Reading the Egyptian Revolution Through the Lens Of

Reading the Egyptian Revolution Through the Lens of US Policy in South Korea Circa 1980: Revelations in US Declassified Documents 米国の1980年ごろの韓国における政策を通してエジプトの革命を読む−−非機密化された文書に見える新事実

Tim Shorrock

Reading the Egyptian Revolution Tahrir Square uprising Through the Lens of US Policy in South Korea Circa 1980: Revelations As the mass and social media beamed the so- in US Declassified Documents called “Arab Spring” around the world, analysts and pundits in the United States quickly began Tim Shorrock comparing the revolts to past uprisings, particularly those during the Cold War, which Since early 2011, major peoples’ revolutions had shaken U.S. foreign policy. A favorite topic, have swept through North Africa and the particularly on Fox News, was Egypt’s Middle East. Most recently, the revoltspurported similarity to the Iranian revolution of engulfed Syria and Libya, leading to enormous 1979, which toppled the pro-US Shah of Iran violence in both countries and a NATO-led and eventually led to a Shiite Islamic state bombing campaign in the latter. By far the hostile to the United States. A few most important to the United States was the opportunistic neocon voices also compared the uprising in Egypt, where the military took Obama administration’s public support for advantage of a popular insurrection to stage a Mubarak’s opponents to Washington’s past coup against Hosni Mubarak, a 30-year U.S. actions to pressure Ferdinand Marcos and ally whose military forces and intelligence Suharto to end their dictatorial rule in the services had – and continue to have - extremely Philippines and Indonesia once popular close ties to Washington. In August, Mubarak uprisings had already sealed their fate. will face trial for corruption and murdering protesters during the uprising that engulfed But not a single analyst or journalist of note Cairo’s Tahrir Square for 18 days in January. mentioned what remains one of the most He could face the death penalty if convicted. significant rebellions against a US-backed tyrant of the past half-century: the student and worker uprising in South Korea in 1979 and 1980, which was mercilessly crushed by the Korean military with the US support. Korea didn’t even make the list of near-revolutions: in mid-February, PBS published a list of “30 Years of Uprisings” that had “brought down governments and transformed societies” or were either “dissipated” or “crushed.” The list included Iran, the Philippines, the Baltics, China’s Tiananmen Square, the 1997 Kosovo

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Rebellion against Serbia and the 1998released those documents in 1996 and wrote Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela – but about them in the Journal of Commerce, the unaccountably skipped South Korea as well as daily newspaper where I once worked, and the Taiwan. Korean weekly Sisa Journal.

The deletion is perplexing. The South Korean Those papers, some of which were further democratic uprising of the 1980s was a declassified in 2005 with the help of the transforming event in Korean history. It began National Security Archive in Washington, with the assassination of dictator Park Chung provide a perfect lens to illuminate how the Hee in October 1979 at the hand of his own CIA Obama administration may have responded to director, and culminated in an armed peoples’ the events in Egypt this year. uprising in May 1980 in the city of Kwangju against the reimposition of military rule by Lt. Egypt, Like South Korea, A cornerstone for General Chun Doo Hwan, who put down the US Policy rebellion with great force. With Kwangju as its Let’s begin this analysis by retracing the recent symbol, the uprising climaxed seven years later events in Egypt and its peculiar relationship (1987) in a national revolt that, like Egypt’s, with the United States. Egypt has long been a brought millions of ordinary citizens into the cornerstone of US strategy in the Middle East. streets and forced the military to finally relinquish power. In the end, the Korean citizens’ movement created one of the most vibrant democracies in East Asia and changed the dynamics of the Cold War in Asia by giving voice to a democratic opposition that called for peace and the end of hostility toward North Korea.

The South Korean experience was also a textbook example of how a US administration deals with the toppling of a dictator who has long been friendly and subordinate to US economic and security interests, and how it US Army Black Hawk Helicopters lift off handles the delicate task of ostensibly from Cairo West Air Base During Bright supporting “democracy” while taking steps, Star Joint Military Exercise, Oct 6, 1999 publicly and covertly, to maintain the essential elements of a system protective of US interests. The United States played a central role in Long regarded as the most influential nation in Kwangju by granting permission to Chun to the Middle East, its 1979 peace treaty with deploy a Korean Army division from the Joint Israel made it a major military ally of the U.S.-South Korean Command to Kwangju to United States. From 2001 it would become a crush the rebellion. major prop in the “global war on terror.” Most of its generals and senior officers were trained The Carter administration’s strategy as it at US institutions such as the National Defense responded to the Korean events first came to University and the Army’s Command and light in a trove of 4,000 declassified documents General Staff College. (The curriculum of the I obtained over a period of years in the 1990s latter, according to theAssociated under the Freedom of Information Act. I Press, includes “instruction in human rights,

2 9 | 28 | 3 APJ | JF the principle of civilian control of the military, As the street protests and confrontations with the US Constitution and other elements of Mubarak supporters intensified over the democracy.”) Like South Korea from 1961 to following week, Secretary of Defense Robert 1987, every Egyptian president since the 1950s Gates and Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike has emerged from its military. It currently Mullen held regular, sometimes daily, receives about $1.3 billion per year in US telephone meetings with the Egyptian generals. military aid, second only to Israel, and the Off the record, they argued (according to the Pentagon has some 625 personnel stationed in AP) that these close ties helped the Egyptian the country to assure peace along the border military “keep its soldiers from attacking with Israel and to coordinate weapons sales protestors seeking to topple” Mubarak. from General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin and other US weapons suppliers. On February 11, clearly under orders from the military, Mubarak finally called it quits, stepped aside and handed executive power to his appointed vice president (and intelligence chief), Gen. Omar Suleiman. Egypt ever since has been under direct military rule, and a period of relative calm has set in while the restive population prepares for Mubarak’s trial and elections later this year. Many of President Obama’s public comments, such as his February 12 appeal to the Egyptian Army’s “restraint and professionalism” further solidified Washington’s ties with the military in Mubarak and Obama a time of turmoil. Yet the situation was far from settled. Even as Mubarak was fleeing Cairo in the early days of the revolt, the Egyptian army Throughout the crisis of January and February was warning workers and newly formed 2010, these military relationships were the independent unions against work stoppages in paramount driving force in US-Egyptiana bid to end the biggest wave of strikes in the relations. When the peoples’ uprisings in country’s history, ranging from state-owned Cairo’s Tahir Square reached a climax on textile mills to the public sector to the Suez January 26, the Egyptian High Command, led Canal. In February, the Army used force for the by Lt. Gen. Sami Hafez Enan, the chief of staff first time to stop a demonstration in Tahir of the Armed Forces, was in Washington Square. Over the spring, with the state of meeting with US counterparts at the Pentagon; emergency still in effect, Army police arrested the visit was cut short as the Egyptian Army thousands of people for taking part in illegal began taking up positions in Cairo. While demonstrations and began trying them before denying formal discussions of the unfolding military courts. Many protesters claim to have events, Pentagon officials made clear they had been tortured, with some female activists broached the subject several times. As Gen. subjected to “virginity tests” and other James Cartright, the vice chairman of the Joint humiliations, according to press reports (See Chiefs of Staff, for example, told the New York especially “Once the Darling of Egypt’s Revolt, Times it was hard to ignore the televised the military is under Scrutiny,” New York footage from Egypt - and therefore he could not Times, April 9, 2011). Much of the public anger discount “hallway” conversations between was directed against Army Field Marshal Egyptian and US commanders. Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, a former ally of

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Mubarak who heads the military’s ruling storm. In the summer of 2011, Egypt may be at Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. the dawn of a new, democratic age – or amidst the calm before a major political storm.

So far, apart from the disclosure of US diplomatic cables on Field Marshal Tantawi and other figures dating back to pre-revolutionary times, neither WikiLeaks nor the media have disclosed the behind-the-scenes dealing between the Obama administration, the Pentagon and US intelligence and their counterparts in the Egyptian military and security apparatus. That will fall to future historians and enterprising journalists. But we have a possible model for what could be happening in my FOIA documents on South Korea, which portray US decision-making at Gen. Tantawi in Tahrir Square before the highest level of government and the lifting martial law military at a similar crossroad in the Korean democratic upsurge of 1979 and 1980. On the other hand, that council has moved decisively to shift the balance of power away In addition to President Carter, the key players from the cronies of the past to the democrats of in the drama were the late Richard Holbrooke, the present. Many observers agree that it is then Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian slowly moving to create an environment for the and Pacific Affairs, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, eventual transition to a civilian democratic Carter’s national security adviser. I’ll begin the system. And activists continue to use that space narrative with a recap of the Korean events; to press the military to reform Egypt’s security but first, some observations about the forces, limit executive power and make moves comparison. to improve the economic situation for the majority of Egyptians. And in keeping with the Obviously South Korea and Egypt today share popular will, the military is studying the little in common in their demographics and possibility of normalizing relations with Iran, history. One is an East Asian economic re-evaluatin Egypt’s complicated relationship powerhouse; the other the largest country in with Israel, and more overtly supporting the the Arab world. But there are similarities. Both cause of Palestinian rights and independence. have histories of colonial rule: South Korea (see “Egypt’s Evolving Foreign Policy,” Foreign (prior to the country’s division) by Japan, and Policy in Focus). Egypt by France and Britain. Both have powerful military establishments that were The situation nevertheless remains precarious. battle-hardened from confrontations with In July, Tahrir Square remains the scene of strong adversaries – North Korea and Israel. daily demonstrations and occupationsFor decades, their respective militaries ruled organized by groups demanding the swift the nation, and both maintained close ties with prosecution of former Mubarak officials. Anger the Pentagon, relationships that run deep at all is particularly strong towards security officials levels, from the high command to their special responsible for the more than 850 protesters forces. There was one big difference, however. killed by security forces during the February Unlike Egypt, South Korea’s military was

4 9 | 28 | 3 APJ | JF hardened by fighting on the US side, first in the textile industries led workers to secretly US-Korea War, then in the US-Indochina Wars. organize unions. As Park's secret police broke But above all, there is a unique command up their meetings and arrested and brutalized structure. Since 1978, South Korean forces are their leaders, frustration mounted. commanded by a U.S. general with a South Korean as deputy commander, making the ROK In August 1979, tensions reached a boiling the only country in the world in which a foreign point when a group of female garment workers general holds such a position. organized a sit-in at the offices of the opposition New Democratic Party headed by The command structure explained by US Kim Young Sam. After two weeks of tense Forces Korea negotiation, Park ordered riot police to storm the building. Protesting workers and And, as in all revolutions, there are strong lawmakers were brutally beaten, and one commonalities. In both cases, the sparks were young woman worker was killed, reportedly years of brutal police state tactics, labor after being thrown out of a window. Afterward, repression an economic downturn that hurt and an agitated Kim Young Sam, in an interview enraged the working class. That is the context with the New York Times, denounced Park and for understanding South Korea’s upsurge in called on the United States to cut off all ties 1979 and 1980. with the dictator. A few days later, Kim was expelled from the National Assembly. William THE SOUTH KOREAN POLITICAL Gleysteen, the US ambassador, was briefly UPHEAVAL OF 1979 recalled to Washington to protest Kim’s By the fall of 1979, Park Chung Hee, a general expulsion. who was trained in the Imperial Japanese The actions against Kim Young Sam, who later Army, had ruled South Korea with an iron hand became president, sparked widespread for 18 years. Although the country’s export- demonstrations in the port city of Pusan, his oriented industrial economy had made huge home town, and the nearby industrial zone at leaps during those years, government decisions to invest in heavy industry, such as steel and Masan. For the first time, industrial workers shipbuilding, had led to overcapacity at a time joined students in the streets in mass when the world economy was slowing down as demonstrations. This time, Park sent Army a result of the Arab oil embargo. In the late tanks and Special Forces to put down the 1970s, runaway inflation bit deep into workers' unrest. In the midst of the turmoil, on October meager wages, sparking a rise in labor unrest. 26, 1979, Park was assassinated by Kim Jae Kyu, the director of the Korean CIA. Kim later Park’s “Yushin,” or “revitalizing,” constitution, explained that he shot the dictator because he unilaterally imposed in 1972, allowed Park to feared Park’s brutal tactics would spark a rule the country virtually by decree. But with revolution. The military responded to the the growth of the industrial labor force and assassination by extending martial law student population, mounting organizedthroughout the country and dispatching troops opposition challenged the dictatorship.to occupy Seoul and other large cities. The Dissidents were routinely arrested andCarter administration warned North Korea not tortured. By 1978, students, intellectuals and to intervene and quickly dispatched aircraft Christians were pressing for a more open carriers and early warning aircraft to the political system including direct elections for Korean peninsula to back up its threat. These president. Meanwhile, the oppressiveevents set the stage for the Korean Crisis of conditions in the low-wage shoe, garment and 1979 and 1980.

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Establishing the Cherokee Communication opportunity to push for the complete Channel dismantling of Park’s hated dictatorial system and a return to electoral politics (in the last For Carter and his national security team, presidential election, in 1971, Kim Dae Jung South Korea was one piece in a global crisis narrowly lost to Park and was nearly killed in triggered by the Iranian revolution of 1978 and an automobile accident that most Koreans the collapse of the Shah, America’s key ally in assumed was planned by the KCIA. Later, he the Middle East. Just two months before Park was kidnapped from his hotel in Tokyo and was assassinated, Iranian radicals had seized almost executed at sea before the United the U.S. Embassy in Teheran, sparking the States, through the CIA, intervened to keep him hostage crisis that haunted the administration alive). until, literally, Carter’s last hours in office. Tensions were simultaneously high with the The growing unrest alarmed the Carter Soviet Union, which had invaded Afghanistan in administration, which feared that a political December 1979. confrontation between the generals and the rising opposition could undermine the military Carter’s increasingly hard line was alsoalliance with Seoul and spark another regional reflected in South Korea. In June 1979, the crisis for the United States. In this context president came to Seoul to strengthen U.S.- Carter and his national security advisers South Korean military ties. Carter formally created a tight circle of experts to monitor and announced cancellation of his campaign pledge influence the situation in South Korea. Their to pull all U.S. ground forces out of South classified communications channel was code- Korea. Just one week before Park’snamed Cherokee. Many of the cables I had assassination, and in the midst of wide-spread declassified were part of this channel and unrest in Pusan and nearby Masan, Secretary became the basis for my 1996 reporting. A few of Defense Harold Brown was in Seoul meeting years ago, I succeeded in further declassifying with Park’s top generals and unveiling a plan to a dozen more of the Cherokee cables, and I sell South Korea 36 F-16 fighter jets, deploy report on them here for the first time. new squadrons of A-10 bombers and transfer two artillery battalions to augment U.S. Army The secret channel was established by helicopter units. The moves, the pro-Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on November 6, government Korea Herald reported, would 1979, about two weeks after Park’s “reinforce deterrence against aggression by assassination. The text reads as follows: North Korea” and “provide tangible evidence of [passages in square brackets are my the United States’ steadfastness and resolve.” explanations]:

But Park’s death and the ensuing political 1. Secret, Entire Text chaos in Seoul disrupted the administration’s 2. In order to assure candid high-level carefully laid plans. In the months following the exchange of information and assassination, tensions erupted between the recommendations on evolving ROK martial law authorities in the ROK Army and political situation and how USG can best the democratic opposition. It was led by Kim encourage positive outcome, we are Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, the symbolic establishing a privacy series with this leader of the dissidents who had recently been message. freed from house arrest. The dissidents and 3. Direct Washington distribution will be their supporters among Koreans in the United controlled by S[ecretary of State] and States saw Park’s death as a golden will include only S[ecretary Vance],

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D[eputy Secretary Warren Christopher] In a revealing aside, Gleysteen told me that the and EA [East Asia – Holbrooke]. In turn, Korean crisis of 1980 was one of the few times EA will hand carry to NSC [National in his career when inter-agency policy ran Security Council, where the intelligence smoothly. One reason for that, he said, was liaison was Donald Gregg, the former CIA because both the State and Defense Chief of Station in Seoul] and will, as departments had good access to President necessary, inform other key officials. Carter, who “was following events as a 4. Embassy [in Seoul] should not use this telegram reader.” At the White House, “you channel for normal reporting of events, just pushed the Korea button and the door but only for those messages requiring opened,” he recalled. Yet, strangely, the events unusual sensitivity in handling. in South Korea and the horror of Kwangju don’t 5. In order to distinguish from other NODIS rate a single mention in Carter’s detailed [no distribution – one of the highest memoir of his presidency, White House Diary – classifications possible] traffic on Korea, an omission I find disgraceful for a man who messages in this privacy series should be continues to position himself – quite rightly – slugged NODIS CHEROKEE and begin above all by his accomplishments after leaving subject line with the two words “Korea the Oval Office - as a peacemaker in Korea and Focus.” a champion of human rights and democracy.

With that, the Carter administration began a THE CHEROKEE FILES series of diplomatic cables that became, after The first documents of interest in the Cherokee they were declassified under FOIA, my own series contain the secret minutes of the first private WikiLeaks of sorts long before the term meetings between the Carter foreign policy Wiki was invented or the Internet existed. team (led at first by Cyrus Vance, with Many of them were written from Seoul by U.S. Brzezinski playing an essential role) and the Ambassador William H. Gleysteen, a veteran Korean government (led by figurehead diplomat who grew up in China as the child of president Choi Kyu-ha and foreign minister missionaries and served in the Ford Park Tong-jin) after the Park assassination. Administration as Deputy Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. These meetings established what would become firm U.S. policy over the next year: Gleysteen, who passed away in 2002, granted Ambassador Gleysteen led an effort to help the me two long interviews in 1996. From the first South Korean generals and the (unelected) day of the crisis, he told me, Korea policy was civilian politicians running the government handled by a small group of officials from the maintain political “stability” while counseling White House and State Department. Inthe opposition movement to “moderate” their addition, the CIA and the Pentagon were demands for open presidential elections and an “brought in at high levels.” The secrecy, “a end to Park’s emergency decrees, and to keep a normal proclivity in a crisis,” was necessary to lid on public protests. deal with the complex military, economic and political issues at stake in Korea, he explained. This plan turned out to be chimerical. It was One can imagine a similar network of officials also the height of political arrogance: today, under the leadership of Secretary of continuation of the dictatorship without Park, State Hillary Clinton and Obama’s intelligence and continued US dominance, was hardly adviser John Brennan, monitoring – and trying attractive for a well-educated and industrious to influence – their military allies in Egypt and people who had lived through 18 years of elsewhere in the Middle East. draconian police-state rule and had gained

7 9 | 28 | 3 APJ | JF political maturity in the anti-dictatorship Whatever changes may occur in the future, movement. Moreover, it was clear to those who they want to see them made peacefully and in crafted the policy that the dissident movement an orderly manner. They see that there are had every right to claim a mandate: asthree evils to be avoided: Gleysteen admits in one NODIS cable in March 1980, the opposition would “win decisively” if No political reprisals against those who an open, fair election were to be held at that have worked for President Park under time. Specifically, said Gleysteen: in a cable the Yushin Constitution and being entitled “Yet another assessment of ROK identified with the previous system. If the stability and political development,” opposition forces take over, this danger exists. A military takeover. The Korean people Prevailing opinion is that the NDP do not want to see this. [opposition party] would sweep any The previous Yushin system blindly election conducted in the near followed and preserved is also something future because of a natural people want to avoid. reaction to the Yushin period…The NDP’s rather unquestioned How to avoid these is the big question. To help advantage is that it would probably you understand and analyze the situation, Mr. win decisively if a popularity Secretary, let me list a number of influential contest were conducted in present sectors in our political system: circumstances, and its great liability is the undisguised distrust The Armed Forces of the military leaders (though not The forces of the opposition political necessarily the troops). groups College students and intellectuals The government in power headed by The first cable on the post-assassination acting president meetings, “Korea Focus – Secretary’s The influence of the United States. Discussion with Foreign Minister Park Tong-Jin November 3, 1979,” shows the extent of Two points to be noted here: first, Korean disarray within the Korean government at the workers – the vast majority in the country and time and underscores how the Koreanthe people most responsible for the country’s authorities, from the beginning of the crisis, much-vaunted “economic miracle” – did not tried to preserve the status quo whileeven merit a mention in Park’s list of recognizing the deep public dissatisfaction with “influential sectors.” Second, it is simply Park’s rule. And they starkly illustrate South stunning to see the foreign minister of a Korea’s complete dependence at the time on sovereign country admit openly that one of five U.S. military support and strategic assistance. key sectors in his nation’s political system “is Consider these comments from the foreign the influence” of the United States. Later, in minister, which were excised in the first cable I another exchange, Vance, Holbrooke and obtained but included when I asked for further Gleysteen informed Park how the United States declassification in 2005. Speaking of the South would exercise that influence. Korean population, Park said (italics are mine):

Their first concern is the maintenance of Secretary Vance: All of us have national security against the North, and then been impressed with the continuity stability at home in politics and economics. of civilian control. This has been

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noted in my country and clear why the Carter administration desired throughout the world “moderation” on the part of the opposition so as to maintain the status quo. First was the Foreign Minister Park: If chaos military situation and the stand-off with North occurs, the armed forces would be Korea. Vance told Choi that the United States tempted to take over. This would was taking extraordinary measures to ensure hurt the interests of the country. It that the North stayed out of the situation: is the responsibility of the politicians here to prevent the chaos that might prompt the Secretary Vance: Let me assure military to intervene. On the other you at the outset that the hand, the opposition forces believe commitment of my government to that there is now a new era, and the security of Korea will remain that they will be able to take over firm and staunch. In addition to the the government. statement and military actions that we took after the assassination to Secretary Vance: In any contact tell North Korea that we would not that we have with the opposition, tolerate adventurism, we also we will be careful to counsel made our intentions clear to both moderation. the Soviets and the Chinese. To date, there have been no signs of Assistant Secretary Holbrooke: movement in the North, but we Yesterday, after our conversation have intensified our surveillance with you, I called on General [John] and the readiness of our forces as Wickham [the Commander of the a deterrent.[This unusual U.S.-ROK Joint Command]. He reference to US intelligence was assured me that he sensed no edited out of the first batch of desire on the part of the Armed documents but included in the Forces to assume control. 2005 declassification.] My judgment is that the orderly action Foreign Minister Park: Well, our of the ROK military together with armed forces are very large, and the reaffirmation of our there are many factions. commitment should work to deter aggression. Ambassador Gleysteen: You are right to point out the dangers of chaos. You should know that the Later in the conversation, Vance underscored lower levels of the embassy are another important factor for US policy-makers: already in contact with opposition South Korea’s value as a market for American figures. I will be in contact too. We exports. At the time, the US Export-Import are counseling moderation. We can Bank was considering a massive loan to the be helpful. Korean government so it could acquire two more nuclear power plants from the US companies Bechtel and Westinghouse – a loan That same day, Vance and Holbrooke met with that finally went through a week after the Choi Kyu-hah, the figurehead president who Kwangju massacre. Yet here, just days after the took over in the wake of Park’s assassination. assassination of South Korea’s president,Vance The secret summary of this meeting makes tried to make sure that nothing will disrupt the

9 9 | 28 | 3 APJ | JF nuclear deal. It’s hard to find a more blatant He also held a virulent hatred for the example of the State Department acting as a opposition forces, considering them virtual sales agent for US multinationals: agents of North Korea. As the dissidents began pushing the limits of martial law by holding small demonstrations and passing out leaflets Secretary Vance: It is very in public, Chun’s forces began arresting and important to give the people a torturing their leaders. sense of direction. We recognize the importance of instilling confidence in the international economic community. I thought I would take the opportunity tonight before leaving for the United States to explain in public that we will be continuing close economic cooperation with your country, that the one billion dollar Exim loan will continue…I think that would have a calming effect.

A “calming effect”? On who? Obviously this news would make the corporations involved quite happy. But for the average man or woman Amb. Gleysteen with Chun Doo Hwan in the street in South Korea, borrowing $1 billion to buy US nuclear technology was hardly One incident in particular shocked the the first order of business as part of a package dissidents, particularly the Christian opposition that would continue to deny a democratic groups gathered around Kim Dae Jung and breakthrough. members of the Korean National Council of Vance’s carefully laid plans for “continuity” and Churches. In late November 1979, a coalition of “stability” quickly floundered. Over the next dissident groups trying to evade the martial law few weeks, it became clear to many Korean edicts against public meetings staged an activists and a few foreign journalists (notably elaborate wedding ceremony at a YWCA the New York Times’ Henry Scott-Stokes) that building, where several hundred people, President Choi had virtually no influence over including Kim Dae Jung, gathered to discuss events. Instead, they learned that a new power the current situation and forge a way forward. center was shaping up inside the Korean All were dressed in wedding clothes. Chun got military, led by a small group of Amywind of the meeting and dispatched troops intelligence officers who had been close to from the Defense Security Command (DSC) to Park. Their leader was Lt. Gen. Chun Doo break it up. Whooping in with clubs, they beat Hwan, the head of the Defense Security many and arrested several dozen people. I later Command, the military intelligence unit that heard stories of the brutality from some of led the investigation into Park’s assassination those detained, including the Korean husband at the hands of KCIA Director Kim Jae Kyu. Kim of an American missionary. He was brought to had been very close to the US Embassy and the DSC headquarters, strapped upside down from CIA, and Chun was suspicious that the United the ceiling, and beaten for hours on the soles of States might have played a role in his crime. his feet; he was still recovering when I met him

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18 months later in Seoul. When the Egyptian secret police began mass arrests of pro-democracy activists in mid- Reports of the violent attack soon reached the February 2011, the Obama administration U.S. Embassy and the pages of the New York publicly criticized the actions and urged the Times, which published a detailed story about Egyptian authorities to end the repression. the wave of “mass seizures” of Christian Anyone reading the Times’ coverage of South students and activists, including the arrest of Korea in the fall of 1979, as well as its daily over 100 activists on November 27, 1979 at the reports on President Carter’s human rights headquarters of the National Council ofpolicies, would have expected a similar Churches. In this article, the Times referred to response from the US administration and its the mock “wedding” at the YWCA, reporting outspoken senior diplomat for East Asia, that the latest arrests “followed the detention Richard Holbrooke. But Holbrooke had other of 96 people after an anti-Government meeting fish to fry, as he laid out in asecret NODIS at the Young Women’s Christian Association cable to Ambassador Gleysteen on December 3, building.” Reporter Henry Scott-Stokes went on 1979. He had been meeting with “key” to detail the depth of the crackdown: Senators and congressmen “about our strategy,” he explained: Informed sources believe that many hundreds of political Their attitudes, like everyone prisoners actually are in else’s, are dominated by the Government custody now. In Iranian Crisis and, needless to say, addition to those arrested most nobody wants “another Iran” – by recently, many people were which they mean American action detained after martial law was which would in any way appear to imposed in the southern port of unravel a situation and lead to Pusan and Masan following anti- chaos or instability in a key government demonstrations there American ally. a week before President Park’s assassination. In other words, the Carter administration The number of detainees is would do all it could to keep South Korea mounting daily as students are “under control” and out of the headlines. But picked up here [Seoul] for handing was Holbrooke concerned about the mass out leaflets and staging small arrests, and the brutal crackdown by Chun’s meetings. Some Western diplomats Defense Security Command on Christian [journalese at the time for U.S. dissidents that was causing the “situation to embassy officials] say that the unravel”? Hardly; indeed, the Christians were period of calm that followed Mr. to blame. Holbrooke continued: Park’s assassination, when no demonstrations were reported anywhere in South Korea, has been In this connection, we are succeeded by widespread unrest. encouraged by many of the things “It looks as if things are turning the Korean leadership has done. At sour,” said one. “It is really sad.” the same time, certain recent (“100 More Arrested by Korean events have caused us to share Military,” New York Times, your concern over the potential November 29, 1979). polarization that exists as a result

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of the actions of what appear to be them as unhelpful while martial a relative handful of Christian law is still in effect. extremist dissidents.

The purpose of Gleysteen’s “blunt message,” Holbrooke then instructed Gleysteen to give instructed Holbrooke, would be this: these Christian “extremists” – as well as the Korean generals - a message from the highest levels of the U.S. government: To alert them to the fact that they should not automatically count on the same degree of American We would like to propose to you a support now that they might have delicate operation designed to use had a few months ago. Our priority American influence to reduce the is on the development of a political chances of confrontation, and to process. Secondly, and equally make clear to the generals that you important, we would propose that are in fact trying to be helpful to you discuss the message you are them provided they in turn carry going to send to the Christian out their commitments to dissidents with the key military liberalization. and civilian leadership of the government prior to sending it. What we have in mind is your This would have the positive effect sending a clear message to of showing the leadership that you Christian dissidents who are now are definitely trying to help them stirring up street demonstrations moderate the situation. and provoking the military into the unfortunate reaction [an interesting choice of words for It would be difficult to find a statement of more officially sanctioned brutality] that stunning arrogance and stupidity in misreading has begun to occur and has put of the political pulse of a nation in the annals of almost 200 people into jail in the American diplomacy. Yet this came from a man last two weeks. The message to the who, since his death, has been hailed as one of dissidents, which you could deliver the visionaries of American foreign policy and through whatever means you felt representative of the country’s highest ideals. was most appropriate, should be understood as coming from the In an interview with Ambassador Gleysteen, I U.S. government. It would be that, showed him Holbrooke’s cable and asked if in this delicate time in Korean he’d followed up on Holbrooke’s advice. “No, internal politics, the United States that was too tricky,” Gleysteen replied. “This believes that demonstrations in the was an armchair suggestion from Washington, streets are a throwback to an something we just couldn’t do.” Yet Gleysteen earlier era and threaten to provoke did continue to press Korean dissidents to take retrogressive action on the part of a “moderate” approach to the military and the Korean government. Even avoid confrontation. While warning the military when these are in fact not to be tolerant, “on the left, we tried to get the demonstrations, but rather just message across to the moderates that they meetings in defiance of martial should keep down their inflammatory actions,” law, the U.S. government views Gleysteen told me. This effort was so

12 9 | 28 | 3 APJ | JF successful, he said, that by December 1979, the martial law commander’s guards to “the “people were beginning to talk about a ‘Seoul officers sent to question the chief of staff about Spring’” as Kim Dae Jung was released from evidence possibly linking him” to Park’s prison and other dissidents were freed to take assassination. In response, said Holbrooke: part in political activities.

The Korean military group under Chun Doo He found the ROKG message Hwan had other plans, however. On the night reassuring and hoped that it would of December 12, 1979, Chun pulled off a be possible to carry out the spectacular coup within the South Korean commitment to broadly based armed forces that not only put him in charge of political development. He assured the military but violated the chain of command Amb. Kim that the USG would not established by the U.S. and ROK armies. As publicly contest the ROKG version Ambassador Gleysteen and General Wickham of recent events, but we would not monitored the events from an embassy bunker, wish to see further military Chun ordered his Army classmate General Roh changes of command “Korean Tae Woo (who would later succeed Chun as style”… The ROK can be assured president) to pull his Ninth Division from the that we stand beside Korea as firm border with North Korea and attack the Seoul allies, but efforts are now required Garrison where the martial law command was to restore ROK military unity and located. After a brief firefight, the top martial to restore the necessary mutual law commander was arrested; Chun was now in trust between the U.S. and ROK de facto control of the ROK military. The armed forces. This mutual trust internal coup stunned the U.S. military and the had been seriously damaged by the Carter administration, both of which were direct action of some generals last acutely aware that internal division within the week. Iranian military had been a key factor in the 1978 collapse of the Shah. The “deal” was cemented in early January 1980 in a letter to President Choi from President But the incident was quickly papered over, Carter (this document was declassified in 1986 sending a signal to Chun Doo Hwan and his and made available to me by Don Oberdorfer, a military allies that they were virtually former reporter for the Washington Post and untouchable by the United States no matter the author of The Two Koreas.) In the letter, what they did. The deal – which involved the Carter promised that the United States would Carter administration staying silent about assist the Korean president “as you undertake Chun’s unprecedented breach of bilateral the important tasks of political reconciliation military protocol as long as the ROK and constitutional change.” But the letter government kept to a vague schedule of included a blunt warning about the 12/12 political reform – was forged in a December 18 Incident: meeting in Washington between Holbrooke and the South Korean ambassador and spelled out in a December 19 NODIS/CHEROKEE I must emphasize that I was deeply cable from Vance to Ambassador Gleysteen. In distressed by the events of the meeting, the Korean ambassador supplied December 12-13. Ambassador the “official” explanation for the “12/12 Gleysteen and General Wickham Incident,” as it came to be called: that it have made clear to you and senior resulted from the “unfortunate resistance” of members of your government why

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the United States has been so and his wife hostage; for the first time since the concerned over strife within the Pusan demonstrations in October 1979, Chun Korean Army…I have been dispatched Special Forces to put down the particularly disquieted by the protest. For Chun and South Korea’s ruling breach of the chain of command in circles, the situation was spinning out of the ROK Army…Any further control. In April Chun took direct control of the disregard for [the Combined Korean CIA. Both the military and South Forces Command structure] and Korea’s most feared intelligence agency were the commitments they embody now run by the same man. would have serious consequences for our close cooperation. By May of 1980, the situation had reached a boiling point. Students began mobilizing huge demonstrations in downtown Seoul, demanding But in the midst of this bluster, Carter made that Chun step down and calling on the sure that the Korean president understood that National Assembly to set a timetable for he would help sweep the 12/12 Incident under democratic rule and direct elections. Seoul in the rug: “Please be assured that we will work those days closely resembled Cairo in mid- with you to try to minimize the political February, with hundreds of thousands of damage,” Carter wrote. Over the next few people in the streets facing thousands of riot months, the Carter administration publicly police. As the situation intensified, the Carter urged “moderation” on both the military and administration decided that the unrest had the dissident movement. But Chun understood become a threat to U.S. interests in the region very clearly that he was at liberty to maintain and might tempt North Korea to intervene in “stability” and keep the situation from some way. These conclusions set the scene for becoming a political liability for the United the most damning cables in the Cherokee States while continuing to amass power for himself and his allies within the Korean Armed series. Forces. Carter’s letter cemented any doubts On May 8, 1980, Ambassador Gleysteen met that President Choi might have had about who with Chun and then traveled to the Blue House was actually in charge: Chun and his US allies. – Seoul’s equivalent of the White House – to A Green Light for Chun Doo Hwan meet with Choi Kwang Soo, the top aide to President Choi and a key liaison with Chun. Over the spring of 1980, students intensified Just before the meeting, Gleysteen cabled protests on campus and off, demandingDeputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, democratization in the country’s universities who had been handling crisis management and pressing for political liberalization and since Cyrus Vance resigned in April to protest direct elections in street demonstrations. As in Carter’s disastrous decision to send Egypt just before Mubarak’s fall, workers paramilitary forces on a failed mission to throughout Korean industry began wildcat rescue the Iranian hostages. strikes seeking higher wages, better working conditions and free and democratic trade Gleysteen noted that “the students are unions. Much of the workers’ rage was directed proceeding remorselessly with their challenge against pro-government union leaders who to law and order and appear to be doing so worked with employers and the security forces with a great deal of coordination and to limit the protests. In one incident, miners in direction.” Meanwhile, “the government is a remote town called Sabuk seized their mine determined to maintain order, if necessary, from the owners and took the union “president” with troops but is highly conscious of the

14 9 | 28 | 3 APJ | JF enormous dangers involved.” GleysteenGleysteen wrote back in another concluded: ”In none of our discussions will we NODIS/CHEROKEE cable, noting the high in any way suggest that the USG (U.S. stakes involved but reassuring Christopher that government) opposes ROKG (Republic of Korea he had told both the Korean government and government) contingency plans to maintain law the military that a military crackdown might be and order, if absolutely necessary, byunavoidable. Speaking of his meeting at the reinforcing the police with the army.” This Blue House, Gleysteen wrote (in a cable that message – essentially a green light to use was fully declassified in 2005): troops from the Combined Forces Command against student demonstrations – was Choi said that the president was communicated to both Chun Doo Hwan and the determined to do his utmost to Blue House, Gleysteen later told me. avoid the use of the Army in The message was well understood in controlling the students, although Washington. Within hours of Gleysteen’s cable, contingency plans had been made. Christopher sent a NODIS/CHEROKEE More than 12,000 combat police cable back to Seoul commenting on the had been distributed throughout ambassador’s analysis. Amazingly, Christopher Seoul, many of them newly trained only now expressed interest in what was behind or drawn from coastal guard duty the massive demonstrations in Seoul: now being covered by the Army…If all the government’s exhortation failed to deter the students, the We note with concern your government would seriously conclusion that tensions are now consider closing the schools if this rising and government tolerance would facilitate police control of perhaps lessening. There have the situation. been anomalous aspects to many of these student demonstrations; do Choi was also uneasy about the you have any indication as to who labor situation, proud of the way is stirring the pot and why? the govt had handled the Sabuk mine riot, and rather pleased with the successful quashing of violence But the answer didn’t really matter; at four major industrial plants in Christopher had already endorsed the message Inchon, Seoul and Pusan. Yet the that the Korean military had no choice but to government was very concerned crack down on these “anomalous” protests: because there was evidence of radical troublemakers and all the settlements so far tended to We agree that we should not undercut the government’s ability oppose ROK contingency plans to to hold down wage increases in an maintain law and order, but you effort to check inflation. should remind Chun and Choi of the dangers of escalation if law enforcement responsibilities are After hearing Choi “lash out passionately” at not carried out with care and Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, Gleysteen restraint. continued:

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I commented that we, of course, apparently warned by their commanders that a understood the government’s need communist revolution was unfolding in to maintain law and order and to Kwangju that could infect the whole country make contingency plans to use of and inspire North Korea to invade. In response, the military as an instrument of they began a two-day rampage through the last resort. Nevertheless, I was city. In broad daylight, they began beating, pleased to hear that President Choi bayoneting and shooting anyone who dared to and General Chun were so stand up to martial law. Bystanders too were reluctant to use the military attacked – some of them chased into their because of the danger of killings homes and killed. and a rapid erosion of public support. I urged that the greatest Horrified and angered by the actions of the care be used in dealing with storm troopers, the people of Kwangju – most ringleaders or politicians who were of them skilled in firearms because of males’ suspected of being unhelpful. As mandatory stints in the army – formed a long as the government would citizens’ militia and started shooting back. continue its present caution, I After two days of combat and hand-to-hand promised to do our best to try to fighting in which dozens of people were killed talk sense into Kim Dae Jung and and wounded, Chun’s Special Forces turned Kim Young Sam. tail and pulled out of the city. It was the first armed insurrection in modern South Korean history since the Korean War. (There were, as Thus the scene was set for the tragedy and Bruce Cumings and Charles Armstrong have massacre in Kwangju – and, despite the terrible pointed out, several significant armed violence that occurred in that city, continued insurrections in the late 1940s, including those U.S. support for Chun Doo Hwan. at Yosu and Jeju Island). A citizens’ committee, made up of armed insurrectionists, clergy and The Kwangju Uprising civic leaders, sought desperately to negotiate a Chun Doo Hwan waited only a week before peaceful end to the crisis. playing his contingency card. On the night of May 17, 1980, he declared martial law and sent On May 22, Carter’s national security team the Army to occupy South Korea’s major gathered at the White House for a high-level universities and most important cities.meeting on the crisis. They met less than 12 Hundreds of student leaders were arrested, as hours after hundreds of thousands of armed were both Kims. The dreaded Special Forces — students, industrial workers, taxi drivers, the only Korean troops not directly under the students and citizens in Kwangju had gathered control of the US-ROK Joint Command — were in their downtown plaza to celebrate the deployed as well (see my original stories from liberation of their city from the two divisions of the Journal of Commerce and Sisa Journal, Special Forces who had been sent to quell their linked above, for details on Special Forces protests. The city was a liberated zone, at deployments). peace with itself and its citizens working to help the wounded, bury the dead, keep order But in Kwangju, a city in South Korea’s and distribute food and water. They looked to southwestern Cholla Province well-known for the United States to act honorably and respect its resistance to centralized, authoritarian rule, their desire to bring to bring an end to military students continued to defy the martial law rule. But, as the declassified minutes of the edicts. On May 18, Chun’s troops wereMay 22 meeting make clear, the die had

16 9 | 28 | 3 APJ | JF already been cast. down any rebellion was repeated:

To get the full flavor of this meeting, it’s important to remember that, as Carter’s Korea We have counseled moderation, team met at the White House, Holbrooke and but have not ruled out the use of others had already been informed in detail force, should the Koreans need to about what had happened in Kwangju. The few employ it to restore order. foreign media in the city had managed to transmit stories of the savage brutality inflicted Another key passage underscored the gravity of by the Special Forces on the city’s population, the situation. especially its youth. The secret cables from the US Embassy in Seoul to the State Department that I later obtained confirmed that massacres Secretary [of State Edmund] had indeed taken place and were the primary Muskie asked the Defense cause of the uprising. The Defense Intelligence Department to take additional Agency, in other documents I obtained, warned planning steps to prepare for that the Special Forces were fully capable of “worst case scenarios” which could vicious cruelty and that Chun was secretly develop. Specifically, he asked that planning to use the Kwangju incident to seize DoD prepare recommendations for power. what should be done if there is a pattern of spreading violence None of that seemed to matter: Carter’s White outside of Kwangju and, secondly, House prioritized the preservation of US what the Defense Department national security interests not the democratic would recommend if ROK impulses of a Korean population rebelling after redeployments to internal security 18 years of dictatorship. As the citizens of duty continued to the point where Kwangju mourned their dead and waited for the counter-North Korea mission of signs of hope, Carter’s team decided to support the joint command was Chun’s plan to crush the rebellion by force. endangered.

The participants in the meeting included Christopher; Holbrooke; Brzezinski; CIABrzezinski summed up the U.S. position: “in the director Admiral Stansfield Turner; Donald short term support, in the longer term pressure Gregg, the NSC’s top intelligence official for for political evolution.” As for the situation in Asia and a former CIA Station Chief in Seoul; Kwangju, having just decided to authorize the and U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown. This use of military force, the group declared that crack foreign policy team quickly came to a “we have counseled moderation, but have not consensus. “The first priority is the restoration ruled out the use of force, should the Koreans of order in Kwangju by the Korean authorities need to employ it to restore order.” If there was with the minimum use of force necessary “little loss of life” in the recapture of the city, without laying the seeds for wide disorders “we can move quietly to apply pressure for later,” the minutes stated. “Once order is more political evolution,” the officials decided. restored, it was agreed we must press the Once the situation was cleared up, the war Korean government, and the military incabinet agreed, normal economic ties could particular, to allow a greater degree of political move forward – including the Export-Import freedom to evolve.” The May 8 promise to Chun Bank loan to South Korea to buy American to allow troops from the joint command to put nuclear power equipment and engineering

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Within hours of the meeting, the US commander in Korea gave formal approval to the Korean military to remove a division of Korean troops under the US-Korean Joint Command and deploy them to Kwangju. The city and its surrounding towns had already been cut off from all communications by a tight military cordon. Military helicopters began flying over the city urging the Kwangju urban army – which had taken up positions in the provincial capital building in the middle of the city – to surrender. At one point, a Kwangju citizens’ council asked the US ambassador, Military leads Kwangju demonstrators William Gleysteen, to intervene to seek a away negotiated truce. The request was coldly rejected. These actions were a stunning blow to the Kwangju resistance and to the few Koreans But not for the people of South Korea. Partly – including some in the United States – who because of the decisions made at that White were aware of the terrible events unfolding in House meeting, they endured eight more years the city; not only was the United States of military dictatorship. Over the 1980s, abetting a military coup, it was directlyhowever, a mass movement, with Kwangju as involved in putting down the democratic its symbol, spread throughout South Korea, resistance. culminating in 1987 with huge demonstrations in Seoul and other cities that drew millions of In the early morning of May 27, the Korean people. In 1997, the democratic movement troops from the Joint Command shot their way reached an apex when Kim Dae Jung, the into the provincial capital and quickly crushed longtime dissident leader (and a Kwangju the resistance. The Kwangju Commune was native) was elected president of South Korea. shut down, and hundreds of people who had Prior to his election, Chun Doo Hwan and Roh participated were rounded up and imprisoned. Tae Woo were tried for treason and murder in connection with the events in Kwangju; both Apparently, the “loss of life” was not enough to were convicted, and their sentences were disrupt normal business for Washington (the commuted by Kim once he became president final toll remains in dispute, but most accounts (in 1985 I interviewed Kim about Kwangju – agree that at least 200 people were killed and read that interview, which was the only time he over 2,500 seriously injured). In early June, spoke publicly about the US role in the Carter’s team approved the Eximbank loan, and uprising, here). South Korea went ahead with its plan to buy US nuclear technology from Westinghouse and I asked Holbrooke once about his role in US Bechtel. By September 1980, Chun wasdiplomacy at the time, particularly the decision president, and in January 1981 he was chosen to allow the Korean military to use force to end by incoming President Reagan as the first the student-worker unrest and the Kwangju foreign head of state to visit the White House. Uprising. The question infuriated him, and he US-Korean ties were restored, and a crisis virtually spat out his words: “Kwangju was an averted. explosively dangerous situation, the outcome

18 9 | 28 | 3 APJ | JF was tragic, but the long-term results for Korea So what’s the lesson for Egypt? Clearly the are democracy and economic stability,” he Obama administration reached the same informed me. He added: “The idea that we conclusion about its army in Egypt that the would actively conspire with the Korean Carter administration did about the Korean generals in a massacre of students is, frankly, military: that it is the only cohesive force with bizarre; it’s obscene and counter to every the ability to hold Egypt together in the service political value we articulated.” When the Carter of US power. As they did with Korea, US Administration heard Chun was sendingofficials today are meeting constantly with their Special Forces to Kwangju, “we made every Egyptian counterparts in government and effort to stop what was happening,” Holbrooke above all the military. Having belatedly said. That was a flat-out lie, as the released recognized that Mubarak must go, they documents show. probably counsel “moderation” on the part of the ruling military and the democratic Ironically, the most honest answer about what opposition to assure that the situation doesn’t drove US policy during this time came from a spin out of control in ways that could CIA agent who was in South Korea during this jeopardize the primacy of US power in Egypt. time. In 1983, a former CIA case officer showed As of early July 2011, it’s too early to say what up at an academic forum on Korea where I was the final outcome will be as the army and the speaking about Kwangju with Bruce Cumings, social movements—with varying emphases on the author of several excellent books about the democracy, labor rights, and religious Korean War and the US role in the Korean orientation—vie to define Egypt’s future. With peninsula. I believe that Cumings identified the huge US oil and geostrategic interests in the man as CIA and told him that it was only fair region, will the United States this time consider for him to say who he was and why he was the Egyptian people in the equation? there. The agent, Robert Muldoon, rose slowly, In Korea in 1979 and 1980, the hopes and and in a halting voice explained how the Carter dreams of the Korean people for democratic administration was initially confused by the reform were trampled in the name of US power struggle that broke out in South Korea national security. The result was the tragedy of after Park’s assassination. But in the end, he Kwangju and eight years of the savage Chun said, Carter opted for national security. dictatorship. Three decades later, with the US enmeshed in unpopular and destabilizing wars “We looked at this as a situation in which there in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, and on the was a political vacuum, there was a struggle for verge of going to war in Libya, it remains to be power among Korean factions, and I think the seen whether the Obama administration can conclusion that we came to was that the learn from the bitter lessons of 1980 Korea and strongest political force in South Korea was the support the forces of democratic progress over Korean Army,” he declared. A few years ago, the continued grip of the military. Donald Gregg, a career CIA officer who, as US ambassador to Seoul during the 1980s, visited Kwangju, gave me a similar assessment. “For us to have broken publicly with Chun would Tim Shorrock, a writer and trade unionist have been a categorically different signal than based in Washington, is the author ofSPIES we’d ever sent to the Korean peninsula,” he FOR HIRE: The Secret World of Outsourced told me. That may be true – but the cost to the Intelligence (Simon & Schuster/2008). He grew US-Korean relationship, and above all to the up in Japan and South Korea and has been Korean people, was incalculable. writing about the U.S. role in Asia since the

19 9 | 28 | 3 APJ | JF late 1970s. Much of his work, including his Revelations in US Declassified Documents, The stories and documents on Kwangju, can be Asia-Pacific Journal Vol 9, Issue 28 No 3, July found at his website,www.timshorrock.com . 11, 2011. He is also an avid poster on Twitter.

Note on sources: A terrific bibliography on the Articles on related subjects Kwangju Uprising can be found at the activist website “Gusts of Popular Feeling”here . It includes books as well as many articles and manuscripts. Readers can also find my original • Peter Dale Scott, The Libyan War, reporting on the Kwangju FOIA documents at American Power and the Decline of the my website here and here. Click here for my Petrodollar System 1986 interview with Kim Dae Jung in which the former president and democratic leader• Peter Dale Scott, Who are the Libyan discussed, for the first and only time in public, Freedom Fighters and Their Patrons? his views on the Kwangju Uprising and the U.S. response. • Herbert P. Bix, The Middle East Revolutions in Historical Perspective: Egypt, Occupied Palestine, and the United States Recommended citation: Tim Shorrock, Reading the Egyptian Revolution Through the Lens of • Mark Morris, The New Korean Cinema, US Policy in South Korea Circa 1980:Kwangju and the Art of Political Violence