets/insurgency_related_kill http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/ 2017, 25, June accessed Portal, Terrorism Asia South 1992–2017,” Assam in killings related “Insurgency 305. with 2014 and 392 with 2009 as such however, years, high-casualty by punctuated been has decline steady This 2012. in 91 and 2006, in 174 2004, in 354 There were 758 in 2000, followed by a steady decline to gency-related killings in Assam peaked at 783 in 1998. insur Portal, Terrorism Asia South the to According Manak Publications,1993). Class,IdeologyandIdentity Movement: Hussain, Monirul See rolls. electoral the on placed been and Bangladesh from Assam entered had migrants illegal of thousands of tens that claims The Assam Movement emerged in 1979 in response to asia/pakistan/284-pakistan-stoking-fire-karachi 19, 2017), in Karachi Fire International Crisis Group (ICG), 28, no.1(2017):48. . It is important to note that these totals in totals these that note to important is It . Asian Survey South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south- th to the 18 the to . , Asia Report no. 284 (Brussels: ICG, (Brussels: 284 no. Report Asia , th Small WarsInsurgenciesSmalland centuries. See Gregory B. Pol B. Gregory See centuries. 49, no. 6 (Nov.–Dec. 2009): (Nov.–Dec. 6 no. 49, 1, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 40–57, . Despite this history of history this Despite . Pakistan: Stoking the Stokingthe Pakistan: th https://www. century, but century, The Assam SOAS Bul (Delhi: http:// . - - - - - .

20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 Mikael Gravers, “Anti-Muslim Buddhist Nationalism Buddhist “Anti-Muslim Gravers, Mikael See theaccompanyingchapteronMyanmar. ICG, Grare, “SectarianConflicts,”130. Ibid., 100. no. 1(Fall2004):98. Asia,” South in Building State and “Decolonization Bose, Sumantra Grare, “SectarianConflicts,”131–132. See theaccompanyingchapteronBangladesh. Feb2017.pdf ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/MM/FlashReport3 Report 2016 October 9 since Myanmar from fleeing Human Rights (OHCHR), for Commissioner High the of Office Nations United See theaccompanyingchapteronMyanmar. in August2017. was written before the outbreak of violence in Rakhine essay This immigrants. Bengali illegal as derided also are India of citizens longtime where Assam, in used is terminology Similar Bengalis. as Rohingya the to with nationalist organizations within Myanmar, refers residence in Rakhine, the Myanmar government, along and Cambodiaforexample. Bangladesh on chapters the See countries. several in As the individual country chapters show, this is the case W.W. Norton&Company,2000). tion and Nationalist Conflict Snyder, Jack Ibid., 136. Grare, “SectarianConflicts,”140. Zia assumedpowerina1978coupd’état. Grare, “SectarianConflicts,”132. (London andNewYork:Routledge,2007). andDemocratization Indonesia:in SmallTownWars Press, 2004); Gerry van Klinken, University Cambridge York: New and (Cambridge India in Riots Ethnic and Competition Electoral Wilkinson, Steven 1996); Press, olence inSouth Asia Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Vi Tambiah, Stanley 2003); Press, Washington India Contemporary lence in Brass, Paul ICG, owning land. from disallowed being Rohingya the despite is This Ibid., 14. Contemporary Buddhism Identities,” Endangered of Imaginaries Globalized and Violence Religious Lanka: Sri and Burma in Karachi Karachi (OHCHR, February 3, 2017), 3, February (OHCHR, . The ProductionofHinduMuslimVio , 9. , 5. From VotingtoViolence: From Democratiza Journal of International Affairs International of Journal (Berkeley: University of California 16,no.1(2015):13. Interviews with Rohingyas (New York and London: (Seattle: University of University (Seattle: Votes and Violence: Communal Violence Communal http://www. Leveling , Flash 58, - - -

217 | Conflict and Antiminority Violence 218 | Cross-Border Insurgency and Terrorism in Asia and Terrorism inAsia Cross-Border Insurgency ing both regional and global players. The willingness of nation-states to undermine and distract in Asiathepost–WorldWar IIyears. insurgency of leitmotifs recurring been have independence or autonomy tribal for movements ethnic of rise the and insurgencies communist by disaffection hill-tribe of co-opting the both seek to extend their administrative writ and military security. Often playing out in border areas, typically that plains the of civilizations agricultural settled the and communities tribal upland warlike, often hardy, between conflict traditional been has One drivers. political modern more of fightersandmunitionsacrossremotefrontiers. organizations, these cross-border crime networks have often played a vital role in the movement greater sophistication and extended reach. Either subsumed into or cooperating with insurgent by characterized enterprises criminal transnational into developed frequently have networks traditional such era, modern the In profit. and connectivity economic for conduits familiar as serve nation-states divide that barriers natural borderlands, inhabiting clans and families local For ethnicity. common and terrain challenging of interplay the from emerged invariably have communities acrossborderlinesoftenarbitrarilyimposedintheageofEuropeancolonialism. of rebel movement by state security forces; and the human geography of shared ethnicity, binding ching factors: the physical geography of inhospitable terrain, which impedes effective interdiction insurgency incentralIndiatodaywillfaceasimilardeclineintopoliticalirrelevance. and ethnic revolt in Pakistani Balochistan. If its current trajectory is any yardstick, the communist Philippines the and Malaya in campaigns communist of fate the was Such defeated. ultimately been denied or failed to develop cross-border connectivity, they have typically been isolated and returning to fight Soviet and Afghan communists. Conversely, where insurgent campaigns have in the 1980s, when U.S.-backed Afghan mujahedeen rested and reequipped inside Pakistan before Viet Minh regiments of Ho Chi Minh were trained and resupplied in southern China; it was true success in post–World War II Asia. This was powerfully illustrated in the early 1950s, when the gaps and tensions between national jurisdictions has been a critical element of their survival and Introduction Anthony Davis A second crucial driver of cross-border insurgency has been geostrategic competition involv At the same time, patterns of cross-border insurgent activity have also been conditioned by smuggling and trading cross-border of traditions century-old beyond, and Asia Across Typically, the cross-border dynamic in insurgent campaigns has been facilitated by two overar The ability of insurgents and terrorists to move easily across international borders and exploit - - ghanistan andPakistanhas usheredinaneraofwarandterrorseeminglywithout end. Af both for that chain-reaction catastrophic a triggered invasion Soviet the threat, existential an as Islamabad from Seen war. proxy into escalate tensions cross-border saw 1979 in Kabul since. ever insecurities its fueled and Pakistan haunted has irredentism Pashtun of specter the Line, of sharedreligion. bonds tenuous the by only together bound state diverse ethnically an Pakistan, new-born and India truncated behind left 1947 in retreat British rivalries. geopolitical bitter of seeds held the also logic same the But Raj. British the for sense strategic made power Pashtun of tion bifurca the and Line Durand the India, British towards Russia czarist of expansion southern against buffer a as country that of utility the and Afghanistan, all conquer to inability ifest Afghanistan. them named and Indus the and Oxus the between territories the 18 whose tribes Pashtun or Afghan independent fiercely the by inhabited lands the severed also It border. the policing effectively power either of possibility the precluding terrain, daunting most world’s the of some through cut Line” “Durand The 1893. in delineated first was border km 2,400 The nation-states. both of viability very the question into called have that ethnicity divided of problems intractable—by rendered arguably underpinned—and critically been has conflict of violence inborderregionsbeenbroughttogetherwithsuchextremeandfar-reachingresults. political persistent exacerbating and underlying factors the of many so have world the in else described as a “perfect storm” of cross-border insurgent and terrorist activity. Arguably nowhere Afghanistan-Pakistan the challengecanbemetand,inatleastsomecases,heldcheck. how about much says them differentiates what time, same the At above. noted issues common the of many illustrate regions diverse culturally and topographically These Indonesia. and sia, the Thai-Malaysian frontier; and the maritime, tri-border zone between the Philippines, Malay Bangladesh; and China, Myanmar, with borderlands northeastern India’s zone; border kistan cross-border insurgency and terrorism at their most immediate. These are the Afghanistan-Pa insurgent threatsisatitslowest. in contain to state targeted a of capacity military and administrative the where regions peripheral out played has dynamic this Typically, era. modern the in insurgency Asian of politics the to fundamental been has revolts domestic to borders across support extending by powers rival Fanned by a succession of Afghan rulers in Kabul who have refused to recognize the Durand theater “Af-Pak” the in dynamic cross-border the terrain, harsh of backdrop a Against Since the late 1970s, the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier zone has witnessed what can fairly be In contemporary Asia, there are four regions where governments confront the challenges of 2 The Soviet Union’s ill-fated intervention to prop up an embattled communist regime in regime communist embattled an up prop to intervention ill-fated Union’s Soviet The th century confederacy led by Ahmad Shah Durrani had conquered had Durrani Shah Ahmad by led confederacy century 1 Given a man a Given - - - - -

219 | Cross-Border Insurgency and Terrorism in Asia 220 | Cross-Border Insurgency and Terrorism in Asia resistance by Afghan Islamist factions of the mujahedeen, supported financially and logistically objective ofbringingafriendly TalibangovernmenttopowerinKabulremains alive andwell. government in Kabul. Amidst the Western-backed chaos the on both to sides of threat the critical Durand Line, a the poses Pakistan military’s now that resurgence countrywide a staged have has continued to provide sanctuary for the “good Taliban”—its Afghan protégés—who since 2005 people. The conflict, still ongoing, has cost tens of thousands of lives and displaced well over one million campaign ofterroristbombingsandattacksincitiesacross thecountry. savage a unleashed it resistance, army tentative first at of face the In country-wide. law sharia impose and Afghanistan in cousins Pashtun their of success earlier the emulate to sought TTP the forces, tribal Pashtun FATA-based of coalition powerful but loose A (TTP). Pakistan iban strikes and the weakening of traditional tribal leadership, finally gave birth to the Tehreek-e-Tal launchpad forinternationalterrorslowlytookshape. belt, where Pakistan’s military was unwilling to challenge tribal writ, an organizational hub and Pashtun autonomous the of vastness mountain the In (FATA). Areas Tribal Administered ally Feder Pakistan’s of sanctuary the Pakistani—to and Asian, Central Chechen, jihadists—Arab, foreign of flight the consequence unintended an as had Kabul from al-Qaeda of uprooting the sought to manipulate and control. The toppling by U.S.-backed forces of the Taliban regime and of a process of terrorist blowback that saw Pakistan falling victim to the very jihadist forces it had which culminatedonSeptember11,2001,withal-Qaeda’sassaultAmericaitself. attacks, terror of wave escalating an plot to which from base perfect the organization al-Qaeda leader Mullah Mohammad Omar and exiled Saudi jihadist Osama bin Laden provided the latter’s and safeguarditsgeostrategicinterestsalonganexposedwesternflank. of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan promised to secure Pakistan’s connectivity to central Asia establishment The Kabul. seized finally zone, border the of madrasas the from fighters kistani Pa of thousands and ISI the by backed movement, Taliban Pashtun-dominated The objective. primary and third its secured finally ISI that factions, mujahedeen divided ethnically between war civil bitter a of midst the in 1996, until not was it But 1992. in forces mujahedeen by Kabul and Pashtun,sympathetictoIslamabad. regime, Pakistani strategy was driven by the need to install in Kabul a pliant regime, both Islamist factions. And for good reason: beyond expelling the Soviets and ousting the Afghan communist Intelligence Directorate (ISI) maintained control over the flow of munitions to the various Afghan Inter-Services military’s Pakistan the However, China. and Arabia, Saudi States, United the by The army struck back with an unprecedented series of incursions into the tribal agencies. tribal the into incursions of series unprecedented an with back struck army The By 2008, the rise of jihadist extremism in the FATA, exacerbated by a campaign of U.S. drone Al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks confounded Islamabad’s Afghan strategy and marked the beginning Taliban between compact fateful a 1996, in Forged however. short-lived, was victory The of capture the with second the 1989; in withdrawal Soviet with fulfilled was goal first The Between 1979 and 1989, Soviet and allied Kabul-government forces faced nationwide guerrilla 4 But even as the military has pummeled the so-called “bad Taliban” of the TTP, the ISI the TTP, the of Taliban” “bad so-called the pummeled has military the as even But 3 - - - challenges of assimilating into the fabric of a new nation-state a patchwork of ethnically and ethnically of patchwork a nation-state new a of fabric the into assimilating of challenges Pradesh, andnotleast,thelargestmostpopulousstate,Assam. Arunachal Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland, states: seven all in campaigns violent launched have union, Indian the within autonomy greater or from secession either ing seek groups, insurgent of proliferation startling a years, the Over Hills. Naga the in authority government restore to in called first was army Indian the when 1956, since conflict persistent Northeast India were killed. The Indian response was immediate, hard-hitting, and unprecedented: heliborne unprecedented: and hard-hitting, immediate, was response Indian The killed. were troops Indian 30 nearly which in Manipur, and Nagaland in patrols security Indian on attacks Committee orCorcom. ULFA and its Assam-based allies, and an alliance of Manipuri factions known as the Coordinating with along (NSCN), Nagaland of Council Socialist National the of faction a together brings tion Southeast Asia (UNLFW). Based in Myanmar’s upper Sagaing Division, the umbrella organiza West of Front Liberation United so-called the alliance, rebel new a of 2015 in establishment the supported extent some to and sponsored have to appears also Beijing market. grey China’s on arms purchase and Province Yunnan in offices liaison maintain to factions several permit nan. Later,left-leaningManipurirebelsweretrained inTibet. northern Myanmar to the Chinese border in 1967 and was given training and weaponry in Yun vulnerabilities in the northeast. The first of a series of Naga insurgent contingents trekked across Bangladeshi militaryintelligence. by documents travel and houses safe with provided were (ULFA), Asom of Front Liberation United the notably rebels, northeastern government, League Awami pro-Indian the by 2009 after imposed crackdown a Until emulate. to was Zia, Khalida then-premier of administrations in erstwhile East Pakistan. It was a tradition that independent Bangladesh, under the nationalist onwards, Naga, Manipuri, and Mizo rebels were all provided sanctuary, training, and weaponry of India’s internal discords has long been a strategic reflex, not least in the northeast. From 1962 and exhaustthesubcontinent’sdominantpower. military and logistical support, India’s neighbors have seldom missed opportunities to destabilize and geostrategic power play. As insurgents have looked beyond India’s borders for sanctuary and unrest tribal domestic of interplay pernicious a to vulnerable been has it west, and south the to With Chinese Tibet to the north, Myanmar to the east, and Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) Bhutan. and Bangladesh between corridor 22-kilometer-wide narrow, a by “mainland” Indian the to connected km sq. 255,037 of appendage territorial far-flung a is today region The 1824. of War Anglo-Burmese First the to back date that rivalries geostrategic regional, unremitting, inflamed thesituation. ment, while heavy-handed counterinsurgency operations and military impunity have perennially resent fanned further have immigration illegal rampant and neglect, political unemployment, Underdevelopment, identities. their to threats social and demographic emerging by alarmed Christian, Hindu, diverse communities—hilltribesandplainspeople, and animist— religiously Northeastern insurgency and its terrorist offshoots have been fundamentally rooted in the in rooted fundamentally been have offshoots terrorist its and insurgency Northeastern seen has northeast India’s insurgencies, ethnic of web diverse most world’s the to Home The UNLFW’s April 2015 launch was followed in May and early June by lethal, cross-border to continues but training, military direct providing in circumspect more is China Today, Following the Sino-Indian border war of October 1962, China, too, moved to exploit India’s For Pakistan, weaker in conventional military terms than its giant neighbor, stoking the fires by impacted profoundly been has northeast the in insurgency however, time, same the At 5 - - - -

221 | Cross-Border Insurgency and Terrorism in Asia 222 | Cross-Border Insurgency and Terrorism in Asia Myanmar territory. Recent Indian ambitions to promote economic connectivity with Thailand with connectivity economic promote to ambitions Indian Recent territory. Myanmar inside just Valley Kabaw the in camps established have rebels Manipuri while 1950s, the since insurgents Naga Indian for haven safe provided have south, further Tract Somra rugged and the border, the and River Chindwin the of headwaters the between hills the tribals, Naga by populated Sparsely Manipur. and Nagaland, Pradesh, Arunachal opposite Division Sagaing in for granted. It marked the culmination of decades of Indian frustration over “ungoverned space” taken be longer no could border the along restraint Indian event—that the after only informed were reportedlykilled. rebels 100 and 50 between where Myanmar inside camps UNLFW two on assaults commando Kelantan and Kedah. At another, a legacy of mistrust between security officials on both sides of eastern portion of the 646.5 km land border with Malaysia that have sustained BRN’s insurgency. the across linkages been has it terms, logistical and operational in But Indonesia. from largely in anetworkofreligiousschoolsthatconstitutethecrucible oflocalMalay-Muslimidentity. embedded deeply organization politico-military a and secrecy operational of level remarkable a of means by violence the sustained has BRN 1990s, the during preparation underground of years After BRN. as known better Front, Revolutionary National Patani-Malay the it: driving organization the of nature the from primarily derives campaign current the of persistence the threat tonationalsecurity. major a constitutes now It 2004. in reerupted it since lives civilian mostly 7,000 over claimed has violence the Songkhla, of parts and Narathiwat and Yala, Pattani, of provinces three the persistence of the conflict. Characterized by widespread bombings, shootings, and arson across insurgent violenceinthe1970sand1980s low-level into spilled discontent political religion, and culture own its to loyalty proud a with community Malay a assimilate to attempts aggressive often of failure the by Driven Bangkok. in governments for irritant recurring a been has provinces border southernmost Thailand’s in Thailand-Malaysia narcotics andweaponsmuggling.TheepicenterofthecrimewavehasbeenManipur. cross-border and extortion involving criminality into descent dizzying a and NSCN, Naga the interrelated factors: splits and setbacks suffered by mainstream organizations such as ULFA and raised incountlessdiplomaticencounters. move decisively against Indian rebels has become a to source efforts of perennial token frustration occasional in than New more Delhi, make to reluctance its years, recent in Indeed, Sagaing. upper over control effective exert to needed resources the committing in interest little had has only madetheissueofinsurgentpresencemoreurgent. and mainland Southeast Asia through northern Myanmar—the so-called “Act East” policy—have At one level, ties are underpinned by strong ethnic, cultural, and linguistic affinities with affinities linguistic and cultural, ethnic, strong by underpinned are ties level, one At The party’s political and ideological roots, transmitted through many of those schools, derive Beyond the failings of Bangkok’s policies of assimilation and a legacy of deep Malay mistrust, In sharp contrast, the current insurgency reflects a major escalation in both the intensity and For decades following World War II, separatist sentiment among the Patani-Malay minority two of result the as insurgency in decline relative a seen has decade past the India, Inside Hard-pressed by insurgencies posing far greater threats, Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw, The Indian counterpunch appeared to serve notice on the Myanmar government—which was 6 7 Thai MuslimsfromNarathiwat. they would surprise narcotics traffickers. In the event, they found a large bomb factory and three impression the under Narathiwat, in Bai Tak from border the across District, Mas Pasir of area rural a in building a raided police Malaysian 2009, December in when, rest to firmly laid were this over Doubts period. 2007–2012 the in campaign IED the of tide high the during ticularly for largedevicesof20kgandabove). sives (typically used in mining) and occasionally Malaysian cooking-gas tanks (used as containers included cheap Nokia mobile phones for remote triggering, as well as power-gel emulsion explo have components These insurgency. the of tactic core a constituted have killings, targeted with along which, (IEDs), devices explosive improvised for parts component of sourcing the in role military facilities to seize arms in 2002–2004. Nevertheless, Malaysia has played an important as possible sources munitions from within the Patani region, as seen in raids on government and of theirownsecurity,seniorBRNleadersareunlikelytoholdmeetingsinsideMalaysia. government have not been forgotten in Malaysian party circles. the by “facilitated” process peace a into leaders BRN reluctant strong-arm to 2013 in Efforts them. detain or coerce to necessary, deemed when guests—and, their manipulate to the DPPandadrivingforcebehindrevolt. in figure powerful most the was 2010 in Malaysia in death his until who Uttarasin, Romli and spiritual figurehead, who fled Thailand in 2004 and diedparty’s inthe his lateBasor, seventiesSapae-ing inbeen Malaysiahave in 2016; examples Notable Malaysia. through pass regularly or in reside who council, executive or (DPP), Parti Pimpinan Dewan nine-man or eight- BRN’s of the border, where well over 100,000 Patani Malays are working. These have included members for sanctuaryandlogisticalsupport. insurgency the to important remains soil Malaysian aware, well are governments both as ever, relations and effectively precluded the possibility of official support from Malaysia to BRN. How sia arrested four key leaders and handed them over to Thai authorities—have repaired strained insurgent factioninthe1970sand1980s. leading the (PULO), Organization Liberation United Patani the supporting by reciprocated Lumpur Kuala complicity. military Thai over Malaysia in suspicions persistent arousing iwat, Narith and Salient Betong Thailand’s of jungles the in bases secure maintained (CPM) Malaya of Party Communist insurgent the 1989, and 1960 Between role. a played also has border the The Malaysian side of the border has also afforded security for actual IED production, par production, IED actual for security afforded also has border the of side Malaysian The As an armed organization, BRN has consistently stressed a policy of self-reliance, and as far and monitor to both sought have services intelligence and security Malaysian Predictably, of south sanctuary from benefited have commanders military and operatives political Both The surrender of the CPM in 1989, and the military collapse of PULO in 1998—when Malay 8 Intensely wary of their hosts, and conscious - - - - -

223 | Cross-Border Insurgency and Terrorism in Asia 224 | Cross-Border Insurgency and Terrorism in Asia lenges acting belatedly to mitigate long-standing, interstate frictions. Not least of these have been evolution of ASEAN as a cooperative regional body and a recognition of common security chal slow the are today Only jurisdictions. national across coordination and cooperation security of mands ofmaritimesecurity. de the by overwhelmed essentially been have forces security Manila’s archipelago, Sulu the of overstretched combating aggressive, land-based insurgent threats on Mindanao and the islands Already constraint. basic a been long has air, the in and sea the on both resources, state of lack lies likealineofsteppingstoneslinkingtheZamboanga peninsula,onMindanao,toSabah. is the Sulu archipelago—the Philippine island provinces of Basilan, Jolo, and Tawi-Tawi—which stretches from the Philippine island of Mindanao to Indonesia. Separating the two bodies of water Sea, which Celebes the Malaysia, and Sabah inEast and Philippines in the Visayas the between southern Philippines. the of zones insurgent active the with Indonesia and Malaysia of states majority-Muslim the connects that zone tri-border the in weapons and terrorists of movement the in lies Asia east jihadist activity isagainbeingassessed. global of focus a as emergence region’s the which in narrative, similar strikingly a to years later, the military collapse of the Islamic State’s “caliphate” in Syria and Iraq is giving rise stan, Southeast Asia was identified as the “second front” in the new global war on terror. Fifteen Philippines-Malaysia-Indonesia years hasproliferatedbeyondBRN’scurrentoperationalnetworks. 13 over that expertise bomb-making dangerously, less no and, firearms available readily both for market black a as Thailand southern to looking cells IS Malaysian of likelihood the in today co-opted byISinterlopersfromsouthoftheborder. being elements “rogue” of prospect the against heavily weighs networks military its of nature clandestine tight-knit, the while tactics, terrorist and ideology Salafist IS’s to opposed mentally funda remains BRN organization, an As links. organizational such any of forging the against on possible links into southern Thailand. However, BRN’s own ideology and objectives militate media governments andnews of attention the have focused in Malaysia cells self-starter spired Resource constraints have been compounded by longstanding political distrust and a lack a and distrust political longstanding by compounded been have constraints Resource Effective policing of the tri-border region has been complicated by three factors. First, a stark lying Sea, Sulu seas—the two on centers region tri-border the unpoliced, largely and Vast South in threat terrorist the countering in challenges salient most the of one now, as Then Within months of 9/11 and the U.S. intervention to uproot al-Qaeda sanctuaries in Afghani As seen by Malaysian intelligence sources, the real danger of cross-border connectivity resides IS-in of emergence the and region the in State Islamic the of profile rising the Predictably, 9 ------Philippines seekingworkinSabah,onlyunderscorethescaleofproblem. of mostly unregistered migration, involving several hundred thousand people from the southern Badjau, and Yakan—has paid little or no attention to international boundaries. Recent patterns Samal, groups—Tausug, tribal local between commerce sea-borne of tradition centuries-old a to the constraints imposed on governments by concerns over resources and national sovereignty, which in recent decades has facilitated the movement of insurgents and now terrorists. In contrast the insurgencyofseparatistMoroNationalLiberationFrontin1970s. Manila’s claim on Sabah in east Malaysia—which is still outstanding—and Malaysian support for state-to-state relations. of nature specific the other, the social; and physical terrain, is One conflict. prolongs and bates Nevertheless, two variables emerge as drivers of a cross-border dynamic that invariably exacer with those underpinning the disaffection of Muslim communities oncommon the islandsin of the Sululittle Sea. have FATA Pakistan’s and Afghanistan southeastern of borderlands the in culture and tactics, and, not least, the roots of conflict. Social and political forces fueling violence insurgent activity examined here reflect obvious dissimilarities in geography, ethnicity, military Conclusion of operationsthanSulu. area wider far a offers terrain mountain where Mindanao, central to archipelago Sulu the from fighters. It also reflected a potentially decisive shift in the insurgents’ center of operational gravity a well-planned, sustained campaign, and that is willing to entertain the participation of foreign in operations coordinated before never had that groups jihadist of coalition new a of pabilities intelligence sharingandoperationalcoordinationinthetri-borderzone. jihadist groups that had sworn allegiance to IS came as a sharp goad to governments to ramp up Philippine of coalition a by City Marawi of mid-2017 seizure The Philippines. the in territory of connectivity between Indonesian and Malaysian terrorist cells by and posed Moro insurgents dangers with specific control the and ideology, jihadist to Asia Southeast archipelagic of abilities between thetwostates. both Manila and Kuala Lumpur, while underscoring the stark inadequacies of naval coordination than any other insurgent group in the tri-border region, the ASG has alarmed and embarrassed from commercial shipping as well as from tourist resorts in Sabah, Palawan, and Davao. hostages high-value seized have raiders ASG annually. dollars of millions worth enterprise an on Christian communities. At the same time, the ASG has transformed kidnap-for-ransom into army have been supplemented with the bombings and beheadings of jihadist terrorism targeted Philippine the against operations in capabilities guerrilla Impressive mix. fluid and virulent a in tactics criminal and terrorist, insurgent, together bringing in adaptive uniquely itself proven Sayyaf Group(ASG). Abu the offshoot, extremist its and MNLF the both in roles leadership dominant played have the impositions of Christian-run central government in Manila. to resistance fierce of history a and piracy and smuggling for proclivity a underpinned long has A second factor has been a history of economic and social connectivity in the tri-border region, Stretching Stretching from the Hindu Kush to the western Pacific, the four zones of major, cross-border ca the audience region-wide a to powerfully demonstrated city the of siege protracted The The rise of IS as a global jihadist brand has only highlighted the social and religious vulner has ASG the Basilan, and Jolo of islands Sulu the on mainly based and 1991 in Founded mobility maritime of tradition a archipelago, Sulu the of Tausugs warlike the of case the In 10 In recent decades, Sulu Tausugs 11 More - - -

225 | Cross-Border Insurgency and Terrorism in Asia 226 | Cross-Border Insurgency and Terrorism in Asia by allthreeparties:KualaLumpur, Bangkok,andBRN. understood well are rules ground Unspoken revolt. the supporting covertly of intention no has it clear made has it border, the of south activities BRN down” “close to desire the nor capacity the neither has government Malaysian the While relationship. beneficial mutually and broader Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur have learned simply to side-step the conflict in the interests of a far an important cross-border dynamic that has had less negative impact on state-to-state relations. work. Indeed, in the case of the Patani conflict, itwould be difficult to find another insurgencywith frame collegial and cooperative ASEAN’s by constrained significantly been has Asia Southeast Lahore occurringonaweeklybasis,thesituationhas neverbeenworsethantoday. to perceived Pakistani counter aggression. With horrific bombings ofa civilian targets in Kabul, Quetta,as and soil its on (JuA) ul-Ahrar Jamaat as such factions terrorist TTP of activities the to eye blind a turning involved has that recently, Most proxies. terrorist own its to turning and itcontinuestodosotoday. Afghan proxies, mujahedeen violence by proxy actors in a savage downward spiral. For decades, Pakistan’s ISI has supported in constraining cross-border insurgent movement; it actively promotes competitive cross-border toxic nature of relations between Islamabad and Kabul not only precludes effective cooperation variable in the severity of cross-border conflict dynamics. At one end of the spectrum, the viscerally that canbemitigated,butneverentirelyovercome. ronment of the Philippine-Malaysian-Indonesian tri-border region also poses security challenges problem, but will never solve it. And, in a very different geographical setting, the maritime envi the mitigating toward way some go can Line, Durand the of sides both along Americans the by given uponclose-inbordercontrol. fective) kinetic operations. By the end of their respective wars, both superpowers inef had (usually effectively for and resupply for both airpower, on dependent increasingly become to tends that undertaking expensive hugely a is movement insurgent cross-border interdicting at aimed Russians and Americans discovered in Afghanistan, maintaining in hostile mountains a presence roles incross-borderinsurgencies. borders, upland tribal peoples are by modern their very of nature predisposed dismissive to play and central or plains, supporting the from projected power state of distrustful Traditionally warlike. often and independent, tribes—hardy, hill of composed is population the cases, both In northeast. India’s of borderlands the other, the at and, Himalayas the of end one at frontier At the other end of the spectrum, the impact of cross-border insurgency and terrorism in terrorism and insurgency cross-border of impact the spectrum, the of end other the At fire, with fire fight to sought has Kabul parties, the of aggrieved more the arguably While decisive a as emerges relations state-to-state of tenor the however, studies, case four all In India faces similar if less extreme challenges in the Naga Hills. Resort to drones, as pioneered the As operations. counterinsurgency constrains powerfully terrain extreme Conversely, Extreme mountain terrain characterizes two of the zones examined: the Pakistan-Afghanistan

and Taliban, to advance its foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan, - - - forces in Sulu and Mindanao. Previously, Kuala Lumpur also tolerated on its soil the activities of government Philippine with war bitter a fueled MNLF the for backing Malaysian covert 1970s, the in while included; frontier Malaysian the borders, its all across from insurgents foreign ing been a given in Southeast Asia. Thailand has had a long tradition of accommodating or support security andintelligencecooperation.Theriskstostabilityaretodaysimplytoobigignore. expanding for catalysts powerful as acted all have alarm international wider and Marawi, for battle the depredations, ASG region-wide. terrorism potentially, and, Mindanao on insurgency relationship exists between the three states confronting the cross-border dynamics that support capitals bytheneedtobalancerisingpowerofChina. sovereignty, the wider relationship remains cordial and largely cooperative, conditioned in both returns. strategic Meanwhile, any notwithstanding Indian if raids few that brieflyoffer but pointedlynorthwest violatedfar Myanmar’s the in terrain rugged from insurgents Indian expel to campaigns Resource-costly different. altogether is calculus the however, military, Myanmar’s opment in the northeast and hopes for overland connectivity and trade with Southeast Asia. For the UNLFW poses potentially serious risks for New Delhi. It threatens both stability and devel relations with China, a revived and more cohesive cross-border insurgent threat in the shape of in New Delhi and Nayptidaw that are notably less balanced. Against the backdrop of deteriorating of thecommonthreatsposedbyjihadistterrorismtoday. context the in unthinkable be would that manner a in Thailand, from insurgents Patani-Malay It is worth stressing, however, that in the modern era these cooperative impulses have not have impulses cooperative these era modern the in that however, stressing, worth is It Notwithstanding the diplomatic baggage of Manila’s claim to Sabah, a similarly cooperative The The difficulties faced by India along its exposed northeastern flank reflect perceptionsrisk of - -

227 | Cross-Border Insurgency and Terrorism in Asia 228 | Cross-Border Insurgency and Terrorism in Asia is basedinBangkok,Thailand. He Philippines. the and Thailand, Myanmar, Pakistan, Afghanistan, in forces government and Asian region. In fieldwork over three decadesthe heacross has spent crime extended periods organized withtransnational both insurgent and terrorism, insurgency, of issues on extensively written has he group, publishing Defence Jane’s the for analyst an as later and journalist a as First China. in Nanjing, of University the at warfare revolutionary and history Chinese modern versity, Canberra, in Asian studies and Chinese language and completed postgraduate studies in Born and educated in the UK, Anthony Davis graduated from the Australian National Uni National Australian the from graduated Davis Anthony UK, the in educated and Born Anthony Davis - 5 4 3 2 1 6 Notes Struggle for Asia’s Most Volatile Frontier Volatile Most Asia’s for Struggle Bertil Lintner, and-south-east-asia/pakistan/figures-analysis 2017, 31, August accessed website, Centre Monitoring ment Displace Internal Analysis,” Figures IDP “Pakistan 1998), 43–71. Force,” in Anthony Wilson, “How the Taliban became a Military Ibid., 492. Princeton UniversityPress,1980),425–6. Dupree, Louis Cross-border Raids,” Cross-border Helicopter-borne Launches “India Davis, Anthony HarperCollins PublishersIndia,2012). the Taliban, http://www.internal-displacement.org/south- Fundamentalism Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and ed. William Maley (London: Hurst & Co., Great Game East: India, China, and the the and China, India, East: Game Great Afghanistan Janes Terrorism & Insurgency Janes Terrorism (Princeton, New Jersey: New (Princeton, (Noida, UP: . - 11 10 9 8 7 aton, Illinois:TyndaleHousePublishers,Inc.,2003). Gracia Burnham, bourne: OxfordUniversityPress,1980),22. in Philippine Politics T. J. S. George, Organization official,March2017. Author’s meeting with Malaysian External Intelligence officers, September2015. Author’s interview with BRN Information Department com/TerrorismSecurity/Display/1746057 Monitor Security Thailand,” Southern in surgency In Pains—Malay-Muslim “Growing Davis, Anthony ismSecurity/Display/1746057 Monitor , June 11, 2015, 11, June , Revolt Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam In thePresenceofMyEnemies , March 22, 2013, 22, March , (Oxford, New York, and Mel and York, New (Oxford, https://janes.ihs.com/Terror . Jane’s Terrorism & Jane’sTerrorism https://janes.ihs. . (Whe - - -

229 | Cross-Border Insurgency and Terrorism in Asia 230 | Conflict in Asia and the Role of Gender-Based Violence half the countries in Asia, while a database covering 1989–2009, violence, partner intimate about only questions include surveys health and demographic country-level example, For GBV. of type particular one on focus rather but GBV, asdefined,isdifficultinAsiaduetothelimitations ofexistingdata. Mapping sexual. and economic, physical, GBV—emotional, of types four are There (DEVAW). in the UN General Assembly’s 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women conceptualizations conceptualizations of GBV across the countries in the region prevent comparative analysis. Third, sources, data few a just on reliance the to related biases reporting are there (UCDP), Program Data Conflict Role ofGender-Based Conflict inAsiaandthe or that affects women disproportionately.” women affects that or woman a is she because woman a against directed is that “violence as girls and women against GBV defines 19, No. Recommendation General (CEDAW), Women against Discrimination of conceptualize what is included in the term. The UN’s Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of gendernormsthatprohibitorconstrainitsreportingrecording. Paradoxically, one of the starkest indications that GBV is widespread violence. in a this society is for the presence impunity of culture the perpetuate reforms, legal and policies, services, ized same time, the extremely low conviction rates for GBV in Asia, and women. the slow adoption against of special men by overwhelmingly perpetrated rape, gang and rape nonpartner including violence sexual and violence, spousal as such GBV, self-reported of levels high show lence, as indicated by recent UN and World Health Organization (WHO) surveys. These surveys There are few official reports to state agencies, and these barely scratch the surface of actual vio definition, baseline data, or systematic documentationconsistent ofno types ofhave GBVAsia againstin women countries andMany girls. Asia. in GBV of forms and scale the understand to beginning only are we however, perpetrators, of impunity historical the to Due problem. the to is imperative that we identify and analyze its patterns and trends in order to adequately respond Gender-based violence (GBV) against women and girls is a major societal problem across Asia. Violence Jacqui True First, there are few datasets designed to record GBV, and those that do are not comprehensive, and define to important is it girls, and women against GBV understand better to order In 8 collects data only on conflict-related sexual violence. Second, violence. sexual conflict-related on only data collects 5 It addresses a range of forms of violence as defined as violence of forms of range a addresses It 7 recently added by the Uppsala 4 6 and only in fewer than fewer in only and 9 and the different the and 3 At the At 1 It It - - 2

violence, and human rights violations as well as disasters. as well as violations rights human and violence, conflict, armed fleeing 2013, of end the at (IDPs) persons displaced internally new million 3.2 men. with compared women affects disproportionately which violence negatively affect women’s social and economic rights in Asia as a result of displacement, world. the in conflicts protracted most the of some has Asia challenges. to GBVorthespecificobstaclesreportingviolationstheymayface. public-policy problem. As such, data may not reflect by victims in societies that have, until recently, failed to recognize GBV as a criminal offense or a there are significant issues with the quality of available data, given the significant underreporting ern Myanmar, ern north in people Kachin the to real very is threat That impunity. with GBV perpetrate can and prosecution, civil from immunity have soldiers Tatmadaw Myanmar, in example, For conflict. identities. Thus, GBV and conflict or violenceat various levelsplayinto and affect one another. reinforces stereotypes and oppression based on gender, ethnicity, class, caste, sexuality, or other and exploits both It communities. or families their association, by and, victims the silence and stigma that victims suffer. Physical, psychological, sexual, or economic GBV intends to denigrate types of violence lies not in the physical acts of violence themselves, but in the shame and social the intergroup and overtly “political” types of violence. The power of GBV compared with other that structuralgenderinequalityisthemostsignificant riskfactorforGBV. and family status, and societal attitudes that condone violence against women. Research shows level—inequality of access to resources or to public space and voice, legal discrimination in civil text to GBV when there is a high degree of structural gender inequality at a national or regional con subnational or national a is there example, For situations. intimate-partner and domestic in even GBV, of aspects local the as well as subnational and national the conceptualize to need We occurs. GBV which in contexts the reveal adequately not does positioning This war). civil (separatism, autonomy, and large-scale communal conflict) and national conflict (interstate and level, positioning it, along with electoral violence and urban crime, outside of subnational conflict lence. The Asia Foundation’s Mapping levelsofviolence to addressit. section considers state responses to GBV, highlighting approaches in the region that have worked third The Asia. in GBV and dynamics conflict between connections key some illustrates section analyzing GBV as a cross-cutting problem interrelated with other types of violence. The second nesia, and the Philippines. The first section highlights gaps in prevailing analyses and proposes group, andasthesubordinategenderwithinthatgroup. are often doubly vulnerable: as members of a subordinate ethnic, religious, or political minority hoods. liveli and education, housing, food, water, to access poor with malnourishment, and poverty of rates higher have generally which households, (single-parent) female-headed of proportions higher with associated also is Displacement violence. sexual conflict-related as well as violence women and children. Analyzing GBV amid ongoing conflict and political violence in the region presents further presents region the in violence political and conflict ongoing amid GBV Analyzing The symbolism and stigma of GBV have a specific, catalytic effect on political and intrastate to interpersonal the from connected, are violence of forms how see us help can lens GBV A The complexity of subnational conflicts in Asia often masks the gendered dimensions of vio Indo Myanmar, Lanka, Sri India, from examples on draws and parts three has paper This 14 In conflict and displacement in Asia, GBV severely affects minority women and girls, who 17 and threats of sexualized GBV against Kachin women and girls, which aim to aim which girls, and women Kachin against GBV sexualized of threats and 13 Protracted displacement places women at greater risk of intimate-partner The State of Conflict and Violence in Asia which 15 groups of women are most vulnerable 12 The great majority of all IDPs are IDPs all of majority great The 11 In the Asia-Pacific, there were there Asia-Pacific, the In examines GBV at the local 10 Conflict and military and Conflict 16 - - - - -

231 | Conflict in Asia and the Role of Gender-Based Violence 232 | Conflict in Asia and the Role of Gender-Based Violence as well as other violations of physical security, according to reports available since the end of the GBV, of levels highest the experience to appear Provinces Eastern and Northern the in Women capacity to respond to postwar GBV reflect a self-reinforcing cycle of acceptance of this violence. violence. sexual of reports official few a only are there however, reports; government in to referred widely is GBV Lanka, is widespreadandsystematic,thatthepaucityof reportingdoesnotreflectactuallevels. women and girls who are GBV survivors. represent to community Rohingya the within organization society civil or voice no is there and nonexistent, also is Tatmadaw, the of immunity the given justice, to Recourse Law). Patients of Treatment Emergency 2014 the under required longer no is this (though police the to GBV ing of GBV, as have fears of retaliation and mistrust of health services, which continue to report and physical GBV, recorded by the UN. sexual including violations, rights human and deaths with minority, Rohingya the and military Conflict broke out in Rakhine in 2012, 2016, and 2017 between the Myanmar border police and of conflict-related sexual violence and the opening of the country after Cyclone Nargis in 2008. reporting increased the as time same the at escalate to began civilians, by perpetrated violence and therefore are not reported. True and Davies observe that reports of GBV, including domestic acceptable or “normal” as seen often are which violence, domestic or intimate-partner of dents civilian women by uniformed men is highly controversial and socially more contested than inci olence that have captured the attention of the global media. international actors in the context of regime change, and by reports of conflict-related sexual vi reporting. lower there is low is unofficial reports. and official on based countries, across patterns GBV in discernable are differences However, resources in conflict-affected and displacement situations affects their vulnerability to violence. situations. conflict-affected in Conflict dynamicsandGBVinAsia improve thetoolsfordatacollectionandanalysis. to seek we as time same the at underreporting this of causes the address to crucial is it Thus, GBV, even with more rigorous efforts to gather betterof data throughunderreporting surveysthe orcompound incident reporting. problems These data. GBV analyse and record to incapacity GBV due to ineffective or gender-biased law enforcement and justice systems; and institutional reporting others or victims for protection of lack the settings; displacement and conflict, rural, the low level of public awareness; the scarcity of institutions to report to or their inaccessiblity in survey of GBV perpetrated by men, based on a national sample across four districts, including districts, four across sample national a on based men, by perpetrated GBV of survey GBV. for impunity to contributing justice, transitional of promise no with minorities, war. national reporting systems are relatively underdeveloped. especially scarce in Asia, where demographic and health surveys are comparatively infrequent and the subnationalconflictwithBurmesestate. in fight to members group mobilize to used be may group, ethnic entire the shame and oppress How a conflict ends has implications for the reporting and underreporting of GBV. of underreporting and reporting the for implications has ends conflict a How underreported. extremely is women Rohingya against GBV however, State, Rakhine In Awareness of GBV against women and girls isnascent in the region, and where awareness GBV has been documented in several conflicts in Asia since 1945, and is frequently heightened is data reliable but stigma, gendered to due world the in everywhere underreported is GBV 30 The victory of government forces has led to continued sexual abuse and torture of Tamil of torture and abuse sexual continued to led has forces government of victory The 29 The nonrecognition of wartime GBV and the lack of institutional of lack the and GBV wartime of nonrecognition The 21 Women and girls’ severe lack of access to social and economic and social to access of lack severe girls’ and Women In Myanmar, GBV awareness was triggered by the presence of presence the by triggered was awareness GBV Myanmar, In 25 27 Restricted humanitarian access has limited the report Qualitative study of the Rakhine case suggests that GBV 18 20 19 22 Underreporting of GBV is affected by Sexual violence perpetrated against 31 A UN A In Sri In 28 24 26 23 - - -

within the minority population to increase conscripts and coerce civilian support with threats with support civilian coerce and conscripts increase to population minority the within relations. sexual prohibiting code moral a to due GBV, of acts Lanka however, the UN’s does notoccur.that it sumption permission oftheirpartner. successfully prosecuted in Sri Lanka, and that 60 percent of men feel entitled to sex without prior two in the war-affectedEastern Province, shows that less then 10percent of rape cases have been been theinclusionofconflict-related sexualviolence. A law. major point of GBV contention in this the dialogue, amid widespread over reports of Tatmadaw government abuses, has the with dialogue of years three than more in engaged been specific laws prohibiting domestic violence. of impunity, and thus can help prevent GBV. In the Asia-Pacific, only Myanmar has not adopted capacity to protect victims and prosecute perpetrators, anti-GBV laws directly address the culture GBV State responses toGBV the prevailingdegreeofgenderdiscriminationandinequality. and reporting, to barriers institutional and political, social, the map to need we contexts, Asian above show. To qualify and contextualize data on all forms of reported GBV in conflict-affected cases the as civilians, or groups, armed nonstate military, the by committed GBV of kinds cific barriers thwartthecollectionofGBVdatathatcouldleadtomoreeffectiveresponses. victims. crime of data demographic other and gender the record to law by forbidden war.” of declaration a to tantamount is it police, the to it report they once because chiefs, village their consult They police official in ARMM stated, “Because of culture, people will not report [crimes] clans. to the police. warring appease to marriage for offered be may daughters where and escalation of clan violence in contexts where abduction, rape, and forced marriage are common, pected to keep silent about the violence they have experienced. They may do this to prevent the ARMM, and the shame associated with rape and other sexual violence, women and girls are ex population. the neighboring, peaceful region of Davao recorded the highest number, despite its much smaller corded the lowest number of GBV cases of any region in the Philippines in 2014 and 2015, while re (ARMM) Mindanao Muslim of Region Autonomous conflict-affected the However, law. the violence against women (EVAW) law and the government’s institutional capacity to implement of elimination an of adoption early country’s the reflecting Asia, in violence domestic reported exist. ment capacity institutions and reporting not reportthisviolence. to incentives strong are there forces, LTTE and Lankan Sri both by committed GBV including pregnancy. teenage of rates high the by evidenced as conflict, the of end the since Provinces Northern and Eastern was promoted during the war to prevent their recruitment by the LTTE. It has continued in the of rape and abduction of family members. GBV perpetratedby nonstatearmedactorsisrarelyreported, leadingtothe falseas How can countries protect women and girls and prevent future GBV? Qualitative studies of conflict situations can help to explain the variation in reporting of spe govern where even conflict-affectedsettings, in data GBV reliable get to difficult still is It and

found that both the Sri Lankan armed forces and the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) committed (LTTE) Tigers Tamil the and forces armed Lankan Sri the both that found governmentaction plans 37 33 Due to strong, gender-based codes of honor within families and communities in communities and families within honor of codes gender-based strong, to Due despite the narrative that the LTTE did not perpetrate GBV within the group the within GBV perpetrate not did LTTE the that narrative the despite Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri 36 40 Given that no prosecutor has been appointed to investigate war crimes, war investigate to appointed been has prosecutor no that Given Moreover, police may not accurately apply the EVAW law, and they are they and law, EVAW the apply accurately not may police Moreover, 32 This is the case in both Myanmar and Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka. In Sri and Myanmar both in case the is This

to implementto them 35 As a result of these practices, early marriage of girls 42 In Myanmar, however, a civil society coalition has The Philippines has among the highest levels of 34 The LTTE are suspected of committing GBV committing of suspected are LTTE The are crucial. With appropriate institutional Nationallawsagainst 39 A high-ranking A 41 These 38 43 - - - - -

233 | Conflict in Asia and the Role of Gender-Based Violence 234 | Conflict in Asia and the Role of Gender-Based Violence victims with justice, reparation, and rehabilitation. government to prosecute the perpetrators of conflict-related GBVIndonesian crimes and tothe provide women of failure the emphasized also It law. domestic-violence the for mechanism a monitoring of absence the and court to brought trafficking and violence sexual of cases of ber num limited the over concern voiced Committee CEDAW the court, specialized a of existence Bureau. Records Crime National Indian the to according evidence, “proper” of lack for courts the by discharged or acquitted either were Perpetrators prosecutions. in resulted period 10-year a over reported girls and women of cases rape 5,337 implementation ofthefast-trackGBVprovisionhasnot yetbeenevaluated,however. the on-camera hearings provided for in the Domestic Violence Crime and Punishment Act. to addition in violence domestic and rape for courts fast-track of establishment the mandated prosecutions for war crimes, including GBV, will take place. In Nepal in 2014, the Supreme Court that unlikely is it however, mechanisms; transitional-justice appropriate considering currently nonratification, for Latin American and Caribbean states. ute of the International Criminal Court, compared with 63 percent of African and 82 percent of Indonesia in East Timor), less than half the region’s countries have ratified the 1998 Rome Stat regime, Rouge Khmer the during Cambodia 1971, in Bangladesh (e.g., women minority against conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region have included documented acts of sexual violence, primarily exception. an are regime, Rouge Khmer the during perpetrated established. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia been (ECCC), addressing hardly crimes have violence, sexual including GBV, conflict-related for hearings tional-justice initiative hassubstantiallyincreasedthestate’saccountabilitytocivilsociety. This GBV. of issue the to judiciary the of responsiveness the examined also They agencies. ing implement the of performance the and Act Violence Domestic the by envisaged infrastructure the of effectiveness the evaluated stakeholders, and organizations other with along Collective, to monitorthe implementationof the law civil society initiative supported by transnational advocacy networks and the UN set up 44 percent in East Asia and the Pacific. with compared GBV, of forms four all covering laws adopted have countries of percent 74 Asia, law andjusticesystem. the in inequalities gender the of reflection a is GBV committing for consequences legal no face entitlement that fuels men’s physical and sexual GBV in Asia. The fact that the majority of men bus drew mass protests in the streets of Delhi and media attention around the world. is the Indian case, in which the fatal gang rape of a 23-year-old female tertiary student on a Delhi note 1) covering the four types of GBV—emotional, physical, economic, and sexual. Best known (see definitions normative UN’s the mirrored closely have that laws anti-GBV stronger or new shaped 2013 in India 2010, and in Bangladesh 2009, in Nepal 2005, in Lanka Sri in cases local Countries in Asia also have Asia, Across Domestic violence laws were adopted in Indonesia in 2004 and India in 2005. High-profile specialist courts 49 as well as the nature of ongoing conflicts. ongoing of nature the as well as 54 extremely have been established to hear GBV cases, although transi although cases, GBV hear to established been have 48 The lack of local judicial infrastructure is cited as a reason 45 In India, following the adoption of the anti-GBV law, a

low GBV convictionrates low in collaboration with state agencies. The Lawyers The agencies. state with collaboration in 53 The UN study singles out the sense of sexual 52 In the case of Indonesia, despite the despite Indonesia, of case the In 50 The Sri Lankan government is government Lankan Sri The 47 Despite the fact that many that fact the Despite .

In India, only 3,860 of the 46 44 In South a system a system 51 The - - - - livelihood needs of victims, India has introduced “one-stop shop” crisis centers for GBV victims, are atstake,andthereislowinstitutionaltransparencyonthedatacollection. may not be recorded and shared at higher levels of policymaking, because professional reputations However, Davies, True, and Tanyag found in their research that even if cases are reported, they of violence against women and girls across 18 different regions, in accordance with national law. Commission on Women compiles nationwide statistics from police reports of 13 different types search has yet to examine whether there are more GBV reports in those districts. The Philippine national conflicts has created women’s police units in some districts to receive GBV reports. Re measures remaincrucialto GBVpreventioninAsia. make them less vulnerable to exploitation and violence and more willempowered to report education it. These secondary and employment, formal resources, to access their promoting and discriminatory civil and family law, strengthening the legal rights of minority women and girls, Reforming GBV. reducing for benefits have also likely will inequality gender structural redress to measures broad However, initiatives. prevention and policy inform to and research this to overcome them, as well as for improved collection of data on the incidence of GBV to contribute lished. There is an urgent need to better understand the obstacles to reporting GBV and how to diligence againstGBV,particularlyinconflictsituations. ments monitor and analyse GBV, ensure redress for victims, and hold states accountable for due contentious matter for governments to address. A regional GBV mechanism could help govern a also is it but before, ever than visible more is GBV Conflict-related region. the in progress of sign positive a is This recording. and reporting GBV to barriers political and institutional the to attention increased also has law, EVAW an without now is country one just where Asia, in and displacement, and the widely varying responses of governments. Greater awareness of GBV in Asia, including the major problem of GBV underreporting, especially in situations of conflict Conclusion continued impunityforGBV,andofrenewedconflict. situations in Asia, transitional-justice processes remain rare, yet without them there is a risk of post-conflict in Finally, GBV. to susceptible most districts the in located are they whether and More research is needed to assess whether these specialized police units increase GBV reporting innovation, but they do not eliminate the need for all police officers to be trained in the EVAW law. adoption elsewhere in Asia must be rigorously evaluated. Third, women police units are also an potential and usefulness their but promising, are survivors for shops one-stop and processes, health services. Second, the infrastructure and capacity offered by specialized courts, fast-track and policing, processes, judicial including laws, EVAW of implementation the monitoring in role a played has society civil impunity, tackled effectively have responses GBV where First, hard to measure, due to the problems with and data collection uncertain and the both lack remains of accurate prevention baseline data. GBV into translate will this how countries—although should expect to see their impact in increased reporting of GBV—the pattern seen in developed we and exists, clearly centers crisis the for Demand creation). their prompted had which case, to be victims of domestic violence rather than sexual violence by strangers (as in the Delhi Rape were intended to serve only victims of sexual violence, but the majority of clients soon turned out following the recommendations of the 2013 Justice Verma Commission. In terms of to respect With The linkages between conflict-affected GBV and gender inequality in Asia are still being estab There are significant issues in the relationship of GBV to other forms of conflict and violence Asia. in interventions and policies GBV recent from learned be to lessons several are There government specialized policing

provision of GBV services provision , only the Philippines among those countries with sub with countries those among Philippines the only , to address the health, psychological, and 58 57 Initially these centers 56 55 - - - -

235 | Conflict in Asia and the Role of Gender-Based Violence 236 | Conflict in Asia and the Role of Gender-Based Violence lence in the Asia-Pacific. Her book vio gender-based and sexual systemic of patterns the and women against violence of economy political the investigates research current Her Oslo. Institute Research Peace Fellow, Global a Centre for Gender, Peace, and Security. She is an Australian Research Council Future Fellow and Security human rights. She is coeditor with Sara Davies of 2012) won the American Political Science Association’s 2012 biennial prize for the bestbook in Jacqui True is Professor of International Relations and Director of Monash University’s Monash of Director and Relations International of Professor is True Jacqui (2018). The EconomyofViolence Against Women Political The Handbook onWomen, Oxford Peace, and Jacqui True (Oxford, - 1 3 2 Notes General Assembly, “Declaration on the Elimination the on “Declaration Assembly, General dation at work, and economic abuse and violence (UN rape, spousal violence, sexual harassment and intimi marital mutilation, genital female women, to harmful dowry-related violence and other traditional practices trafficking, and prostitution forced rape, including violence, sexual and psychological, physical, includes GBV boys. and men against GBV not typically though girls, and women against GBV encompasses but law national in basis legal a has which term, preferred Asia, In However, GBV against men and boys is also a problem. This paper is focused on GBV against women and girls. (Fulu etal., nine sites—did not experience any legal consequences 72 and 97percentacrossthe petrating rape—between per men of majority the study, UN the to According by a nonpartner (Fulu et al., respondents, between 10 and 59 percent reported rape and the Pacific StudyonMenandViolenceinAsia tions Multi-country al., et (WHO Africa Sub-Saharan Central rate of intimate-partner violence, at 41.73 percent, after prevalence second-highest the recorded region Asia Southeast the study, Disease of Burden Global 2010 Global andregionalestimates al., et (WHO Africa after world the in highest second the was Asia Southeast in women ever-partnered for violence sexual and physical of rate prevalence The health/ 17, 2013), WHO, violence and non-partner sexual violence partner intimate of effects health and prevalence and regionalestimatesofviolenceagainstwomen: Council, Research Medical African South and Medicine, Tropical and Hygiene of School London Organization, Health World See percent). (37.7 lence vio physical of prevalence lifetime highest the have to found were Asia Southeast of region WHO the in WHO VAW-prevalence surveys, ever-partnered women by collected data scientific of review systematic a In than that. broader is term the (IPV), violence partner intimate household. Although in common usage it often denotes or home family the in occurring violence nonspousal term The marriage, andonlinesexualabuse.” forced and “early as such (CEDAW), Women against tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Conven UN’s the under considered also are violence plenary meeting, December 20, 1993). Other forms of 85th A/RES/48/104, Women,” against Violence of (Fulu et al., rate prevalence percent 30–57 a average on percent: 68 to 25 at victimization partner of experience en’s wom and sites, across percent 80 to 26 of rates with common, extremely violence sexual and physical ner intimate-part of perpetration men’s found countries of men and women in nine rural and urban sites in six survey This countries. Asian across and within varies rate prevalence the though region, Asian the in VAW and UNV, 2013) further supports the pervasiveness of regional estimates publications/violence/9789241564625/en/ violence againstwomen domestic violence Multi-country Study Multi-country Multi-country Study (Bangkok: UNDP, UNFPA, UN Women http://www.who.int/reproductive , 47). E. Fulu et al., Multi-country Study refers to spousal and spousal to refers , 20). Similarly, in the in Similarly, 20). , , 27). Among women , 3). (VAW) is often the often is (VAW) The United Na Global and (Geneva: Global , 39). ------. 9 8 7 6 5 4 13 12 11 10 ment, ment, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty Intenation Depart State U.S. reporting—the English-language of sources international three on reliant is dataset Conflict Armed in Violence Sexual the example, For PRIO, 2014). 4-2014a Version Codebook Dataset Conflict (PRIO), Oslo Institute Research Peace and (UCDP) Program Data Conflict Uppsala website, Dataset Conflict Armed in Violence Sexual the from Dataset, Conflict Armed in Dara Kay Cohen and Ragnild Nordås, website, Program Surveys Health and Demographic The See recommendations/recomm.htm 2017, 22, August accessed Women), (UN Women of erment Empow the and Equality Gender for Entity Nations (11 19 No. crimination against Women, General Recommendation Dis of Forms All of Elimination the on “Convention Violence.” Gender-Based and Sexual Conflict-Related of vention Pre the “Reframing True, Jacqui and Davies E. Sara women andchildren. are displaced internally the of percent 80 over that sponse-plan-january-december-2017 report December 2017 January– Plan: Response Humanitarian Myanmar for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), by-conflict-and-violence/ 2014/global-overview-2014-people-internally-displaced- www.internal-displacement.org/library/publications/ and Norwegian Refugee Council, 2014), 13, 23, Centre Monitoring Displacement Internal (Geneva: disaster and conflict by displaced internally People al., et Albuja Sebastián land. secure or fight to stay may men that given children, and women toward weighted are they that indication some with population, the in those to similar be to and age of IDPs. However, the numbers are estimated gender the disaggregating data no or little is There ment-grid-2016/ cations/2016/2016-global-report-on-internal-displace http://www.internal-displacement.org/library/publi toring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, 2016), Displacement Alexandra Bilak et al., World Bank,2011). Development and Conflict 2011: World Bank, org/resources/pdfs/ContestedCornersOfAsia.pdf 2013), Foundation, Asia The Assistance Development International and Conflict Subnational Asia: of Corners Contested Oppenheim, Ben and Coletta, Parks, Nat Thomas of PeaceResearch 1989–2009,” dataset, SVAC the Introducing conflict: armed in violence “Sexual Nordås, Ragnild and Cohen Kay Dara See GBV. tracking for important where local civil society and news reports may be more Asia, in compromised heavily be to likely are al—that http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/ /myanmar/2017-myanmar-humanitarian-re http://www.sexualviolencedata.org/dataset/ http://dhsprogram.com Security Dialogue th session, 1992),” website of the United the of website 1992),” session, World World Bank Annual Development Report (Geneva: Internal Displacement Moni Displacement Internal (Geneva: (OCHA, 2016), 3, . 51,no.3(2014):418–428. 2016 . For example, see UN Office

retrieved August 10, 2017 10, August retrieved Global Report on Internal 46,no.6(2015):14. Global Overview 2014: Overview Global https://asiafoundation. . . UCDP/PRIO Armed UCDP/PRIO http://reliefweb.int/ (Washington, DC: (Washington, , which estimates Sexual Violence (San Francisco: Journal (Oslo: http:// . The ------.

237 | Conflict in Asia and the Role of Gender-Based Violence 238 | Conflict in Asia and the Role of Gender-Based Violence 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 25 14 50 of the 100 women and girls interviewed described interviewed girls and women 100 the of 50 than more that 2017 February in reported “OHCHR 616742.2017.1282321 14, of Politics Journal Feminist national Myanmar,” of case the violence: gender-based and sexual conflict-related reporting and counting of politics “The True, Jacqui and Davies E. Sara 1095559 463–479, Myanmar,” in movement peace women’s the and rights, land women, against violence resilience: “Reinvigorating Phyu, Sabe May and Furlong, Roisin Faxon, Hillary tions/Behind%20the%20SilenceFullReport 2015), GEN, Resilience their and Women Against olence Gender Equality Network (GEN), Conflict 3–27; Janie L. Leatherman, 2014), Routledge, (Abingdon: al. et Buss Doris ed. Sexual Violence in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies in Visibility,” of Limits The Societies: Post-Conflict and Conflict in Violence Sexual “Seeing Buss, Doris Women Jacqui True, of-nepal/ based-violence-conducted-in-selected-rural-districts- asiafoundation.org/publication/a-study-on-gender- 2012), Ministers, of Council and Minister ofNepal Districts Rural Selected in Conducted Violence Gender-Based Nepal, of Government see example, For Program website, Surveys Health and Demographic The See Africa. in sexual violence, compared with 29 out of 42 countries and physical intimate-partner on data collect surveys health and demographic conduct that Asia Southeast For example, just seven of the 15 countries in South and 48.2016.1273254 581–595, (2017): 396–412, (2017): Transition,” Myanmar’s in Scapegoat Muslim the and Rumours “Gendered Menager, Jaqueline and McCarthy Gerard See conflict. the of sides many on violence and fear inciting Myanmar, in prevalent are groups ethnic other by violence gendered of threat the of Rumors S2214-109X(15)00013-3 no. 6 (June 2015): 332–40, revolutionary household,” revolutionary Jenny Hedström, “The political economy of the Kachin 36.2017.1304563 ysis of data from population-based surveys,” and multilevel correlates of partner violence: an anal Lori L. Heise and Andreas Kotsadam, “Cross-national Publishing, 1997). Nira Yuval-Davis, stable/3118203 97, no. 2 (May 2003): 189–202, Stops,” Shooting sett, “Civil Wars Kill and Maim People—Long after the Rus Bruce and Huth, Paul Ghoborah, Aadam Hazem http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14 (London:Polity,2011). (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Press, University Oxford (Oxford: . . http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13552074.2015. Gender &Development The Political Economy of Violence against against ofViolence Economy The Political Journal of Contemporary Asia Journal ofContemporary http://www.genmyanmar.org/publica . . .

American Political Science Review Science Political American Gender and Nation and Gender http://dhsprogram.com http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/004723 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/095127 (Kathmandu: Office of the Prime the of Office (Kathmandu: . . http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/ Pacific Review Pacific Sexual Violence in Armed http://www.jstor.org/ Behind the Silence:Vi 23, no. 3 (2015): 3 no. 23, (New York: Sage 19, no.1(2017): English.pdf A Study on . 30, no. 4 no. 30, (Yangon: (Yangon:

Lancet 47, no. 3 no. 47, http:// Inter 3, - - - - . , 29 28 27 26 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 collect baseline data on any type of violence against violence of type any on data baseline collect to failure Lankan government’s Sri the by maintained women?page=2 srilanka.unfpa.org/en/publications/keeping-promise- to Women Promise (UNFPA), Fund Population Nations ed violence. Fulu et al sexual than incidence higher a had marriage within Fulu et al Ibid. Davies andTrue,“Politicsofcounting,”13. ictj.org/publication/opening-remedies-myanmar 2015), Justice, Transitional for Center Myanmar’s Past Understanding the Range of Options for Dealing with Aileen Thomson, sexual-violence-s2017249-enar report/ Security Council, 2017), para. 51, violence sexual conflict-related on UN Security Council, community.” their terrorize and humiliate to atically forms of sexual violence, apparently employed system other or rape, gang rape, to subjected been having women’s silence secures the peace: analysing sexual analysing peace: the secures silence women’s “How Tanyag, M. and True, Jacqui Davies, E. Sara 2012), 11. Lanka of Sri Districts Three in TrendsandDeterminants of TeenagePregnancies (UNFPA), Fund Population Nations United Lanka Sri Women, FOKUS about-sexual-violence-in-conflict/ org.au/australian_outlook/dispelling-four-myths- look Conflict,” In Violence Sexual About Sara E. Davies and Jacqui True, “Dispelling Four Myths 10.1177/0032329208329755 Society Rare?” Rape Wartime is When Violence: Sexual and Groups “Armed Wood, Jean Elisabeth Nations, 2011). Lanka on AccountabilityinSri Experts of Panel Secretary-General’s the of Report Marzuki Darusman, Steven Ratner, and Yasmin Sooka, Fulu etal., Journal ofHumanRights Lanka,” Sri in Violence Gender-based and Sexual Conflict-Related of Case The Justice: No is There “When True, Jacqui and Davies E. Sara pone.0174801 ONE perceptions in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka,” context: Women’s experiences and community leaders’ post-war the in violence partner “Intimate al., et ruge national Truth and Justice Project. See also Sepali Gu Inter the of reports GBV the mentions which 83–84, Council, rity fokuswomen.lk/language-barrier/ 2016), Women, FOKUS (Colombo: AccessingBarrierin The JusticeCriminal System Women, FOKUS See women. , June 15, 2014, 15, June , 12, no. 3 (2017), world/report-secretary-general-conflict-related- 37, no. 1 (2009): 131–161, (2009): 1 no. 37, . , in their survey, (Colombo: FOKUS Women, 2015), 21–22; 2015), Women, FOKUS (Colombo: Multi-country Study Conflict-related sexual violence sexual Conflict-related . . The culture of impunity for GBV is GBV for impunity of culture The . , ICTJ Briefing Paper (International Paper Briefing ICTJ , Opening Up Remedies in Myanmar: Post WarTrendsinChildMarriage ., Multi-country Study (Colombo: UNFPA, 2016), http://www.internationalaffairs. Report Report of the Secretary-General Whither Justice? The Language The Justice? Whither https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.

found that physical violence 21,no.8(2017). . . . (Colombo: UNFPA, (Colombo: http://reliefweb.int/ (New York: United York: (New . . See also UN Secu , S/2017/249 (UN S/2017/249 , https://doi.org/ Australian Out International http://www. https://www. , 2. See Unit Keeping the Politics and Politics , paras. , Extent, http:// PLoS PLoS . ------

40 39 38 51 50 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 pnp/70675/ times.net/armm-is-most-peaceful-philippine-region- Manila Times, region–PNP,” Philippine peaceful most is “ARMM Davies etal.,“Women’ssilence,”467. 1080/10357820903153723 view Mindanao,” in Peace and Conflict Gender, Bodies: “Invisible Hilsdon, Anne-Marie 016.1233672 www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13552074.2 Development Gender & and gender-based violence in a low-intensity conflict,” Violence in Nepal: individual, institutional, legal and institutional, Violence in Nepal:individual, Sarah Hawkes et al., al CriminalJustice International Criminal Court,” the by Posed Values Asian to Threat the Dismantling Tiger: Paper The v. Values “Asian Kapur, Amrita Ibid. dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2014.901295 Affairs International Statute,” Rome the through Asia-Pacific the in justice gender “Strengthening Chappell, Louise and Palmer, Emma Waller, Emily violence cases: World Bank Group, tries have specialized courts or procedures for domestic 616742.2017.1283247 19, no. 1, (2017): 22–38, Cambodia,” crimes at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of gender-based and sexual and change Institutional Emma Palmer and Sarah Williams, “A ‘shift in attitude’? (master’s thesis,UniversityofWyoming,2007),5. dressing Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Issue” Ad Toward Progress “India’s Choudhury, Roy Adilit World BankGroup, B2C1257F9B004F6BDF?OpenDocument document.nsf/(httpPublications)/ 2016), ment, Develop Social for Institute Research Nations United India in bilisations in the Context of Anti-Rape and Domestic Worker Mo weshaa Ghosh, An and Zaidi, Mubashira Chigateri, Shraddha See Faxon etal.,“ReinvigoratingResilience.” and-the-Law-2016.pdf?la=en WBL/Documents/Reports/2016/Women-Business- 2015), 22, 2016: Getting to Equal Group, Bank World et al.,“Women’ssilence.” not trained to accept and follow up on reports. Davies occur in some regions because research participants who argued that reporting doesn’t 20(Rowena%20Guanzon).pdf tion_2008/expertpapers/EGMGPLVAW%20Paper% www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw_le 2008), 26–28, May Austria, Vienna, at Office legislation on violence against women, United Nations ed Nations Expert Group Meeting on good practices in in the Philippines” (Expert paper presented at the Unit Rowena V. Guanzon, “Laws on Violence against Women 33, no. 3 (2009): 349–65, (2009): 3 no. 33, http://wbl.worldbank.org/~/media/WBG/ International Feminist Journal ofPolitics Feminist International . . http://www.unrisd.org/ January 25, 2014, 25, January Locating the Processes of Policy Change Locating the ProcessesofPolicy Change , UNRISD Research Report (Geneva: 11,no.5(2013):1059–90. Getting toEqual Tracking Cases ofGender-Based Women, Businessandthe Law . Worldwide, 117 out of 173 coun 68, no. 3 (2014): 360, (2014): 3 no. 68, (Washington, DC: World Bank, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14 24, no. 3 (2016): 462, (2016): 3 no. 24, . . Davies et al. cite some cite al. et Davies . Australian Journal of JournalofInternation baranguay http://dx.doi.org/10. Getting toEqual http://www.manila 03AB499766D6FD Asian Studies Re Studies Asian , 26. unrisd/website/ . officials are . http:// http:// http:// gisla , 22. ------ 58 57 56 55 54 53 52 Jane Sloane, “Toward a Regional Action Plan on Plan Action Regional a “Toward Sloane, Jane of PolicyChange Ghosh, and Zaidi, Chigateri, Davies etal.,“Women’ssilence,”467. violence-against-filipino-women http://www.pcw.gov.ph/statistics/201405/statistics- 2014, 13, May website, Women on Commission pines “Statistics on violence against Filipino women,” Philip Fulu etal., bodies/cedaw/docs/co/CEDAW-C-IDN-CO-6-7.pdf 2012), paras. 26–29, nesia,” (UNCE DAW, Fifty-second session, July 9–27, Indo Women: against Discrimination of Elimination the on Committee the of observations “Concluding ability- http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/09/lack-of-account India,” in Violence Stella Paul, “Lack of Accountability Fuels Gender- npl_e_annexe4.pdf session_23_-_november_2015/un_nepal_upr23_ upr-info.org/sites/default/files/document/nepal/ Health and Population Activities, 2013), Environment, on Research for Centre and London 2013 analyses policy lence%20Against%20WomenAdopted.pdf of%20Action%20on%20Elimintation%20of%20Vio CC_ storage/images/2015/November/27th-summit/AS Women Regional Plan of Action on Eliminating Violence against been on the ASEAN agenda for several years. See region/ elimination-of-violence-against-women-in-the-asean- http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2004/2004-declaration-on-the- See women.” against violence eliminate to approach ASEAN Region “to promote an integrated and holistic the in Women against Violence of Elimination the on asia/ toward-regional-action-plan-women-peace-security- June 12, 2017, Asia.” in Security and Peace, Women, documents/ASEAN%20Regional%20Plan%20 . ASEAN leaders adopted the 2004 Declaration 2004 the adopted leaders ASEAN . fuels-gender-based-violence-in-india/ . The drafting of a regional GBV convention has , November 27, 2015. 27, November , Multi-countryStudy. http://asiafoundation.org/2017/07/12/ . . IPS News http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ (London: University College University (London: Locating the Processes the Locating http://www.asean. , September 30, 2014, 30, September , . In Asia https://www. . . ASEAN ASEAN (blog) Based Based org/ . - - ,

239 | Conflict in Asia and the Role of Gender-Based Violence 240 | Resource conflict and democratic land governance and DemocraticLand Resource Conflict hectares afterwidespreadprotests againstlarge-scaleconcessions. 10,000 at concessions land cap to forced was government Cambodian the example, For lands. liaments in Asian countries have rushed to address the chaotic situation of villagers losing their par National grabbing. land in engaged companies of executives try and investigate to willing a “crime against humanity.” In 2016, the International Criminal Court declared that it would be is production biofuel to farmlands of conversion the that declared 2008, to 2000 from food, to companies engaged in the global land rush. Security. Food National of Context the in Voluntary Guidelines the adopted 2012, in Security, Food on Committee UN The respond. to institutions ternational of conflictandviolencein14Asiancountries. to high levels of resource-related conflict that simultaneously occurs or overlaps with other forms of vertical and horizontal conflict and violence society-wide. The present volume reveals medium tensions due to social ethnicity, nationality, with class, caste, entangled gender, and also generation, leading usually to other are types they conflicts, violent) (often these of cause immediate and visible most the is villagers from land grabbing while But resources. natural over conflicts them to corporate offer investors. This and leads to coercion, the extra-economic eruption of using new often conflicts, themselveslands, builtthese on older claim to in moves state the when swindlers, andthieves. state—in turn attracting bewildering layers of individual land brokers, entrepreneurs, scammers, the and actors narrative—corporate this on converged have actors of sets Two lands. available and empty, marginal, of existence the in lies it and solution, a is there straightforward: is rush and India have all increased the demand for land. The mainstream narrative on this global land China as such capital of centers newer in dynamism economic growing the and conservation; mate, and the environment; the responses to these crises, such as biofuel production and nature cli finance, fuel, feed, animal food, in humanity, confronting crises Multiple decades. three to Rising resource conflicts:contextandcauses Governance Saturnino M.BorrasJr. The global land rush and the widespread conflict linked to it have forced national and in and national forced have it to linked conflict widespread the and rush land global The erupts Conflict poor. rural the by worked and occupied are lands “available” these of Most Asia is a hotspot in the global land rush that has been gaining momentum over the past two on the Responsible Governance of 1 2 The World Bank proposed a “code of conduct” for conduct” of “code a proposed Bank World The Jean Ziegler, the UN special rapporteur on the right Tenure of 3 Land, Fisheries, and Forests - - - or resolve it in favor of the poor. System-wide deep social reforms will be necessary to strategi to necessary be will reforms social deep System-wide poor. the of favor in it resolve or reduce the extent and intensity of conflict, but they do not necessarily get at the roots of conflict may measures procedural these best, At community-based. and nonstate are that mechanisms conflict-resolution villagers; of rights land private individual, the of formalization acquisitions; corporate large-scale in process consultative the records; cadaster in transparency as such ters to resolve land conflicts tend to address important but secondary issues: largely procedural mat conflict, and violence are likely to explode againtension, inotherwise variouspromoted, forms inand the protected future. is and point starting the is interest people’s poor agrarian sector. Responses to land and resource conflict should be based on social justice, where tension, conflict, and violence. Land politics lies at the heart of this in societies with an important tors associated with climate-change mitigation initiatives. Many of the climate-change mitigation timber and pulp, chemicals, machinery, banking and finance, pension funds. Add a plethora of ac sectors: food, animal feed, energy and fuel, mining, real estate, tourism, auto and aviation, seed, promoted asmarket-basedinitiatives. are which of most projects, biofuel or hydropower as such mitigation, climate-change to linked The state’s role is central, whether it is a straightforward corporate agribusiness deal or something claim to own, even though these are the territories of indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities. governments have been aggressive in investment prospecting, offering vast public lands that they Indian state plays a key role in land expropriation. The enclosures. land corporate-driven of victim passive a as characterized be can today Asia in governments national the of None power. and authority its outside been has historically that territory over sovereignty its extend to state the helping agenda, state-building a with coincide has beendoneinIndia, poor. Or the state expropriates the privately controlled lands of villagers by eminent domain, as peoples or ethnic minorities, marginalized rural poor, artisanal fishers, or urban and peri-urban indigenous by worked and occupied often are they though even spaces, and resources these to land” “public as land investors. Contested land, frequently in the hinterlands or coastal areas, is lumped together large-scale enticing and land on speculating prospecting, investment in involved often is state The state. the implications—is what with and purposes, what for why, much, how how, land, which gets politics”—who “land in stage center at First, individuals. noncorporate nonstate, Cast ofcharacters fairer incorporation. and redistribution, land recognition, restitution, of policies interconnected the require will it cally address current conflict and violence, and in the current context of natural resource politics Social inequities and widespread feelings of injustice are among the root causes of social of causes root the among are injustice of feelings widespread and inequities Social Second are the are Second Often, public and private purposes can become quite blurred. Investment opportunities may and corporations, state, the namely players, principal three attracted has rush land The 5 and therefore in the grey area of property-rights systems. The state lays claim lays state The systems. property-rights of area grey the in therefore and

corporate players—diverse, international and domestic, and from multiple from and domestic, and international players—diverse, corporate 6 inChina,andMyanmar. 7 The Cambodian, Indonesian, and Myanmar 4 But many efforts - - -

241 | Resource conflict and democratic land governance 242 | Resource conflict and democratic land governance policies have implications for land politics and policies, such as carbon-sequestration initiatives land ownership,control,distribution, anduse. explode, which should be seen within the broader context of recasting the institutional rules on eral, however, there are a number of ways that social and political tension and conflict arise and are too scared to resist (although these tensions are palpable and should be addressed). In gen not all unjust expropriations erupt into full-scale conflict and violence,especially where villagers lated, but because of the economy” (in the tradition of James Scott’s work) in societies of those losing lands has been vio marginalized ethnic groups. Full-scale conflicts and even violence erupt, not because the “moral socially to belong often they and disadvantaged, already are land lose who those always, most Al generation. and caste, religion, nationality, ethnicity, gender, of dimensions—dimensions identity and class significant have turn in which relations, power and power about is conflict land politics—who gets which land, how, how much, why, and for what purposes—does. Resource Old andnewresource conflicts and arethereforepartiestoconflicttransformationinitiatives,asseenthroughoutAsiatoday. state, corporate, and noncorporate, nonstate actors become key players in conflict and violence, ership, control, distribution, and use, and poor villagers are usually on the losing side. Thus, these any institutional monitoring. Individually and jointly, these actors recast the politics of land own of radar the below are others while corporations, big involving those especially monitored, and recognized easily are transactions these of not. Some do others while grabbing land of category in Myanmar,militiashavedirectlyengagedforciblyandviolentlygrabbingvillagers’lands. corn, sugarcane, and rubber has been driven largely by this noncorporate process. In some places Shan State in Myanmar from biodiverse, shifting agricultural communities into monocultures of India. in documented as corporations, than more far acquire groups. Across Asia, these individuals operate to accumulate land, and in some locations they can brokers, entrepreneurs, scammers, thieves, and swindlers, some of them in paramilitary or militia prospecting ofthestate,effectisexplosiveandprovokesfurtherconflicts. investment the meet they When prospecting. land speculative in engaged have Most politics. these actors from different sectors interact. There is a convergence of new and oldplayers in land ments as a contribution to climate-change mitigation through the production of biofuel. govern national by justified partly been has land, their from villagers of expulsion widespread example, the massive expansion of oil-palm plantations across Southeast Asia, which has led to For violence. and conflict provoke can policies mitigation these use, and distribution, access, crops.” “flex as understood like REDD+, generic nature conservation, hydropower megaprojects, and biofuel—increasingly Investments in agriculture do not automatically cause conflict and violence, but recasting but violence, and conflict cause automatically not do agriculture in Investments the fit which of some transactions, land of sorts all in engage actors three these Combined, Third, opportunities have opened up for nonstate and noncorporate individual actors: land manner 8 Because they often require involuntary recasting of land control, land of recasting involuntary require often they Because in which that moral economy has been violated. 10 The transformation of northern of transformation The 11 In addition, 9 Often, - - - - - projects, andnatureconservationprojects. hydropower large projects, carbon-sequestration including initiatives mitigation mate-change cli market-oriented, of and zones; economic special like megaprojects real-estate speculative and enclaves, tourism mines, of plantations; tree industrial as such monoculture agricultural of expansion dramatic the with associated Asia, across years recent in spiked has resources over Conflict resist. overtly or complaints formal file to able are villagers when only happen not does Conflict not. or overtly resist villagers whether and coercion, extra-economic without or with it, from them expel and land villagers’ of control take actors These entrepreneurs. and with the land. In such settings, villagers are not expelled. Instead, they are incorporated into the land the need investors the instances, some In land. that wereimpenetrablebefore. ex-military officials capitalizing on the 2011ceasefire penetrateto by someowned ethnic minoritywere territories lands village seized that corporations many Myanmar, In peace-building. and old and provoking new conflicts. Both ways in turn can link to broader issues of conflict, violence, nomic coercion by these elite actors to expel villagers from their land is quite common, igniting extra-eco of use The redistribution. land democratic to opposed vigorously thus are and rush, land on the in to cash effort the of forefront the at are military, the involving times at officials, past has become even stronger and more entrenched. The landed classes and corrupt government violent at times. On the other hand, political opposition to the redistributive land policies of the become can which conflict, of escalation to leading land, their from expelled forcibly often are sector. informal bloated already the into forced been have whom of many rush, land the by created population landless new the to due increased have inequality and landlessness hand, one the On ways. two in distribution land impacted has coveted, more exponentially become has which land, of revaluation dramatic The corporations. and classes landed the by Chittagong HillsTractsinBangladeshisanillustration. territory. sovereign its of parts integral being as well investors—as corporate to offered be can that ores mineral and water, forests, lands, resources—productive coveted have territories their because groups, these of rights land the recognize to refuses state The dynamics. social generational and gender have often conflicts These violence. interethnic to or actors, local and state central the between conflict to led have rights land of recognition People’s Rights Act (IPRA) in the Philippines. But in several countries, these tensions over state edly or problematically implemented policies that call for such recognition, like the Indigenous half-heart has state the Asia, of parts some In society. in groups and classes social specific of Second, states may refuse to recognize the rights to land, territory, and associated resources First, there are land enclosures driven by the state, corporations, or individual land brokers Fourth, not everyone whose land is coveted by investors and the state is expelled from the from expelled is state the and investors by coveted is land whose everyone not Fourth, monopoly land on based inequality social preexisting exacerbated has rush land the Third, 15 and 13 the people, as cheap labor that comes that labor cheap as people, the 12 The violent conflict in the in conflict violent The 14 Villagers - - -

243 | Resource conflict and democratic land governance 244 | Resource conflict and democratic land governance transforms the arena of institutional rules into a key zone of conflict, where the state turn and corpo in This state. the and communities local between conflict and tension provoke questions These purposes. what for and how so, if and recast, be will politics land regulate that on so and violence, as scenes in the banana-plantation belt in Mindanao have demonstrated in recent years. conditions, or greater autonomy are often ignored, creating a trigger for escalation to conflict and ganized this way, for example. Demands for better wages, fairer prices for produce, better living they have no more control over it. Many Malaysian and Indonesian oil-palm plantations are or but land, the of owners nominal the remain often villagers happens, this Where arrangements. growership of variety a through farmers, contract as or workers as either enterprise, emerging the pushfor“sustainablepalm oil”inIndonesiaandMalaysia. as such responsibility, social corporate as framed standards international on focuses Advocacy and development agencies take this position, making it the most popular of the three tendencies. NGOs big Most approach. social-justice-oriented more a see others while violence, and conflict resource address to way strategic the as rights private-property individual see tendency this in community partnerships with corporations are a pragmatic response to the resource rush. Some and responsibility social Corporate favored. are mechanisms conflict-resolution munity-based com and market- tendency, first the Like consummated. is deal land a when off better are all communities local and corporations, state, the where formula, win-win-win a in believe view this of Proponents it. with come that opportunities the all maximizing while mitigated be must opportunities. while maximizing and corporationsarethekeyactorsinthistendency. conflict. The World Bank, mostgovernment ministries in charge ofpromoting land investments, resource address will rights private-property individual on based system a of expansion term, mechanisms can address existing land conflicts by promoting a vigorous land market. In the longer displacement. involuntary to solutions are corporations, for conduct of code a and acquisitions, land large-scale in processes consultative deals, land transparent records, cadaster clear and formal rights, private-property individual of formalization including schemes, market-based and Voluntary producers. competitive and efficient become to potential no have who those for it encourage They displacement. voluntary expulsion of many villagers from their land, involuntarily and unfairly, but they are not against the in resulted has rush land current the that acknowledge view this of Proponents a scarce resource. land, of use efficient most the achieve can economy rural the and land in interested land rush is considered a rare opportunity, whereby states and corporations that are once again the samething.Therearethreebroadpoliticaltendencies. about talking necessarily not are governance land about talk who those Yet, violence. and flict, from their land, so there is a need for “good governance” to address the land rush, resource con tors. Everyone talks about governance: the situation is chaotic, many villagers are being expelled Policy responses Myanmar ishotlycontestedforthisreason. in Policy Use Land National current The lands. their of fate the determine that processes and recast these institutional rules. The villagers are denied representation in the institutions, spaces, often than not, however, villagers are completely ignored and excluded from the processes that More resist. villagers while land, the of takeover their favor to rules the change to want rations Tendency 2: governing land politics in order to mitigate negative impacts on villagers on impacts negative mitigate to order in politics land governing 2: Tendency standards, environmental laws, land preexisting whether over conflict often is there Fifth, Tendency 1: governing land politics in order to smooth corporate land investments. land corporate smooth to order in politics land governing 1: Tendency The global resource rush has produced a consensus among a range of state and nonstate ac The land rush is here to stay, so negative impacts on villagers 17 16 Market- and community-based conflict-resolution community-based and Market- 18 19 The - - - - - in camps, while others are scattered throughout the country and beyond. This is not unique to unique not is This beyond. and country the throughout scattered are others while camps, in each group is currently seeking to go back to “their” village. Many of these displaced people live villages that may have three different waves of occupants fromKaren threein differentresulted ethnic groups,have and operations military of waves Myanmar, in example, For expulsions. of informal sector. In many places, the recent wave of expulsions is just the latest in a long history countryside, or they have gambled on urban and peri-urban spaces, joining the already oversized into other productive sectors of the economy, but others likely have not. They either remain in the without compensation, with or without extra-economic coercion. Some may have been absorbed or with involuntarily, or voluntarily illegally, or legally whether lots, home and farmland their land redistribution,andfairerincorporation. recognition, restitution, of strategies policy four the on based be should response tice-oriented one hand, and prevent future ones from exploding and recurring on the other hand. A social-jus the on violence and conflicts resource and land current address to order in level, system the at the flamesofconflictandviolence. proactive. and reactive both is that stance a require lems procedural measures are important, they are secondary. They are reactive, while existing prob governments. national and institutions mainstream among popular are nature, in procedural are which of many policies, market-based and Voluntary disputes. land specific resolving towards oriented measures short-term advocate and 2 and 1 tendencies resolution andtransformation Towards socialjustice-based resource conflict contextualize responsestoresourceconflictandviolence. across Asia,anditsalliesareattheforefrontofthistendency. La Vía Campesina, the world’s largest farmers’ movement, with strong although uneven presence The solution can only be a system of social-justice-oriented, redistributive land policies. Globally, solutions will facilitate, not stop, the land rush, and will expand, not end, land-based inequality. market-based and voluntary other and mechanisms conflict-resolution think view this of nents Propo poor. rural the especially people, poor of expense the at profit generate continuously to land tovillagers. First, More urgent and important is to take a proactive stance alongside a defensive stance, pitched from been have international, and national conflicts, resource to responses policy Most help can typology the But fit. perfect a rarely are situations life Real types. ideal are These Tendency 3: governing land politics in order to stop land grabbing and return expropriated restitution. The land rush is seen as an inherent manifestation of the imperatives of capital Before and during the recent land rush, villagers have been expelled from 21 They could also unintentionally fan unintentionally also could They 20 While such short-term, such While

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245 | Resource conflict and democratic land governance 246 | Resource conflict and democratic land governance The taskathandistoimprovethetermsofsuchincorporation. Asia. in plantations palm-oil in as on, so and gardens, food and plots home to access produce, gone. Conflict arises over the terms of their incorporation: wages, working conditions, prices of or could not do so even if they wanted to, because the infrastructure for small, family farming is farming, individual autonomous, to back go to want not do Most arrangements. growership of ing capitalist farms and plantations, either as workers or as contract farmers, through a variety land policiesseriously. resource-conflict resolution and peace-buildingare inconceivable without taking redistributive sector, agrarian important an with societies In policies. necessary the have not do countries have such policies, but they are either not implemented or implemented perversely, while other Asia in countries Many redistribution. land for policies common are programs reallocation forest-land and reform, leasehold reform, tenancy reform, Land today. Asia across people of a variety of reasons. System-wide land redistribution is urgent and necessary for a huge number from land on which they are squatting. Many of them might have had land before, but lost it for expulsion of threat constant under are or rent, informal for forces militia or government from harassment constant to subject are or owners, private to rent exorbitant pay to have thus and work, they land the own not do farmworkers or tenants as land the work who those societies, the countryside, and who want to farm for a living do not have land to work. In addition, in many tential forfullerimplementation,suchastheIPRAinPhilippines. po have that Asia in laws progressive some are There both. of combination a or community or various mechanisms, including democratic forms of customary arrangements, either individual not only mean providing formal, individual, private-property rights. It can be achieved through social class, gender, ethnicity, nationality, and generation. Protection through recognition does of dimensions intersecting and deep has recognition of politics The resources. associated and many settings in Asia, this means recognizing the rights of various In social access. groups existing to this land, protect to territory, is context this in task key The investments. land in spike the during the recent land rush. But their access to land is now seriously threatened in the midst of them,” as a popular grassroots slogan goes. In many societies, the institutional bases of representa propriate, meaningful to land, as in Timor-Leste, Sri Lanka, and other places. Where land restitution has been attempted Myanmar; it is common where major armed conflict has resulted in complex layers of claimants anisms whenthetaskathandprincipallyconcernsredress,fairness,andsocialjustice. approaches failed, partly demonstrating the inherent contradictions and limits to market mech This was done in the 1996 Peace Accords in Central America, for example. These market-based strategies. resettlement land-market-oriented with combined and schemes voluntary on based elsewhere in the context of postconflict peacebuilding, it has adopted market-based approaches The four redistributive policies can only be fairly and effectively carried out if there is ap is there if out carried effectively and fairly be only can policies redistributive four The Fourth, Third, Second, land redistribution. fairer incorporation. recognition. representation Not all villagers have lost their access to and control over their land their over control and to access their lost have villagers all Not Many people who do not have stable jobs, either in the city or in There are villagers who have been incorporated into the emerg of villagers in the policy process. “Not about them without - - - - - to work. Anything short of this will result in more of the same: some scattered policy reforms policy scattered some same: the of more in result will this of short Anything work. to plots to ensure that those who want to farm, full-time or part-time, have a place to live and land garden and lots, home farming, for access” land “minimum a and accumulate, can individuals should guide such policies: a “land-size ceiling” that would limit how much land corporations and conflict and violence be resolved democratically. There are two across-the-board principles that the lynchpinthatlinksfourredistributivepolicies. is Representation place. in put be to need still bases institutional such countries other in while informed consent (FPIC); and so on—are established but are not harnessed and are contested, prior, free, consultation; mandatory processes; participatory information; to right tion—the are difficult,butnotimpossibletocarryout. violence. and conflict, tension, of roots agrarian the attacking really not but some, benefitting then, and now there, and here In short, only through system-wide, interconnected, social-justice-oriented land policies will 23 In Asia, as elsewhere, system-wide redistributive land policies land redistributive system-wide elsewhere, as Asia, In 22

247 | Resource conflict and democratic land governance 248 | Resource conflict and democratic land governance net/profile/Saturnino_Borras the Philippines, and Myanmar. His latest publications can be found at Cambodia, Vietnam, China, in conflicts land on research field conducted has He (2014–2018). mitigation policies, resource change grabbing, and climate conflict inof Cambodia, Myanmar, intersection and thethe Philippines on (DFID) UK the and (NWO) Netherlands the by funded research coordinates He (TNI). Institute Transnational Amsterdam-based the of fellow a and Social Studies (ISS), The Hague; Adjunct Professor at the China Agricultural University, Beijing; Saturnino M. Borras Jr. is Professor of Agrarian Studies at the International Institute of Institute International the at Studies Agrarian of Professor is Jr. Borras M. Saturnino . Saturnino M.BorrasJr.Saturnino https://www.researchgate. 4 3 2 1 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 Notes Jennifer C. Franco, Sofia Monsalve, and Saturnino and Monsalve, Sofia Franco, C. Jennifer 305–324. Journal of Development Studies agenda,” research action collaborative and land grabbing and conflict: towards a landscape-based mitigation, change “Climate al., et Hunsberger Carol Publications, 2011). Benefits? Equitable Interest in Farmland: Can It Yield Sustainable and Byerlee, Derek and Deininger Klaus and Forests,” Fisheries Land, of Tenure of Governance Responsible Philip Seufert, “The FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the and InclusiveLandPolicymaking inMyanmar:A al., et Franco Jennifer Peasant Studies building in the Burma-China borderlands,” military-state and concessions resource partnerships, military-private capitalism: “Ceasefire Woods, Kevin Antipode possession and the Protection of Surplus Populations,” Tania Murray Li, “To Make Live or Let Die? Rural Dis Studies resistance,” peasant and relations power interventions, state globalization, neoliberal between interactions Bangladesh: deltaic in lation accumu primitive and grabs “Land Adnan, Shapan Journal ofPeasant Studies nature?” of appropriation new a Grabbing: “Green Scoones, Ian and Leach, Melissa Fairhead, James sources,” Re Water Finite of (Re)appropriation the on Focus Grabbing? Water Issue: Special the to “Introduction Lyla Mehta, Gert Jan Veldwisch, and Jennifer Franco, escalate toviolence. resistance, leading to full-scale conflict that can easily that triggers ordinary villagers to mount overt or covert how much is taken from villagers, but how much is left not often is it us, reminds Scott as settings, agrarian many In 1977). Press, University Yale Haven: (New Scott, C. James 41, no.4(2014):593–612. deals,” land global in sion Nikita Sud, “The men in the middle: a missing dimen mitigation.” 2011); Hunsberger et al., “Land-based climate change Perspective A Transnational Southeast Asia: in Controversy Oil eds., Pye, Oliver and Bhattacharya Jayati of PeasantStudies and commodities: implications for research,” crops flex of rise “The al., et Jr. Borras M. Saturnino Ibid. Change Towns to Special Economic Zones,” Michael Levien, “Regimes of Dispossession: From Steel Development and ‘Unproductive’ Uplands in the Philippines,” ‘Idle’ the of Constructions and Economy Green “The Marvin Joseph F. Montefrio and Wolfram H. Dressler, bility rights,” human and control land “Democratic Jr., Borras M. 15(August2015):66–71. 40no.1(2013):87–128. 44,no.2(2013):381–407. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustaina in Environmental Opinion Current 41,no.S1(2009):66–93. Water Alternatives (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Asian Southeast of (Institute 79(March2016):114–126. Globalizations 38,no.4(2011):747–770. The Moral Economy of the Peasant 43,no.1(2016):93–115. (Washington, DC: World Bank World DC: (Washington, The Challenge of Democratic Journal ofPeasant Studies 39, no. 2 (2012): 237–261. 10, no. 1 (2013): 181–186. 5, no. 2 (2012): 193–207; Journal of Peasant Journal 38, no. 3 (2017): 3 no. 38, Development and Rising Global Rising Journal of Canadian The Palm Journal World World - - - - -

22 21 20 19 18 17 23 used either in favor of or against the interests of poor of interests the against or of favor in either used be can which FPIC, is instruments governance these A key and principal example of the contested nature of bility rights,” human and control land “Democratic Jr., Borras M. Saturnino and Monsalve, Sofia Franco, Jennifer Globalizations Context and Competing Political Views and Strategies,” of Land Grabbing: Changing International Agricultural Governance Global of Challenge “The Wang, Chunyu and Franco, C. Jennifer Jr., Borras M. Saturnino Institute, 2009). (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Opportunities and Risks tries: Developing Coun in Investors grabbing” by Foreign Meinzen-Dick, Ruth and Braun von Joachim Economic Review Rush’?” ‘Land Global the Drives “What Ibid.; Rabah Arezki, Klaus Deininger, and Harris Selod, farmland. Bayerlee, and Deininger sterdam: TransnationalInstitute,2015). Response to the Draft National Land Use Policy Center, 2004). cies, Poli State Misdirected and Landlessness Conflict: Jr., Borras M. Saturnino and Gutierrez ofAgrarian Change Conflict in Mindanao, Southern Philippines,” Violent Contemporary of Roots Agrarian “The Jr., Lara Francisco and Jr., Borras M. Saturnino Vellema, Sietze see Mindanao, in conflict violent historical the For a related analysis and proposition in the context of Institute, 2014). text ofgloballandgrabs and InformedConsent (FPIC) inthe Free Prior con Franco, Jennifer See Philippines. the in conflicts resource in demonstrated Franco as people, Policy Studies no. 8 (Washington, DC: East-West 15(2015),66–71. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustaina in Environmental Opinion Current 10,no.1(2013),161–179. 29,no.2(2015),207–233. 11, no. 3 (2011): 298–320; Eric 298–320; (2011): 3 no. 11, (Amsterdam: Transnational (Amsterdam: Rising global interest in interest global Rising , IFPRI Policy Brief 13 Brief Policy IFPRI , World Bank Reclaiming The Moro Journal “Land (Am - - - - -

249 | Resource conflict and democratic land governance