From the Islamic State to the Messiah's Global Government: Structures of the Final World Order According to Contemporary Sunni and Shiíte Discourses

Home , Khadem (caste), World government

The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters

Citation Khadem, Babak (Ali) Rod. 2017. From the Islamic State to the Messiah's Global Government: Structures of the Final World Order According to Contemporary Sunni and Shiíte Discourses. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences.

Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:42061520

Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA

FROM THE ISLAMIC STATE TO THE MESSIAH’S GLOBAL GOVERNMENT:

STRUCTURES OF THE FINAL WORLD ORDER

ACCORDING TO CONTEMPORARY SUNNĪ AND SHĪ’ITE DISCOURSES

A dissertation presented by Babak (Ali) Rod Khadem to The Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations

Harvard University Cambridge Massachusetts

October, 2016

Advisors: Baber Johansen and David Cook Babak (Ali) Rod Khadem

From the Islamic State to the Messiah’s Global Government: Structures of the Final World Order According to Contemporary Sunnī and Shī’ite Discourses

Abstract

This dissertation exposes a genre of Islamic thought that has remained unstudied in academic scholarship: Islamic conceptions of “final world order.” At the intersection of political and apocalyptic thought, “final world order” refers to the theories that Islamic movements posit regarding the future global government to be established during the final chapter of history. The theories of four movements (ISIS, the Islamic Republic of

Iran, the Iraqi Ṣadrists, and the Egyptian ‘Awaited-Mahdī Party’) are compared across the following domains: (Chapter I) the final political structure, especially political form, geography, and administration; (Chapter II) the final legal system, including law, policy, and jurisprudence; (Chapter III) the final economic system, including science, technology, and transactions, and (Chapter IV) the final social order, including individuals, groups, and the collective. Overall, it is argued that apparently similar movements can have starkly differing theories of final order, and that two debates therein have especially high existential stakes: first is whether the structures of the final order will be regressive or progressive, and second is whether the final order (and humanity) will survive for merely a few years prior to apocalyptic destruction, or will endure for longer horizon. It is argued that Islamic movements approach these debates according to four patterns (reversionism, progressivism, revanchism, and idealism) which correlate primarily to each movement’s ideological orientation rather than its current political or socio-economic status.

iii

Table of Contents

Introduction Exposing Islamic Theories of “Final World Order”: Objective, Methodology, and Source Selection………………. 1

Chapter I The Final Political Structure: Form, Geography, and Administration……………………….. 51

Chapter II The Final Legal System: Jurisprudence, Law, and Policy………………………………. 111

Chapter III The Final Economy: Science, Technology, and Transactions………………………. 158

Chapter IV The Final Society: The Individual, Group, and Collective………………………... 211

Conclusion Overall Summary: Framework, Patterns, and Further Questions…………………. 255

Appendix A The First Problematic: Analytic Framework………………….. 269

Appendix B The Third Problematic: Analytic Framework………………… 271

Appendix C Outline of Contents of Tārīkh mā ba'd ul-ẓuhūr by Muḥammad Ṣādiq Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr…………………………... 273

Bibliography ………………………………………………………………… 275

“First there will be Prophethood… Then Caliphate, on the Prophetic model… Then harsh kingship… Then tyrannical kingship… Then Caliphate again, on the Prophetic model…”1

“Our government will be the final government; All other rulers will already have ruled before us; Tthus, when they witness our method of governance, They will be unable to claim: ‘If only we had been given the opportunity to rule, We, too, would have ruled in this manner!’”2

1 A Sunnī tradition located in numerous compilations, see e.g., M. Nāṣir a-Dīn Albani, al-Silsilah al-ṣaḥiḥah (2004) at Vol. 1, no. 5. 2 A Shī’ite tradition located in numerous compilations. See, e.g., M. Bāqir Majlisī, Biḥār al-anwār (2007) at vol. 52, p. 244. v

—INTRODUCTION—

EXPOSING ISLAMIC THEORIES OF FINAL WORLD ORDER: OBJECTIVES, METHODOLOGY, AND SOURCE -SELECTION

A. Objectives

This study introduces an area of contemporary Islamic thought that has thus far remained unexamined in the secular academic context, namely Islamic conceptions of the final world order, in its multifaceted dimensions of political, legal, economic, and social structures. Situated at the intersection of Islamic political and apocalyptic thought, the concept of final world order refers, in the first instance, to the theories that Islamic movements and thinkers posit regarding the future global government to be established during the final chapter of humanity’s history. Nearly all such thinkers and movements presume that this future world order will be inaugurated after the successful completion of global apocalyptic battles, that this world order will then endure for some stretch of time, and that it will subsequently collapse as part of the universal destruction of

Judgment Day. As such, “final world order” represents the final chapter in humanity’s history, and theories thereof are tantamount to utopian (or dystopian) conceptions of humanity’s grand destiny.

Given its apocalyptic dimension, this topic of final world order may, ostensibly, appear to be a purely esoteric dimension of Islamic thought and might therefore be easily dismissed as irrelevant to immediate political, social, or religious concerns. This, however, would constitute a grave misunderstanding of the topic at hand, for two reasons.

First, many theories of final order—including several of the ones examined in the present study—are espoused by thinkers or movements that are not only prominent but often

quite disruptive in the scene of contemporary world politics. Second, and more importantly, most theories of final world order not only posit visions of the ultimate utopia, but also address precursor forms of world order insofar as they are understood to be teleological antecedents to the final order. Foremost among these precursors is the contemporary, Westphalian order of nation-states, the legitimacy of which is fiercely contested within overall discourses on the final world order. Indeed, these debates reveal fundamental differences in the contemporary landscape of political Islam, but insofar as academic and policy analyses neglect discourses on the final world order, these distinctions are necessarily conflated and thus passed over.

Although Islamic theories of final world government are remarkably varied, several topoi are nearly ubiquitous, invoked by groups as disparate as ISIS and the

Islamic Republic of Iran, both of which claim to be harbingers of the final order:

- First is that the final order will be established by two messianic protagonists:

the Mahdī and Jesus Christ (upon his second coming). ISIS, for instance,

predicts that it will pass its “banner” to Jesus Christ,3 and elsewhere claims to

be the “army” that will eventually “pass on the banner to the slave of Allah,

the Mahdī.”4 Similarly, the Islamic Republic of Iran asserts that “we place this

Revolution in the hands of the Mahdī…[to] pave the way for his arrival”5 and

predicts that “the Mahdī will appoint Jesus Christ as his representative...”6

3 Abū Muḥammad al-Adnānī, This is the Promise of God (2014) at 8. 4 Dabiq, Issue 4 (September, 2014) at 35. See also, Dabiq Issue 5 (October, 2014) at 40, quoting the tradition reported in Ṣaḥiḥ Muslim (“if there were not left except a day from the world, Allah would lengthen that day to send forth on it a man from my family whose name matches my name [Muḥammad] and whose father’s name matches my father’s name [‘Abdullāh]. He will fill the Earth with justice and fairness as it was filled with oppression and tyranny”). Likewise, in Issue 5, ISIS quotes Abū Mus’ab al-Zarqāwī’s claim that the movement has lit the “spark” that will lead to the End Times battle of Dābiq (“The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify – by Allah’s permission – until it burns the crusader armies in Dābiq”). 5 Statement made by Ayatollah Khomeini shortly after the Islamic Revolution of Iran. 6 Tabasī (see Footnote 85, infra) at 86. 2

- Second is the universal jurisdiction and justice of the final world order,

enshrined in the tradition, cited frequently by both ISIS and the Islamic

Republic of Iran, that the Mahdī will “fill the earth with justice and fairness as

it was filled with oppression and tyranny.”7

- Third is social harmony and egalitarianism, exemplified in ISIS’s depiction of

final government as “a state where the Arab and non-Arab, the white man and

black man, the Easterner and Westerner are all brothers”8—or the Iranian

theorists’ explanation that the Mahdī will “reform the entire world…defeat of

the forces of tyranny in their entirety…remove prejudices and wrong attitudes

from the minds of the people, so that they can all live in peace and harmony

under the government of God.” 9

- Fourth is material prosperity, suggested in ISIS’s quotation from a tradition

stating that, “The sky will be permitted to pour its rain and the land to yield its

plants, so even if you were to plant a seed on a stone, it would spring”10—or

the Iranian theorists’ quotation of the similar tradition that “The sky will be

permitted to let rain fall and the earth to produce crops; if a seed be thrown on

Mount Safa, it would surely grow.”11

- Fifth is finality, emphasized by ISIS in statements such as “this state…is a

marvel of history that has come about to pave the way for…the grand battle

7 This Islamic tradition is common to both Shī’ite and Sunnī canonical scriptures. See, e.g., Ṣaḥiḥ Muslim and Biḥār al-Anwār. 8 Dabiq, Issue 1 (June, 2014) at 7. 9 Amīnī (see Footnote 87, infra) at 187. 10 Dabiq, Issue 7 (January, 2015) at 23. 11 Tabasī at 193. 3

prior to the Hour,”12 or by the assertion by a scholar in the Islamic Republic

that the Mahdī’s final government will “last until the end of the world, there

will be no government afterwards...it is the last stage of the world prior to the

Signs of the Hour.”13

While such topoi have been recognized by scholars in Middle Eastern and Islamic

Studies (“MES”), Islamic theories of world order per se, particularly the theorized structures of that order, have thus far remained unexamined in academic scholarship, for several reasons. First, classicists within MES have not examined the topic because did not exist as an independent area of speculation in classical Islamic thought, for while classical sources mention the topoi of final world order, they generally lack commentary on its details and structures, offering instead only terse and ambiguous (if not contradictory) statements. These classical sources, for instance, varyingly invest the

Mahdī with authority lesser than, equal to, or even greater than that of a Prophet, and his rank in relationship to those of Jesus Christ is likewise left opaque.14 The reigns of the

Mahdī and Christ are, likewise, ambiguous, for not only are various time periods suggested, but some statements assert that the Mahdī will be succeeded by subsequent

“Mahdīs”—which in turn obfuscates the question of whether the universal justice and prosperity of the final world order will be temporary or will endure its full breadth.15

Statements regarding the social of the final order equally support the conclusion that all

12 Dabiq, Issue 3 (July, 2014) at 6 (quoting Abū Mus’ab al-Zarqāwī’s statement, “I have no doubt that this state, which has gathered the bulk of the muhājirīn in Shām and has become the largest collection of muhājirīn in the world, is a marvel of history that has only come about to pave the way for al-Malhamah al-Kubrā [Armageddon]”). 13 ‘Alī Kūrānī, ‘Aṣr al-ẓuhūr (1987) at 268-270. 14 See, e.g., Nuʻaym b. Ḥammād Khuzāʻī (died in 843), Kitāb al-fitan (1993) at 250-1, 386-394; Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm Nuʻmānī (wrote between 874-941), Kitāb al-ghaybah (2011) at 290, 236-40, 337; Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan Ṭūsī (died in 1067), Kitāb al-ghaybah (2008) at 280-285; Yūsuf b. Yaḥya Sulamī (wrote in 13th century), ‘Iqd al-durar fī akhbār al-muntaẓar (1985) at 29-32. 15 Khuzāʻī at 252, 268-9, 276, 281-282, 395, 432-450; Nuʻmānī at 240, 353-5; Ṭūsī at 280-285; Sulamī at 28, 92-93; Aḥmad b. Jaʻfar “Ibn al-Munādī” (died in 947), al-Malāḥim (1998) at 177-180, 183-5, 193-199, 268-276. 4

convert to Islam, some convert to Islam, or that Islam itself is altogether abrogated and replaced. 16 Equally unclear is the duration of final world order, which at times is suggested as lasting only the lifetimes of the Mahdī and Christ (whose lifespans are themselves unclear), at other times are described as enduring beyond their deaths for decades or even centuries (and still at other times is described, rather cryptically, as lasting only a few years, yet the nature of time during that era changes such that each year stretches to a millennium). In short, statements in classical sources regarding the nature of final world government are typically sparse, ambiguous, and contradictory—hardly enough to justify a coherent research agenda on the part of MES scholars who focus on classical Islam.

While the topic of final world order emerges as a distinct area of Islamic thought in the modern era, MES scholars with a modern focus have also left the topic unexamined.

This is perhaps owing to the inherent challenges of interdisciplinarity, for the topic at hand lies at the intersection of modern Islamic political and apocalyptic thought, both of which constitute two relatively new subfields within MES. Scholars within each subfield, however, have been fully occupied with basic foundational research, thus leaving their mutual areas of intersection uncharted. For instance, scholars of modern political thought, such as Hamid Enayat and Abdallah Balqaziz, have focused their primary attention on recent and near term, and secondarily on longer term, political objectives of Islamic movements (e.g., the post-WWI political crisis that occurred with the dissolution of the

Ottoman Caliphate; the concept of Islamic nation-state; Islamic reactions to nationalism,

16 Khuzāʻī at 249, 251, 254, 281, 382, 386-393; Nuʻmānī at 243, 252-3; Ṭūsī at 280-285; Sulamī at 20, 26, 32-54; 132; 160-3. 5

democracy, and socialism; rule of law and constitutionalism; etc.). 17 These studies, however, have devoted minimal focus to conceptions of the apocalyptic era, which is precisely where the topic of final world order is situated. Conversely, scholars of modern

Islamic apocalyptic thought, such as David Cook, Jean-Pierre Filiu, and Abbas Amanat, have been fully engaged with accounting for the core features of their field (e.g. nuances and variations among apocalyptic narratives; the cast of messianic champions and villains; trends in the apocalyptic interpretation of current events; historical variations; etc.).18 Inquiry into the structures and details of the End Times government, however, has presumably remained outside the scope of their research to date.19

A further, indirect obstacle to the scholarly examination of this topic is that differentiating between various Islamic theories of final world order presupposes a nuanced grasp of categorical differences across the broad landscape of Islamic thought.

Foremost among these differences are those of Sunnism versus Shī’ism, clergy versus laymen, and status quo versus the disenfranchised. All of these groupings comprise areas of research that are, to greater or lesser degrees, still formative within modern MES research. In particular, the understanding of sectarian differences has been limited by the fact that Shī’ism itself constitutes a new area of study in MES, having attracted serious research interest only after Iran’s Islamic Revolution. Though recent scholarship by the likes of Momen, Sachedina, Arjomand, Keddi, Cole, and Modarressi has shed much light on core features of Shī’ite history, theology, political thought, and jurisprudence, the

17 See generally, Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (2009); Abdallah Balqaziz, The State in Contemporary Islamic Thought: a Historical Survey of the Major Muslim Political Thinkers of the Modern Era (2009). See also, Mavani, Hamid. Religious Authority and Political Thought in Twelver Shi'ism: From Ali to Post-Khomeini (2013). 18 See, generally, David Cook, Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic (2002); David Cook, Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature (2008); Jean-Pierre Filiu, Apocalypse in Islam (2011); Abbas Amanat, Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shī’ism (2009); Abbas Amanat, Imagining the End: Visions of Apocalypse from the Ancient Middle East to Modern America (2011). 19 Among these authors, David Cook appears to be the only one to explicitly address this gap in the field, in his chapter entitled “The Messianic Age” in Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic at 145-159. 6

assimilation of this research within the overall field of MES is still in process. Categorical differences between Shī’ism and Sunnism are therefore still being accounted for, while nuanced differences implicating questions of world order remain understudied.

Unsurprisingly, popular and policy-oriented literature has likewise failed to account for Islamic theories of final world order, and has therefore remained incapable of exposing the final political objectives of Islamic movements. For example, Graeme

Wood’s article in The Atlantic, entitled What ISIS Really Wants,20 observes two facts about ISIS: that it seeks to reestablish Caliphal world order, and that it anticipates an imminent apocalypse. Yet he fails to address the relationship between these two facts: what governmental structures does ISIS envision within this apocalyptic world order, and what are the interim stages between that order and the current ISIS caliphate? Likewise,

Lawrence Wright’s article in The New Yorker, entitled The Master Plan, traces the six stages21 of Al-Qaeda’s 20-year strategy, beginning with 9/11 and culminating in a global caliphate that will “lead the human race once again to the shore of safety and the oasis of happiness.”22 Wright remarks that this strategy constitutes an “apocalyptic agenda,” yet this statement is conclusory, for he offers no detail on apocalyptic elements, let alone proposed structures of apocalyptic government. The same questions are unaddressed in

Shī’ite-oriented analyses, such Mehdi Khalaji’s “Apocalyptic Politics: on the Rationality of Iranian Policy,” wherein he describes the Mahdī as “the savior of Muslims who will appear at the end of days and establish a just world government,” yet offers no details of

20 Graeme Wood, What ISIS Really Wants and How to Stop It, The Atlantic, March 2015. 21 These six stages are: the Awakening, the Eye-Opening, Arising and Standing, Demise of Arab Governments, Declaration of Caliphate, and Total Confrontation. See Lawrence Wright, The Master Plan, The New Yorker, September 11, 2006 (citing from Fouad Hussein, al-Zarqāwī: al-jīl al-thānī lil-Qāʻidah (2005)). 22 Lawrence Wright, supra (quoting al-Qaeda). 7

the proposed structures of this just government.23 Likewise, Wali Nasr’s book, The Shia

Revival, states that “the Shia believe that…the return of this Mahdī…will herald the end of time and the advent of perfect divine justice…there will be a reign of justice until the return of Jesus, at which time the world will end.”24 He neglects, however, to describe the details of the theorized government that will inaugurate this “reign of justice.”25

In short, although Islamic theories of the final order can shed important light on both the immediate and ultimate goals of various Islamic movements and thinkers, the topic has remained largely unexamined within MES. So long as it continues to be neglected, academic and policy analyses of Islamic movements and Islamic thinkers will acknowledge merely the superficial rhetoric and topoi of final world order rather than its theorized structures and precursors, and will therefore continue to conflate important differences s within the overall landscape of contemporary Islamic thought. Proper exposition of the topic of final world order, however, promises to reveal important differences within this landscape, to expose the areas of discourse that are of the greatest potential disruption to the present order of nation-states, and to disclose the problems that are least resolved and most debated within the Islamic discourses themselves and which therefore represent opportunities for external dialogue and engagement.

B. General and Specific Methodologies

The present study attempts to bridge these gaps by providing an initial account of

Islamic theories of the final world order. In exposing this topic, a conceptual framework

23 Mehdi Khalaji, Apocalyptic Politics: on the Rationality of Iranian Policy (2008) at 34. 24 Wali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts will Shape Islam in the Future (2007) at 69. 25 Furthermore, Nasr makes the partially incorrect contrast regarding sectarian conceptions of the Mahdī, stating that, “Sunnīs do not believe in the second coming of a particular individual whose advent will culminate in the end of the world.” Id. at 69. While Nasr is correct to observe that the Sunnī conception of the Mahdī is bereft of the concept of a “second coming” (for the Sunnī conception of Mahdī is devoid of the notion of Occultation) it does, however, typically involve the notion of the apocalyptic end. 8

must be employed in order to organize what would otherwise be a wide and disorienting array of differing views.

1. General Methodology: Three Sequential Problematics of Modality and Time

Islamic discourses on final world order can be divided conceptually into three overarching and sequential problematics which correspond to the phases before, during, and after the final world order. Within each of these three problematics, Islamic theories can then be analyzed according to the two variables of temporality and modality which, for reasons described below, are arguably the two most decisive differentiators of competing theories. Together, these divisions yield a conceptual framework comprising three sequential problematics of time and modality. Although the present study concerns only the second of these three problematics, the remainder of this subsection outlines all three in order to illustrate the broad conceptual range of the Islamic discourses.

Figure 1: Islamic Theories of Final World Order: the Three Sequential Problematics

Islamic theories of final world order

1. Before the final 2. During the final 3. After the final world order world order world order

Time Time Time Modality Modality Modality

(i) Before the Final World Order: the Problem of Precursors

This first problematic concerns the question of teleological precursors or antecedents to the final world order. The primary matter at stake in this regard is whether the current, Westphalian order of nation-states constitutes a valid or illegitimate

instrument for actualizing the final world order, and consequently, whether contemporary

Islamic movements should adopt an attitude of tolerance versus intransigence towards the present Westphalian order. To this end, it should be noted that Islamic scriptures themselves suggest the concept that the final world order will be preceded by a series of predestined, teleological precursor forms of world order—such as the Sunnī tradition stating that “First there will be Prophethood…then Caliphate, on the Prophetic model…then harsh kingship…then tyrannical kingship…then [again] Caliphate, on the

Prophetic model…,”26 or the Shī’ite tradition stating that “Our government will be the final government; all other rulers will already have ruled before us; thus, when they witness our method of governance, they will be unable to claim: ‘if only we had been given the opportunity to rule, we, too, would have ruled in this manner!’”27 While Sunnī and Shī’ite theorists alike28 accept the notion of teleological precursors to the final world order, why do certain Islamic movements and thinkers accommodate the present world order of nation-states, while others are vehemently opposed to not only the Sykes-Picot division of the Middle East, but indeed the very concept of the nation-state as the basis for contemporary world order?

Disputes among various Islamic movements and theorists regarding these questions largely derive from differing conceptions of modality and temporality. The variable of modality, on the one hand, concerns the debate over the legitimate modes or

26 See Footnote 1, supra. 27 See Footnote 2, supra. 28 The Shī’ite theorist, Amīnī, for instance, states that “In every age, human government has appeared in different forms and shapes…These forms of government need to exhaust themselves in order for humans to realize that enough is enough, and that it is time for God's government” (Amīnī at 180). This is echoed by the Sunnī theorist, Maulana Maudidi, who states that “Before the worldy life of the human race comes to an end…disappointed and woe-stricken man, after testing all the “isms” of his own making, will be constrained to take refuge in the “ism” of Allah, and that this will become possible through the efforts of a Great Leader who will…enforce Islam entirely in its original pure form” (Sayyid Maulana Maududi, A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in Islam (2009) at 38-40). 10

forms of these precursors: do only political forms from the Islamic past (e.g., Caliphate or

Imamate) qualify as legitimate antecedents to the final world order, or do “novel,” non-

Islamic forms, such as the present, Westphalian order of nation-states, also qualify? On the other hand, the variable of time concerns concerns the question: when will the era of precursors to the final world order expire, yielding to the final world order itself?

Conceptions of this variable of time can vary greatly, ranging from expectations of the imminent advent of the final order, to a deflection of the final order to the distant future, and naturally have a direct impact on the attitude of patience versus urgency that a movement or thinker will adopt towards their pursuit of ultimate political goals.

(ii) During the Final World Order: the Problem of Structures

This second problematic—which constitutes the focus of the present study— concerns the time period during which the final world order itself is presumed to have become established, and involves consideration of its political, legal, economic, and social structures. The primary matter at stake in this problematic is the question of whether the various structures of this final world order (political, legal, economic, social) will be progressive or regressive in nature. As with the first problematic, theoretical disagreements regarding this second problematic derive largely from differing views concerning temporality and modality. In the case of this second problematic, the variable of temporality concerns the question: will the final world order last for merely a few short years, or will it endure for a much longer time stretch? The variable of modality, on the other hand, concerns whether the mode or form of the final world order will revert to that of the pristine Islamic past (e.g. Caliphate, Imamate, etc.) or will surpass the political forms of Islamic history and reach novel and unprecedented heights. To this end, some

Islamic traditions suggest the former (e.g. the Sunnī tradition cited above, which notes that the final order will be “Caliphate, on the Prophetic model”) while other traditions suggest the latter (e.g. numerous Shī’ite traditions emphasizing that the Mahdī, as founder of the final world order, will establish and implement “a new System, a new Law, and a new Book”).29

(iii) After the Final World Order: the Problem of the End

This third problematic concerns what follows the final world order: namely, the collapse of the final world order, and the demise of humanity, due to the universal destruction of Judgment Day. The primary matter at stake herein is the proper existential outlook that contemporary Islamic movements and thinkers should adopt towards humanity’s ultimate destiny: nihilism and pessimism, on the one hand, or idealism and optimism, on the other.

As with the first and second problematics, this third problematic is also largely reducible to the variables of temporality and modality. In this case, the variable of temporality concerns the question of whether the concept of ‘end’ is to be literally understood as the end of time and humanity due to the destruction of the physical cosmos, or rather has a metaphorical meaning, suggesting the end of an era or epoch of history, and the birth of a new beginning. On the other hand, the variable of modality concerns the proximate causes of this end, and whether this conclusion amounts to the “success” of the final world order, or its failure and miscarriage. Why, in other words, must the final world order—which, after all, is presumed to have been an era of universal justice, prosperity, and goodness—come to an end? In this regard, a commonly held view, among

29 See, e.g., Nu’mānī at 102, 122; 139; Majlisī, III at 194. 12

both Sunnīs and Shī’ites, is that the final end is caused by the wrath of God, as incurred by the depravity and degradation of humanity. This view of continuous human decline30 is often associated with the tradition stating that, “The best of the people are my generation, then those after them, then those after them...”31 More explicitly, numerous traditions support this view of decline, such as, “Near the establishment of the Hour, good deeds will decrease,” 32 and “Near the establishment of the Hour…religious knowledge will be taken away, and general ignorance will spread….It will be from among the most wicked people who will be living at the time when the Hour will be established.”33 Other traditions, however, suggest the counter-concept that the final end will coincide with a general rise and improvement in the condition of humanity—such as,

“My community is like the rain, I do not know whether the first of it is better or the last of it,”34 “The best of my community are the first and the last, and between them there will be some crookedness”35 and “from the time of my Saints until the Day of Resurrection, the days will not alternate.”36

2. Specific Methodology for this Study (i.e. the Second Problematic)

Among the three sequential problematics of modality and time, the present study focuses exclusively on the second problematic—i.e. the time period “during” the final world order itself, and the debate over whether its structures will be progressive or regressive. In addressing this problematic, the chapters of this study will explore Islamic theories of final world order across the following four domains:

30 It should be noted that even the Islamic concept of “Renewal” [tajdid] remains committed to this theory of historical decline, inasmuch as Renewers [mujaddidun] merely punctuates the decline of history with temporary, episodic moments of improvement. 31 Bukhārī, Ḥadīths, Volume 50, #832-833. 32 Bukhārī, Ḥadīths, Volume 9, Book 88, #183. 33 Bukhārī, Ḥadīths, Volume 9, Book 88, #187. 34 Ibn Taymīyyah, Majmū’ al-Fatāwa, 11-370, 371. 35 Ibid. 36 See Ṣadr (Footnotes 105 and 106, infra) at 661 (citing Shaykh al-Mufīd, Kitāb al-Irshād at 344). 13

- Chapter I: What is the political structure of the final world order, particularly

its political form, geography, and the nature of its administration? How does

this political structure compare to conventional Islamic as well as secular

theories of poltical order (e.g., democracy, autocracy, etc.)?

- Chapter II: What is the legal system of the final world order, particularly its

jurisprudence, public policies, and positive laws? How does this legal system

compare to conventional Islamic legal systems, as well as secular national and

international legal systems?

- Chapter III: What is the economic system of the final world order—

specifically, the status of, and relationships between, science, technology, and

transactions? How do accounts of the final economy compare to conventional

Islamic economics, as well as to secular economic systems (e.g., capitalism,

socialism, etc.)?

- Chapter IV: What is the final social order: will it be homogenous or diverse?

Specifically, what will be the status of identity groups based upon biology (e.g.

ethnicity, gender, etc.) and ideology (e.g., religion, political beliefs, etc.)? If

diversity persists in these domains, will it be egalitarian? How do accounts of

the final society compare to traditional Islamic, as well as modern secular,

conceptions?

Throughout these chapters, this study employs the labels of “conservative,”

“moderate,” and “radical” in order to describe modal and temporal variations across

Islamic theories. These three labels are, admittedly, only one way of describing the variables of time and modality, and are adopted herein for heuristic purposes. But how

should these labels be defined? In other words, within discourses on structures of the final world order, what would a “conservative” theory be conserving, and, conversely, what would a “radical” theory be disrupting? This study argues that the soundest point of reference for grounding these definitions is the 7th-Century polity established by the

Prophet himself. The justification for this choice is clear: inasmuch as this study considers Islamic theories of the future utopia, the 7th-Century polity established by the

Prophet himself provides an alternative Islamic utopia, albeit within the past. As such, the labels of conservative, moderate, and radical should describe the degree to which any given theory of the future utopia conserves or disrupts the past utopia established by the

Prophet. (Naturally, these labels of conservative-moderate-radical would need to be redefined for the first and third problematics, as suggested in Appendix A and Appendix

B of this Study).

Thus, for the variable of modality:

 “Conservative” describes theories that conceive of the final world order as

a return or regression, in its most essential dimensions, to the structures of

the Prophet’s 7th century polity (though secondary features may be

different, as indicated in the traditions). A corollary to this view is both an

implicit and explicit affirmation of the continuity of Islam within the final

order, by way of the Mahdī’s (and Christ’s) subservience to the authority

of the Prophet Muḥammad. This subservience is not merely rhetorical, but

also manifests practically, in their curtailed legislative and political

functions.

 “Moderate” denotes theories that conceive of the final world order as

surpassing the Prophet’s polity in its core structures, and therefore being an

unprecedented achievement of progress in humanity’s history. Although

the final world order will remain Islamic in identity, this Islamicity is in

some respects merely nominal, for the novelty of the final order means that

certain fundamental doctrines and “systems” of conventional Islam will be

displaced and supplanted. This is due to the special qualities of the Mahdī

(and Christ), for although they are metaphysically subservient to the

Prophet Muḥammad, their practical accomplishments nonetheless exceed

those of the Prophet.

 “Radical” describes theories that conceive of the final order as not only

surpassing the Prophet’s polity and supplanting many systems of

conventional Islam, but as reaching such heights of progress that Islam will

be explicitly abrogated. This is due to a conception of the Mahdī (and

Christ) as being invested with the full authority ascribed to Prophets and

Messengers, and therefore as having plenary authority to inaugurate a post-

Islamic world order.

Likewise, for the variable of time:

 “Conservative” describes theories that conceive of the final order as

enduring merely throughout the reign of the Mahdī (and perhaps Christ),

just as the Prophet’s polity lasted only until the death of its founder. To this

end, the standard view is that the Mahdī will reign between seven and nine

years, after which point he will die, and the final end of the world will

quickly follow.

 “Moderate” denotes theories that conceive of the final order as enduring

beyond the ordinary reign of a single human being, either because of the

supernaturally long lifespan of the Mahdī, or because of successorship to

further leaders after the Mahdī’s ordinary death. Nonetheless, this overall

time period will remain rather limited in nature, lasting through the

leadership of only a few generations, to be followed by the final end of the

world.

 “Radical” describes theories that conceive of the final order as not only

outliving the Mahdī himself, but indeed as inaugurating an entirely new era

or millennium of humanity’s political history. This era will comprise an

extensive and far-reaching temporal arc—though it will, eventually, be

succeeded by the end of the world.

In aggregate, the above definitions of conservative-moderate-radical yield the following, generic framework that can be employed for categorizing theories of final world order—whereby box 1 represents the least disruption to the structures of the

Prophet’s 7th-Century polity, while box 9 represents the greatest disruption thereto:

Figure 2: Generic Framework for Analyzing Theories of Structures of the Final World Order

C. Scope of Analysis and Source Selection

1. Sunnī Regressivism and Progressivism; Shī’ite Revanchism and Idealism

Because this study is an initial exposition rather than exhaustive survey of Islamic theories of the final world order, it does not attempt to account for all nine categories within the framework depicted in Figure 2 above. Rather, the aim herein is to explore only the most prominent categories of contemporary, orthodox Sunnī and Shī’ite discourses, in order to establish a basic foundation for further and more comprehensive studies. This limitation in scope excludes consideration of all modally-radical theories (i.e. boxes 7, 8, and 9 in Figure 2) because modal-radicalism, by definition, presumes that

Islam is outright abrogated within the final world order. As such, modal-radicalism is considered heterodoxical, if not heretical, from the perspectives of both the Sunnī and

Shī’ite orthodoxies. Thus, although modally-radical theories—such as that of the

Bahá’is—comprise a conceptually rich corpus of source material, analysis thereof is beyond the scope of the present study. Furthermore, among the remaining categories, this

study considers only four orientations, two of which pertain to Sunnī discourses, and two of which pertain to Shī’ite discourses.

As a general matter, Sunnī discourses on final world order are dominated by competing conceptions of Caliphate, as represented in the debate between “regressivism” and “progressivism.” Regressivism, the majority or dominant view among Sunnī theories, represents the combination of modal conservatism plus temporal conservatism—that is, it presumes that the final order will revert to the structures of the Prophet’s 7th-Century polity, and that its time-span will be limited to the reign of its initial founder (i.e. only a handful of years). At the heart of regressivism is a conception of Caliphate which enshrines the pride and nostalgia of a ruling majority that was habituated to centuries of political dominance, and which therefore presumes that the early Islamic polity was and remains the political ideal. As such, final world order will, at best, be a return to this earlier condition of dominance.

To state it colloquially, regressivism is a position which asserts that final government will be nothing “new,” and it would be theologically suspect, if not blasphemous, to assert that it will somehow surpass the Prophet’s own polity, let alone that of the Rightly Guided Caliphs who succeeded him. Consonant with this notion,

Sunnī ḥadīths related to final government are minimal in their conceptual content, asserting little more than that Islam will, in the end, return to its beginning condition, and strongly curtail supernatural elements in the functions of the Mahdī and Jesus Christ, presenting them instead as having “ordinary” human functions, despite being the most fit and qualified to rule. Just as these founders of the final order are subject to the ordinary laws of biology, physics, and time, so are the structures of the final government generally

stripped of the supernatural and extraordinary (except for features explicitly mentioned in the traditions). In short, it appears to be due to these axioms of the doctrine of Caliphate that regressivism is the default Sunnī orientation concerning the final order.

Progressivism, in contrast, is a counter-conception of Caliphate advocated by a vocal Sunnī minority. Progressivism represents the combination of modal moderatism and temporal moderatism—i.e., it presumes that the final order will not only last for a longer time-stretch than the Prophet’s 7th-Century polity, but that it will also be more advanced in its various structures. Reflecting a liberal and modernist ethos, progressivism reinterprets the conventional Sunnī doctrine of Caliphate, such that the idealized “golden age” is understood to lie in the future rather than in the Islamic past. In other words, as important and glorious as the early Islamic polities may have been, the final world order will represent an unprecedented and progressive feat within humanity’s history.

Shī’ite discourses on final world order, however, are not concerned with the conception of Caliphate as such, and instead wrestle with a different set of underlying issues. In these discourses, the combination of modal moderatism and temporal moderatism, which represents a minority Sunnī view, is in fact the common or default orientation. This is due, in large part, to the fact that Shī’ite traditions, while inclusive of the ‘regressivist’ ḥadīths of Sunnism, also include numerous statements regarding the utter novelty and progressive nature of the Mahdī’s government. Typically conceiving of the Mahdī as a superhuman figure, most Shī’ite movements and thinkers presume that this final order will represent a stage of unprecedented advancement and utter novelty in human history, which is why Shī’ite parlance on the topic so often employs adjectives such as “new,” “wonderous,” “amazing,” “progressive,” “unprecedented,” and so forth.

In describing the Shī’ite discourses, however, this study does not label the combination of modal and temporal moderatism as progressivism, but rather as

“revanchism.” This is because the Shī’ite presumption is that although the final world order is indeed progressive in its structures, the purpose of this progress is to exact revenge for the past historical wrongs suffered by the Shī’ite community at the hands of the unjust world generally, and the Sunnī community in particular. As such, revanchism reflects the conventional or standard Shī’ite doctrine of Imāmate. Enshrining the thinking of a disenfranchised minority, this doctrine of Imāmate is essentially chiliastic—that is, it conceives of humanity’s golden age as not lying in the past, but rather deflects and defers it to the messianic future, when the Twelfth Imam emerges out of his Occultation. Thus, it is within the final world order that Shī’ism anticipates the long-awaited correction of historic injustices, by way of a polity that will vindicate the Shī’ite community, not only politically, but also socially, spiritually, and so forth. Insofar as the aim of this progress is to correct the injustices of the past, revanchism remains backward-looking, and in this way resembles Sunnī regressivism.

In contrast, idealism, which represents a minority view in the Shī’ite discourses, presumes a different purpose for the progress of the final world order. While echoing the modal moderatism of the revanchists, idealism is distinctive in its temporal radicalism, i.e. its presumption that the final order will not only last several generations, but rather will establish an entirely new millennium—or even multiple millennia—of future history.

Within this extraordinary time horizon, the revanchist aspiration of correcting past historical injustices is quickly relegated to a matter of tertiary importance. Rather, the primary purpose of the final world order is to advance humanity and transform the world

to such an extent that Islam itself, while being preserved nominally, will become virtually unrecognizable, whether in its Sunnī or Shī’ite variety.

Figure 3: Scope of this Study: the Sunnī and Shī’ite Default and Frontier Orientations

It should be emphasized, however, that until an exhaustive survey of Islamic theories is completed, these primary orientations within Sunnism (i.e. regressivism versus progressivism) and Shī’ism (i.e. revanchism versus idealism) remain suggestive rather than conclusive, and as such are assumed herein as working hypotheses. Furthermore, assuming that this hypothesis is correct, then Sunnī progressivism and Shī’ite revanchism should be recognized as particularly salient categories within the Islamic discourses, for they represent the area of modal and temporal overlap between the two sects. This juxtaposition is informative because it illustrates the fact that even among theorists who share the same underlying modal and temporal presumptions, sectarian differences nonetheless persist, owing to basic distinctions between Sunnism and Shī’ism in their canonical (e.g. ḥadīth) and doctrinal (e.g. theological, jurisprudential, etc.) provisions.

For example, in theories of the legal system of the final world order, the question of independent legal reasoning [ijtiḥād] is far more problematized in Sunnī discourses than

it is in the Shī’ite, owing to differences between contemporary Sunnī and Shī’ite jurisprudence. On the other hand, the question of judicial procedure is prominent in the

Shī’te treatment of the final legal system, but generally absent from the Sunnī, due to concepts present in Shī’ite ḥadīths which are absent from the latter. These and other basic differences in sectarian doctrine shall be identified throughout the Chapters of this study.

2. Selected Case-Studies

Limitations of scope restrict the present exploration regressivism, progressivism, revanchism, and idealism, to discrete case studies rather than exhaustive surveys of multiple theorists and movements. In this regard, it should be noted that Islamic literature on the topic of final world order, particularly in the Shī’ite context, includes a host of works that have not been reviewed by the present author, a sampling of which is provided in the footnote hereto.37 It is left to further research to analyze these and other similar works, sort them according to appropriate categories, and thereby provide a more comprehensive account of the topic at hand. Furthermore, the present method of source- selection involves an obvious limitation which should nonetheless be expressly stated: employment of single case studies belies the fact that accounts of structures can differ

37 A few among the many works not reviewed herein are: ʻAlī Ḥusaynī al-Ṣadr, al-Imām al-muntaẓar ʻalayhi al-salām: min wilādatihi ilá dawlatih [translatable as: “The Awaited Leader [Mahdī]: From His Birth To His Government”] (Qum, 2003/2004); Muḥammad Shawkī, Ākhir al-duwal: dirāsah fī al-dawlah al-ʻālamīyah lil-Imām al-Mahdī [translatable as: “The Last of the Governments: A Study of the Global Government of the Mahdī”] (2008/2009); Makārim Shīrāzī, al-Ḥukūmah al-ʻālamīyah lil-Imām al-Mahdī [translatable as: “The Global Government of the Mahdī”] (Beirut, 2009); Saʻīd ʻAdhārī, Maʻālim al-ḥukūmah fī ʻahd ẓuhūr al-Imām al-Mahdī [translatable as: “Features of Government During the Era of the Mahdī’s Advent”] (Beirut, 2010); Mahdī Shams al-Dīn, Ḥikāyāt al- shaykh Bahjat, al-ẓuhūr wa-al-dawlah wa-mā qablahumā wa-mā ba‘dahumā [translatable as: “Expositions of Grand Ayatollah Bahjat: the Mahdī’s Advent and Government—and That Which Precedes and Succeeds these Two Things”] (Beirut, 2010); al-Sayyid Murtaḍa al-Mujtaḥidī al-Sīstānī, Dawlat al-Imām al-Mahdī [translatable as: “The Government of the Mahdī”] (Qum, 2010); Khudāmurād Salīmīyān, Darsʹnāmah-i mahdavīyat, jild-i 3: Ḥaẓrat Mahdī az ẓuhūr tā ḥukūmat-i jahānī [translatable as: “A Textbook of Mahdism, Volume 3: From the Mahdī’s Advent Until Global Government”] (Qum, 2009-2011); Murtaḍa Ma’āsh, Dawlat al-Imām al-Mahdī wa Badā’il al-‘Awlima [brief essay; translatable as: “The Government of the Mahdī and Alternatives to Globalization”]; Lubna Taha Ismā’īl, al-Furṣah qādimah li-taghyīr al-ʻālam: al-ittijāh al-ḥaḍārī wa-al-idārī wa-al-iqtiṣādī al-mutawaqqaʻ fī ʻaṣr ẓuhūr al-Imām al- Mahdī [translatable as: “The Approaching Opportunity for Transforming the World: the Civilizational, Administrative, Economic Goals Expected in the Era of the Mahdī’s Advent”] (Beirut, 2011); Nāṭiq Saʻīd, Saqīfat al-ghaybah: dirāsah tafṣīlīyah lil-aḥdāth allatī waqaʻat baʻda ghaybat al-Imām al-Mahdī ʻalayhi al-salām [translatable as: “The Shelter of Occultation: Detailed Study of the Events to Pass After the Mahdī’s Occultation”] (Beirut, 2012); Sayyid Muḥammad Nūrbakhsh, Mahdīyān-i durūghīn: bih ẓamīmah-i sih risālah: Risālah dar sharḥ-i ḥadīth-i dawlatunā fī ākhar al-zamān, Risālah-i mubashshirah-i shāhīyah, Risālah-i al-hudá [translatable as: “Three Treatises Concerning False Mahdīs: On the Tradition Concerning ‘Our End-Times Government,’ On the Antecedents to Sovereignty, and On Proper Guidance”] (Tehran, 2012/2013). 23

considerably even among theorists of the same orientation. While further studies will almost certainly confirm these internal variations, the primary intention herein is to illustrate, through the selected sources, several general patterns which correlate to modal and temporal assumptions, as summarized in the Conclusion to this study.

In attempting to identify sources representing each of the four orientations, significant obstacles present themselves from the very outset, owing to stark differences in both the quantity and conceptual sophistication of Sunnī and Shī’ite theories. More specifically, the Shī’ite literature on the final world order appears, on the whole, to be far more plentiful, and to be dominated by both clergy and laymen, whereas Sunnī literature appears to be surprisingly scant, and to be produced primarily by laymen.38 Indeed, Sunnī silence on structures of the final order is so prevalent that certain Shī’ite scholars have even asserted (mistakenly) that speculation on the Mahdī’s government is entirely absent within Sunnī discourse.39

Why is Sunnī discourse on this topic relatively scanty? This appears to derive from disincentives latent within the very axioms of the Sunnī default orientation. As noted, regressivism asserts that the political mode or form of the final order will be essentially the same as the Prophet’s polity—thus, insofar as the latter are already fairly well understood, there is little need for prospective theorists to further speculate on the structures of the final order. Likewise, regressivism presumes that, like the Prophet’s government, the Mahdī’s government will last a mere handful of years, and will then swiftly end as part of the universal destruction of Judgment Day, amounting to a brief

38 This relative dearth of Sunnī speculation is particularly striking given the considerable attention paid by Sunnī theorists to the first problematic of final world order, described above. 39 See, e.g., Ṣadr (Footnotes 105 and 106, infra) at 642 (claiming that, “in the Sunnī [al-ā’ma] sources we find no trace of a government after the Mahdī”) and 651 (claiming that “in the reports of the Sunnīs, from our investigation, we find no reference to a government after the Mahdī”). 24

time-span that similarly deters speculation. As a result of these disincentives, the regressives tend to either remain silent on the structures of the final world order

(presumably viewing it as a waste of intellectual effort) or, at most, make occasional references to the topoi of final world order or cite traditions in that regard, but without commenting or speculating on the implications thereof. Typical statements in this regard are terse and formulaic, such as the following by Sirsāwī: “the Mahdī is a reformer at the end of time who rules according to the Qur’ān and Sunna, fills the earth with justice, rules for seven or eight years, the earth prospers during his reign, his name is

Muḥammad, he’s a descendant of Fāṭima.”40 Insofar as regressivism is the default Sunnī orientation, this tendency towards minimal speculation is standard among not only religious scholars, but also laymen, political movements, and even apocalyptic ‘novelists’ who write dramatic works for a popular audience (for although the latter write copiously about the apocalyptic dramas and battles that lead to the Mahdī’s victory, they mention very little about the world order after this victory).41

Within Sunnism, therefore, explicit speculation on structures of the final order is only worthwhile for those who adopt the frontier orientation of progressivism—for this orientation presumes that the mode of the final order will be unprecedented (thus surpassing the Prophet’s polity), and that it will last considerably longer than a mere handful of years, perhaps up to several generations. Both of these presumptions render speculation on the nature and structures of this order to be a worthy pursuit for aspiring theorists. Within Sunnism, however, the dominance of regressivism within the scholarly establishment means that progressivism is primarily relegated to laymen, particularly

40 Abū ‘Abdallah Māzin b. Muḥammad al-Sirsawī, Kashf al-maknūn fī al-radd ‘ala kitāb harmījīdūn (2002) at 33. 41 See generally, Cook, Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature. 25

among a subset of the apocalyptic novelists mentioned in the previous paragraph. The nature of this authorship has important consequences for the literature produced. On the one hand, the absence of religious scholars in this endeavor means that progressivist literature has remained a relatively fledgling and conceptually immature area of political speculation. Those who do speculate on structures of the final order do so not in the form of monographs dedicated to the topic, but rather by way of various statements that are interspersed, somewhat haphazardly, throughout their more general works on the apocalypse. On the other hand, the freedom of these lay writers from the strictures of traditional scholarship means that they indulge in interpretive liberties that can significantly embellish the conceptual content of their theories (a fact that perhaps accounts for what appears to be an increasing popular appeal of this nascent genre). In doing so, however, disregard of traditional methods means that such authors invite the wrath and censure of the religious scholars. These interpretive liberties include, among other things, direct appeal to Shī’ite as well as non-Islamic writers, movements, and authorities, as we shall see further below.

Within Shī’ite discourses, in contrast, the abundance of speculation on structures of the final world order is due to the dominance of revanchism, which presumes progressive structures and relatively broad temporal horizons (while the frontier orientation of idealism envisions a radically broad temporal horizon which only adds further sophistication and nuance to the Shī’ite discourse). More particularly, the theological centrality of the Mahdī’s correction of historic injustices renders his global government an acceptable object of speculation for religious scholars, resulting in an abundant and conceptually rich corpus of clerical literature that is further supplemented

by the writing of laymen. Shī’ite literature concerning structures of the final world order are, in fact, so abundant that this area of speculation arguably constitutes a distinct genre of Shī’ite political thought, one which has thus far remained neglected in academic scholarship. In contrast to Sunnī progressivism, wherein explicit statements on the structures of the final order are scattered throughout more general works on the apocalypse, in the Shī’ite context it is not uncommon for complete monographs to be devoted to the topic.

In short, the task of selecting representative sources for each of the four default and frontier categories is complicated by the fact that modal and temporal assumptions directly affect the quantity and sophistication—and thus the very availability—of such sources. Nonetheless, even within regressivism, wherein explicit sources are most lacking, the a priori silence which prevails regarding structures of the final order should not be mistaken as a rejection of all structures. Rather, even this Sunnī default position presumes that a final government will, indeed, be established in the apocalyptic era, despite its modal and temporal limitations, and must therefore presuppose some structures within this government, however unworthy of elaboration such structures may be.

Within this complicated and uneven landscape of source material, this study has selected the following case studies to represent the default and frontier positions within

Sunnī and Shī’ite discourses, respectively:

(i) Sunnī Regressivism: Case Study of The Islamic State (ISIS)

As noted, the task of selecting an appropriate case-study for regressivism is complicated by the fact that the very axioms of this orientation deter its theorists from speculating explicitly on the topic of final world order. How then can these theories of

structures, which tend to remain implicit and unformulated, be gleaned? In order to supplement the theorists’ paltry expositions on the topic at hand, this study infers implicit theories from the actual structures and programs of contemporary Islamic movements.

But which movements are appropriate candidates for drawing such inferences? We know, for instance, that the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda, like most Sunnī movements, are both regressivist in their views concerning the final world order. Given this, do the

Brotherhood’s sophisticated political and socio-economic programs imply that these same structures characterize their implicit theory of the Mahdī’s final world order? Likewise, does the relative minimalism of al-Qaeda’s current socio-economic programs suggest that al-Qaeda’s vision of structures in the Mahdī’s order is scanty in comparison to the

Brotherhood’s vision? This inference is admittedly tempting, given provocative statements made by al-Qaeda theorists themselves, such as Abū Bakr al-Najī, who poses the question: “Assuming that we get rid of the apostate regimes today, who will take over the ministry of agriculture, trade, economics, etc.?” After posing this rhetorical question, he dismisses it by replying that, “It is not a prerequisite that the mujāḥid movement has to be prepared especially for agriculture, trade, and industry. . . . As for the one who manages the techniques in each ministry, he can be a paid employee who has no interest in policy and is not a member of the movement or the party. There are many examples of that and a proper explanation would take a long time.”42

In the cases of the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda, however, any attempt to infer implicit theories of the final order from their current political activities would be fraught with a common flaw: namely that both movements presume that the Mahdī’s final

42 As quoted in Wright, supra. 28

world order will not materialize until some point in the distant future. 43 This presumption44 renders their current political and socio-economic programs to be unlikely proxies for the theoretical structures they envision within the final world order, for the long time-span that they project before the advent of the final government presumably allows for numerous changes to occur within their own current programs and structures.

Indeed, such inferences can only be sound and reliable if the contemporary movement in question presumes that the apocalyptic era be imminent—for only on the basis of such imminence can a movement’s current political and socio-economic structures be viewed as direct antecedents to the structures of the Mahdī’s final order, and therefore employed as proxies thereof.45

Such is the case with ISIS—for it differs from the Muslim Brotherhood and al-

Qaeda not only in its presumption that the advent of the Mahdī’s final order is imminent, but also in fancying itself as the direct precursor to that final order.46 Thus, unlike the

Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda, ISIS’s current political and socio-economic structures may be viewed as direct antecedents to the structures that ISIS anticipates within the

Mahdī’s final order, and can therefore employed as proxies thereof. This study therefore employs ISIS statements regarding its current strategies and goals of governance,

43 For example, Mahmoud Ghuzlan, spokesman for the Brotherhood, in a statement to Ahram News (February 12, 2012), emphasized that: “Concerning the Islamic caliphate, this is our dream, and we hope to achieve it, even after centuries… our first goal is the renaissance of Egypt, then the Arab world and then the Islamic world. This will come gradually” Likewise, see al-Qaeda essay, “God Has Withheld Information Regarding the Mahdī’s Personage from Our Religious Community Prior to His Advent” (2006). See also, Filiu at 186 (noting that, “al-Qaeda, so far as one can judge from its internal correspondence, was for many years impervious to the apocalyptic temptation”). 44 This question, concerning the imminence of the final world and the associated ‘expiration-date’ of the contemporary order of nation- states, is one of the central questions of the first problematic of final world order, described above. 45 Interestingly, Muḥammad Ṣādiq Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr (one of the central sources of this study, introduced further below) confirms this general logic. More specifically, he explains that only if one assumes that the apocalyptic era is imminent can the actual structures of the current world order be presumed to become disrupted by the final world order. In Ṣadr’s words, “it is impossible to overcome these difficulties except through a specific assumption, which may not be sound in and of itself…and this assumption is the allegation that the Mahdī will appear during this century, or something similar, provided that no major changes occur in the general, current principles and concepts in the contemporary world of today…And through this assumption, the ‘systems prior to the Mahdī’s Advent’ are the same as the contemporary systems of today. Ṣadr (see Footnotes 105 and 106, infra) at 458. 46 See generally, William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: the History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State (2015). 29

particularly the following five sources: (i) the Arabic treatise, authored by ‘Uthmān b.

‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Tamīmī,47 entitled, I’lām al’anām bi-milād dawla al-islām (2006-

7);48 (ii) the Arabic treatise, authored by Abū Ayyūb al-Maṣrī,49 entitled al-Dawla al- nabawīyya (2008);50 (iii) the Arabic book, authored by Abū Sufyān Turkī b. Mubārak al-

Bin’alī,51 entitled, al-Qiyāfa fī ‘adam ishṭirāṭ al-tamkīn al-kāmil lil-khilāfa (2014);52 (iv) the English translation of ISIS’s statement, issued by its Research and Fatwa Committee, entitled “Clarifying the Ruling on the Education System in the Nusayri [Alawite]

Government [of Syria]” (2014);53 and (v) ISIS’s English-language periodicals, launched in 2014, entitled Dabiq. 54 An important caveat, however, is warranted regarding employment of these sources, for even in the case of ISIS, inferring implicit theories of the final order from its current structures and programs should only be done in a tentative manner, and should be taken as suggestive rather than conclusive. After all, not only are the present political and socio-economic programs of ISIS prone to rapid change, but it is not unlikely that an official statement may, at some point, opine explicitly on the anticipated structures and programs of the Mahdī’s global government, and the manner in which they will differ from the current, precursor structures and programs within ISIS itself.55 Any such statement of explicit theory regarding the structures of the final order would, of course, take precedence over inferences from contemporary structures of the movement.

47 Member of the Sharī’ah Committee for the Islamic State in Iraq, prior to its rebranding as the Islamic State. 48 This title is translatable as, “Informing Humanity of the Birth of the Islamic State,” and is henceforth referred to herein as I’lām. 49 Minister of War and de facto leader of the Islamic State in Iraq, until his death by US airstrikes in 2010. 50 This title is translatable as, “The Prophetic Government,” and is henceforth referred to herein as DN. 51 One of the current, senior scholars of ISIS. 52 This title is translatable as, “Concerning the Allegation of Inadequate Prerequisites for the Full Establishment of the Caliphate,” and is henceforth referred to herein as Qiyāfa. 53 Translation done by Aymenn Jawad al-Tamīmī (available at www.meforum.org), and is henceforth referred to herein as Education Fatwa. 54 Generally available at www.clarionproject.org 55 To the knowledge of the present author, the movement has not been made such statements to date. 30

The modal and temporal conservatism which underly ISIS’s regressivism are readily apparent. Modal-conservatism, on the one hand, is evident in various statements such as the following by the initial ISIS leader, Abū Ayyūb al-Maṣrī, wherein he confirmed that the essential and ultimate goal is a return to, rather than an eclipsing of, the Prophet’s polity: “Some of us incorrectly believe that the concept of government that ought to be established… is that of Hārun al-Rashīd who exhorted the clouds in the sky, scooped up gold as if it were water, and commanded armies so estensive that they stretched continuously from Baghdād to his enemies.” 56 Rather, Maṣrī insisted, “we must orient ourselves towards the Medīnan polity of the Prophet in order to remain attentive…to rearing up the Prophetic government.” A corollary to this modal conservatism is a conception of the Mahdī and Christ as having lesser authority than the

Prophet. To this end, ISIS conceives of the Mahdī as merely having the status of a just caliph, and therefore being responsible for executing the legislation brought by Prophet

Muḥammad. Likewise, Jesus is conceived of as “follower” of the Islamic Sharī’ah, despite his essential status as a Prophet: “A number of the narrations concerning the events…as the Hour draws closer include the mention of ‘Īsā Ibn Maryam…These narrations typically speak of the final battles that the Muslims will engage in with the

Christians and Jews, including the confrontation in which the Muslims are led by

‘Īsā…against the Dajjāl. If Allah had willed, He could have left the Muslims to witness this epic engagement under the leadership of an ordinary man from amongst them.

56 DN at 2. See also, McCants at 134-135. 31

Instead, He decreed that it would be a Prophet–returning as a follower of the Sharī’ah of

Muḥammad…”57

On the other hand, ISIS’s temporal conservatism is indicated in statements that the final order will merely last “a number of years.” 58 More particularly, the Mahdī is understood to be not only a caliph, but in fact the last of the twelve just caliphs destined to rule prior to the end of the world. To this end, ISIS connects the canonical Sunnī tradition regarding the final government59 to a separate tradition regarding these twelve caliphs—noting that among these twelve, “some will appear in the beginning of Islam, whereas others will appear at the end of Islam.”60 Indeed, “the promised, Prophetic

Caliphate…will comprise twelve just caliphs…but they will not come in succession, but rather some will come in the early period [ṣadr] of Islam—and it said that these will be five, six, or seven—then the remainder will come, paving the way for the Mahdī.”61

Therefore, the final world order, which will by definition be inaugurated by the Mahdī, will also only survive through the reign of the Mahdī, who is the last of all twelve caliphs destined to rule before the end of time.

(ii) Sunnī Progressivism: Case Study of The “Awaited Mahdī Party”

As mentioned above, progressivism represents a minority orientation within Sunnī discourses on the final order and appears to be relegated to a subset of the laymen (rather than religious scholars) who write dramatic works about the apocalypse for a popular audience. Compared to the “implicit” theories of the regressivists, those who adopt this

57 Dabiq, Issue 5 at 4. 58 Dabiq, Issue 3 at 10 (noting that, “This pleasant breeze takes the souls of the believers everywhere on the earth: al-Hijāz, Iraq,Yemen, Shām, and so on. It will be sent forth a number of years after the demise of the Dajjāl and the passing away of the Masīh ‘Īsā…”). 59 See Footnote 1, supra. 60 Qiyāfa at 3-4. 61 Ibid. 32

orientation make explicit statements regarding various structures of the final order. These statements, however, tend not to be organized within single accounts or monographs regarding structures, but rather are scattered throughout the authors’ various works on the apocalypse in general, most of which give primary focus to the narrative of events that will occur prior to the establishment of the final world order. This means that multiple works of any single author must be culled in order to yield a composite account of the structures of the final order. In doing so, many authors appear to fluctuate in their modal and temporal presumptions. For example, Manṣūr ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm at times seems to endorse temporal conservatism, at other times temporal moderatism (suggesting that the

Mahdī will rule for “years and years,” or has a “forty-year” reign before his death), and at other times, temporal radicalism (suggesting that the final government is one and the same as the Christian expectation of the “happy millennium”).62 Likewise, his modal orientation seems inconsistent, at times remaining within the Sunnī majority, and at other times departing from it, suggesting that the final world order constitutes a return to the

“peace of the Adamic paradise,” rather than to the peace of the Prophet’s government.

Within this nascent landscape of literature, Muḥammad ‘Īsa Dā’ūd—the founder and ideologue of the “Awaited-Mahdī Party” [ḥizb al-mahdī al-muntaẓar]—appears to offer one of the more consistent accounts of the final world order, and is therefore selected herein as the primary case study of progressivism. Born in 1957 in Egypt, Dā’ūd received his B.A. in Oriental Languages and Studies at Cairo University, and began his career as an editor to the Akhbār al-Yawm newspaper before entering into the arena of

62 Manṣūr ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm, Nihāyat al-‘Ālam wa-ashrāṭ al-sā’ah (2004) at 219-20. 33

apocalyptic writing, in 1991.63 Since then, he has published over 25 books, many of which pertain to apocalyptic subject matter, and the majority of which (since 2001) have been published by the renowned Cairo publishing house, Madbouli al-Saghir 64 —an indication of his popularity. For purposes of this study, the more important of these include, al-Mahdī al-muntaẓar ʻalá al-abwāb (1997),65 al-Mafājāt: bushrāki yā quds: al- mahdī yaḥkumu al-ʻālam min ʻarsh al-quds (2001),66 and Bushrá al-samāʼ: dawlat āl al- bayt qādimah: muslimūn wa-masīḥīyūn min aʻḍāʼ ḥizb al-mahdī al-muntaẓar (2006).67

The last of these works is of particular relevance because it constitutes the manifesto for the Awaited-Mahdī Party in Egypt—a political party which was self-styled as the direct antecedent to the Mahdī’s final world order. Because none of these works constitutes a monograph on the structures of the final world order, this study culls various statements from them in order to produce a composite account of Dā’ūd’s theory. All translations herein are produced by the present author.

Dā’ūd’s modal-moderatism is expressed consistently throughout his writings. To begin with, he expresses his disdain for the regressivist aspiration of reverting to the past in statements such as, “[Islam] does not accept restriction…to Bedouin conceptions of desert-life or the past without assimilating the current age,” and that this regressive outlook is tantamount to “inflexibility, stiffness, opposition, and which is completely fettered with the chains of bygone notables.”68 This mindset, furthermore, afflicts “the

63 Muḥammad ‘Īsa Dā’ūd, “Beware: The Antichrist Has Invaded the World from the Bermuda Triangle” (2001). 64 Daily News Egypt describes the Madbouli parent company as “one of Egypt’s top publishing houses… with the most comprehensive collection of books in the Arab world” (December 12, 2008). 65 This title is translatable as “The Awaited Mahdī is at the Doors,” and is henceforth abbreviated herein as al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar. 66 This title is translatable as “The Surprise: Glad Tidings, O Jerusalem: the Mahdī will Rule the World from the Throne of Jerusalem,” and is henceforth abbreviated herein as al-Mafājāt. 67 This title is translatable as “Heavenly Glad Tidings: the Government of the Prophetic House is Near: Muslims and Christians are Both members of the Awaited-Mahdī Political Party,” and is henceforth abbreviated herein as Dawlat. 68 Dawlat at Chapter 2 34

individual in the Arab world and in parts of the Islamic world…with psychological distress…a sort of schitzophrenia” that “reflects the struggle...between the modern and the traditional.” 69 In contrast to this categorical rejection of traditionalism, Dā’ūd engages in a much softer critique of modernity, acknowledging both its positive and negative dimensions. On the one hand, modernity represents “the side of progress, rapid change, and leaps,” but on the other hand, it is dangerous, for it comprises “material power…that captures us, shakes our foundations, sunders our characters, and corrupts our virtues.”70

The Mahdī, however, will reconcile these “two poles” of tradition and modernity, and will thereby inaugurate an era of unprecedented progress, for his “wonderous, unique worldwide dialogue” will dispel the illusion that material progress has “derived from the

Westerners themselves, and will reveal to them that if it is good, it is because it sprouted from the Qur’ān, and if it’s evil, then the evil derives from themselves.”71 Indeed, far from reverting to the Prophet’s 7th-century polity, the Mahdī will inaugurate an era of “forward leaps in all things—in power, intelligence, inventions, strength, innovations.”72 This final order will appropriate all the progress of the past and present eras, but will far surpass it due to its “vitality of thought and knowledge which will produce discoveries superior to what happened during the Antichrist’s reign.”73 In short, the Mahdī will “raise up the greatest civilization that the world has ever witnessed…”74 These achievements of the

Mahdī will derive from his superhuman nature, for far from the limited Mahdism of the

69 al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 285. 70 Ibid at 286. 71 Ibid at 285-286. 72 al-Mafājāt at 142. 73 Ibid at 131. 74 Ibid at 365. 35

regressivists, Dā’ūd conceives of the Mahdī as having “innate immediate knowledge of all questions” and (employing Shī’ite and Sūfī terminology) as being “God’s chosen

Guardian-Saint [walī]” within whom “the virtues of all the Prophets are concentrated.”75

Despite these extraordinary depictions of the Mahdī, Dā’ūd is careful not to suggest that the Mahdī will be empowered to abrogate Islam (i.e. modal-radicalism), and therefore emphasizes that “all the miracles of the Mahdī are…dependant on the miracles of

Muḥammad,” and that “he is not a Prophet.”76

Dā’ūd’s temporal-moderatism, likewise, is expressed in various statements indicating that the global government will not merely last a handful of years, but rather “a long duration,” for the Mahdī will inaugurate a “new Covenant” [‘ahd],77 as well as “a new era [dawra] in the Straight Path—an era in which God brings His full Proof to all groups among His creatures, in accordance with their various beliefs.” 78 More particularly, Dā’ūd states that “the Mahdī will rule between 40 and 50 years,” and he clarifies that “the question of 7 or 8 years refers [merely] to the time period when Mahdī and Jesus both live, not to mention that 7 or 8 years is insufficient for him to fill the world with justice, let alone to conquer the whole world and build mosques throughout it.”79

Furthermore, after these 40 years of the Mahdī’s reign, the global government will still endure, for leadership will then pass to Jesus Christ.80 While this reign of 50+ years is certainly sufficient to justify his categorization as temporally-moderate, other statements by Dā’ūd hint at the possibility of an even longer time period. For example, in one

75 Ibid at 94, 107, 155. 76 Ibid at 107, 155. 77 al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 281-301. 78 al-Mafājāt at 155. 79 Ibid at 111, 108-109. 80 al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 303. 36

instance he cites the argument of another author who asserts that the Mahdī will rule for

40 years, followed by 30 years of additional caliphs, and then 89 years of kings and sultans, resulting overall in a 159-year reign of the global government.81

These modal and temporal assumptions prompt Dā’ūd to elaborate in considerable detail on the various structures of the final order. These structures span a number of domains, for “[the Mahdī] and his men will…create comfort and peace through

[institutions of] politics, religion, health, science, learning, economics, trade.”82 While

Dā’ūd’s specific account of these structures will be explored in the proceeding Chapters, for the moment it is sufficient to note that these structures constitute the practical elements, or fundamental dimensions which, in the aggregate, are tantamount to the unprecedented progress of the final world order. As Dā’ūd notes, “in the diverse domains of life, the Mahdī, together with the blueprint derived from the Qur’ān, constitute God’s gift of God to all of humanity. They are the practical reply to this critical question that scholars urgently ask: ‘what are the formulas, applications, theories, and social and cultural plans that are required in order for civilization to develop and progress in a manner that is distinct, both formally and substantively, from European civilization, and which can fulfill the true material, cultural, spiritual, and worldy needs of people?’”83

(iii) Shī’ite Revanchism: Case Study of The Islamic Republic of Iran

As noted, the combination of modal moderatism and temporal moderatism, while representing a minority orientation in Sunnī discourses, is in fact the default or majority position in Shī’ism, where it takes the form of “revanchism.” The case study selected

81 al-Mafājāt at 114-115. 82 al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 282. 83 al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 287. 37

herein for revanchism is that of The Islamic Republic of Iran, as reflected in the works of three of its affiliated scholars: Najmuddīn Tabasī, Ibrāhīm Amīnī, and ‘Alī Kūrānī. Each of these three scholars is significant for different reasons. To begin with, Tabasī is an

Iranian cleric, member of the Committee for the Mahdī Specialist Center, and his primary occupation appears to be scholarship.84 Among his tens of works, this study considers his monograph on structures of the final order, entitled “An Overview of the Mahdī’s

Government,”85 in its already existing English translation. Second is Ibrāhīm Amīnī, a senior cleric-politician who serves within the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Expediency

Discernment Council, and within its Assembly of Experts.86 His primary work employed herein is his book, “The World-Administrator of Justice: the Promised Mahdī,”87 in its already existing English translation. This work is not a monograph on structures of the final order, for it also addresses the time period prior to the Mahdī’s Advent. Nonetheless, given its authorship, it arguably represents an official view of the Iranian government, and in any event is one of the more popular contemporary works on Shī’ite Mahdism, having been translated into numerous languages. Third is ‘Alī Kūrānī, a Lebanese scholar who writes predominantly in Arabic rather than Farsi, and appears to have particular appeal to an Arab Shī’ite audience. After completing studies with Grand Ayatollāh

Muḥsin al-Ḥakīm, Kūrānī spent a period of time educating the Shī’a of Kuwait, before establishing residence in Iran and founding Qum’s “Center of Fiqhī Lexicon and Muṣṭafá

Center for Religious Studies.” Among his various works, this study employs his Arabic

84 For further biographic details, see Tabasī’s website, http://velaseddighah.com. 85 The title in the original Persian is, Nishānahʹhāʼī az dawlat-i mawʻūd (Qum: Būstān-i Kitāb-i Qum, (2006/2006)). The Arabic translation is, Jawlah fī ḥukūmat al-Imām al-Mahdī (Bayrūt: Dār al-Walāʼ lil-Ṭibāʻah wa-al-Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʻ (2004)). 86 For further biographic details, see Amīnī’s website, http://www.IbrāhīmAmīnī.com/en. 87 Dādgustar-i jahān ya Mahdī-yi mawʾūd (Qum, Muʾassasah-ʾi Maṭbūʾātī-yi Dār al-Fikr (1967)). The Arabic translation is, Munqidh al-basharīyah (Bayrūt, Lubnān: Dār al-Hādī ((1993). 38

book, “Aṣr al-Ẓuhūr”88 (translatable as “Era of the Mahdī’s Advent”) which, like Amīnī’s work, is not a monograph on structures of the final order, but rather addresses the time periods both before and after the Mahdī’s Advent. Translations of Kūrānī herein are produced by the present author.

As with Sunnī progressivism, the revanchist conception presumes that the final world order will endure beyond a mere handful of years, and likely through several generations of leadership. Kūrānī, for instance, cites sources suggesting that after the

Mahdī dies, leadership will pass to “several previous Prophets and Imāms and they will rule after the Mahdī…Some say that the Return89 starts after the rule of the Mahdī and the rule of eleven Mahdīs after him.”90 Likewise, Tabasī, after recounting various views on the time-span of the Mahdī’s government ranging from seven to one thousand years, gives particular credence to the view that it will endure for 70 years, noting that “the late

Ayatullāh Tabasī, my honorable father, gives preference to the ḥadīth that propounds seven years, but he says: ‘It means that by the power of God, every year at that time will be equal to ten of our years.’”91

Also consistent with Sunnī progressivism, the Shī’ite revanchists advocate a superhuman conception of the Mahdī.92 Kūrānī, for instance, describes that Mahdī as

88 ʻAṣr al-ẓuhūr (Bayrūt : Mu’assasat Shahīd (1988)). 89 “Return” refers to the common Shī’ite doctrine that in the apocalyptic era, various Prophets, Messengers, and heroes from past Islamic and pre-Islamic history will return to the world. 90 Kūrānī at 271. 91 Tabasī at 165. 92 Relative to Sunnī progressivism, these Shī’ite authors to employ more advanced casuistry in reconciling the supplantation of conventional Islam with the doctrine of the finality of Islam. Amīnī, for instance, plays the devil’s advocate, posing a hypothetical criticism of the Shī’ite majority position: “it would seem that [the Mahdī] is more excellent than all the Prophets, including the Prophet of Islam…After all, none of them succeeded in reforming human society, establishing a world government…implementing the divine ordinances in their entirety, executing the divine scales of justice perfectly, and eliminating injustice and tyranny absolutely. The only person able to accomplish all these tasks is the Mahdī, and none other!” He then rebuffs this hypothetical criticism, emphasizing that “all these Prophets are participants and have a share in this final success...The Imām's victory is not his own personal victory... The accomplishment of the promised Mahdī, in truth, is the accomplishment of Adam, Seth, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, Muḥammad, and all other Prophets…The program was conceived and the struggle begun by the past Prophets. Each one of them provided an example through their own conduct and pushed the level of the people's comprehension of God's purposes until the 39

having “innate knowledge,” 93 while Amīnī describes him as a “perfect individual…protected from error, forgetfulness, and acts of disobedience,” as the

“personification of all the possible human potentials of perfection,” and as “the mediator between the hidden world of the spirit and the human world—he through whom the bounties of the hidden world reach other human beings.”94 Similarly, Tabasī explains that the Mahdī “will know the inner personalities of people through their faces,” that “as soon as the Mahdī appears…he will embark on performing a series of miracles and wonders…These are the miracles and wonders that bespeak of the power, sincerity and truthfulness of the words of this heavenly leader.”95

Yet the distinctive feature of revanchism is the notion that the purpose of the final world order is to correct the historical wrongs suffered by Shī’ism. As a corollary, the revanchist conception of the Mahdī—unlike that of the Sunnī progressives—is that he is one and the same as the Twelfth Shī’ite Imam, who, though wrongfully persecuted over a millennium ago, will emerge from his long Occultation as the vindicator of Shī’ism. The progressive nature of the final order, thus, amounts in large part to a supplanting of numerous features of conventional—i.e. Sunnī—Islam. This “conventional” Islam, which line reached the Prophet of Islam. He outlined the complete program and provided the comprehensive blueprint for the transformation of the world. At the time of his death he handed that over to his rightful successors, the Imāms.”Amīnī at 234. More particularly, in defense of the finality of Islam, two separate points tend to be argued—the first concerning the Mahdī, and the second concerning Jesus Christ. First is that the Mahdī’s authority and powers, despite ostensibly being greater than that of the Prophet, are in fact bestowed upon him by the Prophet. For example, Amīnī explains that “God may reveal a law to the Prophet and inform him that the law will be applicable to him and his followers until the time when the Qa’im appears. When the twelfth among his descendants appears he should follow a second injunction. The Prophet also informs about this arrangement to his successor until the information reaches the last Imām. In such a case the ordinance is not abrogated, and the Imām does not introduce a new ruling that was revealed to him. Rather, the first injunction was already limited in time, and the Prophet was already informed about the second one.” Ibid. Compare with Tabasī at 153-154 (also posing a hypothetical criticism that the Mahdī allegedly abrogates Islam, but then rebuffing this criticism on somewhat different grounds). Second, is that despite the innate status of Jesus Christ as a Prophet, in his second coming he will not exercise his functions of Prophethood, but will merely serve as the Mahdī’s lieutenant—and therefore will pose no threat to the doctrine of Muḥammad as the final Prophet. This argument is relatively facile, for both the Shī’ite and Sunnī traditions describe Jesus as deferring to the Mahdī in prayers, insisting that the latter should be the leader of the community. Elaborating on this concept, Tabasī, for instance, notes that “the Mahdī will appoint Jesus as his representative in the offensive operations against the Antichrist.”92 Kūrānī, likewise, states that “The Mahdī will be the ruler of the world government, while Jesus will be his supporter and assistant.” Kūrānī at 246-251. 93 Kūrānī at 258. 94 Amīnī at 53, 54, 57. 95 Tabasī at 51-55. 40

will be overturned, amounts to the various innovations to and corruptions of the true (i.e.

Shī’ite) faith. Thus, although Shī’ite revanchism advocates a progressive view of the final world order, its vision of progress remains backward-looking, for the alleged progress of the final order is, at bottom, merely a return to the true, original Islam, as enshrined in the thwarted purposes of the Imams from over a millennium ago.

Amīnī explains, for instance, that “During the occultation, innovations will appear in the religion, and the ordinances of the Qur’ān and the teachings of Islam will be interpreted in accordance with people's likes and dislikes. As a result, many teachings and laws will be forgotten as if they were never even a part of Islam. When the Mahdī appears he will invalidate these innovations and will restore the ordinances of God as they were when they were commanded…Evidently, such a program will be perceived by the people something new.”96 He further explains that when the Mahdī appears, “People, having abandoned the absolute principles and fundamental teachings of Islam, merely follow the outward forms of religion and regard those to be sufficient…. Hence, when the twelfth Imām appears…[he] will ask them to learn the Islamic social and moral teachings and apply them in their everyday lives… Certainly, such a religion would seem new and difficult to these people, and they might not even consider it to be Islam, because they have imagined Islam to be something else.”97 Similarly, Tabasī explains that the changes brought by the Mahdī “have been mentioned in such terms as new judgment, new tradition…new invocation, and new book, which we regard as nothing else but the revival of the Prophet’s Sunnah. However, the magnitude of the transformations would be so far- reaching that when people are confronted with them they will say, ‘He has brought a new

96 Amīnī at 235-236. 97 Ibid at 237-239. 41

religion!’...it can be deduced from these ḥadīths that the Mahdī will not present a new religion in the world.” 98

(iv) Shī’ite Idealism: Case Study of The Ṣadrists

The Ṣadrists are selected herein as the case study of Shī’ite idealism. To this end, this study focuses on the scholarship of the movement’s ideologue, Muḥammad Ṣādiq

Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr (henceforth referred to herein as “Ṣadr”). Although Ṣadr embraces the default Shī’ite orientation of modal-moderatism, his temporal orientation is radical rather than moderate, thus placing him at the apparent frontiers of orthodox Shī’ite discourse.

More particularly, Ṣadr’s presumption of temporal radicalism gives him a horizon of speculation that is radically broader than those of his temporally-moderate colleagues—a difference that enables him to reconcile conceptual contradictions and conundrums that the others leave unaddressed, and to project a time horizon during which the revanchist preoccupation with vindication pales into insigificance, and during which Islam itself, whether in its Sunnī or Shī’ite variety, becomes virtually unrecognizable. Indeed, Ṣadr’s account represents the most conceptually sophisticated and nuanced of all the theories of final order considered in this study, not to mention the least recognized account within contemporary academic scholarship.

Although scholarship has paid considerable attention to other members of his family (particularly his cousins, Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr99 and Mūsa al-Ṣadr100), Ṣadr has been a particularly influential figure in his own right within contemporary Shī’ite political thought. Assasinated by the Ba’athist regime in 1999, Ṣadr was a Grand

98 Tabasī at 101-102. 99 Iraqi Shī’ite scholar, philosopher, founder of the Islamic Da’wa Party, and author of numerous major works, including “Our Economics” [iqtiṣāduna] and “Our Philosophy” [falsafatuna]. He was assassinated in 1980 by the Ba’thist regime of Saddam Hussein. 100 Lebanese-Iranian Shī’ite scholar and philosopher, considered to be the intellectual founder of the Lebanese Amal Party, as well as Hezbollah. He disappeared in August, 1978 after traveling to Libya for meetings with Muammar Gaddafi. 42

Ayatollāh, leader of the Iraqi Ṣadrist movement following the death of his cousin, and father to the current Ṣadrist leader, Muqtada al-Ṣadr. As such, Ṣadr represented the leadership of the so-called ‘activist’ school in the clerical establishment—in contrast to the ‘quietist’ school led by Ayatollah ‘Alī Sīstānī, and Ayatollah Khoeī before him.101 For purposes of this study, the primary work of Ṣadr to be considered is the third volume of his four-volume Arabic work, “Mawsūʻat al-Imām al-Mahdī”102 (translatable as “The

Encyclopedia of the Imām Mahdī”). While the first two volumes are historical accounts of the Lesser and Greater Occultations, respectively, the third volume concerns the period of time after the Mahdī’s Advent, and is accordingly entitled, “Tārīkh mā ba’d ul-ẓuhūr”

(translatable as “The History of What will Occur After the Mahdī’s Advent”).

Unexamined to date in Western scholarship, this 670-page monograph is singularly dedicated to the structures of the final world order, and the contents thereof are reproduced in the Appendix C to this study. In addition to this third volume, Chapter

Three of this study, concerning the final economy, also refers to the fourth volume of

Ṣadr’s encyclopedia, entitled “al-Yawm al-maw’ūd” (translatable as, “The Promised

Day”), in he expounds a theory of social and economic history, and compares the economy of the final world order with Marxism, capitalism, and other historical forms.

For both volumes, all translations herein are produced by the present author.103

As a modal-moderate, Ṣadr presumes that the final order will eclipse the Prophet’s polity, for it will be “utopian: loftier than the current reality on all levels, whether relative to the age in this ḥadīth being produced, or to the age prior to the Mahdī’s

101 Recent scholarship, however, has suggested that this quietist-activist division is overy simplistic. See Abbas Kadhim, The Hawza Under Siege: A Study in the Ba’th Party Archive (Boston University, IISBU Occasional Paper #1, June 2013). 102 Muḥammad Ṣādiq Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr, Ṣadr, Mawsūʻat al-Imām al-Mahdī, Beirut: Dar al-ta’āruf al-maṭbū’āt [1978]. 103 In order to distinguish between these two sources, this Study refers to Volume III merely as “Ṣadr,” while referring to Volume IV (primarily in Chapter Three of this study) as “Ṣadr, Volume IV.” 43

appearance generally, and…new to the minds and unknown by most of the people – nay by all of them during the age prior to the Mahdī’s appearance.”104 This utopia derives, of course, from the superhuman nature of its protagonists, particularly the fact that the

Mahdī is the recipient of “revelation,” along with being infallible, for “whenever the

Mahdī wants to know something, God gives him the knowledge of it.”105 In any event, it is precisely in the light of this utopian nature of the final order that Ṣadr interprets the various Shī’ite traditions suggesting that the Mahdī will bring a new Cause, new Religion, new Book, and so forth. To this end, Ṣadr explains, for instance, that new “Summons” means either new “instructions” or new “understandings and laws to which the Mahdī will summon people.”106 New Judgment, likewise, means either “the new divine plan for humanity,” “new legislation,” “the Mahdī’s…actions against deviants,” or “a new method in judging and settling disputes.”107 Similarly, new Sunna means “the word, actions, and decisions of the Mahdī…and this Sunna is described as ‘new’ given that its contents will differ from the transmitted Sunna in the prior Islamic sources, inasmuch as it contains new laws, new concepts, and a new profound level of understanding, which the Mahdī will announce and through which all of humanity will advance.” 108

Furthermore, new Cause might mean “new laws” or a “profound new level of thought and doctrine,” but is most likely to mean “new political authority [imāra]…that is unprecedented, absent even in the Prophet’s era…for the Prophet showed leniency towards deviants and hypocrites, but the Mahdī will eliminate them; the Prophet delayed

104 Ṣadr at 105. 105 Ibid at 474-476. To this end, Ṣadr emphasizes that “revelation” is not limited to only Prophets, but was also bestowed upon Mary, the apostles of Christ, and the mother of Moses—though “the Mahdī is preferred greatly” over these other figures. Ibid. 106 Ibid at 451. 107 Ibid at 454-455. 108 Ibid. 44

in announcing some of the true laws, but the Mahdī will present all of them; the

Prophet’s jurisdiction encompassed a limited domain of the earth, but the Mahdī will rule everywhere…in short, renewal of authority means that the Mahdī’s government will be global, unlike any other human government in world history.”109

Ṣadr likewise echoes the modally-moderate majority in reconciling this vision of unprecedented progress with orthodox doctrine. To begin with, neither the infallibility of the Mahdī, nor the return of Jesus Christ, will undermine the status of Muḥammad as the final Prophet-Messenger. As to the Mahdī, his knowledge will fully derive from that of the Prophet, for “the Mahdī inherits the blueprint for complete justice the Prophet of

Islam, for from him and thereafter from the early leaders of Islam was transmitted its details, the solutions for its problems, and the elucidation of its clear as well as abtuse aspects.” 110 In contrast, the presence of Jesus Christ within the final order will not threaten the finality of Muḥammad’s prophecy, for “even though he was a Prophet-

Messenger and the Mahdī is not, yet the highest leadership remains entrusted to the

Mahdī.” A primary reason for the Mahdī’s authority over Jesus is that it is to the former, not the latter, that the Prophet Muḥammad bequeathed the knowledge and instructions required to establish the final world order. This is confirmed by the tradition in which

Christ defers to the Mahdī in leading the community’s prayers, for Christ is “a Prophet of a different people—i.e. other than Islam…but divine wisdom and divine preference requires that the highest ruler of the Islamic government, in addition to possessing the

109 Ibid at 450-451. 110 Ibid at 605. 45

other [requisite qualities], also be Muslim in origin, and not to have any close ties to any other religion.”111

Just as the two protagonists of the final order remain subservient to Prophet

Muḥammad despite their superhuman nature, so does the final world order prove the finality of Islam despite eclipsing and superceding its accomplishments. This is because the final order in fact represents the long-awaited fruit of Islam itself, the seeds of which were planted by the Prophet, but the fruit of which was destined to appear only long after the Prophet’s era. Thus, ‘new Sovereignty’ refers to “new methods of administration in government and societal affairs—methods that were were legislated in Islam, but which humanity previously did not implement—neither in the ‘Ummayad nor ‘Abbāsid caliphates, nor in subsequent governments and societies.” 112 Likewise, ‘new Book’ cannot mean a newly revealed Book, “because the Mahdī adheres to the religion of Islam, so he’ll follow the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet…for coming with a new

Qur’ān would mean abrogation of the [existing] Qur’ān and opposition to Islam… Thus, it is certain that he won’t come independently [of Islam], and therefore won’t bring a single new verse, let alone a complete book.”113 To this end, Ṣadr also casts doubt on the popular Shī’ite notion that the Mahdī will bring the true Qur’ān “in the form it had during the time of the Prophet,” suggesting instead that ‘new Book’ means either “new legislation” or, more likely, “a new interpretation [tafsīr] of the Qur’ān which is deep and vast…or new, general rules establishing a new method of Qur’ānic

111 Ibid at 606. 112 Ibid at 450. 113 Ibid at 451. 46

interpretation.”114 Not surprisingly, Ṣadr also rejects the traditions that ascribe a ‘new

Religion’ to the Mahdī, but asserts that even if such traditions were sound, this term

“would not mean a new Sharī’ah in contrast to Islam and the other religions, which would be impossible given that the Mahdī is not a Prophet, that there is no Prophet after the Prophet of Islam, and that the Mahdī merely implements the Islamic laws and

Sharī’ah…Thus, if the term ‘new Religion’ is truly in the transmission of the tradition, then it would mean the new legislation brought by the Mahdī.”115

While Ṣadr’s modal-moderatism reflects the default Shī’ite orientation, it is his temporal radicalism that distinguishes his account and places it at the frontiers of the

Shī’ite discourses on final world order. To begin with, Ṣadr agrees with the Sunnīs and many Shī’ites that the Mahdī’s lifespan and therefore his personal reign will be limited to a mere handful of years.116 Yet the Mahdī’s global government will outlive the Mahdī, lasting not only several generations, as temporal-moderates might suggest, but indeed much, much longer. To Ṣadr, the Advent of the Mahdī generally, and inauguration of the final world order specifically, mark the advent of an entire new era in the history of humanity, one that will lasts for not only a ‘millennium,’ but indeed for much longer than that, at least multiple thousands of years. Ṣadr justifies this lengthy time-period by way of a philosophical argument that humanity must endure “for a sufficient period of stretch of time in order to be trained in the depths of justice and fixed in it,” noting that this “opens up two possibilities: the first possibility is the brevity of the timespan of humanity after the Mahdī’s appearance, followed by the promised Day of Judgment; the second

114 Ibid at 452. 115 Ibid at 455. 116 He argues, in fact, that the Mahdī’s life will come to an end due to an “external cause” – likely due to being murdered. See Ibid at 613-626 (Chapter concerning “The End of the Mahdī’s Life”). 47

possibility is that humanity will endure for a long period of time, through ages after [the

Mahdī’s Advent].” 117

After acknowledging that “each of these two possibilities has certain merits,”

Ṣadr explains the “two principal reasons” for the soundness of the second view. The first reason concerns the purpose of creation:

“First is that…the fundamental purpose of creating humanity is to to bring about perfect worship, and perfect worship…means [in one sense] the establishment of the goodly society and the goodly world government. And if we limit ourselves to this degree of understanding, then the purpose of creating humanity [appears] to be fulfilled merely through the Mahdī’s establishing the global just government, which raises the issue: presumably, this purpose of establishing this high form of worship be accomplished in a short stretch of time—in which case, there would be no further reason for humanity to continue for a long time stretch after that, because according to absolute wisdom, it is inconceivable for a thing to continue after achieving its purpose….[However], the term ‘worship,’ even though it is very important and fundamental, does not mean a [single] final state. Rather, there are even higher stages in ‘worship,’ and the first levels are merely their beginning…while the remainder of them are [also] attainable by humanity, but are traversable [only] through a long period of time….so the meaning is to [eventually] achieve ‘absolute worship’ [al- ‘ibādat al-muṭlaqa]…Therefore, the fundamental purpose in creating humanity is much more than the mere establishment of the world government—for the purpose in establishing this great government, and its role in the long history of humanity, is to serve an end which is even greater than it and which lies beyond it; and for now it suffices us to describe this [ultimate aim] with the term ‘absolute worship’ of the Creator…In short, the establishment of the world government does not mean realization of the ultimate aim of creating humanity…for establishment of this government doesn’t achieve this aim, and there must rather be much more [time] for humanity in order to reach this ultimate goal. Therefore, it is baseless to assert that humanity’s life will be truncated after establishment of this government; rather humanity must endure in order to reach its goal.”118

Ṣadr then offers his second philosophical argument for temporal radicalism, namely, proportionality:

117 Ibid at 94. 118 Ibid. 48

“The second reason for the long period of humanity’s life is: it is farfetched for the time-span of the final fruits to be much shorter than the time-span of the prior periods…The time-period [leading to] the Promised Day comprises the entirety of humanity’s history, from its inception until the [future] establishment of that great Day, which will amount to not less than several thousands of years, if not more…and this time period will have encompassed millions of incidences of human suffering, pain, and sacrifices, as well as the efforts of the Prophets, saints [awliyā], divine reformers, and martyrs, as well as conditions of divine tests, as well as humanity’s good deeds as well as its sins. All of these things comprised the [time-period] in preparation for the Promised Day, and prerequisites without which it cannot be realized…So is it reasonable for the preparatory stage to continue thousands of years, but then for the fruit to last merely 9 years or less, as traditional thought on this matter claims??? This is most unlikely from the perspective of reason! It would, in all obviousness, be tantamount to employing the long-protracted generations of humanity for the purpose of bringing about the happiness of only one generation, or of only half a generation! This is repugnant to the rational mind, and thus impossible in the absolute eternal wisdom…[Rather,] the sacrifice of the generations prior to the Mahdī’s Advent [must be] of the nature of the sacrifice of the few for the benefit of the many…Thus, if the evidence is for the long lifespan of humanity after the Mahdī’s Advent, and if it will not reach its highest goal by merely attaining unto [the Mahdī’s Advent], therefore it is necessary for there to be a plan for attaining this goal throughout this time-span, since nothing in this realm of existence can be neglected…and in what follows, we shall present the general significance of this plan, and we will familiarize ourselves with its composition and its steps, just as we undersood the composition and steps for the divine plan for the period prior to the Mahdī’s Advent.”119

As suggested in these quoted passages, in order to properly articulate his temporal radicalism, Ṣadr coins an unusual, and presumably new, technical vocabulary. Foremost among these technical terms is his division of the long time-span of humanity into two broad eras, or phases, the first being the “general divine plan prior to the Mahdī’s Advent”

(i.e. the entirety of human history from its beginning until the Mahdī’s Advent), and the second being the “general divine plan after the Mahdī’s Advent” (the entirety of post-

119 Ibid at 96-97. 49

Mahdī human history).120 Elsewhere, he clarifies that the actual transition-point from the first to the second divine plan is not the Advent of the Mahdī per se, but rather is somewhat later, when the Mahdī establishes the final world order, which constitutes the defining moment in humanity’s future. As he explains, “the new plan naturally will not begin at the moment of the Mahdī’s Advent, because the plan for the world which results in implementing justice, along the pathway towards ‘absolute worship,’ well this plan will not end at the first moment [of the Mahdī’s Advent], rather it will require profound and far-reaching efforts from the Mahdī and his devoted companions, in terms of battles with the world militarily and culturally, and attaining complete supremacy in it. So when these efforts have finished and yielded their fruits, only then will the [next] divine plan have begun.”121 More particularly, he explains that “the Advent of the Mahdī does not by itself mark the initiation of [the new Divine Plan], but rather it is the establishment of the just world government that initiates it…Thus, the full consummation of the prior divine plan happens with nothing else but the establishment of the world government, and thus, the efforts of the Mahdī and his companions in gaining supremancy over the world remain part of the prior divine plan, being the last loop in its great conclusion, but when justice is implemented and the just government is established, then the prior divine plan has ended. And the moment that justice is begins is the start of the second plan, and thus there’s no perceptible temporal separation between the two plans.”122 Employing this terminology, the remainder of this study, in exploring Ṣadr’s account of the structures of the final order, considers the ‘second divine plan’ rather than the ‘first divine plan.’

120 Ṣadr elaborates his general theory of history in greater detail in Volume IV of his Encyclopedia. 121 Ibid at 97. 122 Ibid. 50

—CHAPTER ONE—

THE FINAL POLITICAL SYSTEM: FORM, GEOGRAPHY, AND ADMINISTRATION

The first structure of the final world order explored in this study is its political system. The question of the final political system encompasses various dimensions. First, what is the political form of the final order, and how does this compare to other forms known to human political history, such as democracy, federalism, monarchy, autocracy, and so forth? Next, what is the geography of the global polity: is it truly global in scope, will it preserve the boundaries of contemporary nation-states, and where will the political capital and other important political centers be located? Another concern is political administration: how are political tasks and functions administered—do the Mahdī and

Jesus Christ assume all tasks of governance singlehandedly, or do they delegate to subordinates, bureaucrats, and institutions? And finally, what will be the mechanism or method of political successorship, if any, after the reigns of the Mahdī and Christ?

A. Sunnī Discourses

1. Regressivism

Given its modal-conservatism, ISIS presumes that the political structure of the final order will, in its most essential dimensions, replicate that of the Prophet’s polity— but what will this fundamental political structure be? As noted in the Introduction, the vast majority of ISIS’s statements describe its goals and strategies for the contemporary era—i.e. for the era prior to the Advent of the Mahdī and establishment of final world order—yet these statements can, nonetheless, be safely employed as a proxies for ISIS’s implicit theory of the final world order. These inferences can then be supplemented with

and modified by the few explicit statements that ISIS does make concerning the nature of the apocalyptic era and structures of the final world order therein.

To begin with, ISIS’s articulates a negative theory of political structure, whereby it rejects many of the political methods known to most of Islamic history—and certainly all of those known to secular, Western political history. The first general form that is rejected is nationalism, defined by ISIS as “a call of heretical ignorance aiming to wage war on Islam, and get rid of its rulings and teachings. Nationalists consider the call to religion a call deficient in the realization of the nationalists’ ambitions, but also they consider it backward, and that it must be separated from the state as well.”123 Likewise,

ISIS rejects socialism, which it describes as “not only an economic school of thought or social movement, but also a comprehensive theory of man, existence and history, emanating from evil heretical Communism that condemns God's existence, rejecting all heavenly religions and waging war on them, while considering religion an opiate for the masses.”124

ISIS’s rejection of democracy, however, is even more vehement than that of nationalism and socialism, for democracy comprises various features, “every one of which…is disbelief in its own right…”125 Among these features is “rule of the people: the meaning being that legislation and law-making are referred to the people, not to God

Almighty, so the people rules itself in what it chooses, and that by whoso represents them

123 Education Fatwa at 9. Patriotism is similarly rejected, for “under the slogans of patriotism, the right of the ruler and regime is considered greater than the right of God and right of His Messenger…so whoever disbelieves in God or blasphemes the religion or blasphemes the Prophet…is not considered a criminal among them but rather his deeds come under the patriotic framework of freedom.” Ibid at 12. 124 Ibid at 8. 125 Ibid at 12. 52

in the legislative councils of disbelief.”126 Another feature of democracy is “peaceful handover of power: this means annulling the legitimacy of jiḥād against the disbelieving ruler, and that change will only be through peaceful elections, and that the people are to be subjected to whosoever has been elected and are to be led by him, even if he is among the most disbelieving of people, for the priority of power is referred to the choice of the majority of the people with no consideration to religion or law.”127 Yet a further feature of democracy is “separation of powers: and among the powers is legislative power, executive power, judicial power and the like. And the principle of meaning from the separation of powers is the separation of religion from the state and politics, and it is the call upon which the support bases of irreligious secularism have arisen, and the meaning from them is the preservation of religion in the mosques and places of worship and the like, and the independence of internal and external politics from the regulations and instructions of the law.”128

ISIS’s rejection of prevailing political structures concerns not only these overarching political systems, ranging from democracy to socialism, but indeed even the more mundane aspects of conventional administrative and bureaucratic practices. ISIS expresses this general view by raising the question, “It might be argued [against us]: among the basic constituents of a government is the existence of well-known, modern institutions, governing apparati, and government facilities—but the government that you

[ISIS] are announcing does not comprise any of these things, and does not enjoy what we

126 Ibid. 127 Ibid at 14. 128 Ibid at 16. 53

recognize as the facets of sovereignty which we perceive in contemporary governments!”129 ISIS then refutes this hypothetical objection, asserting:

“To this we reply that the principle that we return to in our decrees, and on the basis of which we plan our actions, is the Book [Qur’ān] and the Traditions, and the credible views of the past scholars among the Companions and the generation that succeeded them. Within these sources, we see no description of Muslim government wherein its basic constituents include specific government apparati along contemporary lines—and there’s no known evidence requiring the existence of apparati and instruments in the manner of contemporary states…which derive from the unbelieving West and its political heritage. This does not mean that we deny the function of these apparati and the effectiveness of those instruments which organize a government’s actions and assist in accomplishing its duties—rather, our admonition involves conditioning the desired Islamic government on modern descriptions of governments, in terms of their structures and administration…And from another perspective, the form in which we have announced the government is not unknown…For the initial Prophetic Government was similar in this condition…when the Prophet entered Medina, and began to regulate the affairs of the people...”130

In light of this ethos of minimalism and rejection of modern methods of governance, it is no surprise that ISIS’s positive theory of political structure amounts to a skeletal framework which emphasizes basic elements that are presumed to have defined the Prophet’s Medina-polity. ISIS describes this structure “in a general sense as reformation [iṣlāḥ] of the religious and worldy condition of humanity, or it can be said: restoring the conditions of the congregation and its affairs, and foremost among its affairs is their religion. This is at a general level.”131 While the word “restoration” within this general definition already indicates a regressive vision of political structure, this backward-looking ethos becomes more evident in ISIS’s more detailed elaboration of this general definition. More particularly, the Prophet’s government comprises nine essential

129 I’lām at 66. 130 Ibid. 131 Ibid at 41-42. 54

structures which ISIS replicates within its theories of current and, presumably, final government:

“1. Safeguarding the religion in its fixed principles and in the consensus of the first three generations [salaf] of the community [ummah].” 132 This includes the

“restoration” of true monotheism in the world—which is anathema to “all forms of innovation [bid’a], such as Ba’thism, free-will ideology [qadarīyya], and

Communism…”133 It also means the “restoration” of the “Islamic Sharī’ah to the station which God had designated for it, which is the station of dominion over actions, individuals, organizations, customs, and other structures…”134

“2. Implementing adjudication among quarrelers—or, in other words, settling disruptive quarrels and contentious disagreements (and this overlaps with the

[third function] of establishing judges and mediators, described further below).”135 In describing this function, ISIS likens the citizens of the “Islamic government” to those of the Prophet’s polity wherein the disparate tribes of Aws and Khazraj in Medina reconciled their differences and “melded into a single line, and a single community.”136

“3. Establishing judges and mediators.”137 In explaining this, ISIS first notes that “the term ‘judges’ is defined in accordance to the definition of Ibn Rushd—i.e. informing [disputants] of the required Islamic legal principle that is applicable.”138 This is not limited to the “issuing of fatwas…for the muftī cannot force his fatwa on the

132 Ibid. 133 Ibid. 134 Ibid. 135 Ibid at 42. 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid at 43-44. 138 Ibid. 55

inquirer”139—whereas the judge, in contrast, has the authority to enforce compliance. The judgment itself is a “collective duty” [farḍ al-kifāya], so the ruler must select judges for that purpose. The model for this is the Prophet himself, for “he adjudicated among his

Companions as the six imāms confirmed by narrating the tradition of Umm Salma,”140 and the Prophet appointed ‘Alī and Mu’adh as judges for Yemen. Likewise the Rightly

Guided caliphs undertook adjudication themselves at first—but also appointed judges.

“4. Freeing the captives, safeguarding the territory, and defending the sacred [al-dhi’b ‘an al-ḥarīm].”141 More particularly, “freeing the captives” is explained in light of the tradition which advises to “free the captives, feed the hungry, and treat the sick.”142 Likewise, “safeguarding the territory” means securing highways [al-subul] and spreading safety.”143

“5. Implementing the legal punishments [ḥudūd].” 144 This includes

“punishing the corrupt in order to censure and deter great sins and abominations, for implementing the legal punishments is among the greatest causes of blessings…for punishments deter people from commiting many forbidden things…this is why the

Prophet said, ‘implementing a punishment in the earth is better than 70 days of rain.’”145

Thus, “implementing the punishments is one of the most important solutions to…the land’s economic problems.”146 However, “the veiled ones who soil their thinking with the poison of modern heathenism and afflict their hearts with the darts of Westernization consider implementation of the punishments to be savagery and backwardness, and a

139 Ibid. 140 Ibid. 141 Ibid at 44. 142 Ibid. 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid at 44-45. 145 Ibid. 146 Ibid. 56

cause for angering their international community, which would then implement sanctions and boycott on their land—but this is a test which distinguishes the believers from the doubters.”147

“6. Defense against enemies and reinforcement of breaches.” 148 This means “protecting the Islamic lands from the greed of enemies among the disbelievers and apostates, and this is the concept of ‘guarding the frontiers [ribāṭ],’ which is one of the greatest forms of worship.”149 More particularly, ISIS explains that this duty means

“combatting” a range of opponents, including not only deviants and apostates, but indeed even those who claim to be Muslim but who “refrain from some of the Sharī’ah,” as the

Prophet himself did during the Battle of Khandaq.150

“7. Gathering of taxes [zakāt], war-booty [fay’], charitable contributions

[ṣadaqāt], and other such resources within the Public Treasury.” 151 This means

“gathering wealth in its various resources, the most important of which is zakāt, and this is because it is the third pillar of Islam after the two testimonies and prayer”—and ISIS further explains this by emphasizing that the Companions agreed that whoever withholds the zakāt should be fought, just as Abū Bakr did.152

“8. Guardianship over the family of martyrs and the helpless, and supporting the army.”153 ISIS explains this, noting that within the polity, there are many who have “no provider and no protector,” and this is one means by which God tests the

Government, for government must assume the role of “guardianship over the many”—

147 Ibid. 148 Ibid at 46-47. 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid at 46-7. 152 Ibid. 153 Ibid at 47. 57

particularly the “many orphans and innocent ones.”154 As for the “military department

[diwān al-jund],” ISIS explains that it must be “optimally configured in terms of the quantity of the army’s combatants and casualties, its movements, and so forth—and they are without doubt included among the [recipients of the government’s] assistance and guardianship.”155

“9. Appointment of well-qualified experts [tawlīya al-thiqa al-akfā].”156

ISIS equates this function with Mawardī’s concept of “employing reliable agents and deferring to advisors,” which depends upon competence and trustworthiness, as suggested in the Qur’ān 28:26. 157 However, “the combination of competence and trustworthiness is rare among people…so the leader must select the best for every domain; thus, the domain of warfare lends itself to one who has strength and bravery, even if there be some deficiency in his actions and in his piety, while the judiciary domain requires the most knowledgeable and most pious, even if he is not a brave fighter and lacks insight regarding warfare”—and so forth with the other domains of government.158

Although the final government will replicate these nine structures of the Prophet’s polity, it will necessarily differ therefrom in certain other respects which ISIS mentions explicitly by citating various traditions concerning the apocalyptic era. First and foremost is the nature of leadership and succession. Given the status of the Mahdī as a mere caliph,159 and the status of Jesus as a mere supporter of the Islamic Sharī’ah, the highest leadership in the final government will therefore be merely an executive power. This

154 Ibid. 155 Ibid. 156 Ibid at 47-48. 157 Ibid. 158 Ibid. 159 Qiyāfa at 2. 58

differs from the Prophet, who, as the revealer of the Qur’ān, was not only the executive, but also the source of legislation. In this respect, leadership in the final government will more closely resemble that of the Medīnan polity under the four, Rightly Guided Caliphs

(632-661 CE), than that of the Prophet’s polity. Furthermore, the fact that the final government will only last through the reign of the Mahdī (the last of the twelve righteous caliphs) means that there will be no mechanism or need for succession of political leadership—for his reign is succeeded only by the end of the world.

The final government will also differ from the Prophet’s polity in its geography.

Specifically, its expanse will not be limited to Medina, for with the advent of the apocalypse, the final government will expand. For instance, ISIS, quoting Abū ‘Umar al-

Baghdādī, states that its efforts have “prepared the path for attacking the Jewish State and retaking Baytul-Maqdis. It is as if I stand before the ‘asā’ib (bands) of Iraq that leave from here to give support to the Mahdī whilst he holds on to the curtains of the

Ka’bah.” 160 Beyond the conquest of Israel, “These events all lead up to the final, greatest, and bloodiest battle–al-Malhamah al-Kubrā–between the Muslims and the Romans prior to the appearance of the Dajjāl and the descent of al-Masīh. This battle ends the era of the Roman Christians, as the Muslims will then advance upon Constantinople and thereafter Rome, to conquer the two cities and raise the flag of the Khilāfah over them.”161 Indeed, beyond Europe, the final government will encompass the entire earth:

“The flag of Khilāfah will rise over Makkah and al-Madīnah…over Baytul-Maqdis and

Rome…The shade of this blessed flag will expand until it covers all eastern and western

160 Dabiq, Issue 4 at 35. 161 Ibid. 59

extents of the Earth, filling the world with the truth and justice of Islam.”162 In short, the final government will have a global jurisdiction.

Within this global geography, however, the final government will resemble the

Prophet’s polity insofar as all traces of contemporary, Westphalian nation-state divisions will be faced—therefore excluding any possibility of a global confederation of nation- states, such as that which underlies the United Nations. ISIS emphasizes this theme repeatedly. For instance, it asserts that “It was the rejection of nationalism that drove the mujāhidīn in Nigeria to give bay’ah to the Islamic State…It was the rejection of nationalism that drove two Tunisian soldiers of the Khilāfah to kill crusaders with visas to Tunisia issued by the Tunisian tāghūt. It was the rejection of nationalism that drove five Yemeni soldiers of the Khilāfah to target Yemeni Rāfidah in Sanaa and Sa’dah. It was the rejection of nationalism that drove the Iraqi, Shāmī, and muhājir soldiers of the

Islamic State to wage war against the Iraqi Sahwah and the Syrian Sahwah, after the

Sahwāt had betrayed Islam and the Muslims. It was the rejection of nationalism that drove the Libyan and muhājir soldiers of the Islamic State to wage war against the newly erected Libyan tawāghīt: the House of Representatives and the General National

Congress. It was the rejection of nationalism that drove the Islamic State to expand from

Iraq into Shām and thereafter to other lands: West Africa, Algeria, Libya, Khurāsān,

Sinai, Yemen, and the Arabian Peninsula. And it is the rejection of nationalism that will

162 Dabiq, Issue 5 at 3. See also, Ibid at 20 (citing the tradition, “Indeed, Allah gathered the Earth for me, and thus I saw its eastern and western extents, and indeed the reign of my Ummah will reach what was gathered for me from the Earth”); Ibid at 21 (citing the tradition, “This religion will reach all places night and day reach. Allah will not leave a home of mud nor fur…except that He will enter this religion into it…”). 60

drive the Khilāfah to continue expanding until it takes Constantinople and Rome from the

Crusaders and their allies by Allah’s permission.”163

Another area in which the final government will differ from that of the Prophet’s polity is its conditions of universal peace and security. On the one hand, the Prophet’s polity, as described by the initial ISIS leader, was characterized by severity and starkness of conditions, including fewness of supporters, dearth of food and water, disease, poverty, and perpetual danger and insecurity. In short, “the life of the honorable Companions in the Prophetic government was a life of constant fear, apprehension, expectation of ambush, and vigilance—particularly at the stage of its initial establishment.” 164 In contrast, ISIS depicts the final government, specifically after the second coming of Jesus

Christ, as being distinguished by universal peace and tranquility: “It is clear then that salām (peace) is not the basis of the word Islam, although it shares the same consonant root (s-l-m) and is one of the outcomes of the religion’s sword, as the sword will continue to be drawn, raised, and swung until ‘Īsā…kills the Dajjāl (the Antichrist) and abolishes the jizyah. Thereafter, kufr and its tyranny will be destroyed; Islam and its justice will prevail on the entire Earth.”165 Further elaborating on this peace of the final world order,

ISIS quotes from various traditions, including one which states that “There will be no rivalries, no envy, no hatred, to the point that a man will pass by a lion yet it won’t harm him, and step on a snake yet it won’t harm him”166—and another which states that “the venom of every venomous creature will be removed, to the point that a newborn boy will place his hand in the mouth of a snake and it will not harm him. A newborn girl will make

163 Dabiq, Issue 8 at 5. 164 DN at 4. 165 Dabiq, Issue 7 at 23. 166 Ibid. 61

a lion flee and it will not harm her. The wolf will be amongst sheep like their guard dog.

The Earth will be filled with peace just as a jar is filled with water. The word will be one

– no one will be worshipped but Allah. And war will lay down its burdens” 167—and yet a third tradition which states that, “[t]hereafter, swords will rest from war only to be used as sickles.” 168

2. Progressivism

Dā’ūd—the ideological father of the Awaited-Mahdī Party—suggests a final political form which differs starkly from that of ISIS and which is grounded in a fundamental redefinition of the concept of Caliphate. To this end, he argues that, as to its political form, the final government will be a union of partially self-governing regions under a central government, such that “the term ‘confederation’ is the most accurate and appropriate appellation” 169 (while elsewhere he employs the term “the United

Confederation”).170 In justifying these conceptions, Dā’ūd argues that “there’s no legal or rational reason not to name the united countries something like ‘the United Arab Islamic

States’ or ‘the Union of Arab and Islamic Republics, Kingdoms, and Emirates,’” in support of which he cites the example of the unification of Germany in 1871, under the

German Federation, headed by Wilhelm I.171 In short, Dā’ūd argues that the Mahdī’s government will be a confederation, and contemporary Arabs and Muslims should be flexible regarding these appelations, rather than letting their fixation on conventional

167 Ibid. 168 Ibid. 169 al-Mafājāt at 418. 170 Dawlat at 336. 171 al-Mafājāt at 418. 62

understandings of the term ‘caliphate’ detract from their unity and “consensus

[ijmā’].”172

What is the geographic character of the Mahdī’s confederation? In the initial stages, it will bring unity to the Arabs and Muslims, for “the Caliphate will unite Muslims’ foreign policy, finances, and general welfare…and the purpose of the Caliphate is the unity of the Muslims and absence of their division.” 173 Over time, however, it will encompass the entire world, for “the Mahdī will rule the entire world; all creation will submit to him, either through conquest or diplomacy.”174 The Mahdī will therefore rule over East and West, and Dā’ūd details the process of his conquering of North America, as well as his establishment of “embassies” within Central America. 175 Although the government is global, certain regions will be preeminent: “Jerusalem will be the political capital of the worldwide government, and the Caliph’s headquarters will be built close to the al-Aqsa Mosque; Mecca and Medina will be the two religious capitals; and the fourth most important place will be Mount Sinai…[for] Egypt will be the capital of learning and scholarship.”176 And as to the question of internal borders, Dā’ūd leaves this matter unclear. On the one hand, the conception of confederation typically presupposes the maintenance of nation-state borders, for only on the basis of their continuing integrity can nation-states associate with one another as a confederation. On the other hand, Dā’ūd states that “[i]n the Mahdī’s era, borders between countries and governments will be imaginary: communication and connections will be faster than can be imagined, and the interconnectedness of the world in his era will not be due to formation of economic blocs,

172 Ibid at 418-419. 173 Ibid. 174 al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 120. 175 al-Mafājāt at 510-516. 176 al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 233. 63

but only through borders which are opened by science and human conscience, in its most pure state.”177

How will this global confederation be administered? The Mahdī, of course, will hold its highest post of leadership, for “the Mahdī will renew Adam’s role of caliph over the globe…and just as Adam was the blood father of all humans, so will the Mahdī be the spiritual father of all humans, and obedience to him will be mandatory as it was to

Adam…”178 As such, the Mahdī may have the title of “the General President of the Union of Worldwide Governments,”179 or, alternatively, “we [might] name him ‘the President of the Union of Arab and Islamic Governments,’ or ‘the President of the Arab-Islamic

Union.’” 180 Once again, Dā’ūd emphasizes that we should not be overly concerned regarding his specific title, because “the important thing is the phenomenon that is being named, rather than the name itself, just as some employ the term ‘Caliph of the Prophet,’ while others say, ‘Commander of the Faithful,’ and still others say ‘Imām.’”181

Despite being the highest authority, the Mahdī will not single-handedly bear the burdens of governance, but rather will delegate much of it to an administrative apparatus consisting of his viziers. In describing these viziers, Dā’ūd quotes a passage from Ibn

‘Arabī, stating that “his viziers are the men who…champion him; they they shoulder the weight of the government; the viziers are like the Companions of the Prophet, true in their promise, yet they are non-Arabs [a’jamī]—though they speak only Arabic…”182

Notwithstanding, Dā’ūd quotes another passage from Ibn ‘Arabi, which he explains

177 Ibid at 283. 178 al-Mafājāt at 365. 179 Ibid. 180 Ibid at 418. 181 Ibid. 182 Ibid at 400-402. 64

derives from a Turkish manuscript, clarifying that “the viziers will be both Arab and non-

Arab; they speak Arabic, and among them are notable Egyptians—people of learning, knowledge, and politics—as well as the people of Syria [shām]….”183 Amidst the more mundane aspects of the viziers’ responsibilities, Dā’ūd mentions that their duties include attending to the problems of “tribalism and nationalism” in regions such as Africa.184

Although Dā’ūd’s account is strongly populist in tenor, he does not explicitly address whether democratic or otherwise representative political institutions, such as parliaments, will exist in the final order. His populism is especially evident in his emphasis on consultation as a feature of the final government. To this end, he explains that “although the Mahdī’s innate nature makes him able to dispense with consultation, there will nonetheless be consultation [shūrā] due to the reality of human needs.”185 He further equates these human needs to be those of the masses of humanity—i.e. the

“millions of humans in the world” whose discontent and “protests” against the policies of their own governments are usually unheeded, as evidenced in events such as the

American public’s opposition to the US government’s invasion of Iraq.186 Dā’ūd then attributes this flagrant disregard of the needs of the masses to the “absence of true consultation and democracy,” which he then contrasts with the final political structure, for “the Government of the Prophetic House is one where the people within it have the first word, and the government will safeguard consultation.” 187 This consultation, furthermore, will extend to people of all ages, for “the government of Prophetic House will…will hear the visions of each individual, whether young or old, regarding general

183 Ibid. 184 Ibid at 431-434. 185 Ibid at 402. 186 Dawlat at 59. 187 Ibid. 65

matters.”188Although this championing of the masses might warrant the existence of representative, parliamentary bodies within the final government, Dā’ūd seems critical of such institutions, for he associates them, at least in Egypt, with the oppressive methods of the elite rather than with the needs of the common man. As he states, within the

Government of the Prophetic House “there is no evidence that the elite should make decisions; and for Egypt, no evidence…that the Parliament of Representatives should make the decisions; because there are Egyptian decisions that require seeking counsel of the people as a right, but only after their enlightenment and lifting of the level of culture…”189

Unlike the ISIS account, Dā’ūd addresses the question of political successorship, for temporal-moderatism presumes that the global government will endure beyond the

Mahdī’s personal reign (and indeed, according to Dā’ūd, “the Government of the People of the House is the Owner of the Single, Unified Global System…until the End of the

World!”).190 As noted in the Introduction, however, his statements regarding the time span between the rule of the Mahdī and the end of the world are somewhat inconsistent.

In one instance, he explains that “the Mahdī will rule between 40 and 50 years,” and he clarifies that “the question of 7 or 8 years refers [merely] to the time period when Mahdī and Jesus both live, not to mention that 7 or 8 years is insufficient for him to fill the world with justice, let alone to conquer the whole world and build mosques throughout it.”191

Thus, after these 40-50 years of the Mahdī’s reign, leadership of the global government

188 Ibid at 63. 189 Ibid at 59. 190 Ibid at 30. 191 al-Mafājāt at 111, 108-109. 66

passes to Jesus Christ.192 Elsewhere, he quotes from another author who argues that the

Mahdī will rule for 40 years, followed by 30 years of additional caliphs, then 89 years of kings and sultans, resulting in a total of 159 years of the global government. 193

Furthermore, he emphasizes that such leadership will remain strictly within the line of descendents of the Prophet—i.e. the “House of the Prophet”—and suggests that the general title for whoever rules will be “the Guardian-Ruler of the Government of the

Prophetic House.”194

What are the most distinctive features of the global confederation? In particular, what are the balances and checks of power between the central government and the member nations—and what are the specific relationships between the Mahdī (or his successors), the viziers, and the masses? Unfortunately, Dā’ūd does not specify such details. Perhaps this is due to the presumption that such detail is unnecessary, given not only the extraordinary nature of the Mahdī, who is of course infallible, but more importantly, the special nature of his successors, who defy the tendency towards corruption, for “the family of Prophet see ruling as weighty responsibility and trust; whereas others see ruling as [selfish] opportunity.”195 Likewise, he states that “I swear by God: the House of the Prophet and their descendants have no greed for the world, nor for ruling and thrones; the merely want to spread truth, justice, goodness, and beauty.”196

Lacking such detail, Dā’ūd mentions only general relationships between the various structures and elements of the United Confederation, and these in a typically consluory manner. Respect for human rights, for instance, is summed up in brief statements such as

192 al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 301, 303. 193 al-Mafājāt at 114-115. 194 Dawlat at 65. 195 Ibid at 66. 196 Ibid at 336. 67

“the Government of the Prophetic House is the Owner of the Single, Unified Global

System, which acknowledges and respects others, and strives for him and protects his rights…” 197 Elsewhere, he delineates five “golden principles of reason and logic” characterizing the government, namely: justice, meritocracy, cooperation, and consultation:198

“The first of these principles is justice, and the Europeans have familiarity with conceptual relation between justice and freedom, and this justice extends even to those who disagree doctrinally; the second principle is refusing favoritism based on the principle that ‘the best of you is the most pious’; third is cooperation among the nations comprising the Caliphal government and cooperation with the Imām-Caliph, based on the oath of allegiance [bay’a], and there’s no forcing of this, but it’s due to…the love of the Mahdī in the hearts…even those among them who are of different religion; fourth is actualizing the relationship between religion and government by way of consultation [shūrā], in a manner emphasizing that Islam, in its essence, upholds a flexibile and pragmatic relationship between religion and government…rather than rigidity, radicalism, and ignorance…fifth is that Islam is the world religion…and the policy of the Caliphal-Government will spread Islam…on the basis of a ‘dialogue of civilizations’ and forbearance.”199

To this list of general features can be added a world peace that is enduring, yet not absolute, for weapons and military will nonetheless be maintained for purposes of self- defense and deterrance. As Dā’ūd explains, “the Government of the Prophetic House is a government of peace wherein weapons aren’t carried except for self-defense…as a deterrant power, rather than as a force of aggression for infringing on others and violating their property, wealth, or thoughts.”200 Likewise, he states that “the Caliphal-

Government will…not raise weapons... except against invaders…”201

197 Ibid at 30. 198 al-Mafājāt at 561-562. 199 Ibid. 200 Dawlat at 68. 201 al-Mafājāt at 562. 68

B. Shī’ite Discourses

1. Revanchism

Reganchism, the default orientation within Shī’ism, presumes that the political structure of the final order will surpass that of the Prophet’s polity in both form and time- span. Echoing the Shī’ite traditions, the standard features of this orientation include global supremacy and peace, as well as governance through an administrative apparatus of bureaucrats. Very little is offered, however, regarding the details of political form and the manner in which it contrasts with other political systems, besides conclusory statements that the final polity will be unlike anything known to humanity’s prior political history. Likewise, minimal attention is given to reconciling conceptual contradictions within the underlying traditions, resulting in a tendency for authors to select concepts of their liking, in an apparently haphazard manner.

As to the geographic supremacy of the final government, all agree that it is universal and global in scope, though some add further details, suggesting that certain locations associated with Shī’ism will be of the greatest importance. Kūrānī, for instance, states that “the Islamic world government that the Mahdī will upraise is vaster than the political order which the Prophet Soloman and Dhū al-Qarnayn erected…the Mahdī's government will include all parts of the world, such that no where will be left that does not utter the two testimonies of faith.”202 Amīnī, likewise, describes the Mahdī’s order as the time when “all of humanity will come under one government and one power… a unified world government under the Mahdī,”203 noting that “when the promised Mahdī

202 Kūrānī at 268. 203 Amīnī at 169-172. 69

appears…he will administer the entire world under one Islamic government.”204 Tabasī, similarly, notes that the Mahdī’s government “is not confined to the land of Hijaz, the

Middle East and Asia; instead, it is global in scope.”205 Additionally, Tabasī concludes, from analysis of a number of traditions, that “the city of Kūfah would be the epicenter of activities and the political capital,” and states even more particularly that the Sahlah

Mosque will constitute the Mahdī’s Headquarters. 206 In addition, he emphasizes the special status of Iran in general, and Qum in particular, during the Mahdī’s era.207

These authors likewise agree that due to the global scope of the government, the final era will be one of universal peace. Amīnī, for instance, states that in the Mahdī’s government, “People will have become kind and will treat each other with honesty and sincerity; there will be security everywhere as no one will wish to cause harm to another,” and to this end he he quotes from a tradition, saying that “When our Qa'im rises hostility and resentment will be eliminated from the hearts of the people, and general security will be established all over the world.”208 Tabasī, likewise, explains that in the beginning of the Mahdī’s government, there will indeed be an army, since this is required in order to win the apocalyptic wars. The top military military commanders, he explains, include

Jesus Christ and Shu‘ayb b. Ṣāliḥ. The rank and file, on the other hand, “will be composed of various nationalities…Some will be present in the primary staff and some will join the army. A group has been called the security guard corps.”209 However, after the Mahdī’s global victories, universal peace will be established, for “by the

204 Ibid at 233. 205 Tabasī at 13. 206 Ibid at 112-118. 207 Ibid at 49. 208 Amīnī 233, 169-172. 209 Tabasī at 57-58. 70

establishment of the divine system or global government…the flames of war will be extinguished and there will be no more powers that would be able to confront the army of al-Mahdī…As such, there will be no demand for military equipment in the markets and as a result they will become cheap remain unsold.”210 Tabasī further elaborates upon the

“public security” that derives from this universal peace established by the Mahdī, explaining that “with the implementation of appropriate and accurate programs in his government, within a short period of time security will be restored in society in all aspects, and the people will live in a safe environment experiencing security that mankind has not experienced so far.”211

These authors agree, furthermore, that administration of the government is accomplished not only by the Mahdī, but also through his administrative apparatus of viziers or governers. Amīnī, for instance, explains that the Mahdī “will appoint well- qualified individuals as the governors of different regions of the world with clear instructions and programs for the peaceful and just administration of the region under their governance…The entire earth will flourish under their administration. The Mahdī will distantly oversee the whole earth himself, with its widespread regions and extensive affairs accessible to him like the palm of his hand. His disciples and helpers also will observe and talk to him from remote distances.”212 Tabasī offers considerably greater detail regarding this administrative apparatus, noting, first of all, that the Mahdī “will establish a powerful and efficient government through the assistance of his capable companions…although their roles in overthrowing tyrannical governments cannot be

210 Ibid at 85. 211 Ibid at 130-134. 212 Amīnī at 233. 71

dismissed, their main roles will be in the reconstruction and reformation of the world under the aegis of the universal government...”213

Who will these administrators be? Tabasī observes that “It would be only natural for the administrative workers and officials in the government which Imām al-

Mahdī…will lead to be the leading figures and best of the ummah”—and he further notes that “the heavy burden of governing and administering the vast Islamic territories cannot be shouldered by just anybody—instead, individuals, who have been tested on many occasions and have proven their merit in various trials, must accept this responsibility.”214 But in Tabasī’s view, the standard of conduct for adminstrators is so high that ordinary human beings are disqualified from the outset, such that the job reverts to great figures (especially Shī’ites) from the past, resurrected in the Mahdī’s era, and thus fulfilling the prophecies in the traditions concerning the Mahdī’s 313 champions.

“As such…the government of Imām al-Mahdī…will be comprised of prophets and their successors, the most pious and righteous people of that time as well as of times past, and the towering personalities among the companions of the Prophet.”215 On these grounds,

Tabasi argues that “the head of the ministers in the government of al-Mahdī…is Hadrat

‘Īsa [Jesus] who is one of the leading prophets…Similarly, among the outstanding officials of his government will be Salman al-Farsi, Miqdad, Abū Dujanah, and Mālik al-

Ashtar, who had shown their merit in handling affairs during both the time of the Prophet and that of the Commander of the Faithful, as well as the tribe of Hamdan.” He adds to

213 Tabasī at 13. 214 Ibid at 161, 163. 215 Ibid at 161. 72

this list “the seven Companions of the Cave” as well as “Joshua, the executor…of Moses’ will, the believer in the family of Pharaoh.” 216

As to its underlying political form or structure, these authors echo the Shī’ite tradition which negates all previous political systems.217 Thus, Amīnī notes that “[t]he world community has experimented with different philosophies and ideologies…Nationalism, communism, socialism, capitalism, and so on have alternatively divided the nations, united them partially under one or another -ism, brought them to the brink of destructive nuclear warfare, and forced them to work with each other under international organizations like the United Nations…Different forms of imperialism and colonization are rampant even in the postcolonial era.”218 Likewise, Tabasī rejects all past political forms, noting that “the people of the world would have witnessed that many governments, parties and organizations had claimed that if they were given the chance to take charge of things, they could serve the world and its inhabitants, ensuring peace, security and improvement in economic conditions. In action, however, each of them would have been worse than the other, introducing nothing but corruption, killing and ruin. Leninism collapsed while Maoism was disfavored by its own leaders, and Western democracy, on the other hand, is nothing more than a people-deceiving slogan. The time will finally come when justice and equity would be implemented by the able hand of the man of God on the earth full of tyranny…Imām al-Mahdī will administer the government

216 Ibid at 163. 217 See Footnote 2, supra. 218 Amīnī at 169-172. 73

and nurture the people in such a manner that the word ‘tyranny’ will no longer hold a place in one’s mind…”219

But how in particular will the political structure of the final polity differ from those of democracy, fascism, communism, monarchy, and so forth? Unfortunately, beyond these sweeping negations, it appears that few within the Shī’ite majority offer positive definitions of the final political form. Among the trio of Amīnī, Tabasī, and

Kūrānī, Kūrānī is the only one to venture a positive definition—in his case, a monarchy of sorts: “We prefer the view that after [the Mahdī], Mahdīs from among his children will rule, and then will be the Return [raj'at] of some of the Prophets and Imāms, and they'll rule until the end of the world.”220 Unfortunately, Kūrānī offers no elaboration of this concept of monarchy, though one might infer the notion of the Shī’ite Imams returning to vindicate Shī’ism and correct the initial period of their individual reigns in antiquity, when none yielded actual power.

Lacking positive definitions of the final political form, it is of no surprise that these authors similarly fail to address a host of other questions and details concerning political structure. For instance, although all agree on the global geography of the final polity, none explain whether current nation-state boundaries will be entirely effaced, or somehow preserved, presumably because any answer to this question presupposes a positive theory of political form. Likewise, although they posit governance through an administrative apparatus, they do not detail its operative mechanisms. Rather, the presumption is that such detail is unnecessary, for the extraordinary virtue of the administrators is in itself the guarantor of their success: “in order to administer lands and

219 Tabasī at 112-118. 220 Kūrānī at 268. 74

territories, the Mahdī will appoint ministers who will have had a record of struggle both in experience and action, and who will have shown their firmness and decisiveness.

Governors with strong personalities, who think of nothing but the welfare of the Islamic state and the pleasure of God, will take charge of state affairs. Obviously, a country whose officials possess these qualities will prevail over any difficulty.”221 Similarly, that the existence of parliaments or other representary bodies is not discussed is presumably due to presumption of mass, popular support as a result of extraordinary virtue:

“Naturally, the government, which in a short period of time would prevail over adversities, eliminate confusion and disorder, and sow the seeds of hope in the hearts of mankind by removing despair from them, will enjoy popular support...it will be the government over hearts. The aspiration of mankind is to live under such a government…”222 Finally, these authors generally offer little detail regarding mechanisms for successorship—a feature which is presumably necessary given the temporally- moderate presumption that the government will last multiple generations, yet impossible to elucidate in the absence of an explicit theory of overall political form.

2. Idealism

To begin with, Ṣadr addresses the standard question of the government’s geography, but adds a number of nuances that distinguish his geographic account from those of the Shī’ite majority. The government will, of course, have “supremacy over the whole world,” and in Ṣadr’s account, its global capital will be Kūfa.223 But Ṣadr details this usual trope of global supremacy by noting that “government supremacy includes that

221 Tabasī at 112. 222 Ibid. 223 Ṣadr at 317, 310. 75

which single individuals would have difficulty to oversee—such as the army, judiciary, prisons, power, the post, and so forth.”224 Likewise, Ṣadr echoes the majority in asserting that the final era is one of global peace, but distinguishes between internal and external peace, both of which are accomplished in phases, over the long temporal arc of the final era. In particular, he states that “the importance of army, police, and prisons will gradually fade…and the army is perhaps the quickest to disappear, because its existence is based on external defense, against the hostility of other governments. But with the establishment of the world government, there won’t be any other government, thus the need for an army…disappears. As for police and prisons: they will dissolve gradually in accordance with the dissolving of crimes which will be the natural result of humanity attaining its high level of education in perfections. This level, however, won’t occur during the life of the Mahdī, but rather in accordance to the universal educational foundations that the Mahdī establishes for purposes of the perfecting of humanity.”225

What will be the political form of the global government? At first, Ṣadr echoes the negative definitions of form that are typical within the Shī’ite default orientation—yet with significantly more nuance. He begins by posing the rhetorical question, “is the structure [niẓām] of the Mahdī’s government…similar to prior orders, such as capitalism, socialism, etc.?”—to which he replies that “the Mahdī’s system is totally dissimilar and unlike any prior system” and furthermore that “what we are absolutely certain of is categorical negation—that his order does not comprise the pre-Mahdī orders…and not until after the Mahdī’s appearance will his world government and system be

224 Ibid at 464. 225 Ibid. 76

implemented.”226 The supplanting of all pre-Mahdī orders negates not only Western, but also Islamic political systems of the past, including both the Prophet’s polity and those of subsequent Islamic empires. Ṣadr emphasizes this point by stressing that “the ‘new

Sovereignty’ mentioned in the traditions means the new methods for running government

…which were never properly implemented by humanity, neither in the ‘Ummayad nor the

‘Abbāsid caliphates, nor thereafter in various governments and societies.”227 A primary reason for this negation of all past political systems is their inherent injustice: “Among the most important causes of injustice have been the method of individual, dictatorial rule which has been exercised throughout history.”228 Another reason is materialism, for “all these other systems…are based upon materialism and the discarding of divine considerations, whether explicitly like in communism and existentialism [al-wujūdīyya], or implicitly, as in capitalism, fascism, Nazism, and Roman and German law, and their modern branches...[But] the Mahdī’s system is based on the relationship of man to his

Lord, the training of his body and soul.” 229 In short, Ṣadr concludes that “we can generalize that any manmade system prior to the Mahdī’s Advent essentially comprises the most important sources of oppression and deviation…and thus the principal calling of the Imām Mahdī…is to arise and change these systems....”230

In this negation, Ṣadr addresses a more fundamental question, namely the legitimacy of the nation-state, given that it is a political form common to most, if not all, of these ‘isms’ (whether those of capitalism, communism, fascism, etc.). He begins by posing the question of the “the position of the Mahdī and his government” in regard to

226 Ibid at 87-93. 227 Ibid at 450. 228 Ibid at 88. 229 Ibid at 88-89. 230 Ibid at 87-88. 77

the present world order of nation-states. 231 He then addresses this question with significantly more nuance than his categorical rejection of the ‘isms’ listed in the previous paragraph, noting that, “in this regard, we must not describe his government as the polar opposite of this [present] international order…but rather we should inquire as to the degree to which the current international order is acceptable, and the degree to which it is rejected. For example, in his government, will there be the United Nations, or not? Will ambassadors be exchanged between governments? We must inquire into all of this.” 232 He begins this inquiry by delineating the essential elements of the present,

Westphalian world order, emphasizing international laws and agreements, bilateral and multilateral relationships, and international organizations:

“[This international order] comprises many matters as expressed in laws pertaining to the international community, aimed at upholding the interests of the constitutent governments themselves. There are agreements, treaties, pacts, etc., which bind the governments bilaterally or multilaterally, regulating their relationsihps economically, culturally, militarily, or otherwise. These governments have diplomatic representations, in forms which require ambassadors…and if there is no ambassador, then his place is upheld by administrations, or if diplomatic relations are lost between two, then a a friendly government represents the interests of another government vis-à-vis the third government….and if two or more governments can’t solve a problem independently, there are international organizations responsible for solving it. If the problem is judicial in its nature, then the International Court of Justice is responsible, but if the matter is political, then the United Nations has authority over it, for the United Nations is responsible for solving economic, social, and public health problems occurring amongst the governments, by way of UN subsidiaries, such as UNESCO, the World Health Organization, etc. Also, we must not ignore international laws that define the relationships among governments, concerning the security of borders and nationals, mutual respect, the delineation of crimes and the locus and degrees of punishment (in cases where an individual from one government commits a crime in another government), along with immunity of diplomatic representatives,

231 Ibid at 460. 232 Ibid. 78

rights of political asylum, fixing the extent of bodies of water in the proximity of the government, and other such matters…”233

Having provided this basic delineation, Ṣadr proceeds to offer his basic critique of the nation-state system—or, in his words, “a quick review of the strong and weak points in the current international situation.” 234 Posing the question, “[h]ave all of these structures helped in solving humanity’s problems?”—he offers the reply, “[o]f course not, for none of these structures was based upon an established ethics, but rather was founded exclusively on particularized interests.”235 Ṣadr’s rationale for rejecting the nation-state order, however, is fundamentally different from the standard Sunnī rejection of

Westphalia due to the doctrine of the Caliphate—for he rejects it for pragmatic, rather than ideological reasons. Foremost among these reasons is the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms in the international order: “There is nothing ultimately guaranteeing or requiring a government to implement the international laws—so it’s natural that any government will be selective about which of these structures it will implement according to what is easiest for it and in its best interests. And due to this, wars have continued, colonialism endures in its old and new forms, as does the intellectual and doctrinal attack upon the weak, defenseless masses. And likewise we find aggressive alliances, accusations between governments, the breaking of relations, and enmity. Thus, the United Nations has no enforcement mechanism for implementing its decisions. And it has no truly useful model for handling the disputes of governments or stopping wars, just as the International Court of Justice lacks enforcement in

233 Ibid at 459. 234 Ibid at 460. 235 Ibid at 459. 79

implementing its judgments…except in cases where both governments in the dispute, that is the litigant and defendant, happen to be satisfied.”236

Given these deficiencies of the Westphalian order underlying the United Nations,

Ṣadr concludes that the Mahdī’s global government will completely displace the nation- state system. This is for two reasons, “one theoretical, and the other practical.”237 As to the theoretical grounds, he notes that the self-interest of nation states detracts from the possibility of international unity, whereas the Mahdī “rises against particularized interests and pure selfishness, which will have no existence in the Mahdī’s government, nay rather the situation will change to promoting true, universal welfare.”238 On the other hand, “concerning the practical foundation: he does not allow the division of humanity by borders and governments. Rather, his government is single and global under a single leadership and a single command. The Mahdī will realize this by way of world conquest.

With this, all the international laws and institutions will be pointless, because they are merely for ordering the relationships between various governments, but at that time multiple governments will no longer exist. So this singular state of the world will unlock the door to the best things, the accumulated greed and selfishness steering today’s world will be effaced, war will cease, and this conquest will be the key to happiness, prosperity, peace, and justice for all humanity.”239

Thus far, Ṣadr has echoed the Shī’ite majority in the mere negation of prior political systems—albeit with considerably more nuance and sophistication. Yet his critique then transitions towards a positive theory of political structure, and particularly

236 Ibid at 459-460. 237 Ibid at 460. 238 Ibid at 460. 239 Ibid. 80

the nature of administration, within this global government. This transition begins with his review of the standard methods of administration employed in contemporary governments:

“[contemporary] governments are…abstract legal constructs comprising a populated region with specified borders as well as a governing body. The highest office in the government is held by the king, dictator, or republic- president, along with the head of the ministers of the non-presidential domain. Among these ministers, each is responsible for safeguarding one of the important functions of society, such as foreign affairs, defense, finance, economics, culture, education, and other affairs that the government needs to be administered…and in all of the governments there exists the parliament responsible for the legislative power…and the theoretical basis for this…is that the members of the parliament represent the different segments of the population, such that their agreement on the laws is tantamount to the agreement of the people…as if it issues from the people themselves. And in governments there are political parties, some of which are covert and others overt, some of which exercise actual power, either exclusively, or shared with other parties….and most governments assume the authority to permit or prohibit parties, according to the government’s own best-interests. Each political party represents a specific ideology and particular theory of existence and life. And from this stems the parties’ feuds concerning theory, society, and reform…If a party in the government exercises power alone, that’s what’s called the single-party system, and that ruling party implements its particular perspective of life and existence. And the ruling party usually limits freedom of opinion and political and social activity to its own confines, and prohibits any other view, party activity, or individual activity…The ministries in the government…comprise public bureaus or institutions, each of which is responsible for overseeing a particular domain of the society, according to the needs. The government is responsible for the general oversight of the institutions, and providing for the general arrangements that would be difficult for individuals to attend to, such as the army, police, prisons, customs, power, the post, mining, distribution of water and electricity, and banking. In this oversight, the government can extend participation to all transactions, companies, and banks, import-export activities, large-scale production, and so forth.”240

After enumerating these features of contemporary government, Ṣadr accomplishes the transition to his positive theory of political structure by asking whether and which of

240 Ibid at 461-462. 81

these contemporary features might endure: “So what, then, is the Mahdī’s view on all of this—what form will his global government take?”241 To this question, Ṣadr responds with five fundamental features of the final political structure. First is that “the highest leadership in the government will neither be kingship, nor presidency, nor dictatorship— but, rather Imāmate, for the highest ruler will be the Imām appointed by God. This post will be occupied by the Mahdī himself while he lives, and after his death it will be occupied by his caliphs from among the Righteous Guardians [al-awliyā al-

ṣāliḥīn]…This is in regards to the central leadership in the global government.” 242

However, the central leader will also employ a bureaucratic apparatus, for “the Mahdī will not himself attend to the safeguarding of all specific matters in the world— rather…he’ll entrust leadership over the various regions of the world to his devoted, tested companions, the ‘rulers of God in His earth.’”243 The world state, in other words, will be under the central leader of a single Imām or Caliph, who also delegates to an administrative apparatus. While the difference between this Imāmate and a monarchy isn’t very clear, perhaps it lies in the fact that the central leader will himself observe the rule of law, for elsewhere Ṣadr states that “even the Mahdī himself will be obliged to obey all laws.”244

Second is that the Imāmate will not only be an executive, but also a legislative power—in contrast to many contemporary nation-states in which the legislative domain derives from the general population, through a representative or parliamentary system. As

Ṣadr explains, “the Mahdī’s government, due to the nature of its doctrinal

241 Ibid at 462. 242 Ibid. 243 Ibid. 244 Ibid at 89. 82

composition…will be devoid of a parliament in the legislative sense. Power, in the ideology of this government is not ‘of the people’ nor ‘of their representatives,’ but rather belongs to God alone, who has no partner.”245 Despite this, Ṣadr envisions the possibility that some secondary, legislative functions may nonetheless vest in the people—for “[i]t is possible that the settlement of various derivative matters [al-waqā’i al-far’īyya] may be delegated to an assembly resembling a parliament, or to assemblies produced by the national institutions—though there is no specific historic evidence confirming that they will exist in the Mahdīst government.”246 Furthermore, it is important to note that this legislative function of the Imāmate is also fundamentally different from conventional

Islamic political theories, which view the Imām or Caliph as being merely an executive authority, and consider the legislative function to derive from the Qur’ān and Sunna.

Rather, the Mahdī himself, in this case, is also the source of legislation, for “indeed, it is up to the Mahdī to rule and…define the fundamental legislation [al-tashrī’ al-aṣlī], as he will report new items of fundamental legislation that weren’t previously known.”247 (This conception of Islamic legislation will be further explored in Chapter Two of this study.)

Third concerns the “nature of relationships between regions” within the final government—which Ṣadr suggests will likely be reminiscent of federalism, albeit in a modified form wherein the members of the federation have very limited autonomy.248

Ṣadr’s explanation of this system is rather tentative, noting that we “have nothing that can cast [definitive] light on this matter.”249 On the one hand, he suggests that the various regions or geographic members of the global government will have some degree of

245 Ibid at 463. 246 Ibid. 247 Ibid at 462. 248 Ibid at 463. 249 Ibid. 83

independence, for he states that “in customary usage, a ‘land’ [iqlīm] is a part of the earth with a distinct name—i.e. Egypt is a land, and Syria is a land… But in the global government, ‘lands’ means all the discrete regions [manṭiqa muḥadida] with internal rule that is independent from others.”250 On the other hand, he emphasizes that the rulers within each of the regions will lack any independent legislative powers, being merely be extensions of the Mahdī’s executive function. This is because “[the government’s] central rule is singular, its general ideology is singular, and its fundamental law is singular—therefore, given this, nothing remains for the regional ruler except for execution.”251 A regional ruler, in other words, lacks “full supremacy, nor is such an individual legally independent from the central rule. Rather, his status…is like that of a single State in the USA, or a single Republic in the USSR—despite its difference from these two governments in ideology and legislation.”252

Fourth concerns the further details of the administrative or bureaucratic apparatus.

In this regard, Ṣadr is rather flexible and accommodating of different possibilities, acknowledging that “administration of the government, whether at central or regional level, will be exercised in a form that is familiar to the people at the time–i.e. the form that is customary directly before the Mahdī’s Advent…though it will naturally involve significant reforms.”253 To this end, Ṣadr envisions the possibility that the Mahdī will appear very soon, in which case the administrative apparatus will resemble that of contemporary governments: “thus, if our hypothesis that the Mahdī will appear during this century is sound…then his government’s administration will be in a form that is

250 Ibid. 251 Ibid. 252 Ibid. 253 Ibid. 84

generally familiar to contemporary government, namely: administration firstly by way of ministers, secondly by way of general directors, and thirdly through social institutions.

[However], some of the traditions suggest that there will be a ‘head’ of the viziers, as well as a highest leader of the army…”254 Elsewhere, Ṣadr elaborates on these institutions and ministries. He explains that as a general matter, government administration will take place from mosques, noting that “employment of mosques as administrative centers is not a strange thing, for the concept of mosques in Islam was based on this, rather than their being constructed for formal beauty.”255 More particularly, within the global capital, the

Mahdī himself will “employ the Kūfa mosque as the seat [majlis] of his rule— corresponding to the leader’s palace or sovereign’s court in contemporary language.”256

Likewise, the “the Sahlah mosque will be the Public Treasury [bayt al-māl], corresponding to the Ministry of Finance in contemporary government.” 257

Fifth is the absence of “political parties in the Mahdī’s government.”258 Ṣadr addresses this by distinguishing between two meanings of the term, political party. The first meaning is one that opposes the reigning government, based upon the libertarian notion that “it’s the right of every man to choose what he wishes in terms of opinions and beliefs, and to defend the views he wants. And by this, political parties divide themselves, for instance, into right-wing and left-wing, and so forth.”259 Ṣadr explains that this sense of political party is “banned in the Mahdī’s government, and an individual is deserving of death if his pursuit is clearly against the divine blueprint for complete justice. And we’ve

254 Ibid. 255 Ibid at 580-581. 256 Ibid. 257 Ibid. 258 Ibid at 463-464. 259 Ibid. 85

already seen that in the Mahdī’s government, the fate of every deviant is death.”260 The second meaning of political party, however, is “grouping by belonging to a particular belief”–but in a manner involving “no opposition to the Mahdīst government.”261 This meaning of political party might very well endure in the final political structure, for

“there’s no definitive evidence supporting or refuting this…Indeed, the clay of humanity is molded generally through competition—and the starting point of true consciousness is, to a great extent, heated debate.” 262 Therefore, it is conceivable that “the Mahdīst government sees benefit in permitting this second type of division, for it won’t be against the generally known rules.”263 However, even if this type of political party formation is permitted, it will eventually recede during the long temporal arc of the final world order, for “this form of division will gradually dissolve as a result of…humanity reaching a level wherein it comprehends in detail that which is beneficial and that which is corrupting...” 264 (This theory of the gradual emergence of unity of thought will be explained further in Chapter 4 of this study).

Among these five general features of the final political order, Ṣadr elaborates in much greater detail on the third and fourth features—i.e. the nature of relationships between various regions within the global government, and the nature of government administration. First of all, why does the central authority require an administrative apparatus, particularly when the Mahdī, who is the central authority in the first instance, has extraordinary powers? The reason is that “individual power, even if it is great and deep, still falls short from being able, all by itself, to execute rule throughout the entire

260 Ibid. 261 Ibid. 262 Ibid. 263 Ibid. 264 Ibid. 86

world, in the sense of adjudicating all particular matters of the individuals and society.

This is because these matters amount to millions in a single hour, not to mention in a single day…Yes indeed, a miracle could overcome that, and could bestow on the individual a limitless ability, except that such miracles can’t be assumed concerning the

Mahdī, due to their violation of the rules against miracles whenever a clear substitute for the material exists--in this case being the implementation of global rule by way of the many individuals who are his tested companions. So when, in this manner, there is a natural substitute for a miracle, then no space is allotted for miracles to be fulfilled and actualized.”265

Thus, because the central authority can not govern single-handedly, “each region needs a perfect administrative and judicial apparatus…comprising the ruler, viziers, general administrators, judges, and others.”266 But how will this administrative apparatus be organized? Ṣadr proposes two theories. The first theory, which Ṣadr strongly prefers, is that of rule by individual administrators. This theory presumes that the global confederation comprises between 120-200 regions, a range that derives from the present composition of Westphalian nation-states, for “the regions comprising the inhabited world are numerous…the member governments of the United Nations now exceeds 120, and there are also regions and governments not participating in this global group, like all the colonies and most of the oceanic islands and the polar regions. Furthermore, some present governments are particularly vast—like China, the USSR, the USA, Canada,

Australia, etc. If the best interests of the [Mahdī’s] global government are to subdivide these…into further regions, then the result will be an even greater number than what was

265 Ibid at 478. 266 Ibid. 87

there before, such that the number of regions in the global government might reach

200.”267

To this aggregate of 120-200 regions will be assigned 313 top administrators, who will rule as individuals, while any remainder would constitue the elite of the elite— namely, the central ruler’s vanguard within the central government headquarters. 268

Admittedly, 313 administrators will be “too small” for the comprehensive administrative needs of the global government, for “if we posit that 10 high administrators are required for each of 200 regions, then this amounts to a need for 2,000 of such individuals.”269

This figure of 313, however, refers only to the very highest administrators in each land, which in each case consists of “two individuals: the highest ruler and the highest judge.”270 Thus, “if, for example, the lands comprising the global government do not reach 200, but rather fall short to 150, then the needs dictates that there be 300 of these highest administrators [assigned to the regions], and not more; in this case, the remainder is 13, and perhaps these 13 occupy the functions of the world’s central government, at the flanks of the Mahdī himself.”271

The second theory of administrative organization, mentioned though not favored by Ṣadr, posits rule by administrative committees, rather than by individuals. 272

According to this theory, the geographic division is not into 120-200 regions, but rather

“the entire world is divided into four regions: North, South, East, and West, to each of which is appointed an [administrative] committee comprised of 12 men”—resulting in a

267 Ibid. 268 Ibid. 269 Ibid at 479. 270 Ibid. 271 Ibid. 272 This theory derives from the traditions within the classical Shī’ite text, the Khuṭbat al-Bayān, which Ṣadr criticizes due to various weaknesses in its chains of transmission as well as content. Ibid at 494-495. 88

total of 48 highest administrators.273 Each of these four regions is then “sub-divided into smaller regions,” resulting in a totle of “thirty-five lands, some of which are extremely huge—for instance, all of Africa is a single land, as are all of the Andalucian islands.”274

Naturally, “the rulers appointed in [the smaller regions] are of lesser degrees of virtue than those assigned to the first division, so these two divisions requires the rulers of the smaller regions to derive their responsibilities from the rulers of the larger regions.”275

Furthermore, not only are the four macro-regions ruled by committee, but so are the subdivided regions, such that “the number of the individuals of the ruling committee of each particular land fluctuates between 5 and 8.”276 One of the problems with this theory, however, is that the sum-total of administrators does not add up to the desired 313. As

Ṣadr points out, “the totality [of regional administrators] is 197; so if to these are added the 48 rulers of the first-order geographic division, the aggregate is 245 rulers—which falls short of the desired number of elites by 68 individuals.”277

Having acknowleged that either theory (or even a combination thereof) might be possible, Ṣadr addresses some further details concerning these administrators. First is that their presence in sufficient number is essential to the “stabilization” and viability of the global government—for “were these judges and rulers to amount to only a portion of the

[required number]...then the global Mahdīst government could not succeed.” 278 The second point concerns their qualifications. Ṣadr explains that these rulers are among those who have passed at least the first of the three levels of divine testing (to be explained

273 Ibid. 274 Ibid. 275 Ibid. 276 Ibid. 277 Ibid. 278 Ibid at 495, 477. 89

further in Chapter 4 below), for only “the devoted ones of the two upper levels [of testing] are worthy of custodianship over the most important of duties in the Mahdī’s government.”279 At the highest level—that is, those who have reached the final level of tests—are those who have comprehensive knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence [fiqh] to a degree that is similar to what the contemporary Islamic terminology refers to as independent legal reasoning [ijtiḥād].280 “Islamic jurisprudence confirms that the head of the government must combine certain specific requirements, and attaining unto specified competencies in order to be fit to occupy this great rank, and likewise the judge [qāḍī] must combine certain prerequisites inorder to be able to judge Islamically and be capable of solving problems that arise among people. The most important of these prerequisites, shared by both the ruler [ḥākim] and the judge, are justice and possessing knowledge of the law [fiqāha]. By justice is meant a great degree of devotion and readiness to sacrifice which curbs the individual from transgressing or disobeying the teachings of God. By knowledge of the law is meant being broadly apprised of the Islamic legal rulings, which is called ijtiḥād in the language of Islamic jurisprudence during the time-period prior to the Mahdī’s Advent.”281 It should be noted, however, that although the Mahdī’s top administrators have a level of legal knowledge resembling that of ijtiḥād in the contemporary world, they will not be mujtaḥids (for reasons that will be explained in Chapter Two).

Thus far, we have reviewed the general political structures that persist throughout the entire temporal arc of the final government. These include the presence of a central

279 Ibid at 483. 280 Ibid at 502. 281 Ibid at 478. 90

autocratic authority, which Ṣadr names the Imāmate, along with a federation of 120-200 regions, each of which is ruled through an administrative apparatus, at the very top of which is a high ruler and a high judge. Although these general features persist through the entirety of the final order, Ṣadr specifies that this overall time period will be sub-divided into three separate phases, each of which will have certain political features that are unique.

a. First Political Phase: the Mahdī’s Personal Rule

The first political phase of the final government, which will last for up to 20 years, is the period when the Mahdī himself is the global ruler, and wherein Jesus Christ (after his second coming) will be the Mahdī’s second-in-command, or “something like the capital’s prime minister in contemporary governments.”282 This first phase is described by Ṣadr as the phase of consolidation of the global government. More particularly, the period of the Mahdī’s personal reign constitutes the world’s transition from the prior divine plan, which represented the history of human injustice, to the new divine plan, the aim of which is to achieve complete justice and to produce the infallible human society

(as described further in Chapter 4 below). As Ṣadr notes, “in these two divine plans, the

Mahdī himself represents the end of the first divine plan, and the beginning, starting point of the second divine plan…this requires sufficient time for attaining the desired goal…and we’ve already explained that this will not be achieved through miracles.

Therefore, it is necessary to conclude the Mahdī will live for a sufficient time period to implement it in a form that ensures its continuation after him…and this is not accomplished merely by conquering the world, for when all the lands come under Muslim

282 Ibid at 604. 91

rule in the legal sense, there will still be much greater educational requirements for those societies.”283 After reviewing the various traditions, Ṣadr’s conclusion is that the Mahdī will accomplish his task of consolidation within “in a relatively short period of time”— specifically, “his reign is either 5-10 years, or 19-20 years, and is likely that the first option (i.e. 5, 7, 9, or 10 years) is closer to the truth.”284

In addition to the Mahdī and Jesus, the role of his 313 companions, who comprise the first cohort of the global administrative apparatus, is crucial to the success of this first phase. Ṣadr explains that this first cadre of administrators represents the choicest fruits of the previous divine plan (i.e. the contemporary era), for “this prior divine plan requires that they be produced in order for the experience [of the subsequent divine plan] to be successful—first through their function as the military leadership in the global conquests, and secondly through their function as the worldwide leaders and rulers throughout the regions of the global government.”285 To this end, Ṣadr suggests, in one instance, that upon the Mahdī’s Advent, those who have passed the first level of tests might number

“not less than 10,000,” while those who have passed the second level of tests, and are therefore fit for the highest level of rule, would number 313.286 At the most granular level of detail, Ṣadr engages in a lengthy discussion of traditions suggesting the specific identities of these 313 individuals comprising the first cohort of the government’s administrators. Ṣadr notes, however, that the primary textual sources of these traditions

283 Ibid at 432. 284 Ibid at 437-438. 285 Ibid at 477. Note that Ṣadr also addresses the theoretical problem: if the same individuals who were previously the military commanders of the global conquest are the same cohort who, after completion of the conquestion are to administer the global government, then presumably their numbers will have diminished, for some would have been killed in the conquests. Ibid at 496. 286 Ibid at 483-506. 92

contain numerous weaknesses and discrepencies, rendering any conclusions regarding specific identities of the 313 to be highly speculative and unreliable.287

While the Mahdī’s extraordinary nature renders him fit to rule, the question naturally arises as to how his 313 companions receive their ijtiḥād-like qualifications.

After all, given to the inherent injustice and tyranny of the world during the prior divine plan, it is unthinkable that these 313 companions could have gained their qualifications through practical experience in ruling or adjudicating. “Rather the situation is the opposite…their attainments…result from righteous reactions against the conditions of darkness and tyranny…[which] requires distancing themselves from the instruments of ruling and adjudication, and from unjust governments entirely, for if they were to have participated in it, they would have failed in the divine testing [tamhīṣ].”288 Despite their lack of prior practical experience, Ṣadr emphasizes that the soundness of their theoretical knowledge is sufficient for their task—for “lack of practical experience doesn’t lead to a significant deficit in the individual’s success, so long as there is a theoretical understanding.”289 To this end, Ṣadr notes that there are sufficient numbers among the

Islamic jurists in the contemporary world (albeit, those who are unaffiliated with government): “there’s no doubt that the existence of jurists [fuqahā] who are confirmed in the science of Sharī’ah and the scholars [‘ulamā] apprised of its minutia in the age prior the Advent are not small in number, and naturally it can’t be said that all of them fail in the divine tests, nor can it be said that all of them succeed in the tests; rather, we

287 Ibid. See also Footnote 275, supra, concerning Ṣadr’s textual criticism of the Khuṭbat al-Bayān. 288 Ibid at 498. 289 Ibid. 93

assert that some of them do…”290 On these grounds, Ṣadr expresses his confidence that the ‘ulamā of the contemporary world will establish the first cohort of the Mahdī’s future administrators: “as for the weakness of today’s Islamic jurists vis-à-vis global power, and their outward refusal to be involved in public affairs …well these qualities will naturally be lifted from them after the Mahdī’s Advent.”291

However, Ṣadr emphasizes that it is not merely through conventional methods of study that the ‘ulamā can reach this level of qualification—but it also requires direct training from the Mahdī himself. In the first instance, this training occurs during the

Occultation period itself, for “the devoted ones receive their deep education from the

Mahdī himself, prior to his Advent, rendering them fit for undertaking the highest duties in the just global government; this is based on the concept…that the Mahdī is not veiled from his elite ones…who know his truth during his Occultation…and only the tested, devoted ones, who are rid of sins and faults, can attain this level.”292 After the Mahdī’s

Advent, of course, the provision of ongoing training to incumbent administrators is significantly simplified. This will occur in two general ways. 293 First is the general curriculum shared by all administrators, whereby “the pure ones receive most or all of their training in general concepts and new teachings from the Mahdī’s instruction after his Advent.” 294 Second is the specific instruction tailored to each administrator, for

“whenever the Mahdī wants to dispatch an individual as a ruler in a region…he will write a covenant [‘ahd]…comprising the plan that such individual must follow during the

290 Ibid. 291 Ibid at 502. 292 Ibid at 504. 293 Ṣadr acknowledges, however, that beyond these two methods, “perhaps there are other ways……which the ḥadīths are silent about, given that they speak in the language of the age in which they were written.” Ibid at 506. 294 Ibid at 504. 94

tenure of his rule, as ‘Alī did when he dispatched Mālik al-Ashtar as governor of

Egypt…But this covenant will not consist of general rules, as it was for Mālik al-Ashtar— for it assumes that they are already capable of the general rules and understanding of the new jurisprudence [fiqh]—rather, this covenant provides the necessities when the ruler encounters difficulties in implementing the general rules in the world’s particular problems…for when [the administrator] goes to his region for the first time…he assumes unfathomably monumental responsibilities.”295

Given these “unfathomably monumental” pressures, the question naturally arises as to whether some administrators might fail in their task, for however virtuous they may be, they do not possess the superhuman nature of the Mahdī. The possibility of their failure seems all the more likely given that “the slightest greed and avarice would threaten to thwart and corrupt their duties, just as the slightest forgetfulness or neglect would threaten to derail them.”296 Given this precarious nature of their duties, Ṣadr explains that the Mahdī “will deal severely” with them—for he “will deal sternly with the actions of his companions who have been assigned to rule the various lands of the world…The Mahdī will focus his attention on them, observing and scrutinizing them.”297

But does this “severity” of the Mahdī towards the adminstrators imply that some of them will fail in their task? Ṣadr considers this possibility in his discussion of particular Islamic tradition which suggests that over time, the administrators will “gradually evince weaknesses” in their functions, prompting the Mahdī to “summon them all from around the world into a conference…in which he presents a sealed book…which is the Prophet’s

295 Ibid at 505. 296 Ibid at 522. 297 Ibid at 521. 95

covenant [‘ahd ma’hūd]…and which then supplements their responsibilities.”298 Despite this, only twelve remain steadfast, and the remainder of the 313 falter, becoming enemies of the Mahdī and apostates deserving of death.

However, Ṣadr rejects this tradition, not only on the basis of textual criticism, but also due to its import. Ṣadr emphasizes the great time period required for the raising up of such administrators—these individuals, after all, are the choicest “fruits of humanity’s long history…prior to the Mahdī’s appearance.”299 Therefore, it is inconceivable for the bulk of administrators to fail, for otherwise “from where will the Mahdī summon others for that purpose?”300 He concludes that “the fact that they are irreplacable negates the possibility that they cease their functions, for it would lead to a breach in the great aims of the government.” 301 Furthermore, “it is impossible for them to them to doubt his

Mahdīhood” because the Mahdī’s truth is not only “as clear as the sun to all human beings,” but is even more indubitably clear to these 313 administrators, who “reached such high levels of tests and faith…that they encountered the Imām during his

Occultation.”302 In short, Ṣadr concludes that “we can be fully certain that these elite ones will remain continuously steadfastness in their administration of power and judgment in the just, global government….so the notion of their apostacy can not be endorsed.”303

Ṣadr also emphasizes that during this first political phase, the Mahdī and his administrators must observe frugality and modesty in their personal lives, even to the

298 Ibid at 523. 299 Ibid at 525. 300 Ibid. 301 Ibid. 302 Ibid at 527. 303 Ibid. 96

point of asceticism, “for it is necessary that in his personal life he represent the poorest and most famished individual in the whole world—and this behavior will also extend to…his special companions, the governers in the earth, because each one will be a just leader for a region of the earth, so it is necessary for him to materially represent, in his personal life, the lowliest individual in his region.”304 Over the course of the Mahdī’s reign, however, rising prosperity throughout the global and regional economies

(described further in Chapter Three below) means that the asceticism of the Mahdī and the administrators will begin to wane, for “throughout the personal reign of the Mahdī, the gradual nature of the effects of justice will spread prosperity in the world.” 305

However, even after the personal reign of the Mahdī, the central ruler and the administrators must continue to observe personal modesty and frugality relative to their overall societies given the longer time-span is required in order for universal prosperity to be achieved, for “this great goal will only be achieved after the Mahdī, in accordance with the system that he [entrusts] to the global rulers who succeed him.”306

b. Second Political Phase: the Reign of Appointed Righteous Saints

The second political phase of the global government begins upon the Mahdī’s passing. Ṣadr’s discussion of this phase focuses mostly on the question of successorship.

As to their general qualities, Ṣadr explains that successors—not only to the Mahdī but also to the first cohort of administrators—must be “elite [khāṣṣa] in their great faith, devotion, and education; their training occurs via profound and continuous cultivation in the various tests of strength…rendering them the righteous, chosen ones capable of

304 Ibid at 548. 305 Ibid at 549. 306 Ibid. 97

custodianship over the important responsibilities of world leadership after the Mahdī, or of custodianship over the leadership the various regions after their various rulers, should they die or relocate.”307 Indeed, possession of these superior qualities “is necessary for the continuation of the system of Mahdīst rule, otherwise his system would be dependant on his personage, and wouldn’t be capable of continuation after him, for there wouldn’t be anyone qualified to take over.”308

Who will the successors be? Ṣadr addresses this by first rejecting two doctrines common to the Shī’ite majority position of revanchism. The first is the commonly held notion that Jesus Christ will be the Mahdī’s immediate successor. Ṣadr concedes that the two figures will be contemporaneous during the last 10 years of the Mahdī’s life, during which Jesus will serve as “something like the capital’s prime minister.” 309 After the

Mahdī’s passing, Christ will continue to live for an additional 30 years, which is the reason that the traditions state that Jesus is at the end of the Islamic community.310

Nonetheless, Ṣadr emphasizes that “after the Mahdī, the highest leadership post in the just, global government will not, in any event, pass to the Messiah.”311 He justifies this based upon the tradition which states that Christ will decline to lead the community in prayers, deferring instead to the Mahdī, and stating to the Mahdī that ‘verily, you

[Muslims] are rulers over one another.’312 The interpretation of this tradition, according to Ṣadr, is that “after the Mahdī, all of the Righteous Saints [awliyā] will be Muslim, rather than Christian, in origin; thus, these Saints have precedence over Christ in

307 Ibid at 481. 308 Ibid. 309 Ibid at 605. 310 Ibid at 606 (citing the well-known Sunnī and Shī’ite tradition, “The Ummah can never die which has me at one end and the Messiah, son of Mary, at the other”). 311 Ibid. 312 Ibid. 98

succeeding to leadership, because he is a Prophet of the prior religion.”313 Rather than assuming the highest leadership post, Christ will “participate via an administrative role, or will continue in the same manner [as he did]…during the lifetime of the Mahdī.”314

The second doctrine that Ṣadr rejects is that of Return [raj’at], which posits that the Mahdī’s rule will be succeeded by the rule of various figures from the Islamic past, particularly the first eleven Shī’ite Imāms, who return to the world in the End Times,

(particularly for the purpose of vindicating Shī’ism). Ṣadr rejects this popular doctrine on three grounds in particular—first is textual criticism, second is principle of rejecting miracles when there is a natural substitute, and third is common sense, for “the return of the dead would mean that there’s no need for any ordinary, living humans…and if this were possible, then it would have been a pointless injustice to humanity for the Mahdī to appear only after a long Occultation, for it would mean that humanity would have been subjected to these difficulties [of Occultation] despite the possibility of such difficulties being verily easily removed [through the return of the dead].”315 It should be noted, however, that Ṣadr accepts the doctrine of Return with respect to one individual in particular—namely ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib whom, he explains, is one and the same with the

Qur’ānic figure of the ‘Beast of the Earth’ [dābba]. This return of ‘Alī, according to Ṣadr, will occur right after the Mahdī’s death—yet the “the principal function of the Beast of the Earth” is not to rule, but rather “to distinguish the believer from the disbeliever, and the deviant from the pious, and to publically manifest the moral reality of each

313 Ibid. 314 Ibid. 315 Ibid at 497. 99

person.”316 This will be necessary because “immediately after the Mahdī’s death, the global, just government will experience its most vulnerable time, having lost its great leader. Although…the Imām Mahdī will have eradicated the deviants from the earth, there will remain a portion of humanity, however small it may be, which will have submitted to the Mahdī’s government merely out of fear or greed, rather than from true allegiance, so after he passes, so it’s very possible that they will direct this avarice towards gaining ascendency over the government, or at least over some of its parts...[Thus] the Beast of the Earth will emerge in order to buttress the global, just government by [stopping] any such transgression.”317 In any event, Ṣadr reemphasizes that Alī’s return qua Beast is not only “contrary to the general [Shī’ite] usage of the term

Return,” but is also devoid of any implication of succession to rule. 318

Having excluded the common Shī’ite doctrines of successorship to Christ, or by way of Return, Ṣadr asserts that successorship to the Mahdī will instead proceed by way of the “rule of the Twelve Righteous Saints” who, in the aggregate, will rule for roughly

720 years. Ṣadr provides several justifications for these claims. That there will be twelve of these successors is not a certain matter, but is the most likely case, given the variety of traditions suggesting that after the Mahdī will be “twelve further Mahdīs.”319 Likewise, that these individuals will rule for a 720 years is not absolute. Ṣadr explains that “[i]f the number of the ruling Saints is twelve, we can assume that their reigns of leadership is according to ordinary, natural ages—except that the average ordinary age in the government of perfect justice…will not be 60 or 70, but rather at least 100. Thus, it is

316 Ibid at 652. 317 Ibid. 318 Ibid at 639. 319 Ibid at 648. 100

possible for the leader to spend 80 of those years occupying the seat of leadership. So, if their average reign is 60 years, then the sum of the time periods of rule of the Righteous

Saints is 720 years.”320 Thus, the reign of 720 years is merely a rough approximation.

The rule of these twelve Righteous Saints, Ṣadr explains, will not derive from election or any other democratic process, but rather will occur by way of direct appointment by the Mahdī, and thereafter by each ruler, who will appoint his successor.

This is due to the fact that the general society at that time, due to its inherent fallibility (as described further in Chapter 4, below), will be unfit to elect a qualified ruler: “it is not feasible for him to be designated through election…for none but a perfectly righteous human...can assume the reigns…such that none but the Mahdī himself can recognize the likes of such a man.”321 To this end, Ṣadr assures us that “there’s no doubt that the Mahdī, prior to his death, will have emphasized and stressed, through repeated global announcements, the necessity of obedience to to his caliph.”322 Furthermore, he explains that the Mahdī himself will, “during his lifetime—and possibly during the last year of his life—designate his successor [walī ‘ahdī] or his caliph, that he may succeed as the highest leader of the global just government after him, and the first ruler of the era of the

Righteous Saints.”323

Furthermore, the personal tie between each ruler and his appointed successor is not merely one of appointment, but also of direct training, for amidst a fallible society, it is only through such personalized training that these individuals can achieve their qualifications. Thus, with regards to the first of these twelve Righteous Saints, the Mahdī

320 Ibid at 649. 321 Ibid at 646. 322 Ibid. 323 Ibid. 101

himself “provides him with special training qualifying him for this great office.” 324

Likewise, this successor provides personal training to the next, and so forth, for “each ruler whose appointment occurs via designation is…the result of the special, centralized training received from his predecessor, [thereby] constituting direct links to the clear, detailed training in the principles directly bequeathed by the Mahdī.” 325 On these grounds, Ṣadr asserts that the first of these twelve successors will be “superior to the eleven who will succeed him, given that he is the fruit of the personal training of the

Mahdī himself, and is contemporary to the Mahdī’s words, deeds, and ways, unlike the rulers who will follow him.” 326

The practical requirements of these mentor-apprentice relationships, Ṣadr explains, renders it highly likely that these twelve successors will be “the progeny of the Imām

Mahdī himself…linked in lineage through father-son relationships.” 327 Ṣadr’s justification for this is logical, rather than textual, for during this time period, “there are many realities, methods, and laws…that only the ruler is aware of, which were specifically bequeathed from the Mahdī; disclosing these to the new ruler requires the prior ruler’s time and effort, something that is already scarce enough between fathers and sons, and even more rare between, for example, cousins…”328 Ṣadr then emphasizes that this theory of successorship via direct descent from the Mahdī is independent of the

Shī’ite doctrine of Occultation, and is therefore fully compatible with the Sunnī notion of the Mahdī as “a man that is born in due course, who fills the earth with justice.”329 In any

324 Ibid at 645. 325 Ibid at 647. 326 Ibid at 646. 327 Ibid at 650. 328 Ibid at 651. 329 Ibid. 102

event, Ṣadr de-emphasizes the matter of their descent from the Mahdī, noting that it “is not of great importance…since the most important matter is their essential qualities and their just actions, regardless of the possibility of kinship.”330

As a final note, Ṣadr emphasizes that despite their infallibility and close ties to the

Mahdī, “a difference, naturally, exists between the Mahdī’s rule and the rule of his caliphs…in terms of the degree of the perfection of his leadership and theirs”—and it is due to this qualitative differences that the traditions state that ‘there will be no good in life after the Mahdī.’ 331 This qualitiative gap comprises “personal, educational, and psychological differences.”332 But despite the relative inferiority of these 12 successors,

Ṣadr assures us that “the Mahdī will not neglect the matter of the Umma’s survival after him.” 333 More particularly, he emphasizes that “the foundation of the world order continues to exist continuously, given the revolution…that the Mahdī initiated among humanity…which the government after the Mahdī pursues in his course, and given the central education of humanity upon his foundations.”334 Likewise, Ṣadr states that “given the rules of training bequeathed, in full detail, to the ruler from the Mahdī, there will be no failure in the government, but rather it will, venerated and beloved by the masses, endure and continue, uninterruptedly, in implementing the central training program, fully just as it was in the era of the Mahdī.”

c. The Third Political Phase: Reign of the Elected Righteous Saints

330 Ibid. 331 Ibid at 481. 332 Ibid at 646. 333 Ibid at 645. 334 Ibid at 481. 103

In contrast to the autocracy of the first two political phases, the third political phase marks the advent of a democracy of sorts. The justification for this transition is that society as a whole will have reached a point of sufficient maturity for democracy to succeed, for the 720-year reign of the Righteous Saints “will be a very ample time period for delivering humanity, through central, continuous, and exacting training, to the stage of being the ‘Infallible Society.’” 335 More specifically, “the reign of the [twelve]

Righteous Saints is a preparatory or transitional period for delivering the global society to the era of infallibility wherein public consensus will be infallible…so at that time, the need for appointment of leadership, as was the case during the rule of the [twelve]

Righteous Saints, will be removed, and leadership will instead be entrusted to election

[al-intikhāb] or consultation [shūrā].” 336 Similarly, Ṣadr explains suggests that the viability of democracy derives from the fact that the “majority” view in this society will be sound—“for the great majority of its individuals are righteous and just, therefore its public consensus is infallible, because the views of righteous individuals must also be righteous.”337

Compared to his commentary on the first two phases, Ṣadr offers scant detail on this third phase, noting that “the [era of] consultation will proceed in accordance with laws that will be enacted at that time, which are impossible for us to have knowledge of presently.”338 Nonetheless, he offers some basic points of comparison. To begin with, the elected rulers of this third phase will share in the virtues of the appointed rulers of the preceding phase: “the advent of this [era of] consultation marks the end of the era

335 Ibid at 649. 336 Ibid at 647. 337 Ibid. 338 Ibid at 647. 104

wherein the Righteous Saints, who were appointed by designation, reigned—but the new rulers, who are appointed by election, will also be Righteous Saints.”339 On the other hand, they not will only differ their mechanisms of appointments, but also in their

“methods of education.”340 Ṣadr elaborates, noting that, “the ruler whose appointment occured by the method of designation is, with full certainty, a result of the special, centralized training received from his predecessor...But as for the elected ruler, he belongs to a society whose public consensus is infallible…So through this [societal] quality, they gain their qualifications to exercise the universal leadership of the just, global government…”341 In short, rather than gaining their education through personal training, enshrined in the master-apprentice relationship of the previous political phase, these elected rulers gain their education and training directly and entirely from their natural upbringing within the just society.

Ṣadr also addresses the question, “How will the society recognize the advent of the quality of infallibility?”342 He explains that this will occur through the Mahdī’s will and testament—but one of three possible ways. The first possibility is that “society recognizes it through the Mahdī’s [public] will and testament—for instance, his [public] statement that the Rightous Saints who exercise power will be 12 in number, so when this number is reached, then the reign of these Saints will have clearly ended, and the advent of the infallible society will be known to have begun.”343 A second possibility, though “unlikely,” is that the Mahdī will not publically disclose the number of Righteous Saints, in which case “it’s possible for the Mahdī to bequeath a specific will and testament to the Saints

339 Ibid. 340 Ibid. 341 Ibid. 342 Ibid at 649. 343 Ibid. 105

themselves, indicating that ‘in such-and-such a year, when the ruling Saint [walī] dies, he must not designate any person after him as successor, but rather the appointment mechanism transitions to consultation [shūrā]. And such a will and testament might mention that the rationale for this is that the infallible society will have begun.”344 The third possibility is that “the Mahdī leaves a specific will and testament to the Saints in which he correlates the end of their reign with specific societal events and qualities— either historical events, or the mental and cultural level that humanity will have reached in the future, or otherwise.”345

Finally, it should be noted that Ṣadr’s account actually subdivides the infallible society into two further substages—the first of which is infallibility in the majority of individuals, and the second of which is infallibility in the entirety of individuals.

Although Ṣadr conflates and subsumes both of these substages within this third political phase, he distinguishes between them in his discussion of the society in the final world order, which will be presented in Chapter 4 of this study.

C. Summary of Sunnī and Shī’ite Discourses

Given its regressivism, ISIS presumes that the political structure of the final order will, in its most essential dimensions, replicate the essential structures of the Prophet’s polity—and will last only the reign of the Mahdī, just as the initial Islamic polity lasted only the reign of the Prophet. In elaborating this vision, ISIS rejects the political forms known to most of Islamic history, and indeed all of those known to secular, Western political history, particularly nationalism, socialism, and democracy. Instead, ISIS articulates a skeletal and minimalist model of political structure which encompasses nine

344 Ibid. 345 Ibid. 106

basic governmental functions, including: judicial and arbitrative apparati, moral police, a retributive body for implementing punishments, a military, a public treasury (responsible for gathering taxes, war-booty, charity, and other resources), an institution responsible for safeguarding the needy and the hapless, as well as further, non-specified specialty areas run by “appointed experts.” While the final government will replicate these essential features of the Prophet’s government, it will differ therefrom in several ways that are explicitly stated in the Sunnī traditions. The first difference is that highest leadership is merely an executive rather than legislative power (i.e. the Mahdī is merely a Caliph, not a

Prophet). Secondly, the government’s jurisdiction will be global rather than confined to

Medina (though within this jurisdiction, Westphalian nation-state borders will be non- existent, just as in the Prophet’s polity). Thirdly, the final government will be distinguished by global peace and security, unlike the constant insecurity of the Prophet’s polity.

Still within the Sunnī context, the Awaited Mahdī Party’s account confirms certain basic features of the ISIS account—including global jurisdiction, global peace and security—but, in its progressivism, it posits a final political system that lasts considerably longer, and differs in mode, from the Prophet’s polity (as well as from that of the

Rashidun Caliphs). As such, Dā’ūd’s account includes a number of features that are entirely missing from that of ISIS. Foremost among these is an express endorsement of non-Islamic, including modern and secular political models, such as the German

Federation of the 19th Century. To this end, Dā’ūd’s conception of the final political structure redefines the pivotal concept of “Caliphate” such that it will comprise a global confederation of partially self-governing regions, or a union of semi-autonomous

107

governments. Likewise, he redefines the term “Caliph” such that the Mahdī, or his successors, can be understood as this Union’s “President.” As for the Mahdī himself, in contrast to the ISIS account in which he holds merely an executive office, Dā’ūd’s conception also attributes legislative and other powers to him. Given his temporal moderatism, Dā’ūd also raises the topic of successorship to the Mahdī’s leadership, although he treats this question insufficiently. Unfortunately, Dā’ūd does not detail the final polity’s specific political and administrative institutions (aside from mentioning the presence of viziers), and unlike ISIS, there is no existing governance project from which we might infer Dā’ūd’s implicit theory thereof. Nonetheless, he enumerates several key, operating principles of any such administrative institutions, namely: justice, meritocracy, cooperation, and consultation. The last two of these suggest some form of democratic process within the final political structure—particularly given his diagnosis that the suffering of the masses in the world today is due to the “absence of true consultation and democracy.”

As with Dā’ūd’s account, modal-temporal moderatism in its Shī’ite variety—i.e. revanchism—also presumes that the political structure of the final order will surpass that of the Prophet’s polity in both form and time-span. Some of the important details thereof differ, however, from the Sunnī context, due to underlying doctrinal differences. The question of the “Caliphate,” for instance, is not a prominent problem to be resolved.

Echoing the Shī’ite traditions, the accounts of these authors emphasize a final polity characterized by global supremacy and peace. Furthermore, the task of governance will not be undertaken by the highest leader single-handedly, but rather will be largely delegated to an administrative apparatus of bureaucrats. To this end, a prominent theme is

108

that these administrators will, like the Mahdī, be extraordinary and superhuman figures— literally the Prophets and Shī’ite heroes from the past, who will be resurrected in the final world order. As with Dā’ūd, these authors raise the topic of successorship to the Mahdī, which is necessary given the assumption of temporal-moderatism, but similarly offer unsatisfying details in this regard. But arguably the greatest weakness in the Shī’ite majority account concerns the political form of the final world order. The emphasis of these authors is in negative definitions, whereby the final polity will be unlike anything known to humanity’s prior political history. In this regard, this Shī’ite default position agrees with Dā’ūd in its rejection of the return to the initial Islamic polity—but whereas

Dā’ūd embraces modern, non-Islamic political concepts, the Shī’ite default rejects them

(and in this sense agrees, ironically, with ISIS). Beyond this negative definition, these authors offer little in the way of positive formulations of the final political structure.

Likewise, minimal attention is given to reconciling conceptual contradictions within the underlying traditions, resulting in a tendency for authors to select concepts of their liking, in an apparently haphazard manner.

Ṣadr’s account (idealism) confirms several features of the above accounts, including the final order’s global supremacy and peace, and the negative definition whereby its political form is unlike anything known to prior Islamic or non-Islamic history. Ṣadr articulates this negative definition, however, by way of a far more detailed critique of prior political forms, including democracy, nationalism, socialism, multi-party systems, as well as the institutions of the United Nations and the underlying modus operandus of the contemporary international order based upon the Westphalian nation- state. He then goes beyond the mere negation of prior political forms, and proceeds to

109

articulate a positive theory of the final political structure, the salient features of which include: (i) organization as a federation of 120-200 regions, each of which will be directly ruled by a High Ruler and a High Judge; (ii) a central leadership—which Ṣadr defines as the Imāmate—which holds not only executive but also legislative and judicial powers, and which will first be exercised by the Mahdī, and thereafter by his successors; (iii) government administration by way of modern bureaucratic methods and institutions.

While these features comprise the foundation of the final political structure, the superstructure will change throughout the succession of three phases within the final order’s long temporal arc. The first two stages (roughly 20 years and 720 years, respectively) will be eras of autocracy, while the third stage (lasting much longer than the first two) will resemble a democracy. The succession of these stages will also witness changes in administrative features—such as the gradual dissolution of the army, police, and prisons.

110

—CHAPTER TWO—

THE FINAL LEGAL SYSTEM: JURISPRUDENCE, LAW, AND POLICY

Closely associated with the global government’s political structure is its legal structure. This can be thought of in two domains, one being its jurisprudence and judicial apparati, and the other being its specific positive laws and policies. Numerous questions arise with respect to each. As to the domain of jurisprudence: what is the overall purpose of the legal system? What is the fate of the multiple schools of law [madhāhib] that characterize conventional Islamic law? What is the fate of various mechanisms of legal reasoning that characterize conventional Islamic law—such as analogical deduction

[qīyās], independent reasoning [ijtiḥād], and so forth? In the case of disputes, what will be the method of establishing evidence? How will conflicts of laws be addressed, both in the sense of Islamic versus secular laws, as well as Islamic laws versus the laws of other religions? As to the second domain: what new positive law, in the form of specific legislation and policy, will be established in the global government? Will these laws and policies return to, or a departure from that of the Prophet’s polity? How will these laws and policies differ from that which was formed substantially after the Prophet’s polity, during the classical Islamic period—as well as from those of modern, secular governments?

A. Sunnī Discourses

1. Regressivism

ISIS’s account of legal structure, as with its account of political structure, begins with a negative definition, and then arrives at a positive definition. As for the negative

111

definition, ISIS denounces every man-made legal system as “tāghūtī”—i.e. “a regime that does not rule by God's law, but by temporary man-made laws of disbelief... so the ruler who rules by temporary man-made laws is to be considered among the tawāghīt that God ordered us to reject and avoid.”346 This categorical rejection of man-made law has several implications. First and foremost, it is tantamount to a rejection of positive law in the modern sense of codification, whether in the form of legislation, written constitutions, or other forms. This, in turn, prompts ISIS to reject the democratic norm of rule-of-law, for it is “the source on which the state proceeds is the law, and no one has the right to go outside it or infringe on it, because it is the foundational source on which the disbelieving regime arises and refers to and is issued from.”347 Thus, according to

ISIS, the rule-of-law norm presumes that “the law is the legislator and is to be worshipped, obeyed and followed- and one must be subject to it and be led by its rule and refer to it in every matter. And this is among the greatest of what nullifies tawḥīd and the shahāda that Muḥammad is the Messenger of God.”348 Additionally, the rejection of man-made law in general, and positive law in particular, means the invalidity of another cornerstone of democracy, namely judicial independence which, according to ISIS, describes “the judiciary existing in the states of disbelief and apostate organizations—a judiciary whose source is the temporary, man-made laws and idolatrous legislative councils.”349

Stated positively, the desired legal system will revert to the legal system of the

Prophet’s polity in the essential sense that the sources of law will be the Qur’ān and

346 Educational Fatwa at 5. 347 Ibid at 17. 348 Ibid. 349 Ibid at 16. 112

Sunna. One major distinction from the Prophet’s legal system, however, is that the leader of the final polity (the Mahdī) will be a Caliph, rather than a Prophet, and will therefore be merely an executor of the Sharī’ah, rather than combining the executive, legislative, and judicial functions.350 More particularly, this leader will appoint well-qualified judges and adjudicators (as described in Chapter One). All judicial decisions, and all law, will derive directly from the Qur’ān and Sunna. This, of course, contrasts not only with

Western or secular jurisprudence, but also with one of the hallmarks of ‘classical’ jurisprudence after the Prophet—namely, the existence of multiple legal schools

[madhāhib] and their monopoly over the law. (Rejection of the authority of the classical legal schools is, of course, also tantamount to rejecting the Sunnī doctrine of the end of independent legal reasoning [ijtiḥād]).

What specific laws does ISIS envision within the final world order? The restriction of all law to the Qur’ān and Sunna suggests a jurisprudence of minimalism

(not unlike the minimalism characterizing ISIS’s theory of political structures, described in Chapter One). Indeed, as noted recently by one scholar, “the Islamic state has avoided codifying all but the most widely known Islamic legal rules,” taking the position that

“there is no need to write down the rules of the shari’ah because they have already been expressed in the primary texts of revelation.”351 Thus, any law explicitly stated within the scriptural sources will be reinstated within the final legal system—such as the fixed punishments [ḥadd] stated within the Qur’ān, which ISIS announced in Aleppo, in 2014, as follows:352

350 ISIS’s conception of the Mahdī as a Caliph is explained in the Introduction to this study. 351 Mara Rivkin, The Legal Foundations of the Islamic State (Brookings Institute, 2016) at 7. 352 The English translation of this table is produced by Mara Rivkin (Ibid at 11). 113

Crime Punishment Blasphemy of God Death Blasphemy of the Prophet Death, even if the accused repents Blasphemy of Islam Death Adultery Stoning until death if the adulterer was married and 100 lashes and exile if he or she were unmarried Sodomy (homosexuality) Death for the person committing the act, as well as for the one receiving it Theft Cutting off the hand Drinking alcohol 80 lashes Spying for the unbelievers Death Apostasy Death Brigandage Murder and theft: Death and crucifixion Murder only: Death Armed robbery: Cutting off the right hand and the left leg Terrorizing the people: Exile

On the other hand, the restriction of all law to that which is expressly stated in the

Qur’ān and Sunna presents a practical dilemma of addressing the many mundane aspects of life which are not mentioned in the scriptural sources, particularly realities of the modern era which were non-existent in the Prophet’s era. This is why ISIS employs Ibn

Taymīyyah’s doctrine of ‘Sharī’ah-governance [siyāsa shar’īyya]’353 in order to legally justify a considerably body of de facto positive legislation—or “law-like decisions.”354

Employment of this doctrine has enabled ISIS to issue “rules and regulations governing virtually every aspect of life in the caliphate, including commerce, healthcare, education, and military operations, as well as the enforcement apparatus—consisting of courts, police, and prisons—that is necessary to enforce them.” 355 Furthermore, “[s]uch

353 See, e.g., Muḥammad Khālid Mas’ūd, The Doctrine of Siyāsa in Islamic Law (2001). 354 Ibid at 8. 355 Ibid. 114

regulations include mandatory education through the ninth grade (girls and boys are educated in different schools) and prohibitions on the use of birth control.”356

While ISIS is careful to avoid the appearance of engaging in the polytheistic enterprise of positive law, there are fewer theological risks at stake in announcing general policies—such as promotion of Islamic education, for “the education system is considered among the most important pillars of the states, and it is part of the regime and a foundational pillar, a crucial joint, a strong-arm in it, and a face for it on the inside and outside.”357 But perhaps the most prominent examples of general policy statements are ISIS’s “Documents of the City” which are publicized in the various cities or regions within its claimed territories. Despite explicitly rejecting modern, written constitutions as examples of positive law, these “Documents” nonetheless provide a rough equivalent thereof, and are generally modeled after the so-called Medina Charter of the Prophet’s own polity. More specifically, these documents comprise both general policy announcements as well as various laws that deriving directly from the Qur’ānic principles.

Excerpts of the policy-related items include the following:358

“Document of the City” (Wathīqat al-Madīnah) Art. 1 “We [the Islamic State] bear responsibility for restoring the glories of the caliphate and obtaining retribution for the oppression and injustice suffered by … our Muslim brothers.” Art. 2 “… We do not make accusations without evidence and proof… We show mercy to a Muslim, unless he has apostasized or given aid to criminals.” Art. 3 “The people in the shadow of our rule are secure and safe … Islamic governance guarantees to the ri’āya their rights. The wronged will be given justice against a violator of his right …” Art. 4 “We order that the funds that were under the control of the apostate

356 Ibid at 13. 357 Educational Fatwa at 4. 358 Reproduced from Rivkin at 28. 115

government (public funds) must be returned to the public treasury under the authority of the caliph of the Muslims who bears responsibility for spending these funds in the maṣlaha [interest] of the Muslims. Art. 5 “Trafficking and dealing alcohol or drugs, or smoking, or other taboos, are prohibited.” Art. 6 “Mosques are the houses of God … We urge all Muslims to build them and pray …” Art. 7 “Beware of employment with the apostate government and the tawāghīt … He who repents of sin is not guilty of sin. To the apostates of the army and police and the rest of the unbelieving apparatus we say that the door of repentance is open to anyone who wants it, and we have designated specific places to receive those wishing to repent subject to conditions … Art. 8 “Councils and associations and banners [bearing the names of other groups] are unacceptable.” Art. 9 “God commands that you join the society [the Islamic State] and renounce factions and strife …Division is one of the traps of the devil …” Art. “Our opinion regarding … polytheistic and pagan shrines is that of the 10 Prophet [who prohibited them].” Art. “To the virtuous and dignified women: … Dress decently and in loose 11 tunics and robes …Do not leave the house except out of necessity …” Art. “[God commands that we] establish Islamic governance and … release 12 the people from the shackles of rotten positive laws …” Art. “We listen to the council of the small and the great and the free and the 13 slave, and there is no difference among us between red and black, and we judge ourselves before others.”

Although the various features of legal structure enumerated above characterize

ISIS in its contemporary (i.e. pre-apocalyptic) configuration, we can assume that it equally characterizes ISIS’s implicit theory of the final world order. This inference is sound due to the due to the fact that ISIS conceives of both the Mahdī and Jesus Christ

(i.e. the two primary protagonists of the final world order) as being subordinate to the

Islamic Sharī’ah. As mentioned in the Introduction, ISIS conceives of the Mahdī as

116

merely a caliph (albeit the last of the prophesized Twelve Righteous Caliphs), and therefore as an executor of the Sharī’ah, rather than as a new legislator. Likewise, Jesus

Christ, in his second coming, is described by ISIS as being merely “a follower of the

Sharī’ah of Muḥammad…”359 Neither of these two protagonists, therefore, will have any authority to alter Islamic law or the Islamic legal system in general.

Indeed, the few explicit statements that ISIS does make regarding the final legal order confirm the assumption that it will not be altered. For instance, in rejecting the

Shī’ite conception of the Mahdī, one of the primary criticisms made by ISIS is that the

Shī’ites presume that the Mahdī will change the structure of the legal order and the content of Islamic law. As ISIS explains, “As the Hour approaches, it becomes important to reflect upon the fabricated accounts of future events…Of these accounts is that of the

‘Mahdī’ of the Rāfidah…In the book ‘Al-Kāfī,’ the Rāfidī al-Kulaynī titled a chapter with the following: ‘Chapter: When the Imāms Emerge They Will Rule by the Laws of David and the Family of David.’ He then reported that Ja’far as-Sādiq said, ‘When al-Qā’im

[the ‘Mahdī’] from the family of Muḥammad emerges, he will rule by the Law of David and Solomon.’ In another report, Ja’far as-Sādiq said, ‘The world will not end until a man from my offspring rules by the Law of David.’ Al-Kulaynī also reported that Ja’far as-Sādiq was asked, ‘By what law will you rule?’ He responded, ‘By the Law of the

House of David.’…”360 After citing these various Shī’ite sources, ISIS concludes with a categorical rejection thereof, due to their import that “the Rāfidī ‘Mahdī’… rules by the

Torah.”361

359 Dabiq, Issue 5 at 4. 360 Dabiq, Issue 11 at 16. 361 Ibid. 117

2. Progressivism

Dā’ūd’s theory of the final legal system is grounded in a critique of contemporary legal systems. In the first instance, his concern is with the negative effect that Western legal systems have had on conventional Islamic legal systems. He explains, for instance, that “the first ‘wound’ that the Antichrist [dajjāl] inflicted on the Muslim world, which the Mahdī will fix, is the distancing of governments from the spirit of Islamic law and its ruling authority. This is the case in all Muslim countries, and affects all aspects of life. Its first manifestation was the flow of [legal] systems and legislation that impelled all the

[Muslim] countries to establish foundations based on Western laws from France and

England…which are inappropriate for Islamic countries.”362

As noted in the passage just quoted, these defective legal systems, according to

Dā’ūd, will be “fixed” by the Mahdī himself—but how? In Dā’ūd’s account, the Mahdī will fix these problems through his miraculous, personal knowledge, for God will

“disclose and shine knowledge and light to him…such that within his heart he will know the truth of realities, for they will disclose their true essences and conditions to him from all sides…as an effulgence of the Lord of Knowledge.”363 This extraordinary knowedge will directly displace the traditional authority of experts in various fields, for the Mahdī

“will share in the knowledge of the scholars [‘ulamā] in all of their outward sciences, but will surpass them in inner knowledge, and will solve problems by means that are unavailable to the men of learning.”364 In short, the Mahdī’s solution relies on his own miraculous, personal qualities rather than on a new system that can exist independently of

362 al-Mafājāt at 423. 363 Ibid at 103. 364 Ibid. 118

him. This feature arguably comprises the most prominent flaw of Dā’ūd’s account, for if the final legal system depends on the Mahdī’s personal charisma, then it is difficult to conceive of how it can survive beyond his personal reign—a problem that Dā’ūd does not address.

In any event, Dā’ūd emphasizes that, in curing these “wounds” imposed by the

West, the Mahdī will not return the world to conventional or classical Islamic legal systems, for he will efface these as well. To begin with, the Mahdī’s knowledge will render Islamic jurists—who Dā’ūd refers to as sources of “stagnation” and “obstacles between Muslims and their primary sources”—to be obsolete.365 Jurists will, in fact, be counted among his foremost enemies: “the Mahdī has no clear enemies except for the jurist-followers, for the jurists will lose their leadership and distinction among the masses, and they will no longer have knowledge regarding ruling, except for a little.”366

Likewise, he states that “the Mahdī’s sword will crush the jurists! The jurists will envy and fear him; they will submit to his rule, but faithlessly, for their outward obedience will be due to being vanquished by him.”367 Similarly, he states that “the jurists will follow him out of desire for his wealth and out of fear of his power—but inwardly they will be infidels.”368

Not only will jurists become irrelevant, but so will two of the most fundamental features of classical Sunnī legal practice—namely the authority of multiple legal schools and as a corollary, the virtual entirety of jurist-derived, positive law.369 This is because the Mahdī’s presence invalidates the dogma that ijtiḥād is no longer permissible: “when

365 Dawlat at 60. 366 al-Mafājāt at 97. 367 Ibid. 368 Ibid at 98. 369 Ibid at 400. 119

he rules outside of the jurists’ legal school [madhhab], they will view him as erring, because they fancy that the era of ijtiḥād ended, that no more mujtaḥids can exist in the world, and that subsequent to the eponyms of their schools, God brought forth no one else at the rank of ijtiḥād.” 370 As a mujtaḥid, the Mahdī’s knowledge of law derives not from the various Islamic legal schools, but rather “all of the Mahdī’s knowledge derives from the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet.” 371 This disregarding of the authority of Islamic legal schools is tantamount to the end of juristic differences, for “due to the existence of this Leader, differences [khilāf] in rulings will disappear from the world.”372 This also implies the discarding of whatsoever has been produced as a result of the false precedential authority of these schools—namely, the virtual entirety of Islamic positive law [fiqh], which Dā’ūd dismisses as “erroneous fatwas that have entangled the

Islamic world.”373 (Given this attitude towards conventional Islamic legal practice, it is no wonder that Dā’ūd refused to involve al-Azhar in his own political enterprise of establishing the Awaited Mahdī Party in Egypt).374

In the aggregate, these distinctive features of conventional Islamic legal systems will be replaced with an entirely new, “flexible legislative order [niẓām tashrī’ī marn] that will preside over Islam.”375 This flexibility will reflects the spiritual advancement of humanity during the Mahdī’s era, for “the greatest aim of Islam is to free of humanity from all worship except God, and to improve the soul of humanity, society, and public

370 Ibid at 98. 371 Ibid at 101. 372 Ibid at 97. 373 Ibid at 101. 374 Dā’ūd similarly indicates his contempt for the jurists in his refusal to al-Azhar University in his own efforts to launch the ‘Awaited Mahdī’ political party in Egypt. In response to the question, “have you consulted al-Azhar in this matter?”—he stated: “we don’t consult al-Azhar, because their fatwas are for legal [shar’ī] religious matters, not for political matters, and they are not a clergy, but merely a symbol for Islam learning; thus we don’t need a religious fatwa.” Dawlat at 53-54. 375 Ibid at 34. 120

life—and this is the essential difference between [true] Islam and the various legal schools [madhāhib], social ideologies, and even politics. It is a religion that begins with restoration of the primordial disposition [fiṭra] within humanity, and…this means love and tolerance.”376 Love and tolerance will, indeed, be the most distinctive features of the new jurisprudence, for “the Islamic sharī’ah is one of mercy, beauty, and civilization; even in its essential doctrines, it knows neither violence nor hatred, for it safeguards others and their doctrines…as the Prophet said, ‘none of you are believers, unless you love your brother like yourself.’”377

According to Dā’ūd, This “flexible legislative order” will advance three fundamental socio-economic policies. First is the protection of individual liberties, for

“individual freedom will be encouraged, so long the rights of others aren’t infringed upon…”378 This policy of individual freedom means that in the final order, “individuals will not be required to follow others, nor will they be suppressed in their actions…”379

Furthermore, this individual liberty extends to both young and old, for “the government of

Prophetic House will guarantee political freedom to the people, and will hear the visions of each individual, whether young or old, regarding general matters.”380 Nonetheless,

Dā’ūd clarifies that “freedom of thought – not libertinism and heresy – are respected so long as they spring from goodly motivated principles which benefit of the collective.” 381

Similarly, he emphasizes that “[t]he important thing is that there be no excess in using the freedom…for freedom ceases if it violates the freedom of others, or violates the

376 Ibid. 377 Ibid at 35. 378 Ibid at 65. 379 Ibid. 380 Ibid at 63. 381 Ibid at 64. 121

prohibitions of God.”382 The second policy will be that of actualizing humanity’s destiny of being “caliph over the earth.” This will occur primarily through a re-ordering of socio- economic relationships, for “the humanity of man—i.e. the fulfillment of the verse, ‘verily,

I place a caliph in the earth [Qur’an 2:30]’—will be realized through the Mahdī’s policy of…promoting truth, charity, and prosperity amidst the various segments, groups, and organizations of society, and thereby bridging all [current] gaps; thus, even arrangements between the top leaders and the common people, as well as the various levels in between them, will be characterized by relationships of reciprocity and active cooperation [mushārika], rather than command, and will promote self-confidence and the courage to take initiative, rather than generating fear and failures.”383 The third policy will be promoting global unity, which Dā’ūd equates in one instance as “the principle of the brotherhood of man.”384 This means that “the Mahdī will treat the entire globe as one body, such that if one of its members complains, then the other members become feverish and can not sleep; he will interact with all the parts of the earth with integration that brings them into a whole, and with long-term, international planning for the globe.”385

What will be the specific, positive laws of the new legal system? Dā’ūd offers only sparse details. For example, in the socio-economic domain, although he mentions that the new legislation will include “correction of educational programs for men and women,” as well as the permissibility of “cinemas and television,”386 he focuses primarily on generalities. In the economic area, for instance, he does not mention particular laws,

382 Ibid at 65. 383 Ibid at 68. 384 al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 287. 385 Ibid at 281. 386 Ibid. 122

but rather mentions that “the Mahdī’s economic laws will cause the earth to meet man’s needs so that man is not a servant to the earth. Thus, in the Mahdī’s era, the earth will become subservient to man, and man will thereby return to a position of power, as caliph over the earth, as Islam had intended. This… also bestows upon other human institutions the ease, wealth, and comfort necessary in order to enable man to fully worship God.”387

This lack of enumeration of positive laws appears to be deliberate, for according to Dā’ūd, a direct consequence of the “flexibility” and “tolerance” of the new legislative order is a jurisprudence of minimalism. In other words, in the final order laws will be kept to a minimum due to the fact that “the Mahdī follows the path of his ancestor:…

Prophet Muḥammad was merciful, and [thus] hated addressing religious questions, for fear of increasing the [number of] laws; thus, whatsoever was not expressely inquired about [remained] in the domain of theoretical principles [‘aṣl], while whatsoever…was expressly disclosed and defined acquired the status of positive legislation [shar’].”388

Indeed, it is precisely in support of this jurisprudence of minimalism that analogical legal reasoning [qīyās], according to Dā’ūd, will be absent from the future legal system. In the first instance, qīyās will become obsolete due to the Mahdī’s personal qualities, for “the

Mahdī does not need to practice qīyās, given that he is infallible [ma’sūm] like the

Prophet, and thus receives explicit [naṣṣ] guidance from God.”389 But additionally, “one of the reasons preventing the Mahdī from implementing qīyās…is his definitive knowledge that the purpose of Muḥammad in his sharī’ah is to lessen [takhfīf] the

387 Ibid. 388 al-Mafājāt at 97-98. 389 Ibid. 123

burdens upon his nation.”390 Qīyās, in other words, has been one of the principal causes of the rise of the legalism that has oppressed the Islamic world, due to both its restrictive content and its voluminious quantity. The Mahdī’s jurisprudence of minimalism will thus unequivocally dispense with it.391

While the jurisprudence of minimalism will presumably implicate all branches of positive law in the final order, Dā’ūd illustrates this principle within the domain of penal law, in which minimalism manifests as leniency and tolerance in applying punishments.

On the one hand, the penal law of the final order will preserve basic categorical distinctions of licit versus illicit that are common to contemporary Islamic jurisprudence, for “God will give [the Mahdī] the power to derive…the outward laws…[consisting of] the mandatory [al-wājibāt], the recommended [al-mandūbūt], the forbidden [al- muḥarramāt], and the reprehensible [al-makrūḥāt].”392Another point that Dā’ūd makes regarding the final penal law is that the principle of blood-money will be changed, such that “in the government of the Prophetic House, the blood-value of Muslims and non-

Muslims will be equal, such that any infraction on Christians or peaceful Jews will equal an infraction on Muslims.”393 On the other hand, Dā’ūd de-emphasizes the sway of such legal concepts over actual life in the final order, for “the aim of Islam is not to implement punishments [ḥudūd], but rather to perfect the noble character traits of all humanity.”394

He elaborates that “[we announce] to those who fancy that Islam is religion of...prohibitions, and who seek to stone adulterors and sever the hands of thieves, liars, and traitors of Islam: the very prohibitions in Islam are themselves restraints and

390 Ibid. 391 Ibid. 392 Ibid at 101. 393 Dawlat at 63. 394 Ibid at 34. 124

deterrants against most of the punishments—but beyond this, the actual implementation of every prohibition in Islam is limited by certain conditions and societal requirements.” 395 For Dā’ūd, this liberality requires “tolerance towards not only the

Muslims…but even those who have no religion—i.e. the non-believers [al-mulāḥida]—so long as they are peaceful with you.”396 On these grounds, Dā’ūd concludes that “the

Mahdī, [even] in his anger, will not excessively apply the punishments of God.”397

Dā’ūd assures us, however, that this inherent tolerance within the domain of penal law will not be jeopardized by libertinism or other such abuses, for “in the government of the Prophetic House, you will see neither the need, nor even the opportunity to commit illicit [ḥarām] actions, such as cheating, gambling, unjust encrichment [riba], monopolizing, exploitation, or theft of others’ possessions…rather…there will be so much abundance that won't be all these bad actions; even spending zakāt will be difficult because there won't exist those who need it!”398 Indeed, the society in the future world order will receive such “copious divine blessings” that “the domain of the permissible

[ḥalāl] will be expansive, inclusive, and sufficient for everyone.” 399

B. Shī’ite Discourses

1. Revanchism

Given the statement in the Shī’ite traditions that the Mahdī will bring a New

Judgment, virtually all Shī’ite accounts assert that the mode of the final legal system will be unprecedented, yet the tendency among the majority is to selectively and disjointedly

395 Ibid. 396 Ibid at 52. 397 al-Mafājāt at 96. 398 Dawlat at 66. 399 Ibid. 125

emphasize particular aspects of this final legal system, ranging from its purposes to its positive laws, but not to reconcile these elements within a coherent, overarching theory.

Among these authors, Kūrānī devotes the least attention to the details of the final system. Although he notes the Mahdī’s employment of Prophet David’s method of judgment, he offers no analysis of this method of evidence, merely stating that “the traditions state that the Imām Mahdī will judges among the people with the judgment of

God which God oversees, and asks none for witnessing or testimony.”400 Elsewhere, he suggests that in the final government, “there will be no need for courts [maḥākim],” and attributes this to the fact that in this “society…people will strive to serve each other and to be near to God.”401 From this statement, it can perhaps be deduced that Kūrānī’s lack of elaboration on the details of the legal system is due to his utopian vision of morality within the final society.

Amīnī, for his part, does not elaborate on the underlying legal theory or judicial mechanisms of the final legal system (other than a passing reference to David’s method of judgment),402 but rather dwells primarily on the overall purposes of the final legal system, as well as offering a few statements regarding construction policies. As for purposes of the legal systems, he outlines eight. First, the legal system must be

“comprehensive” enough to “cover and administer all spheres of individual as well as collective human activity.”403 Second, it should lead to “actual” rather than “speculative” prosperity of human beings. Third, it should promote the “well-being of the entirety of

400 Kūrānī at 258. 401 Ibid at 264. 402 Amīnī at 239. 403 Ibid at 49-50. 126

humanity, not just a particular group of people or specific individual.”404 Fourth, it should be “based on human virtues and the perfection of humanity.” Fifth, it should

“protect the people from manipulation and chaos, and guarantee the rights of all individuals.”405 Sixth, it should reflect the “spiritual needs of the people.”406 Seventh, it should promote “humanitarianism” and protect from the “path of destruction.”407 Eighth, its formulators should be “well informed about all the crooked and scrupulous aspects of human encounters and should be knowledgeable about all the judgements given at different times and places.”408 As to the aggregate of these eight requirements, Amīnī asserts that are impossible for ordinary human legal systems, but rather it is only possible within a “divinely ordained legal system.” 409 As for construction policies, Amīnī emphasizes requrements that will be implemented pertaining to public spaces: “In the matter of building the roads, interesting programs will be introduced. Main roads will be sixty yards wide. In building the roads there will be so much diligence that the mosques standing in the middle will be demolished. Footpaths will adorn the streets. Pedestrians will be asked to cross the roads at the proper pedestrian's crossing; whereas the drivers will be asked to move into the middle. All the windows of the homes that open to the street will be closed. There will be prohibitions against constructing open drains and sewage on the streets. Imposing structures will be demolished. The highly decorative and

404 Ibid. 405 Ibid. 406 Ibid. 407 Ibid. 408 Ibid. 409 Ibid. 127

elevated mosques as well as minarets and the grills separating the leader of the congregational prayers from the worshippers will be destroyed.”410

Tabasī’s account of the final legal system is considerably more detailed than those of Kūrānī and Amīnī, but is likewise rather haphazard in its emphasis. More specifically, he devotes the majority of his efforts to extrapolating the positive laws and policies of the legal system, through analysis of the “many ḥadīths concerning the new laws and judgments of…al-Mahdī (‘a) and the reforms he will pursue.”411 He begins by delineating ten new laws. First is the “execution of adulterers and those who prevent zakāt.”412

Second is the new “law of inheritance,” whereby the Mahdī will “prescribe inheritance between brethren-in-faith while cutting off the inheritance of one’s consanguineous brother.”413 Third is the “execution of liars.”414 Fourth is the “termination of jizyah.”415

Fifth is the law of “revenge against the remaining descendents of Imām al-Ḥusayn’s murderers.”416 Sixth is the “ruling on mortgage (rahn) and deposit (wathiqah)”—though he refrains from stating the content of this ruling, noting that it reverts to the Mahdī.417

Seventh is the law concerning “business profit,” whereby it will be prohibited to profit from transactions with other believers, even though this practice is legitimate at the present time.418 Eighth is the law requiring “brethren-in-faith to assist one another.” 419

410 Ibid at 233. 411 Tabasī at 141. 412 Ibid at 143. 413 Ibid at 144. 414 Ibid at 145. 415 Ibid. 416 Ibid at 146. 417 Ibid at 147. 418 Ibid. 419 Ibid. 128

Ninth is the law prohibiting “private estates [qaṭāi’]” and their reversion to the Mahdī.420

Tenth is the prohibition against “amassing wealth.”421

After noting these discrete laws, Tabasī describes some of the broader, public policies of the final world order. The area that emphasizes most is promotion of security—both with respect to physical safety, as well as financial and social security. He explains: “[w]ith the implementation of appropriate and accurate programs in his government, within a short period of time security will be restored in society in all aspects, and the people will live in a safe environment experiencing security that mankind has not experienced so far. The people will live in total judicial security to the extent that no one ever has the least apprehension that his right would be trampled upon. Programs and laws will be made and implemented in such a way that the people will see themselves in total financial and social security. Stealing will be eliminated from society and financial security will prevail to the extent that if someone puts his hand in another’s pocket, there will be no probability of stealing involved, and he will honestly justify his action.”422

Elsewhere, Tabasī outlines three further areas of policy: construction, public health, and communal worship. First, concerning construction, Tabasī affirms that “the

Mahdī’s government will undertake the repairing of those destructions and make the entire world prosperous and developed.”423 Likewise, “the cities will be so developed, main roads so expanded and means of transportation so multiplied, that a law will be imposed not only for the means of the transportation but also for pedestrians….[as well

420 Ibid at 148. 421 Ibid. 422 Ibid at 177. 423 Ibid at 190. 129

as] a law for driving.”424 Second, concerning public health, he explains that “maintaining health in cities and in the social environment is one of the government’s responsibilities...

Dumping of domestic waste on the streets and constructing cess pits outside the house…are detrimental to the healthy condition of the environment. So, we can see that one of the Mahdī’s jobs is to prevent any violation of health regulations.”425 Third, regarding communal worship, he notes that although mosques will “mushroom” throughout the world, several important reforms will be undertaken. This consists mostly of destruction of existing construction—including destruction of “the Kūfah Mosque and the fixing of its Qibla,” “embellished mosques and those along the highways,” “minarets,” and “the roofs and pulpits of mosques.”426 Aside from destruction, the government will also restore the “Masjid al-Ḥaram (the Sacred Mosque in Mecca) and the Masjid an-Nabī

(in Medina) to their respective original sizes.” 427 Finally, he explains that “those who want to perform their religious obligations will have priority over those who are at the threshold of doing optional acts of worship,” citing as an example that the Mahdī “will issue an order for priority to be given to those who are performing the obligatory ḥajj” over those who do optional ḥajj.428

Despite this considerable detail regarding the positive laws and policies of the final legal system, Tabasī mentions little regarding the overall legal theory, jurisprudence, and legal structures within the final legal system. For instance, although he mentions the

Mahdī’s employment of Prophet David’s method of judgment, he does not speculate on

424 Ibid at 191. 425 Ibid at 200. 426 Ibid at 148-150. 427 Ibid at 150. 428 Ibid at 157. 130

its implications for jurisprudence more generally.429 Similarly, he suggests that jurists will continue to play a critical role in the final legal system—but refrains from elaborating on the methods of legal reasoning through which the jurists will arrive at their decisions. Instead, he resorts to miraculous explanations, quoting from a tradition stating that administration will occur by way of “a group of jurists, experts, learned men, and judges upon whose breasts and backs of the head, the Imām will put his hand and rub.

Afterward, no judgment will be difficult for them.”430 He further refers to a different

ḥadīth, noting that “It is possible that finding the judicial ruling on a problem from the palm of the hand alludes to the speed of communication with the central government and obtaining the pertinent information on solving them.”431

2. Idealism

To begin with, why does the final world order require a legal system? Ṣadr explains that a legal system is necessary because “it is obvious that…if law [al-qanūn] is not perfectly just, then it constitutes the greatest handicap in the path of implementing

[perfect justice], and therefore in the harvesting of desired goodly societal fruits. Hence, the existence of the [proper] law is a decisive guarantor of ultimate success. Thus, the

Mahdī’s government will exercise [tamlūk] these laws…[which] in all of its provisions, is the framework for perfect justice.”432 In other words, law and legal systems are not ends in themselves, but rather are means through which the transformation of society, which is the ultimate purpose of the final government, can be achieved (to be described further in

Chapter 4).

429 Ibid at 151. 430 Ibid at 183. 431 Ibid. 432 Ṣadr at 470. 131

Like Dā’ūd, Ṣadr’s vision of the final legal order derives from his broader critique of legal systems that have preceded the Mahdī’s Advent. In its broadest sense, this critique implicates all of the diverse legal systems that have existed throughout humanity’s history—for “all these other systems and posited laws are based upon materialism.”433 This universal materialism, he explains, resulted from the fact that all legal systems “discarded the divine element from consideration, whether explicitly, as in communism and existentialism [al-wujūdīyya], or implicitly, as in capitalism, fascism,

Nazism, as well as Roman and German law, and their modern branches.”434 Such defects within legal systems, however, cannot be remedied by ordinary human beings, but rather requires the solution brought by the Mahdī—for his legal knowledge will be perfect and infallible. As Ṣadr explains, “the Mahdī’s perfect leadership…is due to his infallibility and his knowledge of the laws of society and human history in a manner that no one else is capable of.”435 In particular, this peerless knowledge of all legal systems throughout history is due to the Mahdī’s “long existence [Occultation], which rendered him contemporaneous with hundreds of generations of men.”436 Due to this perfect knowledge of legal matters, the Mahdī’s legal system will not suffer from the materialism that has afflicted all other systems, but rather “will be based on the relationship of man to his

Lord, the training of his body and soul. And the relation between these elements is a relationship of justice and depth, and all laws will be in accord with divine, Islamic laws…”437

433 Ibid at 88. 434 Ibid at 89. 435 Ibid at 477. 436 Ibid. 437 Ibid at 89. 132

Although Ṣadr envions the final legal system as being Islamic, it will be fundamentally different from Islamic law as conventionally understood, for Islamic legal systems have all suffered from “four areas of deficiency…during the era of

Occultation.”438 The first of these deficiencies is that many laws “were not announced to the people, but existed only in the knowledge of God, the Prophet and the Leaders

[Imams].”439 This is because “it was impossible for many important laws, such as those pertaining to riding aircraft, using bombs, heart transplants, and so forth, to be issued in the beginning of Islam…given the dearth of society’s understanding of the subject matters

[mawḍū’iha] and the insufficiency of intellectual and educational levels.” 440 Second, many laws were “lost over time” due to the “obliteration of the Sunna…containing these laws” as a result of “the great wars against the Muslims—such as the Crusades, Tatar attacks, Mongol invasions, and so forth—wherein huge numbers of books, numbering hundreds of thousands, were destroyed.” 441 Third is that “almost the entirety of positive law [fiqh]…has consisted of ‘outward rulings [al-ḥukm al-ẓāhirī]’” rather than true rulings. 442 This is because the jurists, in lacking the true legal sources, were “compelled to cling merely to generally-defined Islamic rules for specifying the individual’s legal duties.” 443 Although these general rules were “sound,” they nonetheless suffered from

“ignorance of the true, fundamental law” and therefore “did not, in every case, produce the true Islamic law or principle, but merely the outward ruling.” 444 Thus, “the fatwas

438 Ibid at 444-446. 439 Ṣadr explains that unlike ordīnary laws, which were “announced to the people and concerned a specific period of time to ground their actions and jurisprudence,” these laws “remained hidden from the people; their announcement was delayed until the Mahdī’s Advent and time for achieving full justice.” Ibid. 440 Ibid. 441 Ibid. 442 Ibid. 443 Ibid. 444 Ibid. 133

that the jurists produce in their compendia are merely outward rulings, even though they are not explicit about this and issue their fatwas as if it were the true law.” 445 Despite this major flaw, “the fatwa, even though it is not the true Islamic ruling, has nonetheless been the best definer of individual legal responsibilities, guaranteeing obedience to God and relieving the legal-personality of the legally-bound individual.” 446 The fourth deficiency is that many “clear, fixed laws in Islam, whether they are personal laws pertaining to individuals, or public laws pertaining to social order and government, are not applied in Muslim societies.” 447 This is due to moral degradation owing to “failure in the [prior] divine plan, which prompted most individuals to stray from the clear Islamic laws, and the requirements of religion.” 448

On the other hand, Ṣadr’s critique also acknowledges certain strengths and capacities that have been gained by humanity over the course of the Occultation. As he explains, “despite these [four] areas of weakness and deficiency in Islamic laws, the passage of time during the long Occultation raised the intellectual level of the Islamic community in several respects, delivering it to a new level of legal understanding, and a new depth [that would be needed] for the era after the Advent. And this is a necessary level for the Islamic community, nay rather for all of humanity, in order to be worthy of the educational level that corresponds to the Mahdī’s goal.”449 Ṣadr then specifies five areas in which the intellectual capacities of humanities have been raised. First is the

“deepening of Islamic understandings and conceptions of existence and life, in the minds

445 Ibid. 446 Ibid. 447 Ibid. 448 Ibid. 449 Ibid at 446-447. 134

of the masses of Muslims, and specifically the Islamic thinkers.”450 Second is “deepening of legal and jurisprudential [fiqh] thinking among the Muslims, through new events that occur, on the one hand, and through rational deduction, on the other hand, even though jurisprudence, as we’ve explained, mostly comprises ‘outward rulings’ and thus does not disclose the legal truths of the case.”451 Third is the “gaining of awareness of other views and philosophies, of divergent modes of thought, along with increasing sophistication through criticizing or dialoguing with them.”452 Fourth is the development of “deep skills in bearing public burdens, evaluating the news of the people, and responding to the events of the world.”453 Fifth is “deepening of scientific concepts regarding reality, such as in medicine, physics, chemistry, astronomy, and so forth.”454 As to the aggregate of these five, Ṣadr concludes that “all these areas are, through the passage of time, and through abundance of discource and close scrutiny, causes of development and perfection, such that when the Islamic community [eventually] reaches a specified level

[of understanding], it will at that time be capable of comprehending the true conceptual depths upon which the Mahdī’s order, after his Advent, will be established.”455

The synthesis of these strengths with the four weaknesses already outlined constitutes the basic foundation for the final legal order, for “when Muslim society reaches a suitable [conceptual] level in the [prior] divine plan, it will be possible for the

Mahdī to easily perfect the weaknesses that we’ve mentioned.” 456 First, as to the deficiency of unannounced laws: “after the Islamic community has attained the

450 Ibid. 451 Ibid. 452 Ibid. 453 Ibid. 454 Ibid. 455 Ibid. 456 Ibid at 447. 135

[sufficient] level of legal understanding…the Mahdī will elucidate them fully, given that among all humanity, he is the sole inheritor those non-announced laws.”457 Second, concerning the Sunna that was destroyed over the course of history, the Mahdī

“announces them again after his Advent.” 458 Third, concerning the absence of “true rulings” within the jurists’ positive law, Ṣadr asserts that “if the individual were apprised of the true Islamic ruling, then he would be forbidden from acting in accordance with the

‘outward ruling.’”459 This is precisely what will occur, for “the Mahdī will announce the true Islamic rulings themselves.”460 Thus, the bulk of Islamic positive law as currently known will be eliminated, such that “the ‘outward ruling’ will be effaced from the fundamental legislation, and will only remain in the implementation of certain particulars.” 461 Fourth, concerning the waywardness of current Islamic societies in adhering to the known laws, “the Mahdī himself will arise to implement the general laws, and will establish, administer, and lead the global government of complete justice…and as to laws concerning individual conduct, every disobedient one will be killed, such that those who remain will have the capacity to obey the just law.”462

Thus, in correcting these four historic deficiencies, the Mahdī himself personally lays the foundation for the world’s final legal system—but what are its details and particulars? To begin with, Ṣadr asks the question, “among the Islamic legal-schools

457 Ibid. More particularly, Ṣadr explains that the Mahdī knows the more “fundamental” of these new laws through “direct transmission” from previous Imāms, rather than “through direct inspiration from God, which would otherwise amount to the station of Prophethood.” On the other hand, he may be “inspired” with the non-fundamental laws, such as those pertaining to “world leadership.” Furthermore, he rejects Ibn ‘Arabī’s claim that the Mahdī will know the laws through divine inspiration. Ibid at 448. 458 Ibid at 449 (explaining that the Mahdī knows this Sunna both through “transmission from his forefathers, and ultimately from the Prophet,” and also through “being contemporaneous with these laws prior to their being destroyed over time…and [continuing to] directly know their contents [during his Occultation]”). 459 Ibid. 460 Ibid (agreeing, in this regard, with Ibn ‘Arabī). 461 Ibid. 462 Ibid. 136

[madhhab], which will the Mahdī select?”463 First, he clarifies his usage of the term legal-school by defining it as the “sum of the concepts expressed in prevalent doctrines and positive law [fiqh] as expressed in the words of the founders and scholars of a

[particular] school.”464 He then states unequivocally that Mahdī’s legal-school will be unlike any known to Islam thus far, whether Sunnī or Shī’ite: “it won’t be possible for it to be derived from any one of the prevailing schools, because a large portion of the concepts in each schools is derived from the thinking of ‘ulamā, which is prone to error and mistake.”465 This inherent “error and mistake” of the ‘ulamā, as already explained, is due to their inability to discern the true rulings, such that their fatwas merely convey

‘outward rulings.’ Ṣadr provides further nuance, explaining that in relation to Sunnism, it can be said that the Mahdī disregards the four Sunnī legal schools due to his status as a mujtaḥid, which excludes the possibility of following [taqlīd] any school—while in relation to Shī’ism, the Mahdī can not follow any legal school because as an infallible

Imām, he is a source, rather than a follower, of the law.466 In any event, given his perfect knowledge of the true rulings, he will utterly disregard the Islamic legal schools, for

“when the Mahdī comes, he’ll implement true Islam…regardless of whether it’s in accordance with or contrary to the known rulings of the legal schools.”467

This elimination and overhaul of the Islamic legal schools is tantamount to the establishment of the ‘new Sunna’ mentioned in the prophecies. Ṣadr explains that “this

Sunna is described [in the ḥadīth] as ‘new’ because its contents will differ from the

Sunna transmitted in the prior Islamic sources, for it contains new laws, new concepts,

463 Ibid at 67. 464 Ibid. 465 Ibid. 466 Ibid at 67-72. 467 Ibid at 68. 137

and reflects a new, profound level of awareness that the Mahdī will announce, and through which all of humanity will advance.” 468 More particularly, this new Sunna comprises, in the first instance, “the words, actions, and decisions of the Mahdī.” 469 On the other hand, it does not abrogate the Sunna of the Prophet, but rather corrects its deficiencies, for in addition to the Mahdī’s words and deeds, the new Sunna includes

“new understandings of the Qur’ān and the first Sunna.” Thus, the new Sunna both corrects the inadequecies within the Prophet’s Sunna, and also complements, or consummates it, with the Sunna of the Mahdī. As such, it constitutes the foundation for the jurisprudence of the final world order, for “it constitutes a proof [ḥujja] for legally- capable individuals [mukallifīn], and for [comprehending] God’s demands of obedience…” 470

What, then, will be the relationship of jurists to this new Sunna? Ṣadr assures us that jurists will continue to perform a critical, albeit reformulated, role within the final legal order. As noted in the previous Chapter, according to Ṣadr, juristic qualifications— i.e. “knowledge of the law”—constitutes the essential qualification for judges and rulers, who are the highest political figures within the government administration. During the

Mahdī’s lifetime, these de facto jurists perform critical administrative roles described in the previous Chapter, yet the Mahdī himself will personally “establish the central, general rules and the remote, final-end goal for training humanity.”471 After the Mahdī, the role of these jurists becomes even more critical, for “after the Mahdī’s passing, his

Sunna…will become the principal…axis and foundation from which laws and other

468 Ibid at 454. 469 Ibid. 470 Ibid at 454. 471 Ibid at 646. 138

matters will be deduced…and from which proceeds the continual training program after him.”472 However critical this deductive role of the jurists will be, Ṣadr emphasizes that it is nonetheless distinct from the practice of ijtiḥād, for “[the rulers’ and judges’] knowledge of the law means their being broadly apprised of the Islamic legal rulings, which is called ijtiḥād in the language of Islamic jurisprudence during the time-period prior to the Mahdī’s Advent.”473 In other words, the primary qualification of the leaders in the final government will be their attainment of the highest levels of legal knowledge—a level that corresponds to ijtiḥād, which is the highest juridical rank in the pre-Mahdī era. Within the final order, however, the new Sunna will provide jurists with a consummate and flawless basis of jurisprudence—one which will be replete with the true rulings on all matters—and which will therefore render the practice of ijtiḥād obsolete.

Another distinctive aspect of the future legal order will be its two phases of judicial procedure—i.e. the ‘new Judgment’ mentioned in the traditions. The first phase occurs at the outset of the Mahdī’s reign, specifically “after completion of world conquest and securing of world peace…and at the advent of implementing universal Islam.”474

During this phase, the Mahdī will “employ the adjudicative methods of the prior

Prophets,” while during the second phase, he will limit his methods to only those of the

Prophets David, Solomon, and Muḥammad, while eschewing the adjudicative methods of the remaining Prophets.475 In both phases, this variability of adjudicative methods is for the Mahdī to test the nascent society. The positive benefits of these tests are threefold: first, they will demonstrate the “successive links that organically connect the Mahdī to

472 Ibid at 454. 473 Ibid at 479. 474 Ibid at 520. 475 Ibid at 520-521. 139

the prior Prophets,” second, they “prove the breadth of the Mahdī’s knowledge of the past,” and third, they “train humanity to accept the Mahdī, his laws, and his universal justice without debate…and with utmost faith.”476 Conversely, the negative benefit is that these tests will purge the nascent society from any lingering “heedlessness or negligence,” for “the Mahdī will kill all doubters…of this [adjudicative method].” 477 Ṣadr explains that “when a pious individual sees his Leader acting contrary to the [known Islamic] rules of judgment, and violating what he believes to be the clear Islamic Sharī’ah, he may, for example, be afflicted with crises of faith…fancying that if he were truly the awaited

Mahdī, he would follow the known Sharī’ah…Such an individual…thereby begins to fail in this new test, and thereby becomes a deviant…for the provisions of the Sharī’ah are to be derived from the Mahdī, rather than enjoined upon the Mahdī…and the Mahdī orders that all who oppose his adjudicative method be killed.”478 Ṣadr assures us, however, that only a minority of the society will fail these adjudicative tests, and most of such failures will number among the jurists rather than laymen. 479 Furthermore, although these failing jurists will be “generally learned in the Sharī’ah,” they naturally “will not be among the highest-level of the pure, tested ones, but rather those of the second rank.” 480

Ṣadr elaborates on these adjudicative methods, noting that the Mahdī gives particular preference to “the adjudicative methods [ḥukm] of David and Solomon, whereby evidence is not required from the individuals.”481Although David and Solomon’s adjudication is a common trope within Shī’ite discourses on the Mahdī, Ṣadr’s treatment

476 Ibid at 521-522. 477 Ibid at 517. 478 Ibid at 518. 479 Ibid at 519-520. 480 Ibid. 481 Ibid at 566. 140

of the topic is considerably more comprehensive than those of the modally-temporally moderate Shī’ite authors considered earlier in this Chapter. He begins by reviewing the renowned case of the dispute between a farmer and his shepherd neighbor (as referred to in the Qur’ān [21:77-78] and detailed in several ḥadīths) wherein the former seeks restitution for the consumption of crops by the latter’s sheep. Ṣadr first reviews the technicalities of this case, noting three possible judgments: first, that the cash equivalent of the value of crops be paid, but “cash was non-existent at that time, rather trade was conducted entirely in the form of goods [‘arūḍ], so this solution wasn’t feasible”; second is Solomon’s solution, which was for the farmer to “receive the value of the destroyed crops…from the sheeps’ milk and other produce”; and third is David’s solution, which was for the farmer to “receive restitution through receipt of the sheep themselves.”482

Ṣadr then acknowledges the superiority of Solomon’s solution over David’s, noting that the essence of David’s ruling was consists not so much “in his particular judgment

[ḥukm]…but rather in his general method of ruling without requiring evidence from the claimant regarding his claim.” 483 In contrast, Solomon’s method is in closer “accordance with conventional Islamic rules [qawā’id] themselves,” for his method not only requires the destruction of the crops to be “proven,” but also “holds the shepherd liable…only for the value of the destroyed crops.”484 Indeed, the only difference between Solomon’s method and conventional Islamic rules is that Solomon judged for the restitution to be paid in-kind, rather than in cash, which was anyways impossible at that time. “Therefore, if the Mahdī rules [ḥakama] with the rule of Solomon, then he has, in his capacity as the

482 Ibid at 571. 483 Ibid at 572. 484 Ibid. 141

highest Islamic ruler, judged that the liability be transformed from cash to in-kind goods, and this is binding upon the debtor.”485

However, despite its greater inherent virtue, “the Mahdī’s will only employ

Solomon’s adjudicative method as an occasional recourse [amr muwwaqat]…whereas he will regularly and customarily employ David’s method.”486 Why would the Mahdī choose an adjudicative method that dispenses with the need for evidence—and which is thus, at least ostensibly, less Islamically sound? Ṣadr provides three justifications. First is for the purpose of providing adjudicative tests, as already noted above. He elaborates on this, explaining that initially, the Mahdī will deliberately appear to be capricious in adjudication, for “when he applies the Prophet David’s adjudicative method, he will not explicitly state from whom it derives, and will not clarify the basis on which he judges, even though it conflicts with the conventional rules of adjudication—so from this arises protest, and this is the measure of the test [tamhīṣ].” 487 Second is that when circumstances require it, the Mahdī will revert to the Islamic method of adjudication, for although David’s method “is his standard method, this does not mean that he uses it in all matters absolutely, but merely more often.” 488 Thus, the Mahdī “combines the adjudication methods of the Prophets David and Muḥammad—for whenever

Muḥammad’s method, namely adjudication with evidence and oath, is more appropriate to the reality…then the will Mahdī employ it over that of David…But in any event, he always arrives at the truth.” 489 Thirdly, Ṣadr de-emphasizes the role of adjudicative methods within the final world order relative to its role during Prophet David’s era. He

485 Ibid at 573. 486 Ibid. 487 Ibid. 488 Ibid at 574. 489 Ibid. 142

explains that “one of the differences between David and the Mahdī, is that for David, this adjudicative method was predominant...whereas for the Mahdī it will [merely] be preferred, depending on the best interests of his government.”490 The reason for this has to do with the needs of society, for “in David’s era, the [general] society had not reached a level wherein it needed to ascertain the truth of [all public] matters [al-wāqi’], so the general rules of adjudication were [in themselves] sufficient.” 491 In contrast, in the

Mahdī’s era, society will need to ascertain the truth in all matters of public interest, “not only in the judicature, but in all general, public matters; [thus] the judicature, despite its importance, will not be the most important element of government, nor its profoundest dimension…”492

Another feature of the final legal system will be its mechanism for addressing conflicts of laws. On the one hand, conflicts of laws will largely be eliminated from the very outset, for Ṣadr’s vision of the final political order (described in Chapter One) is one in which the nation-state, and therefore international public and private law, will all cease to exist. Furthermore, even within the global federation that replaces the nation-states, there will be no regional differences in legislation, for all legislation would originate from the central authority. As such, there would be no possibility of a clash of jurisdictions in the form familiar to contemporary legal systems. On the other hand, Ṣadr acknowledges that conflicts of laws will arise due to the simultaneous jursidictions of different religions—as suggested in the tradition stating that the Mahdī will “rule over the Jews with their Torah, and over the Christians with their Gospels…and over the Muslims with

490 Ibid at 575. 491 Ibid. 492 Ibid. 143

their Qur’ān.” 493 In elaborating on this tradition, Ṣadr explains that these various sharī’ahs “all spring from a single Source of wisdom,” yet differ from one another due to the “differing educational requirements of their [respective] societies.”494 In other words, although law is singular and absolute its essence, positive law is relative, and thus is enshrined within a multiplicity of systems, each of which caters to the specific societal needs of that particular religious community.

How, then, can the simultaneous jurisdictions of these various religious Books be reconciled? In his analysis of the tradition just quoted, Ṣadr evaluates four common interpretations. The first, which he rejects for being inadequate, is the view that

“implementation of these holy Books refers only to their contents commanding embracing

Islam, and their glad-tidings regarding the Prophet of Islam.” 495 The second interpretation, which he rejects for being too excessive, is that “implementation…refers to the laws of these Books in the entirety of their details”—in other words, the Torah would have comprehensive jurisdiction over the Jews in all matters, the Gospels would likewise have full jurisdiction over Christians in all matters, and so forth.496 A third interpretation, which Ṣadr acknowledges as sound, is that “implementation refers to a portion of the important laws expressed in these Books,” namely, “laws reflecting universally applicable concepts of justice” rather than “the entirety of their detailed laws.”497 Ṣadr explains that even though these particular laws originated from religions and “sharī’ahs” that preceded Islam, “these laws will [nonetheless] enter the contents of the global government’s legislation…for all humanity, rather than being particular to the people of

493 Ibid at 607. 494 Ibid at 610. 495 Ibid at 609-612. 496 Ibid. 497 Ibid. 144

a prior religious community.”498 Ṣadr then further approves of a fourth interpretation, which he describes as complementary to the third interpretation, namely that the relevant portions of each holy Book will be implemented with respect to only that particular religious community, rather than for all of humanity, “but not in a comprehensive manner, which we’ve already negated [in the second interpretation].”499 Taking the two sound interpretations as an aggregate, the conclusion is that in some areas of legislation, each religious community will be “distinguished by the laws of their Books,” while in other areas, “[the same] laws will apply to all humanity.” 500 More particularly, Ṣadr explains that “in every legal matter in which the laws of the government differs from the rulings in the Books, the just Ruler will decide between implementing his law or their law for them, just as the Muslim jurists gave verdicts, and for this they employed the Qur’ānic verse

5:42.”501 Furthermore, Ṣadr views these conflicts of laws as existing only insofar as religious minorities continue to exist within the final world order502 (a matter that will be further explored in Chapter 4 below).

Finally, Ṣadr enumerates a number of the specific public policies and positive laws of the final legal order. As to public policies, Ṣadr begins by outlining the universal decadence of social and economic policies prior to the Mahdī’s Advent—a decadence that resulted from “grevious, ethical decline traversed by all people across different religions, schools of thought [madhāhib], languages, colors, and cultures,” and which

498 Ibid. 499 Ibid. 500 Ibid. 501 Ibid. 502 Ibid. 145

therefore led to “thousands of social problems throughout all human societies.”503 He enumerates these deficient public policies as the following:

“[C]heating and deceit in transactions, infringement on the rights and property of others,…pursuit of unjust enrichment [riba] in transactions to the point where it becomes a necessity of life; the degradation of women; consumption of alcohol; the spread of immorality [fujūr] and rise of secular forms of marriage, divorce and inheritance; the establishment of many indecent schools, swimming pools, theatres, cinemas; the broadcasting, on every radio and television, of indecent, sexually-inciting songs and films which are influential and often lead to crimes; the further spread [of such content] throughout most of the world’s newspapers, journals, and shows, in various languages, schools [madhāhib], and with various aims [maqāṣid]…such that what is atrocious [munkar] is seen to be seemly [ma’rūf], while what is seemly is perceived as atrocious.”504

Ṣadr then states that the Mahdī’s position concerning all such policies will be to “uproot the decline in its entirety, replacing it with the atmosphere of virtue, justice, and perfection.” 505 This solution, however, is not merely a sophomoric assertion of the antithesis of all these prior social and economic policies, for “the Mahdī in his global just government, will not abolish television and broadcasting, theatres and cinemas, summer- resorts and swimming pools—nor will he abolish schools, hospitals, banks, newspapers, publications, or serial-dramas.”506 Rather, these institutions will be preserved, for “all these things exist for the good of humanity, and for facilitating the needs of the individual and society.”507

Government policy, therefore, will be to preserve and employ all of these social and economic institutions “as means of furthering the cultivation and perfection of characters and virtues, as well as reciprocity and respect between humans, and

503 Ibid at 465-466. 504 Ibid. 505 Ibid. 506 Ibid. 507 Ibid. 146

thereafter as means for education humanity in a universal manner, and attaining through it unto its desired, highest perfection.” 508 Therefore, mass-media will be used for promoting right-thinking, for “broadcasting, television, theatres, cinemas, and newspapers will be means for promulgating beneficial concepts of justice.”509 Likewise, recreational activities will be promoted so long as they are righteous, for “resorts and swimming pools will continue—without degrading characters, but rather [as means to] uplift thoughts to the level of justice and true prosperity.” 510 As to educational institutions, “schools of various levels and types… will be paths for educating, cultivating, and perfecting the individual in the true form that binds the creature with his great

Creator…and they will cease to employ the means that led the individual to develop bad character, prejudice, and materialism…In short, in a general sense, educational institutions will preserve their systematic, academic format, but will change to accommodate…the new doctrines of justice.” 511 Similarly, concerning gender relationships, “the government will regulate the social relationships between the two genders with laws.”512

In support of such policies, Ṣadr enumerates several examples of positive law within the final legal system. In the realm of penal law, for instance, the Mahdī will implement “the Islamic laws…from the inception of Islam, which then lapsed during the age prior to his Advent—such that he will be the first to implement them after the

Prophet’s era.”513 Among these penalties, Ṣadr explicitly mentions that of stoning for

508 Ibid. 509 Ibid. 510 Ibid. 511 Ibid. 512 Ibid. 513 Ibid at 580. 147

adultery, and death for “those who obstruct the zakāt.”514 However, Ṣadr explains that such penalties will only be necessary during the first phase of the final society, prior to its large-scale transformation (described in Chapter 4 below), for “such disobedience occurs only in the beginning of the age of the global government, prior to the firm establishment of faith in the souls of all humanity.”515

Another domain is that of transactional law, which Ṣadr elaborates on in considerable detail, particularly in Volume IV of his Encyclopedia. To begin with, transactional law will include many well-known prohibitions within conventional Islamic jurisprudence—such as unjust enrichment, theft, plunder, pillaging, and other means of

“attaining property through illegitimate means…even if it is not a cause of profit.”516 But new transactional laws will also be introduced. These will include new and unprecedented transactional forms, for “forms of transactions change from age-to-age, so it is possible that there will be new forms of transactions in the global government, rendered valid through the Mahdī’s legislation.”517 Another example is a new law of trusts, whereby trusts will only be executed on condition that the beneficiaries are righteous believers. This, he explains, is in contrast to “the present age, in which it is incumbent to execute trusts for both pious and immoral recipients among the variety of schools of thought [madhāhib] and religions, and in which one must not challenge the beneficiary’s right, even if he is wayward or blasphemous.”518 Therefore, the difference between the law of executing trusts before and after the Mahdī is that “execution of trusts prior to his Advent was a measure of the trustee’s justice and steadfastness, whereas

514 Ibid. 515 Ibid. 516 Ṣadr, Volume IV at 700. 517 Ibid at 699. 518 Ṣadr at 580. 148

refusing to execute it after the Mahdī’s Advent one of the most important steps in confronting and uprooting disbelief [kufr] and deviation, and there’s no liability to the trustee if he is commanded to refrain from discharging the trust.”519 Elsewhere, Ṣadr adds to this list of new transactional laws by grouping together the following laws which all pertain to limitations of private ownership:520

“[L]imitations [on private ownership] will manifest in a number of the principles that we have reviewed, such as: prohibition of monopoly; prohibition on unjust enrichment; 521 prohibition on trade-profit; 522 prohibition on acquiring wealth through illicit means; prohibition on exclusive inheritance to a designated heir if there be additional, common heirs, and the [corollary] requirement to distribute wealth to all inheritors; the government’s right to limit the amount that individuals can acquire from lawful, common goods, [such as] mines and agriculture—all of that via legislation [qānūn] according to what the global government deems expedient;. . . As well as the prohibition on [individuals] acquiring surplus amounts of natural sources and mines 523 —constituting a temporary legislation and therefore distinct from the government limitation on such amounts, which comprises part of the foundational legislation.”

Likewise, a separate body of legislation will pertain to the mandatory Islamic pilgrimage [ḥajj]—for the Mahdī will “revert the ḥajj to its true laws that were there at the time of the Prophet, and to that he will add further laws.”524 To this end, Ṣadr emphasizes two points. First is that the Mahdī will “reduce the size of the Prophet’s

519 Ibid. 520 Ṣadr, Volume IV at 712. 521 Ṣadr explains that the conventional Islamic prohibition on unjust enrichment will be recast in the final world order so as to also prohibit all forms of “advantage” derived from “brethren in faith,” for the heightened ethical standards requires that “between believing brothers, there musn’t be the slightest degree of advantage, even if it’s customary legal in the prior societies.” Ibid at 713. 522 In the final order, according to Ṣadr, ordīnary trade-profit, which is permitted by conventional Islamic jurisprudence, will be prohibited, “for it will be considered as unjust enrichment…because a believer profiting from another believer is unjust enrichment.” Thus, any “sale in pursuit of profit in that age will be considered illicit unjust enrichment—for on that day there’s no difference in the inviolability of profit between being ribawī or non-ribawī, according to today’s jurisprudential [fiqhī] terminology. Indeed, legal sale will be a sale that remains between equal amounts of monetary value, whether it is barter or by cash.” Ibid. 523 Individuals will be “required provide surplus natural resources, and likewise surplus from mining, to others—for withholding it from others…is a form of taking advantage from brethren in faith.” Thus, “if an individual finds in the earth a river or fountain of water, he can use it to satisfy all of his personal needs--but if the water exceeds his needs…he is not permitted to stop others from it.” Even natural resources found on privately owned land must be provided for public benefit. For example, “mines of coal, gold, or oil, whether found in public or privately-owned land, are possessions of the people...if the mine is in personal land, the owner of the land is permitted to benefit from it that which labor and possession is capable of, but as to the excess, he’s not permitted to stop others from to do labor for possession.” Ibid at 713. 524 Ibid at 579-580. 149

Sacred Mosque [masjid al-ḥarām] to less than a fourth of its current size, particularly after its recent, huge expansion.”525 Second will be the challenge of reconciling this reduced size with the “extraordinary increase in pilgrims from all of humanity.”526 The

Mahdī will overcome this challenge through legislation, including restoring the proper location of,527 and then “permitting circumambulation behind, the Spot of Abraham,”528 as well as “preventing superogatory circumambulation, given the existence of the plethora of circumambulators doing the mandatory circumambulation.”529

These policies concerning pilgrimage are only a portion of the Mahdī’s many

“feats in construction legislation”—a matter to which Ṣadr devotes considerably more attention.530 Cities will be expanded considerably—“not only the capital-city [Kūfa]…but also other areas.”531 More particularly, the breadth of Kūfa will be increased to 80 kilometers, while “other places will approximate that, or, for example, will be reduced to half of that, in accordance with the conditions of each land and its geographic position and social importance.” 532 Furthermore, “mosques will gain prominence, for they are the principal Islamic centers.” To this end, the Mahdī will “prohibit ornamentation and embellishment of mosques [al-masājid al-musawwara].” Likewise, he will “raze every mosque that is built too tall, limiting them to the desirable height, according to the sharī’ah.” Similarly, the Mahdī will “raze four mosques in Kūfa, without reconstructing them…for they were not built out of piety, which is the fundamental condition for the

525 Ibid. 526 Ibid. 527 Ṣadr explains this, noiting that “the Mahdī will fundamentally transform the Spot of Abraham, meaning the place wherein Abraham the Prophe built the Ka’ba. Naturally, the reconstruction will revert to the side of the wall which Abraham built, rather than several meters away from it. As a result, the Spot of Abraham will be resituated in proximity to the Ka’ba.” Ibid. 528 Ṣadr explains that “the Mahdī will overcome this challenge through issuing legislation.” Ibid. 529 Ibid. 530 Ibid at 553-555. 531 Ibid. 532 Ibid. 150

legality of constructing mosques.”533 On the other hand, he will have a great mosque built in “upper” Kūfa: “it will face Najaf and, as the traditions say, ‘it will have 1000 doors,’ that is, a plethora of doors…So we can assume this mosque to be shaped as a square, each side of which will have 250 doors, and every two doors being separated by at least

10 meters, because the length of the sides are 2500 meters, and this means that the mosque’s total area is no less than 6.25 million square meters, so this mosque will be unprecedented…and this is needed for the Friday Prayer that the Mahdī will lead every week, which legally requires the attendance of the great majority of men residing in the capital and the surrounding environs.”534

Construction legislation, however, includes numerous other matters beside that of mosques. Ṣadr mentions, for instance, “the expansion of the great roads [al-ṭuruq al- a’ẓam], meaning the roads connecting two lands…, and expansion of the important roads connecting the cities generally.”535 Ṣadr elaborates, noting that “in our current age, we understand the importance of this expanding [of roads] and the gravity of its task greater than in any previous time.”536 Therefore, the Mahdī will “forbid the ‘ajnaḥa’ from the roads, destroying those that exist…and the linguisting meaning of this term [from the traditions]…is the windows which reach from the homes to the street, revealing the interior of the house which should not be revealed…so their removal is required, and they will be replaced with a new means of ventilation. Or, perhaps by ‘jināḥ’ is meant something else—the frames facing roads or streates that are usually placed in buildings,

533 Ibid. 534 Ibid. 535 Ibid at 556-557. 536 Ibid. 151

either with or without pillars.”537 A further instance of construction legislation is that the final government will “prohibit public lavatories [al-kunūf] as well as gutters connecting to the streets…[due to] the flowing of filthy water. Both of these are used abundantly in our current time and they soil the streets and irritate pedestrians, so the Imām will forbid them, and the home-dwellers will be required to employ cleaner and purer methods to dispose of their water.”538

While Ṣadr’s account of the final legal system is relatively detailed, he summarizes his own account by highlighting its six most distinctive features. The first is that the final legal system will be based upon “the true laws [aḥkām] which were

[already] announced prior to the Advent.”539 Second, it will incorporate “the concepts and understandings resulting from advancement of Islamic thought.”540 Third, it will

“expose and reformulate the laws and concepts that had become lost over time.”541

Fourth, it will include “laws and concepts that were delayed and [deliberately] unannounced before—and whose announcement depended on the actualization of the world government.” 542 Fifth, it will involve “detailed structures that the Mahdī will himself implement, within the bounds of the fixed laws in the Sharī’ah…for the purpose of regulating the various realities.”543 Sixth are “the general rules that the Mahdī fixes for the rulers (ḥukām)…for purposes of continuing human education and perfection over the long-term.” As to the aggregate of these six features, “through these parts, the framework

537 Ibid. 538 Ibid. 539 Ibid at 469-470. 540 Ibid. 541 Ibid. 542 Ibid. 543 Ibid. 152

for complete justice secures its path for implementation, and for gradually educating humanity.” 544

C. Summary of Sunnī and Shī’ite Discourses

Though regressivism asserts that all general structures within the final order will revert to those of the Prophet’s polity, the domain of legal structure arguably represents the least complicated case of this reversion. This is because the other three domains of structures (political, economic, and social) must each depart, in certain respects, from the general rule of regression, due to explicit statements made in the Islamic traditions regarding novel features of the final order. Sunnī traditions, however, are much quieter regarding changes to legal structures in the final order. As such, ISIS’s theory of final legal order is almost fully inferred herein from its current legal practice—an inference which is further justified given ISIS’s conception of the Mahdī and Christ as merely being executors of the existing Sharī’ah, rather than as new legislators. ISIS’s theory begins with a negative definition wherein all legal systems subsequent to that of the

Prophet are categorically denied. This amounts to rejection of modern conceptions of positive law in its various forms, as well as the associated concepts of rule-of-law, judicial independence, and so forth. Instead, sources of law will be the Qur’ān and Sunna, while the caliph (i.e. the Mahdī), and the judges he appoints, will be merely executors and enforcers of the law. This return to the Qur’ān and Sunna means that the authority of multiple legal schools—a feature of later Islamic legal history—will necessarily be discarded, and the associated doctrine of the end of independent legal reasoning [ijtiḥād] rejected. As for specific laws and policies, the rejection of positive law grounds a

544 Ibid. 153

jurisprudence of minimalism. On the one hand, there is no objection to enumerating or publishing explicit legal provisions within the Qur’ān, such as the fixed punishments

[ḥadd], qua legislation. On the other hand, practicalities of modern life not mentioned in the scriptural sources, and not experienced within the Prophet’s polity, giving rise to numerous rules and regulations (or de facto laws) covering all of the standard and mundane domains of legislation that a government must concern itself with, and even a de facto constitution, resembling the Prophet’s own Medina Charter.

In contrast to ISIS’s implicit account, Dā’ūd, in his progressivism, offers an explicit Sunnī account of the final legal system. In doing so, he affirms certain features suggested by ISIS. To begin with, he rejects Western legal models—a stark contrast to his general approval of secular, Western political structures (described in Chapter One).

Also echoing ISIS, he predicts the end of multiple legal schools and their precedential authority, and thus the end of juridical differences [khilāf]. Dā’ūd, however, goes beyond this, and envisions the discarding of the virtual entirety of conventional Islamic positive law [fiqh], the end of fundamental methods of legal deduction (such as analogical reasoning [qīyās]), as well as an end to the very function of jurists themselves. All of these features will become obsolete within the final legal system due to the extraordinary personal powers of the Mahdī (a point which arguably constitutes the greatest flaw in

Dā’ūd’s account, for he does not address the guarantors of the legal system after the

Mahdī’s personal reign). In the aggregate, Dā’ūd argues that these central features of conventional Islamic legal systems will be supplanted by an entirely new “flexible legislative order” which differs from, rather than returns to, that of the Prophet and/or

Rightly Guided Caliphs. The hallmark of this new legal system will be a jurisprudence of

154

minimalism—i.e. the dearth of legislation and positive law that it will produce. Although this minimalism echoes that of the ISIS account, the underlying reasons differ. While minimalist jurisprudence for ISIS is due to equating positive law with polytheism, for

Dā’ūd it derives from new social conditions in the final order—namely, tolerance, prosperity, and love—all which will eliminate the need for excessive legalism. Dā’ūd illustrates this with the example of penal law in the final order, in which conventional categories of licit versus illicit will be preserved as a matter of theory, but in practice

“you will see neither the need, nor even the opportunity to commit illicit actions…rather…there will be so much abundance that these bad actions won’t be committed.”

Shī’ite revanchism, like the progressives, asserts that the final legal system will be unprecedented in its structure and contents. This is a stark contrast to the default Sunnī position, wherein legal structure represents the clearest example of reversion to the initial systems of Islam, for reasons stated above. Indeed, at the heart of the Shī’ite default position are explicit statements in Shī’ite traditions regarding the novel and unprecedented nature of law within the final order—for the Mahdī is said to bring with him a new Judgment and a new Sunna, and will employ a new method of evidence or testimony—namely, that of Prophet David. Beyond this, the traditions provide numerous indications of the particular, positive laws and policies that will comprise the new legislation within the final legal system. Specific accounts the final legal system, however, appear to be rather unformulated in the Shī’ite default orientation, for the tendency among authors such as Amīnī, Kūrānī, and Tabasī is to selectively and disjointedly emphasize particular aspects of this legal system (ranging from its purposes to its positive

155

laws) but not to reconcile these elements within a coherent, overarching theory.

Furthermore, despite sharing a general orientation with that of Dā’ūd, these theories all differ in particulars from that of Dā’ūd due to basic distinctions between Sunnī and

Shī’ite jurisprudence. Unlike Sunnī jurisprudence, conventional Shī’ite (i.e. ‘uṣulī) jurisprudence does not problematize the doctrine of ijtiḥād, nor does it grapple with the existence of multiple legal schools—all of which themes are therefore de-emphasized in

Shī’ite discourses on final legal system. It is therefore unsurprisingly that the Shī’ite theorists herein all envision jurists to play a key role in the final legal system, while

Dā’ūd’s account categorically rejects the role of jurists.

While accounts of the final legal system among the Shī’ite majority appear haphazard and patchwork, Ṣadr’s idealist account addresses both legal theory and positive law (from not only Shī’ite, but also Sunnī and indeed secular, non-Islamic perspectives) and thus represents the most comprehensive and nuanced account of the final legal system considered in this study. He begins with a broad historical critique of

Islamic as well as non-Islamic legal systems prior to the final world order, and in doing so, notes not only their general weakness, but also their various strengths. This enables

Ṣadr to distinguish the final legal system from not only secular, but also traditional Sunnī and Shī’ite legal systems, for its fundamental sources of jurisprudence will be unprecedented, as will be the function of its jurists, its judicial procedure, and its method for addressing conflicts of laws. After explaining these foundational structures of the final legal system, Ṣadr enumerates various public policies and positive laws that will be enacted across numerous domains ranging from social relations to education, crimes, transactions, public health, and religious practice. Ṣadr’s own summary of his account of

156

legal structure reduces it to six most distinctive features: (i) implementation of the true laws that were already announced before the final order; (ii) incorporation of new understandings resulting from the advancement of Islamic thought; (iii) exposing laws and concepts that had been lost over the ages; (iv) implementing laws and concepts that are fundamentally new and unprecedented; (v) establishment of detailed regulatory structures implemented by the Mahdī; and (vi) general rules specifically applicable to the rulers.

157

—CHAPTER THREE—

THE FINAL ECONOMY: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND TRANSACTIONS

Within discourses on final world order, one of the tropes acknowledged by virtually all theorists is that of material prosperity. What will be the nature of, and reasons for, this prosperity? Various theories differ in this regard. Almost all acknowledge agriculture as a fundamental to this prosperity—for agricultural plenty in the final order is explicitly mentioned in the Islamic scriptures, in traditions such as one which notes that during the apocalyptic era, “[t]he sky will be permitted to pour its rain and the land to yield its plants, so even if you were to plant a seed on a stone, it would spring.”545 Will the material prosperity of the final world order therefore be entirely miraculous in nature, as suggested by such traditions, or will it ordinary planning and human efforts, particularly in sciences, technologies, and other non-agricultural sectors? Moreover, what will be the overall economic and financial system in the world within which this prosperity will be managed and secured? What will be the fundamental features of this final economic system, and how will it differ from conventional theories of Islamic economics, as well as various alternative systems within economic history, whether capitalism, communism, or otherwise?

A. Sunnī Discourses

1. Regressivism

For ISIS, the general benchmark for the final economy, as with other structures of the final order, is that of the Prophet’s polity. At the most general level, material life will

545 Versions of this same tradition are common to both Sunnism and Shī’ism. See Footnotes 10 and 11, supra. 158

reflect an ethos of cooperation, generosity, and philanthropy. In the Prophet’s polity, for instance, “despite [the difficult conditions], we hear absolutely nothing [in the traditions] suggesting that the Muslims, let alone the hypocrites, discredited the Prophet’s government with words such as ‘he’s unable to secure that which will nourish himself and his Companions, so how can he possibly deprive himself and yet establish a government which doesn’t possess the vital ingredients of government, including the most basic of them, which are food and water?’”546 Likewise, ISIS emphasizes the economic ethos of generosity and philanthropy by citing a tradition regarding Abū Hurayra who, despite his hunger, was instructed by the Prophet to share a portion of milk with the ‘men of the platform’ [ahl al-suffah], for “these people…were the guests of Islam who had no families, nor money, nor anybody to depend upon, and whenever an object of charity was brought to the Prophet, he would send it to them and would not take anything from it, and whenever any present was given to him, he used to send some for them and then take some of it for himself.”547

More particularly, this benchmark of the Prophet’s polity means a return to the transactional and economic norms thereof, particularly the prohibitions stipulated within the Qur’ān and Sunna. While ISIS has not yet (to the knowledge of the present author) expounded on some of these prohibitions (e.g. the prohibition of transactions involving excessive uncertainty [gharār]), it has explicitly mentioned others, such as the prohibition on unjust enrichment [riba]. Arguably, one way in which ISIS has attempted to prevent unjust enrichment has been through regulation of prices within the market, including

“housing rents, medications at pharmacies, and childbirth operations performed in its

546 DN at 9. 547 Ibid at 6. 159

hospitals, and even…that the price of counterfeit goods be lower than the price of the authentic product.”548 Likewise, the prohibition on unjust enrichment has prompted ISIS to return to the original Islamic standard of gold, silver, and copper currencies, rather than fiat money. ISIS noted this connection between currencies and unjust enrichment in its announcement that “[i]n an effort to disentangle the Ummah from the corrupt, interest- based global financial system, the Islamic State recently announced the minting of new currency based on the intrinsic values of gold, silver, and copper.”549 As to the form of the coinage, “[t]he images used are representative of the guidance that the Muslims have attained from the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger.”550 In a subsequent statement, ISIS acknowledges that the world at large might consider this gold-based currency to be regressive: “many central banks around the world rubbish the idea of a return to gold or a gold standard in the 21st Century, citing that it would be a huge step backwards.”551 Nonetheless, ISIS rejects the modern banking system as “a scam designed to feed itself and governments. Nothing tangible exists, just a huge amount of paper and lots of numbers on computers. With today’s system, the governments and banks hold all the gold while the public have worthless pieces of paper to play with, and when the economy collapses guess who’ll still have the gold…”552

Aside from prohibitions such as riba and gharār, the basic Prophetic model for redistribution of wealth is also to be replicated in the final economy. This means, in the

548 Rivkin at 15. 549 Dabiq, Issue 5 at 18. 550 ISIS acknowledges, however, that the practice of minting Islamic coinage derives not from the Prophet’s polity, due to practical restrictions at that time, but rather from the later period, specifically the Ummayad caliphate. ISIS explains: “The minting of a unique currency specific to the Muslims and based on precious metals has its precedence in the Umawī Khilāfah of ‘Abdul- Mālik Ibn Marwān. The Muslims during the time of the Prophet (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam), the Rightly-Guided Khulafā’, and the early Umawī Khulafā’ made use of coinage circulated by the Persian and Roman empires.” Ibid. 551 Dabiq, Issue 6 at 62 (article entitled, Meltdown, written by British hostage, John Cantlie). 552 Ibid at 58-59. 160

first instance, that government will accumulate revenue through various Islamically- sanctioned levies (as mentioned in the Chapter One)—including the kharāj land tax,553 s zakāt (for ISIS, this is currently a 2.5% tax on total income and savings),554 ghanīma

(military seizure of non-Muslim property),555 fay’ (peaceful acquisition of non-Muslim property),556 and ‘ushr (an import-export tarrif which was introduced to Islamic practice during the reign of Caliph ‘Umar—i.e. shortly after the reign of the Prophet).557 These proceeds are then redistributed by government for various purposes. For example, zakāt, according to ISIS, can be spent by the government for a variety of ends, including outreach and recruitment, providing for the needs of jiḥād, freeing Muslim prisoners and slaves, and assisting the poor.558 Ghanīma and fay’, likewise, can be used for various purposes, including the provision of living quarters to fighters, 559 or the support of orphans. 560

Though these general transactional and economic norms of the final order will match those of the Prophet’s polity, the level and sources of material prosperity, on the other hand, will fundamentally differ between the final order and the Prophet’s polity. In this regard, ISIS describes “the economic condition in the Prophet’s government” as one of “life-threatening poverty from which none, whether young or old, were exempt,” and

553 Dabiq, Issue 4 at 12. 554 ISIS video, “And they Gave Zakāt,” 17 June 2015 (available at www.jihadology.net). 555 ISIS, Media Office of North Baghdād Province, “Photographic Report: Aspect of the Spoils of the Islamic State in the Battle of Nazem with the Safavid Army Near the Nibai Region,” 30 April 2015 (available http://justpaste.it/we_sh_bag01). See also, Rivkin at 14. 556 ISIS, Committee of Research and Fatwas, “Series of Fatwas Issued by the Committee of Research and Fatwas,” Fatwa No. 35, 25 February 2015. See also, Rivkin. 557 Rivkin at 15. 558 ISIS video, “And they Gave Zakāt,” 17 June 2015 (available at www.jihadology.net). 559 Rivkin at 14. 560 “Recording the Muslims for Contribution to Orphans of Fay’ in the Eastern District of the Province,” ISIS Sharī’ah Committee for Raqqa Province, September 2015 (available at http://justpaste.it/nhcr); “Announcement on Contributing Ghanīma and Fay’ to Orphans,” ISIS Sharī’ah Committee for Raqqa Province, May 2014 (available at web.archive.org/web/20160323013442/https:/twitter.com/baqiah1407/status/462371102405431296). 161

therefore “no one owned any possessions.” 561 This poverty endured throughout the entirety of the Prophet’s polity, for “from its inception until the Prophet’s passing, the

[material] condition of the Prophetic government was hunger which afflicted everyone— to such an extent that none can comprehend its danger save those who have experienced it.” This will undoubtedly change within the final world order, due to explicit statements within the traditions regarding the great prosperity of the apocalyptic era. ISIS directly cites several traditions in this regard. For instance, “[t]hen, it will be said to the earth, let your fruits grow and yield your blessings. On that day, a group will eat from a single pomegranate and take shade under its bowl-shaped peel. Milk will be blessed so much so that the young female camel will suffice a very large group of people, and a young female cow will suffice a tribe of people, and a young female sheep will suffice a clan of people.”562 Likewise, “[t]he sky will be permitted to pour its rain and the land to yield its plants, so even if you were to plant a seed on a stone, it would spring.”563

These traditions quoted by ISIS suggest that the primary sources of material prosperity in the final order will be miraculous bounties from God, particularly in the agricultural sector. Notwithstanding, these miraculous agricultural sources would presumably be supplemented by other secondary sources (such as oil, which ISIS is currently benefitting from considerably). Furthermore, within its current political enterprise, ISIS acknowledges the use of modern sciences and technologies—which therefore also, presumably, characterize the movement’s implicit theory of prosperity within the final order. Among these modern sciences and technologies, ISIS lays

561 DN at 6. 562 Dabiq, Issue 7 at 23. 563 Ibid.

162

particular emphasis on those in the field of medicine. For instance, ISIS emphasizes that

“[t]he Islamic State provides the Muslims with extensive healthcare by running a host of medical facilities including hospitals and clinics in all major cities through which it is offering a wide range of medical services, from various types of complicated surgery to simpler services such as hijāmah. This infrastructure is aided by a widespread network of pharmacies run by qualified pharmacists and managed under the supervision and control of the Health Dīwān. Just as the medical staff in the hospitals and clinics are made up of qualified, trained professionals, the pharmacies are likewise only run by qualified and certified pharmacists.”564

2. Progressivism

Given its prominence in Sunnī traditions, Dā’ūd places special emphasis on the agricultural sector, but attributes its prosperity largely to ordinary human planning, rather than to miraculous divine causes. Thus, he explains that in the “government of the

Prophetic House…great emphasis will be placed on the earth and agriculture, and on industries related to agriculture, resulting in such abundance in harvests that the

[contemporary] catchphrase, ‘food security’ will seem as a joke in comparison.”565

Dā’ūd suggests that these transformations will first “begin in Africa,”566 before spreading globally. The result is that “in the Mahdī’s era, deserts will become verdant, fertile, green, and fruit-bearing; the 5 billion acres of agricultural productivity that the earth has lost, due to wind and water-induced erosion, will return to productivity; trees will be planted everywhere to protect the earth, and for their produce; and the choicest water will be

564 Dabiq, Issue 9 at 24. 565 Dawlat at 68. 566 al-Mafājāt at 428. 163

protected from industrial use.”567 Furthermore, ordinary human beings will not merely be witnesses to, but rather will be protagonists of these agricultural technologies, for “the sons of Adam and the daughters of Eve will be the producers of the [agricultural] leap, rather than being victims of it, or merely being its ignorant consumers.” 568 Finally, among the various types of agricultural produce, Dā’ūd mentions a few in particular, including “olives, apples, pomegranetes, milk,...honey, and manna.”569 In the aggregate, these technologies will unlock such abundance of new wealth that the final order will be

“a time of plenty…no one will be needy.”570

Agricultural plenty, however, is merely one of the fruits of the sweeping scientific and technological breakthroughs that will occur in the final world order. These scientific innovations will encompass all domains of material life. For example, the new technologies will include those that will “solve the worlds various pollution problems…”571 They will also enable “full geographic surveys throughout the entire earth, in order to yield the earth’s treasures; [thus], Egypt will explode with ‘black and green gold,’ as will the Arab Peninsula, and indeed the entire world!”572 Likewise, the technologies will involve a greatly increased use of “robots…computer production…and communications technology….”573 In the aggregate, these scientific and technological advances will solve all of humanity’s material problems, for “the Qu’rān contains all the scientific truths that will save the world from corruption, pollution, need, poverty, and disease,” and only through the coming of the Mahdī will these “Qur’ānic treasures

567 al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 282. 568 Dawlat at 68. 569 al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 233. 570 Ibid at 234. 571 al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 282-283. 572 Ibid. 573 Ibid. 164

explode with scientific knowledge.”574 The Mahdī’s era, therefore, “will be the actualized answer to the question, ‘Have we not made the world a receptacle for the living and for the dead?’ [Qur’ān 77:25-26]).” 575 Furthermore, Dā’ūd assures us, this miraculous explosion of knowledge will continue “after the Mahdī,” for after him, “the era of

Jesus…will also be one of forward leaps in science and technology…and a continuation of the scientific accomplishments that the Mahdī initiated, which the minds will not forego.”576 In short, “the Mahdī’s…intellectual contributions will solve all of the world’s problems.” 577

Although agricultural and scientific breakthroughs provide a necessary foundation for material prosperity, a sound economic superstructure is also necessary to guarantee proper management and distribution of the abundance. Dā’ūd’s theory of the final economic system stems, in the first instance, from his underlying concern with the dismal material conditions in the contemporary Islamic world, for “among the harms that the

Antichrist has inflicted on the Islamic world are poverty, ignorance, and debt.”578 After elaborating on the indebtedness of even the oil-producing, Islamic countries, Dā’ūd notes that the economic “features of the Antichrist’s government” also include “lack of local production, disease, [malfunctioning] health-care systems, and civil wars.” 579 These material problems within the Islamic world, in turn, derive from the flaws of contemporary, global economic systems, ranging from capitalism to communism:

“[n]umerous experiences throughout the Islamic world with communist and capitalist

574 Ibid. 575 Ibid. 576 Ibid at 301. 577 al-Mafājāt at 398. 578 Ibid at 424-425. 579 Ibid. 165

nations confirm their corruption: difficult crises, crashes in rates of growth, crashes in national currencies;…crises of debt, culture, character, and conscience, along with crashing of trust in governments and their tyrannical, repressive policies, and the spreading of corruption, base careerism, and the most dangerous thing of all: the pulverizing of individuality and its Westernation.”580 Elsewhere, Dā’ūd adds several more items to this list of crises, including “extreme disparity between poor and rich countries,”

581 as well as “exacerbation [of all problems] due to population growth.”582 In yet a further rebuke, he observes that “humanity is full of aches and pains due to experimentation with fantasies such as communism and capitalism.”583 Despite critiquing both communism and capitalism, Dā’ūd’s sharpest rebuke is against the latter, for “the anarchy of capitalism proceeds from production, increase, profit, and generating limitless output of various products with great speed and without consideration to their usefulness…because the aim is only profit, as impelled by an insatiable appetite for luxury, as well as mindless, needless imitation [taqlīd] of others.”584

While these global problems plague contemporary economic systems, Dā’ūd contrasts it with the economy of the final world order, noting that “the government of the

Prophetic House will efface all of these crude problems, such that in its [economic] order there won’t be any trace of the statement ‘when the advanced countries sneeze, the developing countries catch a cold.’”585 To some extent, this effacement of economic problems will occur simply through the technological—particularly agricultural—

580 Dawlat at 65. 581 al-Mafājāt at 428. 582 Ibid. 583 Dawlat at 15. 584 Dawlat at 58. 585 Dawlat at 65. 166

breakthroughs already mentioned above, for “an underlying reason for this

[contemporary] economic situation, poverty, ignorance, and hunger, is agricultural in nature, for the Islamic world does not rule over its own loaf of bread, it has no autonomy or independence….” 586 Yet mere technical solutions will be insufficient, for the effacement of contemporary economic problems in the final order will also require the fullscale dismantlement of today’s economic systems, particularly those of the classical economists: “among the marvels of the Mahdī…is that Adam Smith and David Ricardo will fall, along with their economic ‘clerics’ who have been made divine by the

Americans and Westerners.”587 With the dismantling of these failed economic systems,

“the Mahdī’s era will witness the true application of the divine, primordial science of economics, through which the whole world will realize that it had cheated itself by disregarding this great religion!” 588

What is the structure of this “divine, primordial” economic system? Dā’ūd outlines a structure that can perhaps best be described as ‘spiritualized’ market-socialism.

As this term suggests, Dā’ūd’s vision combines two basic systems—free-market economics, and socialism—yet both will spiritualized and thus distinct from their contemporary corollaries. As to the free-market dimension, Dā’ūd emphasizes that “the government of the Prophetic House is based on the principle of economic freedom…its economic foundation is freedom of the market, free competition, individual and societial initiative, respect for private ownership.”589 This freedom means that “there will be no

586 al-Mafājāt at 426. 587 al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 283. 588 Ibid. 589 Dawlat at 67. 167

ideological compulsion as the capitalists, and before them the communists, committed. 590

It is thus through free-market forces of supply and demand that the agricultural and scientific innoviations, described above, will catalyze the overall economy, for

“[technological] innovation is the catalyst of all historical, political, and economic progress, and the Mahdī’s era is one of Qur’ānic innovations, and thus the spreading of the means of production, whereby supply will create demand.”591 Yet the spiritualization of the free-market means that the economy “will not, of course, operate through a magical cane that whips things into shape, but rather through…morality based on the

‘fear of God,’ and the concept in Qur’ān [7:96] that ‘if the people…had believed and kept from evil, surely We would have opened for them blessings from the sky and from the earth.’”592 Participants in the free-market, therefore, will, out of piety and fear of God, freely choose to exercise restraint, moderation, and fairness in all their dealings, such that

“the mode of consumption will not be extravagant and haughty, in the conspicuous manner that derives from [contemporary] Western bourgeoisie.” 593 This individual restraint and morality also means that “there will be no impudent exhaustion and contamination of environmental resources…or the consumption of wealth in a manner that neglects…what God has permitted.”594

On the other hand, the socialist dimension of Dā’ūd’s vision means that the government will play a critical role in regulation of the final economy, for the free-market and “financial economics alone will not fulfill the Islamic order, but will merely comprise

590 Dawlat at 65. 591 al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 283. 592 Dawlat at 65. 593 Ibid. 594 Ibid. 168

its base.”595 Indeed, it is due to the need for regulation of the economy that Dā’ūd is particularly critical of the proponents of classical economics—particularly Adam Smith and David Ricardo—for they espoused doctrines of “eternal nature of the capitalist system which, on its own accord, moves from one success to another, without the need for intervention in order to restrain its influence, such that this system attains the status of being an eternal standard.”596 In contrast, through the socialist element of the final order,

“economic development will benefit the people by providing freedom from need, poverty, exploitation, and one-directional subordination by the ‘invisible hand,’ which gives from its right hand, then, with its left hand, lavishly consumes what it just gave.”597 Yet the spiritualization of the socialist element means that this regulation will adhere to Islamic spiritual principles—for “the government of the Prophetic House is charitable in the comprehensive sense of promoting [universal] prosperity, religious belief, and love. It will order relationships in a manner that will actualize the form that Prophet Muḥammad envisioned [in the tradition]—that the believers’ relationship to each other is like the different parts of a building that support each other.”598

How, specifically, will the government regulate the economy? In some statements,

Dā’ūd suggests a minimal degree of government intervention: “[in] the government of the

Prophetic House…there will be no direct government interference in economic activity, except for prohibiting that which God has prohibited, or to prohibit transactions that are forbidden due to unjust enrichment.”599 Yet other statements of Dā’ūd suggest a much more active regulatory role. To begin with, the global government will ensure universal

595 al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 283. 596 Ibid. 597 Dawlat at 65. 598 Ibid. 599 Dawlat at 65. 169

employment, particularly through providing new work opportunities presented by the new sciences of technologies: “in the Mahdī’s era, the global problem of unemployment will be solved…there will be no difficulty in creating jobs for those who are able…for work revolves around means of production and administration of plans…”600 To this end,

Dā’ūd explains that the Mahdī will begin providing employment opportunities even before the global apocalyptic wars have ended—that is, prior to the inauguration of the global government. These initial employment opportunities will particularly benefit the

Americans and Europeans, whose countries will, at that time, be plagued with economic inflation, 601 resulting in widespread joblessness and mass poverty: “prior to [the

Mahdī’s] conquest of Europe, swarms of European youth, who will have reached level of destitution, will come to his luminous lands in search of employment... and Mahdī will employ them straight away.”602

The government will also play a central role in the gathering and redistribution of wealth and resources. On the one hand, it will generate revenue not only from the natural resources unlocked by the new Qur’ānic technologies, but also through tax revenues.

Presumably, the proceeds of such taxation will be considerable, particularly the income tax gathered after the establishment of universal employment. In any event, the taxation system will, of course, be equitable, such that “there will be no wrongful taxation of the cities’ poorer regions, or of the remote countrysides, without the provision of

[reciprocal] services…” 603 On the other hand, the government will redistribute the wealth that it gathers, for its structure as a confederation (described in Chapter One)

600 al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 282-283. 601 Ibid. 602 Ibid. 603 Dawlat at 68. 170

“embodies the principle that ‘wealth encompasses all,’ whereby dispersed countries will be under the leadership of a greater polity, and the wealth of the Muslims will be expended for the well-being of [all] the Muslims.”604 This redistribution, however, will not aim to completely eliminate disparities of wealth within the society, but rather to eliminate the extremes of wealth and poverty—or, in Dā’ūd’s words, to eliminate “the abyss [that currently persists] between owners and non-owners.”605 In other words, even in the final world order, there will continue to be varying degrees of individual wealth, but there will be harmony and a “spirit of cooperation” between the “richer and the poorer.”606

More particularly, this wealth redistribution will occur through a system that will resemble, yet will be distinct from, the prevailing practice of social security, which Dā’ūd defines as “the [individuals’] beneficial participation through contributions to the sovereign, or to a specific institution thereof, which then bestows it as social security in whatever form it may be.”607 This current system of mandatory contributions, however, is inherently problematic, because it is tantamount to repayment of a debt or loan (thus violating the Islamic prohibition on unjust enrichment), not to mention that it is discriminatory because not all individuals can afford to make the necessary contributions.608 Therefore, “the government of the Prophetic House will eliminate the prevailing practice of social security because it is flawed…[and instead] will employ an

Islamically-licit substitute which has two civilized and humane features.” 609 The first

604 al-Mafājāt at 310. 605 al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 283. 606 Dawlat at 69. 607 Ibid. 608 Ibid. 609 Ibid. 171

feature is that every individual who is in need will be guaranteed proceeds, regardless of whether he or she had made contributions: “first is a social guarantee concerning individual bail, wealth, and possessions, because this is the government’s duty towards every one of its citizens, regardless of whether it receives any levy, income deduction, or advanced contribution from the citizen—for the government is obliged to assist the needy in all necessary situations, without such assistance taking the form of a debt or loan.” 610

The second characteristic is that funds will be gathered and distributed in accordance with the cooperative structure of takāful, 611 for “the government will implement social takāful…[reflecting] society’s duty to have a spirit of cooperation.”612

Although Dā’ūd does not elaborate on further economic structures, he does posit a general principle according to which any further structures would operate. This principle is that all economic structures and mechanisms, whether pertaining to the gathering, management, or redistribution of wealth, will need to harmonize means with ultimate ends. More specifically, all features within Dā’ūd’s vision of spiritualized market- socialism must ensure that humanity and religious values are never sacrificed in the pursuit of economic aims: “in the government of House of Prophet, under the leadership of the Mahdī…there will be no absolute disconnect between the means that are employed and the ends [that are achieved]…because the former will be in harmony with the latter; for example, the end goal of labors and innovation is not only to produce particular products, but is also…to make further scientific discoveries, as well as to [promote] a faithful character and a divine culture. Thus, in the [economic] order of the government

610 Ibid. 611 A system wherein individuals make cooperative contributions to a shared pool of funds to be used for reimbursement in events of loss. 612 Ibid. 172

of the Prophetic House, there will be no absolute, or even partial, disconnect between the powers of production and the relationships of production, for man is both the former and the latter—nay, he is even as the ‘ultimate’ end, because he is God's designated caliph.”613

In summary, the final economic system will fulfill man’s potential of being caliph over the earth—not only through agricultural, scientific, and technological breakthroughs, but also through proper wealth management within an economic system of ‘spiritualized’ market-socialism. Its free-market dimension will, on the one hand, guarantee the proper incentives for scientific innovation to continue, and will also result in a natural variability in levels of individual wealth. On the other hand, the spiritualization of the market will translate into individuals transacting with restraint, moderation, and fairness in all their economic dealings. The socialist dimension means that the government will play an active role in economic regulation, but this regulation will proceed according to Islamic spiritual principles. More particularly, the government will guarantee universal employment, will levy taxes in an equitable manner, and will redistribute wealth equitably. This redistribution will largely occur through a takāful-based program, resembling social security, which will provide a guaranteed, financial safety net to all of humanity and will thereby eliminate extreme wealth disparities. Through this economy of spiritualized market-socialism, the tropes of universal economic justice and prosperity, common to virtually all theorists, will be realized, such that “in the government of the

Prophetic House, there will be neither the need, nor even the opportunity to commit illicit actions, including cheating, gambling, unjust enrichment [riba], monopolizing,

613 Ibid at 65. 173

exploitation, or theft of others’ possessions…rather…there will be so much abundance that won't be all these bad actions—even spending zakāt will be difficult because there won't exist those in need of it!”614

B. Shī’ite Discourses

1. Revanchism

Within Shī’ism, the default orientation attributes material prosperity first and foremost to agricultural boom, often described as miraculous rather than practical in nature. Typical of this tendency is Amīnī’s account, which attributes material prosperity primarily to agricultural boom, noting that in the final world order, “there will be plenty of rain to cause the earth to become lush with greenery and there will be all kinds of grains and fruits in abundance.”615 Though this agricultural boom is due to primarily to increased rain, he does, in passing, acknowledge the role of human efforts and innovation, noting that “necessary improvements will be introduced in agricultural methods.”616

Aside from agricultural factors, he also attributes material prosperity to advances in general sciences and technologies—for after all, “during the Mahdī’s era, human reason will have reached perfection”—but he does not specify these advances, noting that “our

[present] knowledge about the future events of the world is limited; nor do we know in any detailed manner about…its technological enterprise.”617 Nonetheless, he assures us that the future scientists, “in order to compensate for the [contemporary] abuse of their scientific contributions, will see no other way but to respond to the call of the Mahdī to

614 Dawlat at 66. 615 Amīnī at 232-233. 616 Ibid. 617 Ibid. 174

fight for justice and work for the good of the peoples of the world.”618 Beyond these sparse statements regarding agricultural and technological sources of prosperity, Amīnī offers no commentary on fundamental changes to the economic system—aside from the negative statement that “all the wealth that is currently being used to produce…weapons could then be diverted for the elimination of poverty, the advancement of education and the well-being of humankind.”619 Rather than detailing the economic system—whether capitalist, communist, or otherwise, he merely gives the assurance that in the final world order, “the economic condition of the people will improve enormously.”620

Another account is that of Kūrānī, which oddly de-emphasizes agricultural sources of prosperity, but provides marginally more detail on new technologies, attributing some to human efforts (rather than miraculous causes), and vaguely implying the possibility of a socialist, if not communist structure. He begins with the standard emphasis on unprecedented prosperity, noting that the Mahdī’s role is not only political, but also “includes establishing the great material development of human life, before which the [material] bounties of previous eras can not compare.”621 What are causes of this unprecedented material development? Kūrānī mentions new breakthroughs in

“knowledge, communications, and economics,” noting that “some of these derive from

[the Mahdī’s] miracles and wonders, while many others spring from sciences, and are fruits of God's laws.” 622 As to the new sciences, Kūrānī suggests, by interpreting several traditions, that these will include “means of space travel to planets other than ours…for there are planets in the heavens with creatures other than human beings, angels, and

618 Ibid. 619 Ibid. 620 Ibid. 621 Kūrānī at 255. 622 Ibid at 265. 175

jinn.” 623 Unfortunately, Kūrānī does not explicitly define the overarching economic system, but a socialist, if not communist, structure can perhaps be inferred from his statements. For instance, after commenting on a particular tradition, he mentions that the economy will include a “public treasury from which distributions will be made to the population every six months, while edible foodstuffs will be distributed every two weeks.”624 However, he also suggests that the final economy will be “without money

[naqd] because the people will, desiring nearness to God, labor to serve one another, and will prayerfully receive what they need from one another.”625 Beyond these few assertions, he echoes Amīnī in his conclusory statement that, whatever the structure of the economy might be, it will involve “economic factors that confer unprecedented material bounties upon the people in his time—which is one of the factors that influences them to accept him.”626

Another account is that of Tabasī, who likewise attributes prosperity to miraculous agricultural and technical advances (albeit with greater commentary), and similarly falls short in detailing the structure of the final economy and contrasting it with other economic systems. Tabasī’s emphasis on economic prosperity is standard, and repeated in statements such as, “one of the features of the Mahdī’s era is that greed and covetousness will be wiped away and the spirit of freedom from want will be instilled in men.”627 To this end, after reviewing several traditions, Tabasī emphasizes that “this spiritual transformation will not be confined to a particular group. In fact, this inner

623 Ibid at 269. 624 Ibid at 261. 625 Ibid. 626 Ibid at 263. 627 Tabasī at 174-175. 176

change will happen to all human beings.”628 Furthermore, he clarifies that although there will be material plenty, “riches and freedom from want is not the point—rather, it is magnanimity and inner freedom from want. It is possible for a man to be poor but has inner freedom from want.” 629 Thus, “in the government of the Imām, money and wealth will become so insignificant and trivial for the people that for them asking for such will be regarded as a sign of meanness and vileness of nature.”630

As to the sources of this material prosperity, Tabasī echoes the emphasisis on agriculture, but adds further detail. He explains that in the final government, “one of the sectors that will experience considerable transformation…is the agricultural sector…after the people had tasted the pain of scant rain, long draughts, lack of foodstuffs, the destruction of sown fields, and a lack of news about domesticated animals and animal husbandry…a tremendous transformation in agriculture will occur and foodstuffs will become abundant in society.”631 To some extent, this agricultural boom will be practical rather than miraculous in nature, for “since there will be no more war at that time, people will therefore utilize instruments and industries intended for use in war for agricultural activities.”632 But its primary causes will, indeed, be miraculous and divine in nature. For instance, in the domain of animal husbandry, Tabasī recalls several traditions confirming not only the abundance of such animals, but also that “[a]fter the killing of the Antichrist, God will bestow blessings on the herds of animals so much so that a young camel (which is at the age of preparation for pregnancy) would be able to satisfy a number of people; a calf would be the enough food for an entire tribe; and a

628 Ibid. 629 Ibid. 630 Ibid at 167. 631 Ibid at 192. 632 Ibid at 122. 177

goat would be enough to feed a certain number of people.”633 Similarly, concerning agricultural produce, “the rain would change…Thereafter, divine grace will descend opportunely upon the people, and as a result, the blessings of God for them will become abundant to such an extent that it would seem as if they had received ten years of produce in one day…thereafter, accordingly, great blessings will envelop the people, encompassing flora and fauna as well. Plains, mountains and deserts, and perennially barren fields will become verdant; the divine blessings will be so bountiful that the people would wish for a new life for the dead.” Beyond this, Tabasī emphasizes that crops will be of better “quality,” containing much more nutrition, and to this end he recites a tradition stating that “a single pomegranate will satisfy many persons, while a bunch of grapes will be consumed by many (and satiate them).”634

Aside from agricultural boom, Tabasī echoes Amīnī and Kūrānī in attributing material prosperity to scientific and technological advances. Of course, the underlying source of this scientific leap is also divine and miraculous in nature, for it concerns the divine bounties of the Mahdī’s era, as expressed in the tradition regarding the Mahdī and the 25 out of 27 letters—for “it can be deduced from this ḥadīth that although mankind progresses in terms of knowledge and learning, in the period of the Mahdī it will suddenly attain growth and expansion thirteen times more…” 635 Tabasī therefore concludes that “a government whose…doors of knowledge which have opened thirteen times more than that of the prophets and the awliyā’ (saints) will naturally make tremendous progress in knowledge and will bring about remarkable transformations in

633 Ibid at 196. 634 Ibid at 194. 635 Ibid at 166-167. 178

the world of culture, science and technology. In other words, the understanding of the science and knowledge that the Imām of the Age will bring about for the people cannot be compared with the progress that mankind has so far attained…In the fields of technology and industry, there will also be astounding advancements.” 636 Likewise, Tabasī emphasizes that “the ḥadīths show the world during the period of the Imām of the Age as a civilized world at the apex of power and scientific advancement. In general, the state of technology at that time will be far more advanced than that of the present day just as today’s technology is astoundingly different from that of past centuries.”637

However, Tabasī is careful to not only emphasize the great technical and scientific prowess of the final world order, but to underscore the fact that this technology will be used to advance moral and spiritual ends. As he explains, “[t]he most fundamental distinction between the advancement at the time of al-Mahdī with that of the present is that in our time the advancement of science and technology has been leading to the degeneration of the culture and morality of human society and the more human beings make advancements in science the farther they move from humanity and the more they head toward corruption, retrogression and annihilation. During the period of al-Mahdī, however, the situation will be different. While mankind will be attaining the highest growth in science and technology, to the same extent it will also be achieving the loftiest moral goals and human perfection.”638

Tabasī then details a number of new technologies in the domains of communications, transportation, and information. As to communications technology, he

636 Ibid. 637 Ibid. 638 Ibid. 179

recounts a tradition stating that in the Mahdī’s era, a believer in the east can see his brother in the west—explaining that “this ḥadīth can be better understood by taking into account the invention of video-telephones. It is not clear, however, if this means of communication will be introduced in the entire world so that the people could use it conveniently. It is also possible that a more advanced system will replace it, or there is another means which is beyond all these mentioned things.”639 Likewise, he recounts several other traditions, and then explains that “there are two probabilities in this regard:

(1) a system of broadcasting three dimensional images will be spread all over the world at that time, and (2) a more advanced system which will replace the existing one will be utilized in seeing him, or the ḥadīth points to a miracle to be preformed by the Imām.”640

As to transportation technology, Tabasī suggests that “man will ride on the clouds in traveling, flying from one direction to another”—which he deduces from the tradition stating that “communities…shall come, under whose feet the earth can be traversed and for whom the doors of the world will be opened… The earth can be traversed in less than the blink of an eye so much so that if any of them wants to traverse the world from east to west in an hour, they would be able to do this.”641 As for information technology, two breakthroughs will occur. First, ordinary items will report information to their owners— as suggested in the tradition that “the Day of Resurrection shall not come to pass unless one’s shoe, walking stick or staff would report to him what his family had done after going out of his home.”642 Second will be advanced, government surveillance techniques, as suggested in the tradition that, “the degree of the Imām’s awareness of the people

639 Ibid at 169. 640 Ibid. 641 Ibid at 166. 642 Ibid at 170. 180

would be such that if a person would speak inside his house he would be afraid lest the walls of his house gave report and bore witness.”643 In interpreting this tradition, Tabasī notes that “this probably indicates the amazing advancement of the system of information during the period of the Imām of the Time. Of course, any government that will rule over the entire world will need a complex system and structure of information. Similarly, it is also possible that it refers to the apparent purport of the ḥadīth, i.e. the wall itself would give a report.”644

Aside from communications, transportation, and information technologies, Tabasī also emphasizes great scientific advances in the fields of medicine and public health. This is particularly significant due to Tabasī’s prediction that prior to the Mahdī’s Advent, there will be a major “deterioration of health conditions and the inefficiency of treatment measures…leading to the spread of contagious diseases and sudden death throughout the world; the spread of ailments such as leprosy, plague, paralysis, blindness, heart failure, and hundreds of others will be so threatening to the lives of people that it would seem as if everyone was waiting for certain death without any hope for a longer life.”645 These dismal conditions, Tabasī explains, will result from various factors, including environmental pollution, chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons, the decay of corpses, as well as “psychological and emotional causes.”646 In the final government, however, human health will attain its “highest and ideal level.”647 In part, this will be due to structural changes already mentioned—such as public health policies (outlined in Chapter

Two), as well as “extinguishing the flames of war; peace of mind; the preservation of

643 Ibid. 644 Ibid. 645 Ibid at 197. 646 Ibid. 647 Ibid at 199. 181

mental health…and the blossoming of agriculture and animal husbandry providing proper nourishment for people.”648 But beyond this, health advances will also be due to

“astounding, quantum leaps in…medical science.” 649 Although Tabasī does not offer details of the advances in medical science, the end result is that “lifespans will become…much longer… diseases will decrease such that only a few individuals will be afflicted with sickness...diverse sicknesses will be cured within a very short period of time…In fact, it can be said that no ailment would be found during the [personal] rule of the Imām.”650

Within what type of economic system will this agricultural and technological boom will occur? In one instance, Tabasī hints at the presence of a new economic system—for “programs and laws will be made and implemented in such a way that the people will see themselves in total financial and social security.” 651 Yet rather than detailing these economic programs, and the manner in which they ensure financial security, he merely lists several features of a possible system. First, the final economy will be commercial in nature and market-based, for “since the people during the rule of the Imām of the Age will experience good economic conditions, commerce will flourish and markets will be active.”652 Second, “the people will have incomes through various means,” and will, out of “intellectual maturity…without any force or pressure…pay taxes on their income,” in the form of zakāt and khums, to the global government.653 Fourth, from these and other proceeds, “the government will have a huge, aggregate sum and will

648 Ibid. 649 Ibid. 650 Ibid at 200. 651 Ibid at 177. 652 Ibid at 196. 653 Ibid at 188 . 182

be able to undertake any measure of reform and public service.”654 Fifth, even after the government’s public expenditures, its “wealth will exceed consumption; in other words…apart from having no budget deficit, it will have surplus income.”655 Sixth, the government will “distribute the public treasury to the people evenly,”656 particularly through “gifts to the people twice a year…and salaries twice a month.”657 Seventh, “in addition to the right that every Muslim has with respect to his share in the public treasury,” the government will also “pay off the debts of all debtors” and will “pay particular attention to the deprived and weak, giving them more property.”658 As a result, people will have “a comfortable and easy life and they will live while being free from want.”659

This account, of course, gives rise to numerous unanswered questions as to the nature and underlying structure of the final economy. To what extent will the market— and commerce in general—be free versus regulated? Does the government’s great charity eliminate the need for individuals to labor in occupations and enterprise? Or, does the the fact that individuals have “various means” of income aside from government grants suggest that there will be a labor force? Does government charity entirely level all wealth disparities, or will there continue to be various degrees of wealth in the world?

Rather than expounding an economic structure that can reconcile these questions,

Tabasī emphasizes the miraculous agricultural and technological booms as sufficient in themselves for ensuring universal prosperity; an elaborate economic system is, in other

654 Ibid. 655 Ibid at 187. 656 Ibid at 186. 657 Ibid at 188. 658 Ibid at 189. 659 Ibid at 175. 183

words, unnecessary. This is evident in his statement that “if a government is supported up by God and implements the divine laws and rules in the society…As a result, the

[material] favors of God will be showered on His servants from all directions.”660 This principle means that economic prosperity derives from miraculous divine bounty released by human morality—rather than by economic systems per se. He explains this: “In the government of al-Mahdī in which the people will direct their steps toward submission to

God and obedience to the Proof of Allah, there will be no more reason for the sky and earth to withhold their blessings from the servants of God. As such, seasonal rains will pour; rivers will become full of flowing water; the soil will become fertile; agriculture will bloom; gardens will become green and full of fruits; desert climates in places such as

Mecca and Medina which had never become verdant will at once turn into palm-groves; and animal husbandry will flourish. The society’s economy will boom; poverty and indigence will be wiped out; there will be progress everywhere, and commerce will flourish considerably.”661 The end result is the trope of material prosperity common to all theorists: “poverty and indigence will be uprooted from human society, and a needy person will be endowed with so many assets and wealth that he would be incapable of carrying them. The condition of the society will be such that those who are liable to pay zakāt will find difficulty in finding recipients entitled to it.”662

2. Idealism

Consistent with his temporal radicalism, Ṣadr explains that material prosperity will not emerge all at once within the final world order, but rather gradually, over the

660 Ibid at 185. 661 Ibid. 662 Ibid. 184

long course of time. At the outset of the global government, there will, indeed, continue to be poverty in various regions of the world. It is precisely for this reason that the Mahdī himself, as well as his administrators, will live as ascetics in their personal lives—“for it is necessary that in his personal life he represent the poorest and most famished individual in the whole world, and this behavior will also extend to…his special companions, the governers in the earth, because each one will be a just leader for a region of the earth, so it is necessary for him to materially represent, in his personal life, the lowliest individual in his region.”663 Although material prosperity will increase over the course of the Mahdī’s rule, it will not become universal during that time, for

“throughout the personal reign of the Mahdī, the effects of justice will gradually spread prosperity in the world, yet it’s likely that destitute individuals will remain in remote or underdeveloped regions of the world, and this reality therefore requires the Mahdī to retain this [ascetic] behavior throughout the length of his life—only the just, global government is able to eradicate that poverty, at the hands of its caliphs.”664 In short, “this great goal [of universal prosperity] will only be achieved after the Mahdī, in accordance with the system that he [entrusts] to the global rulers who succeed him.”665 Elsewhere,

Ṣadr reiterates that wealth and abundance will begin to accumulate during the Mahdī’s personal reign, but will not become universal until after him: “[e]ven if this abundance of wealth isn’t [fully] achieved during the life of the Mahdī…it has its beginning in none

663 Ibid at 548. 664 Ibid. 665 Ibid. 185

other than during the period of the Mahdī himself in his global government, and this abundance continues after him, for centuries, over the course of time.”666

What will be the underlying sources of this material prosperity? Ṣadr’s account emphasizes the standard tropes of agriculture and mining found in the traditions, but his most distinctive feature is rejecting the miraculous nature of these sources, and attributing them, instead, to the practical results of human efforts and government planning. To this end, Ṣadr poses the rhetorical question, “what causes the accumulation and abundance of wealth in the Mahdīst government, whether at the individual or government level?”—in response to which he considers two possibilities.667 The first possibility, favored by the

Shī’ite majority, is that of miracles, which Ṣadr rejects: “[t]he first thesis is that wealth piles up via miracles, by way of the Mahdī’s blessings and his call, but this thesis faces several obstacles, of which we’ll mention two. First, insofar as it is possible to furnish the wealth in natural ways, this thesis violates the rules concerning of miracles…The second obstacle is that the context of the ḥadīths suggests that the accumulation and abundance of wealth derive from the justice of the order…To express this in another way: if wealth results from miracles and not from the just system, then this is contrary to the outward meaning of the ḥadīths, so this thesis is therefore unsound..”668 Having rejected this first thesis of miracles, Ṣadr presents the second thesis, which he approves of: “[t]he second thesis is that the government furnishes wealth via plans that are undertaken in

666 Ibid at 562. 667 Ibid at 558-559. 668 Ibid. 186

agriculture, industry, mining, and other forms of investment—causing wealth to flow to both the government and the individual.” 669

More specifically, the practical, rather than miraculous, programs resulting in material prosperity will all depend upon a common feature: human labor. Ṣadr addresses the question of human labor by rejecting the false dichotomy which associates labor with materialism and as separate from spirituality. He first formulates this false dichotomy in the following manner, “it might occur to the mind that, insofar as the achievement of wealth and prosperity derives from an increase in labor, this must be inversely proportionate to the goal, because increasing labor for material well-being detracts from efforts that could otherwise be expended towards character-building and worship—and therefore, our claim must be false that the improvement of material prosperity contributes to the [overall] educational process.”670 Ṣadr then refutes this hypothetical objection by equating work with worship: “[t]he response to this [objection] is very clear to whoever comprehends true concepts of worship and labor—for he will find the claim that worship detracts from labor to be absurd, given that worship itself is the important method for achieving the desired economic prosperity…and conversely, he will find the claim that labor detracts from worship to be absurd, since it is the principle goal of life. In the end, the two occur together in the path towards the highest human goal.”671 This unity of work and worship has two implications within the final world order. First, work and worship will be “harmonized” so that it will be impossible for work to become an

669 Ibid. 670 Ibid at 107-108. 671 Ibid. 187

obstacle to worship.672 Secondly “work itself can be worship, if it occurs in the path of worship and in accordance with the fully just order. At that moment it becomes among the most virtuous form of worship in the relationship between the individual and others

(and by this worship we do not mean the particular individual rites pertaining to the individual’s relationship with God)...But this is on the condition that the individual who labors be aware of this intimate relationship, and has this as his goal…and this awareness is naturally achieved within the just government’s administration of education.” 673

Ṣadr then provides somewhat more detail as to these government programs— particularly in the agricultural and mining sectors. As to the agricultural domain, he asks,

“[w]hat is the causal element for this comprehensive agricultural revolution?”674 His answer is “the detailed legislative and practical program which the Mahdī follows in his government for attaining this amazing agricultural output.” 675 For example, Ṣadr interprets a number of traditions to mean that the Mahdī will implement global irrigation projects, noting that although the tradition in question mentioned only particular methods and regions, this was merely “in accordance with ancient understanding, so we can imagine the extent of the rivers and channels that are stretched through the world’s deserts for irrigation, and the extent of the agricultural apparatus which people are permitted to use freely, for assisting the speed and huge scale of output.”676 He then emphasizes that this “agricultural revolution” will have three principal consequences: (i) distribution of produce to people at a reduced, or even at a free, price, presumably due to

672 Ibid. 673 Ibid. 674 Ibid at 552. 675 Ibid. 676 Ibid. 188

the increased supply; (ii) the provision of employment to “millions of households who were poor and afflicted during the time prior to the Advent”; and the “provision of great opportunities for supplying basic needs, free-of-cost.”677

Likewise, the boom in the mining sector will not be due to the miraculous surfacing of the contents of mines to the earth’s surface, but rather “due their their being extracted with tools, via a specific plan and close attention from the government, such that the mines furnish their ore as a result of the many hands that are involved inindustry.”678 More particularly, mining activities will be carried out through public- private partnership. The private side, on the one hand, comprises the “thousands of laborors in the mines, and they will become owners of an enormous quantity of the extracted ore.”679 The public side, on the other hand, is the government, which will

“furnish the tools for extraction according to the Islamic principle [al-ḥukm] which states that whosoever extracts anything from the mines must pay a fifth [khums] to the poor, and will then own the remainder.” 680 These khums payments, Ṣadr notes, will thus

“provide for the needs of millions who were formerly poor.” 681 This means, in the aggregate, that “contrary to the [contemporary] positive laws that consider [extracted ore] to all be government property, the Mahdī will render individuals to be the owners” – yet “this [ownership] will be spread throughout the hands of thousands rather than concentrated in the hands of a few.”682 This ownership of these thousands, however, will be limited in accordance with the principle that “no individual who works in mining has

677 Ibid at 553. 678 Ibid at 556-557. 679 Ibid. 680 Ibid. 681 Ibid. 682 Ibid. 189

the right to enrich himself through others, and as soon as his wealth reaches the specified limit which furnishes his and his family’s annual needs (according to their social status), then the government prevents him from acquiring any extra extracted ore—so either he must retire from work and allow others to extract, that they too may also own that amount, or he can work, but the fruits thereof will directly revert to the government.”683

Material prosperity will, of course, not only derive from mining and agriculture, but also from additional industrial sectors, as well as from advances in sciences and technologies. Although Ṣadr does not specify the additional industrial sectors, he suggests that the costs—particularly labor costs—of these other industries will, to a large extent, be funded by the government’s mining proceeds: “the government will own the surplus of ore which exceeds the workers’ portions, and this is a great amount, many multiples greater than the aggregate owned by the laborers. The government will allocate this amount to its industries in order to fill their labor needs—and in this way, mining...directly and indirectly benefits millions of people, and enriches millions of families in the world.”684 Likewise, although Ṣadr does not state it explicitly, we can assume that the boom which will occur in sciences and technologies will be the practical result of the government’s investment of surplus. Ṣadr acknowledges the difficulty of gleaning details of these scientific advances from the ḥadīth reports, “because there wasn’t a trace of industry or modern inventions in that nascent society, so the reports could not mention them clearly, or state their names and qualities.”685 Therefore, the reports mentioned “symbolic terms that were metaphors for modern apparati both within

683 Ibid. 684 Ibid. 685 Ibid at 582. 190

the Mahdī’s government, and prior to the Mahdī’s Advent (i.e. the industry of our current era”).686 Ṣadr begins by interpreting traditions that predict the science and technology of this “current era.” To this end, he primarily emphasizes military technology, including: weapons such atomic missiles and hydrogen bombs; means of transportation, such as submarines, ships, airplanes, and other “modern means of ground and air transport”; and communications technology, including television, satellite broadcasting, and

“amplification” methods.687

As impressive as these technologies of the “current era” may be, the final government will far surpass this level, and will “attain unto..the loftiest and most precise heights of the industries, which will be employed in order to further the lofty aims of the government…”688 Ṣadr details these technologies of the final government by interpreting a separate set of traditions.689 To begin with, the final government will not only continue to use television, but “the Mahdīst government might undertake the creation of other instruments to render possible exchange of visions and speech together, relative to the individuals – nay for groups as well.”690 Although Ṣadr penned these lines prior to the invention of today’s video-equipped smartphones, he nonetheless noted that, “in the current age we have a smaller model of that, namely the ‘video-telephone,’ which has been discovered, although it thus far has not been widely distributed throughout the world.”691 These audio-visual technologies will be employed, first and foremost, by the

Mahdī himself, for “the Mahdī himself will use it, perhaps even more than it was used

686 Ibid at 581. 687 Ibid at 582-585. 688 Ibid. 689 Ibid at 585-590. 690 Ibid. 691 Ibid. 191

prior to him.”692 This will in fact fulfill a tradition which predicts that all people will directly see the Mahdī despite his distance, for the Mahdī “remains in his location, but the live, televised-broadcast causes them to hear his words and see him, but this isn’t in the report because of the impossibility of the reports’ description of television.”693 But

“usage of this broadcasting isn’t limited to the Mahdī, but rather includes the other brothers in faith, such that we see ‘in the era of the Qā’im, the believer in the East will see his brother in the West, and vice versa.’” 694 Separately, Ṣadr explains that the tradition stating that ‘God summons wind’ refers to advances in audio-surveillance technology, whereby “the Mahdī’s government will employ an intelligence apparatus against criminals and deviants, ‘such that one of them speaks in his house and fears that the wall will see him.’”695 Finally, there will likely be advances in aviation technology, and these advances will be employed by the Mahdī, his administrators, and the rest of humanity.696

These accounts of agriculture, mining, and technology—particularly their non- miraculous nature and their dependence upon ordinary labor and planning—all beg the further question: what is the overarching economic system within the final world order?

Echoing the various Sunnī and Shī’ite theorists considered in this study, Ṣadr rejects all secular economic systems, for in addressing the question of whether the final economy

“resembles prior orders, such as capitalism, socialism, and so forth,” he gives the categorical reply that “the Mahdī’s system is totally dissimilar and unlike any prior

692 Ibid. 693 Ibid. 694 Ibid. 695 Ibid. 696 Ibid. 192

system.”697 As mentioned earlier, one of the reasons for this negation is the inherent injustice of these previous systems, an injustice which manifests within “European-

American capitalism” as “colonialism,” and within communism as “intellectual assault.”698 A second reason that Ṣadr rejects these systems is their inherent materialism, for “all these other systems…are based upon materialism and the discarding of divine considerations, whether explicitly like in communism…or implicitly, as in capitalism.”699

Yet this sweeping rejection includes even that of the Prophet’s original economic system, as well as all later developments within Islamic economics. Thus, Ṣadr states that Islamic economics in its contemporary form is merely a “transitional [marḥalī] doctrinal-school for the training of humanity towards the era that would succeed it.” 700 More specifically,

“[t]he economic school of the global Mahdī government doesn’t necessarily resemble the economic school upon which Islamic economic principles are based during the period of the Occultation, i.e. our current time…for it is possible, nay clear, that it it will not endure in all of its [current] particulars after the Advent, even if it resembles it in general spirit, which is its connection to Islam—that is, to its Book and Sunna, and to its aims of justice and perfection.”701

While the rejection of secular as well as conventional Islamic economics is common to modal-moderatism in general, Ṣadr is the only one of the Shī’ite authors considered herein who goes beyond this mere negation of previous economic systems, and attempts a positive theory of the final economic system. Although he observes that

“the full details” of the economic system “are incomprehensible to man prior to the

697 Ibid at 87-89. 698 Ibid. 699 Ibid. 700 Ṣadr, Volume IV at 690. 701 Ibid. 193

Advent,”702 he nonetheless devotes the entirety of the fourth volume of his ‘Encyclopedia of the Mahdī’ —a volume comprising 867 pages—to the topic of the final economic system.703 As he explains therein, “we shall attempt…to understand some of the general details of the [economic] school that produces this great prosperity…with attempts at comparing it to the schools of Marxism and Capitalism, and with consideration to the fruits of these schools.”704 Before enumerating the doctrines of the final economic school, however, Ṣadr provides several caveats and points of clarification. First of all, he defines

“economic school” as “the sum of the economic concepts which, as an aggregate, describe what must or must not be done in economic discourse, whether in the market or otherwise.”705 Furthermore, his intent is not to present a comprehensive account of these concepts concerning the final economy, because “currently, we do not and must not claim that we have comprehended the entirety of the economic school—for the utmost hope is to

[merely] deduce some of its important dimensions in order to assist us in understanding the features of the promised government at that time.”706 Thus, in propounding his theory of the final economy, his intent is merely “to convey a general idea of the principles of the [final] economic school [al-aḥkām al-iqtiṣādī al-madhhabīyya], and their difference both from customary [Islamic] economic principles [aḥkām iqtiṣādī i’tīyādīyya] and from the [secular] science of political economy.”707 As to the first of these two comparisons,

Ṣadr explains that the final economic school “differs from customary economic principles in Islamic jurisprudence [fiqh] and positive law [qānūn], for even though they both imply

702 Ṣadr at 458. 703 See the Introduction to this Study for further details. 704 Ṣadr, Volume IV at 690. 705 Ibid at 710. 706 Ibid at 714. 707 Ibid at 709. 194

meanings of law [tashrī’] and justice, the principles of the [final economic school also] include a fundamental conceptual meaning strongly connected to a general understanding of life…whereas customary [Islamic] economic principles are [by themselves] far from this conceptual domain, and rather must combine with something extraneous in order to, as a result of the aggregate, reach…[this type of] conceptual meaning.”708 As to the second comparison: “the science of [political] economy…has no connection to legislation and justice, and thus differs from both of these two [Islamic] economic spheres. Rather, it merely enumerates or describes economic matters and phenomena in a particular market, resulting from particular experiences and events— such as the laws of supply and demand, the law of…labor… ensuring free capital in the market, and so forth!”709

After an extensive discussion of the “practical principles” of the final economy,

Ṣadr states the four main “conceptual doctrines” of the final economy. First is “the government’s right of dominion over all economic sectors.”710 This doctrine is in fact one of the manifestations of the government’s justice, for “intervention in all of society’s economic affairs is closely connected with the vital foundation of delivering humanity to its desired goal in the universal divine plan.”711 Ṣadr provides numerous examples of this doctrine, including: “government’s right to [resources] extracted from the earth…and its right to impose tax upon whoever it permits to work on the land; likewise, its dominion over all public property,…the land tax [kharāj], right to booty [ghanā’im], and the universal Islamic levies of khums and zakat; likewise, its authority over banks, including

708 Ibid at 710. 709 Ibid. 710 Ibid. 711 Ibid. 195

the divesting of their contents and the removal of illicit money from them; likewise, its authority over the surplus generated by individuals from crops, land, and mining, after their personal needs are met;….as well as other areas that are unnecessary to detail here.”712

Elsewhere, Ṣadr elaborates upon government authority over banks, noting that this is tantamount to establishment of an entirely new banking system: “the government will...establish a new banking system based on…the prohibition of unjustly-earned profit, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, prohibition of wealth gained in Islamically impermissible ways…If the new conditions are not duly met, the government removes the wealth from the banks and confiscates it, owing to it being of unknown ownership, and it then reverts to the Islamic government per Islamic law [ḥukm]. And if it is proven that wealth is registered [in the account of] somone other than its true owner, it will be returned to its owner. Through these means, the government will acquire great wealth, exceeding tens of millions, yet there will also remain a huge amount that will continue to belong to the [prior] owners, because they will have fulfilled the desired conditions.”713

Furthermore, Ṣadr emphasizes that the amount of wealth that the government generates in this way, though it will be considerable, will nonetheless be dwarfed by the wealth acquired from natural resources.714

The second conceptual doctrine of the final economic school is social welfare—or

“the government’s duty to provide economic assistance to the individual and to the

712 Ibid. 713 Ṣadr at 559. 714 Ibid. 196

collective.”715 Government dominion over the economy (i.e. the first conceptual doctrine) of course renders it capable of providing such social welfare, for “[w]ealth is furnished by the government via paths that are undertaken in agriculture, industry, mining, and other forms of investment, causing wealth to flow to both the government and to individuals. These projects render the global Mahdīst government self-sufficient—nay, production will be greater than needs…so a huge amount of surplus wealth will flow…”716 How will the government spend this surplus? This will occur in two stages.

The first stage aims at raising the level of human prosperity to the point where it becomes universal—i.e. all of humanity’s “basic needs” are met—for “whenever this [surplus] is spent, in whatever amount, it reverts, first, to basic needs.” 717 This will include “free distribution of wealth…to the needy, conferring land to individuals without extacting fees…and distribution of specific instruments and machines for agriculture, mining, and otherwise.”718 Although the government will “give charity money as it deems expedient,”

Ṣadr specifies that these charitable mechanisms will include “granting salaries twice a month, with additional amounts twice a year.”719 Furthermore, Ṣadr then predicts that

“the global government will implement a program of social insurance [al-ḍimān al- ijtimā’ī] and will establish charitable, industrial, and agricultural institutions…though the details of these are not currently knowable.”720

The second stage of social welfare begins“when primary and secondary basic needs, as well as educational needs, are all met throughout the entire world…at which

715 Ṣadr, Volume IV at 711. 716 Ṣadr at 558-559. 717 Ibid. 718 Ṣadr, Volume IV at 711. 719 Ibid at 698. 720 Ibid at 711. 197

point the surplus will have no specified target for its expenditure.” 721 Elsewhere, Ṣadr describes this as the stage in which “the methods and programs within the Mahdī’s government for making humanity happy and prosperous are stabilized—such that not a single poor person remains in the world, and no one longs for wealth.” 722 At this point, prophecies will be fulfilled, for the government will wish to “demonstrate this [feat] to all of humanity and to history, and will therefore implement a particular, temporary plan

[takhṭīṭ], which is to universally announce that whosoever wishes to take from the public surplus is free to take whatever amount he wishes. The people, however, will not accept to take from the wealth…at which point it will necessarily be proven that all individuals have become wealthy and prosperous, to such an extent that their greeds have been severed and all their wishes have become realized.”723 More particularly, this temporary plan will “begin with the Mahdī himself, in the central capital, to be followed by the rulers in each of the regions of the world, but the people’s response will be more or less the same in all those lands, even in those that had produced the customs of capitalist greed.”724 Given that there will be no more recipients for this surplus, Ṣadr explains that

“at that point the wealth can accumulate for assisting any region of the world that might be in need as a result of natural emergencies, such as floods, earthquakes, epidemics, and so forth—though the wealth will proportionately be much greater than the needs generated by such calamities.”725

The third conceptual doctrine is that of “limited [private] ownership”—i.e. ownership “with restrictions imposed on it, in a way that doesn’t harm others in the

721 Ṣadr at 558-560. 722 Ibid. 723 Ibid. 724 Ibid. 725 Ibid. 198

least.”726 This is in contrast both to Marxism, which “fully rejects ownership,” and to

Capitalism, which “asserts the necessity of unbridled ownership.”727 Ṣadr begins his exposition of this doctrine by emphasizing that “legality of private ownership is perhaps one of the clearest [economic] principles that will remain effective.”728 To begin with, private ownership is presupposed in a number of features attributed to the Mahdī’s era, including “inheritance, the Mahdī’s distribution of wealth, and other things which are incomprehensible without the concept of private ownership.” 729 But the strongest evidence for private property lies within the explicit text of the Qur’ān itself, which permits “sale transactions” [al-bay’], and which thereby presupposes the existence of markets. Sale transactions and the presence of markets, in turn, presume the legitimacy of private ownership, for “if we limit [sale] transactions to only government transactions in public property, then who will be the counterparty to the government in such transactions…given that the government will be global and therefore the only one in the arena? Thus, in that era it would be meaningless for the government to ‘transact’ unless there be private individuals [as counterparty]. Therefore, because [sale] transactions will exist, there will necessarily be private ownership.”730 Furthermore, Ṣadr explains that all of the “Qur’ānic rules, laws, and economic principles, will be implemented within the global government…thus, sale transactions will remain the principal transaction within the market—or, more precisely, erelong the sale transaction will be made sound and effective within the global government, even if the society doesn’t have a great need for it,

726 Ṣadr, Volume IV at 711. 727 Ibid at 704, 712. 728 Ibid at 702. 729 Ibid at 704. 730 Ibid. 199

due to reaching a state of great prosperity.”731 However, Ṣadr points out that it is quite possible that the customary form of sale transactions will differ in the final economy, for

Qur’ānic verses “confirm the validity of transactional contracts generally…[but] forms of transactions change from age-to-age, so it is possible that there will be new forms of transactions in the global government, rendered valid through the Mahdī’s legislation.”732

On the other hand, private ownership will not be unbridled, but will exist within clear limits. Ṣadr acknowledges that this principle is, of course, already common in various forms within contemporary economic systems—such as “the prohibition on monopolies, which is fixed within our current jurisprudence in relation to foodstuff, such as certain seeds and salt, for it is prohibited to acquire a monopoly over them…and likewise monopoly is prohibited in relation to all the resources of the collective…and monopoly is likewise prohibited concerning any resources that might otherwise be withheld from the just, Islamic government.”733 Yet within the final government, the limitations on private property will extend far beyond mere prohibitions on monopolies.

Ṣadr elaborates on this in various ways, including by commenting on several traditions, concluding that “these reports indicate that in the era of Occultation, parties to transactions may claim ownership over the earth or its products—but erelong his status will not remain as such, for the [Mahdī’s] global government will seize the earth from them and…distribute it equitably to others.”734 Elsewhere, he enumerates a detailed list

731 Ibid at 698. 732 Ibid at 699. 733 Ibid at 707. 734 Ibid at 693. 200

on the various limitations that will be imposed on private ownership within the final economy:

“[L]imitations [on private ownership] will manifest in a number of the principles that we have reviewed, such as: prohibition of monopoly; prohibition on unjust enrichment; prohibition on trade-profit; prohibition on acquiring wealth through illicit means; prohibition on exclusive inheritance to a designated heir if there be additional, common heirs, and the [corollary] requirement to distribute wealth to all inheritors; the government’s right to limit the amount that individuals can acquire from lawful, common goods, [such as] mines and agriculture. . . As well as the prohibition on [individuals] acquiring surplus amounts of natural sources and mines (constituting a temporary legislation and therefore distinct from the government limitation on such amounts, which comprises part of the foundational legislation). And all of these principles confirm the restriction on ownership.”735

Additionally, Ṣadr emphasizes the role of government in approving modes of acquisition that consummate in private ownership, noting that these modes “are fixed within the rules of Islamic jurisprudence of the current age, some of which will remain fixed in the global government.” 736 In particular, he mentions “ownership through acquisition” in the case of scarce goods, mines, hunting, wood, and fields—as well as the receipt of government licenses that grant ownership, which will at times be “conditioned on paying a portion of it to the government, to the needy, or to the public institutions, and so forth.”737

Despite affirming this concept of limited private ownership, Ṣadr predicts that over time, increasing prosperity will render private ownership increasingly irrelevant within the final economy. As he explains, “there’s no evidence that the Mahdīst government will prohibit the private sector of production, and banking and trade. But it

735 Ibid at 712. 736 Ibid at 707. 737 Ibid at 707. 201

is clear…that the institutions that the government will be establish and supervise, and on the basis of which prosperity and well-being will spread through the society, will cause the private sector melt away on its own accord, and its importance to gradually diminish until it disappears, and individuals will benefit directly from the outpourings of the government.” 738 Furthermore, insofar as individuals increasingly eschew ownership, property will pass from the private to the public sector: “private ownership gained its importance from its ability to benefit the owners…but if the owner turns away from private ownership, then his status as an owner retains no significance…and from this, public property, or public assets, are generated, comprising that which no individual or group attaches importance to…”739

How will this irrelevance of the private sector come about? As Ṣadr explains,

“given the abundance of production, and its distribution in great excess of individual needs…individuals will no longer place any no real value on property. After all, we know

[from traditions] that the Mahdī will announce the free distribution of property, but no one will take it…Given this, there would remain no meanings to private ownership, theft, extortion, sales, or many other transactions—for the individual, whenever he wants to satisfy his needs, will find them in abundance. And perhaps this is the meaning of

‘distributing wealth freely.’”740 Likewise, Ṣadr explains that universal prosperity “means that particular resources, such as bread, will become as readily available as air. Thus, individuals will place no importance on ownership, for it will be of no consequence to the individual if this loaf remains with him, or if a thief steals it, because he knows that he

738 Ṣadr at 464. 739 Ṣadr, Volume IV, at 704-706. 740 Ibid. 202

will immediately acquire another just like it. In this way, ownership, theft, extortion, guarantees, and many other transactional concepts lose their meaning.”741

Ṣadr then distinguishes this from the Marxist ideal, noting that, on the one hand, universal “prosperity and abundance…will reach levels that Marxism cannot dream of in its lofty limits”—but on the other hand, this gradual irrelevance of private ownership

“does not prove the conclusion that Marxism wishes for, which is absolute elimination of ownership.”742 Indeed, although private ownership will be rendered generally irrelevant, it will nonetheless persist in several respects. First of all, even though individuals will eschew ownership, private ownership will remain as a feature of the law, for that which is mandated by the Qur’ān can not be effaced from legislation: “When owners cease to attach importance to ownership, then ownership ceases as an actual reality, and nothing of it remains except the chatter of the tongue—thus, the importance of ownership will remain [as merely] legislative [qānūnan].”743 Furthermore, ownership will, in any event, persist in relation to non-fungible goods and items. Ṣadr explains this as follows: “it is impossible to abundantly distribute all things, for there are a number of small things…that can not be distributed, except by way of miracles…Thus, ownership will still remain over all that is relatively unique [nādir]…whether in nature, or amidst manmade products—like manuscripts, antiques, and so forth—which have no simultaneous equivalent…and can not be duplicated… 744 Furthermore, the irrelevance of private ownership will “remain contingent on abundance—for as soon as there is relative scarcity, all of these economic meanings become applicable again to society. And insofar

741 Ibid. 742 Ibid. 743 Ibid. 744 Ibid. 203

as society isn’t devoid of some relatively rare things, therefore, these concepts [which depend on that of private ownership] can not be categorically eliminated.”745

The fourth and final conceptual doctrine is “the morality [akhlāqīyya] of the just economy.”746 This morality is a necessary consequence of the fact that the goal of final government is to enable humanity’s spiritual advancement, and therefore, “material prosperity…is a means towards the goal, rather than the goal itself.”747 More particularly,

“the earth will provide abundantly for purposes of perfecting man to the highest level possible, because the aim of this second divine plan is the attainment of the utmost level of human perfection possible for man on this earth.”748 Elsewhere, Ṣadr echoes this sentiment, explaining that in the final government, “the theoretical foundation for establishing an atmosphere of material abundance and happiness is not merely the procurement of pleasure, because…that is not sufficient in itself for humanity to progress towards its intended, ultimate goal. Material happiness has importance only insofar as it influences that far-off goal, and trains humanity towards it.”749 Given this overarching spiritual purpose to material prosperity, it is therefore “natural that the economic school at that time will, in its method, correspond to the new awareness announced then…and

[facilitate advancement] in perfection towards the infallible society.”750 This means that

“the economy is not meant to...further personal interests, but rather is…a reality that comprises a designated, general method [minhaj] for attaining unto the Most High…unto

745 Ibid. 746 Ibid at 712. 747 Ṣadr at 107. 748 Ibid at 102. 749 Ibid at 107. 750 Ṣadr, Volume IV at 690. 204

the supreme human aim: the infallible society.751 And if the economy is truly in this path, then it must be ethical, encompassing leniency but also strictness with the ego, and promoting sacrifice in the path of others. Nay, this sacrifice possesses the tone of legal obligation [al-ilzām al-qānūnī] when society achieves the level of this responsibility.”752

In illustrating the morality of the economy, Ṣadr repeats a number of features already mentioned under the previous three conceptual doctrines, but with different emphases. To begin with, Islamic moral norms of the current age will endure. This will include the conventional prohibition on unjust enrichment, for “its prohibition will remain in practice, whether it is at the level of markets or banks, or public institutions or otherwise.” 753 Likewise, “theft will be forbidden, because it violates the property of others, thence we can generalize the import…unto all plunder or pillaging of property of others, whether it’s called theft or otherwise.”754 Likewise, “the prohibition on attaining unto property through illegitimate means” as well as the “impermissibility of coercion, even if it is not a cause for profit.”755

But arguably the most novel indication of economic morality will be the introduction of new ethical norms—most notably a redefinition of unjust enrichment

[riba] so as to include all forms of “advantage” gained from “brethren in faith,” for the heightened ethical standards requires that “between believing brothers, there musn’t be the slightest degree of advantage, even if it’s customary legal in the prior societies.” 756

This new definition of unjust enrichment will include a “prohibition on trade-profit, for

751 Ibid at 713. Note that Ṣadr’s concept of the infallible society will be explained in Chapter Four, below. 752 Ibid. 753 Ibid at 699-700. 754 Ibid. 755 Ibid. 756 Ibid at 713. 205

this will be considered as unjust enrichment…because a believer profiting from another believer will be unjust enrichment.”757 Thus, any “sale in pursuit of profit in that age will be considered illicit, unjust enrichment—for on that day, the prohibition on profit will not distinguish between ribawī or non-ribawī according to today’s jurisprudential [fiqhī] terminology. Indeed, a legal sale will be a sale involving equal amounts of monetary value, whether by barter or cash.”758 Likewise, the new definition of riba will “require

[individuals to] provide surplus natural resources, and likewise surplus from mining, to others—for withholding it from others…is a form of taking advantage from brethren in faith.” 759 Thus, “if an individual finds a river or fountain of water in the land, he can use it to satisfy all of his personal needs, but if the water exceeds his needs,…he is not permitted to prevent others from it.”760 This means that even natural resources found on privately owned land must be used for public benefit—for example, “mines of coal, gold, or oil, whether found on public or privately-owned land, are possessions of the people…[I]f the mine is on personal land, the owner of the land is permitted to benefit from it…but as to the excess ore, he’s not permitted to stop others from acquiring it through their labors.”761

C. Summary of Sunnī and Shī’ite Discourses

As with the other domains of the final order, ISIS, in its regressivism, looks to the

Prophet’s polity as the basic benchmark for material prosperity. As such, the final order will reject secular, Western approaches to economics (e.g., capitalism, communism, etc.),

757 Ibid. 758 Ibid at 695. 759 Ibid at 713 . 760 Ibid at 707. 761 Ibid at 708.

206

and will revert to the ethos of cooperation, generosity, and philanthropy that characterized the Prophet’s policy. At a more technical level, the final economy will replicate the basic transactional and economic norms of the Prophet’s polity, including: the use of gold and silver currencies (though the specific coinage will be modelled after that of the ‘Ummayad empire, rather than the Prophet’s polity); prohibitions on unjust enrichment [riba]; prohibitions on transactions involving excessive uncertainty [gharār]; and the government’s collection and redistribution of wealth through various levies (e.g., zakāt, kharāj, ghanīma, khums, fay’, etc.). On the other hand, the level of material prosperity within the final order, and its underlying sources, will fundamentally differ from that of the Prophet’s polity, due to explicit statements made in the traditions in that regard. More particularly, although the Prophet’s polity was characterized by extreme poverty, the final world order will be one of great prosperity. This prosperity will derive primarily from miraculous sources, particularly in the agricultural sector, as indicated in traditions quoted by ISIS—such as: “[t]hen, it will be said to the earth, let your fruits grow and yield your blessings,” and “[t]he sky will be permitted to pour its rain and the land to yield its plants, so even if you were to plant a seed on a stone, it would spring.”

Secondarily, material prosperity will derive from other resources (e.g. oil, etc.), as well as from the practical employment of certain modern sciences and technologies, such as those in the field of medicine.

Dā’ūd’s progressivist account differs from that of ISIS in numerous respects. To begin with, although the Dā’ūd acknowledges a miraculous dimension to material prosperity (specifically, the “explosion” of Qur’ānic truths), he de-emphasizes miracles and instead attributes prosperity to ordinary human labors and planning. Thus,

207

agricultural plenty will be due not to miracles but rather to great emphasis placed by the government on the agricultural sector (particularly through reversing soil erosion and environmental degradation). Other sectors, including robotics, computer science, and communications technology will also comprise the new means of production. As to the overall economic system, while Dā’ūd echoes ISIS in his rejection of Western economic systems (particularly communism and capitalism), he does not advocate for a return to the economic norms of the Prophet’s polity, but rather envisions a new economic system.

This is already implied in Dā’ūd’s account of the final legal system (described in the

Chapter Two), wherein he explains that “the Mahdī’s economic laws will cause the earth to meet man’s needs so that man is not a servant to the earth…[which] also bestows upon other human institutions the ease, wealth, and comfort necessary in order to enable man to fully worship God.” Dā’ūd’s description of this economic system can be best summarized as ‘spiritualized’ market-socialism. On the one hand, the free-market dimension will guarantee incentives for innovation, and will also result in a natural variation in levels of individual wealth. On the other hand, the socialist dimension means that government will play an active regulatory role—through guaranteeing universal employment, levying taxes, and redistributing wealth (particularly through a takāful- based program which will provide a safety-net for all of humanity). Finally, the

‘spiritualization’ of this system means that all actors in the economy, whether individuals or the government, will behave according to Islamic norms of justice, kindness, and charity.

Within Shī’ism, the default position echoes that of ISIS in its attribution of material prosperity to miraculous agricultural boom. This is typically supplemented with

208

breakthroughs in science and technology, which is also attributed to miraculous sources

(i.e. the Mahdī’s “unlocking” of the remaining 25 of the 27 letters of knowledge, as the traditions suggust). Among these scientific breakthroughs, particular attention is given to technological advances in communications, information technology, transportation, and medicine. Some authors enumerate these innovations in considerable detail, suggesting space travel whereby humans will interact with other creatures, a global system of three- dimensional broadcasting, video-telephones, and advanced surveillance methods. But how will these sources of material comfort and prosperity be distributed and redistributed throughout the final world order? Unfortunately, theories of an overarching economic system are generally lacking within the Shī’ite majority orientation. At most, these authors make passing references to the possibility of a market-based system wherein the government will collect and then redistribute tax revenue in order to guarantee universal welfare. But to what extent will the market, and commerce in general, be free versus regulated? What will be the nature of employment? Will there be disparities in wealth and ownership? Perhaps the lack of commentary on these questions is due to the presumption of temporal-moderatism that the final world order will last only several generations. Given this rather modest time-frame, the miraculous abundance that results from the agricultural and technical domains is presumably deemed sufficient to last the entire temporal duration of the global government. An elaborate economic system, in other words, may be unnecessary.

Ṣadr envisions a final economy in which universal prosperity will not be achieved immediately, but rather will be realized over the long temporal arc of the final world order. such that poverty will exist in various regions at the outset, but will eventually be

209

eliminated. The initial sources of this prosperity will derive from agriculture and mining—but unlike the Shī’ite default (and similar to Dā’ūd’s account), Ṣadr attributes the flourishing of these sectors to practical rather than miraculous causes (i.e. through ordinary human planning and labour, which Ṣadr equates with worship). Surplus from agriculture and mining will be invested within science, technology, and other industries, particularly those which concern communications, transportation, and information technology. More importantly, all of this prosperity and advancement will occur within the overarching framework of a new economic system. To this end, Ṣadr echoes other authors in rejecting secular systems such as capitalism and socialism, and in stark contrast to the ISIS vision, also explicitly rejects the possibility of returning to the

Prophet’s economic system, which Ṣadr describes as merely a “transitional” economic model “for training humanity towards the era that would succeed it.” In short, “the

Mahdī’s system is totally dissimilar and unlike any prior system.” The four primary features of the final economic system will be: (i) government dominion over all sectors;

(ii) government guarantee of universal social welfare by providing universal employment and financial assistance; (iii) limited private ownership; and (iv) morality of the economy.

While each of these elements may sound commonplace, Ṣadr interprets them in novel ways. For example, his theory of limited private ownership is temporal in nature, whereby the final order will eventually reach a state in which private ownership (and therefore derivative concepts, such as theft, sales, guarantees, etc.) ceases to have meaning. Likewise, his theory of economic morality includes new norms, such as a new law of trusts and a redefinition of unjust enrichment [riba] whereby even trade profit will be illicit.

210

—CHAPTER FOUR—

THE FINAL SOCIETY: THE INDIVIDUAL, GROUP, AND COLLECTIVE

Although numerically diminished, humanity will emerge from the global apocalyptic wars as the nascent society of the final world order.762 What will be the nature of the individual, groups, and the collective within this society? Nearly all of the theorists considered herein acknowledge two tropes mentioned in Islamic traditions concerning the final world order: the righteousness and distinction of its individuals and, as a corollary, the harmony, fraternity, and justice that characterizes group and collective relationships. These two tropes, however, give rise to a host of questions, the answers to which depend upon modal and temporal presumptions. Will the level of righteousness and knowledge of individuals in the final society simply revert to, or rather exceed that of the individuals who resided within the Prophet’s polity? Will the composition of identity- groups within the final society reflect that of the Prophet’s polity, or differ therefrom?

More particularly, will be the status of various ethnic, gender, and religious groups?

Insofar as various identity groups will exist within the final society, will they co-exist under protections of equality?

Amidst these debated matters, the question of religious differences is particularly decisive in differentiating between various accounts of the final social order. Given that this study has excluded modal-radicalism from its analysis, it is beyond the present scope to consider movements that presume the explicit abrogation and full supplantation of

762 The theorists considered in this study, as well as most Sunnī and Shī’ite theorists generally, Shī’ite, presume that the final order will emerge only after the completion of violent, apocalyptic wars, which will result in a significant reduction in the human population. See generally, Cook, supra at Footnote 18. 211

Islam.763 Thus, all of theories considered herein presuppose that Islam will dominate the final world order, whether substantively (as in modal-conservatism) or nominally (as in modal-moderatism). But what, in the final society, will be the fate of the competing interpretations of Islam that currently exist—particularly Sunnism versus Shī’ism, but also the varying interpretations of the ‘ulamā, Sūfīs, and so forth?

Furthermore, does the dominance of Islam in the final order mean that all non-

Muslims will cease to exist in the final society, or rather that they will continue to exist, but as minorities? Traditions in both Sunnism and Shī’ism suggest both possibilities. On the one hand are traditions suggesting the end of all non-Muslims, such as one in which

Muḥammad is reported to have stated that, “[t]here is no prophet between me and him, that is, Jesus…He will descend [to the earth]…He will fight the people for the cause of

Islam. He will break the cross, kill swine, and abolish the religious poll-tax [jizya]…God will cause all religions will perish except Islam.”764 On the other hand are traditions suggesting the persistence of non-Muslims as religious minorities within the final society, for the Mahdī will “extract the Ark of the Covenant…within which is the original Torah that God revealed to Moses, and the Gospels which He revealed to Jesus, and he will rule the people of the Torah according to their Torah, and the people of the Gospels according to their Gospels.”765 The conceptual contradiction between these two sets of traditions is one with which virtually every theory of the final order must grapple.

A. Sunnī Discourses

1. Regressivism

763 See Introduction to this study for the definition of modal-radicalism. 764 Abū Dā’ūd, Sunan, Volume 37, Number 4310. For the Shī’ite traditions expressing the same concept, see, e.g., Majlisī, Biḥār al- Anwār, Volume 13 at 198. 765 See, e.g., Nu’aym b. al-Ḥammād, Kitāb al-Fitan at 249-251; see also: al-Suyūṭī, al-Hawi li al-Fatāwī, Volume II at 81. 212

ISIS benchmarks its theory of the final society according to the ideal of the

Prophet’s polity. To begin with, ISIS suggests that the understanding and righteousness of the individual within the final society, though undoubtedly loftier than most of human history, will nonetheless fall short of the level of individuals who resided within the

Prophet’s polity. This view is expressed in a footnote wherein ISIS states that, “[t]his contrast between the Islamic State today and the state of Madīnah in the time of the

Prophet…and his Companions is not to suggest that the khalaf (later Muslims) are better than the Salaf (early Muslims)…Ibnul-Qayyim…makes a similar contrast, saying, ‘Rather, the true Islam, which Allah’s Messenger…and his Companions were upon, is something far stranger today than it was when it first emerged’… Also similar to this is the hadīth that states, ‘He from among them who does good deeds will receive the reward of fifty [of you]…’…Finally, the Companions have virtues that will never be attained by any individual after them regardless of how hard he works or how much he strives.”766

Likewise, ISIS benchmarks group dynamics in the final society are according to the standard of the Prophet’s polity. This means that within the final society, differences based on mere biology will surely continue, and will comprise the primary form of diversity within the society. On the one hand, certain biological differences—particularly those of gender—will of course persist, but under traditionally-conceived restrictions of inequality. Indeed, the fundamental inequality between men and women is one of the two reasons that ISIS explicitly rejects the modern, democratic ideal of human rights. More specifically, ISIS decries “human rights” for “[c]ondemning the [Islamic] distinction

766 Dabiq, Issue 3 at 5. 213

between man and women in stipulated rights in law, like divorce, inheritance and blood money, holding that they are equal in humanity”—and therefore concludes that human rights advocates “have condemned what it [Islam] has designed in the rights and values between male and female.”767

On the other hand, other forms of biological diversity—particularly race, ethnicity, and linguistic background—will enjoy protections of equality. ISIS, for instance, decries

“racism,” particularly in its American forms, as “a tool of Shaytān, which, like nationalism, is intended to divide and weaken the children of Ādam and prevent them from uniting upon the truth.”768 In contrast, the ideal society for ISIS is one wherein “the

Arab and non-Arab, the white man and black man, the easterner and westerner are all brothers. It is a Khilafah that gathered the Caucasian, Indian, Chinese, Shami, Iraqi,

Yemeni, Egyptian, Maghribi…, American, French, German, and Australian. Allah brought their hearts together, and thus, they became brothers by His grace…” 769

Similarly, ISIS quotes from Abū Mus’ab al-Zarqāwī, who stated that “you would find the soldiers and the commanders to be of different colors, languages, and lands: the Najdī, the Jordanian, the Tunisian, the Egyptian, the Somali, the Turk, the Albanian, the

Chechen, the Indonesian, the Russian, the European, the American and so on…I have no doubt that this…is a marvel of history that has only come about to pave the way for al-

Malhamah al-Kubrā (the grand battle prior to the Hour)…”770 On the other hand,

While ‘biological diversity’ will thus be tolerated in the final society, such is not the case with diversity in matters of belief, doctrine, or practice. ISIS expresses its

767 Educational Fatwa at 17. 768 Dabiq, Issue 11 at 19. 769 Dabiq, Issue 1 at 6. 770 Dabiq, Issue 3 at 5. 214

rejection of such diversity in various instances, such as its criticism of so-called “‘Islamic’ preachers and writers…with humanistic undertones that seek to portray Islam as a religion of peace that teaches Muslims to coexist with all. Deluded by the open-ended concept of ‘tolerance’…for the purpose of advancing an agenda that attempts to

‘Islamize’ more ‘liberal’ concepts that the kuffār apply across the board for achieving evil, such as political pluralism, freedom of religion, and acceptance of sodomites.”771

This rejection of the freedom-of-belief norm in fact constitutes ISIS’s second ground for rejecting the modern concept of human rights, for according to ISIS, another implication of “human rights” is “[d]ealing with people on the basis of humanity and human matter, far removed from the religious and doctrinal basis.”772 This presumption of human rights causes its advocates to feel “annoyed by what the religion of Islam has stipulated in dealing with people on the basis of religion and creed.”773 In short, when it comes to matters of doctrine, belief, and practice, the operating principle for ISIS is that of inequality—which ISIS expresses as the doctrine of ‘walā’ and barā.’ In elucidating this doctrine, ISIS first establishes a basic dichotomy: “[t]he Muslim…does not accept the

Ummah remaining divided in the name of petty concepts, for he recognizes that the only acceptable line of division is that which separates between a Muslim and a kāfir…”774

Given this dichotomy between Muslim and kāfir, “the Muslim’s obligation [is] to reject kufr, separate himself from the kuffār…harbor enmity and hatred towards them, and wage war against them until they submit to the truth.” 775

771 Dabiq, Issue 11 at 19. 772 Educational Fatwa at 16. 773 Ibid. 774 Dabiq, Issue 11 at 19. 775 Ibid. 215

Although ideological and doctrinal differences may take varying forms, ISIS elaborates in greatest detail on the proper method of addressing religious diversity which, unsurprisingly, should be delt with as per the stratification that existed within the

Prophet’s polity. This standard dictates that Muslims are to enjoy the highest level of social status. Second to Muslims within this hierarchy are the People of the Book—i.e. pre-Islamic, Abrahamic religious minorities, which for practical purposes, is reducible to

Jews and Christians. These religious minorities face the options of conversion Islam, death, or maintaining their religions through by entering into the protection [dhimma] contract and paying the associated religious poll-tax [jizya].776 Should they opt for the latter, their social standing will, of course, be inferior to that of Muslims. To this end, the government is to guarantee Muslims a number of “legally enforceable rights,” such as

“the right to an impartial judge,” the right for male Muslims to enjoy “equal treatment before the law of God,” the right to “a seven-day limit on pre-trial detention before an accused suspect is entitled to a court hearing,” as well as “the right of women to appeal to its courts for redress when their rights are violated.”777 In contrast, the protected dhimmīs are second-class citizens: they are entitled to “protection of the Islamic State and limited freedom of worship,” but must comply with various requirements, including “bans on the construction or repair of houses of worship, bearing of arms, or public consumption or trade of pork and wine, engaging in religious rituals outside of their churches; a duty to

776 According to Rivkin, “Reports from Islamic State-controlled areas of Iraq indicate that the jizya tax there is set at a rate of four gold dīnars for the wealthy, two dīnars for middle-income, and one dīnar for the poor.” Rivkin at 8-10. 777 Ibid. 216

hand over spies or other individuals wanted by the judiciary of the Islamic State; and a duty to respect Islam and Muslims.”778

The next two rungs in the descending social hierarchy, after dhimmīs, are ‘original unbelievers’ [kuffār aṣlīyyīn] (largely reducible to non-Abrahamic faiths, which ISIS typically equate with polytheism), followed by the lowest of all, the apostates [murtadd], which comprise those groups that historically originated within Islam, but then broke off therefrom. According to ISIS, an example of the ‘original unbelievers’ is the Yazīdī community, while examples of the apostates include Shī’ites, Drūze, Nusayrīs, and

Ismā’īlis, along with many who claim to be Sunnīs but who have apostacized due to embracing non-Islamic beliefs (e.g. Ṣūfism, democracy, etc.).779 In one sense, these two social stratas are similar, for neither is eligible for the protection contract (ISIS states, for example, that “[u]nlike the Jews and Christians, there was no room for jizyah payment” for the original unbelievers—and similarly states that apostates “cannot pay jizyah to become a dhimmī”). 780 However, the reason that original unbelievers enjoy a higher status than apostates is that the former maintain a possibility of keeping their religion by becoming subjugated as slaves, while the latter face only the choice between conversion to Islam or death. It is for this reason that ISIS explains, regarding the Yazīdī, that “their women could be enslaved unlike female apostates who the majority of the fuqahā’ say cannot be enslaved and can only be given an ultimatum to repent or face the sword.”781

778 Ibid. 779 One might contrast this with al-Qaeda, for instance, which suggests that misguided groups—even the Shī’ites—remain within the fold of Islam (though we are lacking in al-Qaeda’s depicition of the final order, so do not know if they believe that such groups will remain wayward or will convert to Sunnism within the final world order). See, e.g., Ayman Zawāhirī’s letter of instruction, from July 9, 2005, to Abū Mus’ab al-Zarqāwī (reprimanding the latter, and noting, “why kill ordīnary Shia considering that they are forgiven because of their ignorance?”). Available at www.csr.org. 780 Dabiq, Issue 4 at 14; Dabiq, Issue 13 at 33, 43 ; Dabiq, Issue 10 at 8. 781 Dabiq, Issue 4 at 14. 217

It should be noted, however, that although slavery is not an option for apostates, it is not restricted to original unbelievers, but can also forced upon People of the Book, and even Muslims. While it is beyond the scope of this study to consider how ISIS distinguishes between these various categories of slaves, it should be noted that slavery, according to ISIS, will be a prominent feature of the final society, as emphasized in its article, entitled “The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour.”782 To this end, ISIS states, for instance, that “slavery has been mentioned as one of the signs of the Hour as well as one of the causes behind al-Malhamah al-Kubrā,” and “one of the signs of the Hour is the increased conquests and bringing in of slaves from the lands of kufr.”783

How do these general features of ISIS’s social vision reconcile with the contradictory concepts suggested in the Islamic traditions concerning religious diversity versus religions homogeneity in the final society? As with a number of other regressivists,

ISIS has not explicitly addressed this conceptual contradiction, and has instead endorsed one set of traditions over the other, with minimal elucidation or justification as to to its reasoning.784 More specifically, ISIS appears to support the traditions which suggest that the final society will be purged of all non-Muslims—for in a recent publication, ISIS has predicted that “the sword will continue to be drawn, raised, and swung until ‘Īsā

(Jesus)… kills the Dajjāl (the Antichrist) and abolishes the jizyah. Thereafter, kufr and its tyranny will be destroyed; Islam and its justice will prevail on the entire

782 Dabiq, Issue 4 at 17. 783 Ibid. 784 On the one hand, some regressivists agree with the ISIS position. See, e.g., Amīn Jamāl al-Dīn, ‘Umr ummat al-islām wa qurb ẓuhūr al-mahdī (1996) at 63-64 (noting that Jesus’ breaking of the cross and abolishing the jizya tax means that only Islam will remain in the world, and that the Asian nations of China, Japan, and Mongolia are unlikely to convert to Islam, for they represent the figures of Gog and Magog, and will therefore eventually be eliminated). See also, ‘Ādil Zakī, al-Mahdī: dawlat al-islām al-qāḍīma wa al- khilāfa al-akhīra (2005) at 121 (noting that “when Jesus comes, he’ll rule with the shari’ah that the Mahdī implements, and will accept only Islam”). On the other hand, other regressivists suggest that religious diversity will continue in the final order. See, e.g., ‘Abd al- Ḥakīm, Nihāyat al-‘ālam wa ashrāṭ al-sā’a (2004) at 131. 218

Earth…Thereafter, swords will rest from war only to be used as sickles.”785 In this same statement, ISIS contrasts this abolition of jizya with the state of affairs prior to Jesus’ arrival, noting that “until then, parties of kāfirīn will continue to be struck down by the unsheathed sword of Islam – except for those who enter into īmān (Islamic faith) or amān,” and explains further, within a footnote, that “Amān includes the condition of dhimmah granted to those from Ahlul-Kitāb residing in the Muslim state if they pay jizyah.”786 To the knowledge of the present author, ISIS has not explained its reasons for rejecting the alternative set of traditions, regarding the Mahdī’s employment of the scriptures of previous religions, which suggests the persistence of religious minorities in the final society.

2. Progressivism

Dā’ūd’s theory presumes that individuals within the final order will reach unprecedented heights in intellectual and moral attainments, for “in the government of the

Prophetic House, the immature minds will easily mature, due…to the opening up of all the fields before each mind; there will be no defectiveness of the mind.”787 This bolstering of the status of the individual has several consequences. To begin with, it means that the final society will discard the injustice that prevails in current societies, whereby individuals receive special favors due to accidents of birth rather than personal merit—for

“the government of the Prophetic House will be anathema to the expressions—‘Don’t you know who I am!?’ and ‘Don’t you know whose son I am!?’—which are common to many haughty people due to the status of their ancestors, or their descent, or the power and

785 Dabiq, Issue 7 at 23. 786 Ibid. 787 Dawlat at 64. 219

wealth belonging to their families.”788 Indeed, this norm of a just meritocracy means that in the final society, “the only distinction among the people” will be distinctions of “piety,” due to the fact that “humanity is charged with obligation of worshipping God, regardless of their doctrinal school, religion, color, race, or nationality.”789

However, despite the maturation of the individual human mind, not all individuals or groups will arrive at the same understandings of reality—for Dā’ūd’s account presumes an unstated epistemology of the relativity, or partiality, of truth. In other words, each individual or group in the final society, despite fulfilling their full potential in morality and understanding, will monetheless only attain a partial understanding of an aggregate spectrum of truth. As Dā’ūd explains, “[t]he Mahdī and his men will…understand that this world is decorated with different colors in terms of…understandings, traditions…ways, and thoughts. And these are colors that cannot be ignored…and even can not be incorporated and melted into a single melting pot—for they are colors of depth and expansiveness across geographie, and likewise they represent colors of the spectrum, and are therefore great in their differences.”790

This relativity of truth requires individual and group diversity to be safeguarded within the final society, for only through diversity can individual and group understandings, as an aggregate, represent the full spectrum of truth, or a comprehensive understanding of reality. It is for this reason that the legal system of the final order

(mentioned in Chapter Two) will be “flexible,” and its public policy will be to protect individual freedoms and to safeguard the global brotherhood of man. Dā’ūd repeatedly

788 Dawlat at 61-63. 789 Ibid. 790 al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 285. 220

emphasizes this need for flexibility and diversity in statements such as, “worship has a wide-ranging meaning,” and that Islam is a flexible and adaptable “method [minhaj].” 791

Thus, “the conquests of the Mahdī do not mean smashing the prevailing traditions, but merely restoring them to their virtuous state, or restoring virtue to the traditions.”792 As a result, the “culture” of the final social order will comprise “varying forms”—that is, it must necessarily “differ among different people, and between any two individuals.”793

More specifically, Dā’ūd, referring to the works of Richard Mark and Zakī Najīb

Maḥmūd, emphasizes that despite individual, group, or national differences, “we nonetheless see indications of commonalities and generalities that manifest in human relationships, confirming that the man is the brother of man, regardless of differences of beliefs and colors.”794

What specific forms of diversity will exist at the group or collective level? To begin with, Dā’ūd emphasizes the form that virtually all theorists agree on, namely cultural and ethnic diversity. To this end, he affirms that “Islam…comprehends various civilizations and cultures, and cannot be restricted…to the understanding of Bedouin desert-life, or of the past without assimilating the current age…and is not limited to any particular group, tribe, or family.”795 Of course, these various ethnic groups will not only continue to exist, but will also exist in a state of equality, for “[there will be] no class, or power status distinctions…for the House of the Prophet is based on the general equality of rights…”796 Dā’ūd is especially emphatic on the rising status of historically oppressed

791 al-Mafājāt at 562-564; 792 al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 286-287. 793 Ibid. 794 Ibid. 795 Dawlat at 34. 796 Ibid. 221

ethnic groups, noting that the “government of the Prophetic House” is one in which

“blacks and negros are uplifted.”797

What about the question of religious diversity? As with the other theorists considered in this study, Dā’ūd envisions a final order in which Islam is dominant. This dominance, however, will not be achieved through violent extermination of other religions,798 let alone coercion to convert to Islam—but rather will be accomplished “first and foremost in the battleground of consciousness…against the roots of ignorance.”799

To this end, the Mahdī’s policy will not be compulsion, but rather dialogue, wherein he will “elucide Islam appropriately, and will present it beautifully as God intended.”800

More particularly, the Mahdī will “organize the greatest dialogue among different cultures and different religions that the earth has ever witnessed—a dialogue that will embrace rather than reject the concept of ‘other.’”801 In short, as a result of this great dialogue, much of humanity will eagerly embrace Islam, through the rational conclusions of their own mental faculties.

Despite the dominance of Islam, religious diversity will persist in the final world order. Agreeing with many other theorists, Dā’ūd acknowledges that this religious diversity will encompass the People of the Book—i.e. the Jews and Christians—for

“there is no compulsion in religion for they who want to keep to their Books.” 802 More particularly, as a result of the Mahdī’s global dialogue, the Pope will recognize the

“errors” of Christianity and will seek the Mahdī’s protection, thus joining the Christians

797 Ibid. 798 This should not be confused with Dā’ūd’s account of the global, apocalyptic battles that precede the establishment of the final world order—which he emphasizes will be violent in nature. 799 al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 285-287. 800 Ibid. 801 Ibid. 802 Ibid at 218. 222

to the final society as a protected minority [dhimmī]. 803 But unlike conventional conceptions of the protection contract wherein the religious minorities are second-class citizens, Dā’ūd emphasizes that in the final society, these the People of the Book will enjoy equal rights in all respects, as guaranteed in law (e.g., the new law of blood-money will be equal for all religions). 804 Dā’ūd is inconsistent, however, as to the specific proportion of Jews and Christians that will remain in their faiths. At times, for instance, he suggests that most of the Jews in the world will remain in their faith,805 but elsewhere suggests that “only a negligible number of Jews will remain [in their faith], for all [the rest] will convert due to the Mahdī’s bringing the true Torah.”806 Likewise, with respect to Christians, he states in one instance that eventually, “many of the Christians will enter

Islam”—therefore, “crosses remain for some time, and will not be broken [until later] by

Jesus.”807 In any event, the overarching principle of religious diversity is grounded in the fact that “Prophet Muḥammad protected the dhimmīs and said that we [Muslims] are related to them—and this will also be the policy of the Mahdī.”808 (Incidentally, it is precisely on these same grounds that in Dā’ūd’s own attempt to establish the Awaited

Mahdī Party in Egypt, he emphasized that membership comprised Muslims as well as

Christians, noting that “the party’s unity with the Christians derives from the Mahdī’s unity with Jesus”).809

Beyond this, arguably the most distinctive feature of Dā’ūd’s account is that religious diversity will include not only Muslims and People of the Book (i.e. Jews and

803 Ibid at 238. 804 Dawlat at 63. 805 al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 234 (suggesting that most Jews will remain in their religion during the Mahdī’s era). 806 Compare al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 234 with al-Mafājāt at 239. 807 al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 284. 808 Dawlat at 47. 809 Ibid at 54. 223

Christians), but in fact all other religious minorities, including even atheists, whom he argues also have a rightful sanctuary within the final world government. For instance, in his explanation of the tradition that ‘One is not a true believer until he wishes for others what he wishes for himself,’810 Dā’ūd asserts that the word ‘others’ implies that not only should Muslims and other religions enjoy peaceful association, but so should the atheists

[al-mulāḥida]. 811 Likewise, he explains that in the social policy of the final order,

“freedom of thought” guarantees the rights of even the atheists, for “freedom of thought implies freedom of belief, and no one’s beliefs will be suppressed in the government of the Prophetic House…commensurate with the Qur’ānic verse [18:29], ‘Then whosoever wills, let him believe, and whosoever wills, let him disbelieve.’”812 Further, he states that

“Islam is universally inclusive and inclusive universally, so our vision is a tolerant one that admits the other and is peaceful with him regardless of his religion—and even if he has no religion, he’s still a human, deserving of respect, and should not be threatened.”813

While the presence of non-Muslims is an important feature of the final society,

Dā’ūd also addresses the competing interpretations of Islam itself. As mentioned above,

Dā’ūd argues that the Mahdī’s “wonderous, unique worldwide dialogue” will dispel the many misunderstandings and prejudices that afflict Muslims throughout the world. To begin with, Sunnī Islam itself will be purged from “inflexibility, stiffness…and [being] completely fettered with the chains of bygone notables,” and Muslims will be

810 Bukhārī, Ḥadīths, Volume 2, #13. 811 Dawlat at 35. 812 Ibid at 64. 813 Dawlat at 52 224

consequently be freed from their “confusion as to their true identity.”814 This cleansing of

Sunnī Islam will first involve a purging of (Salafī) extremism—for “fighting extremism” constitutes a “basic goal within the government of the Prophetic House.” 815 Dā’ūd elaborates on this point, contrasting the “love, mercy, simplicity, and flexibility” of true

Islam with the “rod and cane” of these extremist “movements”816 (and it is on these same grounds that Dā’ūd’s own Awaited Mahdī Party rejected Salafīs as potential members, particularly those with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood). Likewise, Islam will be purged of its legalistic interpretation, for the ‘ulamā and the various Islamic legal schools

[madhāhib] will all be displaced and rendered irrelevant (as noted in Chapter Two), as a result of which, “the government will not stagnate from the understanding of the

‘ulamā.”817 In contrast, Ṣūfism will be rejuvenated in the final society (as well as within

Dā’ūd’s Awaited Mahdī Party, for “the Ṣūfīs are our helpers, and the party is present in the Ṣūfī orders”).818

Even more importantly, the true Islam envisioned by Dā’ūd is one that will accomplish a full rapprochement between Sunnism with Shī’ism—for the Mahdī himself will “supra-Shī’ite and supra-Sunnī,” and will thereby bring about true Islamic unity. 819

Because Sunnism and Shī’ism will be united in the final society, Dā’ūd emphasizes “the utmost need” for contemporary Sunnīs and Shī’ites “to unite in one line, and to overlook their differences.”820 This is particularly urgent given the fact that “the Shī’ite-Sunnī

814 al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar at 285. 815 Dawlat at 49. 816 Ibid. 817 Ibid at 60. 818 Ibid at 54. 819 al-Mafājāt at 41-42. 820 Ibid at 453. 225

division benefits no one except for the enemies of Islam.”821 More particularly, “[the] enemies delight in this division with the Shī’ites, and it causes us to suffer in our strategy for the Islamic community [umma].”822 Therefore, “true scholars should aim to melt the ice between the two sects, because they are both wings of the Islamic community, and sinful, criminal hands are those who write without proof to denigrate…the moderate

Shī’ites, which are the majority [of Shī’ites]…”823

In his own efforts to unite the two sects, Dā’ūd credits contemporary Shī’ites in a number of respects. To begin with, he includes Shī’ite works among the sources for his own writings.824 Likewise, he recognizes the political feats of Shī’ite politicians—noting, for instance, that “the Mahdī will accomplish what Islamic leaders in the last fifty years have been unable to do, except for some of the Iranian leaders, and Amīr ‘Abdullāh b.

‘Abd al-‘Azīz of Saudi Arabia.”825 More particularly, he explains that “Iran is to be praised, and many of its people are preferable to the Arabs, because of their piety and defiance of America, and this is despite certain features of their government, such as

‘governance of the jurist [wilāyat al-faqīh]’.”826 Though rejecting the Iranian system of governance of the jurist, Dā’ūd nonetheless praises Ayatollah Khomeini’s division of the world into “tyrants and oppressed,” describing it is a “genious idea…because it describes the condition of the people all over the world prior to the Mahdī’s Advent.”827 Perhaps most importantly, Dā’ūd recognizes certain doctrinal contributions of Shī’ism: Shī’ites are correct regarding the special status of the Prophet’s family, for “the family of the

821 Ibid at 459. 822 Dawlat at 167-168. 823 Ibid. 824 al-Mafājāt at 90 (citing ‘Alī Kūrānī). 825 Ibid at 310. 826 al-Mafājāt at 450. 827 Ibid. 226

Prophet [ahl al-bayt] know the legal principles and worldly secrets.”828 In particular, the

Shī’ites are correct in their core view regarding successorship, for “‘Alī was the successor of Muḥammad, and it was due to the [interference] of he who washed

Muḥammad’s body after his passing that we have no explicit will and testament…but this great heritage, nonetheless, [passes] within the lineage of ‘Alī, until it reaches the Imām

Mahdī.”829

Given such overtures to Shī’ism, is no surprise that Dā’ūd must regularly defend himself against accusations of being a dissimulating Shī’ite. He thus complains, “some accuse you of being a Shī’ite the moment you speak of the House of the Prophet, even though you revere Abū Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Uthmān!”830 Given these accusations, he he devotes considerable effort throughout his writings in affirming his Sunnī loyalties. He states, for instance, that “Shī’ites are wrong and unrealistic to think that had ‘Alī had the rightful caliphate, the fate of the world would have been different.”831 More importantly, he rejects the standard Shī’ite doctrine of Occultation832—yet in a manner that would not alienate a Shī’ite audience: “although I personally do not believe in the bodily

Occultation of the Mahdī, it’s not preposterous for God to render one’s life extended.”833

In this regard, Dā’ūd offers reinterprets the doctrine of Occultation in a manner that might be compatible with Sunnism—noting that Occultation can mean: “first, occultation of thought…second, occultation of the Islamic Caliphate…and thirdly…separation of

828 Ibid at 41-42. 829 Ibid at 42-53. 830 Dawlat at 167-168. 831 al-Mafājāt at 459. 832 Ibid at 363-364. 833 Ibid at 456-457. 227

religion from government.”834 Beyond these doctrinal matters, Dā’ūd observes that the greatest flaw with the Shī’ites is their practice of “cursing the Companions [of the

Prophet]—Abū Bakr and ‘Umar—and this shortcoming amounts to forgetting the present and only heeding the past, whereas we should extract lessons from the past in order to address the present.”835

In any event, these mistakes of Shī’ism do not warrant disunity among Muslims, let alone excommunication. First of all, the Shī’ite errors are not necessarily worse than mistakes committed by Sunnīs: “although some Shī’ites may be excessive, they are still part of the Islamic community, just as among Sunnīs there are those who are excessive, but are not cast out as Muslims.”836 Furthermore, the doctrinal errors of Shī’ism are not tantamount to any actual harm, for “if the Shī’ites believe that the Mahdī was the Twelfth

Imām who was born in year 256, and if the Sunnīs reject this, this rejection does not harm the Shī’ites, in the same way that this Shī’ite belief…does not harm the Sunnīs; furthermore, this does not corrupt fundamental doctrines of faith.”837 Thus, in stark contrast to the ISIS vision of the final order, wherein Shī’ites are excommunicated as apostates, Dā’ūd explains that it is “evil to excommunicate [takfīr] the Shī’ites,” due to the fact that “Shī’ites hold the same beliefs as Sunnīs in all the fundamentals of religion except for the Imāmate versus Caliphate, which is not tantamount to blasphemy; furthermore, in jurisprudence they agree with Sunnīs in all matters except for some secondary ones such as temporary marriage.”838

834 Ibid. 835 Dawlat at 167-168. 836 Ibid. 837 al-Mafājāt at 457-460. 838 Ibid. 228

B. Shī’ite Discourses

1. Revanchism

Standard Shī’ite accounts, echoing Dā’ūd, presume that the individual within the final order will attain unto unprecedented levels of knowledge and morality—to such an extent that knowledge and virtue will reach ‘perfection.’ This is typically understood in light of the Shī’ite tradition mentioned in Chapter Three, concerning the Mahdī’s unlocking of the remaining 25 of 27 parts of knowledge (as well as other traditions, such as one which states that ‘you are believers, but your faith will not be perfected until our

Qa’im rises up; at that time, God will instill brotherhood and fortitude in you and then you will become perfect believers’).839 On the basis of these sources, Tabasī, for example, explains that the Mahdī “will bring about the intellectual growth of the people and materialize the objective of the Prophet when he said: ‘I was sent to perfect the morality of mankind’…The people during the time of al-Qa’im will believe in the deceitfulness of the world, knowing all the adversities and sins therein. In terms of faith and piety they will reach such a sublime state where the world can no longer beguile them.”840 He further confirms, “Yes, the government of al-Mahdī will lead to the growth and perfection of the intellect and morality, and that time will be the day when talents will be perfected…in the divine system of the Mahdī, humanity will reach the pinnacle of maturity and such qualities as morality, thinking and will, will reach their heights…It is a gift that no government at no point in time has been able to present to human society.”841

839 Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Volume 67 at 351. 840 Tabasī at 175. 841 Ibid at 167. 229

At the level of groups, further tropes are standard within the Shī’ite discourses.

First is that of ethnic diversity and equality, common to virtually all Sunnī and Shī’ite theorists. Typical of this is Amīnī’s statement that “it is not appropriate to confine the deliverer of the world, the Mahdī, to one particular nation. He will actually come to fight against all discriminatory claims of racial, creedal and national distinction.

Consequently, he should be regarded as the Mahdī of the whole of humanity.” 842

Nonetheless, these claims of ethnic equality belie a tendency that persists among some

Iranian authors to extol the special status of Iranians in the final social order. Tabasī, for instance, suggests that Iranians will be the promulgators of the morality and spirituality of humanity, saying that “This ḥadīth clarifies the identity of the teachers of the Qur’ān as

‘ajam and according to linguists the word ‘ajam here refers to the Persians and

Iranians.”843 Likewise, Amīnī suggests that “The teachings of Islam will be proclaimed to the world from Qumm.”844

Another common theme is the elevated (though still unequal) status of women, largely grounded in the Shī’ite tradition stating that women will, in the Mahdī’s era, independently reach judicial decisions. Amīnī elaborates on this in his commentary on the release of the additional 25 letters of knowledge, noting that “[d]uring the age of the

Mahdī, human reason will have reached perfection. General information among people will have advanced to such a degree that women will be able to formulate judicial decisions while at home.” 845 Despite this overture, Amīnī does not clarify whether women in the final order will reach the same heights of understanding and moral

842 Amīnī at 46. 843 Tabasī at 172. 844 Amīnī at 227. 845 Ibid at 233. 230

perfection as men. Tabasī emphasizes the same tradition, noting that “even very young women will become so well-versed in the Book of God and religious principles that they could easily deduce the decrees of God from the Holy Qur’ān.”846 Tabasī, however, goes beyond this point and addresses the status of women more broadly. First, women will have some degree of greater freedom to travel unaccompanied, for “highways will become so safe that young women will travel from one place to another without an accompanying close relative, being safe from any molestation and bad intentions.”847 But as to their occupations and overall contributions to society, women will not have equal status to men. To this end, he emphasizes a tradition stating that “During the time of the

Qa’im, the women will perform the same tasks they did during the time of the

Prophet.”848 In interpreting this tradition, he notes that “[i]n view of the fact that the women in the government of the Mahdī will have the same role as that which they had had during the early period of Islam, we shall examine the role of women during that period…traditions indicate that they will treat the wounded and attend to the sick just like the (female) companions of the Messenger of God did…[but] women during the wars of the Prophet also shouldered other responsibilities, such as delivering food and water to the combatants, cooking, keeping the belongings of the combatants, procuring medicine, delivering weapons, repairing equipment, transporting the martyrs, participation in defensive wars, encouraging combatants to go to the warfront, encouraging them at the scene of combat, and so on.”849

846 Tabasī at 166. 847 Ibid at 177. 848 Ibid at 69-70. 849 Ibid. 231

While these views on ethnic diversity and gender are fairly standard within the

Shī’ite majority, there is far less consensus on the question of religious diversity. This is arguably due to the fact that within the Shī’ite majority, the trope regarding perfection of individual knowledge and morality which was just described does not translate into a clear epistemological position concerning the subjectivity versus objectivity of truth. As noted in Dā’ūd’s account of the social order, the subjectivity or partiality of truth constitutes a grounding principle for religious diversity, for only if diversity is preserved can truth, as an aggregate of the partial understandings of individuals and groups, be safeguarded. An alternative position, to be considered further below, is that of Ṣadr, who presumes the objectivity of truth, which constitutes a grounding principle for religious uniformity and homogeneity. Within the Shī’ite minority, however, the lack of a clear position regarding the subjectivity versus objectivity of truth leads to inconsistent, if not haphazard, positions conserning the nature and degree of religious diversity within the final society.

Kūrānī, on the one hand, envisions the final society to be homogenously Muslim, thereby effacing all religious diversity. As with most theorists, he envisions no place for polytheism (however it may be defined) within the final society—for “no idolatry will remain on the face of the earth.”850 But beyond this, he also envisions the elimination of all non-Muslims, whether People of the Book or otherwise. As he explains, “my preference is the view…that all Christians and all Jews will believe in the Mahdī…and the Christians are strongest power in the world and will become the means of spreading

850 Kūrānī at 260 (citing a tradition on the authority of Ja’far al-Ṣādiq). 232

Islam and his government.”851 Furthermore, Kūrānī’s conception of erstwhile Christians propogating Islam is due to the fact that “Westerners love power, even if it is in their enemies.”852 Therefore, he explains, “the meaning of ‘lifting’ the religious poll-tax [jizya] is that nothing will be acceptable from the People of the Book except for Islam.”853 It should be noted that despite this view, Kūrānī mentions the tradition regarding the Mahdī ruling over religious minorities according to their own scriptures, but he offers no commentary or analysis of this tradition, let alone any inference that religious minorities will endure. Oddly, his only statement in connection with this tradition is that there will be a condition of economic prosperity.854

On the other hand, Amīnī envisions religious diversity in the final society, predicting that “the religions of the Jews and the Christians will be around until the Day of Judgment.”855 To this end, he discusses the ḥadīths about the lifting of jizya and the

Mahdī’s employment of the true scriptures, explaining that “Jews and the Christians will remain under the government of the Twelfth Imām, but they will have abandoned their belief in the Trinity and all forms of idolatry, and will have become worshippers of One

God. They will continue to live under the protection of the Islamic government. At the same time…Islam will be the world's religion, gaining precedence over all other religions.”856 It should be emphasized, however, that Amīnī’s vision of religious diversity is not as liberal as that of Dā’ūd, for whereas Dā’ūd includes non-Abrahamic religions, and even atheists, within the final society, Amīnī’s tolerance only extends to the People

851 Ibid at 247-250. 852 Ibid at 261-262. 853 Ibid at 259. 854 Ibid at 263. 855 Amīnī at 223. 856 Ibid at 225. 233

of the Book. He indicates this in his statement that “the Peoples of the Book, that is the

Jews and the Christians, will continue to receive the protection of the Islamic government.

Other sinful and corrupt disbelievers will be killed by the universal upholder of justice, the Mahdī. The number of the latter group will, consequently, be insignificant.”857

Meanwhile, Tabasī appears undecided on the issue of religious diversity, acknowledging the possibility of both Kūrānī’s notion of a homogenously Muslim society, as well as Amīnī’s notion of the continuation of Jews and Christians. In one instance,

Tabasī notes that “[r]egarding the breaking of the cross and the killing of pigs, which means the end of the period of Christianity and the ruling on the jizyah…Perhaps, this tradition alludes to the end of Christianity and the decline of the People of the Book.”858

Elsewhere, however, Tabasī concedes that “the confrontations and encounters of the

Imām with the People of the Book would not always be the same. In fact, in some cases, he will allow them to remain in their religions by paying the jizyah. He will engage another group in discussion and debate, and in doing so, he will invite them to Islam. We can probably say that at the beginning of the uprising, he will engage in discussion with them and wage war with those who hide the truth.” 859 Furthermore, as to the true scriptures that the Mahdī uncovers, “through them he will discuss and debate with the

Jews, and a group of them will embrace Islam through this.”860 Despite this indecision,

Tabasī leaves no doubt as to the general supremacy of Islam within the final order, stating that “people will enter the fold of Islam in an unprecedented manner, and the period of the strangulation and suppression of religious people and the banning of Islamic symbols

857 Ibid at 227. 858 Tabasī at 145. 859 Ibid at 135. 860 Ibid. 234

will come to an end. The call of Islam will reverberate everywhere manifesting the impact of religion. In the words of some ḥadīths, Islam will penetrate every house, slum and tent just as heat and cold would penetrate therein. As the effect of heat and cold is inevitable, not subject to our choice and will, in the same manner, Islam at that time will penetrate all places, cities, villages, fields, and deserts notwithstanding the inner opposition of some. It will influence and transform them.”861

2. Idealism

In Ṣadr’s account, even at the very outset of the final world order, society will, despite its nascency, be far more advanced than the immediately preceding human society.

This will partly be due to the fact that the global apocalyptic battles prior to the final world order will eliminate the defective portion of humanity, for “the Mahdī will kill a large number of individuals who failed the tests of the prior divine plan and who posed dangers to the new society’s realization of complete justice.”862 But more importantly, upon completion of the apocalyptic battles, the Mahdī will have removed the “sources of deviation of the wayward society during the age prior to the Mahdī’s appearance”—a feat which, according to Ṣadr, is the true meaning of the so-called killing of the Antichrist

[dajjāl], or Satan.863 Removal of these “sources of deviation” is tantamount to remedying the world’s structural injustices across five domains: “[f]irst, deviant educational methods…Second…the fabricated laws that are contrary to Islamic justice…Third, material need generally, and material competition speficially…Fourth, social competition…[in] attaining modern means for optimizing ease and comfort…Fifth,

861 Ibid at 171. 862 Ṣadr at 101. 863 Ibid at 575-579. 235

sexual temptation in its various levels and forms.” 864 These five domains will, respectively, be replaced with, “[f]irst…educational methods oriented towards obedience and worship of God…; second…just, perfect laws…; third…charity and philanthropy…; fourth…, distribution of huge amounts of wealth to greatly uplift every individual’s income and to provide equal work opportunities for every individual…; fifth, elimination of sexual temptation…due to [the correction] in educational methods and justice in gender relationships.” 865 These corrections, in the aggregate, will render the initial society of the final order generally free of corrupt inclinations, for “the individual will be oriented towards contentment and purity, towards the necessity of charity and justice…will clearly perceive that evil is contrary to his best-interest.” 866

Yet these qualities of society, however unprecedented, will still be far from sufficient, for the fundamental purpose and indeed crowning achievement of the entire world order will be to produce an “infallible” [ma’sūm] society. Ṣadr’s theory of infallibility [‘isma] is indeed the unifying principle of not only his account of the final social order, but indeed of his entire account of the global government.867 Employing his terminology of ‘divine plans,’ Ṣadr elaborates that “this second divine plan has, as its aim, the attainment of the utmost level of human perfection possible for man on this earth, and it makes the earth provide abundantly for perfecting man to the highest possible level, such that through slow and gradual advancement, it will become possible for the

864 Ibid at 531-535. 865 Ibid. 866 Ibid. 867 Ṣadr clarifies that in using the term ‘infallibility’ [‘isma], “I mean that which, in the language of the Muslim philosophers, is called ‘contingent infallibility’ [al-‘isma ghayr al-wājiba]”—and that “this is that in which there is no possibility for injustice, transgression, error, or forgetfulness.” Ibid at 647, 102. 236

individual to become infallible, and to become complete in his infallibility.”868 Elsewhere,

Ṣadr links these concepts with another term that he coins—the ‘blueprint for complete justice’—explaining that “through the appearance of the Mahdī, complete justice is implemented…and through implementing justice, humanity will have reached a higher level in perfection, and afterwards will achieve an still higher level, which is the deepening and permeation of this justice until humanity achieves the quality of infallibility—that is, immunity from error, whereby the sinless community will be realized…”869

Attainment of this infallibility, however, will be a gradual process, for “humanity will not achieve this exalted level [of infallibility] from the start. Rather...this divine plan results in their slow and gradual perfection…[for] this new plan grants salvation to most individuals and it slowly and gradually reaches all individuals, to the desired extent.”870

At the outset of the final order, therefore, “humanity will not have reached the stage of infallibility in any way”—for despite its advancement relative to pre-Mahdī society,

“there will still be numerous voids and deficiencies in the world” and, more particularly,

“there will remain in regions of the world wherein groups lag behind the general procession…however much they may have been uplifted by the Mahdī’s efforts.” 871

Therefore, attainment of infallibility requires the passage of time, for “the production by this plan of its ultimate result [of infallibility] is dependant on humanity enduring for a sufficient stretch of time in order to be trained in the depths of justice, to become

868 Ibid at 102. 869 Ibid at 93. 870 Ibid at 103. 871 Ibid at 101, 646. 237

established within it, and in order for us to finally reach the highest degree of human perfection.”872

More particularly, society’s development will occur according to three stages that partially correlate to the three political phases of the government described in Chapter

One. The first societal stage—fallibility in the majority—is the period wherein the rulers are infallible, but the majority of society is fallible. This stage begins at the outset of the final world order and endures through both the first and second political phases of the government (i.e., the Mahdī’s personal reign, as well as the reign of the Appointed

Righteous Saints, the aggregate of which will last nearly 800 years). That this first societal stage will span both of these political phases is due to the fact that “after the departure of the highest leader…it is very possible that individuals and groups will continue to lag behind.”873 Given the fact that the majority of society will be prone to error, Ṣadr asks the question: “what about the possibility of transgression and confusion during the rule of the [Appointed] Righteous Saints?”874 He assures us, however, that the fallibility of the society will not threaten the integrity of the global government, for several reasons. First, “the prosperity, happiness, fraternity, and equity that the Mahdī himself establishes and promulgates causes the individuals and thus the collective to spontaneously tend towards love, respect, and sympathy for the order…”875 Second, the order will be safeguarded through “the specific principles and elements that the Mahdī himself taught his caliphs…that they be capable of rearing their current government and

872 Ibid at 94. 873 Ibid at 646. 874 Ibid at 651-652. 875 Ibid. 238

easily defending it from threats.”876 A third safeguard is “the global nature of the just government, in terms of both…the prestige that the global government acquires within the hearts and minds of men, due to its exercise of important central rule which no other government in history exercised, and its supremacy over all sources and productions of weapons in the world, with no exceptions, and its possessing the means of ending…smuggling, deceit, cheating, and so forth.”877 Due to these three factors, “the number of people who would even think of rebellious action would diminish,” and any

“trifling few who might consider it would be thwarted at every step due to these certainties of the government.” 878

The second and third societal stages comprise two different levels of infallibility.

The second societal stage—infallibility in the majority—is the period when enough individuals within the society have become infallible such that societal consensus (i.e. the majority view) will be infallible. The advent of this stage will coincide with the advent of the third political phase (i.e. reign of the Elected Righteous Saints), for infallibility in the majority consensus prompts the political transition from appointment of Righteous Saints to their election (as explained in Chapter One). But at some point within this final political stage, society will also advance to the third societal stage, which is infallibility in the entirety of its individuals. Ṣadr distinguishes between these two phases of infallibility in numerous instances, such as his explanation that “human society, as a result of the future plans implemented by the global government, will traverse two levels of infallibility: [in] the first level of infallibility, [all] individuals are not infallible, but the

876 Ibid. 877 Ibid. 878 Ibid. 239

general view that they agree on is infallible; [in] the second level of infallibility, all individuals become infallible.”879 Likewise, he notes that “the great and final fruit of the

Mahdī’s long-term educational program…is the divine goal itself for creating humanity…and this is the realization of the just society in its individuals and infallibility in it’s general view [ra’ī]—nay rather the infallible society in [all] its individuals in the long run.”880

Through what mechanism will society traverse these three societal stages? As in the pre-Mahdī era, the “general methods” of advancement will consist of “the individual overcoming tests and trials,” but the nature of testing will differ fundamentally from tests in the pre-Mahdī era. The first difference is that “the source of tests in this new divine plan differs from the prior one, for in the first divine plan, the [world’s] conditions of injustice and waywardness were sufficient to test whether individuals would disregard righteous Islamic behaviour…But in the second divine plan, no traces or conditions of tyranny or corruption will remain.”881 In other words, the Mahdī’s effacement of the world’s structural injustices will remove the modus operandus of the prior tests. The new source of tests, rather, will derive from a centralized, government-sponsored educational program: “The government will undertake deliberate actions aimed at training…humanity through the testing. This is one of the important differences between the two forms of testing: before the Mahdī, testing of individuals was a spontaneous phenomenon because it was generated by the inescapable conditions of injustice and corruption; but after the Mahdī, society will be free from delinquents and unbelievers, so

879 Ibid at 103. 880 Ibid at 534. 881 Ibid at 105. 240

testing will be deliberately implemented by…the government for purposes of training…humanity.”882 The second difference concerns the predetermined success rates:

“testing in the prior plan resulted in the failure of the great majority of humanity…but this new testing…will result in the success of the great majority of humanity, and this success will be uninterrupted, until humanity reaches the goal of becoming the infallible society.”883 More specifically, “the aim of the prior [era of] testing was to produce a limited number of devoted individuals sufficient for conquering the world, but it caused the remainder to veer to extreme injustice and waywardness. But the aim of the new testing is the universal divine plan…of training humanity—both the rulers and the ruled—through centralized, continuous education, towards perfection in every one of its individuals, in order to create the absolutely just society. This [perfection] is not only at the level of the rulers—rather, it’s the infallible society.” 884

More particularly, these tests will comprise three levels of education, through which “the government will…directly intervene in the individuals’ spiritual, emotional, rational, and social lives.” 885 The first and most elementary level is “testing the individual vis-à-vis his natural impulses, desires, and passions [‘awāṭif, in order that he resist his desires and safeguard his humanity via reason, thought, and natural propensities.” 886 In this level of testing, the government’s role is to “provide the individual with copious opportunities for achieving equilibrium—socially, economically, psychologically [nafsīyan] and intellectually.”887 For the most part, the government will

882 Ibid at 507. 883 Ibid at 106. 884 Ibid at 506. 885 Ibid at 108-109. 886 Ibid at 527-530. 887 Ibid. 241

provide these opportunities in the form of its “just legislation...[which] regulates these needs of the individual, guaranteeing their equilibrium as well as the continuation of the individual’s advancement.” 888 Despite this government role, it will nonetheless be

“entrusted to the individual himself…to take the initiative for controlling his natural impulses and preventing them from running wild, and in this respect there’s no difference before and after the Mahdī’s Advent. So the individual will face this responsibility constantly, and this will comprise an important test for him according to which his actions and reactions will be measured…He will succeed in the test insofar as he follows the path of justice…but he will fail in the test insofar as he falls short, allowing his desires to reign over his thoughts and actions and thereby prevent him from advancing.”889

Individuals who master this elementary level of testing will advance to the second level of testing, which entails full obedience to the government—or, in Ṣadr’s words,

“participation in implementing the full justice.” Ṣadr elaborates, explaining that “full justice leads to harmony and empathy between the government and individuals at one level, between individuals themselves at another level, and to full obedience and true implementation of the just legislation, on all levels, in order that every individual in the government and society may have the honor of participating in process of actualizing the great experience of justice, and in advancing all humanity along the path of true perfection and full prosperity, which is the aim of the divine plan after the Mahdī’s

Advent.”890 He then warns that “any shortcoming or falling behind in this, even if it’s

888 Ibid. 889 Ibid. 890 Ibid. 242

basic, will contribute to the ruinous reversal of this sacred divine plan…and thus constitutes deviation and failure in the test…Thus, disbelief and disobedience of the demands of justice after the…establishment of the global just government will constitute the utmost depravity and regression.”891 Ṣadr assures us, however, that “the government, naturally, devotes the utmost care to providing assistance and in creating conditions that encourage implementation of this responsibility…and in this regard, it will, to a great extent, be easy for the individual to take initiative to obey and implement justice.

Thus…deviancy and disobedience in this responsibility constitutes the greatest of crimes, and the punishment thereof by death is not unfair.”892

The third level of tests will consist in “submission to all that the Mahdī upholds in his actions and sayings, and belief that it is the sound truth…regardless of whether his actions are visible or if its purposes are known.” 893 Ṣadr explains that “it is this submission…that constitutes the educational foundation of the world rulers who exercise power after the Mahdī, to whom it is obvious that he…knows the truths, the best-interests, and the laws.”894 Ṣadr further notes that it is success in this final level of tests that makes an individual qualified to be a ruler in the world, for “the third level of his companions…succeed fully in all the levels [of testing], and thereby become the select- elite of the faithful, through whom God advances His universal summons.”895 Elsewhere,

Ṣadr describes this third level of tests as requiring the individual to “cling to and

891 Ibid. 892 Ibid. 893 Ibid. 894 Ibid. 895 Ibid. 243

implement complete justice…and safeguard it in [his] relationships with himself, with his

Lord, with others, and with the world order.” 896

Individuals who succeed in this third level of testing will, presumably, attain the quality of infallibility, but what are the distinctive qualities of these infallible individuals?

In answering this question, Ṣadr describes a “brotherhood,” the hallmark of which is unity of thought, which in turn presupposes the objectivity of truth. To this end, he draws a comparison to the Prophet’s polity: “it behoves us to imagine the brotherhood that the

Prophet established among his companions—that pure brotherhood which evinced common belief and aims. The Mahdī will establish his society in a similar way…and although this brotherhood may, at the beginning…be restricted to the select-elite of the tested [tamhīṣ] ones, eventually it will be the predominant attribute that necessarily characterizes every Muslim, as a result of the Mahdī’s education and efforts.” 897

Elsewhere, Ṣadr elaborates interprets a particular Islamic tradition in order explain that the hallmark of this brotherhood is unity of thought—or, in his words, “the consensus of minds [ijtimā’ al-uqūl]…and the meaning of their ‘consensus’ is their agreeing on a singular creed and a singular legislative plan [uṭrūha], such that it is difficult to imagine a disagreement occurring between two individuals who are united in the general ideology of the Mahdī’s global government, particularly when the community [umma] and humanity will have attained unto a level of perfection wheren its view becomes infallible and it achieves, to a great degree and with great ease, unto consensus [ijtimā] and harmony.”898

896 Ibid at 105. 897 Ibid at 535. 898 Ibid at 537. 244

Ṣadr’s principle of gradually-attained infallibility, together with its underlying epistemology of the objectivity of truth, grounds a social theory wherein diversity and equality flourish only in categories that do not implicate matters of doctrine, creed, or other claims to truth. Foremost among these innocuous categories are those of race, ethnicity, and language: “the Mahdī will always be opposed to prejudices [‘unṣurīyya] of blood, language, color, country, tribe, and so forth…for his call and his government will be world-wide, reaching all humans without preference of any one group or another.”899

Elsewhere, Ṣadr emphasizes that “ethnic hatred will be effaced in the Mahdīst society, given…the government’s provision of abundant and orderly employment opportunities to all people, the prosperity that will encompass all individuals, and the gifts that each will receive from the government, which will free him from preoccupations with class antagonism…Animosity and prejudice between different linguistic groups will also be effaced, for all will be brothers in belief and purpose, brothers in faith and action, and none will be favored except to extent of each individual’s attainment of true perfections.”900

Gender differences, likewise, are based on mere biological differences rather than ideological or doctrinal positions—yet this category of diversity will not enjoy the same equalities as ethnic and linguistic differences. On the one hand, men and women will be subject to different norms of behavior, for “the government will regulate the social relationships between the two genders with laws.”901 In particular, women will continue to face certain traditional restrictions—for instance, “the unveiling of women, in the sense

899 Ibid at 79. 900 Ibid at 468. 901 Ibid. 245

of their uncovering before the eyes of men in un-Islamic and immoral ways, will naturally be forbidden and punishable, not to mention regression and vice in all its forms.”902 On the other hand, women will, despite these restrictions, nonetheless reach unto unprecedented heights in the final society. Ṣadr explains that restrictions such as veiling

“will not in any way obstruct the utmost education of women in the sciences [‘ulūm], her attainment of the most precise knowledge, unto the best and broadest of achievements, nor will it prevent her…from arising to all forms of trade and work, or her association with the society, or her advancing her legal needs.”903 Elsewhere, in commenting on a tradition, Ṣadr explains that “the last ḥadīth which we heard speaks of woman, of the high educational level that she reaches in the age of the Advent…During the deviant society, women suffered from the conditions of ignorance, oppression, and restrainment—but in the global government she will speak with wisdom…will judge in accordance with the Book of God and Sunna of the Prophet…will arise for leadership of an important segment [jānib muhim] of society in the best of ways. And if she will be like this, then how great her condact will be with her husband, and how virtuously she will educate her children!”904

While ethnic, linguistic, and gender differences may endure, religious differences must be effaced within the final society, for attainment unto unity of thought requires common creed. How then does Ṣadr reconcile the contradictions in the Islamic traditions concerning religious diversity versus homogeneity in the final order? Ṣadr’s solution, consistent with his orientation of temporal radicalism and his theory of gradually-attained

902 Ibid. 903 Ibid. 904 Ibid at 540. 246

infallibility, is to assert a slow process whereby religious diversity eventually gives way to homogeneity.

Thus, the initial condition of the social order is that of religious diversity—a diversity that he labels as a “deficiency.” This religious diversity consists, first and foremost, in the presence of non-Muslim minorities. To be sure, at the very outset of the final order, large numbers of the People of the Book will convert to Islam, because “the

Mahdī will reveal the inherited relics of the Prophets in their true form…And these are: the Adam’s chest containing his religious scriptures and laws [tashrī’āt]…the staff of

Moses, the Torah, the scriptures [zubūr], the Gospels, and the other books of God. Then, with these books and inherited relics, he and the Messiah will begin to dialogue with the people of the divine religions, and they will enter into Islam.”905 Nonetheless, not all will convert at the outset, and this remainder “will gradually enter into Islam over the course of time.”906 More particularly, Ṣadr suggests that only through passage of the third level of societal tests, described above, will these remnants within the minority religions convert to Islam “in troops”—for such conversion will be the natural outcome of the unity of thought that is gained through the third level of testing.907

Ṣadr elaborates on two features of this interim period when the People of the

Book are still converting to Islam. To begin with, “they will enter into the Islamic dhimma contract”—which means that they will indeed be required to pay the jizya poll

905 Ibid at 603. 906 Ibid. 907 Ibid at 530. 247

task. 908 To this end, Ṣadr directly addresses some of the contradictions in the underlying traditions:

“[i]t is explicit, in a number of reports, that the public policy of the just government towards the People of the Book, so long as they haven’t converted to Islam, is that of maintaining them in their religion and exacting from them the religious poll-tax [jizya]…Some of the reports attribute this policy to the Messiah, Jesus son of Mary, and others attribute it to the Mahdī, but we’ve learned [elsewhere] that this formal difference reverts to the single action and shared aims that these two Leaders will equally uphold. The apparent meaning is to ‘fix’ the religious poll-tax—i.e. to legislate and implement it, after it had been suspended…prior to the Mahdī’s appearance…Except that we’ve heard in one of the reports that the Mahdī requires the Jews and Christians to choose between Islam and death, just as he does with other infidels and atheists…And this is the view that Majlisī prefers in the Biḥār, wherein he says that “the meaning of the phrase ‘fixing the religious poll-tax’ is that he removes it from the People of the Book and delivers them into Islam”…[But this view of Majlisī] cannot be supported given the much greater number of reports confirming the implementation of the poll-tax…and in any case, the matter is limited to those who remain in the religions of Judaism and Christianity, and at that time they will, in any event, be a small number…”909

Also, as noted in Chapter Two, Ṣadr confirms the veracity of the tradition wherein the

Mahdī will rule among each non-Muslim minority according to their own Book. This concept, Ṣadr clarifies, means “implementation of these books from the perspective of a number of the important laws which are expressed in them, but the meaning is not implementing them in their entirety and in detail.”910 Furthermore, “in every legal matter in which the laws of the government differs from the the ruling of the Books, then the just ruler decides between implementing his law or the their law for them, just as the Muslim jurists also gave opinions on.”911

908 Ibid at 603. 909 Ibid at 612. 910 Ibid at 609-610. 911 Ibid at 611-12. 248

Setting aside the matter of non-Muslim minorities, a second form of religious diversity concerns the multiplicity of understandings of Islam itself, namely “the existence of numerous schools [madhāhib] among those who embrace Islam who don’t manifest opposition to the new order.”912 Ṣadr elaborates on this matter, explaining that there will be a general “deficit in Islamic culture…with respect to the world which encounters Islamic laws for the first time, and this comprises those people who were non- believers [kāfir] prior to the Mahdī’s appearance, and who then accepted Islam afterwards.”913 Yet even those who will enjoy descent from many generations of Islamic lineage will suffer from a “deficit…as a result of having been remote from Islam during the ages of rebelliousness and deviation,” not to mention deficit due to transitioning to the Mahdī’s new “laws…and profound concepts.” 914 Indeed, there will be a “deficit in devotion…among the mass majority of Muslims, for the greatest fruits of the first divine plan is the realization of profound devotion among merely a portion of the Muslims.”915

As with the problem of non-Muslim minorities, these diverse interpretations of

Islam must also be effaced in order for the unity of thought, which constitutes the hallmark of the infallible society, to be achieved. Ṣadr addresses this by discussing “the principal doctrines comprising the foundational disputes between the Imāmites and other uslims—such as the doctrines of justice and the Imāmate.”916 In such matters, Ṣadr is unequivocal that the Mahdī will endorse the doctrinal-school [madhhab] of Twelver

Shī’ism. The Sunnī sources are “totally silent” on this matter—“the only thing that they

[the Sunnīs] can do is to say that he implements the ‘true religion’, but without any clue

912 Ibid at 101-102. 913 Ibid. 914 Ibid. 915 Ibid. 916 Ibid at 67-76. 249

that he first of all will re-orient them towards the true doctrinal-school.”917 Indeed, “the

Mahdī endorses the school-of-thought of Twelver Imāmism…and we have several indications of this…first, it is not possible for the sinless Imāms to upraise their doctrinal-school…but for the Mahdī to disagree with them in his doctrinal-school, and to differ from them in understanding and Islamic beliefs; and second: if we say that the

Mahdī differs from these prior, sinless Imāms in his doctrinal-school, then we must admit to either the nullification of his school or of theirs, given that the doctrinal-school of truth is one in Islam of necessity. But this negation is impossible for either of them, therefore they must all share the same doctrinal-school.”918 It is on these same sectarian grounds that Ṣadr suggests that the initial “companions of the Mahdī”—those who will be entrusted with the duty of promulgating his “educational method”—will most likely be the “Shī’ah,” due to the fact that their doctrinal-school is already largely compatible with that of the Mahdī from the very outset..919

C. Summary of Sunnī and Shī’ite Discourses

As with other aspects of the final world order, ISIS benchmarks the final society according to the Prophet’s polity. Individuals within this final society, though undoubtedly reaching loftier heights of understanding and morality than the preceding society, will nonetheless fall short of the excellence of the Prophet’s companions.

Relationships and dynamics at the group and collective level will, to a great extent, match those of the Prophet’s polity. Thus, diversity due to mere biology or physicality will continue, some forms of which (e.g. ethnic, linguistic, etc.) will enjoy protections of

917 Ibid. 918 Ibid. 919 Ibid at 539. 250

equality, while other forms (e.g. gender) will proceed along traditionally conceived restrictions. Far more problematic, however, are differences concerning matters of doctrine and belief—the primary manifestation of which is religious diversity. In this regard, ISIS expressly rejects modern norms of equality and “human rights.” The bulk of

ISIS’s statements and practice concerning religious co-existence endorse the general structure that ISIS attributes to the Prophet’s polity. In this system, Muslims represent the top social strata, and the only possible mechanisms for non-Muslim faiths to co-exist is either through the protection contract (available to only Jews and Christians, rendering them second-class citizens) or through slavery (unavailable to apostates, who are broadly defined by ISIS to include not only standard offshoots of Islam, but also Shī’ites, Sūfīs, and indeed many Sunnīs who do not subscribe to the ISIS creed). This option of slavery is particularly important because slavery, according to ISIS, is one of the signs of the advent of the final world order. Outside of these two mechanisms of protection and slavery, the default choice presented to non-Muslims is that of conversion or death.

Notwithstanding the bulk of ISIS theory and practice which endorses this general structure, in at least once instance ISIS confirms the tradition which asserts that in the final society, Jesus Christ will abolish the jizya-tax, meaning that all non-Muslims will cease to exist. Unfortunately, ISIS does not expound in detail upon this concept, let alone reconcile it with the second set of traditions that suggest the persistence of religious minorities in the post-Mahdī order.

In contrast, Dā’ūd envisions a final social order that will radically surpass the

Prophet’s polity in its inclusiveness, heterogeneity, and egalitarianism. The basis for this theory of social order is an epistemology of relativism, whereby individuals and groups,

251

despite reaching unprecedented heights of understanding and morality, will nonetheless achieve only partial understandings of the full spectrum of truth. This relativity, in turn, requires the protection and flourishing of diversity of all forms. In illustrating this concept, Dā’ūd lays particular emphasis on ethnic and religious diversity, rather than gender or other forms. Ethnic diversity means that all racial and ethnic groups will live in equality and harmony, reflecting the Islamic norm that the only distinction among people is their level of piety. As to religious diversity, although the social order will be majority

Muslim, it will also include religious minorities, including not only Peoples of the Book, as was the case in early Islamic history, but non-Abrahamic religions as well, and indeed even atheists. Not only will these various religious groups co-exist, but they will do so under an egalitarian framework of equality, a point which Dā’ūd emphasizes in various instances (such as his assertion that blood money for Muslims and non-Muslims will be equal). As to the Muslim majority in the final society, Dā’ūd predicts that Islam itself will be purified, such that it will be rid of both extremist (i.e. Salafī) tendencies, as well as from the legalistic interpretation of Islam common to the jurists. This purified Islam will witness not only a rejuvenation of Ṣūfism, but also a full rapprochement between

Sunnism and Shī’ism—for Shī’ism and Sunnism each have their respective merits, and the Mahdī himself will be “supra-Sunnī and supra-Shī’ite” in his confession.

Default Shī’ite accounts of the final social order typically emphasize its unprecedented quality, expressed in idyllic statements in the traditions, such as “the sheep and wolf will live together while children will play with scorpions and biting creatures without being harmed.” But what will be the nature of the individual, group, and collective within this final society? The standard Shī’ite position is that the individual in

252

the final order will attain unto “perfection” in knowledge and virtue. This trope, however, does not account for a clear epistemological position regarding the subjectivity versus objectivity of truth—which in turn leads to inconsistencies in accounts of social diversity.

On the one hand, theorists such as Amīnī, Kūrānī, and Tabasī agree that ethnic diversity and equality will flourish, and that women will be elevated, but will not reach the status of men. On the other hand, there is considerable disagreement regarding the question of religious diversity. In this regard, views are quite disparate, ranging from visions of religious diversity wherein Islam will co-exist with Religions of the Book, to visions whereby all will convert to Islam, resulting in religious homogeneity. This ambiguity largely echoes the ambiguity of ISIS’s account concerning religious diversity versus homogeneity in the final society.

Ṣadr’s account of the social order elaborates on the standard Shī’ite features, while resolving a number of inconsistencies. To begin with, he confirms the standard

Shī’ite notion of the modal advancement of the final society, describing it as “utopian— loftier than the current reality on all levels, whether relative to the age in which the

ḥadīth was produced, or to the age prior to the Mahdī’s appearance generally.” His depiction of this society not only repeats common tropes—such as “attainment of the utmost brotherhood, peace, and harmony between the individuals of society”—but also explains the root causes of this social utopia. This begins with the Mahdī’s elimination of a number of structural injustices that marred humanity’s pre-Mahdī history. Thus, even the initial society of the final world order will be far more advanced than human society just prior to the Mahdī’s Advent, yet will still be far from its ultimate level of advancement, which is that of infallibility. Individual and collective infallibility will be

253

attained gradually, spanning three long temporal phases of the final government: fallibility in the majority, infallibility in the majority, and then infallibility in the entirety of individuals. These three stages will be traversed due to a government-implemented curriculum of “testing,” the highest level of which produces unity of thought. As such, social diversity will undergo natural changes over these three temporal phases. On the one hand, differences based upon mere physical or biological differences will flourish throughout. More specifically, ethnical and linguistic diversity will endure, under the safeguards of full equality, while gender differences will be partially equalized, for women will attain unto unprecedented heights, and will attain unto achievements in all fields of endeavor, but will nonetheless face certain restrictions. On the other hand, differences based on belief and creed—namely religious differences—will eventually disappear, for unity of thought presupposes the objectivity of truth, and therefore oneness of creed. Thus, although the initial society of the final order will include protected religious minorities paying the religious-poll tax (i.e. People of the Book), all such minorities will eventually convert to Islam (in its Twelver Shī’ite interpretation), constituting one of the hallmarks of the infallible society. In this manner, Ṣadr reconciles the conceptual contradiction latent within the two sets of traditions which suggest the religious homogeneity as well as the heterogeneity of the final society.

254

—CONCLUSION—

OVERALL SUMMARY: FRAMEWORK, PATTERNS, AND FURTHER QUESTIONS

A. Analytic Framework: Time and Modality

Because the topic of final world order has remained understudied in the academic study of Islam, the task of this study has inevitably doubled, for in order to accomplish the primary aim herein—i.e. exposition of specific Islamic theories—it has first been necessary to construct a basic analytic framework in order to navigate through the uncharted subject matter. To this end, the analytic framework constructed herein has divided Islamic discourses on final world order into three phases (before, during, and after the final world order), and has then subdivided each of the three phases into two variables (modality and time). This division and subdivision has yielded the “three sequential problematics of modality and time” depicted in Figure 1 of the Introduction.

While this framework is, admittedly, only one of numerous possible ways of analyzing

Islamic discourses on the final word order, it has been employed herein as a means of accounting for the basic landscape and most fundamental categories of the Islamic discourses. It is the hope of the present author that this framework will enable future scholarship to conduct further and more comprehensive accounts of the topic at hand— accounts that may, indeed, lead to a more refined, or even an altogether different, analytic framework.

Among the three problematics of this framework, this study has limited its inquiry to only the second (i.e. during the final world order), and has relegated exposition of the remaining two problematics (i.e. before and after the final world order) to the author’s

255

separate, forthcoming studies. Nonetheless, for present purposes, it is worth noting the major differences in the fundamental questions and existential stakes of the three problematics. Among all three problematics, the first one, which concerns the teleological precursors to the final world order, is conceptually the most straightforward, its discourses are the most robust and well-formulated, and its existential stakes (i.e. flexibility versus intransigence towards the current, Westphalian order of nation states) are the most easily discernable from the political behavior of contemporary Islamic movements and actors. In contrast, the second problematic, which concerns structures of the final world order (i.e. the focus of the present study) is conceptually more complex, such that fewer movements and thinkers offer explicit speculation. Furthermore, its existential stakes (progressive versus regressive visions of the future) are more abstract and thus less readily observable from ordinary political activity of contemporary movements and agents. Finally, the third problematic, which concerns the end of the final world order, is conceptually the most complex and intractable of all three, thus yielding the most truncated of all three discourses, and its existential stakes (i.e. idealism versus nihilism vis-à-vis humanity’s ultimate destiny) are essentially philosophical and psychological in nature and are thus the most difficult to glean from the political activity of contemporary Islamic movements and agents.

B. Three Patterns that Correlate to Time and Modality

In exposing Islamic theories of structures of the final world order (i.e. the second problematic), this study has not attempted a comprehensive account. Rather, limitations of scope have restricted this study to selected several case studies in order to represent a range of modal and temporal presumptions. As such, the following patterns which have

256

been identified are suggestive rather than conclusive, and await to be corroborated by further research.

1. Sectarian Default and Frontier Orientations

The first pattern concerns the correlation between modal-temporal presumptions and sectarian affiliation. In the Sunnī context, the standard or default presumption—not only by ISIS but indeed by the majority of movements and thinkers—is regressivism, which presumes that the final world order will, except for certain elements expressly stated in the traditions, revert to the structures of the Prophet’s polity (i.e. modal conservatism), and that like the Prophet’s polity, it will last only the reign of its founder, the Mahdī (i.e. temporal conservatism). As noted in the Introduction, this orientation derives largely from the triumphalist and backward-looking ethos underlying the standard doctrine of Caliphate. While regressivism is thus the Sunnī default, theorists at the frontiers of Sunnī discourse, such as Dā’ūd, advocate progressivism, which radically reinterprets the concept of Caliphate, positing a final world order which will fundamentally differ from, and indeed supplant, the initial Islamic polity (i.e. modal- moderatism), and will last considerably longer than the reign of a single leader, perhaps up to multiple generations (i.e. temporal-moderatism). In the Shī’ite context, on the other hand, modal-temporal moderatism represents the standard or default orientation towards the final order, in this case labeled revanchism, due to the chiliastic ethos underlying the doctrine of Imāmate. At the frontiers of Shī’ite discourse, theorists such as Ṣadr endorse idealism which, while affirming the modal-moderatism of the Shī’ite majority, envisions a time horizon wherein the final order lasts for not merely several generations, but indeed for multiple millennia (i.e. temporal-radicalism).

257

2. Quantity and Sophistication of Speculation

The second pattern observed in this study concerns the correlation between modal-temporal presumptions, on the one hand, and the sheer quantity as well as conceptual sophistication of theories, on the other. In general, the greater the conservatism of modal or temporal assumptions, the less distinctive and significant the final world order is presumed to be, and thus the fewer the incentives for a prospective theorist to engage in detailed or sophisticated speculation. Conversely, the greater the shift away from modal conservatism, the more that a theory must explicitly distinguish humanity’s ultimate future from its past, while the greater the shift away from temporal conservatism, the broader the final order’s temporal horizon which a theorist must fill with nuance, detail, and purpose. As such, the four default and frontier positions within

Sunnism and Shī’ism, respectively, comprise an ascending scale of both quantity and sophistication of literature within the overall Islamic discourses.

In accordance with this ascending scale, each Chapter of this study has first presented the case study of ISIS (i.e. regressivism), which represents the least explicit and most terse of all accounts herein of the final order. Given the dearth of explicit commentary by ISIS, many features of its theory can only be inferred or extrapolated from the paltry statements (typically quotations from traditions) that ISIS makes regarding the nature of the world during the End Times. Next, each Chapter has presented the case studies of modal-temporal moderatism, first in its Sunnī variety (i.e. progressivism) and then in its Shī’ite variety (i.e. revanchism)—and it is within this orientation that we see the beginning of explicit speculation on the structures of the final order. Such statements are typically made not within monographs dedicated to the topic,

258

but rather within the context of more general speculation on the apocalypse, particularly books and essays which elaborate primarily on the apocalyptic drama which will occur prior to the establishment of the final world order. Within this context, such speculation on the final order is often tangential to the primary purposes of the theorists, and is therefore conceptually unsatisfying, tending to echo tropes of the final order without rigorous analysis, and failing to reconcile conceptual contradictions latent within the underlying Islamic traditions. Finally, each Chapter has presented the case of temporal- radicalism, namely Ṣadr, wherein explicit speculation on the final order finds its most comprehensive and sophisticated expression (i.e. idealism). Not only does Ṣadr dedicate two entire monographs (exceeding 600 and 700 pages, respectively) to the topic, but within his account, the superficial tropes of the final order are merely starting points from which he posits elaborate theories of structures and attempts to reconcile the conceptual contradictions that other authors either ignore or address haphazardly.

3. Progress versus Regress

The third and most important pattern observed in this study is that the more conservative that modal or temporal presumptions may be, the more regressive the accounts of the final order—while the greater the shift away from conservatism, the more progressive the accounts become.

(i) Sunnī Discourses

Of the various accounts considered in this study, ISIS has represented the baseline case, for its theory of the final order is clearly most regressive of all accounts considered herein. In the political domain, ISIS envisions a final government comprising nine basic functions attributed to the Prophet’s polity, yet differs therefrom in three ways stated in

259

the traditions: (i) the Mahdī is not a prophet but merely a Caliph—and therefore the highest leadership is merely an executive power; (ii) the government’s jurisdiction will be global rather than confined to Medina; (iii) the final polity will enjoy global peace and security, unlike the constant insecurity of the Prophet’s polity. In the legal domain, the final order match the Prophet’s polity even more closely, for the status of the Mahdī and

Christ as mere executors of the Sharī’ah means that no new legislative order will be introduced, and the Sunnī traditions provide no statements to the contrary. Thus, modern positive law (equated with polytheism), as well certain features of conventional Islamic law (e.g. multiple legal schools) will be discarded and replaced with a jurisprudence of minimalism based on direct interpretation [ijtiḥād] of the Qur’ān and Sunna. The final economy, likewise, will revert to the cooperative ethos and transactional norms of the

Prophet’s polity, but, as stated in the traditions, will differ therefrom in its great prosperity, which will derive primarily from miraculous, agricultural sources. Lastly, the social order will be one in which individuals will approach, yet fall short of, the moral excellence of the Prophet’s companions, while group dynamics will mirror those of the

Prophet’s polity. As such, ethnic and linguistic diversity will flourish with equality, gender differences will observe traditional restrictions, while religious diversity will experience the greatest inequality. As to the latter, ISIS equivocates, suggesting in one instance the complete absence of non-Muslims (implied in the tradition that Christ will abolish the religious poll-tax) and elsewhere that Jews and Christians might endure through the protection contract (rendering them second-class citizens), apostates must choose between conversion and death, while all other non-believers (e.g. polytheists, etc.)

260

might endure if subjugated through slavery—an institution that will flourish in the end times.

Dā’ūd, in contrast, offers a Sunnī vision of final order which is considerably more progressive than that of ISIS. In describing political structure, Dā’ūd redefines the key,

Sunnī concept of Caliphate according to modern, non-Islamic forms (such the German

Federation of the 19th Century), thus conceiving of the Mahdī as a “president” (who nonetheless holds legislative and judicial powers) and positing four operating principles of governance: justice, meritocracy, cooperation, and democratic consultation. Scant detail is offered, however, regarding political successorship or the nature of administrative institutions. As for the legal system, it will discard both conventional

Islamic and Western jurisprudence, for the Mahdī, in his capacity as legislator, will inaugurate an entirely new “legislative order” distinguished by a jurisprudence of minimalism (which in turn reflects social conditions of tolerance, prosperity, and love, which render excessive legalism unnecessary). In the economic domain, Dā’ūd does not deny miraculous sources of prosperity, but primarily emphasizes ordinary planning (not only in the agricultural sector, but also in robotics, computer science, and communications) as well as transactional norms that will not revert to the Prophet’s polity, but rather will comprise a new system, best summarized as “spiritualized market- socialism.” Lastly, the social order will differ from the Prophet’s polity in its inclusiveness, heterogeneity, and egalitarianism. At its basis is an epistemology of relativism, whereby individuals and groups, though reaching unprecedented heights of understanding and morality, will nonetheless only achieve only partial understandings of truth. This relativity requires the protection and flourishing of diversity of all forms—

261

particularly religious, for although Muslims will comprise a majority, the society will include religious minorities (Peoples of the Book and otherwise) and even atheists, all of which will enjoy equality. Islam itself, for that matter, will be rid of extremism (i.e.

Salafism) and legalism (i.e. jurists and their sway), will witness a rejuvenation of Ṣūfism, and will enjoy a full rapprochement between Sunnism and Shī’ism.

(ii) Shī’ite Discourses

In the Shī’ite context, Tabasī, Amīnī, and Kūrānī envision a final order which is progressive, but tend to offer conclusory statements in that regard, and leave many points of analysis, as well as conceptual inconsistencies, unaddressed. In the political domain, they agree with Dā’ūd in rejecting the possibility of returning to the initial Islamic polity—but also reject the possibility of modern, Western political political forms (as does ISIS). Instead, these authors invoke Shī’ite traditions emphasizing that the final polity will be utterly unprecedented, that it will be an era of global peace, and that it will be ruled by the Mahdī, a superhuman figure who will in turn delegate to an administrative apparatus of superhuman bureaucrats. These statements however, hardly amount to a positive definition of political form, nor do they give details regarding administration, bureaucracy, or successorship. Similarly, traditions are emphasized suggesting an utterly novel legal system, but the tendency is to emphasize, in a seemingly haphazard manner, particular aspects of this legal system (ranging from its overall purposes to its positive laws) rather than reconciling these disparate elements into coherent, overarching theory.

As to the final economy, traditions are cited which suggest miraculous agricultural boom

(as with the ISIS account), and are typically supplemented with other traditions which these authors interpret as breakthroughs in the fields of communications, information

262

technology, transportation, and medicine. Theories of an overarching economic system within which this prosperity will be organized are, unfortunately, lacking. Lastly, as to the final social order, these authors emphasize that individuals will attain unto “perfection” in knowledge and virtue, but such claims typically lack a clear epistemological grounding

(i.e. the subjectivity versus objectivity of truth) which in turn leads to inconsistencies in accounts of social diversity. Though virtually all theorists agree that ethnic diversity and equality will flourish and that women will be elevated (though still inferior to men), there is considerable disagreement regarding religious diversity, for some theorists envision the co-existence of Islam with Religions of the Book, while others suggest a homogenously

Muslim society (mirroring ISIS’s equivocation).

In contrast, Ṣadr’s theory not only envisions a progressive final order, but resolves the conceptual inconsistencies unaddressed by the other authors and provides multiple basis for such progress rather than merely offering conclusory statements to that end. In describing political structures, Ṣadr first gives a detailed critique of all prior political forms (particularly the current, international order of nation-states), and then states a positive theory addressing the form, geography, leadership, administration, and bureaucracy of the final polity, and emphasizing its gradual transformation from autocracy to democracy throughout three temporal phases. As to the legal system, he similarly begins with a historical critique of previous legal systems, then theorizes an unprecedented, final system wherein he addresses legal theory, judicial procedure, conflicts of laws, and enumerates specific public policies and positive laws in various domains (e.g. social relations, education, crimes, transactions, public health, and religious practice). In describing the final economy, Ṣadr dismisses sophomoric notions of sudden

263

and miraculous prosperity, arguing instead that prosperity will be realized through an unprecedented economic system, the bases of which will be: (i) government dominion over all sectors; (ii) universal social welfare through universal employment and financial assistance; (iii) limited private ownership; and (iv) economic morality. Through this system, prosperity will be achieved through practical means (beginning with agriculture and mining, and then followed by other sectors, particularly communications, transportation, and information). Most importantly, this prosperity will be achieved gradually, and the end result of universal prosperity will transform basic concepts, such that “ownership,” “theft,” and so forth to be meaningless. Lastly, the society of the final order will traverse three stages: fallibility in the majority of individuals, infallibility in the majority of individuals, and infallibility in the entirety of individuals. Because the hallmark of infallibility is unity of thought (i.e. the objectivity of truth), traversing these stages means that religious differences will eventually disappear. Religions of the Book will thus persist at first, but eventually all will convert to Islam (thereby reconciling the conceptual conflict in the underlying traditions). On the other hand, ethnic and linguistic difference will flourish throughout the final order under safeguards of equality, while gender differences will be partially equalized, for women will attain unto unprecedented heights in all fields of endeavor, but will nonetheless face certain restrictions.

(iii) Islamic Discourses in the Aggregate

Within their respective sectarian contexts, progressivism and idealism, as represented by Dā’ūd and Ṣadr, respectively, appear to be largely analogous—for although they differ considerably from one another in their specific accounts of structures, the manner in which Dā’ūd differs from the Sunnī majority is arguably quite similar to

264

the manner in which Ṣadr differs from the Shī’ite majority. On the one hand, the Sunnī default, insofar as it envisions the future ideal as a regression to the bygone structures of the past, is characterized by a self-serving and backward-looking ethos. Dā’ūd’s account, however, explicitly rejects this ethos, for his modal and temporal assumptions ground a conception whereby the final order benefits not just the Sunnī community, or even the

Muslim community as a whole, but rather a broad array of humanity, including non-

Muslims and even atheists. The Shī’ite default, on the other hand, ostensibly resembles

Dā’ūd’s “frontier” account, for in its common modal-temporal moderatism, it too envisions a future ideal as one of progress rather than regress. But insofar as the aim of this progress within the Shī’ite default position is the vengeful correction of historic wrongs, its fundamental ethos, like that of the Sunnī default, remains self-serving and backward-looking. In contrast, Ṣadr’s account—analogous to that of Dā’ūd in the Sunnī context—explicitly rejects this default Shī’ite ethos, for his temporal assumptions ground a vision of the future in which the correction of historic wrongs suffered by the Shī’ites is quickly forgotten and eclipsed by unprecedented horizons for all of humanity.

C. Questions for Further Research

Although the case studies employed herein are highly suggestive of the modal- temporal patterns just enumerated (i.e. sectarianism, quantity and quality, and progress versus regress), it is left to further studies to provide comprehensive surveys of the

Islamic discourses on the final order and to thereby confirm these hypotheses. Critical to this task will be establishing a basic account of an entire dimension of theories that has been excluded from this study, namely modal radicalism, which, as mentioned in the

Introduction, presumes that the final world order will not merely surpass the Prophet’s 7th

265

Century polity, but will entirely abrogate Islam and supplant it with a post-Islamic world order (a view that is in turn based on a conception of the Mahdī and Christ as being invested with the plenary powers of Prophethood and/or Messengership). Likewise, whereas the present study has limited its inquiry to orthodox Shī’ite and Sunnī sources, accounts of numerous “non-orthodox” interpretations of Islam have yet to be considered

(e.g., Ismī’īlism, Drūze, Aḥmadīyya, etc.).

Beyond accounting for these basic categorical differences, it is left to further research to address variations that inevitably exist within the same categories—i.e. among among theorists who share not only the same sectarian, but also the same modal-temporal orientation. This inherent variation has already been demonstrated herein by juxtaposition of the views of Tabasī, Amīnī, and Kūrānī—all three of which are Shī’ites and share the same orientation of modal-temporal moderatism, yet nonetheless disagree on various details within their respective visions of the final world order. This same variation no doubt persists within each Sunnī and Shī’ite category considered in this study. For example, further studies will presumably confirm that the majority of Sunnī theories share ISIS’s basic assumptions of time and modality (for regressivism, after all, represents the default Sunnī orientation). Yet a comprehensive survey of accounts within the Sunnī majority will no doubt demonstrate that numerous theorists disagree with ISIS concerning specific details of the final world order, in the same manner that Tabasī,

Kūrānī, and Amīnī’s accounts differ from one another.

When Islamic theories of final world order are accounted for more comprehensively, new horizons of comparative and interdisciplinary inquiry will, in turn,

266

be unlocked. Numerous questions arise in this regard, a sampling of which include the following:

1. In what ways do contemporary Islamic theories of final world order differ from

classical Islamic conceptions of final world order? For example, do the classical

theories envision the final world order as one of perfect human happiness and

prosperity—and if so, then do contemporary theories replace this goal with that of

perfect political, economic, and social systems?

2. How do Islamic theories of final world order reconcile with standard doctrines of

other branches of the Islamic sciences? For example, do theories of final world

order disrupt the Ash’arite presumption of humanity’s direct encounter with God?

Do theories of the Reckoning and Judgment (at the end of the final world order)

reconcile with transactional rules pertaining to debtors and creditors within

conventional Islamic legal theory [uṣūl al-fiqh]? How do theories of final world

order compare with Platonic conceptions of political utopia espoused within

Islamic philosophy?

3. To what extent do Islamic theories of the final order betray the general tendency

towards simplication which characterizes Islamic modernism (particularly in the

form of systems theory)? This possibility seems highly likely, for in modern

Islamic political thought, theories of Islamic nation-state already simplify the

ambiguity and complexity that dominated the classical Islamic period, wherein

jurisprudence, juridical dissent [ikhtilāf], and scholarly tradition held sway. In

contrast, Islamic theories of the final world order appear to represent an even

greater tendency towards systematization, the correction of history, the discarding

267

of ambiguity and complexity, and the reduction of the possibilities for individual

discretion in decision-making.

4. What are the various motivations which prompt theorists to speculate on the final

world order? For example, when is speculation prompted by a genuine desire to

envision the future, versus feigned interest in the future which in fact betrays a

desire to critique contemporary Islamic and/or non-Islamic practices?

These and other such questions concerning Islamic theories of final world order still await to be answered.

268

—APPENDIX A—

THE FIRST PROBLEMATIC OF FINAL WORLD ORDER: SUGGESTED ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

As noted in the Introduction to this study, the first problematic of final world order concerns forms of world order before the final order, insofar as they are understood to be teleological precursors or antecedents to the latter. The primary matter at stake in this problematic is whether contemporary agents (i.e. Islamic movements and thinkers) should adopt an attitude of flexibility and patience, versus intransigence and urgency, towards the current world order of nation-states. This, in turn, differentiates between those Islamic movements and thinkers that pursue their aims by working within the present, Westphalian nation-state system, and those that vehemently opposed it.

As noted, this problematic can be reduced to the ariables of modality and time.

Modality concerns the debate over legitimate forms of precursors: do only a limited range of “Islamic” political forms (e.g. Caliphate) qualify as legitimate antecedents, or do “non-

Islamic” political forms (e.g., the modern nation-state) also qualify as instruments for actualizing the final order? On the other hand, the variable of time concerns concerns the question: when will this phase of precursors, expire, yielding to the final world order?

Conceptions of this variable of time can vary greatly, ranging from expectations of the imminent advent of the final order, to a deflection of the final order to the distant future.

In describing these two variables of time and modality, the conservative- moderate-radical typology, if employed, should indicate the relative degrees to which various theories threaten to disrupt the current, Westphalian order of nation states.

As such, for the variable of modality:

269

 Conservative would denote full acceptance of the nation-state as an end in

itself (i.e. a categorical rejection of the advent of final world order);

 Moderate would imply toleration or accommodation of the nation-state,

but only as a legitimate means towards the end of final world order;

 Radical would suggest categorical rejection of the nation-state as an

unacceptable instrument for actualizing the final order.

Likewise, for the variable of temporality:

 Conservative denotes the view that nation-states need not ever expire;

 Moderate indicates the notion that nation-states will indeed yield to the

final order, but not until the unknown (and likely distant) future;

 Radical suggests that the imminent expiration of nation-states (and advent

of final order).

These definitions yield the following framework for differentiating various theories of precursors to final world order. While Box 1 represents the least disruption to the present world order of nation-states, Box 9 represents the breatest disruption thereto:

Modal-Temporal Framework for Analyzing Theories of Precursors to the Final Order

270

—APPENDIX B—

THE THIRD PROBLEMATIC OF FINAL WORLD ORDER: SUGGESTED ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

As also noted in the Introduction, the third problematic of final world order concerns that which follows the final world order—namely, Judgment Day and the end of the world. The primary matter at stake herein is the proper existential outlook that contemporary Islamic movements and thinkers should adopt towards humanity’s ultimate destiny: pessimism and nihilism, on the one hand, or optimism and idealism, on the other.

As with the first and second problematics, this third problematic is also largely reducible to the variables of time and modality. In this case, the variable of time concerns the question of whether the “end” is to be literally understood as the end of time and humanity due to the destruction of the physical cosmos, or rather has a metaphorical meaning, suggesting the end of an era or epoch of history, and the birth of a new beginning. On the other hand, the variable of modality concerns the proximate causes of this end, and whether this conclusion amounts to the “success” of the final world order, or its failure and miscarriage.

In describing these two variables, the conservative-moderate-radical typology, if used, should be redefined in order to describe the the degree to which a given theory imaginges the very existence of humanity and the physical cosmos to be conserved versus disrupted.

Thus, for the variable of modality:

 Conservative would describe theories that presume the ‘success’ of

humanity in the final end;

271

 Moderate would indicate a neutral result—perhaps one of partial success

and partial failure;

 Radical would indicate a clear failure.

Likewise, for the temporal variable:

 Conservative would indicate a figurative meaning for the “end of time,”

and therefore the uninterrupted continuation of humanity and the physical

cosmos;

 Moderate could refer to hybrid theories wherein, for example, humanity

perishes, but the physical cosmos continues;

 Radical could refer to theories that assert the unequivocal end to humanity

and the physical cosmos.

In the aggregate, these definitions yield the following analytic framework for distinguishing between various theories of the end of the final world order. While Box 1 represents the least threat or disruption to humanity and the physical cosmos, Box 9 represents the greatest disruption thereto:

Modal-Temporal Framework for Analyzing Theories of the End of the Final Order

272

—APPENDIX C—

OUTLINE OF CONTENTS:

“A HISTORY OF WHAT WILL OCCUR AFTER THE MAHDĪ’S ADVENT” [ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MAHDĪ , VOLUME III]920 BY MUḤAMMAD ṢĀDIQ ṢĀDIQ AL-ṢADR

1. Introduction (pp.1-31) a. Importance of the topic b. Methods of argument c. Difficulty of the discourse/topic d. Solving the difficulty e. Organization of the book

2. Part One: Antecedents and Introduction to the Mahdī’s Advent (pp.31-189) a. Chapter 1: The general foundational principles of the Mahdī’s Advent (31-111) i. Relationship between the Advent the general divine plan ii. Resulting affect of the Greater Occultation on what is after the Advent iii. Fixing the time of the Advent via it’s conditions and signs iv. General ideology of the Mahdī (his religion, doctrinal-school, position, structure of government) v. The divine plan for after the Mahdī’s Advent and its relation to the prior divine plan b. Chapter 2: Events prior to the Mahdī’s Advent (111-189) i. Natural phenomena (eclipse, cry, the Call, rain) ii. Societal phenomena (Dajjāl, Gog and Magog, Sufyānī, al-Nafs al-Zakīyya)

3. Part Two: Events of the Mahdī’s Advent and the Global Government (pp.189-626) a. Chapter 1: From the Advent to the road to ‘Iraq (189-308) i. Meaning of the Advent ii. History of the Advent iii. His first speeches iv. Companions of the Mahdī v. First miracles of Mahdī until arriving in Iraq b. Chapter 2: Conquering the world with justice (309-440) i. Starting point ii. Extent of the breadth of his empire iii. Guarantors of the victory iv. The nature and length of his supremacy in the world v. Position/status of others vi. How long will the Mahdī rule c. Chapter 3: Implementing Mahdist Islam—Global Mahdist Government (441-612)

920 Muḥammad Ṣādiq Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr, Mawsū’at al-imām al-mahdī, al-jild al-thālith: tārīkh mā ba’d al-ẓuhūr (1978).

273

i. Mahdī’s coming with a new Cause [amr] and new Book ii. Mahdī’s position concerning political, social matters prior to him iii. Guarantors of quick and deep realization of justice in the world iv. Leadership of his companions and extent of their capacities v. The Mahdī’s testing of his companions and umma vi. The Mahdī’s methods of educating/training his umma vii. Some of Mahdī’s accomplishments in social and economic domains viii. Mahdī’s position vis-à-vis People of Book and descent of Jesus to his government d. Chapter [4]: The end of the Mahdī’s life (pp.613-626)

4. Part Three: The World After the Mahdī (pp.627-666) a. Chapter 1: Leadership after the Mahdī (627-655) b. Chapter 2: the Coming of the Hour (655-666)

5. Sources for this History

6. Index

274

—BIBLIOGRAPHY—

A. Primary Sources

1. Classical

Albani, M. Nāṣir a-Dīn. Silsilat al-aḥādīth al-ṣaḥīḥah wa-shayʾ min fiqhihā wa- fawāʾidihā (al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1969).

Bukhārī, Muḥammad b. Isma’īl. Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī: the translation of the meanings of Sahih al-Bukhari: Arabic-English (Dārussalām Publications, 1997).

Ibn al-Munādī, Aḥmad b. Jaʻfar. al-Malāḥim (Qum: Dār al-Sīrah, 1998).

Ibn Taymīyyah, Aḥmad ibn ʻAbd al-Ḥalīm. Majmū’āt al-Fatāwa (al-Riyāḍ: Maktabat al-ʻUbaykān, 1998).

Khuzāʻī , Nuʻaym b. Ḥammād. Kitāb al-fitan (Beirut, Dār al-Fikr, 1993).

Majlisī, M. Bāqir. Biḥār al-anwār al-jāmiʿat li-durar akhbār al-āʾimmat al-āthār (Beirut, 2001).

Nuʻmānī, Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm. Kitāb al-ghaybah (Jamī’ Ḥuqūq, 2011).

Al-Sijistānī, Abū Dā’ūd Sulaymān b. al-Ash’ath. Sunan Abī Dā’ūd (Beirut, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīyya, 2008).

Sulamī, Yūsuf b. Yaḥya. ‘Aqd al-durar fī akhbār al-muntaẓar (Beirut, Dār al- Kutub al-‘Ilmīyyah, 2009).

al-Suyūṭī, Jalāl al-Dīn ʻAbd al-Raḥmān b. Abī Bakr b. Muḥammad. al-Ḥāwī lil- fatāwī fī al-fiqh wa-ʻulūm al-tafsīr wa-al -ḥadīth wa-al-uṣūl wa-al-naḥw wa-al- iʻrāb wa-sāʾir al-funūn (Beirut, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīyyah, 1982).

Ṭūsī, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan. Kitāb al-ghaybah (Beirut, Manshūrāt al-Riḍā lil- Ṭibāʻah wa-al-Nashr wa-al-Tawzī’, 2008).

2. Contemporary Sunnī: ISIS

al-Adnānī, Abū Muḥammad. This is the Promise of God (Al-Hayat Media Center, 2014).

al-Bin’alī, Abū Sufyān Turkī b. Mubārak. al-Qiyāfa fī ‘adam ishṭirāṭ al-tamkīn al- kāmil lil-khilāfa (2014).

275

Al-Furqān Media Center. And they Gave Zakāt [video] (2015).

al-Hayat Media Center. Dabiq Magazine, Issues 1-13 (2014-2016).

al-Maṣrī, Abū Ayyūb. al-Dawla al-nabawīyya (2008).

Media Office of North Baghdād Province. Photographic Report: Aspect of the Spoils of the Islamic State in the Battle of Nazem with the Safavid Army Near the Nibai Region (2015).

Research and Fatwa Committee (transl. Aymenn Jawad al-Tamīmī). “Clarifying the Ruling on the Education System in the Nusayri [Alawite] Government [of Syria]” (2014).

______. Series of Fatwas Issued by the Committee of Research and Fatwas (2015).

Sharī’ah Committee for Raqqa Province. Recording the Muslims for Contribution to Orphans of Fay’ in the Eastern District of the Province (2015).

______. Announcement on Contributing Ghanīma and Fay’ to Orphans (2014).

al-Tamīmī, ‘Uthmān b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān. I’lām al’anām bi-milād dawla al-islām (2006-7).

3. Contemporary Sunnī: Muḥammad ‘Īsa Dā’ūd

Dā’ūd, Muḥammad ‘Īsa. Bushrá al-samāʼ: dawlat āl al-bayt qādimah: muslimūn wa-masīḥīyūn min aʻḍāʼ ḥizb al-mahdī al-muntaẓar (Cairo: Madbūlī al-Ṣaghīr, 2006).

______. al-Mafājāt: bushrāki yā quds: al-mahdī yaḥkumu al-ʻālam min ʻarsh al-quds (Cairo: Madbūlī al-Ṣaghīr, 2001).

______. Mahdī al-muntaẓar ʻalá al-abwāb (‘Arabīyya al-Ṭabā’a wa-l-Nushr, 1997) .

4. Contemporary Sunnī: Other

‘Abd al-Ḥakīm, Manṣūr. Nihāyat al-‘Ālam wa-ashrāṭ al-sā’ah (Damascus, Dār al- Kitāb al-‘Arabī, 2004).

Ghuzlan, Mahmoud. Statement on behalf of Muslim Brotherhood (Ahram News, February 12, 2012)

276

Jamāl al-Dīn, Amīn.‘Umr ummat al-islām wa qurb ẓuhūr al-mahdī (Cairo, 1996)

Maududi, Sayyid Abū al-A’lā Maulana. A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in Islam (Kuala Lumpur, The Other Press, 2009)

al-Qaeda. God Has Withheld Information Regarding the Mahdī’s Personage from Our Religious Community Prior to His Advent (2006).

al-Sirsawī, Abū ‘Abdallah Māzin b. Muḥammad. Kashf al-maknūn fī al-radd ‘ala kitāb harmījīdūn (Cairo, al-Maktabat al-Salāmīyya, 2002)

Zakī, ‘Ādil. al-Mahdī: dawlat al-islām al-qāḍīma wa al-khilāfa al-akhīra (Beirut, Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 2005)

Zawāhirī, Ayman. Letter of instruction to Abū Mus’ab al-Zarqāwī (July 9, 2005).

5. Contemporary Shī’ite (Directly Examined in this Study)

Amīnī, Ibrāhīm. Al-Imām Al-Mahdī, the Just Leader of Humanity (1987). Translation of Dādgustar-i jahān ya Mahdī-yi mawʾūd (Qum, Muʾassasah-ʾi Maṭbūʾātī-yi Dār al-Fikr (1967).

Kūrānī, ‘Alī. ʻAṣr al-ẓuhūr (Bayrūt: Mu’assasat Shahīd, 1988).

Tabasī, Najmuddīn. Overview of the Mahdī’s Government (2006). Translation of Nishānahʹhāʼī az dawlat-i mawʻūd (Qum: Būstān-i Kitāb-i Qum, 2006).

al-Ṣadr, Muḥammad Ṣādiq Ṣādiq. Mawsūʻat al-Imām al-Mahdī, volume 3: Tārīkh mā ba’d ul-ẓuhūr (Beirut: Dar al-ta’āruf al-maṭbū’āt, 1978).

______. Mawsūʻat al-Imām al-Mahdī, volume 4: al-Yawm al-maw’ūd (Beirut: Dar al-ta’āruf al-maṭbū’āt, 1978).

6. Contemporary Shī’ite (Identified But Not Examined in this Study)

See sources listed in Footnote 37 above.

B. Secondary Sources

Amanat, Abbas. Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shī’ism (I.B. Tauris, 2009).

______. Imagining the End: Visions of Apocalypse from the Ancient Middle East to Modern America (I.B. Tauris, 2011).

277

Balqaziz, Abdallah. The State in Contemporary Islamic Thought: a Historical Survey of the Major Muslim Political Thinkers of the Modern Era (I.B. Tauris, 2009).

Cook, David. Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic (Princeton, Darwin Press 2002).

______. Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature (Syracuse University Press, 2005).

Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought (I.B. Tauris, 2009).

Filiu, Jean-Pierre. Apocalypse in Islam (University of California Press, 2011).

Hussein, Fouad. al-Zarqāwī: al-jīl al-thānī lil-Qāʻidah (Beirut, Dār al-Khayyāl lil-Tibāʻah wa-al-Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʻ, 2005).

Kadhim, Abbas. The Hawza Under Siege: A Study in the Ba’th Party Archive (Boston University, IISBU Occasional Paper #1, June 2013)

Khalaji, Mehdi. Apocalyptic Politics: on the Rationality of Iranian Policy (The Washington Insitute for Near East Policy, 2008).

Masud, Muhammad Khalid. The Doctrine of Siyāsa in Islamic Law, in Recht van de Islam 18 (2001).

Mavani, Hamid. Religious Authority and Political Thought in Twelver Shi'ism: From Ali to Post-Khomeini (Routledge, 2013).

McCants, William. The ISIS Apocalypse: the History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

Nasr, Wali. The Shia Revival: How Conflicts will Shape Islam in the Future (New York, Norton, 2007).

Rivkin, Mara. Legal Foundations of the Islamic State (The Brookings Institute, 2016).

Wood, Graeme. What ISIS Really Wants and How to Stop It (The Atlantic, March 2015).

Wright, Lawrence. The Master Plan (The New Yorker, September 11, 2006)

278