Emigration in Europe

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EMIGRATION IN EUROPE

ANNUAL REPORT 2020 MERCATOR FORUM MIGRATION AND DEMOCRACY EMIGRATION IN EUROPE MIDEM ANNUAL REPORT 2020

ISSN 2748-8454

Editor: Editorial Staff: Prof. Dr. Hans Vorländer, Director Dr. Oliviero Angeli Mercator Forum Migration and Democracy (MIDEM) Johanna Haupt

TU Dresden Institute of Political Science Design: Centre for the Study of Constitutionalism and Vollblut GmbH & Co. KG Democracy 01062 Dresden © MIDEM 2021 Germany

Phone.: +49 351 463 35811 MIDEM is a research centre at the Technische Universität [email protected] Dresden (TUD), funded by Stiftung Mercator. www.forum-midem.de

Citation: MIDEM 2021: Emigration in Europe. Annual Report 2020, Mercator Forum Migration and Democracy, ed. by Hans Vorländer, Dresden. CONTENTS

FOREWORD 7

FINDINGS 8

A EMIGRATION IN EUROPE: SOCIOECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 10

B EMIGRATION, OUT-MIGRATION AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM

1 Emigration and voting for the AFD in Germany: Shrinking regions – frustrated citizens? 18

2 Emigration and the election results of far-right parties in Europe 32

C EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

1 Bulgaria 42

2 Czech Republic 56

3 Greece 72

4 Hungary 86

5 Italy 102

6 Poland 118

7 Portugal 132

8 Romania 148

9 Spain 164

LIST OF FIGURES 180

AUTHORS 186

IMPRINT 187 EMIGRATION

FOREWORD

Migration has been one of the dominant topics in European politics and public debate in the past years. However the focus was mostly on immigration. Until now much less attention has been paid to emigration. That has changed: According to a 2019 survey conducted by the European Council of Foreign Re- lations, people in economically weaker regions of Europe now feel less threatened by immigration than by emigration.

Since 1989 there has been a huge loss of population in many countries of the former “Eastern Bloc”. After the expansion of the EU to the East, an East-West migration began, which has persisted for decades. And since the financial and economic crisis many young and well-educated people in search of work have left the countries in Southern Europe. This development poses great challenges for some European countries.

MIDEM takes up this change in perspective in its 2020 annual report and examines the extent, structure and development of emigration in the EU. Here the countries of East-Central and Southern Europe are the focus. But also in the former East Germany, due to the reunification in 1990, great social and demographic changes have taken place. What are the political consequences; how are outward migration and emigration discussed in public; is emigration a driver for right-wing populist trends?

MIDEM is breaking new empirical ground. To date there has not been a comparative investigation of the emigration dynamics and the political handling of them. The 2020 annual report therefore has an explorative character and it will hopefully encourage discussion and further research. In any event, the study contains surprising results, which do not confirm the occasionally expressed suppositions that it is emigration that is dividing Europe and providing impetus for right-wing populist movements. As always, here too the relationships are more complex, more varied.

This annual report is the result of discussions which started following our 2019 study (“Migration and Europe”) and which were inspired not least by a talk given by Ivan Krastev at MIDEM in November last year and the East-Cen- tral European problem perspective that he consistently pursued therein. This report was written by members of the MIDEM staff with supplementary expertise provided by researchers associated with us. Many thanks go to all of them and also to the editing and production team. In this year 2020, with its pandemic-related difficulties, our work would not have been possible without the generous and trusting support of Stiftung Mercator and the infrastructur- al support of TU Dresden. Our sincere thanks also go to them.

Prof. Dr. Hans Vorländer Director Mercator Forum Migration and Democracy (MIDEM) TU Dresden

7 FINDINGS

While many Central and Eastern European countries have The link between the migration balance and voting for experienced a remarkable loss of population since 1989, the the AfD in general speaking more pronounced in Western population in Northern and Western Europe has increased Germany than in Eastern Germany. With regard to Eastern rather than decreased. An important factor in this develop- Germany, it is evident that it was not the outward migra- ment is the East-West migration, which has persisted for tion immediately after the reunification that had a benefi- decades. It began with the collapse of the real-socialist sys- cial impact for the AfD in terms of election results, but the tems and gained momentum with the EU enlargement. out-migration since the turn of the millennium.

Emigration has been a major contributing factor to the Emigration is rarely purposefully politicized. It is rather massive loss of population in many Central and Eastern rare even for right-wing populist parties in Central, East- European countries. This development is strengthened by ern and Southern European countries to take up the topic the decline in birth rates as well as by a lack of immigration. of emigration. Unlike the topic of immigration, emigration Furthermore, this imbalance exacerbates the shortage of hardly polarizes the European party landscapes. skilled workers in many places and poses great challenges for the health care and pension systems. Regardless of party boundaries emigration is mostly portrayed as a social and economic problem. Left-wing parties If this trend continues the population in the former East- denounce in particular the high unemployment and pre- ern Bloc countries will continue to shrink considerably in carious employment that force young people to emigrate. the future. According to prognoses, countries like Bulgaria The explanation of right-wing parties, on the other hand, are likely to lose up to 20 percent of their population by contains elements of a narrative of crisis or decline, accord- 2050. The situation looks better for countries like Poland ing to which emigration can also be interpreted as proof of and the Czech Republic, which have been receiving in- the erosion of the cultural foundations of society. creasing numbers of immigrants for some years now. A much more positive tone prevails in political discourse In Southern Europe the emigration to the North of pre- when dealing with compatriots living abroad. Cultural dominantly young people with higher formal education is frames are more important than socioeconomic ones in evidence of the consequences of the financial crisis and the portrayal of the role of ‘diaspora’. Thus, fellow country- persistent economic weakness. However, structural prob- men living abroad are often considered to be ‘intermediar- lems also drive people to leave their country. In particular ies’ or ‘ambassadors’ of one’s own traditions and culture. young people are affected by precarious employment con- An issue that is politically controversial is the expansion of FINDINGS ditions and low wages. the right to vote for citizens who live abroad. In the public perception emigration did not play a big Parallels between the emigration experiences of one’s role for a long time. That has changed. According to a sur- own population and those of today’s refugees are seldom vey, people in economically weaker EU countries now feel drawn by right-wing populist parties. On the contrary: In less threatened by immigration than by emigration. Many particular in Central and Eastern European countries the respondents would even approve of measures that make image of the hard-working emigrant is set against that of it more difficult for their fellow citizens to emigrate. the refugee taking advantage of the social system.

Right-wing populist parties in Europe do profit from The temporary closure of national borders during the rising immigration from third countries, not however Corona pandemic has shown how vulnerable migration from higher emigration rates. On the contrary: In places is, even in the EU. It affects emigration and immigration increasingly affected by emigration, right-wing populists between individual member states and especially those performed worse in the last EU election. It is only in eco- workers who temporarily ‘commute’ across borders as nomically weak regions that there is a positive correlation employees. The precarious situation of many employment between a high emigration rate and the election results of relationships in the EU has also become apparent in the right-wing populist parties. Corona crisis.

For Germany there is a positive correlation between the overall migration balance (the difference between the inflow rate and the outflow rate) and right-wing populist voting behavior: The more strongly a region was affected by outward migration in the past three decades, the greater the tendency to vote for the AfD there. This effect can be observed independently of socioeconomic and sociodemographic factors.

8 9 EMIGRATION INTRODUCTION

EMIGRATION IN EUROPE: SOCIOECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

In recent years migration was one of the dominant topics in European politics. Strictly speaking, however, the focus was on only one side of migration: immigration (particularly from non-European countries). The topic of emigration attracted considerably less attention. This narrowing of perspective becomes especially obvious at the European level: Emigration is not mentioned explicitly in the EU treaties nor in the EU laws and it hardly plays a role in the daily business of the EU. The center of attention is the freedom of movement of persons, which embodies an essential component of a unified Europe and is understood as an asset which promotes peace and prosperity. If emigration is explicitly mentioned then it is with a non- European dimension (in the context of the “root causes of flight” in Africa and other regions where refugees originate from).

This thematic narrowness makes it clear just how much migration policy and migration discourse in recent years reflect the perspective of Western European immigration countries1. The EU accession of the countries from Central and Eastern Europe in the years 2004 and 2007 did little to change that. The accessions caused the net migration of many Central and Eastern European countries to plummet into negative territory, yet did little to change the general perception of the problem in the area of migration policy. The conflict about the allocation of refugees after 2015 may have also played a part in this: According to Eurobarometer the proportion of respondents who named immigration as the most important problem rose sharply in the wake of the ‘refugee crisis’, also in Central and Eastern Europe (MIDEM 2018).

Since then the public interest has again shifted somewhat in favor of ‘home- EMIGRATION INCREASINGLY made’ problems. A survey by the European Council of Foreign Research from PERCEIVED AS A PROBLEM 2019 shows that people in countries like Poland or Romania are more concerned about emigration than immigration (Krastev et al. 2019). These concerns are not unfounded. Although the total population of the EU has increased a little in the last decades, in Central and Eastern Europe the populations are rapidly declining in some instances (see Figure 1). Since 1989 2.5 million Poles have turned their back on their country. In the same time the population of Bulgaria went from nearly 9 million back to 7. The development in almost all Balkan and Baltic countries is similarly dramatic. In Lithuania, for example, the population sank from 3.5 to 2.9 million.

Due to emigration, but also because of low birth rates2 and a lack of POPULATION IN CENTRAL immigration, the demographic bleeding will also probably be difficult AND EASTERN EUROPE SHRINKS to stop in the future in most Central and Eastern European countries. According to prognoses made by the United Nations, the population in Bulgaria will sink about 19 percent to 5 million in the coming 30 years. For the other countries in the region the prognoses – with few exceptions – are similar (see Figure 2). The profile of the emigrants also poses a problem for most countries in the region: many young and highly qualified people set off towards the West – with considerable consequences for the labor market. The health sector is particularly affected. Some Central and Eastern

1 Historically speaking, this is a relatively new development, after all during the 19th and early 20th century European countries made enormous efforts to control or restrict the emigration of their citizens (Torpey 2000, Mau et al. 2012, Angeli 2018). 2 In most EU Member States the fertility rate declined significantly between 1980 and 2000: By the year 2000 it had fallen under 1.30 in many Central and Eastern European states. Gradually it rose to over INTRODUCTION 1.30 again in almost all countries (Eurostat 2020). A 11 EMIGRATION INTRODUCTION

Fig. 1: Population development in the EU countries (2010-2019) European countries are running too short of medical professionals to maintain an adequate level of medical care across the country. Around 10 percent of the Romanian population no longer has access to adequate medical care (Paun 2016).

Like in most Central and Eastern European countries emigration is also IN SOUTHERN EUROPE, perceived as a problem in Southern Europe3. Here the high emigration EMIGRATION IS A CRISIS rate among young (and mostly well-qualified) people is an indication of PHENOMENON FI +3.11% the precarious economic and social situation in the country. If many young people emigrate from countries like Greece or Italy, then this is a clear sign

SE of an ongoing economic crisis and the associated high unemployment. Yet +9.52% EE also structural problems (low wages, precarious employment conditions -0.64% etc.) as well as the level of frustration about the lack of a career perspective LV -9.46% lead to many people from Southern Europe trying their luck in Germany DK LT or England (Enriquez/Romera 2019). The coronavirus crisis has made the +4.9% -11.07% consequences of outward migration of medical specialists for the health IE +7.8% sector glaringly apparent (Faus/Amante 2020). Especially in hospitals and NL PL retirement homes the staffing level is low. +4.27% -0.13% BE DE +5.68% +1.49% CZ The upheavals that emigration causes in the communities of origin vary from LU FOCUS ON HIGHLY SKILLED +22.27% +1.79% SK +1.11% country to country. In many places it is almost exclusively the emigration of AT HU the young and highly qualified that is bemoaned. In the political discourse FR +6.07% -2.41% RO the talk is often of ‘brain drain’. However, the number of low-skilled workers +3.64% SI -4.34% +1.66% HR emigrating is also significant – primarily in countries like Romania and -5.27% SM BU Bulgaria. In addition, the departure of those employed in agriculture or the MC +40.6% -5.68% building sector can have a negative impact on the labor market, especially AN +33.3% IT PT +41.7% +1.98% if there is a lack of people of working age in sparsely populated regions. -2.81% ES +0.97% Thus, rural areas in Bulgaria or Romania are threatened by depopulation, GR -3.55% which also brings with it serious consequences for the infrastructure as

CY well as for the health, pension and education systems. The question as to +6.93% whether the money sent back by emigrants is capable of offsetting the loss MT of human capital and workforce is also a point of controversy in migration +19.21% research and the field of economics (De Haas 2012). What is certain is that Source: Eurostat / own representation remittances are a significant source of revenue in some countries. Based on a measurement as a proportion of their gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019, Croatia (6.6 percent), Bulgaria (3.4 percent) and Romania (3.3 percent of GDP) are among the largest recipients of remittances (Eurostat 2020). Fig. 2: Projected population development in the EU countries (2020-2050) The negative consequences of emigration for the labor market are not 40% DISTORTED IMAGE IN THE MEDIA noticeable in all Central and Eastern European countries. The reason: Some AND IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE 30% countries experience not only emigration but increasingly also immigration from third countries like Ukraine. Proof of the economic upturn in 20% Poland and the Czech Republic is that they have recently developed from emigration countries to emigration and immigration countries. Most 10% Southern European countries already went through this transition. What stands out: many of the emigrants in these countries consist of former 0% immigrants as well as citizens with a migrant background. If these people emigrate, this is often not reflected in the migration statistics. Furthermore, -10% they are afforded considerably less attention in media and politics. In fact, the portrayal of emigration in most countries’ media is tied to the -20% image of a young and highly educated native. Emigrants with a migrant -30% background are often not viewed as nationals, but instead as returnees or ‘circular migrants’. In some instances this also applies to ethnic minorities in

Italy Central and Eastern Europe. For example, in Romania for a long time it was Spain Malta Latvia France Poland Cyprus Ireland Austria Greece Croatia Estonia Finland Sweden Slovakia Belgium Bulgaria Slovenia Portugal

Hungary endeavored to not count the Roma originating from Romania and living in Romania Lithuania Germany Denmark

Netherlands Western and Southern Europe as part of one’s own emigration. Luxembourg Czech Republic

Source: Eurostat / own representation

3 According to a survey, people in Italy and Spain are more concerned about the departure of their own citizens than about the immigration of foreigners (Krastev et al. 2019).

12 13 EMIGRATION INTRODUCTION

RIGHT-WING POPULISTS What demographic fears can be triggered by a high emigration rate in living conditions like identification with the country and its culture. A GENERALLY DO NOT BENEFIT countries with low fertility and little immigration? Does the fear of population further difference: only right-wing populist parties like, for example, the FROM EMIGRATION loss fuel an illiberal revolt, as Ivan Krastev claimed (Krastev/Holmes 2019)? Italian party Lega and the Spanish Vox occasionally link emigration with Do these fears make emigration countries a fertile ground for right-wing immigration. The link occurs within the framework of a dystopic narrative populists? The MIDEM annual report 2019 addressed a similar question. of a loss of one’s home or a loss of cultural identity. It involves on the It looked at the relationship between the rising immigration numbers and one hand emigration and the falling birth rate and, on the other hand, the election results of right-wing populist parties (using the example of immigration of people who are ‘culturally foreign’. Right-wing populist Germany) (MIDEM 2019). In this year’s MIDEM annual report, however, the parties do not tend to draw parallels between the emigration experiences question is: Are rising emigration numbers beneficial for right-wing populist of the native population and that of today’s refugees. On the contrary: parties? The results show that a higher emigration rate does not generally Above all in Central and Eastern European countries a clear distinction is benefit right-wing populist parties. On the contrary: In places where more made between the image of the hard-working emigrant and that of the people emigrate, they perform worse. However, there is an exception: In refugee burdening the social system. economically weak regions right-wing populist parties profit from the high emigration numbers of the native population. A different, much more positive tone prevails in the political discourse when DIASPORA dealing with compatriots living in other countries (also called ‘diaspora’). POSITIVELY FRAMED IN GERMANY: For such regions, however, not only out-migration but also internal migration Here it becomes apparent that cultural frames are generally of greater MORE EMIGRATION MEANS poses a problem. With regard to Germany, the focus of the analysis was importance than socioeconomic ones. Fellow countrymen living abroad are MORE VOTES FOR THE AFD therefore broadened and - at the level of counties and independent cities - often portrayed as ‘ambassadors’ of one’s traditions and culture. Politicians the general relationship between migration balance and right-wing populist across the political divide demand that the relationships with the emigrants voting behavior was examined. Here, too, the analysis shows that the effects are maintained and financially supported. Members of the diaspora can of emigration can be quite different in different contexts. What applies contribute to acquainting people abroad with the language and culture of only to economically weak regions in the case of emigration abroad can be their home. Furthermore, organized diaspora communities can deepen the observed for overall emigration in general: The more strongly a region was economic relationships between the sending and receiving countries, by, affected by out-migration in the past three decades, the better the election for example, facilitating investments in their home countries. results of the right-wing populist parties there. This link between a district’s net migration and right-wing populist voting behavior is not influenced Measures which limit the willingness to depart and thereby the mobility HARDLY ANY MEASURES by factors like population density, age structure or unemployment rate. of the country’s own population are very rarely the subject of emigration TO REDUCE EMIGRATION In other words, socioeconomic and sociodemographic factors are not policies. Especially in the Central and Eastern European countries the vast decisive. What is also striking: The link between the migration rate and the majority of the population considers the regained freedom of movement election results of the AfD is more pronounced in Western Germany than in within Europe to be a great good which should not be infringed upon. Thus, Eastern Germany. In Eastern Germany, however, more recent waves of out- countries attempt to counteract the loss of specialists by other means: migration (after 2000) have a sustainable effect. In the search for the causes Firstly, incentives to stay are created (for example by raising the level of of right-wing populist electoral propensity, they are much more important remuneration for systemically relevant professions), secondly, attempts are than, for example, the migration flows immediately after reunification. already being made to motivate emigrants to return by means of financial support. In most cases such measures prove to be ineffective because they EMIGRATION: Building on these results this annual report investigated whether the topic do not change the socioeconomic causes of emigration. What seems much HARDLY POLITICIZED of emigration is purposefully politicized by right-wing populist parties. The more effective, on the other hand, are measures which are intended to investigation was carried out on the basis of nine European countries which strengthen the relationship with the citizens living abroad. These provisions are comparatively strongly affected by emigration, or rather, which have a cover in particular rights and obligations in the context of citizenship policy negative net migration rate. The examination of these Central, Eastern and (among them in particular the right to vote) as well as instruments for a Southern European countries shows that emigration is rarely deliberately better socioeconomic integration in the country of origin or the destination politicized. This also applies for right-wing populist parties. Unlike the country (e.g. with regard to taxation and the recognition of qualifications). topic of immigration, emigration hardly polarizes the party landscapes. Its salience in the party programs and parliamentary speeches is thus In view of the different national interests, the EU is the appropriate political EU: EMIGRATION comparatively low. It is only when the alleged inaction of the governments level to tackle problems in the European countries of origin resulting from IMPORTANT IN THE FUTURE in socioeconomic questions is criticized that the topic becomes polemically emigration in the context of the free movement of workers in the EU. These charged. The general tenor of the criticism: the government is unable to problems could exacerbate not only the economic but also the political improve the economic situation and the quality of life and thereby reduce differences between and within European regions. Particularly inthe emigration. In society, too, there are sporadic protests against the departure economically weaker regions, from which mostly young and well-educated of qualified workers and in particular medical personnel. people emigrate, right-wing populists can rise up to be the mouthpiece of those “left behind”. And yet the consequence cannot therefore be EMIGRATION: Characteristic for the political treatment of the topic of emigration is not the restriction of European free movement of workers. On the contrary: SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROBLEM only the socioeconomic framing but also the negative or critical assessment dealing with the negative consequences of emigration and out-migration of it. Regardless of party boundaries, emigration is mostly not viewed as is of prime importance if the European freedom of movement is not to a chance or as a valve for an overburdened labor market. Emigration is become the trigger for new divisions between the West and the East and always connected with something problematic. Left-wing parties denounce between the North and the South of Europe. in particular the high unemployment and precarious employment conditions, which motivate young people to emigrate. Right-wing parties see the causes of emigration – somewhat more generally – in the worsening of living conditions in the country, with which they also mean intangible

14 15 EMIGRATION INTRODUCTION

REFERENCES

Angeli, Oliviero 2018: Migration und Demokratie. Ein Spannungsverhältnis; Reclam, Ditzingen.

De Haas, Hein 2012: The Migration and Development Pendulum: A Critical View on Research and Policy; in: International migration 50 (3), p. 8-25.

Eurostat 2020: Personal Remittances Statistics; available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/ index.php/Personal_remittances_statistics (retrieved: 22.11.2020).

Eurostat 2020: Fertility Statistics; available at: https:// ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/ Fertility_statistics#live_births_per_woman_in_the_EU_ in_2018 (retrieved: 22.11.2020).

Faus, Joan / Amante, Angelo 2020: Southern Europe Rues Exodus of Doctors, Nurses as Coronavirus Surges; in: Reuters, November 19th, 2020; available at: https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus- spaindoctors/southern-europe-rues-exodus-of- doctorsnurses-as-coronavirus-surges-idUSKBN27Z1IC (retrieved: 22.11.2020).

Krastev, Ivan / Holmes, Stephen 2019: Populisms in Eastern Europe: A Demographic Anxiety; in: Le Débat (No 204), p. 161-169. available at: https://www.cairn.info/journalle- debat-2019-2-page-161.htm (retrieved: 24.11.2020).

Krastev, Ivan / Leonard, Mark / Dennison, Susi 2019: What Europeans Really Want: Five Myths Debunked. ECFR Report; available at: https://ecfr.eu/special/what_ europeans_really_want_five_myths_debunked/ (retrieved: 22.11.2020).

Mau, Steffen / Brabandt, Heike / Laube, Lena / Roos, Christof 2012: Liberal States and the Freedom of Movement: Selective Borders, Unequal Mobility; Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills.

MIDEM 2018: Migration und Populismus. Jahresbericht, Mercator Forum Migration und Demokratie, ed. by Hans Vorländer, Dresden.

MIDEM 2019: Migration und Europa. Jahresbericht, Mercator Forum Migration und Demokratie, ed. by Hans Vorländer, Dresden.

Paun, Carmen 2016: Race Against Time to Save Romania’s Health System; in: Politico, August 12th, 2016; available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/vlad-voiculescu- romaniahealth-minister-corruption-hospitals-feudal- health-system/ (retrieved: 22.11.2020).

Torpey, John 2000: The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.

16 17 EMIGRATION, OUT-MIGRATION AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM

1 EMIGRATION AND VOTING FOR THE AFD IN GERMANY: SHRINKING REGIONS - FRUSTRATED CITIZENS?

Summary

For Germany, at district level, a clear link between migration rate and right-wing populist voting behavior can be observed: The more severely a region was affected by outward migration over the last three decades, the greater the tendency to vote for the AfD there today.

This correlation is independent from socioeconomic and sociodemographic factors. It is neither influenced by the population density, the type of settlement and the age structure, nor by the unemployment rate, the gross domestic product or the percentage of recipients of long-term unemployment benefits.

Moreover, two regional effects can be observed: Firstly, the link between migration rate and AfD vote is more pronounced in Western than in Eastern Germany. Secondly, when looking only at Eastern Germany, it is apparent that it was not the first wave of outward migration immediately after the reunification, but the second wave after the turn of the millennium that had a lasting effect on the politico-cultural landscape of the new Länder. In other words, in the East the tendency today to vote for the AfD is particularly strong, where since the turn of the millennium a large number of people have moved away.

The tendency to change one’s place of residence, to leave one’s own home region or to emigrate abroad is not equally prevalent in all sections of the population. Those who are considered to be particularly mobile are people who have a high level of education and an above average income. For that reason alone, it can be presumed that in regions which are strongly affected by outward migration, political attitudes and election results also change, and that, for instance, the preferences of regionally rooted sections of the population that possibly tend to vote conservatively may gain in significance. In Germany, too, there is frequent speculation about such effects on the political culture as a result of migration dynamics. After the emergence of the Alternative for Ger- many (German: Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) and its programmatic consolidation as a right-wing populist force it quickly became apparent that there was support for the party above all in rather sparsely populated, economically underdeveloped regions and that it appealed to a broad electoral base in particular in Eastern Germany. It also became apparent that, especially in areas which had been affected by a sharp decline in population in the past decades, perceptions of threats, fears of loss of social and economic status and concerns about the future as well as collective feelings of being personally disadvantaged are thriv- ing. These notions are still today often successfully addressed by populist actors in most Western democracies (Bergmann/Diermeier/Niehues 2017; Herold 2018; Herold/Schäller 2020; Lengfeld/Dilger 2018; Rippl/ Seipel 2018).

Accordingly, it can be assumed that emigration dynamics in Germany RESEARCH QUESTION also have a relevant impact on political attitudes especially the tenden- AND DATA BASIS cy to vote for right-wing populist parties. Yet, can this link be proven EMIGRATION, OUT-MIGRATION statistically? Can local election successes of the AfD thus be described AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM as a delayed effect of outward migration flows? B18 19 EMIGRATION, OUT-MIGRATION AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM EMIGRATION AND VOTING FOR THE AFD IN GERMANY

Fig. 1: Does outward migration dynamics strengthen the tendency to vote As the available data provides information about the nationality of the individ- METHODOLOGY for the AfD? uals, one can also differentiate between Germans and foreign citizens.2 Here it AND HYPOTHESES can be assumed that there would be different effects on voting behavior if there were increased outward migration of people from one of these two groups.3 Independent variable Dependent variable Independently of each other, a high influx of people with foreign citizenship could increase the AfD vote share, as could high outward migration of German Net migration rate Election results of the AfD citizens. In the former case, this could possibly be explained by ‘feelings of being overrun by foreigners’, in the second case by an increasing impression of being deprived and abandoned.

In summary, the following hypotheses can be formulated: This question is to be answered below. Data from the Federal Statistical Office, which provides information about inward and outward migration H1: The lower the net migration of a district, i.e. the more out- since the reunification in an aggregated and anonymized form serves as migration outweighed inward migration in the past three dec- the basis. The study focusses on the share of the votes received by the ades, the higher the share of votes for the AfD today. AfD in the 2019 Elections to the European Parliament. Its unit of analysis are districts (“Landkreise” and “kreisfreie Städte”).1 The net migration rate H2: The lower the net migration of German citizens in a district, (NMR) – also referred to as migration balance– serves as the explanatory the higher the share of votes for the AfD there today. variable. It is calculated by means of the difference between the inward and outward migration rates of a district, whereby the out-migrations (OM) and H3: The higher the net migration of people with non-German in-migrations (IM) are then put in relation to the mid-year population (P). citizenship, the better the performance of the AfD there. If a district has a negative value here this means that over the year more people moved away than migrated into the district. These hypotheses will be tested below using statistical models of linear regression. Additionally, potential moderating variables that could strengthen or weaken a possible correlation between outward migration and AfD vote share will be identified and their influence will be evaluated. One could assume, for instance, that the politico-cultural effects of outward migration are particularly strong in economically weak regions, characterized by high unemployment and an aging population. It also seems probable that this relationship extends to rural regions If the number of inward and outward migrations were to be looked at sep- or those in the former German Democratic Republic as well. Lastly, the sociode- arately, mobility effects could strongly influence the results. For instance, mographic classification of the district4 could be of importance as well. It seems regions with a high demographic dynamic could be wrongly classified as obvious that the political consequences of high outward migration rates in rural heavily impacted by outward migration. Thus, only by balancing in- and out- regions would be noticeable in a different way than for example in urban metro- ward migration one can see whether a certain region, in relation to the size politan regions, where a heightened level of outward migration of Germans may of its population, is affected by migration gains or losses over the long-term. be compensated by inward migration of people with non-German citizenship.

DYNAMICS OF OUT-MIGRATION IN REUNIFIED GERMANY INFOBOX – Migration data of the Federal Statistical Office In order to answer the question about whether there is a link between MIGRATION RATE The German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) collects out-migration and right-wing populist voting behavior, one must first differ- AND POPULATION DEVELOPMENT information from the regional Residents’ Registration Offices for all the entiate between various explanatory variables. The situation in terms of out- residents who have registered their principle place of residence in the ward migration in a specific region is not identical to the general population respective region. development. The latter looks at the total number of inhabitants, thus also including births and deaths, whereas the net migration rate only describes As de-registrations are carried out in Germany automatically, and are the difference between inward and outward migration in relation to the size not matched with registrations in another district, this data exist only as of the population. Both variables show a strong correlation overall, yet they aggregated and anonymized quantities for individual districts. Thus, it can also convey regional differences. For example, districts like Essen or Kai- is not possible to draw conclusions about the destination of individual serslautern are characterized by a shrinking total population even if they are migrations. more affected by inward than outward migration. Conversely, since 1990 cities like Leipzig, Dresden and Jena have profited not only from their positive Because the boundaries of some districts have changed in the last 30 net migration rate, but above all from a high birth rate (Figure 2). years, conversions were also required to retain the comparability for the whole time period. For this purpose, the conversion key of the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Develop- ment (BBSR) was employed. 2 However, this only applies to the data from 1995 onwards. 3 An examination of the relationship between the election results of the AfD and the inward migration of refugees or the share of non-German residents can be found in Otteni 2019. 4 Used for the basis of the analysis is a classification system in accordance with the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR) which differentiates between a total of four district types according to settlement structure on the basis of population and central local 1 To validate the results the analysis was also repeated with the AfD vote share in the Bundestag function: sparsely populated rural districts, rural districts with some concentrations of population, election 2017. The results were largely the same. urban districts and independent large cities (cf. BBSR 2019, p. 7).

20 21 EMIGRATION, OUT-MIGRATION AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM EMIGRATION AND VOTING FOR THE AFD IN GERMANY

Fig. 2: Net migration rates (left) and general population development (right) from 1991-2018 in percent Fig. 3: Net migration rates 1995-2018 in percent (left: German citizens; right: people with non-German citizenship) 22.85 - 44.89 18.9 - 41.9 8.23 - 33.33 11.18 - 19.45 18.36 - 22.84 13.7 - 18.9 5.97 - 8.22 8.97 - 11.17 15.62 - 18.35 10.4 - 13.6 3.28 - 5.96 7.87 - 8.96 13.28 - 15.61 6.9 - 10.3 1.40 - 3.27 6.97 - 7.86 10.47 - 13.27 2.7 - 6.8 -0.36 - 1.39 5.73 - 6.96 7.12 - 10.46 -1.0 - 2.6 -2.08 - -0.37 4.70 - 5.72 3.99 - 7.11 -7.3 - -0.9 -4.29 - -2.09 3.93 - 4.69 -3.89 - 3.98 -15.5 - -7.2 -8.64 - -4.30 2.56 - 3.92 -27.14 - -3.88 -35.4 - -15.4 -28.07 - -8.65 -8.36 - 2.55

Source: Own representation based on data from the German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) Source: Own representation based on data from the German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis)

Fig. 4: Net migration rates 1991-2018 (left) and share of votes for the AfD in the 2019 Elections to the European Parliament (right) in percent MIGRATION RATES OF GERMANS A comparison of the net migration rates of German citizens and res- 22.85 - 44.89 20.5 - 33.0 idents with other nationalities also reveals clear regional differenc- 18.36 - 22.84 12.9 - 20.4 AND NON-GERMANS 15.62 - 18.35 11.1 - 12.8 es, which are sometimes superimposed with an urban-rural-divide 13.28 - 15.61 10.1 - 11.0 (Figure 3). In the greater Berlin-Brandenburg area, for example, it 10.47 - 13.27 9.4 - 10.0 7.12 - 10.46 8.7 - 9.3 can be seen that in the last three decades an increasing number of 3.99 - 7.11 8.0 - 8.6 Germans have moved to the area surrounding the capital, whereas -3.89 - 3.98 7.2 - 7.9 non-Germans primarily chose the capital itself as their destination. -27.14 - -3.88 4.0 - 7.1 Similar phenomena can also be described in the cases of Munich, Hamburg, Frankfurt and Cologne. It is only in some large cities in central and Eastern Germany that this effect has somewhat different characteristics. Cities like Dresden, Leipzig, Magdeburg or Erfurt were chosen as a destination during the same period both by Ger- mans and non-Germans at a comparable level. Other regions, conversely, can be described as clear losers in terms of migration and were most notably affected by outward migration. As Figure 3 shows, this is especially true for rural regions in Eastern Germany, but also for parts of Upper Franconia, the Bavarian Forest, and North Hesse.

DO NEGATIVE MIGRATION BALANCES STRENGTHEN THE ELEC- TION RESULTS OF THE AFD?

All that being said, the question remains whether there is a direct and identifiable link between the net migration rate of a district and the AfD vote share. The graphical comparison already leads one to suspect that there is at least some interdependence (Figure 4).

With regard to the general net migration rate, a clear negative cor- Source: Own representation based on data from the German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) relation to the respective election results of the AfD can indeed be established mathematically as well. That is to say: In places where

22 23 EMIGRATION, OUT-MIGRATION AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM EMIGRATION AND VOTING FOR THE AFD IN GERMANY

many people have moved away in the past three decades, the ten- Fig. 5: Relationship between a district’s net migration rate 1991-2018 and the share of the votes gained by the AfD in the dency to vote for the AfD is much more pronounced today. One per- 2019 European election (OLS regression) centage point decrease in the net migration rate is on average associated with a 0.06 percentage point increase in the election result of 18 the AfD (Figure 5). 16 The picture is similar if one looks at German citizens only. An even stronger negative correlation can be observed between their migra- 14 tion balances and the respective election results of the AfD. Here, one percentage point decrease in the net migration rate is on average cor- related with a 0.11 increase in the AfD vote share. 12

However, if the analysis only includes migration of people with 10 non-German citizenship then there is no statistically significant link to the share of the votes gained by the AfD – regardless of whether 8 the results of the 2019 European election or those of the Bundestag election in 2017 are chosen as the basis. Hypotheses 1 and 2 formulated at the outset can thus be confirmed based on the available data, 6 hypothesis 3, on the other hand, can be rejected. 4 When including further factors to investigate possible interactions, WHICH OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCE Linear prediction of AfD election results THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE no corresponding moderating influence can be determined for most 2 MIGRATION RATE AND VOTING of the respective variables. Thus, the statistically demonstrable link FOR AFD? between net migration rate and voting for AfD seems to be influenced neither by the socioeconomic nor by the sociodemographic condi- 0 tions. It is not even strengthened if a region is to be characterized -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 migration balance in percent as ‘structurally weak’ in an economic sense, particularly affected by aging or is designated as typically ‘rural’ due to its low population Source: Own calculation based on data from the German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) density. Conversely, positive economic markers, such as high GDP or a lower proportion of recipients of ALG II, are likewise incapable of weakening the described effect of a negative migration rate. Even Fig. 6: Relationship between a district’s net migration rate of German citizens 1995-2018 and the share of the votes for AfD in if some of these factors are nevertheless capable of influencing the the 2019 European election (OLS regression) share of votes cast for right-wing populist parties themselves, this clearly indicates that outward migration is to be treated as an inde- 18 pendent explanatory variable when explaining right-wing populist voting behavior in Germany. 16

INFLUENCE OF OUTWARD Ultimately, only the question of whether a district is located in Eastern 14 MIGRATION IS GREATER IN or Western Germany makes a significant difference. The effect of the WESTERN GERMANY THAN IN district’s net migration rate on the tendency to vote AfD is more pro- EASTERN GERMANY nounced if the affected district is located in Western Germany (Figure 12 7). On the one hand, this might reflect the fact that in the ‘old Länder’ only specific regions are affected by a negative migration balance, 10 whereas in Eastern Germany this applies to a large number of highly diverse district types. On the other hand, the differing strength of the 8 effect also indicates that there are further, possibly politico-culturally anchored differences at work in the background, still marking a significant difference between the formerly separated parts of the coun- 6 try. Figure 7 shows the correlation for eastern and western districts. Each dot represents the AfD vote share in the European elections 4 2019 and the migration rate between 1995 and 2018 of one district. Linear prediction of AfD election results While blue dots represent western, red dots indicate eastern German 2 districts. The line in the center of the scatter plots show the linear prediction of the correlation between migration rate and AfD vote share. A one-percentage point decrease in the migration rate is on 0 average associated with 0.16 points increase in the share of votes in -35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Western Germany, and 0.08 points in Eastern Germany, respectively. migration balance in percent Source: Own calculation based on data from the German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis)

24 25 EMIGRATION, OUT-MIGRATION AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM EMIGRATION AND VOTING FOR THE AFD IN GERMANY

It is also apparent that amongst the Eastern German regions there is consider- MILLIONS WHO STAYED BEHIND: OUTWARD MIGRATION AND ably more dispersion in both dimensions than in the rest of the country.5 This VOTING FOR THE AFD IN EASTERN GERMANY is illustrated, for instance, by the fact that the AfD achieved similar results in 2019 in both the city Frankfurt/Oder and the adjacent districts Dahme-Spree- Concerning Eastern Germany, the relationship between the net mi- wald, Märkisch-Oderland and Barnim, although these regions in the past dec- gration rate and the tendency to vote for the AfD can be specified ades were affected to completely different extents by migration – with a domi- even more accurately. One question that arises is what impact em- nation of outward migration in Frankfurt/Oder (NMR = -28.1) and a prevalence igration dynamics had during certain time periods – for instance, of inward migration in the other counties (e.g. Barnim: NMR = +29.9). One the whether districts that were most heavily affected by a shrinking of other hand, despite having the same slightly positive migration rates, regions its population through emigration during the early 1990s show to- like the district Sächsische Schweiz-Osterzgebirge saw an AfD almost twice as day a different propensity to vote for a right-wing populist party than strong (32.9 percent) as Nordwestmecklenburg (15.8 percent).6 regions which were not affected by a large number of out-migration until in recent years.

Fig. 7: Relationship between districts’ net migration rates of Germans 1995-2018 and the share of votes for AfD in the 2019 If one looks at the patterns of migration between the former territory WAVES OF OUTWARD MIGRATION European Parliament election in Eastern German and Western German districts of the Federal Republic and the new Eastern German Länder, several FROM EASTERN GERMANY waves of migration can be identified. Even during the times of the Districts West Districts East Cold War it is known that among the GDR – i.e. the regions that are today’s Eastern Germany – there was a high willingness to emigrate 35 to the West – which was only suppressed by the communist government internally closing its borders and building the Berlin Wall from the 1960s onwards. After the peaceful revolution and the German reunification, massive migration flows were soon recorded. Between 30 1989 and 1991 alone almost 1 million East Germans left their country

Fig. 8: Migration flows between Eastern and Western Germany (in thousand) 25 Net migration of the East compared to the West Migration from East to West Migration from West to East 250

200

150

10 Linear prediction of AfD election results

100 5 "

-35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 migration balance of German citizens (1995-2008) in percent

Source: Own calculation based on data from the German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis)6 0

-50

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 5 The migration rates for districts in Western Germany show a variance of σ² = 30.7, whereas for Eastern German districts it is approximately five times as high (σ² = 157.8). There is also considerably more Source: Own representation based on data from the German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) variance in the election result of the AfD for Eastern German districts than for their western German counterparts (23.3 to 4.3). 6 The colored area around the regression lines show the 95 percent confidence interval.

26 27 EMIGRATION, OUT-MIGRATION AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM EMIGRATION AND VOTING FOR THE AFD IN GERMANY

and headed to the West. The collapse of the economy, the massive loss of jobs subject of intense discussion. By means of the comparative analysis of migra- as well as the overall better life chances and opportunities motivated many tion balances and the election results of the AfD, the politico-cultural long-term people to turn their back on their former home (Figure 8).7 effects of the outward migration can however also be examined through statistical methods. To this end in the analysis presented the time period since the re- This development initially trailed off in the following years. The migration loss- unification was divided into smaller sections. Based on the data of the German es of the East declined considerably, especially as people from the former Federal Statistical Office the net migration rates were calculated for each sec- West Germany also increasingly moved to the new Länder. However, towards tion and then included as independent explanatory variables. Figure 10 shows the end of the 1990s a second wave of outward migration started, the struc- the resulting regression coefficients as point-estimates. For each period of time, ture and causes of which were quite different from the previous one. This it indicates the average influence of a one-point increase in the migration rate new wave had even more serious repercussions for the affected regions in on the AfD vote share in 2019. While a reduction of one percentage point in the the long term. The out-migrations from Eastern Germany between 1989 and migration rate between 1991 and 1995 is associated with an on average 0.1 1995 affected mainly people who, for example, had lost their jobs and saw no points decrease, a decrease in the period from 2006 and 2010 leads to a 0.5 real economic prospects in their old home. The new wave was comprised of percentage point increase in the electoral result of the AfD. The lines crossing broad segments of a new generation deciding to move away from their home the point estimates indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals. regions and to leave Eastern Germany – especially young people with higher education qualifications, women in particular (Figure 9). They were the first co- As a result, it can be argued that the correlation between former net migra- OUTWARD MIGRATION FLOWS horts that possessed a unified-German educational biography but after the tion rates and present AfD vote differs widely among distinct time periods since BETWEEN 2001 AND 2010 HAD A end of their high-school qualification, they primarily saw the best chances for 1990. The negative net migration rate from the first post-millennial decade ev- PARTICULARLY LASTING IMPACT professional development in the dynamic economic, university and cultural idently had a much more lasting impact and is therefore to be more strongly centers of the old (Western) Federal Republic. For many Eastern German re- associated with the present tendency to vote AfD. Even more than the wave 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 gions, the absence of these people continues to have an effect to this day. of outward migration which was directly connected with the ‘transformation Their departure not only meant a long-term loss of innovative capacity, dy- shock’ of the early 1990s, the exodus of young and educated East Germans namism and future opportunities, but at the same time due to the above-av- which started right before the turn of the millennium and continued in a weak- erage number of young women departing, it was accompanied by a further er form over the next two decades had a lasting impact on the political culture decline in the birth rates (Bangel et al. 2019; Dorn 2018, p. 99 ff.; Kröhnert in the former communist regions of Germany. In recent years, this finding also 2009; Mai 2006). seems to cause many discussions among those former Eastern Germans who have migrated away. In the face of today’s growing tendencies towards politi- RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIFFERENT Since right-wing populist actors have achieved a new level of visibility and influ- cal polarization in their former home regions, they increasingly draw attention PERIODS OF OUT-MIGRATION AND ence on the streets and in the parliaments of Eastern Germany, the social and with self-reflecting and thoughtful, sometimes even moralizing contributions: VOTING FOR THE AFD political consequences of these developments are increasingly becoming the “Because I wanted to have it better somewhere else, I let my home down. Economically, culturally, most of all politically. How egoistic” (Spiller 2019).

Fig. 9: Migration losses of the eastern towards the western states within Germany per 1,000 inhabitants according to age group (without Berlin) Fig. 10: Relationship between the migration balances from different time periods since 1991 and the election result of the AfD in 2019 under 18 18-25 18-25 (only women) 25-30 30-50 50-65 65 and older 60 0.4

50 0.2 40

30 0 "

20 -0.2

10 -0.4 0

-10 -0.6

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 -0.8 Source: Own representation based on data from the German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015

Source: Own calculation based on data from the German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis)

7 Around 80 percent of the working population of the GDR was affected by temporary or long-term unemployment between 1990 and 1995 (Windolf 2001: 411).

28 29 EMIGRATION, OUT-MIGRATION AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM EMIGRATION AND VOTING FOR THE AFD IN GERMANY

REFERENCES APPENDIX

Table 1 - Correlation between migration balance and AfD election result in the 2019 European election Bangel, Christian / Blickle, Paul / Erdmann, Elena / Faigle, Otteni, Cyrill 2019: Zunahme von Migration – Stärkung der (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Philip / Loos, Andreas / Stahnke, Julian / Tröger, Julius / AfD? Der Zusammenhang zwischen Ausländeranteilen district’s district’s net district’s Venohr, Sascha 2019: Die Millionen, die gingen; in: Zeit und AfD-Wahlergebnissen auf regionaler Ebene; in: net migration net Interaction Interaction AfD election result in the migration Interaction Interaction Interaction Interaction Online, May 2nd, 2019; available at: https://www.zeit. MIDEM, Migration und Populismus. Jahresbericht, rate migration Population Unemploy- European election 2019 rate East 65+ GDP ALG2 Germans rate density ment rate de/politik/deutschland/2019-05/ost-west-wanderung- Mercator Forum Migration und Demokratie, ed. by Hans 1991- 1991- Foreigners abwanderung-ostdeutschland-umzug Vorländer, Dresden, p. 81–90. 2018 2018 (retrieved: 17.11.2020). Rippl, Susanne / Seipel, Christian 2018: district’s net migration rate -0.007*** Bergmann, Knut / Diermeier, Matthias / Niehues, Judith Modernisierungsverlierer, Cultural Backlash, 1991-2018 2017: Die AfD: Eine Partei der sich ausgeliefert Postdemokratie; in: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und (0.002) fühlenden Durchschnittsverdiener?; in: Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie 70 (2), p. 237–254. Germans 1995-2018 -0.011*** -0.017*** -0.014 -0.009*** -0.008 -0.011*** -0.012** Parlamentsfragen 48 (1), p. 57–75. (0.002) (0.002) (0.025) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) Spiller, Christian 2019: „Ich habe den Osten im Foreigners 1995-2018 0.003 (0.006) Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung Stich gelassen!“; in: fluter.de, November 8th, 2019; East 10.96*** 11.18*** 11.31*** 11.25*** 11.22*** 11.29*** 11.16*** 11.18*** 11.17*** 2019: Erläuterungen der Raumbezüge; available at: available at: https://www.fluter.de/abwanderung-aus- (0.560) (0.556) (0.600) (0.552) (0.653) (0.571) (0.559) (0.561) (0.557) https://www.inkar.de/documents/Erlaeuterungen%20 ostdeutschland (retrieved: 17.11.2020). district’s net migration 0.009** Raumbezuege19.pdf (retrieved: 02.12.2020). rate_de#east Windolf, Paul 2001: Die wirtschaftliche Transformation. (0.004) district’s net migration Dorn, Raphael E. 2018: Alle in Bewegung. Räumliche Politische und ökonomische Systemrationalitäten; 0.000 rate_de#65+ Mobilität in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1980- in: Schluchter, Wolfgang / Quint, Peter E. (eds): Der (0.001) 2010; Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen. Vereinigungsschock. Vergleichende Betrachtungen zehn district’s net migration 0.000 Jahre danach; Velbrück, Weilerswist, p. 392–413. rate_de#Desity Herold, Maik 2018: Migration und Populismus in (0.000) Deutschland. Erklärungsansätze und empirische district’s net migration rate -0.001 Befunde; in: MIDEM, Migration und Populismus. Unemployment rate (0.001) district’s net migration Jahresbericht, Mercator Forum Migration und 0.000 rate_de#GDP Demokratie, ed. by Hans Vorländer, Dresden, p. 27–45. (0.000) district’s net migration 0.000 Herold, Maik / Schäller, Steven 2020: Zwischen rate_de#ALG2 Konvergenz, Konkurrenz und Kooperation: PEGIDA und (0.000) die AfD; in: Backes, Uwe / Kailitz, Steffen (eds): Sachsen Voter turnout EP19 -0.108*** -0.091*** -0.124*** -0.082** -0.091*** -0.085** -0.089*** -0.098*** -0.099*** - eine Hochburg des Rechtsextremismus?; Vandenhoeck (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.033) & Ruprecht, Göttingen, p. 127–154. Unemployment rate -0.131 -0.146* -0.0750 -0.176** -0.148* -0.181** -0.164*** -0.178** 0.351 (0.0837) (0.0852) (0.0811) (0.0822) (0.0814) (0.0872) (0.078) (0.0885) (0.216) Population density 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 0.0004 Kröhnert, Steffen 2009: Analysen zur geschlechtsspezifisch (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) geprägten Abwanderung Jugendlicher; in: Schubarth, over65 0.263*** 0.285*** 0.409*** 0.301*** 0.285*** 0.289*** 0.293*** 0.277*** 0.272*** Wilfried / Speck, Karsten (eds): Regionale Abwanderung (0.078) (0.076) (0.090) (0.074) (0.076) (0.075) (0.074) (0.076) (0.074) Jugendlicher. Theoretische Analysen, empirische County type (ref. sparsely Befunde, und politische Gegenstrategien; Juventa, populated rural district) Weinheim, p. 91–110. Rural district with 0.932** 0.880** 0.862** 0.925** 0.885** 0.833** 0.850** 0.889** 0.990** densification approaches (0.404) (0.401) (0.412) (0.401) (0.411) (0.400) (0.409) (0.402) (0.403) Lengfeld, Holger / Dilger, Clara 2018: Kulturelle und Urban district 1.018*** 0.911*** 0.991*** 0.933*** 0.911*** 0.897** 0.898** 0.925*** 1.059*** (0.355) (0.349) (0.365) (0.354) (0.351) (0.348) (0.350) (0.352) (0.343) ökonomische Bedrohung. Eine Analyse der Ursachen der district-free city -0.392 -0.506 -0.165 -0.596 -0.513 -0.555 -0.505 -0.384 -0.280 Parteiidentifikation mit der „Alternative für Deutschland“ (0.841) (0.814) (0.816) (0.801) (0.812) (0.817) (0.813) (0.845) (0.813) mit dem Sozio-oekonomischen Panel 2016; in: Zeitschrift GDP -0.0121 für Soziologie 47 (3), p. 181–199. (0.00853) ALG2 -0.195*** Lutz, Burkart / Grünert, Holle 1996: Der Zerfall der (0.0740) Beschäftigungsstrukturen der DDR 1989-1993; in: Lutz, Constants 11.05*** 8.989*** 7.526** 8.369*** 8.998*** 8.734*** 8.782*** 10.12*** 9.365*** Burkart / Nickel, Hildegard M. / Schmidt, Rudi / Sorge, (2.727) (2.716) (3.089) (2.717) (2.731) (2.716) (2.721) (2.875) (2.622) Arndt (eds): Arbeit, Arbeitsmarkt und Betriebe; Springer VS, Wiesbaden, p. 69–120. Observations 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 R² 0.806 0.812 0.797 0.815 0.812 0.814 0.813 0.813 0.815

Mai, Ralf 2006: Die altersselektive Abwanderung aus Notes: Results of various linear regression analyses (OLS); Robust standard error in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 Ostdeutschland; in: Raumforschung und Raumordnung Source: Own calculation based on data from the German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) 64 (5), p. 355–369.

30 31 EMIGRATION, OUT-MIGRATION AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM

2 EMIGRATION AND THE ELECTION RESULTS OF FAR-RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE

Summary

In many countries in Europe, people are more concerned about the negative consequences of emigration than immigration. This applies in particular to Central and Eastern European as well as Southern European countries, which in some cases have had a negative net migration rate for decades.

This study examined whether and to what extent emigration rates have an impact on the election results of far-right parties. To this end, 15 Euro- pean countries were selected, the emigration numbers at municipal level were established and then possible connections to the local results in the 2019 European election were investigated.

The study also examined whether the economic performance of a region plays a role.

The results show that far-right parties generally do not profit from higher emigration rates. On the contrary: Where more people emigrate, these parties even perform worse than the general European average. They only benefit from a high emigration rate in economically weak regions.

In the wake of the movement of refugees in the past years, the topic DO FAR-RIGHT PARTIES BENEFIT of ‘immigration’ has increasingly become the focus of social science re- FROM EMIGRATION? search. For the issue of ‘emigration’ however this could be observed much less, although, for many regions in Europe, emigration constitutes a much more significant phenomenon in terms of its sociodemographic, economic and political impact. For instance, a survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) showed that in the elections to the European Par- liament in 2019 more than a quarter of the voters were equally concerned about immigration and emigration. In some countries, the concern about persistent emigration flows was even considerably greater. This applies above all to Central and Eastern European countries like Romania, Poland and Hungary, as well as Southern European countries like Italy, Spain and Greece (Zerka 2019; Dennison et al. 2019). However, it remains unclear what influence the extent of emigration has on voting behavior. Do high emigration numbers lead to political mobilization, in a way similar to the topic of immigration? Is it even possible to establish a statistical relationship between migratory movements abroad and the election success of far-right parties?

Fig. 1: How does emigration impact on the share of votes for far-right parties?

Independent variable: Dependent variable:

Rate of emigration Share of votes for abroad far right parties EMIGRATION, OUT-MIGRATION AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM B32 33 EMIGRATION, OUT-MIGRATION AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM EMIGRATION AND THE ELECTION RESULTS OF FAR-RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE

In the following, the study examines this question in a European perspective Fig. 3: Parties analyzed by applying multivariate linear regression analyses (OLS). Data on emigration Far-right parties in Europe (according to ‘The PopuList’) in 15 selected EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, In brackets: CHES value for the general left-right classification Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, and Sweden) serve as the basis for the investigation. For the Austria • Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (9.1) • Parti pupulaire (Pp) analysis, a cross-sectional dataset was prepared with the level of Local Admin- Belgium istrative Units (LAU2) chosen as the unit of analysis. The 35,000 municipalities • Vlaams Belang (VB) (9.6) examined also represent all geographic and cultural regions of the EU (Figure 2). • Patrioti za Valeri Simeonov (NFSB i Sredna evropeĭka klasa) (NFSB) (7.4) The corresponding data were retrieved from the national statistical offices (cf. Bulgaria • VMRO-BND (6.9) the information in the appendix). For every municipality the total of all emi- • Ataka (6.8) • Sdružení pro republiku-Republ.str.Českosl.M.Sládka (SPRRSČ M.Sládka) gration abroad from 2009 to 2018 was calculated as a proportion of the total Czech Republic • Svoboda a přímá demokracie - Tomio Okamura (SPD) (8.8) population in 2009. Denmark • Dansk Folkeparti (DF) (6.9) In addition, all analyses controlled for further potential influences on the elec- Finland • Perussuomalaiset / Sannfinländarna (PS) (7.6) tion result. In other words, various other influencing factors were included in Germany • Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) (9.2) • Fratelli d‘Italia (FdI) (9.1) the analysis in order to test whether, independent of them, the emigration rate Italy has a statistically significant impact on the independent variable. Such factors • Lega Nord (Lega) (8.8) include economic variables like the employment rate and the GDP per capita Latvia • Nacionālā apvienība „Visu Latvijai!“-Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK (NA) (8.4) as well as respective changes to those numbers in the last ten years. Further- The • Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) (8.7) more, demographic factors like the population density, the relative proportion Netherlands • Forum voor Democratie (FvD) (9.5) of men and women as well as the proportion of the population made up of • Konfederacja KORWiN Braun Liroy Narodowcy (KORWiN) (9.5) people over 65 (Data source: European Commission 2020).12 Poland • Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) (7.6) • Kukiz‘15 (7.1) Romania • Partidul România Unită (PRU) WHAT IS DISTINCTIVE ABOUT The sum of the election results for all far-right parties in the European election • Kotleba - Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko (L’SNS) (9.3) FAR-RIGHT PARTIES? 2019 served as the dependent variable for the analysis. The vote share for Slovakia • Slovenská Národná Strana (SNS) (7.4) these parties was calculated according to the same scheme for the classifica- • Sme Rodina - Boris Kollár (SR) (7.1) tion of far-right as used in the research project ‘The PopuList’ (Roodujin et al. Spain • Vox (9.7) Sweden • Sverigedemokraterna (SD) (8.5) Fig. 2: Data basis2 Number of spatial 2019). Two central ideological features have been established as typical charac- reference units at NUTS3 level (in Number of Net migration rate teristics: nativism and authoritarianism. Nativism describes the idea that one’s Country Germany: districts municipalities (LAU2) 2009-2018 own country should primarily be inhabited by members of one’s own ethnic and cities constituting group. Authoritarianism, on the other hand, is the view that a society should districts) be organized in a strictly hierarchical way and that violations are to be firmly sanctioned (Mudde 2007). International research also refer to parties, which Austria 35 2096 5.86 exhibit these two ideological aspects, as populist radical right3. Additionally, in Belgium 43 563 4.33 order to increase the robustness and validity of the selection, the Chapel Hill Bulgaria 28 265 -0.96 Expert Survey (CHES) was used, which classifies parties from extreme left (0) to Czech Republic 13 6256 1.81 extreme right (10) (Bakker et al. 2019; Roodujin et al. 2019). Germany 381 11050 5.27 Denmark 11 99 4.03 FAR-RIGHT PARTIES GENERALLY DO NOT PROFIT FROM EMI- Spain 53 8079 0.79 GRATION Finland 19 311 2.77 Italy 104 7808 4.01 The results of the study are remarkable, yet unambiguous: Generally speaking, EMIGRATION DOES NOT Latvia 6 119 -7.81 emigration does not benefit far-right parties. On the contrary, the more people GENERALLY BENEFIT The Netherlands 33 296 2.77 as a proportion of the population between 2009 and 2018 emigrated from a FAR-RIGHT PARTIES Poland 73 2477 -0.06 municipality, the worse these parties performed in the 2019 European election. Romania 42 3181 -2.43 A one-percentage point higher emigration rate even resulted in election results Sweden 21 290 7.56 for far-right parties that were on average 0.2 percentage points worse (Figure 4). Slovakia 8 2926 0.35 This indicates, firstly, that on average in Europe not only those left behind – the less mobile, locally rooted, possibly less educated and rather conservative sections of the population – tend to vote for far-right parties, but also those who leave their home countries in search of work, career prospects and personal

1 In the case of the GDP per capita, the analysis includes an interaction variable. By doing so, the relationship between the emigration rate and the election result of far-right parties depending on the economic performance of a region could be identified. Table 1 shows the results of both regressions in the appendix. 3 This definition does not in fact consider the aspect of ‘populism’. Nevertheless, most of the parties 2 The analysis uses municipality data. In the case of Germany, data at the district level (Landkreise). selected here have also been characterized by ‘populist’ strategies in the past years.

34 35 EMIGRATION, OUT-MIGRATION AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM EMIGRATION AND THE ELECTION RESULTS OF FAR-RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE

development. Secondly, it is evident that the moods and feelings that arise due EXPLANATIONS to emigration dynamics do not necessarily benefit the parties on the far-right. Various explanations are conceivable for these results. It is generally accepted, SOCIAL REMITTANCES: IN ECONOMICALLY WEAK However, when the analysis includes the economic efficiency of a region to that international mobility – thus, also emigration – can promote the develop- EMIGRATION CAN STRENGTHEN REGIONS THE RELATIONSHIP IS see whether economic factors influence the relationship between emigration ment of pro-European or cosmopolitan attitudes (Kuhn 2011; Mau et al. 2008). COSMOPOLITAN VALUES. REVERSED: FAR-RIGHT PARTIES processes and voting for far-right parties, then a more varied picture emerges. The basic assumption: People with migration experience develop increasingly PROFIT FROM EMIGRATION With decreasing economic strength, the correlation initially weakens and ulti- pro-European and cosmopolitan values and norms and at the same time dis- mately even turns around, until finally in economically weak regions high em- play nationalistic attitudes less frequently (Favell et al. 2011). Furthermore, it is igration rates are associated with an increasing vote share of far-right parties. possible that this change also has an impact on the relatives and friends and ac- Figure 5 illustrates this relationship: The yellow regression line shows the rela- quaintances of the emigrants in the countries of origin. Social science research tionship between emigration rate and the election results of far-right parties calls this phenomenon social remittances. The term refers to the diffusion of in those regions that have a GDP per capita in the lowest decile of all studied norms, values, ideas and customs due to the direct exchange between emi- regions. The green line, in contrast, shows the same relationship for the eco- grants and their contacts in their home countries (Levitt/Lamba-Nieves 2011; nomically strongest regions. The more people who emigrated from here, the Perez-Armendariz / Crow 2010; Mahmoud et al. 2017; Lodigiani 2016; Barsbai lower the election result of right-wing parties. Thus, economic factors signifi- et al. 2017). If cosmopolitan values are then increasingly prevalent in the emi- cantly moderate the relationship between emigration rates and the election grants’ home countries, this can also have an impact at the ballot box (Lubbers/ success of far-right parties in Europe. Coenders 2017).

A further possible explanation is less about the ‘social’, but rather about the MONETARY REMITTANCES: Fig. 4: Relationship between the emigration rate and the share of votes for far-right parties ‘monetary’ transfers (remittances), i.e. the money sent by emigrants to their MONEY TRANSFERS families back in their home countries. By means of remittances, emigrants help 30 FROM ABROAD PROMOTE their families in their old homelands, especially in periods when they have fi- DEVELOPMENT 25 nancial difficulties. In this way the level of satisfaction of the recipients can be 20 increased, which can raise the tendency towards cosmopolitan values but also lead to more support for the European freedom of movement (Rapoport/Doc- 15 quier 2006). Since most far-right parties in Europe are at the same time charac- 10 terized by EU skepticism, they will therefore tend to lose support (Vasilopoulou 5 2018). Furthermore, remittances from citizens who have emigrated can also contribute to the overall economic development of a region, which should also 0 weaken the support for far-right parties. In fact, remittances account for above -5 three percent of the total gross domestic product in some countries strongly affected by emigration (World Bank 2020). Predicted election result of far-right parties (in percent) -10

-15 The established influence of the economic strength of a region on the relation- SPECIAL CASE: 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 ship between emigration and the election results of far-right parties however EMIGRATION FROM Emigration rate between 2009 and 2018 (in percent) seems to confirm that high emigration rates are not only found in regions with ECONOMICALLY WEAK REGIONS Source: Own calculation based on national statistical offices a shrinking population. They also provide information about generally higher mobility in the population. Mobility is often greater in economically ‘dynamic’ regions, whereas the tendency to vote for parties on the far-right is lower there. Fig. 5: Relationship between the emigration rate and the share of votes for far-right parties depending on the economic per- However, structurally weak regions are often not only affected by emigration formance abroad, but also by outward migration to economically stronger regions, such high GDP per capita median GDP per capita low GDP per capita as urban centers within the country. A shrinking and increasingly aging popu- 70 lation is the result, which in turn promotes feelings of economic, societal, but 60 also political deprivation and thereby promotes the tendency to vote for right- 50 wing populist and extreme right parties (Manow 2018; Krastev/Holmes 2019). In addition, it is conceivable that the individual characteristics of those willing 40 to emigrate also influence the relationship between emigration and the elec- 30 tion success of far-right parties. The level of formal education, the social back- 20 ground or the motivation of those affected, as well as their attachment to their 10 home countries could play a role. This would have to be further investigated 0 by drawing on individual-level data. Specific criteria of individual countries of -10 origin – such as institutional frameworks, political attitudes or the degree of -20 mobility of the population – could also be of significance here. A decisive factor Predicted election result of far-right parties (in percent) -30 for the impact of emigration on the success of far-right parties is also, whether, how and who addresses the topic in the political discourse. In Lithuania, for -40 example, the party ‘Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union’ (Lietuvos valstiečių ir 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 Emigration rate between 2009 and 2018 (in percent) žaliųjų sąjunga) decided to tackle the problem and in 2016 successfully made it the key issue in the parliamentary election campaign (Day 2016). Unlike in other Source: Own calculation based on national statistical offices regions in Europe, far-right political actors were thereby left with few possibilities to benefit, not even in areas strongly affected by emigration.

36 37 EMIGRATION, OUT-MIGRATION AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM EMIGRATION AND THE ELECTION RESULTS OF FAR-RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE

REFERENCES

Bakker, Ryan / Hooghe, Liesbet / Jolly, Seth / Marks, Gary / Polk, Lubbers, Marcel / Coenders, Marcel 2017: Nationalistic Attitudes Jonathan / Rovny, Jan / Steenbergen, Marco / Vachudova, Milada and Voting for the Radical Right in Europe; in: European Union 2020: 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey. Version 2019.1. Chapel Politics 18 (1), p. 98–118. Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. https:// www.chesdata.eu/2019-chapel-hill-expert-survey Mahmoud, Toman / Rapoport, Hillel. / Steinmayr, Andreas / (retrieved: 21.09.2020). Trebesch, Christoph 2017: The Effect of Labor Migration on the Diffusion of Democracy: Evidence from a Former Soviet Barsbai, Toman / Rapoport, Hillel / Steinmayr, Andreas / Trebesch, Republic; in: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics Christoph 2017: The Effect of Labor Migration on the Diffusion 9 (3), p. 36-69. of Democracy: Evidence from a Former Soviet Republic; in: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 9 (3), pp. 36- Manow, Philip 2018: Die Politische Ökonomie des Populismus; 69. Suhrkamp Verlag, Berlin.

Day, Matthew 2016: Anti-Emigration Party Storms to Victory Mau, Steffen / Mewes, Jan / Zimmermann, Ann 2008: in Lithuania; available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ Cosmopolitan Attitudes Through Transnational Social news/2016/10/24/anti-emigration-party-storms-to-victory-in- Practices; in: Global Networks 8 (1), p. 1-24. lithuania/ (retrieved: 16.10.20). Mudde, Cas 2007: Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe; Dennison, Susi / Leonard, Mark / Zerka, Pawel / Coratella, Teresa Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. / Janning, Josef / Mendel-Nykorowycz, Andrzej / Torreblanca, Ignacio 2019: How to Govern a Fragmented EU: What Perez-Armendariz, Clarisa / Crow, David 2010: Do Migrants Europeans Said at the Ballot Box. European Council on Remit Democracy? International Migration, Political Beliefs, Foreign Relations (ECFR); available at: https://www.ecfr.eu/ and Behavior in Mexico; in: Comparative Political Studies 43 publications/summary/how_to_govern_a_fragmented_eu_ (1), p. 119-148. what_europeans_said_at_the_ballot_box (retrieved: 10.09.2020). Rapoport, Hillel / Docquier, Frédéric 2006: The Economics of Migrants’ Remittances; in: Kolm, Serge-Christophe / Ythier, European Commission 2020: Eurostat Database; available at: Jean Mercier Ythier (eds.): Handbook of the Economics of https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/de/data/database Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity; Nord Holland, Amsterdam, (retrieved: 21.09.2020). p. 1135-1198.

Favell, Adrian / Recchi, Ettore / Kuhn, Theresa / Jensen, Janne Roodujin, Mathjis / Van Kessel, Stijn / Froio, Caterina / Pirro, Solgaard / Klein, Juliane 2011: The Europeanisation of Everyday Andreas / De Lange, Sarah / Halikiopoulou, Daphne / Lewis, Paul / Life: Cross-Border Practices and Transnational Identifications Mudde, Cas / Taggart, Paul 2019: The PopuList: An Overview of Among EU and Third-Country Citizens. State of the Art Report. Populist, Far Right, Far Left and Eurosceptic Parties in Europe; EUCROSS Working Paper 1; available at: http://www.eucross. available at: www.popu-list.org (retrieved: 14.09.2020). eu/eucross/images/docs/eucross_d2_2_state_of_the_art.pdf (retrieved: 25.10.20). Vasilopoulou, Sofia 2018: The Radical Right and Euroscepticism; in: Rydgren, Jens (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Krastev, Ivan / Holmes, Stephen 2019: The Light that Failed: A Right; Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 122-140. Reckoning; Penguin Books, London. World Bank 2020: Annual remittance data; available at: Kuhn, Theresa 2011: Individual Transnationalism, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesd Globalization and Euroscepticism: An Empirical Test of iasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data Deutsch’s Transactionalist Theory; in: European Journal of (retrieved: 14.10.2020). Political Research 50 (6), pp. 811-837. Zerka, Pawel 2019: Europe’s Emigration Paradox. European Levitt, Peggy / Lamba-Nieves 2011: Social Remittances Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR); Available at: https://www. Revisited; in: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 37 (1), ecfr.eu/article/commentary_europes_emigration_paradox p. 1-22. (retrieved: 10.09.2020).

Lodigiani, Elisabetta 2016: The Effect of Emigration on Homecountry Political Institutions; in: IZA World of Labor 2016 (307), p. 1-11.

38 39 EMIGRATION, OUT-MIGRATION AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM EMIGRATION AND THE ELECTION RESULTS OF FAR-RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE

APPENDIX

OLS regression of emigration rate on the election results for right-wing populist parties in the election to the European Parliament in 2019 in municipalities in fifteen European countries controlling for various alternative explanatory factors Analysis I Analysis II Emigration rate -0.198** 0.627*** (0.0990) (0.163) GDP per capita 0.000269*** 0.000499*** (9.17e-05) (0.000135) Emigration rate#GDP per capita -3.06e-05*** (6.92e-06) Change in GDP per capita 0.0452 0.0251 (0.0280) (0.0266) Employment rate 0.00208* 0.00164 (0.00110) (0.00118) Change in employment rate -0.151*** -0.165*** (0.0363) (0.0362) Population density -0.00116*** -0.000967** (0.000410) (0.000401) Gender ratio -0.559*** -0.503*** (0.167) (0.158) Proportion 65+ 0.323** 0.257* (0.141) (0.136) Constants 59.58*** 51.00*** (16.38) (15.24)

Observations 35.120 35.120 R² 0.841 0.845 Countries Fixed Effects Ja Ja

Robust standard error in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05

Overview of the sources for the national statistics Austria https://www.statistik.at/web_de/services/statcube/index.html Belgium https://statbel.fgov.be/de/theme Bulgaria https://www.nsi.bg/en Czech Republic https://vdb.czso.cz/vdbvo2/faces/en/index.jsf?page=home Germany https://www.regionalstatistik.de/genesis/online/ Denmark https://www.statbank.dk Spain https://www.ine.es/dyngs/INEbase/en/categoria.htm?c=Estadistica_P&cid=1254734710990 Finland http://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin/ Croatia https://www.dzs.hr/PXWeb/default.aspx?px_language=hr&rxid=5e3e3af1-7661-46be-977c-d43bee0cb9c5 Italy http://demo.istat.it/index_e.html Lithuania https://osp.stat.gov.lt/statistiniu-rodikliu-analize#/ Latvia https://data1.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/en/ The Netherlands https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/en/dataset/37259eng/table?ts=1600766283403 Poland https://stat.gov.pl/en/regional-statistics/publications-and-studies/ Romania https://insse.ro/cms/en/content/regional-economic-and-social-benchmarks-territorial-statistics-0 Sweden https://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/en/ssd/ Slovakia http://datacube.statistics.sk/#!/lang/en

40 41 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES BULGARIA

1 BULGARIA

Summary

The biggest wave of emigration from Bulgaria took place in the 1990s. The 2007 accession of Bulgaria to the EU did not lead to а serious increase in emigration but rather legalized the status of Bulgarians who had already emigrated. More and more Bulgarians engage in seasonal work and temporary mobility rather than permanent emigration.

In 2019, one in three young Bulgarians wanted to emigrate. The main reasons for emigration are economic: wages in Bulgaria have remained low. An often overlooked issue is the extent of internal migration within Bulgaria due to dramatic regional disparities.

Emigration has been acknowledged as a systemic problem with serious consequences for the demography, economy and social life. Over the years, the topic of emigration has increased in salience and has been discussed by an expanding number of actors. During the ‘refugee crisis’ discussions about preventing immigration were more prominent in political debates than discussions about preventing emigration despite the fact that immigration has affected the country significantly less.

While emigration has high salience in the media, it is addressed far less often in both party manifestos and parliamentary debates. Emigration has repeatedly been brought up by civil society actors as part of broader protests against the government (regardless of which particular party was currently in power).

DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE OF EMIGRATION

Bulgaria is the poorest member of the EU with a GDP per capita of just HARPLY SHRINKING POPULATION under 8,000€. The country joined the EU in 2007. As of the January 1st, 2019, Bulgaria’s population was 7 million citizens. This is 1.7 million less than in 1990.

In fact, Bulgaria is the fastest shrinking country in the world (Mohdin 2018). The population projection for Bulgaria in 2060 is only around 5.3 million people, which is a 38.5 percent decrease of more than one third compared to the population in 1990. According to political scientist Ivan Krastev, “Bulgaria is currently experiencing the largest percentage drop in population not attributable to war or famine for a country in the modern era” (Krastev 2019).

The fertility rate in Bulgaria is 1.58 children per woman, which is close to the average for the European Union: 1.55. While low birth rates are a common problem in many EU countries, in Bulgaria this factor also combines with the highest mortality rate in the EU and high emigration rates, thereby leading to an unprecedented demographic crisis.

The combination of these three factors (fertility, mortality and emigration) has also led to a substantial change in the age structure of the population: the number of persons aged 65 and over by the end of 2019 was around 1.5 million or more than one fifth (21.6 percent) of the country’s population. EMIGRATION IN Compared to 2018, the share of population aged 65 and over increased EUROPEAN COUNTRIES by 0.3 percentage points. As of the end of 2019, there were only around C42 43 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES BULGARIA

Country Factsheet Fig. 2: Age structure of Bulgarian population as of December 31st, 2019

100+ male female GDP per Capita: 7,984€ 95 - 99 90 - 94 85 - 89 EU accession year: 2007 80 - 84 75 - 79 70 - 74 Population in 2019: 7,000,039 65 - 69 Population in 1990: 8,669,269 60 - 64 55 - 59 Population projection for 2060: 5,332,585 50 - 54 45 - 49 40 - 44 Share of foreign citizens: 1.37% 35 - 39 Current number of Bulgarians living abroad: no official data, about. 1.1-2.4m 30 - 34 25 - 29 20 - 24 Young population: 14.4% (EU average: 15.2%) 15 - 19 10 -14 Working age population: 59.28% 5 - 9 Elderly population: 21.6% (EU average: 20.2%) 0 - 4 300,000 200,000 100,000 0 0 100,000 200,000 300,000

Fertility rate: 1.58 (EU average: 1.55) Source: NSI 2019: 1 / own representation

1 million children up to 15 years of age in Bulgaria, corresponding to 14.4 The most dramatic net migration rates in the country were observed percent of the total population (NSI 2019: 2). from 1989 to 2001 – the net migration in this period was approximately -882, 000 people (Anguelov/Lesenski 2017: 6), as a result of two factors: 1) The number of people at working age in Bulgaria as of the end of 2019 The Revival Process – the policy of forced assimilation of Turkish citizens was 4.15 million people i.e. around 60 percent of the total population. The and other Muslim minorities in Bulgaria that were forced to change their age-dependency ratio of Bulgaria was 56.4 in 2019. Finally, the number of Turkish and Arabic names to Bulgarian ones. This assimilation policy was foreigners residing in Bulgaria is only slightly less than 100,000, which is enforced at the threat of imprisonment and expulsion for those refusing approximately 1.4 percent of the whole population. to collaborate. After ethnic violence in early 1989, in the summer of the same year more than 360,000 Turkish Bulgarian citizens were encouraged ACCESSION TO THE EU DID NOT In both the interwar authoritarian regime and the following communist to leave to Turkey. 2) After the fall of the Berlin wall and the opening of CAUSE MASS EMIGRATION regime, Bulgaria saw low levels of emigration, mainly political emigration, borders towards the West, a high number of Bulgarian citizens emigrated with some famous political emigrants such as Georgi Dimitrov (leader to the US for economic reasons but also to other western countries such of the Communist International from 1934 to 1943) and Georgi Markov as Canada and Germany. The net migration for this early period has been (Bulgarian dissident writer, killed in London in 1978, most probably by estimated to be -217,809. In the following period, between 2001 and the Bulgarian secret services) (Rone/Junes 2020). 2011 net migration amounted to -175,244 people. According to the last available data – net migration between 2011 and 2016 had shrunk to only -24,103 people (Anguelov/Lesenski 2017: 6). Thus, there has been a clear decrease in emigration from Bulgaria over the years. Contrary to what Fig. 1: Population development and annual migration rates was expected, Bulgarian accession to the EU did not lead to an increase immigration emigration net migration total population in the number of Bulgarian emigrants but rather to the legalization of people who had already migrated. 80 7.4

70 7.3 Another important issue is post-socialist internal migration (Guentcheva HIGH LEVELS OF INTERNAL 2009): 128,179 people changed their place of residence within Bulgaria in 7.2 MIGRATION DUE TO REGIONAL 60 2019 alone (NSI 2019: 15). Within the country there is a dramatic disparity DIFFERENCES 7.1 50 in economic development between the centre and the periphery, both 7.0 within the country as a whole and at regional and local levels: “The North- 40 western region is the most scarcely populated, which is mostly affected 6.9 by outgoing migration flows, with the poorest economic development, 30 6.8 high unemployment and serious social problems. The Southwestern 20 region is the most densely populated region due to better living and 6.7 employment opportunities, offered by the capital city” (AER 2017). In 10 migration (in thousand) 6.6 big cities in Bulgaria, 48 percent of the population lives in overcrowded total population (in million) 0 6.5 accommodations (Nikolov 2018). At the same time, in small villages there are 560,000 accommodations in which no one lives (this amounts -10 6.4 to almost half of all accommodations in villages). In Bulgaria as a whole, 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 there are 1.2 million accommodations in which no one lives permanently Source: Infostat. National Statistical Institute Bulgaria / own representation – which corresponds to 31 percent of all accommodations in the country.

44 45 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES BULGARIA

MOST BULGARIAN EMIGRANTS There are seven countries in the world with between 1.1 and 2.4 million Fig. 3: Remittances (percent of GDP) – Bulgaria NOW MOVE TO EU COUNTRIES Bulgarian citizens – however, there is no official data. These are Turkey, Germany, Spain, the UK, Greece, the US and Italy (Anguelov 2019). In 9 general, emigration to other EU countries is increasing in comparison 8 to emigration to third countries such as the US or Canada. Currently, 7 Germany is the most popular destination for Bulgarian emigrants (Anguelov 2019). While the UK was becoming an increasingly popular 6 destination, it is expected that Brexit will slow this trend. Research on 5 attitudes to migration among Bulgarian youth (14-29 years old) confirms 4 that Germany and the UK are the leading choice for youth emigration, having replaced the US and Canada (FES 2019: 46). 3 2 FROM PERMANENT TO It is also important to note that most statistics trace ‘emigration’ by looking 1 TEMPORARY AND CIRCULAR at changes in registered addresses. However, Bulgarian citizens increasingly 0 MIGRATION engage in seasonal mobility which does not involve a change in their registered address. A lot of Bulgarian workers go abroad to work but then 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2018 2020 return home to their families to spend the winter, to seek medical care or to Source: Worldbank / own representation take care of children and elders. Considering that many European countries have increasingly „restricted and made conditional the access of workers from its eastern peripheries to social security, benefits, and healthcare (KarieriBg 2020). The Confederation of Employers and Industrialists in protection […] tasks of sustaining health, social networks, and social security Bulgaria has systematically insisted on importing workers from third are relegated to the home country and, more specifically, to the household” countries (such as Ukraine, Moldova, Vietnam, Kirgizstan, Armenia, (Hristova 2020, quoting Apostolova/Hristova, forthcoming). Less and less Georgia), especially for seasonal work (Shushkov 2020). Bulgarian workers abroad perceive themselves as ‘emigrants’ seeing their stay rather as temporary and planning to return home. Among Bulgarian The dramatic consequences of emigration have gone beyond the economic youth more specifically, only 14 percent are contemplating emigrating for sphere and can be felt in the field of healthcare, where many professionals more than 10 years (FES 2019: 44). Even though the percentage of young have emigrated and doctors are increasingly ageing (Ranguelova/ people who wanted to emigrate had fallen in comparison to previous years, Bogdanov 2012). The effects are also strongly felt in society in general, such desires were still expressed by more than 1 in 3 (FES 2019). although often hardly measurable: emigration tears families apart – a development that contrasts with the traditional strong intergenerational Expanding the focus beyond the youth and observing emigration trends in solidarity in Bulgaria. general, the profile of the typical Bulgarian emigrant is a man of 40 from a regional metropolis with secondary education or lower who is looking for EMIGRATION IN THE POLITICAL DEBATE a job for around 5 years (Boyadjieva 2018). At the same time, this “average profile” hides specific clusters of female emigration, especially in the field Emigration has been politicized in Bulgaria mainly in the sense that the THE POLITICIZATION OF of care work.1 issue has become increasingly salient and there has been an expansion EMIGRATION of actors discussing it. There has hardly been any polarization in the The main reason why Bulgarians emigrate is obvious: wages in Bulgaria discussion of emigration per se, which has been almost universally are particularly low compared to other European countries. The minimum perceived as a negative phenomenon with negative consequences for wage in Bulgaria is 286 euros, and the average income is 690 euros. The society. Nevertheless, there have been controversies around particular average wage is thus a fraction of the European average (Davidescu 2017). policies related to the consequences of emigration: first of all, in 2015-2016,

THE POSITIVE SIDE OF While mass emigration has mainly been discussed in relation to the severe 100 EMIGRATION demographic crisis in the country, it has had both positive and negative Fig. 4: Frequency of emigration-related keywords in Bulgarian media consequences. The most researched consequences are the economic ones. In the first nine months of 2019, Bulgarian emigrants abroad sent 75 back 922 million euro, which surpassed the amount of foreign investment in the country during the same period – 715 million euro (Dnevnik 2019). 50 In 2018, Bulgarians had sent back more than 1 billion euro. These personal remittances account for more than 3 percent of the national GDP of Bulgaria. 25

At the same time, labour shortages are a problem for the Bulgarian LOW WAGES DRIVE 0 WORKERS ABROAD economy. Recently published research revealed that 62 percent of Bulgarian employers had encountered difficulties finding suitable cadres 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Manual coding based on the key word “emigration” or “employees abroad” 1 The famous documentary “The Town of Badante Women” provided a fascinating insight into the life of Source: Factiva / own representation the former spa resort Vurshets from 2009, where most women have gone to Italy and have assumed the breadwinning role, while men and children were left behind with all the domestic tasks.

46 47 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES BULGARIA

Fig. 5: Frequency of emigration-related keywords in the debates of the Bulgarian Parliament instance, in the 2000s, the right-wing liberal magazine Capital Weekly had 20 a section with the life stories of emigrants, mainly those from the educated 18 middle class. But recent scandals around working conditions in Germany 16 during the COVID-19 crisis also allowed many manual workers to share their experiences. Almost absent from the discussion are NGOs3 and social 14 movements. Emigration as a topic for civil society is usually part of broader 12 protests against the government (regardless of which particular party is in power) and rarely attracts attention as a stand-alone issue. While over 10 the years there has also been increasing involvement of state agencies and 8 ministries trying to combat the effects of emigration, they have remained 6 less vocal in the public debate. 4 The analysis of both media articles and parliamentary debates reveals that DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDINGS 2 there have been clear changes in the discourse related to migration in the OF EMIGRATION 0 period between 1990 and 2019. Parliamentary debates in the beginning of the 21st century often dealt with Bulgarian political emigrants during communism. Their departure was designated as “enemy emigration” by 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 the Bulgarian Secret Services and these emigrants were closely observed. Manual coding based on the keyword “emigration” For example, in the 2000s, a number of investigations into the murder of Source: Bulgarian parliament / own representation writer Georgi Markov (1929-1978) appeared. Furthermore, notions such as “internal emigration” describing the withdrawal of intellectuals from public life and within their own personal sphere were also very prominent in there were massive protests and debates in relation to the new electoral debates about the communist period in the 2000s. law and its provisions for Bulgarians voting from abroad. Second, the far-left and the Bulgarian Socialist Party have contested the 2018 laws Another dominant frame in the early 2000s, both in media and in enacted by the ruling right-wing coalition allowing Bulgarian employers parliamentary debates, was the rising number of illegal immigrants from and industrialists to import workers from third countries. Bulgaria in other European countries, especially the Netherlands, and potential police measures against it. On the eve of Bulgaria’s accession to INCREASE IN SALIENCE To begin with, the salience of emigration in the political debate has the EU in 2007, there was a prominent discussion on measures taken by the steadily increased over time. For the whole period between 2001 and Bulgarian Socialist Party (the major partner in a triple coalition at the time) 2020, there were 524 mentions of the words “emigration” and “workers to bring emigrants back home and tackle the demographic crisis. abroad” in the Factiva database, the majority of which are concentrated in the period 2016-2020.2 In 2015-2016, there was a major discussion with regard to proposed CONTROVERSIAL ELECTORAL changes in the electoral law that aimed to make it logistically more difficult LAW FOR EMIGRANTS There were 169 mentions of the word “emigration” in National Assembly for emigrants to vote. The proposals were put forward by the ruling debates for the whole period 1990 - 2019. Many of those were irrelevant Bulgarian center-right party GERB and its coalition partners – the nationalist (for example, discussions from the 1990s on who owns migratory birds). United Patriots – with the implicit goal to reduce the influence in Bulgarian Furthermore, the peak in 2015-2016 is driven above all by the use of the political life of the ethnic Turkish Liberal Party DPS (Movement for Rights term “illegal emigrant” for refugees from the Middle East (which is not the and Freedoms) that had become the king maker in Bulgarian politics thanks case for the Factiva media data). Nevertheless, even if we exclude the non- to a dedicated voter base abroad. The proposals were accused of being relevant data, there is still also a slight increase in the salience of debates unconstitutional by DPS but also by right-wing liberal parties in Bulgaria about emigration in the parliamentary field. that have traditionally perceived themselves as representatives of the most educated emigrants. It was mainly the latter group that organized protests Not only is emigration not salient but it is in fact almost absent in party in front of Bulgarian embassies in a number of foreign countries and wide manifestos – the word “emigration” only appears in five party manifestos media coverage of the issue. While public attitudes to emigrants have 2009 - 2014. All in all, while “emigration” has high public salience in the been favorable in general, the debates around the electoral law revealed media it remains less often addressed in both party manifestos and debates the hostile attitude of the United Patriots against not only Turkish-origin at the National Assembly. Bulgarian citizens but also against ethnic Bulgarian emigrants.

MANY ACTORS TAKE UP The newspaper data reveals a wide diversity of actors engaging with the topic Throughout 2015-2016, at the height of the ‘refugee crisis’, Bulgarian MPs EMIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION THE ISSUE of emigration – from the usual statisticians, to politicians from both ruling and political parties fervently discussed the issue of immigration, often also DISCURSIVELY INTERCONNECTED parties and the opposition, to heads of medical and education authorities, in relation to the demographic crisis. The country witnessed a widespread artists, including film and theatre directors and students of arts. Media also consensus among all political parties against admitting immigrants – from often give a voice to Bulgarian emigrants themselves to tell their stories: for the nationalists to the center-right party GERB and the Bulgarian Socialist Party. The issues of emigration and immigration were strongly discursively interconnected – the demographic crisis in Bulgaria and persistent

2 It is important to note that the Factiva database for Bulgaria contains above all right-wing liberal newspapers (such as Dnevnik, Capital Weekly and 24Chasa, whereby the latter has become increasingly conservative over the years), thus underrepresenting left-wing media discourse on migration. At the same time, these newspapers also gave a voice to left-wing politicians and can thus be considered 3 With the exception of Open Society which has published some of the best research on the topic and representative to some extent at least. NGOs such as Tuk-Tam promoting career development at home.

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Fig. 6: Key themes in Bulgarian emigration discourse from 1989 to 2020 the (non-)functioning of the state, corruption and the feeling of a lack of perspective at home. Big anti-government protests in the country, regardless of the party in government, often have slogans mentioning emigration as a consequence of bad government. During the 2020 anti- government protests, for example, people protested with slogans such as “Your own children escaped from the misery you left! #resignation” or late 1990s - 2010s “I want to want to live in Bulgaria”. early 1990s early 2000s Demographic crisis; 2000s Nevertheless, the most often discussed topic in the media by far is the FOCUS ON CONSEQUENCES OF Political emigration from Voting abroad; Lack of Demographic crisis; consequences of emigration. The main focus is on the demographic THE DEMOGRAPHIC CRISIS communism; "internal Demographic crisis workers & import of Bulgarian illegal migrants crisis, accompanied by a dramatic loss of population, an increasingly emigration" workers from EU third abroad ageing population and a changing ethnic profile of the population – many countries commentators note as a negative phenomenon the rising shares of Roma and Turkish Bulgarian citizens as compared to ethnic Bulgarians. There is also ample reporting on other socio-economic consequences such as the lack of workers, particularly the lack of medical specialists, increased pressure on the pension system, decreasing contributions to the social and health security systems, the closure of schools and problems with educational attainment.

emigration were used as arguments against accepting more immigrants, Considering the scale of the emigration problem and its consequences, it POLICY MEASURES TO TACKLE out of cultural fears of ‘replacement’ of the already shrinking Bulgarian is not a surprise that over the years there have been multiple initiatives EMIGRATION population. Kornelia Ninova, leader of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, for and government bodies that have aimed to support emigrants abroad example, explicitly posed the question: “Can we solve the demographic crisis and to bring Bulgarian citizens back to Bulgaria. The Agency for Bulgarians by allowing the long-term settlement of refugees?”. She explicitly rejected abroad was already created back in 1992 and in 2000 it received the this strategy and called on local mayors to “mobilise their people and not status of a state agency. Among its main missions have been “protecting allow long-term settlement of refugees in the country” (NewsBg 2016). A the Bulgarian ethno-cultural space”, the “spiritual union of all Bulgarians local youth section of the BSP published an open letter against immigrant around the world” and “creating Bulgarian lobbies abroad” (ABA 2020). integration, asking several key questions that reflected broader societal concerns: “Is it acceptable for Bulgaria to become a mother to refugees The agency is also responsible for issuing certificates certifying “Bulgarian and provide them with assistance while acting as a stepmother to our origin”, which can be used for naturalisation so that non-Bulgarian citizens grandmothers and grandfathers who live in poverty? [...] Is it acceptable to can obtain Bulgarian citizenship. In 2018, both the head of the agency accept foreigners when our own children are fleeing abroad?” (Infomrezha and its chief secretary were arrested due to charges of corruption – they 2016). In the year 2016, immigration was much more salient in the political had traded certificates of “Bulgarian origin” for money and influence debate than emigration had ever been, featuring prominently, for example, (Paunova 2019). What is more, the Agency has produced a number of in the 2016 presidential debates. However, immigration faded away as a new EU citizens that do not enter the statistics as they never changed topic in subsequent years. their address to one in an EU country – for example, the Agency has given citizenship to more than 6,000 Macedonians who do not live in Bulgaria Finally, another important topic that received public attention, albeit much but in Macedonia and use, when needed, the Bulgarian citizenship as a less than the planned changes in the electoral law, was the discussion “visa” for the EU (Paunova 2019). At the same time, Bulgarian emigrants of the adoption by the center-right government of a law that made it insisted that the Agency should be closed since it is completely irrelevant possible to import foreign workers from EU third countries ready to work for Bulgarians abroad and most of its functions are in fact performed by for lower wages. Discussions about this law were also discussions about existing Ministries (OffNews 2018). emigration since the far-left, the BSP and the syndicates and workers argued that if salaries in Bulgaria had been higher there would have been In the mid-2000s, Bulgaria also sent labour attachés to the UK, Germany, less emigration and less need to import foreign workers. Greece and Spain. Their tasks have included giving consultations to Bulgarian workers abroad, providing support when it comes to concrete INCREASING DRAMATIZATION Throughout the whole period observed but especially from the end of labour disputes and providing information and assistance to Bulgarians OF EMIGRATION IN PUBLIC the 1990s onwards, which was when the dramatic effects of emigration who would like to return to the country. In 2013, three of the four labour DISCOURSE were strongly felt, emigration has been discussed as a highly problematic attachés refused to return to Bulgaria after the end of their mandates topic for the country. Quite indicatively, in his 2019 New Year speech claiming they had irreplaceable expertise (OffNews 2013). Such examples the president of Bulgaria, Rumen Radev, explicitly referred to emigration show that the emigration of the qualified work force is a problem even in more than once: “There are few minutes that separate us from the new the very institutions designed to deal with it and its consequences. 2019. Most of us have the good fortune to celebrate the New Year with relatives and friends. Others at this hour are at work, and hundreds of As of 2019, Bulgaria has a Deputy Prime Minister responsible for thousands are far away from our home country […]. This evening many economic and demographic policy who also oversees the State Agency of us will discuss the future and some will share plans for emigration”. of Bulgarians Abroad, a Parliamentary Committee on the policies for Bulgarians abroad, and finally, a Council for Working with Bulgarians EMIGRATION AS AN ANTI- The causes of emigration as discussed in the media are most often low Abroad. In 2019, Vice President Iliyana Yotova started an initiative for the GOVERNMENT ISSUE salaries and a low standard of living but also general dissatisfaction with creation of a Bulgarian Cultural Institute Abroad.

50 51 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES BULGARIA

MEASURES TO FOSTER RETURN While NGOs have been largely absent from wider societal debates on Bulgaria. So even though Bulgarian agricultural producers experienced MIGRATION emigration, they have been very pro-active in encouraging Bulgarians a dire lack of workers during the COVID-19 crisis, Bulgarian workers still abroad to come back through the organization of career forums. In 2019, preferred to take the plane and go abroad. These migrant workers often the Association Tuk-Tam organized a career forum under the patronage had to sleep in caravans or share apartments, especially bathrooms of Bulgarian President Radev which also allowed for online meetings and kitchen space, with multiple other workers, in the hope that they and presentations, including online job interviews for Bulgarians abroad could send back money to their family and save for their retirement who are interested in returning (CarrerBG 2020). Finally, at the end of years (Nikolova/Balhorn 2020). 2019, the Social Ministry started an initiative to attract Bulgarians who had emigrated back to Bulgaria using 5 million euro allocated from the Yet, even if workers knew what they were signing up for, the COVID-19 EU program for labour mobility EURES (Vasilev 2020). The proposed crisis exacerbated existing problems in terms of labour conditions. The measures include paying up to 1,200 leva per month (approximately 600 case of thousands of workers getting sick in the German meat factory euro) for childcare, covering returnees’ rent and providing them with a Tönnies was highly salient and discussed in all Bulgarian media with first- scholarship, as well as paying half a minimum wage per month if the hand accounts of labour exploitation, overcrowded accommodations returning family moves into one of the less developed regions in the and working in cold temperatures with no protective measures against country (Vasilev 2020). the virus. Despite these problems, emigration from Bulgaria is unlikely to decline. For individuals, the decision to emigrate remains rational However, despite the high number of government bodies trying to attract as long as there is no increase in wages and investment in economic back Bulgarian emigrants, most of the measures so far have only had structural changes. limited success. The career forums tend to mainly target the well-educated middle class, while the problem of emigration of manual workers, less educated ethnic Bulgarian, Roma and Turkish-Bulgarian citizens remains OUTLOOK unaddressed. What is more, the measures proposed are mainly ‘soft measures’ that fail to encourage emigrants to return since they cannot Ultimately, emigration is a symptom as much as a problem in itself, address systemic problems such as corruption and the lack of proper revealing the systemic problems of Bulgarian economic and political life. social security related to the pervasive underfunding of kindergartens, The extent of emigration reflects the uneven development of the EU, with healthcare and education. Western countries using Eastern ones as a labour reserve, while Eastern EU members recruit workers from third countries. Similar patterns of inequality can also be seen within Bulgaria, where regional disparities INFOBOX – Migration in times of the Corona pandemic cause high levels of internal migration.

The question of emigration once again came to the fore with the Provided that salaries in Bulgaria remain low and there is no substantial beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite restrictive lockdowns investment in regional development, one can expect the high levels of across the EU, many Bulgarian workers headed to Western Europe both internal migration and seasonal and temporary work emigration to at the peak of the crisis to pick strawberries, asparagus and work continue in the coming years, even in the unprecedented times of the in factories and warehouses (Weisskircher et al. 2020). The Prime global pandemic. At the same time, many Bulgarian students returning minister of Bulgaria Boyko Borisov commented in April “Off the record, from abroad due to COVID-19 took active part in the mass protests I consider it unfair that Bulgarians are going to Austria as care workers against the Borisov government, demanding systemic change in the and once their contracts are over, they will come back, will bring country, more rule of law and an end to corruption and the mafia capture back the contagion, we’ll quarantine them and all of us will have to of the state. Former Deputy Prime Minister and nationalist leader Valery pay because of them” (Maritsa 2020). The discussion about the threat Simeonov infamously claimed that some of the protesters were “students from the virus was also often racialized in public debates, with Roma who have come to Bulgaria because Western universities are closed. They engaged in temporary work abroad singled out as the main carriers want to show some political activity, take a few selfies and send them to of the disease back in Bulgaria. Yet, the Bulgarian government did their colleagues” (Sega 2020). Yet, it was not only the returning emigrants not exchange diplomatic notes with any receiving country and did but also local youth – the children of the so-called “transition period” – not prevent Bulgarian workers from leaving. It remains to be seen who stood by the claim that they want to live in Bulgaria. In a country in whether the COVID-19 crisis has led to any considerable change in which emigration has affected both the educated and uneducated, young the largely positive attitude towards free movement of people among and old, men and women, intertwined in a self-enforcing demographic Bulgarians – according to Eurobarometer data from 2015 - 2017, 87 crisis, and in which everyone either is, has been or knows an emigrant, percent of Bulgarians were in favor of free movement of labour in the emigration is unlikely to become a polarized topic in the coming years. Yet, EU (Vasilopoulou/Talving 2020). it remains a silent threat, an impending reality and a long-term challenge for Bulgarian politics. Despite the high health risks and problematic labour conditions, many seasonal workers still preferred to go abroad rather than stay at home during the COVID-19 crisis. The reasons for this were, first of all, situational – in the first months of the crisis, the quick and adequate lockdown measures in Bulgaria were not combined with adequate economic measures to effectively help the population and unemployment rose sharply. Second, and more importantly, there were systemic reasons for this choice – even the minimal wage in Western European countries is usually several times higher than wages in

52 53 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES BULGARIA

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Pavlova, Boryana 2019: Как България крие”производството” Hristova, Tsvetelina 2020: Morbid Mobilities. Identities на нови граждани на ЕС, Свободна Европа; available at: Davidescu, Lucian 2017: Познай коя е най-продуктивната Journal; in: Identities Journal, April 28th, 2020; available https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/29808615.html страна в ЕС?, Барикада, 2017; in: Baricade, July 14th, at: https://identitiesjournal.edu.mk/index.php/IJPGC/ (retrieved: 03.11.2020). 2017; available at: https://baricada.org/2017/07/14/ announcement/view/43#_ftn2 (retrieved: 03.11.2020). produktivnost-romania-bulgaria/ Ranguelova, Rositsa / Bogdanov, Gueorgui 2012: Sotsialnoto (retrieved: 03.11.2020). Infomrezha 2016: Младежите от БСП излязоха с vŭzdeĭstvie na emigratsiyata i vŭtreshnata migratsiya позиция срещу заселването на мигранти в Гоце selo-grad v Tsentralna i Iztochna Evropa, Doklad ot Deutsche Welle 2020: Студ и невероятен стрес за 1200 Делчев; available at: http://infomreja.bg/mladejite-ot- imeto na Generalna direktsiya “Zaetost, sotsialni vŭprosi евро - какво разказват българи за «Тьониес»; in: Dnevnik, bsp-izlqzoha-s-poziciq-sreshtu-zaselvaneto-na-migranti- i priobshtavane” na Evropeĭskata komisiya; Europäische June 27th, 2020; available at: https://www.dnevnik.bg/ v-goce-delchev-34130.html (retrieved: 03.11.2020). Kommission, Brüssel. sviat/2020/06/27/4084264_stud_i_neveroiaten_stres_ za_120_evro_-_kakvo/?ref=home_layer2&fbclid=IwAR1W Krastev, Ivan 2019: A New Mental Barrier Is Dividing Sega 2020: Симеонов за протестите: Лузъри, ултраси msJ3H0sYTLCj8ZIjE21gdXM3maMM9OCjfAt0-VEJ-HE5l5_ Europe; in: Zeit Online, November 6th, 2019; available at: и студенти за селфи, Sega; available at: https://www. CbtcJTGM (retrieved: 03.11.2020). https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/2019-11/outmigration- segabg.com/node/144466 (retrieved: 03.11.2020). eastern-europe-germany-populism (retrieved: 03.11.2020).

54 55 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES CZECH REPUBLIC

2 THE CZECH REPUBLIC

Summary

Currently almost 9 percent of Czechs live abroad. Before 1989 people emigrated for political reasons. But since the Czech Republic’s increasing integration in the West, economic motives have been the deciding factor.

The public significance (‘salience’) of emigration is very low in the Czech Republic. When emigration plays a role in political discourse, it is usually with reference to people who turned their backs on the communist-ruled country before 1989. This politically motivated emigration fits into the anti-communist, sometimes also anti-left rhetoric used by members of center-right parties in particular.

In connection with current emigration flows, the loss of medical professionals to Western countries is discussed as a problem in the political and media discourse irrespective of the political affiliation. Policy measures have not been far-reaching enough so far.

DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE OF EMIGRATION

The territory of today’s Czech Republic was marked predominantly by em- EMIGRATION HAS MARKED igration from the second half of the 19th century until the early 1990s. THE CZECH REPUBLIC SINCE Under the Habsburg monarchy most Czechs emigrated for socioeconomic THE 19TH CENTURY reasons. By the end of the First World War around 350,000 people had gone to the United States of America, which was the most attractive destination at the time. It came to a second, far greater loss of population in the former Czechoslovakia as a result of the Second World War: Over three million Germans were resettled (Kittel/Möller 2006: 568), this emigration was forced in the vast majority of cases.

Under the communist system the country, similar to Poland and Hungary, registered mainly politically motivated emigration to the West (Culik 2017). According to estimates, between 1948 and 1989 more than 550,000 people left the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (Československá socialistická repub- lika, ČSSR): “The two main emigration waves occurred in 1948, when the communists came to power, and in 1968, when the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies invaded the country.” (Drbohlav/Janurova 2019) In both cases those concerned were particularly well educated.

The most recent outflow of emigrants took place after the end of communism. In 1990 the Czech part of the country of Czechoslovakia had 10.4 million inhabitants. Of those 2.7 percent lived abroad. Although the peaceful division of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia on January 1st, 1993 did not influence the emigration numbers in any significant way, the increasing integration with Western countries, not least manifested by the accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union in 2004, most certainly did.

Today the percentage of Czechs living abroad is more than three times as TODAY 8.5 PERCENT OF CZECHS high as it was in 1990. In 2019, the most recent year of data collection, the ARE LIVING ABROAD EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES C56 57 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES CZECH REPUBLIC

Country Factsheet Fig. 1: Czechs living abroad as a proportion of the total population (in in percent)5 total in Europe GDP per capita 19,400€ 9

8 EU accession: 2004 7 Population in 2019: 10.7 million Population in 1990: 10.4 million 6 Population projection for 2060: 10.4 million 5

Share of foreign citizens: 10.3% 4

Young population (2018): 15.9% (EU-Durchschnitt: 15.2%) 3 Working age population (2018): 64.5% 2 Elderly population (2018): 19.6% (EU-Durchschnitt: 20.2%) 1 Fertility rate (2018): 1.7 (EU-Durchschnitt: 1.55) 0 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2019

statistics put the Czech population at almost 10.7 million.1 8.5 percent of Source: UN 2020 and World Bank 2020 / own representation them live abroad, which corresponds to over 910,000 people. In spite of this, there is no downward trend in terms of population development. On the contrary: As Figure 2 shows, the Czech population has almost continu- Western European country or to a Western country outside of Europe. In ally grown in the past years. addition, approx. 700,000 of all Czechs abroad live in one of the neighboring countries Germany, Slovakia or Austria. They often remain strongly ori- BECAUSE MORE PEOPLE The Czech net migration has been positive every year since 2004 with ented towards their country of origin, also in part due to the geographical ARE IMMIGRATING THAN the exception of three years as a consequence of the global economic proximity. Apart from regular stays this is also expressed in the form of EMIGRATING THE POPULATION IS and financial crisis. Although the Czech Republic, with a birth rate of money transfers.5 CONTINUOUSLY GROWING 1.7 children per woman, ranks near the top when compared to other EU-member countries, it is a different factor that has been decisive for The remittances do not play a major role in the Czech Republic. In 2018 the population growth since 1990: immigration from abroad. In 2019 Czechs employed abroad sent about 3.3 billion euro home. As a proportion there were 595,881 foreigners living in the Czech Republic.2 Compared of GDP this was merely 1.6 percent. to other East-Central European countries their 6.4 percent proportion of the total population is remarkably high. In Slovakia and Hungary the Since accession to the EU the annual number of emigrants leaving the COMPARED WITH THE REST OF proportion of foreigners is under two percent, in Poland it is even un- Czech Republic has fluctuated greatly at times (Figure 2). The country reg- EUROPE CZECHS ARE RELUCTANT der one percent. Between 2013 and 2015 most of the immigrants were istered its highest emigration figures not directly after accession, but be- TO EMIGRATE still from another EU country,3 since then the greatest influx has been from outside of the EU. In 2018, the most recent year for which data is available, around 17,800 EU-citizens moved to the Czech Republic. In the Fig. 2: Distribution of Czechs living abroad according to country same year there were around 43,500 immigrants from non-EU countries (Eurostat 2020a). The Czech labor market already became the number 1 Germany 545,361 one pull factor soon after the political change. Of the Visegrád countries 2 Slovakia 92,832 today it is the Czech Republic that is the most attractive destination for labor migration – not least from the eastern part of Europe.4 The typical 3 USA 74,639 immigrant is male, about 30 years old and is from Ukraine or Slovakia 4 Austria 60,651 (ČSÚ 2019a). 5 Great Britain 51,552 6 Canada 23,706 In contrast, the largest communities of the Czech diaspora are to be found not in the East, but primarily in the West. 7 Australia 15,031 8 Switzerland 14,763 MOST EMIGRANTS LIVE IN A The distribution in Figure 3 shows two things: To date most Czech nation- 9 Russia 11,264 als left the country heading towards the West, i.e. they moved either to a NEIGHBORING COUNTRY 10 France 9,244

Source: UN 2017 / own representation

1 The last time so many people lived in the Republic was 1945, in other words after the Second World War and before the resettlement of the large German minority (ČSÚ 2019a). 2 Thus there are about a third more Czechs living abroad than foreigners living in the Czech Republic. 3 Data on the country of origin of immigrants has only been collected since 2013. 4 The labor migration hardly intensifies the competition between locals and foreigners. In the labor market immigrants are complementary to the native population. In other words, they work in jobs for which there 5 Only Czech citizens are included here. Over two million people worldwide claim that they are of Czech is no qualified personnel in the country or which tend to be unattractive for Czechs. origin, although many of them are not or no longer proficient in the Czech language. (Vašák 2015).

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tween 2008 and 2012 in the wake of the global economic and financial cri- Fig. 4: Remittances to the Czech Republic 2018 (in million EUR) sis.6 In all the other years since 2004 the number of emigrants was between 20,000 and 39,000. In 2018 only 26,742 people left the country (Eurostat 2020b), making the Czech Republic currently one of the states with the few- est emigrants, not only among the more recent EU members, but EU-wide. Within East-Central those even more reluctant to emigrate are the Slovaks; in 2019 only 6.3 percent of Slovakian citizens lived abroad. In Slovakia from Germany 2004 to 2018 the number of emigrants annually was between just 1,586 643 Mio. EUR 7 and 3,870 people (Eurostat 2020b). Others 1,015 Mio. EUR Based on those who have left the Czech Republic in recent years,8 three types of emigrants can be identified: Czech nationals, other EU citizens and citizens of non-EU countries.

ONLY 19 PERCENT OF EMIGRANTS In 2018, the most recent year of data collection, 19 percent of all emigrants Slovakia 583 Mio. EUR ARE CZECH NATIONALS had Czech citizenship, 11.6 percent were citizens of other EU countries and 69.4 percent were from non-EU countries (Eurostat 2020b). Great Britain 271 Mio. EUR In the case of the Czech nationals leaving the country since the end of communism it is regularly a form of labor migration. Most of them have found a job in Western countries or seek work once they are there.9 Although there is Austria USA 274 Mio. EUR no exact information on the number of Czechs employed abroad, according 522 Mio. EUR to a qualified estimate almost 490,000 Czechs were working abroad in 2018. In comparison with 2008 this number has thus risen by about a third. Most of them (over 307,000 people) work in another EU country and thus take advantage of the freedom of movement of persons (ihned.cz 2019). The number of Source: World Bank 2019 / own representation Czechs employed abroad does not match the numbers for the Czech popu-

lation abroad, however: firstly, because not all emigrants work, and secondly, Fig. 3: Population development and annual migration rates because not all those working abroad have emigrated. Among those work-

Immigration Emigration Net migration Population development ing abroad are a growing number of so-called cross-border commuters like 120 10.7 “those people who travel — at least once a week — from the region where they have their usual residence to a different region in order to be at their 100 10.6 place of work.” (Eurostat 2018).

80 10.5 Fig. 5: Number of emigrants from the Czech Republic according to type 60 10.4 Czechs other EU citizens non-EU citizens 40 10.3 30,000

20 10.2 25,000 0 10.1 Migration (in thousand)

Total population (in million) 20,000 -20 10.0

-40 9.0 15,000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Sources: Eurostat 2020a, 2020b, 2020c / own representation 10,000

5,000

6 A glance at the extreme value from 2009 shows that, for the most part, the emigrants were not Czech nationals, but foreigners who had been living in the Czech Republic until that point: Of the 61,069 people 0 who emigrated from the Czech Republic, only 24,284 had a Czech passport (Eurostat 2020b). 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 7 The top three destination countries for the Slovak emigrants were the Czech Republic (35.5 percent), Austria (22.5 percent) and Great Britain (8.9 percent) (Eurostat 2020b). There has also been no signifi- Source: Eurostat 2020b / own representation cant immigration to Slovakia since 2004: The annual figures fluctuate between 4,460 and 8,624 (Eurostat 2020b). Net migration has consistently been a positive four-digit figure since 2004 (Eurostat 2020a, 2020b). 8 Data on the citizenship of the emigrants has only been collected since 2013. 9 There is a less significant, yet also noteworthy, number of emigrants due to family reunification.

60 61 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES CZECH REPUBLIC

Fig. 6: Number of cross-border commuters (in thousand) population were unemployed (CSU 2019b) – and young people from abroad continue to come to the Czech Republic for temporary work, this will largely 70 compensate for the out-migration of native Czechs in any case. 60 EMIGRATION IN THE POLITICAL DEBATE 50 Similar to other post-communist states emigration plays a role first of all SINCE 2013 IT IS POSSIBLE 40 in various polity and policy areas: among them in particular the citizenship TO HAVE MORE THAN ONE policy, the electoral legislation and the health care system. The Law on NATIONALITY 30 Acquisition and Loss of the Citizenship of the Czech Republic of December 29th, 1992 (Sb. z. č. 40/1993) formed the basis for the regulations regarding 20 citizenship for many years. Among other things it enabled people who had lost their citizenship in connection with the communist regime to regain it 10 comparatively easily – however on the condition that they were not nationals of another state or that they renounced the relevant citizenship, which, 0 for many who importantly had gained a foothold in the West at that time, was an unattractive prospect. With the current Law on the Citizenship of the Czech Republic from June 11th, 2013 (Sb. z. č. 186/2013), the citizenship

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 policy has fundamentally changed in this regard: Since it came into force Source: Eurostat 2020d / own representation Czech citizens have also been able to have other nationalities. At the same time the acquisition of Czech citizenship for foreigners has been made tougher: Henceforth higher standards apply with regard to knowledge of The rising number of commuters employed abroad (cf. Figure 6) corresponds the Czech language (MZV n.d.). with the decline in the number of Czech nationals who have emigrated in recent years (cf. Figure 5). All Czech nationals, and thereby also those whose center of interest is THE VOTES OF EXPATRIATE abroad, are allowed to participate in two types of elections: since 2002, CZECHS HARDLY HAVE UKRAINIAN WORKERS The smallest group of emigrants is almost always EU-citizens. They are of- elections for the Chamber of Deputies which is the first and more important ANY IMPACT TYPICALLY RETURN TO ten people who have a short-term job in the Czech Republic, usually one chamber of the Czech parliament and, since 2013, the direct election of the THEIR HOME COUNTRY requiring a higher qualification, especially in the capital Prague, and who president. One can vote in more than 130 locations worldwide, however a then return to their home country after a few years. The largest group of postal vote is not possible. Most of the voters in question live in Europe. A emigrants by far is made up of people who come from outside the EU. These look at the statistics indicates that their influence on the election result is are primarily Ukrainians, who also came to the Czech Republic for work pur- minimal; in January 2018, in the second and decisive round of voting of the poses. Mostly they work in the low-wage sector for a few years before then presidential election 17,507 Czech expatriates exercised their voting rights. returning home. This corresponds to a 0.3 percent share of all votes cast (Kučera 2018).

The main three types of emigrants – Czech nationals, other EU citizens and The policy area that plays the greatest role in connection with emigration EMIGRATION IS THE BIGGEST non-EU citizens – and their respective numbers also determine the destina- is health policy. Similarly to the other East-Central European EU member PROBLEM FOR HEALTH POLICY tion countries. 53.3 percent, and thus more than half of the emigrants, left states, the Czech Republic is also losing medical professionals to (Western) the Czech Republic in 2018 headed to a country outside of the EU and 46.7 foreign countries because of the better working conditions and higher percent emigrated to another EU country (Eurostat 2020b). remuneration. Currently approximately every fifth doctor trained in the Czech Republic leaves. Since this means that the Czech state not only has IT IS MAINLY YOUNGER As far as the socioeconomic profile of the emigrants is concerned, the Czech shortages in its own health care system but also incurs a large monetary PEOPLE WHO EMIGRATE Republic is no exception: It is primarily young people who are emigrating. loss because the training costs of those in question are not ‘repaid’ in The most represented age cohort is those between 15 and 34 years old, how- any way, attempts are being made to address this form of emigration by ever the age cohort of 35 to 49 year-olds is also not negligible (ČSÚ 2019a). means of various policy measures. The most recent initiative of the Czech Between 2004 and 2013 considerably more men than women emigrated Ministry of Health is from last year and is incentive-oriented: What is under but gender has played an increasingly minor role since; in 2018 there were discussion is considerably better pay for medical graduates during their 13,872 male emigrants and 12,870 female (Eurostat 2020b). Exactly half of specialist training. In return they should give a commitment to stay in the the emigrants had completed intermediate-level education; over a third had Czech Republic for a few years (idnes.cz 2019). In addition, the higher edu- a higher education qualification. At 14 percent those with a low level of for- cation institutions that teach medicine are to receive hundreds of millions mal education constitute the smallest group (Eurostat 2020e). Thus, the typi- of Czech crowns more in the eleven years to train a larger number of doc- cal emigrant from the Czech Republic is male, in his mid-thirties, has interme- tors. In addition, attempts are being made to improve working conditions diate-level education and is emigrating towards the West. (Berger 2019). Immigration also helps remedy the shortage of specialists in the health care system– especially immigration from Ukraine. In 2015 the Since primarily young people are leaving the country, emigration exacer- Project Ukraine started, by means of which over 400 Ukrainian nurses and bates the demographic change in the Czech Republic. Currently almost sev- just under 300 doctors came to the Czech Republic by 2019 (ČT24.cz 2019). en million people, thus two thirds of the population, are of working age and only a fifth is 65 years old or older but the prognoses look similar to those Aside from polity and policy, emigration also plays a role in the field of poli- THE SALIENCE OF EMIGRATION for Germany; in 2060 already every third person will be a senior citizen. As tics. Basically, with respect to the Czech Republic, migration in general was IS VERY LOW long as the economic situation stays good – in 2018 only 2.2 percent of the not a particularly controversial topic for many years. This was until the ‘ref-

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ugee crisis’ which made the salience of immigration rapidly shoot up; in Czech Social Democratic Party (Česká strana sociálně demokratická, ČSSD) 2016 immigration was the topic that concerned the population most of all heavily criticized the planned cuts because they would affect not least (CVVM 2017). Since then the topic has lost significance again at a national many highly qualified workers like doctors, employees in the school system level. According to current Eurobarometer data only 8 percent of Czechs and higher education etc.: consider it to be one of the two most important topics for their country (European Commission 2019a). For the European Union, however, 29 per- “Today the government comes and says that, for the first time in history, as a cent of respondents still see it as a top issue (European Commission 2019b). directive for next year it wants to reduce their wages [those employed in vari- Although the public significance of emigration was never even close to that ous sectors of public service]. Yet we know that in a number of these sectors the of immigration at any point,10 emigration was nevertheless made the topic workers are primarily people with higher education [... C]ompetent, educated, of discussion now and again in politics and the media. talented and experienced people are something no country has too many of. Not one. I would even say that the Czech Republic is even worse off because of PARLIAMENTARY DISCOURSE The protocols of the parliamentary discourse show that since statehood its past than for example Austria, Germany, Switzerland. Because in our case it ON POLITICAL EMIGRATION (January 1st, 1993) until today (status on August 29th, 2020) the topic of was more emigration of the educated and competent people that took place, BEFORE 1989 emigration was talked about in only 177 of the debates that took place and it wasn’t only emigration before the war, emigration after 1948, emigra- in the Chamber of Deputies.11 The term emigration is thematically most tion after 1968 [following the crushing of the Prague Spring], but, ladies and frequently used to refer to the politically motivated emigration from the gentlemen, this emigration has also continued after 1989. Naturally it has a former ČSSR. In this context, especially in the 1990s, there were discus- different scale, it often has no political dimension, but an economic dimension. sions about citizenship questions and how they were closely related to [...] The only way we can lead this country to long-term prosperity and make a restitution and pension entitlements, yet emigration rapidly evolved into rich country out of the Czech Republic, [... is], if we not only keep our compe- an inflammatory term which is used in anti-communist, at times also an- tent, educated, talented people here, but if we are also capable of attracting ti-left arguments. Representatives of center-right parties like the Civic some such people here from abroad.” (Rath 2010) Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana, ODS) or the Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party (Křesťanská a demokratická In the context of the ‘refugee crisis’ it seems remarkable that the Czech EMIGRATION AND unie – Československá strana lidová, KDU-ČSL) regularly use it. By emphasiz- deputies regularly refer to refugees as emigrants. The attitude towards ref- ‚REFUGEE CRISIS‘ ing the repressive side of the communist regime it is possible to this day to ugees is clearly negative across the party spectrum. Here in the words of a consistently score points with the voters: Civic Democratic parliamentarian:

“It is simply not possible to forget the system, the regime and its ideology, which “I think that what Germany did in the context of the opening to the emigrants in our countries alone caused the deaths of several thousand people, put the was a fundamental mistake. I call it European suicide and we have to do citizens in jail, probably for a combined total of millions of years, forced hun- everything so that we don’t repeat this mistake not only of Germany’s but also dreds and thousands of citizens to emigrate, which broke not only our econo- of other Western states.” (Skopeček 2018) my, our school system, our culture, our ecology, our interpersonal relationships and everything that you could break, and which have the values that individuals Time and time again there are attempts to culturalistically refute the argu- and a society should be guided by completely wrong.” (Pavela 1993) mentation referring to the former – in contrast to the current refugees – positively connoted emigrants from the communist-governed Czechoslovakia Comparatively striking in the anti-communist framing of emigration is the being grateful at the time that they were received in the West. The following reference to the fact that the emigrants between 1948 and 1989 were peo- statement by Tomio Okamura, the leader of the movement Freedom and ple who were particularly important for Czech society and culture: “It was Direct Democracy (Svoboda a přímá demokracie, SPD), which at times using people who mostly made up the elite of this nation.” (Mejstřík 2006; cf. simi- right-wing radical argumentation, is paradigmatic: lar also Bartošek 2018 or Stanjura 2020) In particular the representatives of center-right parties acknowledge that the Czechs living abroad contributed “The parallel drawn that Europeans have also migrated and that it was “to the preservation and flourishing of the national cultural heritage” (Karas positive for the host countries, is not valid. When our emigrants headed to 2005) and as emigrants carried out “substantial intellectual, political and Austria, the Netherlands or the USA, it was a movement of people with the cultural activity dedicated to the restoration of freedom and democracy in same European culture, who did not take a parallel world anywhere, a par- their homeland” (ebd.). Yet at the same time they look with regret at the allel and hostile ideology.” (Okamura 2018; cf. similar also Klaus jr. 2018) loss due to emigration: “[T]o this day we must miss them, because we have lost outstanding talents, brains and people that are simply irreplaceable.” A search for emigration and related topics12 in the party programs of 2017, ELECTION PROGRAMS FOCUS (Němcová 2019) when the election for the Chamber of Deputies in the Czech Republic was ON THE SHORTAGE OF SKILLED most recently held, and those from 2019 when the European elections took PROFESSIONALS IN THE HEALTH Socioeconomic issues are seldom explicitly linked to emigration in the par- place, reveals results similar to in the parliamentary discourse: a low rele- CARE SYSTEM liamentary discourse. An important moment in the Chamber of Deputies vance and an even lower degree of politicization. In 2017 the parties that was a discussion about the salary reduction in various areas of public ser- referred to emigration at all13 framed emigration in the broadest sense in vice, initiated by a civic-led government in response to the consequences of two different ways. First, relating to the health care system, it is emphasized the global economic and financial crisis. Representatives of the opposition by the populist Action of Dissatisfied Citizens Akce( nespokojených občanů,

10 In the case of the Czech Republic the fact that public opinion research only sporadically addresses the topic 12 A search was performed not only for emig*, but also for vystěh*, odchod, zahrani*, pohyb* and schen- of immigration can also be seen as an indication of its low salience. gen*. The star at the end of the word stem makes it possible to find the search term with different word 11 A systematic search was conducted on the website of the Chamber of Deputies https://fulltext.psp.cz/ endings. stenozaznamy looking for protocols which contained emig*. 13 Not even one of the terms searched for could be found in the programs of the KDU-ČSL, KSČM and ODS.

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ANO), the strongest power in the country, and by the Social Democrats, that In the media discourse in the last years, emigration also only plays a spo- THE MEDIA MAINLY DISCUSSES the departure of medical personnel needs to be counteracted:14 radic role. The state’s dealings with emigrants of Czech descent became THE PROBLEM OF THE DEPARTURE virulent for example in 2014 – with the outbreak of the armed conflict in OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL “By means of fair remuneration, improvements in quality, well-organized Ukraine. There, living in Volhynia, are a few thousand people with a Czech postgraduate training, a thoroughly motivating system and helpful com- migrant background, the so-called Volhynia Czechs. In view of the threat to munication we will reduce the unwanted departure abroad of in particular the country posed by Russia, the community sent several requests for help young medical professionals and maintain the international competitiveness to the Czech President and the government, which were ultimately also dis- of the Czech health care system.” (ANO 2017; cf. similar also ČSSD 2017) cussed in the media (for an example see idnes.cz 2014). In December 2014 the government finally reacted with a declaration which enshrined “that Second, in the run-up to the national election a number of parties, every foreigner of verifiable Czech origin krajan( ) [would be able to receive] among them for example the civic-liberal and pro-European Tradition, a visa or a residence permit for the Czech Republic” under facilitated con- Responsibility, Prosperity 09 (Tradice, odpovědnost, prosperita 09, TOP 09), ditions (Vláda ČR 2014). stressed how profitable the freedoms associated with the EU are and in particular the freedom of movement of persons: When emigration was the topic in recent times, it was mostly concerning the already mentioned out-migration of medical professionals. The media “What we will not allow: [...] The restriction of the personal freedom of move- also often put up for discussion whether the emigrants should be made to ment for work purposes and other restrictions of the fundamental freedoms pay for their studies retroactively (for an example see rozhlas.cz 2020 or of the Union.” (TOP 09 2017) Kolman 2020).15

The freedom of movement of persons within Europe is regularly linked with effective protection of the EU’s external borders: INFOBOX – Migration in times of the corona pandemic

“The preservation of the Schengen area is fundamental for the Czech Republic. During the first wave of the coronavirus the Czech Republic was amongst The prerequisite is the common management of the external borders with the countries with the strictest anti-coronavirus measures (Guasti 2020a). the help of joint border protection and the coast guard and the expansion of Only a few of days after the government had declared a state of emer- the Schengen Information System, so that the illegal economic migration to gency on the March 13th, 2020, an entry ban was imposed for all for- Europe is stopped.” (TOP 09 2017; cf. similar also ČSSD 2017 and Piráti 2017) eigners without a permanent or more than 90-day residence permit as well as a ban on travel abroad for all Czech citizens and foreigners with The programs of the Czech parties for the European election 2019 yield a longer-term residence permit. As the infection numbers in Germany similar findings: Once again, most of the parties which were victorious in and Austria were particularly high in spring, additionally, from the March the end primarily stressed the advantages of the freedom of movement of 26th, a compulsory 14 day quarantine period applied for everyone re- persons and at the same time a necessity not only to protect the common turning from both neighboring states – regardless of nationality and res- European area at the external borders, but also to defend the national in- idence status. The Czech emigration discourse was affected by the first terests in Europe: wave of Covid-19 in so far as that it triggered renewed discussions about the health care personnel of Czech descent employed abroad. However, “The EU may not restrict the free movement of labor and services in any the Czech government’s strict regulations affected Czech emigrants less way, on the contrary, it must promote it. We will therefore resolutely assert than it affected cross-border commuters. Of the 17 Czech doctors, who, the existing rights of our citizens who are working in other countries of the for example are employed in the hospital in Bavarian Cham, about half EU. We will see to it that the European Commission demands the elimination live in the Czech Republic. In that particular case the solution reached of the protectionist measures that some member states have taken. [...] We for the problem was that the Czech specialists worked for a week at a are aware that complete and reliable protection of the external border is an time and then returned home for the 14 day quarantine called for by the indispensable prerequisite for the preservation of an area without borders government due to a stay abroad (novinky.cz 2020). inside the EU.” (ANO 2019; cf. similar also ČSSD 2019, ODS 2019, Piráti 2019 or STAN 2019) The success of the measures proved the government right: The Republic reported one of the lowest rates of infection in Central Europe in the The communists explicitly emphasize “that workers sent abroad receive first half of the year. Consequently the government relaxed the meas- the usual local wage. It is necessary to stop every kind of social dumping.” ures enormously in the summer months. From June to August in the (KSČM 2019) The health sector is brought into play in this context solely by Czech Republic masks were only compulsory in medical facilities and re- the Social Democrats: tirement homes. With the exception of the Prague Metro not even the passengers using public transport were required to wear one. That the “The goal of the CSSD is, with regard to a high quality health care system, to loosening of restrictions was not accompanied by increased testing, an catch up to Western Europe. In the Czech Republic we have great results but expansion of contact tracing and a strengthening of the trust between well-trained doctors and nurses are being lost to countries abroad, therefore the population and the government proved in the end to be a fatal er- we want to eliminate the differences between the wages in the West and our wages.” (ČSSD 2019) 15 As even a nurse completes a higher education course in the Czech Republic a lot of money is indeed involved here. Survey data from 2019 at least puts this problem in perspective somewhat: Increasing numbers of medical students would like to remain in the Czech Republic after completing their stud- 14 It would seem important to point out here that not all people who work abroad actually also emi- ies. In 2016, 73 percent expressed this intention; three years later that number was over 81 percent. grate. Alternatively it can also be a form of labor migration (for a differentiation see Wagner/Hassel In Slovakia this trend is in the opposite direction: In 2017, 80 percent of the surveyed medical stu- 2017). Furthermore there is a not negligible number of health care specialists, who, for example, dents indicated that they wanted to stay in Slovakia after completing their studies, but in 2019 that commute to Germany or Austria. figure was 75 percent (Berger 2019).

66 67 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES CZECH REPUBLIC

ror (Guasti 2020b). The Czech Republic went from being a leader to one REFERENCES of the worst performers. Since mid-September the Czech Republic has had one of the highest rates of new infections in Europe. In October Act on the Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship of the ČT24.cz 2019: Lékaři a sestry z Ukrajiny měli ulevit českým there were three different ministers leading the Ministry of Health. Since Czech Republic of 12/29/1992 (Zákon České národní nemocnicím, komplikací je ale byrokracie; available at: October 22nd the country is once again in lockdown. How long or under rady o nabývání a pozbývání státního občanství České https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/domaci/2985857-lekari- what conditions the cross-border commuting will remain possible is un- republiky, Sb. z. č. 40/1993); available at: https://www. a-sestry-z-ukrajiny-meli-ulevit-ceskym-nemocnicim- der discussion, however, it is still unclear. zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1993-40 (retrieved: 30.10.2020). komplikaci-je-ale-byrokracie (retrieved: 30.10.2020). Act on Citizenship of the Czech Republic of 06/11/2013 OUTLOOK (Zákon o státním občanství České republiky a o změně Culik, Jan 2017: Why Is the Czech Republic so Hostile některých zákonů, Sb. z. č. 186/2013); available at: to Muslims and Refugees?; available at: http://www. Although 8.5 percent of the Czech population lives abroad, which is https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/2013-186 europenowjournal.org/2017/02/09/why-is-the-czech- slightly more than the EU average, emigration plays a marginal role in the (retrieved: 30.10.2020). republic-so-hostile-to-muslims-and-refugees/ societal, political and media discourse in the Czech Republic. The fact that (retrieved: 05.09.2018). the native population is aging or that there is a shortage or lack of special- ANO 2017: Program hnuti ANO pro volby do Poslanecké́ ists in some areas, is concealed by the immigration numbers which are sněmovny 2017; available at: https://www.anobudelip. CVVM 2017: Míra naléhavosti různých oblasti veřejného high when compared to other East-Central European countries. The sole cz/file/edee/2017/09/program-hnuti-ano-pro-volby-do- života – únor 2017; available at: https://cvvm.soc.cas. topic that is regularly discussed is the departure of medical professionals, poslanecke-snemovny.pdf (retrieved: 30.10.2017). cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c2/a4271/f9/ whose training cost the country a lot of money and, in addition, whose po170322.pdf (retrieved: 30.10.2017). departure results in shortages in the Czech health care system. Apart ANO 2019: CESKO OCHRÁNÍME. Tvrdě a nekompromisně. from this problem, which other East-Central European states like Poland Program hnuti ANO pro volby do Evropského Drbohlav, Dušan / Janurova, Kristyna 2019: Migration or Slovakia are battling to a much greater extent, the Czech Republic can parlamentu; available at: https://www.anobudelip. and Integration in Czechia: Policy Advances and the nevertheless calmly face the emigration of some of its population: Czechs cz/file/edee/ke-stazeni/ano-cesko-ochranime.pdf Hand Brake of Populism; available at: https://www. are not particularly keen to depart. The standard of living is relatively high (retrieved: 30.10.2020). migrationpolicy.org/article/migration-and-integration- and the economy is flourishing – the country offers not only so-called czechia-policy-advances-and-hand-brake-populism high achievers from the native population enough incentives to stay. In Bartošek, Josef 2018: Speech in the Chamber of Deputies (retrieved: 20.06.2019). addition it presents itself as an alternative to Western Europe for other on 07/11/2018; available at: https://www.psp.cz/ Eastern Europeans who are willing to emigrate. Thus it counts – although eknih/2017ps/stenprot/017schuz/s017026.htm European Commission 2019a: What Do You Think Are to a much lesser extent than Germany, yet nevertheless – as one of the (retrieved: 30.10.2020). the Two Most Important Issues Facing the Czech beneficiaries of thebrain drain from the East. Republic at the Moment? (from 05/2005 to 06/2019); Berger, Vojtěch 2019: Odliv českých lékařů do ciziny available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/ zpomaluje, ukázal průzkum. Doma je drží i podmínky publicopinionmobile/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/ atestací; available at: https://hlidacipes.org/odliv- themeKy/42/groupKy/208 (retrieved: 30.10.2020). ceskych-lekaru-do-ciziny-zpomaluje-ukazal-pruzkum- doma-je-drzi-i-podminky-atestaci/ European Commission 2019b: What Do You Think are (retrieved: 30.10.2020). the Two Most Important Issues Facing the EU at the Moment? (from 05/2005 to 06/2019); available at: https:// ČSSD 2017: Volební́ program CSSD pro volby 2017; ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinionmobile/ available at: https://www.cssd.cz/data/files/program- index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/31/groupKy/188 210x210-seda.pdf (retrieved: 30.10.2017). (retrieved: 30.10.2020).

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70 71 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES GREECE

3 GREECE

Summary

The patterns of Greek emigration have shifted several times: High volu- mes of labor-related emigration persisted until the 1970s, followed by a precipitous fall, which lasted until the early 2010s, when, in the context of the economic crisis, emigration rates picked up again.

The ‘new emigration’ has become a salient topic in public discourse. Greek media generally present emigration as a negative phenomenon. The issue of emigration is rarely framed in explicitly demographic terms, but mainly as a socio-economic issue.

In the 2019 general election campaign emigration was widely discussed, though the salience attached to it by the left-wing Syriza, as an incumbent, was lower than beforehand. All major political parties view emigration as a problem, but they differ in the level of salience they attribute to it, as well as offering different interpretations of its drivers and solutions.

In terms of policies, a major development has been the extension of the right to vote to expatriate Greeks in 2019. Proposed by the center-right Nea Dimokratia government, it passed with an overwhelming majority in the parliament. Beyond the issue of expatriate voting, both Syriza and Nea Dimokratia have introduced targeted measures to fight emigration and incentivize return.

DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE OF EMIGRATION

The Greek experience of geographic dispersion spans centuries, stretching through antiquity, the Middle Ages, modernity, and our current times, making the Greek one of the three ‘classical’ diasporas, along with the Jewish and the Armenian one (Brubaker 2005: 3). Various migratory movements, that of people over borders and borders over people, have created an expatriate community that is currently estimated to be 4-5 million strong, scattered in dozens of countries around the world (Greek City Times 2018). This long and intricate history of expatriation informs the understanding of present-day mobility, as well as conceptions of the Greek ‘nation’ as such.

Even if one limits the discussion to recent history, a complex picture CHANGES IN THE PATTERNS OF emerges. In the post-war period, Greece became a net exporter of GREEK EMIGRATION migrant labor to richer European countries, but also to the United States, Canada and Australia. Between 1955 and 1977 about 1.2 million people emigrated from Greece, making it the European country with the highest emigration rate relative to its population at the time (Mavrodi/Moutselos 2017: 38). Also noteworthy is that in the aftermath of the Civil War (1946-1949) between 75,000 and 100,000 people, many of which were supporters of the Greek Communist party, left the country as political refugees, settling in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Marantzidis 2015: 8).

From the 1970s onwards, the trend started to reverse, and Greece’s EMIGRATION IN net migration rate turned positive due to, in part, the return of earlier EUROPEAN COUNTRIES waves of emigrants and other co-ethnics to Greece, and, in part, C72 73 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES GREECE

Country Factsheet Fig. 2: Emigration in absolute numbers 2004-2018 120,000 GDP per capita: 26,967€ 100,000 EU accession year: 1981 80,000 Population in 2019: 10,716,322 Population in 1990: 10,196,792 60,000 Population projection for 2060: 9,038,456 40,000 Share of foreign citizens: 11.1% 20,000 Foreign born population: 5.8% 0 Young population: 14.4% (EU average: 15.2%) Working age population: 63.7% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Aged 65 and over: 22% (EU average: 20.2%) Source: Eurostat / own representation

Fertility rate: 1.35 (EU average: 1.55) An oft-cited statistic was provided by the Bank of Greece in 2015, putting the number of Greek emigrants from the onset of the crisis until that because of the first arrivals of foreign laborers. Even though emigration point in time at half a million people (Bank of Greece 2016). Other credible from Greece never ceased, the country’s EU-accession in 1981 was not sources, however, estimate these numbers to be lower: e.g. Labrianidis accompanied by significant outflows and the share of population living and Pratsinakis (2016) talk about 280 000 to 350 000 emigrants between abroad continuously decreased from the 2000s (Figure 1), and Greeks 2010 and 2015. Moreover, a large share of those who left in the context remained, for many years, among the least mobile European citizens. of the new emigration wave were foreign citizens, many of them migrants Like other South-European countries, by the 1990s Greece had become of Albanian origin, who were particularly vulnerable to the deteriorating a destination country for international migrants, attracted by relative economic conditions in Greece (Mavrodi/Moutselos 2017: 39). 40 percent economic prosperity and geographic proximity. of emigrants did not hold EU citizenship.

Outflows began to outnumber inflows again staring in 2008, and Return migration is also significant: Approximately 200,000 Greeks came emigration grew rapidly in the wake of the economic crisis and the austerity back between 2008 and 2015 (Efsyn 2017). At the same time, it should be measures introduced as part of the bailout conditions. A large portion of noted that official statistics may underestimate the number of emigrants, this mobility took place for work within the EU single market (more than since not all EU countries require registration of EU citizens upon arrival, two thirds of Greek emigrants are employed), with the major destination making it impossible to accurately trace their return. countries being the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands. Significant numbers have also been recorded in Switzerland, Sweden and In previous emigration waves the protagonists were typically unskilled SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE Belgium, as well as in countries outside of-Europe with traditionally large workers and farmers, and the students who left Greece for tertiary Greek communities (US, Australia, Canada), but also new destinations, education also tended to return. The new emigration, however, has a such as the United Arab Emirates. component of human capital flight to it, although not quite as pronounced as public discourse would have it. The economic crisis induced a steep Estimates of the magnitude of emigration from Greece vary, and the decline in disposable income and mass unemployment, especially numbers are sometimes inflated in Greek media and political discourse. among the young. Indicatively, in 2013, nearly 4 out of 10 unemployed persons were tertiary education graduates, most of them 25-44 years of age (Lazaretou 2017: 41). This exacerbated the preexisting weaknesses of the Greek labor market, and in particular its inability to absorb the Fig. 1: Population change (in percent) highly skilled (Lazaretou 2017: 47). In fact, emigration of the highly skilled had started to pick up even before the crisis years (Lambrianidis 2011). 4

2 It is quite striking that in Greece, the labor market position of primary education graduates has been persistently better than that of other 0 education categories (Mavrodi/Moutselos 2017: 36). This calls into question the extent to which the new emigration phenomenon in -2 Greece is solely a crisis effect, which is the dominant political narrative. -4 Not only do labor-market inefficiencies pre-date the crisis, but focusing solely on economic aspects alone also obscures the complex set of non- -6 economic motivations that underlie emigration from Greece. Social and 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 political factors, such as a perceived lack of meritocracy, the prevalence Source: Eurostat / own representation of nepotism and corruption and disillusionment with Greece’s political system seem to have played an equally important role (Groutsis et al. 2019: 5).

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EMIGRATION FROM AN In terms of age composition the new emigrants are relatively young, The other main type is feature articles covering the personal stories of AGING SOCIETY though older than previous generations of emigrants: In the 1990s, the people who either emigrated or decided to stay (To Vima 2016). Often average age of emigrants was 24.8 years as opposed to 30.5 years post- these stories contain first person accounts of migrant trajectories and 2010 (Pratsinakis et al. 2017: 81). Emigration occurs within and exacerbates motivations. Many portray the adverse circumstances that lead people the circumstances of population decline. The current fertility rate is 1.35 away from Greece, such as unemployment, exploitation by employers or births per woman, which is among the lowest in Europe. The share of older failing businesses. These articles present the lives of Greek emigrants in people in the total population in Greece is, inversely, one of the highest in their new countries of residence, many of whom are working in low-skilled Europe. They greatly outnumber the young; there are 1.5 times as many occupations (hospitality or retail). The articles illustrate the difficulties the people 65 years or older than young people in Greece. The population is emigrants face adjusting to the new country, including their inability to projected to have fallen by more than 1.5 million people by 2060. get a job which matches their qualifications and the increased costs of living. Furthermore, these articles show emigrants who wish to return but POSITIVE ASPECTS Depopulation of rural areas is also a factor in emigration, as the European are unable to do so (In.gr 2018b; To Vima 2012). OF MIGRATION regions that have registered demographic decline are disproportionately located in the south, including Greece, but also Bulgaria, parts of Spain, There is a special emphasis on Greeks in the UK and Germany, two Italy and Portugal (van Herwijnen et al. 2018). Within Greece, however, countries with a history of Greek immigration, where new emigrant demographic shrinkage has mostly affected large cities, with Athens and communities are forming. In this context, Germany is not only the Thessaloniki registering the highest rate of population decline, and thus preferred destination of Greek emigrants, but it is also seen in Greece emigration has actually contributed to slowing down the divergence as the architect and main proponent of austerity policies, which are between urban and rural areas in terms of population density (Salvati 2019). blamed for the sharp increase in emigration in the first place. The strong focus on Germany accordingly suggests that emigration primarily serves A positive aspect of emigration is the money sent home by emigrants. the interests of rich and powerful countries, which deprive Greece of its Remittances currently amount to a little more than 0.3 percent of Greece’s labor force and at the same time simultaneously exploited migrant labor GDP, which is in line with other South-European countries (lower than Italy, (see also Mavrodi/Moutselos 2017: 43). Headlines like “Greeks and other a little higher than Portugal and Spain), but still much lower than for Eastern immigrants boosted German GDP” (To Vima 2018a) drive home the point. European countries. Even during the worst years of the deep economic crisis, when the number of Greek emigrants soared, the increase registered By far the most salient theme reported by the press during the last two in this rate is not particularly noteworthy. That being said, remittances may decades has been the process that lead to granting the expatriate vote have mitigated the liquidity problems experienced by the country in the in December 2019, which has enabled recent emigrants to participate context of the economic crisis (Correia/Martins 2016). in Greek elections, without having to travel back to Greece to cast their ballot. Despite its large diaspora, both recent and historic, Greece was one EMIGRATION IN THE POLITICAL DEBATE of the last EU member states to introduce expatriate voting as attempts to do so in the past, have repeatedly failed. Immigration, more than emigration, has been a salient topic of public debate and academic research throughout the 1990s and 2000s in Greece. More recently, emigration emerged as an important theme in public discourse, viewed, like so many other political, social and economic phenomena, Fig. 3: Frequency of emigration-related keywords in Athens News Agency coverage through the prism of the economic crisis (Mavrodi/Moutselos 2017: 43). emigration OR emigrant OR Greeks abroad diaspora brain drain 90 While the discourse related to emigration is heterogenous, some general features also emerge. First and foremost, emigration is seen as 80 a predominantly negative phenomenon, something to be stopped or reversed. Emigrants are often presented as having been forced to migrate 70 due to adversity and there is a strong desire for these individuals to return. The typical image of an emigrant that is constructed is of a young 60 and educated person who is advancing abroad, yet constantly longs for the homeland. 50

40 EMIGRATION IN THE MEDIA In the quality press, there are two main types of articles looking at the topic of emigration. On the one hand, many pieces report on statistics, 30 such as emigration rates and/or intentions, taken from opinion polls, official reports or academic research findings. The focus on numbers in 20 the thousands conveys the impression of a constant stream of people leaving. Emigration is framed as a result of failure and the deficiency of the 10 Greek state and its political class, exacerbated by the crisis (To Vima 2019; In.gr 2017). In this category we find reports on various events related to 0 emigration, such as roundtables and debates, often with the involvement 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 of politicians, bureaucrats, academics and private entrepreneurs. And, finally, there are also articles reporting on the content and progression Source: Athens News Agency via Factiva / own representation of emigration related policies proposed by parties or the government (Neakriti 2020; In.gr 2018a).

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VISIBLE AND CONCEALED Greek media present the issue of emigration in a highly selective way percent, the return of young scientists from abroad, the defense and ASPECTS OF EMIGRATION (Mavrodi/Moutselos 2017: 44; Pratsinakis et al. 2017: 83), focusing on expansion of public and free education and the prevention of any some types of migration and migrants while concealing others. This attempts to privatize higher education, as well as the safeguarding of includes the lack of acknowledgment of how the new wave of emigration the political and social rights of young people should be key political has affected a large proportion of non-Greek citizens. In addition, priorities for both the party and the government.” (Syriza 2016) emigration and immigration are treated as almost completely separate issues, especially in the context of the ‘refugee crisis’. As will be shown, Notable policy developments during the Tsipras government included the public policy interventions, too, are geared towards a very specific type of establishment of the Hellenic Foundation for Research and Innovation, emigrant: young, active, qualified. followed by a program against unemployment and ‘brain drain’ that was launched in 2018 and that focused on vocational training and Another aspect, which is indicative of the resonance of the issue of education (To Vima 2018b). The measures included 2 billion euro funding emigration in Greek public life, is the increased artistic interest in the topic, for research and development, job creation for young researchers and with a number of plays and artworks examining the theme of migrant actions supporting innovative entrepreneurship, among others (Ethnos identity and agency during times of hardship (In.gr 2013). 2019). It is difficult to judge whether these targeted policies have had any effect, as the rate of emigration during this time remained stable. It is, however, difficult to precisely determine to what extent people are worried about emigration because public opinion surveys rarely, if By 2018, the expatriate vote had also become an issue of big symbolic ever, ask about it. A recent opinion poll that was widely discussed shows relevance. As the positions of the governing Syriza and the largest that, when asked separately about emigration and immigration, Greek opposition party, Nea Dimokratia, converged on the necessity to finally respondents tend to be more concerned about the former than the latter pass legislation allowing it, they nonetheless sought to differentiate (28 percent as opposed to 7 percent) (The Guardian 2019). Strikingly, the themselves from each other, which manifested in little more than largest share of respondents are concerned about both (54 percent). This reciprocal accusations and a public brawl (Free Sunday 2018). Ιn the mirrors a generalized unease with which people view geographic mobility same year, the Syriza-led government appointed an expert committee to in its various forms. devise a draft law on expatriate voting (Efsyn 2018), but did not come up with a plan in time for the 2019 general elections. This meant that EMIGRATION IN THE PROGRAMS The issue of the ‘new emigration’ gained political significance starting in Greek emigrants were not going to be able to vote in yet another general OF MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES 2015 (Pratsinakis et al. 2017: 86). Even though outflows peaked prior to election from their place of residence abroad, for which Tsipras was that, in 2012, emigration was crowded out by other considerations related harshly criticized (Kathimerini 2019). to the most immediate threats posed by the economic crisis. In other words, emigration was not a political priority before 2015. It became more visible belatedly, as part of a broader reckoning with the adverse social effects of protracted economic hardship and austerity policies: from Fig. 4: Emigration and diaspora in the programmatic documents of the main Greek parties 2019 rising unemployment to poverty to soaring suicide rates. Direction Framing Policy proposal Emigration was seen as a symptom of this social malaise by the newly elected Syriza government, a left-wing party with a young voter base, Nea Dimokratia demographic negative social/family policy which had signaled an interest in taking action to diminish the exodus. right-wing socio-economic It is striking that Syriza’s programmatic documents from that time focus Syriza exclusively on young and well-educated individuals as the targets of policy - - - intervention. In February 2015, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras was elected. left-wing During his statement presenting the Government program in parliament attracting private investment he made the following pledge: KINAL socio-economic mixed extending political rights “The aim of the Government […] is […] to draw up a long-term plan for center-left rights-based the return of thousands of young men and women, this important part diaspora education & culture of the Greek society, the most dynamic part, the young researchers, KKE the young people with the many degrees, who left the country and - - - today are employed in universities and research centers abroad.” far-left (Tsipras 2015) economic nationalism The Syriza party congress of 2016 also mentioned emigration, setting the Elliniki Lysi demographic family ministry negative following goals: radical right socio-economic diaspora education, culture & religion “Our plan for equitable development and productive reconstruction cannot move forward if it does not include the new generation. MeRA25 socio-economic negative extending political rights Young men and women should be one of its central pillars. In the left-wing rights-based years of economic crisis and neoliberal barbarism, young people are experiencing with particular cruelty the effects of capitalist aggression. Source: Election programs 2019 / own representation In this light, the fight against black and undeclared work, the fight against unemployment, especially of young women reaching 65

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The issue of the political representation of emigrants and the broader state conflict about resources (emigration being “exploited by countries topic of emigration became salient in the electoral campaign. Zooming like Germany, while we all paid for it”, Greek Solution undated: 155). All of in on the programmatic documents (manifestos or other programmatic the parties tended to cast emigration in a negative light, i.e. as a loss for or ideological material1) of the major parties in the 2019 elections, i.e. the community and the individual. At best, emigration was framed as an those that managed to pass the parliamentary threshold, enables a more inevitable process that needs to be pragmatically managed via EU-based detailed breakdown of the way parties define the “problem” of emigration, cooperation (the center-left KINAL represented this viewpoint). how they frame it and what proposals they make to address it. Finally, programmatic documents placed comparatively less emphasis All major contenders in the 2019 general elections referred to the issue on the historic Greek diaspora as a target of public policy intervention of emigration in some form except the incumbent Syriza and the Greek in its own right: only the center-left KINAL and the far-right Elliniki Lysi Communist Party. That being said, the issues emphasized, the framing mentioned it explicitly. The focus as far as this population group was and proposed policy solutions vary greatly. It seems that whether, concerned was on cultural policy and the cultivation of bonds between how and how much a party speaks about emigration is influenced by the diaspora and the ancestral homeland, while more extensive political political ideology. While left-wing parties focus comparatively more on and economic proposals targeted the new emigrants. Emigration and socio-economic interpretations and offer rights-based solutions, right- diaspora have been recurring topics in the deliberations of the Greek wing parties tend to frame emigration not only as a socio-economic parliament, even though they are typically mentioned in passing, rather problem but also as a demographic one. Right-wing parties devote more than constituting the focus of a specific policy proposal. attention to the issue overall (apart from a brief mention of emigration in its manifesto, Nea Dimokratia also produced a campaign video on the Figure 5 presents the incidence of keywords capturing various RELEVANCE OF MIGRATION IN THE subject of emigration, see: In.gr 2019). (overlapping) forms of human mobility: ‘expatriate’ (απόδημος), ‘diaspora’ GREEK PARLIAMENT (ομογένεια), ‘migrant’ (μετανάστης) and ‘refugee’ (πρόσφυγας).2 It shows EMIGRATION THROUGH THE Furthermore, emigration is used as a vehicle to express a given party’s that throughout the last two decades the salience of outgoing migration IDEOLOGICAL LENS general ideological outlook, linking it with other issues the party already has been considerably lower than it has been for incoming migration, ‘owns’. The euro-critical MeRA25 interpreted emigration as the result of especially in 2015 and 2016, a spike clearly linked to the ‘refugee crisis’.3 a failure of Europe, the mainstream KINAL as a concomitant of increased intra-EU mobility that needs to be managed but cannot be undone. The In December 2019, Greece reached a momentous milestone when a VOTING RIGHTS FOR FOREIGN radical right Elliniki Lysi emphasized emigration more than any other parliamentary supermajority passed a law on expatriate voting proposed GREEKS party, while also using more alarmist language, depicting it as an inter- by the Nea Dimokratia government. This also required a constitutional amendment, which tied the external vote to certain preconditions, including a “real bond with the State”, “personal presence at the polling Fig. 5: Frequency of migration-related keywords in parliamentary debates station” or “time of absence from the country or presence in the country for a certain period in the past” (Christopoulos 2019). In fact, drawing the expatriate diaspora migrant refugee dividing line between the old diaspora and the new emigrants was one of 180 the most contentious parts of the proposal. 160 Recall that Syriza had already been working on a plan to expand the expatriate vote. Nea Dimokratia prepared its own proposal in parallel, 140 having separately pledged to enfranchise external citizens when it 120 announced its government program (Mitsotakis 2019). As the debate minutes reveal (Greek Parliament 2019), all parliamentary parties agreed 100 with the general intention of the law, i.e. to enable political participation of Greek emigrants. The parties therefore differentiated themselves 80 regarding the policy details: how exactly this right should be realized and what kind of preconditions to link it to. 60 MPs also used the debate on the issue to attack political opponents, 40 praise their own record and take credit for highlighting the issue. Syriza’s keynote speaker, for example, accused previous Nea Dimokratia and 20

0 2 The keyword search was conducted in the online repository containing the minutes of the plenary 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 sessions of the Greek national assembly (available online at https://www.hellenicparliament.gr). The unit of observation was the parliamentary debate. This is a crude measure of salience, since such a Source: Hellenic Parliament / own representation method does not allow us to count the incidence of relevant keywords within a single debate, i.e. we do not know if members of parliament mentioned it only once or on several occasions. Note that the search functionality identifies not only the stems but also the conjugated forms of words, but it is not possible to search for more than one keyword at a time. 3 However, note that in Greek several terms are used to convey the meaning of ‘emigrant’ and 1 The programmatic documents are made available on the parties’ websites: https://nd.gr/ekloges-2019 ‘emigration’: Sometimes the word ‘expatriate’ (απόδημος) is used, other times the expression ‘Greeks (Nea Dimokratia), https://kinimaallagis.gr/programma/ (KINAL), https://elliniki-lisi.gr/wp-content/ abroad’ (Έλληνες του εξωτερικού), or the word ‘migrant’ (μετανάστης) along with the adjective ‘Greek’. uploads/2020/08/ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑ-ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ-ΛΥΣΗ-ΙΑΝΟΥΑΡΙΟΣ-2019.pdf (Greek Solution), https:// Given this complexity, in combination with the limited search functionality of the parliamentary mera25.gr/politiko-programma/ (MeRA25). The official websites of Syrizahttps://www.syriza.gr ( ) and minutes available online, the results in Figure 5 should be interpreted with caution. KKE (https://www.kke.gr/) were also reviewed.

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PASOK governments of disenfranchising expatriate citizens for decades, INFOBOX – Migration in times of the Corona pandemic claiming: “We brought it up, not you”. The representative from KINAL (the heir of PASOK) argued that they were the “faction that did the most” for Like many countries around the world, Greece, too, imposed lockdown the diaspora, evoking actions undertaken back in the 1960s and 1970s. measures and travel restrictions aimed to prevent COVID-19 infections. Even though Greece avoided an uncontrolled spread of the virus and POLARIZATION BETWEEN THE The Communist Party and the far-right Elliniki Lysi took diametrically an overburdening of its medical system during spring 2020 due to early PARTIES opposed positions, with the former advocating for a restrictive conception preventive action, the easing of travel restrictions in the holiday season of the expatriate electorate (those with genuine involvement in the led to a considerable increase in the number of detected cases. country’s politics and society), and the latter advocating for an expansive one, accusing the Communist Party of excluding “more than 85 percent The mobility of Greek citizens to and from Greece has also been [..] of real Greeks” (it is unclear where this number comes from). dramatically reduced, especially in March and April of 2020, but limitations were progressively relaxed starting in May. As Europe became The MPs of MeRA25 were the only ones who voted against the proposal on the epicenter of the global pandemic, the Greek government suspended grounds that it was not going far enough, i.e. because according to them travel from several countries, within and outside the EU. A small number it barred large numbers of prospective voters from participation, hence of repatriation flights from the UK, Italy, Spain and other countries were rendering expatriate Greeks “second-class citizens”. Unlike Elliniki Lysi, organized, but repatriationswere limited to cases deemed urgent, e.g. however, the objections of MeRA25 were focused on the administrative citizens with health problems or terminated apartment leases. These and socio-economic exclusion of potential voters (e.g. the requirement operations and the sporadic discontent expressed by emigrants wishing of having submitted a tax declaration in Greece in order to be able to to return to Greece but unable to do so gained considerable visibility in register). Greek media.

After a lengthy debate about these particulars, the law was passed in a There has always been a significant risk that the virus would spread in historic vote, which was exceptional in its unanimity: 288 of the 296 MPs Greece’s refugee camps, exacerbated by the prevalence of unsanitary voted in favor, seven against and one abstained. conditions, overcrowding and lack of medical resources. In early September 2020, several cases of COVID-19 were detected in Moria, the INCENTIVIZING RETURN OF HIGH- Beyond the expatriate vote, the Nea Dimokratia government also devised largest refugee camp in the country at the time. A few days later the SKILLED PROFESSIONALS a targeted repatriation program for emigrants. The project, branded camp was completely destroyed in a fire, reportedly set by residents ‘Rebrain Greece’, was introduced in 2019 by the Ministry of Labor and protesting strict isolation measures imposed by the Greek government Social Affairs. The flagship action of the program is “Again, Greece” to contain the virus. After the fire, refugees were stranded on the island that aims to repatriate Greeks with high specialization and scientific of Lesbos, because of the government’s fear that, if transferred to experience, aged 28-40 years. These individuals are to be hired by private mainland Greece, they could “end up infecting others” (Al Jazeera 2020). companies with a minimum monthly salary of 3,000€, 70 percent of which would be financed by the state, but the employees would commit to work Even prior to this incident, the Greek government’s approach was to for another 12 months in the company. Beyond this, ‘Rebrain Greece’ limit physical movement as much as possible, quarantining thousands includes three other components: development of online platforms of people in the camps and taking the incidence of COVID-19 cases as a where prospective returnees and employers could register, setting up pretext to revive older plans to further isolate refugees. The government an advisory organization tasked with research and policy planning and a also applied stricter external border checks of new arrivals from Turkey package of ‘smart actions’ of targeted public policies for the labor market, with assistance from FRONTEX. utilizing modern data visualization technologies and the principles of artificial intelligence (Naftemboriki 2019). OUTLOOK CULTIVATING THE BONDS A separate framework composed of governmental, legislative and BETWEEN DIASPORA AND THE administrative bodies is tasked with the engagement of the historic Greek While Greece’s old diaspora has always been a background issue in Greek HOMELAND diaspora. These include the World Council of Greeks Abroad, the World politics, the more recent exodus that accompanied the economic crisis be- Hellenic Inter-Parliamentary Association and the General Secretariat of came politicized starting in 2015. Indicative of the increased importance of Hellenes Abroad within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Parliament the issue of emigration was the passage of a historic law in December 2019 has set up a Special Permanent Committee on Greeks Abroad, whose which allowed expatriate Greeks to vote from abroad. The law has opened stated aim is to identify the problems of Greeks abroad, to preserve a new chapter in Greek electoral politics, as contenders will have to devise the Greek language and disseminate philhellenism (Hellenic Parliament new strategies to capture the expatriate vote in the next general election undated). This is indicative of the broader focus of such institutions; they campaign. are predominantly geared towards the preservation and promotion of Greek cultural identity through funding, organization of cultural events, Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether targeted return policies, conferences and scientific research in collaboration with the numerous such as the one instituted recently by the Nea Dimokratia government, organizations of Greeks abroad. Some attention has also been paid to will have any substantive effects. It seems unlikely that such measures the provision of economic support for return as well as the expansion of can effectively tackle the deeper drivers of emigration, such as persisting expatriate voting rights, but this has been much less emphasized than in social and political ills as well as imbalances within the EU Single Market. As the case of the new emigrants. Greece’s already fragile economy is expected to deteriorate in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, emigration is likely to persist.

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Naftemboriki 2019: Rebrain Greece: Πρωτοβουλία για To Vima 2018b: €2,6 δισ. κατά της ανεργίας και του Brain Efsyn 2017: Μετανάστευση και φυγή εγκεφάλων: μύθος In.gr 2017: Στουρνάρας: 427.000 άτομα έφυγαν από τη επαναπατρισμό των αποδήμων στην ελληνική αγορά Drain; available at: https://www.tovima.gr/2018/01/05/ και πραγματικότητα; available at: https://www.efsyn.gr/ χώρα τα χρόνια της κρίσης; available at: https://www. εργασίας; available at: https://www.naftemporiki. finance/2-6-dis-kata-tis-anergias-kai-toy-brain-drain/ stiles/apopseis/122456_metanasteysi-kai-fygi-egkefalon- in.gr/2017/11/15/economy/stoyrnaras-427-000-atoma- gr/story/1541061/rebrain-greece-protoboulia-gia- (retrieved: 05.11.2020). mythos-kai-pragmatikotita (retrieved: 05.11.2020). efygan-apo-ti-xwra-ta-xronia-tis-krisis/ epanapatrismo-ton-apodimon-stin-elliniki-agora- (retrieved: 05.11.2020). ergasias (retrieved: 05.11.2020). Tsipras, Alexis 2015: Prime Minister Tsipras’ Speech During Efsyn 2018: Επιτροπή για τους Ελληνες εκλογείς the Presentation of the Government Program; available εξωτερικού; available at: https://www.efsyn.gr/ In.gr 2018a: Εκδήλωση για την ανάσχεση του brain Neakriti 2020: ΓΓ Απόδημου Ελληνισμού: Σημαντική at: https://primeminister.gr/2015/02/08/13322 politiki/158631_epitropi-gia-toys-ellines-eklogeis- drain από το Οικονομικό Πανεπιστήμιο; available at: συνάντηση για τη δημιουργία πανομογενειακού δικτύου (retrieved: 05/11/2020). exoterikoy (retrieved: 05.11.2020). https://www.in.gr/2018/05/23/greece/ekdilosi-gia-tin- Ελλήνων ιατρών; available at: https://www.neakriti.gr/ anasxesi-tou-brain-drain-apo-oikonomiko-panepistimio/ article/politismos/1583077/gg-apodimou-ellinismou- van Herwijnen, Marjan / Daly, Gavin / Iotzov, Vassilen 2018: ESPON 2018: Fighting Rural Depopulation in Southern (retrieved: 05.11.2020). simadiki-sunadisi-gia-ti-dimiourgia-panomogeneiakou- Fighting Rural Depopulation in Southern Europe; ESPON: Europe; available at: https://www.espon.eu/sites/ diktuou-ellinon-iatron/ (retrieved: 05.11.2020). Luxembourg; available at: https://www.espon.eu/sites/ default/files/attachments/af-espon_spain_02052018-en. In.gr 2018b: Έλληνες νέοι: «Να μείνω ή να φύγω;»; default/files/attachments/af-espon_spain_02052018-en. pdf (retrieved: 05.11.2020). available at: https://www.in.gr/2018/06/25/world/ Pratsinakis, Manolis / Hatziprokopiou, Panos / Labrianidis, pdf (retrieved: 04.11.2020). deutsche-welle/ellines-neoi-na-meino-na-fygo Lois / Grammatikas, Dimitris 2017: Crisis and the Resurgence Ethnos 2019: Τσίπρας: Καταφέραμε να αντιστρέψουμε (retrieved: 05.11.2020). of Emigration from Greece: Trends, Representations and το brain drain; available at: https://www.ethnos.gr/ the Multiplicity of Migrant Trajectories; in: Glorius, Brigit / politiki/27699_tsipras-kataferame-na-antistrepsoyme- In.gr 2019: Το νέο σποτ της ΝΔ για το brain drain; available Domínguez-Mujica, Jozefina (eds.): European Mobility in brain-drain (retrieved: 05.11.2020). at: https://www.in.gr/2019/06/10/in-tv/neo-spot-tis-nd- Times of Crisis; J. Transcript Verlag, Bielefeld, p. 75-102. gia-brain-drain (retrieved: 05.11.2020). Free Sunday 2018: Τσίπρας: Θα δώσουμε δικαίωμα ψήφου Salvati, Luca 2019: Bridging the Divide: Demographic στους Έλληνες του εξωτερικού; available at: https:// Kathimerini 2019: Επιστολή Ελλήνων εξωτερικού προς Dynamics and Urban–Rural Polarities During Economic freesunday.gr/politiki/item/20993-tsipras-tha-dwsoyme- Τσίπρα για το δικαίωμα ψήφου; available at: https:// Expansion and Recession in Greece; in: Popularuib Space dikaiwma-pshfoy-stoys-ellhnes-toy-exwterikoy www.kathimerini.gr/1032453/gallery/epikairothta/ and Place 25 (8); available at: https://doi.org/10.1002/ (retrieved: 05.11.2020). politikh/epistolh-ellhnwn-e3wterikoy-pros-tsipra-gia-to- psp.2267 (retrieved: 04.11.2020). dikaiwma-yhfoy (retrieved: 05.11.2020). Greek City Times 2018: The Greek Diaspora Approaches Syriza 2016: Second Congress: Text of Political Decision; the 5 Million Mark; available at: https://greekcitytimes. Labrianidis, Lois / Pratsinakis, Manolis 2016: Greece’s New available at: https//www.syriza.gr/article/id/67313/ com/2018/11/18/the-greek-diaspora-approaches-the-5- Emigration at Times of Crisis; GreeSE paper (99); Hellenic Politikh-Apofash-2oy-Synedrioy.html million-mark/ (retrieved: 05.11.2020). Observatory, LSE. (retrieved: 05.11.2020).

Greek Solution (undated): Without Title; available at: Lazaretou, Sophia 2016: The Greek Brain Drain: The New The Guardian 2019: Europe’s South and East Worry More https://elliniki-lisi.gr/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ Pattern of Greek Emigration During the Recent Crisis; in: About Emigration Than Immigration – Poll; available ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑ-ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ-ΛΥΣΗ-ΙΑΝΟΥΑΡΙΟΣ-2019.pdf Economic Bulletin (43), p. 31-54. at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/01/ (retrieved: 05.11.2020). europe-south-and-east-worry-more-about-emigration- than-immigration-poll (retrieved: 05.11.2020).

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4 HUNGARY

Summary

Emigration from Hungary has grown rapidly from 2011 onwards. The socio-economic factors that motivate labor-related emigration persist, while migration networks are continuously strengthening, and a culture of emigration is taking hold.

Emigration has become an important political issue and an area of public policy intervention. It is frequently discussed in parliament, and it is also part of the broader public discourse. The Fidesz-led government is the primary target of criticism for persistently high emigration rates.

Emigration is typically viewed as a negative phenomenon, affecting mainly the young and the economically active. The focus is on the dire circumstances in which people find themselves and which push them away in search of better living and employment conditions.

Fidesz-led governments have made some attempts to stem the tide of emigration and/or incentivize return with the introduction of targeted policies, but with little notable success. The main strategy has been to de-emphasize the issue as much as possible, while drawing attention to the alleged “danger” of incoming migration instead.

DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE OF EMIGRATION

The estimated number of recent Hungarian emigrants is half a million. The bulk of this movement has taken place for work purposes within the EU single market. The major destination countries of Hungarian movers are Germany, Austria and the UK. Other destinations attracting a significant share are Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and Italy.

During state socialism, international migration from and to Hungary was strictly controlled and limited in number. A wave of politically motivated emigration followed the defeat of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 against the Communist puppet government and the USSR, when approximately 200,000 refugees fled to the West. Emigration from the country was continuous after that, though its volume was small, with an average annual migration loss of less than 3,000 people. After the regime change in 1989, the heavy political control over mobility was lifted. Nonetheless, there was only a small increase in the rate of emigration in the 1990s, while many of those who had gone abroad returned. The still relatively high levels of social expenditure, lack of foreign language skills, and low desire to relocate even within state borders, delayed large-scale emigration until the 2010s, when the trend belatedly picked up. A crucial juncture was that in 2011 the 7-year restrictions on labor mobility imposed by the majority of old EU member states on new EU countries’ citizens were lifted. While beforehand only the UK, Ireland and Sweden had opened their labor markets to Eastern European citizens, freedom of movement within the EU was now unlimited.1

EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 1 This section is based on Gödri et al. 2013. C86 87 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HUNGARY

Country Factsheet Willingness to emigrate from Hungary has followed an upward trend that WIDESPREAD INTENTIONS TO predates EU accession (Blaskó et al. 2014: 352). In the 1990s only 5–6 per- EMIGRATE GDP/capita: 13,973€ cent of the population planned to emigrate, but this proportion had dou- bled by 2001, and tripled by 2011 (Mikó 2019: 252). Migration intentions EU accession year: 2004 are high among men, secondary school graduates, the unemployed and especially students under 18 (Mikó 2019: 252). A recent survey found a Population in 2019: 9,769,949 large proportion of secondary and tertiary students intend to go abroad for Population in 1990: 10,373,988 study and/or work, citing a variety of reasons, such as a lack of job oppor- Population projection for 2060: 9,117,095 tunities and precarious jobs in Hungary, the intention to learn a language, but also a desire for adventure (Mikó 2019). Share of foreign citizens: 8.5% Foreign-born population: 1.8% Emigration occurs and is evaluated in the broader demographic context of EMIGRATION AS PART OF THE Hungary. It is seen as exacerbating already low rates of natural reproduc- BROADER DEMOGRAPHY Young population: 14.6% (EU average: 15.2%) tion among the majority Hungarian population. The World Bank currently Working age population: 66.3% records a fertility rate of 1.5 births per woman, which is, in fact, a relative Elderly population : 19.3% (EU average: 20.2%) improvement since 2011, when fertility reached a historic low point at 1.23 births per woman. In addition to the numerical decline, the population is Fertility rate: 1.55 (EU average: 1.55) also aging with the elderly (over 65) outnumbering the young. The share of economically active people is declining, while the old-age dependency ratio is increasing, a trend that foreshadows economic, social and fiscal difficul- ACCELERATION OF After 2011 emigration from Hungary picked up, even though the country ties for the longer term. EMIGRATION IN still ranks relatively low compared to its neighbors regarding the net rate THE LAST DECADE of emigration in the economically active age brackets (Hárs 2018). This was Regarding its ethnic composition, Hungary is a fairly homogenous state, approximately 5 percent in 2017, while, by way of comparison, it was more with a small share of autochthonous national minorities (mainly German) than 17 percent in Romania (Hárs 2018: 84). However, Hungary has one and a relatively large Roma population. The 2011 census recorded 316 000 of the highest emigration growth rates in the EU, which suggests that the Roma, even though estimates put their actual number as high as 800 000 country is quickly catching up (Ibid.). Hungarian emigrants tend to be rela- (Minority Rights Group International 2018). Not only is the Roma minority tively young and skilled, with the majority holding secondary-level qualifi- subjected to racist exclusion and violence, but also higher natural repro- cations. After 2011, the emigration rate of people with a low level of edu- duction rates among this population group are routinely cast as a cause for cation increased, but only slightly (Hárs 2018: 84-85). Human capital flight alarm, especially (but not only) by the Hungarian far right. It should be not- from Hungary is particularly pronounced: a larger proportion of tertiary ed, however, that migration intentions among the Roma are slightly lower graduates emigrate compared to all other educational categories, and the than among the non-Roma population, which goes contrary to the regional rate is also among the highest recorded in the region (Hárs 2018: 86). trend (Duval/Wolff 2016). Hungary’s EU accession has made it more difficult for the Roma to apply for refugee status, which was quite frequent before- EMIGRANT PROFILES A closer look at the profiles of labor migrants in the period of acceler- hand; there have also been some instances of forced repatriation of Roma ated emigration from Hungary (2011-2016) reveals a number of patterns: from more affluent EU countries back to Hungary (Hárs 2009). the emigration rate is the highest among employed people under the age of 30, those holding a high school diploma, and those who had still been Another phenomenon meriting attention in the Hungarian context is the studying in the year prior to emigration (Hárs/Simon 2017: 96). While the migration undertaken by ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring states. proportions are similar, the profiles of emigrants differ according to the The so-called “transborder Hungarians” constitute one of the largest na- destination country: those who had experienced unemployment in the tional minorities in Europe (approximately 2 million people), whose origin year prior to emigration and had lower educational qualifications chose goes back to the First World War, when Hungary lost about two thirds of its Germany in larger numbers; those who were still in school a year prior to territory along with an estimated 3 million ethnic Hungarians, who found emigration and possessed higher educational qualifications chose the UK themselves outside of the redrawn state borders (The Columbia Encyclo- in larger numbers (Hárs 2018: 91). Emigration, especially if it takes place pedia 2020). within the EU’s single market, is not necessarily one-way or permanent: some emigrants return and/or go abroad again in a circular fashion. Return EMIGRATION IN THE POLITICAL DEBATE rates are higher from Germany than from the UK and Austria, where, due to geographic proximity, commuting is also prominent; women return less Keyword-based analysis of parliamentary debates reveals that the political sa- FREQUENT MENTIONS OF than men and so do younger people (Hárs 2018: 91-92). lience of emigration has grown considerably from 2010 onwards, while prior EMIGRATION IN THE HUNGARIAN to Hungary’s EU accession emigration was rarely mentioned (Figure 1). This PARLIAMENT THE EFFECTS OF EMIGRATION Emigration is linked to labor shortages and this impact is strongest in low rise coincided with two developments: on the one hand, an increase in emi- value chain sectors, including hospitality, construction and the processing gration rates, and on the other hand, the entry of the far-right party, Jobbik, industry (Hárs 2018: 93). Also particularly affected is the health sector, where into the Hungarian parliament. Jobbik MPs made the most references to em- emigration exacerbates acute labor shortages (Hárs 2018: 93). Modest wage igration in their speeches, blaming the government for the soaring numbers increases have been ineffective in reversing these trends (Hárs 2018: 94). and warning of the dire socio-economic and demographic “danger” posed by Remittances partly compensate for some of the adverse effects related to emigration. Prior to 2010, emigration was often mentioned in relation to in- emigration. Recent data put the share of remittances at 2.6 percent of the GDP, which is quite high and on a par with the broader regional trend.

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Fig.1: Relevance of emigration in the Hungarian parliamentary debates / number of mentions (2000-2019) amass savings that can be invested upon return. Substantively, therefore, emigration is not a polarizing issue in that all political actors are against it, even 250 though they differ in terms of emphasis on the issue, framing and proposed policy solutions.

200 It is also worth noting that when politicians speak about emigration, they tend to have a very specific image of the “emigrant” in mind, namely young, economically active individuals. Jobbik in particular has been quite vocal about the emigration of younger generations from Hungary, which was a major constitu- 150 ency of the party at the time. The liberal LMP attempted to do something similar, by speaking about the gendered aspects of emigration, calling attention to the precarious situation of female emigrants in particular. Another aspect of 100 emigration, which tends to attract major attention from Hungarian lawmakers, is the emigration of medical doctors and other healthcare professionals, often discussed as a particularly pernicious form of ‘brain drain’.

50 Note that emigration became politically salient in the last decade, during which EMIGRATION AS A CAMPAIGN time the right-wing Fidesz has dominated the Hungarian party-system. In fact, ISSUE AGAINST THE the opposition parties often refer to the issue of emigration to articulate a GOVERNMENT 0 broader anti-government critique. Emigration stands as the epitome of the failure of Fidesz-led governments to ensure adequate living and working con- 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 ditions for their citizens, pushing them away from their homeland in a process Source: Hungarian National Assembly, Minutes of the Plenary Sessions3 / own representation that is painful for both those who go and those who stay, and which is especially delegitimizing for a national-populist government like Fidesz-KDNP. As the opposition MP Tímea Szabó (Párbeszéd) explains: ternal movement (i.e. relocation from the countryside to the cities2) and the transborder Hungarian communities.3The latter became particularly salient “You know, fellow Members of Parliament, [...] children are born in countries in 2004 due to a referendum that took place in the same year. Fidesz, which where it is good to live. Where it is not good to live, no children are born [...] was the largest opposition party at the time, initiated the referendum, asking The declining birth rate shows this, and so do the embarrassing emigration voters whether ethnic Hungarians residing in neighboring countries should be figures. 600,000 people, 600,000 adults of childbearing age went abroad granted dual citizenship. Even though the “yes” option won, the referendum from Hungary because they do not see the possibilities of having children failed because of low turnout. One point of disagreement between the Social- or making a living at home.” (Hungarian National Assembly, Plenary Ses- ist-led government and the opposition was the extent to which dual citizenship sion, June 4th, 2018) would incentivize the relocation of members of the Hungarian diaspora communities towards their homeland or other EU member states, eventually lead- The government’s response has been to dispute the statistics, or to downplay FIDESZ SEEKS TO DEEMPHASIZE ing to the disappearance of these ethnic communities. The preoccupation with the adverse effects of emigration, arguing for example that many of the emi- EMIGRATION the survival of the Hungarian transborder minority continues to be a dominant grants later return or pointing out that Hungary still ranks lower in emigration dimension of diaspora-policy and discourse to this day. rates than other neighboring countries. The overall tactic is to simply de-emphasize the issue of emigration altogether, which is why Fidesz politicians rare- The concern about the endurance of the diasporic communities reveals a gen- ly mention it unprompted. eral tendency to depict emigration as an overwhelmingly negative phenomenon. This evaluation reflects a sedentary bias4: i.e. the reification of the link This de-emphasizing strategy on the part of Fidesz and vocal criticism on the POLICY PROPOSALS AND between people and their place of origin, which renders emigration as a devi- part of the opposition in relation to emigration also prevailed in the context of ELECTORAL PLEDGES ation from the natural (and desirable) state of affairs. the two most recent elections held in Hungary, the 2018 general elections and the 2019 European Parliament elections. All of the major opposition parties EMIGRANT IMAGE: Accordingly, parliamentary speeches tend to emphasize the negative so- that stood a realistic chance of winning mandates in at least one of these polls YOUNG, SKILLED, HARD-WORKING cio-economic causes and consequences of emigration, also linking it to ad- sought to address the issue in their electoral programs. verse demographic trends in Hungary. Emigration is seen as something that uproots individuals and fragments society; it can only ever be positive on the The last electoral manifesto published by Fidesz, which runs in permanent condition of an eventual homecoming, e.g. as a way of skill acquisition or to alliance with the Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (KDNP, Christian Democratic People’s Party), was in 2010 and since then the party has virtually stopped publishing programmatic documents. As a substitute, it is worthwile to look at 2 In Hungarian two slightly different words are used interchangeably to convey the meaning of the content published on the official website of the Hungarian government in “emigration”: kivándorlás, which literally translates to “outmigration,” i.e. exiting the country, and 2018 and 2019 retrieved via a keyword search (www.kormany.hu). Among oth- elvándorlás, which means moving away from one’s place of residence to a destination located both within and beyond the national borders. er things, the website contains reports of events in which government officials 3 The keyword search was conducted in the online repository containing the minutes of the plenary participate, press conferences and transcripts of speeches. sessions of the Hungarian national assembly (available online at https://www.parlament.hu/). The unit of observation was the parliamentary debate. This is a crude measure of salience, since such a method does not allow us to count the incidence of relevant keywords within a single debate, A simple search of the keywords “emigration” and “immigration” turns up ten i.e. we do not know if an MP mentioned it only once or on several occasions. Note that the search functionality identifies not only the stems but also the conjugated forms of words. times more content for the latter than for the former: 1 106 entries related to 4 This concept originates in the work of Liisa Malkki, see, e.g. Malkki 1993. “immigration” as opposed to 102 for “emigration.” Looking closer at the arti-

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cles that contain the word “emigration” few of them actually address current Hungarian emigration. Many refer to emigration in the past, e.g. after 1956, or Fig. 2: Parties and emigration: frames and measures emigration affecting other countries. One of the most dominant topics is emigration from African or Middle Eastern countries towards Europe, that is, from Framing Policy proposals the perspective of Hungary, incoming migration. Most of the entries that come JOBBIK socio-economic DOMESTIC up are related to the Hungarian government’s policy intended to “help” people (radical right) housing who otherwise would emigrate from these less developed countries to instead demographic targeted measures for medical personnel stay put. The government devised this “alternative” approach to migration pol- Hungarian diaspora policy icy as a response to the European migration crisis and has advocated for it at Youth policy the European level as well as establishing its own aid program. It is difficult to Rural development overlook the xenophobic principles underlying this policy: a fear of inundation and a claim of inherent incompatibility between ethnicities. EU wage union protection of EU citizens’ rights A second theme running through these entries is the emigration of transborder Hungarians from their traditional places of residence and the gov- MSZP socio-economic DOMESTIC ernment’s efforts to prevent it. Yet another theme is internal migration, i.e. (social-democratic) wage increases for healthcare workers movement from the countryside toward urban centers, which is also deemed urban policy (Budapest) undesirable and is tackled by policies such as the Hungarian Village Program. EU In fact, the emigration of Hungarians from Hungary is rarely ever mentioned, EU-level unemployment insurance fund and if it is, this is only to declare that the government’s efforts to reverse the targeted program: “Home awaits” trend “are working.” support of emigrants (general) tackling mass East-to-West migration on the EU level THE OPPOSITION’S PROPOSALS All major Hungarian parties provide very detailed policy proposals about emi- targeted measures for medical personnel RELATED TO EMIGRATION. gration in their 2018 and 2019 programs5, though they do so in different ways. youth policy Doubtlessly, the far-right Jobbik is the most fervent critic of the emigration of LMP (green-liberal) socio-economic DOMESTIC Hungarians, often using alarmist language and the tropes of organic nation- family policy alism. For example, the 2018 Jobbik party program describes the problem of targeted measures for youth emigration as follows: comprehensive (transborder) diaspora policy DK socio-economic DOMESTIC “An astonishing erosion has begun in the deep tissues of society, culmi- raising wages for civil servants nating in a spike in emigration, a demographic catastrophe, and a sense (social liberalism) of almost complete hopelessness.” (Jobbik 2018: 11) EU Youth Guarantee Our Homeland, a splinter from Jobbik, uses almost identical language in its targeted program: “Bring Europe home” description of the problem: “This phenomenon is causing the Hungarian Momentum socio-economic DOMESTIC economy to lose billions and is preparing a demographic catastrophe.” The (centrist) wage increase in the healthcare sector party program contains virulently Islamophobic and anti-Roma segments, demographic targeted measures for transborder Hungarians which are part of an all-encompassing “demographic panic.”6 The idea that (strengthening economic relations) transnational Western European economies are luring in and exploiting Eastern Europe- comprehensive diaspora engagement strategy, including: an workers, i.e. an intra-EU fight for human resources between the various cultural policy, revision of science grant system, knowledge- nations, also features eminently. sharing between locals and emigrants Further to the left, LMP, DK and MSZP define emigration as a socio-eco- Our Homeland ethno-nationalist EU nomic problem which can be solved with wage increases and/or social (extreme right) demographic “Social Europe” (vague) policy measures, both national and pan-European. Momentum’s program socio-economic stands out in that it is the only one that mentions the potential positive aspects of emigration: Source: Election programs / own representation

“Emigration is not the problem; returnees with knowledge gained abroad could make a major contribution to boosting the country. The problem is that Accordingly, the party proposes not only measures for preventing or re- Hungarians studying or working abroad never come back. If they or their chil- versing emigration but also ways in which the links between emigrants dren lose contact with Hungary, they lose their Hungarian self-consciousness. (as well as the historic diaspora living in Hungary’s neighborhood) and the The Hungarians must adapt to the situation: we must become a World nation. Hungarian state can be preserved and strengthened, putting forth the ideal We need to lay the foundations for a diaspora strategy that meets the require- of a new type of national identity, that is not eradicated but rather trans- ments of the 21st century.” formed by the experience of mobility.

Beyond the sphere of politics, emigration has become a major issue in PUBLIC PERCEIVES PERSISTENTLY the Hungarian media, too, reaching its peak in 2016. A separate keyword HIGH EMIGRATION AS A search in Magyar Narancs (“Hungarian Orange”), a liberal political and cul- 5 The programmatic documents analyzed in this section were retrieved from the parties’ official GOVERNMENT FAILURE websites. tural weekly, reveals that the number of articles mentioning emigration 6 This term originates from the work of Ivan Krastev (2016). steadily rose, also after 2016 (Figure 4).

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What are these articles about? Many of them present emigration-related of movement within the Single Market, but the tide may now be turning. facts and statistics, including the results of public opinion polls and aca- Indicatively, when explicitly asked about it, every second person is in favor of demic research. Others seek to capture the human face of emigration in emigration controls, i.e. measures introduced in order to inhibit the outward social interest stories examining the experience of migration. These stories movement of fellow citizens for extended periods of time (Krastev/Leonard/ present a more complex picture of emigration than the political discourse Dennison 2019). does, bringing the element of individual choices and motivations into the discussion. A recurring theme is that of the loss experienced in the fami- It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the Hungarian government has sought FIDESZ INSISTS ON DISTINCTION lies of emigrants, such as the article titled “’The hug is gone’,” the stories to downplay the phenomenon of Hungarian emigration focusing instead on BETWEEN MIGRATION FROM of mothers left behind,” (Nők Lapja 2020) which broaches the issue of the anti-immigrant fearmongering. The Hungarian government also strictly dif- HUNGARY AND IMMIGRATION FROM complex feelings of parents of emigrants, such as guilt and worry, but also ferentiates between the outward migration of Hungarians and the inward THIRD COUNTRIES pride because of their children’s success abroad. Another typical theme is migration of third country nationals. An example of this separate treatment the migration intentions and/or experiences of young Hungarians (Magyar was the insistence of the Fidesz government that Hungarian movers working Narancs 2016). in the EU single market did not constitute and should not be labeled as “migrants.” This was in response to increasing opposition to intra-EU free move- The media also report on various public opinion surveys conducted among ment in pre-Brexit Britain, which had a particularly anti-East-Central European Hungarians related to the issue of emigration. A widely-cited survey has edge. In July 2015 the Hungarian Secretary of State for EU Affairs expressed his shown that the Hungarian public is more preoccupied with emigration than satisfaction that due to the Hungarian government’s insistence “a Romanian or with immigration: 39 percent of Hungarians worry about emigration, 20 per- Hungarian citizen working in England will no longer be mentioned on the same cent about immigration and 34 percent about both (Krastev/Leonard/Denni- page as African immigrants” (Hungarian Government 2015a). This discourse is son 2019). Moreover, the perception that the political leadership should be part of a broader strategy to sideline the fact of Hungarian emigration and to blamed for emigration is widespread among the majority of the Hungarian frame migration “as something that comes only outside of Europe” (Waterbury public. An opinion poll conducted in 2018 shows that nobody receives more 2020: 1). blame for the exodus than the Hungarian government, and/or Prime Minis- ter Viktor Orbán personally (blamed by 24 percent of all respondents, with Conversely, among the Hungarian progressive opposition and civil society cir- REACTION OF THE multiple choices allowed) (Publicus Research 2018). It is notable that 9 per- cles, it has become customary to link the critique of the government’s virulently OPPOSITION cent blame the previous Socialist government, even though the latter hasn’t anti-immigrant stance to the emigration of Hungarians from the country. This governed for more than a decade. On the whole, people blame emigration usually takes the following form: the government launches an attack against on political factors (government record, bad political mood, corruption) and immigrants, immigrant rights organizations or the supposedly “pro-migrant” economic factors (low wages, not enough jobs) to an equal extent. The sur- EU to which the opposition responds by pointing out that plenty of Hungari- vey did not explicitly ask about the role the EU may play as a pull-factor. ans also live as migrants, calling out what they see as an arbitrary distinction On average, Hungarians have been among the “cheerleaders” of freedom between various forms of mobility, and/or calling out the government for fearmongering and setting the wrong priorities.

For example, in the summer of 2018, the spokesperson and the youth organ- Fig. 3: Frequency of articles mentioning various migration-related keywords. Economic news service of the Hungarian News ization of the KDNP (Fidesz’s satellite), undertook a smear campaign against Agency, 2001-2019 emigrants cross-border Hungary immigrants refugee 200 Fig. 4: Frequency of articles mentioning ‚emigration‘, Magyar Narancs, 2010-2019

100

150 80

100 60

40 50 20

0 0

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Source: MTI-Eco; Access: Factiva / own representation Source: https://magyarnarancs.hu / own representation

94 95 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HUNGARY

Amnesty International and another organization assisting migrants, marking served as a reserve of migrant labor, despite the government’s stated aim their entrances with stickers that read “Immigration Support Organization” of preserving these communities in their historic place of residence. Start- meant as an insult. Critics reacted with gluing their own sticker on a Fidesz ing in 2017 the Hungarian government has encouraged the employment office in the capital reading “Emigration Support Organization.” In another -in of foreigners from neighboring non-EU countries in predetermined occu- stance, political newcomer Momentum, a centrist party advocating for political pations by applying simplified administrative procedures for the issuance renewal and a regular organizer of anti-government protests, launched a so- of short-term work permits. However, the policy has only increased the called “reality campaign” as a response to the government’s “information cam- employment of foreigners by a few thousand people (Putnoki 2017, cited paign,” which attacked European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker in Hárs 2018: 98). and Hungarian-American businessman George Soros, accusing “Brussels” of allegedly imposing migrants on the member states. Momentum prepared In Hungary such policies do not seem viable for two reasons. On the one large stickers that would partly cover the government ads, including one that hand, a country that successfully attracts workers from abroad is also able read: “Every sixth Hungarian child is born abroad. We shouldn’t give up our fu- to keep its own, and one that is unable to keep its own, finds it difficult to ture!” On its Instagram page, the party argued that “In our opinion, the biggest attract foreigners too (Hárs 2018: 98). On the other hand, the Hungarian threat is not the European Union or Soros, but low wages, labor shortages, government has also made it clear that such “substitution” of Hungarians emigration or even corruption!” (Momentum Mozgalom 2019). The issue of with migrants is not a desirable option. The idea that immigration would emigration has become a potent tool for creating a counter-narrative to the compensate population loss is completely rejected, and the intent of some anti-immigrant and anti-refugee panic spread by the Fidesz-led government Western European member states to stop population decline in this way is while also calling attention to the lack of regard for social justice and solidarity. seen as a symptom of cultural and moral decline. As Orbán explains:

EMIGRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY Tackling the issue of emigration is a complex task given that it is influenced by “We are living in times when fewer and fewer children are being born a large set of factors, including the socio-economic context in both the sending throughout Europe. People in the West are responding to this with immi- and the receiving states, as well as individual predispositions and agency. Ac- gration: they say that the shortfall should be made up by immigrants, and cordingly, it is hard to tell what constitutes emigration policy as such: a host of then the numbers will be in order. Hungarians see this in a different light. economic and social policies can also be considered emigration policies, since We do not need numbers, but Hungarian children. In our minds, immigra- improving people’s circumstances is thought to disincentivize emigration. Fur- tion means surrender.” (Orbán 2019). thermore, emigration, despite being depicted as a negative phenomenon in political discourse, can in reality have macro-economic and political outcomes Pronatalism is a central pillar of the government’s population politics and that probably work to the benefit of the government. Not only do remittances has received much more attention than emigration. In the past few years sent back home by emigrants increase the national income, but also some a comprehensive set of family policies was introduced, accompanied by a of the government’s challengers and critics go away too. This is particularly discourse that exalts the traditional family as the foundation of a well-or- worrying in the context of Hungary’s steady democratic backsliding since 2010. dered society.

TARGETED MEASURES TO PREVENT That being said, the Hungarian government has made some attempts to The Hungarian government’s targeted emigration policies pale in compar- DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT OR REVERSE EMIGRATION stem the tide of emigration, even though it is hard to judge whether these ison to the extensive diaspora policies that it has consistently advocated POLICIES policies have had the intended effects. One long-standing but controver- for post-2010. The political leadership has devised a wide-ranging strategy sial policy which seeks to prevent emigration is the student contract, intro- aiming to fortify the bonds between the diaspora and the homeland. Par- duced in 2012. In a nutshell, in exchange for state-funded higher education, amount among these has been the extension of political rights, including students commit to work in Hungary for at least twice their training period preferential naturalization of non-resident ethnic Hungarians. The policy within 20 years of graduation. E.g. after a three-year college degree, they tool-kit also includes a cultural revitalization program, projects aimed at the have to work in the country for a minimum of six years. If students fail to preservation of physical heritage, as well as funding Hungarian-language do so, they are obliged to pay back the full costs of their training. The policy education, offering scholarship and exchange programs, among others is problematic in several respects: Conceptually, it is difficult to define what (Herner-Kovács 2014). constitutes “state-funded” education given that, for instance, the EU also contributes to the costs of Hungarian higher education. From a practical perspective, the costs of administration and monitoring are high (Golovics INFOBOX – Migration in times of the Corona pandemic 2015). More profoundly, however, the policy clearly undermines broad access to higher education while also hindering people’s freedom to seek em- The first confirmed case of COVID-19 in Hungary was reported on March ployment in the EU (Szabó 2018). 4th, 2020. The Hungarian government introduced social distancing measures analogous to the ones taken around the world, which were A different program targeted those already abroad: Gyere haza fiatal gradually lifted or reimposed as the epidemic situation improved or de- (“Young, come home”) was introduced in 2015 with the stated aim to help teriorated. However, in a highly controversial move, the Hungarian gov- Hungarian young people working in the UK in selected sectors to return ernment also declared a national emergency which lasted from March home by providing housing and settlement support and a suitable job until June, 2020. The move was widely interpreted as an attempt to use (Hungarian Government 2015b). Given its narrow focus, the program led the pandemic as a pretext to augment the government’s authoritarian to the return of a little more than 100 people and was discontinued in 2017 tendencies. (Heti Világgazdaság 2016). Another peculiar feature of the Hungarian COVID-19 response was its IMMIGRANTS AS SUBSTITUTES Sometimes it is suggested that the effects of outgoing migration (as well explicitly anti-immigrant and especially anti-Iranian edge, which lead FOR EMIGRANTS as declining fertility and aging population) can be compensated for by in- to a minor diplomatic incident between the two countries (Radio Farda coming migration. In the Hungarian context, the transborder diaspora has 2020). As early as March 1st, 2020 the Hungarian government indefinite-

96 97 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HUNGARY

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A by Hungarian medical doctors in Germany, who argued that the rule was (retrieved: 06.11.2020). Jobbik 2018-as választási programja; available at: https:// “discriminatory and professionally unfounded” (Mérce 2020). Hungarian blob.jobbik.hu/programs/magyar_szivvel_jozan_esszel_ commuters living near the Austrian border also protested the measure Golovics, József 2015: A hallgatói szerződések tiszta_kezzel.pdf (retrieved: 06.11.2020). as unenforceable, claiming that their employers were threatening them közgazdaságtana; in: Sugo Szemle, 2 (1), p. 104-111. with dismissal for not being able to work properly (Mérce 2020). On Sep- Krastev, Ivan 2016: The Specter Haunting Europe: The tember 4th the government yielded to public pressure, announcing that Hárs, Ágnes 2009: Dimensions and Effects of Labour Unraveling of the Post-1989 Order; in: Journal of Democracy it would accept tests from the Schengen area and North America. Migration to EU Countries: The Case of Hungary; in: 27 (4), p. 88–98. Galgoczi, Béla / Leschke, Janine / Watt, Andrew (edp.): EU Labour Migration Since Enlargement: Trends, Impacts and Krastev, Ivan / Leonard, Mark / Dennison, Susi 2019: What OUTLOOK Policies, p. 229-251. Europeans Really Want: Five Myths Debunked; available at: https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/what_europeans_really_ Emigration rates from Hungary have trended upwards for the last dec- Hárs, Ágnes 2018: Növekvő elvándorlás – lehetőségek, want_five_myths_debunked (retrieved: 11.09.2020). ade. Despite some efforts to stem emigration, there is still a high num- remények, munkaerőpiaci hatások; in: Kolosi, Tamás / ber of Hungarians with the intention to emigrate, migration networks are Tóth István György (edp.): Társadalmi Riport 2018, TÁRKI, KSH 2015: A hazai nemzetiségek demográfiai jellemzői strengthening and expanding, while the political and economic conditions Budapest, p. 81- 105. (Demographic characteristics of Hungarian nationalities). in Hungary still leave much to be desired. The structural drivers of emigra- Statisztikai Tükör 2015/82; available at: https://www.ksh. tion remain, including the gaping inequality between the EU’s new and old Hárs, Ágnes / Simon, Dávid 2017: A külföldi munkavállalás és hu/docs/hun/xftp/stattukor/nemzetiseg_demografia.pdf member states. The COVID-19 pandemic is further exacerbating the vul- a munkaerőhiány; available at: http://www.mtakti.hu/wp- (retrieved: 10.11.2020). nerability of Hungary’s economy. In this context, there is little chance that content/uploads/2018/01/mt_2016_hun_23.pdf the rate of emigration from Hungary will significantly subside. (retrieved: 06.11.2020). Magyar Narancs 2016: Nem jönnek haza – Beszélgetés az elvándorlásról; available at: https://magyarnarancp. Large-scale emigration poses a particularly strong challenge to the legiti- Herner-Kovács, Eszter 2014: Nation Building Extended: hu/lelek/nem-jonnek-haza-beszelgetes-az- macy of Hungary’s national-populist government. This is duly exploited by Hungarian Diaspora Politics; in: Minority Studies 17, P. 55- elvandorlasrol-98822 (retrieved: 06.11.2020). opposition forces casting it as a glaring failure of the political leadership 67. to provide even the most basic living and working conditions for ordinary Malkki, Liisa 1992: National Geographic: The Rooting of Hungarians. The government, for its part, seeks to deemphasize Hungarian Heti Világgazdaság 2016: Vége, megbukott a Gyere Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity emigration focusing instead on the vilification of incoming migrants. haza, fiatal! Program; available at: https://hvg.hu/ Among Scholars and Refugees; in: Cultural Anthropology, gazdasag/20160613_nem_folytatjak_a_Gyere_Haza_Fiatal_ 7 (1), P. 24–44. programot_varga_mihaly (retrieved: 06.11.2020). Mérce 2020: Németországi magyar orvosok kérik, fogadja Heti Világgazdaság 2020: Magyar vendégmunkások is el a kormány a hazatérők külföldi koronavírus-tesztjeit; megfertőződtek koronavírussal egy bajorországi farmon; available at: https://merce.hu/2020/09/04/nemetorszagi- available at: https://hvg.hu/vilag/20200726_Felezer_ magyar-orvosok-kerik-fogadja-el-a-kormany-a-hazaterok- vendegmunkas_fertozodott_meg_koronavirussal_egy_ kulfoldi-koronavirus-tesztjeit/ (retrieved: 06.11.2020). nemet_farmon_koztuk_magyarok (retrieved: 06.11.2020).

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Mi Hazánk 2019: A Mi Hazánk Európája EP-választási program, 2019; available at: https://mihazank.hu/a-mihazank-europaja-ep-valasztasi-program/ (retrieved: 06.11.2020).

Mikó, Eszter 2019: Az elvándorlási szándék viszgálata a közép-és felsőoktatásban tanulók körében; in: Földrajzi Közlemények 143 (3), p. 250–262, https://doi. org/10.32643/fk.143.3.5

Minority Rights Group International 2018: Hungary Roma; available at: https://minorityrightp.org/minorities/roma-8/ (retrieved: 06.11.2020).

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Nők Lapja 2020: „Eltűnt az ölelés” – hátrahagyott anyák történetei; available at: https://www.noklapja.hu/ olvasnivalo/2020/05/03/kulfoldre-koltozott-gyerekek- szulei/ (retrieved: 06.11.2020).

Orbán, Viktor 2019: Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s “State of the Nation” address, ; February 10th, 2019; available at: http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/prime-minister-viktor- orbans-state-of-the-nation-address-3/ (retrieved: 06.11.2020).

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Radio Farda 2020: Iran and Hungary in Dispute over Coronavirus Expulsion of Students; available at: https:// en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-and-hungary-in-dispute-over- coronavirus-expulsion-of-students/30497491.html (retrieved: 06.11.2020).

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100 101 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ITALY

5 ITALY

Summary

Emigration from Italy has increased in recent years – in particular from northern Italy and the big cities. A similar development can also be observed with regard to internal migration: More and more people are migrating from southern to northern Italy. It is predominantly young and well-qualified people who are leaving the country. Over the long term the emigration of young Italians is contributing to the aging of the population.

The population is increasingly concerned about the high emigration rates: In a survey the respondents considered emigration to be an even bigger problem than immigration. In the media, however, the topic of immigration receives more coverage. The situation is similar in terms of political discourse: While emigration is mostly mentioned as an aside in party programs and parliamentary debates, immigration plays a more important role.

The topic of emigration is linked above all to socioeconomic problems in the political discourse. All parties have in common an emphasis on the positive role of the Italian communities abroad. Party political differences become visible above all with reference to the relationship between immigration and emigration: Right-wing populist parties link the problem of emigration with their criticism of immigration.

DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE OF EMIGRATION

The history of Italian emigration is closely linked with the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. In this period (in particular between 1875 and 1928) emigration was at its peak and there were approximately 17 million emigrants. Around half of them moved to a Western or Northern European country, the other half emigrated to North and South America (Del Boca/Venturini 2003). A new wave of emigration began after the end of the Second World War, whereby the main destinations were first and foremost Northern and Western European countries. In the 1970s and 1980s the number of Italian emigrants decreased sharply as a result of the positive economic development in Italy (Bonifazi et al. 2009). At the same time there was strong growth in immigration to Italy, so that it gradually went from being an emigration country to an immigration country.

This development is evident in the net migration numbers which have EMIGRATION HAS INCREASED been constantly positive since 2004 (see Figure 1). In spite of this, the IN RECENT YEARS number of registered emigrants has again risen somewhat since 2004: In 2004 that number was around 49,900, whereas ten years later already approximately 136,000 people left the country. The year 2016 marked the peak for the time being with 157,000 emigrants (Eurostat 2020a).1

1 As is the case in many other countries, in Italy the extent of emigration is calculated by means of the de-registrations of people in local registry officesanagrafi ( ). For the analysis of migration flows EMIGRATION IN these data are essential, however they also inevitably remain incomplete: They do not provide any information about non-registered emigration (Bonifazi et al. 2009). It is to be assumed that the actual EUROPEAN COUNTRIES emigration numbers are probably considerably higher. C102 103 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ITALY

Country Factsheet Fig. 2: Population development and annual migration rates for Italian citizens

Immigration Emigration Net migration GDP per capita: 26,860€ 140,000 0

EU accession year: 1957 120,000

Population in 2019: 60,360,000 100,000 Population in 1990: 56,690,000 80,000 Population projection for 2060: 55,989,561 -50,000 60,000 Share of foreign citizens: 8.7% Population born abroad: 10.4% 40,000

Young population: 15% (EU average: 15.2%) 20,000 Working age population: 64% 0 -90,000 Elderly population: 22.8% (EU average: 20.2%) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Fertility rate: 1.29 (EU average: 1.55) Source: ISTAT 2019 / own representation

The balance is negative when looking at the immigration and emigration of 2019: 3). Thus, more than half of those who emigrated from Italy either had people with Italian citizenship: According to government data, from 1999 to a migrant background or did not have Italian citizenship. 2008 around 428,000 people emigrated, while only 380,000 people newly registered their place of residence in Italy (ISTAT 2019: 2). Between 2009 Italian men are a little more likely to emigrate than women: The proportion MANY YOUNG AND and 2018 even as many as 816,000 Italians emigrated – and only 333,000 of men is 56 percent (ISTAT 2019: 4) which is roughly the same as for other WELL-EDUCATED PEOPLE moved back to Italy in that time (Figure 2). The sinking willingness to return Mediterranean countries. Young people in particular are increasingly leaving EMIGRATE can be interpreted as an indication of Italy’s persistent economic weakness. the country: As Figure 3 illustrates, in 2018 those who emigrated were above all people from the age groups 25 to 34 (just under 50,000) and 35 to EMIGRATION IS OFTEN Not all people who turn their back on Italy possess Italian citizenship. 44 (approximately 30,500) (Eurostat 2020d). In contrast to earlier phases of RETURN MIGRATION Among them are also many people who once came to Italy as immigrants emigration, today most people who leave the country are well- or very well- and who are returning to their home countries. In 2018, according to official educated. In 2018 half of them had a school-leaving qualification (33,000) statistics they accounted for a share of 26 percent (of a total 157,000). In or university degree (29,000). The proportion of qualified emigration has addition, there are Italian citizens who were born abroad. They make up risen by a further 45 percent in the last five years (ISTAT 2019: 4).2 For Italy approximately 30 percent of the total emigration flow. A third of them were the consequence of this development is that investments in education are born in Brazil, 10 percent in Morocco and 6 percent in Germany (ISTAT increasingly being lost to countries abroad.

Fig. 1: Population development and annual migration rates Fig. 3: Emigration from Italy according to age (2018) Immigration Emigration Net migration Total Population 600 62 60,000

50,000 61 500 40,000 60 400 30,000 59 300 20,000 58 10,000 200 57 0 Migration (in thousand) Total Population (in million) 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 100 56 Source: Eurostat 2020d / own representation 0 55

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Source: Eurostat 2020a, 2020b, 2020c / Own representation

2 There is no precise definition of ‘qualified emigration’ in Italy. In general it is used to mean both those persons who have a university degree and also other workers with professional expertise.

104 105 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ITALY

Fig. 4: The most important European destination countries (2018) Fig. 5: Number of changes of place of residence within Italy (2017)

25,000 120,000

100,000 20,000 80,000 15,000 60,000 10,000 40,000

5,000 20,000

0 0 Changes of residence from Changes of residence from Great Britain Germany France Switzerland Spain southern to northern Italy northern to southern Italy

Source: ISTAT 2019: 3 / own representation Source: ISTAT 2018b / own representation

In 2018 Great Britain was the most important destination country (Figure 4). will be offset by the positive net migration rate. In concrete terms, this From 2009 to 2018 the Italian emigration to the United Kingdom quadrupled means that immigration will compensate for the population decline.4 (from 5,000 to 21,000 per year). The peak was reached in 2016, when 25,000 Italian citizens living in Great Britain registered their place of residence Until the 1990s the domestic migration flow from southern Italy to the INTERNAL MIGRATION FROM there as a result of Brexit. The country ranked second is Germany (18,000) industrial regions in the North of the country was the dominant topic in THE SOUTH ahead of France (14,000), Switzerland (10,000) and Spain (7,000). These five Italian migration discourse. The topic never completely disappeared from countries account for around 60 percent of all emigrants. Among the non- from public consciousness however it was overshadowed by the topics European countries, the most frequent destinations are Brazil, the USA, of emigration and, above all, immigration. Now there are again signs of a Australia and Canada (ISTAT 2019: 3). trend reversal. Recent confirmation of this is the once again high number of changes of place of residence from southern to northern Italy (Figure 5): EMIGRATION MAINLY Unlike in earlier emigration waves, the majority of Italian emigration no In 2017, for example, almost 110,000 people migrated to northern and FROM NORTHERN ITALY longer comes from the Mezzogiorno (southern Italy), but from the north. central Italy, yet only 60,000 to southern Italy (ISTAT 2018b). AND THE BIG CITIES A look at the official statistics from 2018 shows Lombardy (22,000) and Veneto (11,000) at the top of the list3. The most striking geographical Based on current projections the population in southern Italy will shrink features below the level of regions are related to the difference between by about 5 million people in the next fifty years (whereas for the rest of areas with urban or rural character: Especially the large cities exhibit a high the country an absolute decline in the population of only 1.5 million is volume of out-migration. Besides Rome (8,000) and Milan (6,500) these expected; Svimez 2019). A consequence of this is the aging of the southern include in particular also Turin (4,000) and Naples (3,500) (ISTAT 2019). regions, whose populations will be one of the oldest in Europe in the coming decades.5 A central reason for the emigration is the poor employment and career prospects in Italy. This is also confirmed by surveys. In 2018 44 percent of respondents explained that they had left Italy in order to “find better INFOBOX – The ‘Italian diaspora‘ employment opportunities“, while 38 percent justified their emigration ‘Italian diaspora‘ is a term mostly used in reference to two large by declaring that they saw “no future“ in Italy. A central role, however, is waves of emigration in the last two centuries.6 The first diaspora also played by educational opportunities: In the same year 44 percent began after the unification of Italy in 1861 and continued until the of respondents explained that they had left Italy “in order to get a better rise of fascism in the 1920s. Particularly relevant was the period from education” (Enriquez/Romera 2019). 1861 until the First World War (also called the ‘Great Emigration‘), when approximately 14 million people left the country. However, EMIGRATION EXACERBATES The emigration of young people contributes to the aging of the population: only 5 million remained abroad long term. A look at the regional THE AGING OF THE POPULATION According to a forecast the average age in Italy will climb from 44.9 to over distribution of the regions of origin reveals a clearly discernable 50 by 2065 (ISTAT 2018a). Emigration also causes negative impacts due to pattern: Emigrants from northern Italy primarily headed to Central the significant loss of highly qualified personnel to foreign countries (‘brain drain‘). In the last ten years almost 182 000 people with university degrees have left Italy (ISTAT 2019). In terms of demographics there is however a 4 The Italians living abroad transfer comparatively little money to Italy. In 2019 they transferred positive side to the migration situation: According to a projection, in the considerably less (0.5 billion euro) than the foreigners living in Italy (6.1 billion) (Croce/Oddo 2020).

coming years the anticipated negative birth rate in the country (-200 000) 5 The migration from southern Italy to northern Italy is mainly linked to socioeconomic issues. The most industrialized and richest parts of the country are still to be found in northern Italy to this day, whereas the most underdeveloped areas are to be found in the south. This also results in the high youth unemployment rate in the southern regions: in 2019 it reached 22 percent (ISTAT 2020). 6 Although the term ‘Italian diaspora‘ was coined in reference to this time period, today it is colloquially 3 With regard to relative numbers, however, Friuli-Venezia Giulia is the region with the highest rate of used in a more general way to denote the large share of (groups of) people with Italian migrant emigration (on average 4 inhabitants per 1 000 left the country in 2018) (ISTAT 2019). background abroad.

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European countries. 90 percent of the emigrants from southern Italy, on the other hand, emigrated to the USA, Argentina or Brazil (Nobile Fig. 6: Are you more worried about people who are immigrating to your coun- 2005). try or about your fellow citizens who are leaving the country? (2019)

The second diaspora took place between 1945 and the 1970s. In the Neither I don't know Both equally Citizens leaving the country 1950s in particular the net migration was clearly negative -163,000. People immigrating to Italy Many Italians moved to Germany as ‘guest workers‘ after the 2% conclusion of a labor recruitment agreement. However many Italians also settled in other European countries (like Belgium, Switzerland and France). At the same time the emigration overseas also rose. Particularly South American countries like Argentina and Venezuela were the main destinations. 7% Today the highest numbers of emigrants registered in the A.I.R.E.7 are to be found in Argentina (842,000), Germany (764,000) and Switzerland (623,000) (Fondazione Migrantes 2019). However, the USA remains highly significant: In 2019 there were approximately 35% 272,000 people officially registered there as Italian citizens; however, 32% in addition, approximately 17 million people who have Italian roots or ancestry live in the country.

EMIGRATION IN THE POLITICAL DISCOURSE

In the Italian population emigration is largely perceived as a problem: 24% According to a survey, in 2019, 50 percent of the respondents were in favor of introducing measures which reduce emigration. It is only in Spain (63 percent) and Greece (60 percent) that an even larger segment of the population shares this view. In addition, the respondents considered emigration to be an even bigger problem than immigration (Figure 6). In response to Source: Krastev et al. 2019; cf. also Fubini 2019 / own representation the question “Are you more worried about people who are immigrating to your country, or about your fellow citizens who are leaving the country?“ 32 percent of the respondents answered with the latter option. In contrast, A similar pattern is also recognizable in the Italian party programs. only 24 percent were more concerned about immigration. However, nearly Sentences related to emigration were, for example, rare in the election every third respondent considered emigration and immigration to be program of the right-wing populist Lega in the year 2018 (0.8 percent). equally concerning (Krastev et al. 2019; cf. also Fubini 2019). The topic of immigration, on the other hand, appeared much more often (Figure 9). In the other party programs, too, emigration is virtually absent. EMIGRATION IS The topic of emigration is present in the media, yet, in comparison to Solely the right-wing populist Fratelli d’Italia (1.9 percent of the words) paid UNDERREPRESENTED IN the topic of immigration (Figure 7) it is of much less relevance. Between somewhat more attention to emigration. Only the Partito Democratico paid MEDIA COVERAGE 2010 and 2019 there were approximately 2,500 news articles related to a similar amount of attention to both topics (0.9 percent and 1.3 percent).9 emigration in the daily newspaper ‘La Repubblica‘, whereas the number related to the topic of immigration was about 17,300 (Factiva 2020). This discrepancy is also apparent in the evening television news broadcasts in Fig. 7: Number of news items related to emigration and immigration in the newspaper La Repubblica Italy: Between January and December 2019 emigration was the focus in News items about emigration News items about immigration only 0.02 percent of the contributions (Osservatorio di Pavia i.e.)8 4,500 4,000 In parliamentary debates the topic of emigration ranks far behind the topic of immigration. A frequency analysis of the stenographic protocols 3,500 of the Italian Chamber of Deputies shows that the relevance of the topic of 3,000 emigration has remained at a stable low level over time. This is in contrast 2,500 to the topic of immigration, which was frequently the focus of parliamentary 2,000 debates particularly in the course of the ‘refugee crisis‘. In 2018 and 2019 there were only just under 160 stenographic protocols related to the topic 1,500 of emigration. Immigration, on the other hand, was referred to much more 1,000 frequently (Figure 8). 500 0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Source: Factiva 2020 / own representation

7 The A.I.R.E. (Anagrafe Italiani residenti all’estero) is the residential register for Italian citizens who have 9 Even in past Italian elections emigration barely played any role in the election programs of the their place of residence abroad. different parties. Only the Partito Democratico devoted some space to the topic of ‘Italians abroad’ in 8 Many thanks go to Stelle Paola Barretta, Associazione Carta di Roma and Osservatorio di Pavia. its election programs in 2006 and 2008.

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Fig. 8: Salience of emigration and immigration in the parliamentary debate The Five Star Movement expressed itself similarly in a flyer for the 2019 European elections: “Stop brain drain. Let us keep our youth in Italy and Immigration Emigration let those who have left return“ (Five Star Movement 2019a): Similarly to 700 the Lega, the Five Star Movement sees emigration as „bleeding dry of 600 resources” and as a loss of “social capital“.

500 However, a close look reveals some important differences between the parties: Whereas the Lega rather emphasizes the emigration of highly 400 qualified people, the Five Star Movement focuses very strongly on the low- 300 wage sector and acts primarily as a defender of the weaker sections of society: 200 Two of three young people decide to go abroad because they can even find 100 low-skilled employment there more easily than in Italy. What’s more, this 0 employment is also better paid. It applies to a large number of waiters, cooks, employees […], who in their home country neither receive minimal welfare 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 benefits nor an opportunity to pursue a career (Five Star Movement 2019b). Manual coding based on the key words “emigrants”, “emigration”, “Italians abroad”, “brain drain”, “immigrants”, “immigration”, “refugees” Source: Italian Chamber of Deputies / own representation In addition, in the case of the Five Star Movement there is a clear link made between the topic of emigration and the populist narrative of the battle against corruption or the demand for ‘meritocrazia‘ (meritocracy). For Fig. 9: Salience of emigration and immigration in the 2018 election pro- example, Marco Fumagalli, a prominent representative of the movement grams (in percent) in Lombardy, claimed that “people leave our country because a principle of Immigration Emigration merit does not exist […and] you can only find a job by having some kind of 7 connections“ (Fumagalli 2019). 6 The biggest difference between the Italian parties becomes apparent in RIGHT-WING POPULISTS 5 particular with respect to the connection made between emigration and LINK EMIGRATION AND immigration. The center-left parties and the Five Star Movement generally IMMIGRATION 4 handle the topics of emigration and immigration separately, whereas a 3 connection between the two is frequently made the by right-wing populist parties: In 2017, for example, the head of Lega, Matteo Salvini, declared that 2 “the only immigration“ that the Lega wants to promote is that of the “Italians, who were forced to flee abroad to secure their future“ (Salvini 2017). 1

0 The history of Italian emigration after the Second World War is also used Lega Fratelli Movimento Partito by right-wing parties in order to mark the difference between emigration d‘Italia 5 Stelle Democratico and immigration: Since the Italian emigrants in the past had adapted to Number of terms that contain the keywords “emigrants”, “emigration”, “Italians abroad”, “brain the rules of their host countries, today a stricter policy should be called drain”, “immigrants”, “immigration”, “refugees” in the election programs of Lega, Fratelli d’Italia, for towards new arrivals in Italy, who have supposedly been treated too Movimento 5 Stelle and the Partito Democratico leniently in the past. The demand is connected with the typically right- Source: election programs of Italian parties / own representation wing populist attack on the ‘center-left elites’, with links made to the social democratic Partito Democratico in particular. For instance, in 2019, a Lega representative declared: PARTIES SHARE The reason for the discrepancy between immigration and emigration is A NEGATIVE PERCEPTION probably the differing degrees of politicization. When it comes to the topic Our emigrants had to adapt to their host countries in the post-war period. OF EMIGRATION of immigration the positions of the parties differ greatly in some cases, They had no demands, they were obedient and kept their heads down. whereas with regard to the topic of emigration the ‘hegemonic narrative In contrast, the immigrants were allowed everything when the Partito of brain drain’ prevails (Tintori/Romei 2017: 50). Emigration is described Democratico governed this country. (Bisa 2019) across party boundaries as a primarily socioeconomic problem and it is linked in particular to the loss of highly qualified labor. An example of this Cultural frames – and in particular the portrayal of emigration as a cultural CULTURAL FRAMES critical view of emigration is the right-wing populist Lega, which, in its 2018 loss or as a crisis of the nation-state – play a lesser role in comparison to NOT DOMINANT election program gave a chapter the title “Stop migrazione cervelli“ (‘Stop (socio-)economic aspects, yet not an insignificant one. All parties have in brain drain‘). In it understanding for the situation of many highly qualified common that they emphasize the positive role of emigrants as ambassadors people in Italy is expressed: of Italian culture and traditions. An example of this is provided by the Partito Democratico, which described the Italian communities abroad as a The goal is to retain our best researchers, scientists and in general our highly “resource“ in its 2008 election program and called for greater promotion qualified academic personnel in Italy. They, however, find no room for their of the Italian language and culture (Partito Democratico 2008). In 2013 it professional development in our country […] and are thereby forced to take went further, describing the Italian communities as a “fundamental and their great individual skills abroad (Lega 2018: 50). essential part of the Partito Democratico“, that has contributed to the

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“economic and productive revival of Italy“ (Partito Democratico 2018). A There were also attempts made at the regional level to ‘lure’ highly qualified further example can be found in the election program of the Fratelli d’Italia, emigrants to Italy. A prime example is the region of Umbria, which pursued which emphasizes the important role of the Italian communities: the project ‘Brain Back Umbria’ in 2017 and 2018: This project, too, used tax relief as an incentive. In addition, returning researchers were promised a We demand] more regard for the Italian communities abroad, the protection one-off financial support payment of 5,000 euro. Local governments also of Italianness in the world, which is also a valuable instrument that simplifies invested in order to get people to return: Milan, for example, made 510,000 the diplomatic, economic and commercial relationships with other states euro available for the program “Welcome Talent”, the goal of which was to (Fratelli d’Italia 2018). promote economic projects.

The right-wing populist party Fratelli d’Italia also uses arguments which INFOBOX – Migration in times of the Corona pandemic are recognizably ethno-nationalistic: In 2016, for example, the chairperson Giorgia Meloni linked emigration and immigration with reference to the Like in many other countries the Covid-19 crisis also temporarily led to a conspiracist narrative of ‘replacement‘: significant restriction of mobility in Italy. On January 31st, 2020 the Italian government declared a state of emergency. However, the most severe restrictions were not introduced until the beginning of March, when some The Italian governments have clearly shown that they do not care that northern Italian provinces – and above all Lombardy –, which had the Italians are leaving their country. They can replace Italians with immigrants highest registered number of infections, were isolated. Later a ban on anyway (Meloni 2016). leaving one’s home was put in place for the whole of Italy, which forbade unnecessary travel in the entire territory, as well as public gatherings.

The possibility to travel abroad was also restricted. The first restrictive INFOBOX – The political rights of Italians living abroad measure came at the end of January, when the government introduced The right to vote for Italians living abroad is guaranteed in the Italian a ban on flights to and from China. Shortly thereafter all air traffic nearly constitution. However, for a long time severe restrictions existed for Italian came to a standstill: Only a few airports remained open during the citizens abroad. Particularly problematic, for example, was that they had lockdown, in particular in order to enable the transport of medical goods. to return to their Italian municipalities of origin for the election. Electoral Checks were conducted at the borders to the neighboring countries. districts abroad were not introduced until the year 2000. From March until May 2020 the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs carried Shortly thereafter the neo-fascist member of parliament Mirko Tremaglia out a large number of ‘return operations’: Around 78,000 Italians were pushed for a new law (Legge Tremaglia), which provided for postal voting. brought back to Italy from 117 countries in this period. The majority In 2001 this law was passed. It also stipulates the amount of seats in of them were in Great Britain (33,000) and Spain (14,000). However, a parliament that are to be elected abroad: 12 out of 630 for the Chamber significant number of people were also brought back from Australia of Deputies and 6 of 315 for the senate. The new electoral law was first (2,000), Albania (1,700), Romania (1,500) or Malta (1,200) (Pelosi 2020). applied in the 2006 parliamentary elections. The votes from abroad provided the center-right alliance with a slim majority in the senate. Aside from the points mentioned above, there was hardly any connection made between Covid-19 and the topic of emigration in the public debate.13 At the center of public attention in the Covid-19 crisis was immigration once again and in particular the irregular migration via the Mediterranean The emigration policy of Italian governments has for a long time had two SUPPORT FOR route. The topic was instrumentalized primarily by the right-wing different, at times contradictory, dimensions. On the one hand, emigration THE DIASPORA populists: In August 2020 Salvini criticized the arrival of approximately 250 is associated with an increase of the economic and cultural influence of people, who tested positive for Covid-19, and accused the government of Italy abroad. Against this background, Italians abroad are supported by endangering Italy with its migration policy. the promotion of transnational networking structures as well as language schools and educational programs.10 On the other hand, Italian governments make constant efforts to recruit academics who have emigrated by means OUTLOOK of incentives for return migration. For example, as early as 2001 a project to promote the return of young scientists was launched (‘Rientro dei Cervelli‘), Despite the predominantly negative consequences of emigration for the which was mainly based on financial incentives: A sum equivalent to almost demographic development in the country the topic does not currently play 20.6 million euro was invested to this end at the time.11 In 2010 the so- a central role in the political discourse. This is certainly surprising, however called Legge controesodo (‘counter-exodus law‘) was passed, with which the it reflects the fact that the parties are largely in agreement in terms of their government introduced tax relief for all EU citizens born after 1969 (and interpretation of the causes and consequences of emigration. Thus there can especially for persons with Italian citizenship) who enter Italy and have be no talk of polarization. There is also consensus about the positive role employment there.12 played by the Italian communities abroad. Hardly any party disputes that the diaspora performs the important function of imparting Italian culture.

However, the topic also contains potential for future conflict. It can be 10 For example, in 2012, the Monti government founded the online platform ‘Innovitalia‘: The goal was assumed, for instance, that in the future emigration will increasingly to “optimize the effects of the Italian ‘human capital‘ abroad“ and to strengthen the ‘partnership‘ of the Italians with their homeland. In addition, with the so-called ‘Decreto Brexit‘ in 2019 the Italian government made 3.5 million euro available for the strengthening of diplomatic structures in Great Britain and for the support of the Italians living there. 13 Like in many other countries the movement restrictions also had negative effects on seasonal work 11 However, the project had little success: Of 50 000 researchers who were abroad only 466 returned. in Italy. Comprehensive measures were lacking, however, in August 2020 some regulations were 12 A similar attempt was made in 2017: At that time a tax break was established for all persons with a introduced to protect seasonal workers (key elements were, for example, a one-off financial ‘bonus’ university qualification who had worked or studied abroad for at least two years. of approximately 1 500 euro as well as tax relief for those employed in the tourism sector).

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LITERATUR be exploited by the Italian parties for the purpose of criticizing political opponents. In this context, for example, one can expect populist narratives Bisa, Ingrid 2019: Speech in the Camera dei Deputati; in: Fratelli d’Italia 2018: Il voto che unisce l’Italia. Il to be spread, according to which emigration is interpreted as a consequence Resoconto stenografico dell’Assemblea Seduta n. 214 programma. Le priorità in 15 punti; available at: https:// of ‘corrupt politics’ or a supposed lack of a principle of merit. The talk of di mercoledì 24 luglio 2019; available at: https://www. www.fratelli-italia.it/programma.pdf ‘brain drain‘ also provides opportunities to make a connection to criticism camera.it/leg18/1008?idLegislatura=18&sezione=docu (retrieved: 15.10.2020). of the EU. Particularly right-wing populist parties could accuse the EU menti&tipoDoc=assemblea_file&idSeduta=0214&nomef and individual EU member states like Germany of engaging in a form of ile=stenografico&back_to=0 (retrieved: 15.10.2020). Fubini, Federico 2019: La fuga dei giovani è la nuova plundering of human resources from the Italian labor market. In addition, paura; available at: https://www.corriere.it/economia/ emigration is likely to have a greater demographic impact in the coming Bonifazi, Corrado / Heins, Frank / Strozza, Salvatore / Vitiello, lavoro/19_aprile_25/fuga-giovani-nuova-paura- years with a decrease in immigration from third countries. This could Mattia 2009: The Italian Transition from Emigration to 469fe1a6-6799-11e9-8fa9-3e1bbc7d4c0f.shtml cause the salience and significance of the topic to increase once again – as Immigration Country. IRPPS WPs (24). (retrieved: 15.10.2020). recently in many Eastern European countries. Croce, Alessandro / Oddio, Giacomo 2020: Il saldo delle Fumagalli, Marco 2019: Contro la fuga dei cervelli occorre rimesse dell’Italia: alcuni appunti per una corretta lettura puntare sulla democrazia; available at: http://www. delle statistiche; available at: https://www.bancaditalia. fumagallimarco.it/wp/2019/03/22/contro-la-fuga-dei- it/pubblicazioni/metodi-e-fonti-approfondimenti/ cervelli-occorre-puntare-sulla-meritocrazia/ metodi-fonti-2020/approfondimenti_STATEST_ (retrieved: 15.10.2020). rimesse_20200402.pdf (retrieved: 15.10.2020). Five Star Movement 2019a: I 10 punti del MoVimento Del Boca, Daniela / Venturini, Alessandra 2003; Italian 5 Stelle per le elezioni europee del 26 maggio Migration; available at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp938.pdf #ContinuareXCambiare; available at: https://www. (retrieved: 15.10.2020). ilblogdellestelle.it/2019/05/i-10-punti-del-movimento- 5-stelle-per-le-elezioni-europee-del-26-maggio- Enríquez, Carmen González / Romera, José Pablo Martínez continuarexcambiare.html (retrieved: 15.10.2020). 2018: Debilidades de la emigración española; available at: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/ Five Star Movement 2019b: La “lost generation” dei giovani rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/ emigrati italiani: perché serve una legge sul salario elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/demografia+y+poblacion/ minimo; available at: https://www.ilblogdellestelle. ari6-2018-gonzalezenriquez-martinezromera- it/2019/04/la-lost-generation-dei-giovani-emigrati- debilidades-emigracion-espana italiani-perche-serve-una-legge-sul-salario-minimo.html (retrieved: 15.10.2020). (retrieved: 15.10.2020).

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Osservatorio di Pavia I.e.: Dati per il VII Rapporto Carta di Roma “Notizie senza approdo”.

Partito Democratico 2008: Il programma di governo del PD; available at: https://www.partitodemocratico.it/ archivio/programma-governo-del-pd/?__cf_chl_jschl_tk __=f877fceb9f668a9bba7d7b893ad76ba0ab68ca6f- 1603182046-0-ARzCINuFt8loW6H_pWcnRQVgBqZl_ RwGeFoUuqnaEEz-6nfp_kLOfGSLC-a99BLsXFADBYYfAJ9xR SohX5KiXLIT0NlVnzIgz_Z93iKhY9L6itWkP3dWT65tPi52rr6A xvXnAOSSn7UhGZ6etqIL4nWvI2_GkoL21DRaXTZQa5O8_ dq6yohlGEIjJo6i8DxrEYQoKazn_FrQgxy3MZ_ NYtLYDNzWQH-CXpu0VOYqd1U8XSgEbzUjgjB22E- Ti2_2_h-dIC8xwJbwbUAuMGzZ1IzUFWyHLJA- WWua1r8dpbh0MO8W-0y72gX8_brYxQHMjA (retrieved: 15.10.2020).

Partito Democratico 2018: Il Programma del PD per gli italiani nel mondo; available at: https://www. partitodemocratico.it/archivio/il-programma-del-pd- per-gli-italiani-nel-mondo/?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=653365a 4fdeeafae9174843d014b1d2202adc135-1603709870-0- AVjD-z7s88ZCsLjXy5dZiqnuZCxzPUMvBecxqy3ZczsbMK k5adYKnw20FnKBQNNGHUsaR7an-OQwQj5-m1DKn8- 02DXcz9u8dUk95mc7BV114zSlbUBMPsQQOQQZM5 oM_TtKuG-htNM-YETFB_9mZ00mEII8F-W3QPB2Xh-upk kpUnFmfYbf6d9S9KTaPGCOm2EUFSXf1JiZL62N1AnAQ1 JX_TRrZ4hrpaGUEb5ftM6yeD6w_Ue5esWfhp1qvNPUNRsv ut4BMR0kGbim9rEspmetAjtZNmfr_DO6cok2sQ3I7TfFVd_ VZzXUvQQZXP9CGHhHUR0ohZWNfRx9qEAo- VOcC1yS1b3Iivfrw5FuSfOBw (retrieved: 15.10.2020).

Pelosi, Gerardo 2020: Quasi 80mila gli italiani rentrati in Patria 4mila ancora all’estero; available at: https://www. ilsole24ore.com/art/quasi-80mila-italiani-rentrati-patria- 4mila-ancora-all-estero-ADCTrXP?refresh_ce=1 (retrieved: 15.10.2020).

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6 POLAND

Summary

Over the last two centuries the history of Poland has been intertwined with the topic of emigration. Particularly the accession to the EU led to a considerable acceleration of emigration, although this trend did slow down in recent years. Nevertheless, the number of people leaving the country remains high up to this day.

Polish emigrants are typically young but otherwise represent a cross-section of society. The main reason for emigration is their search for work, particularly amongst those whose destination is Western Eu- rope.

To this day the topic of emigration has retained higher salience than immigration. Despite this the stances of the political parties only differ in nuances. Center and far-left primarily stress the importance of the individual right to free movement. On the other hand, right-wing parties frame emigration mostly in a negative way: To them, especially economic emigration is at odds with the citizens’ right to live and work in their own country.

Both maintaining good relations to the diaspora as well as improving the domestic living conditions in order to motivate return immigration are seen as the most important tasks of the state.

DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE OF EMIGRATION

Of the countries that joined the EU as part of the eastern expansion in 2004, Poland is the largest, with a population of 38 million. Over the last decade between 190,000 and 275,000 people left the country each year (Figure 1), which corresponds to an annual emigration of between 0.5 percent and 0.72 percent of the total population. However, it can be assumed that the actual numbers are even higher, as the Eurostat data only refer to permanent migration (i.e. for 12 months or longer) and thus do not take into account other, more short-term, forms of emigration.

Similar problems occur when estimating the number of immigrants. According to the data from Eurostat the figure for annual migration to Poland ranges between 155,000 and 222,000 (Figure 1). After adjusting for short-term and circular migration – the majority of the immigration to Poland – and making use of the data on registered employment of foreigners (Figure 2) the number of immigrants is probably around 4 percent of the current Polish population (and thus considerably higher than the figure of 0.76 percent determined by Eurostat). These numbers paint a peculiar image: On the one hand, the country has one of the largest emigrant populations in Europe and, at least from 1945 to 2000, one of the lowest shares of foreigners in the country (under 1 percent) – yet on the other hand, in recent years Poland has had one of the highest immigration rates among EU member states.

In the public discourse emigration is a topic of great importance to this day. THE POLISH DIASPORA EMIGRATION IN The sheer number of emigrants alone makes this topic so explosive: it is IS ONE OF THE LARGEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES estimated that today about 18 to 20 million people with Polish roots live C118 119 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES POLAND

Country Factsheet Fig. 2: Official declarations of the employment of foreigners (2009-2019) 2,000,000 GDP per capita: 28,516€

EU accession year: 2004 1,500,000

Population in 2019: 37,972,812 Population in 1990: 38,038,403 1,000,000 Population projection for 2060: 32,519,968

500,000 Share of foreign citizens: 0.76%

Young population: 15.2% (EU average: 15.2%) 0 Working age population: 67.6% 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 65 and older: 17.22% (EU average: 20.2%) Source: Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy / own representation Fertility rate: 1.4 (EU average: 1.55)

a large number of political and cultural elites left the country.1 Even today the schools teach about the longing of the national poets for their lost abroad (MSZ 2015). The Polish diaspora, called ‘Polonia’, is one of the largest homeland. The government in exile, which formed in 1939 and only came in the world and its composition is rather diverse. It includes, inter alia, to an end in 1990, is also part of the curriculum. Due to the communist economic migrants and political refugees from the time of communism and censorship a significant part of Polish cultural life took place in exile. Above their descendants. The ‘Polonia’ also includes those people who decided to all in France, literary works were first published and subsequently smuggled stay in the former Eastern territories after the borders were adjusted in back to Poland.2 1945 (i.e. in present-day Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine). Maintaining the relationships to the diaspora is one of the statutory tasks of the Senat (Dz. Since 1800 emigration has shaped Polish history and culture. The time of SEVERAL WAVES OF EMIGRATION U. 2016 poz. 395). the communist regime from 1946 to 1989 produced several larger waves of emigration, which totaled 1.5 million people. After the fall of the Iron Curtain A KEY TOPIC IN POLISH A further reason for the great importance of the topic to this day is the the migration only slowed down slightly, however it was mostly more short- LITERATURE AND HISTORY lasting cultural and political impact of emigration. In particular, the so-called term and predominantly seasonal work (cf. Stachowiak 2004: 216; all data “Great Emigration” (wielka emigracja) from 1831 until the 1870s should be from the statistical yearbooks). With Poland’s accession to the European mentioned here. After the suppression of the November Uprising in 1831 Union in 2004 a veritable ‘migration fever’ broke out: approximately 1.5 to 2 million people left Poland within a year, most of them to Great Britain.3 Today the vast majority of Polish migrants live in the European Union (about 2 million) whereby the largest populations are to be found in Germany, Fig. 1: Yearly net migration rate and total population (2009-2018)

immigration emigration net migration total population Fig. 3: Largest populations of Polish citizens aboard 30 38.5 No. Country Size 25 1 Germany 706,000 20 2 The UK 695,000 15 3 The Netherlands 123,000 10 4 Ireland 113,000 38.0 5 Source: GUS (2019: 4) / own representation 0 -5 1 This exodus included among others the composer Frederic Chopin and the national poets of Poland, migration (in thousand)

-10 total population (in million) Adam Mickiewicz and Juliusz Słowacki. It also heavily influenced the Polish era of Romanticism, considered to be the most important period for Polish literature and a significant part of the school -15 37.5 curriculum to this day. 2 As a result, a large share of Poland’s most important cultural artefacts were created outside of the 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 country’s borders. Even the national anthem of Poland was written in Italy, originally as a song of the Napoleonic Polish legions, and includes a passage about hopes of returning to Poland to re-join the Source: Eurostat / own calculation nation. 3 Most EU countries decided to have a transition period and did not immediately open up their labor markets – with the exception of three countries: Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Although there was no significant increase in immigration from Poland in the countries that brought ina transition period, many of the Polish migrants already living in these countries took the opportunity to change their legal status to that of an EU citizen, thereby securing a more stable residence permit.

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the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Ireland (Figure 3). The Poles top of the list of basic rights, which can probably also be attributed to the constitute the largest foreign population groups in Iceland, Ireland and trauma of the restrictive travel policy of the communist regime.5 Norway, and the second largest in Germany and the United Kingdom (Statistics Iceland 2020; Central Statistical Office of Ireland 2020: 50; It is therefore not surprising that open borders within the Schengen area Statistics Norway 2020; United Nations 2015; Statistisches Bundesamt are viewed by the Poles as one of most important advantages of accession 2017; Skandynawia Info 2016). to the EU (CBOS 2019: 7) and it would be considered the most painful loss if the EU were to fall apart (Krastev/Leonard/Dennison 2019). Many YOUNG PEOPLE TEND TO At present the typical Polish emigrant is rather young, is emigrating actively use this freedom, among other things because it greatly simplifies EMIGRATE MORE for economic reasons and is doing so for a relatively short period (i.e. settling abroad and reduces the legal and bureaucratic hurdles. This is for a couple of months or years). The young age of the emigrants is also reflected in the preferred destinations of Polish migrants: 80 percent characteristic for the emigration wave after 2004. According to a survey, choose destinations in the EU and EEA (i.e. Norway, Iceland or Switzerland) 74 percent of respondents answered in the negative when asked about an over other countries. intention to emigrate – among the 18-24-year-old, in contrast, that figure was only 36 percent (CBOS 2018: 3). There are no significant differences Last but not least, both the population and the government seem to regard with regard to occupation and gender, however it is noteworthy that emigration as a kind of “safety valve“ (wentyl bezpieczeństwa), helping to most are childless at the time of emigrating (Bobrowska 2013: 55) – a reduce social tensions. In simply allowing the dissatisfied to leave, the pattern which can also be found among those who are at the very least government has found an easy way to avoid conflict. This effect became considering emigration (Randstad 2019: 45). Furthermore, emigrants tend clearly visible in the context of the recent anti-LGBT rhetoric of the to be relatively well educated (according to Eurostat 49.8 percent of them governing party: Many people belonging to sexual minorities decided to possess a secondary school qualification and 29.1 percent have higher leave the country, attracting the attention of domestic and foreign media education). Not least there also seems to be a geographical component: (z.B. Karpieszuk 2020; NBC News 2020). Those most likely to emigrate are people from the structurally weak regions in the East of Poland, followed by the south- and northwest of EMIGRATION IN THE POLITICAL DEBATE the country. The prosperous central regions, in contrast, are the least impacted by emigration (CBOS 2013: 12). Emigration is not a polarizing topic in the public discourse in Poland. Most ALMOST NO POLITICIZATION social and political actors share a negative perception of the consequences ECONOMIC REASONS FOR In 2013 14 percent of Polish citizens worked abroad (CBOS 2013: 7). of emigration. Moreover, they are in agreement that the economic causes EMIGRATION This figure rose to 20 percent by 2018 (CBOS 2018: 3). The Polish labor need to be addressed. The need to slow emigration and promote return market seems to be one of the main reasons for emigration (GUS migration belong to the so-called ‘valence issues’ (Stokes 1963) in Poland, 2019: 1). According to a study by the Polish National Bank in 2018 (NBP i.e. issues that all political parties largely agree on without differing in 2019), although only 19 percent of the emigrants surveyed named their general assessment of the problem. As a rule, emigration is a cross- unemployment as the reason for their departure, 46 percent said the cutting issue because it worsens the social problems in other areas, e.g. the salary was too low and 9 percent mentioned other kinds of work-related emigration of medical staff intensifies the crisis in the health system, and the dissatisfaction. emigration of people of reproductive age deepens Poland’s demographic crisis. The last time emigration was at the center of political debate was In the year 2009 Poland had a positive net migration rate for the first during the parliamentary elections in 2007, when as many as two million time (taking into account short-term migration, which is not considered people emigrated after Poland joined the EU (Lesińska 2015: 19). After in Figure 1; GUS 2019) – which can be seen as the result of the combined this tendency later slowed down, the issue lost its perceived urgency and effect of an overall slowdown in Polish emigration and an increase in instead once again became more of a latent problem. Nonetheless it has immigration from Ukraine. However, the economic crisis and the euro remained present in the media to a certain extent – in recent years it even crisis of the following years caused that number to slip back into negative seems to be more salient than in 2007 (Figure 4). territory; it was not until 2018 that it again became positive, once again due to the influx of Ukrainian workers. In 2018, in addition, the total Although there is broad consensus regarding the nature of the problem EMIGRATION NUMBERS USED number of Polish citizens living abroad fell for the first time – by 85,000, as well its causes and consequences, the question as to what should be AS A MEANS TO CRITICIZE THE i.e. by 3 percent compared to 2017 (GUS 2019: 1).4 This could indicate a the political response, however, causes considerable conflict at times: GOVERNMENT trend reversal with regard to return migration. The opposition often instrumentalizes emigration in order to criticize the government and its – actual or alleged – inability to eliminate the causes. EMIGRATION: The society is divided with regard to the persistent emigration. On the one In the meantime, the governing parties portray themselves as dealing with BOTH PROBLEM AND hand emigration is perceived as one of the country’s biggest problems: the problem with due care and attention. For example, when the party “Law FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT According to a survey 30 percent of the Polish respondents are more and Justice” (PiS) was in the opposition, it questioned the effectiveness of concerned about emigration than immigration, 27 percent are however the political suggestions made by the Civic Platform-led government: more concerned about immigration and 30 percent considered both to be equally bad (Krastev et al. 2019). On the other hand, emigration is seen as an expression of personal freedom and as a legitimate means to improve one’s own standard of living (Work Service 2018: 16). The Poles 5 Back then, Polish citizens were not allowed to emigrate or to travel freely. Nor were they allowed to value this freedom highly: The possibility to leave the country is at the even just keep their passports at home; passports had to be applied for before every journey and it was at the state’s discretion as to whether travelling documents would be granted to the citizen in question, which, unsurprisingly, was used to harass dissidents. For this reason, any policy proposals curbing the ease of emigration today would be condemned as a brutal attack on personal freedoms. Polish citizens expect to be allowed to move across borders freely. Thus, the closing of borders due 4 This statistic is related to migration lasting 3 months or longer. Therefore it does not match with the to the outbreak of the coronavirus in spring 2020 was the only measure to lead to loud protests on data provided by Eurostat (e.g. Fig.1), which only count stays of 12 months or longer. both the Polish-German and Polish-Czech borders (Grzesiczak 2020).

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“No less than 75 percent of those who wish to leave are young, under 35 Ukrainian workers is regarded as beneficial for the Polish labor market, years of age. Our compatriots who go abroad are even better educated, as it can fill gaps. Although both groups – Polish nationals abroad and it is no longer emigration to then work as a dishwasher. Now, nurses, foreign workers in Poland – are similar in size, the latter is not seen as a engineers and builders are declaring their willingness to leave Poland. I “replacement” for the emigrants. The public perception is that the jobs have the impression that the government does not notice this problem; performed by the Ukrainians mean that they are not in competition with the government does not notice that the mass emigration of young the native population, rather they are seen as engaging in employment for people causes a rapid aging of the population, and thus threatens to which there were not enough people available. slow down the already poor economic growth, and cause a collapse of the pension system” (Małgorzata Sadurska, a PiS MP, during a A result of the constant emigration of the Polish workforce to Western Europe RESENTMENT TOWARDS parliamentary debate on May 14th, 2015) is that there is quite widespread resentment towards the main receiving THE WEST countries – primarily, but not only, on the part of the right-wing parties. Since the PiS party took power, however, it in turn has been criticized by its Although these countries are not directly held responsible for attracting political opponents for not addressing the underlying causes of emigration immigrants, many still see it as unjust that the poorer countries in the East quickly or comprehensively enough, for example, when the Left held the have to bear the cost of educating the labor force, which is then “snatched PiS government responsible for failing to solve the issue of the precarious away” from the eastern countries without adequate compensation. This employment conditions of young people: frustration was expressed, for instance, in the exposé of the Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki from November 19th, 2019: „Research shows that young people decide to emigrate due to the lack of housing, lack of stable work and a lack of a sense of security. (…) “According to data from the IMF, between 1990 and 2016 almost 20 million In 2015, PiS announced the liquidation of junk contracts6. When is the people moved from Central Europe to rich, Western European countries. government going to deliver on this promise?” This trend accelerated after our countries joined the EU. According to the (Marcelina Zawisza, MP, during a parliamentary debate on January 8th, 2020) fund, this change caused Central European countries, including Poland, to lose income. Our per capita income is at least 5 percent lower because of EMPHASIS ON EMIGRATION AS AN Interestingly, the right to emigrate as such is not questioned by the political this migration. This is a great tribute that Poland has paid to the countries INDIVIDUAL RIGHT actors. The possibility to emigrate is unanimously recognized as legitimate of the West. Such a tribute from the poor to the rich is not normal. A state and as an important cornerstone of the democratic transformation of 1989 with high standards must stop this.” and the accession to the European Union in 2004. President Bronisław Komorowski clarified this ambivalence in a radio interview in 2015, when In 2015, in the context of the European ‘refugee crisis’, the existing he said it was important resentment towards Western Europe mixed with the rejection of non- European refugees. Two quotes from a debate on September 16th, 2015, “that people do not leave because they have no opportunities in one month before the election, which brought the PiS to power, are Poland. The fact that they are leaving and looking for better conditions particularly noteworthy. First, the President of the European Commission at somewhere is a gain of freedom. So no one should forbid anyone from the time, Jean-Claude Juncker, attracted criticism for his remark that Poland leaving, but it would be good for young Poles (…) [to have] opportunities was obliged to return the favor of the opening of the internal European in Poland.” (Website of the President of Poland 2015) borders and had to accept Syrian refugees, also because 20 million people of Polish origin lived abroad. The leader of PiS Jarosław Kaczyński replied: FOR RIGHT-WING PARTIES: Here certain differences between the political blocs in terms of NEGATIVE FRAMING OF argumentation are also becoming visible. For the political center and the “Yes, indeed, many Poles have emigrated in recent years, in earlier EMIGRATION Left, emigration is not only something negative. They also recognize a years, in the previous century, and before that. This is true. Only, High positive dimension, as it can be a decision to emigrate for something, such Chamber, did the Poles, when they emigrated, impose their rules on as another culture, a more open and modern society, a more progressive those countries? Did they even terrorize people? No, they worked hard, legal order. They thereby underline the demand that nobody should feel with great humility, often with excessive humility.” the need to emigrate due to discrimination or social pressure (cf. Karpieszuk 2020). The transformation of Poland into a modern, European country where He was supported by MP Marzena Wróbel (also PiS): people want to live is seen to be just as important as the development of the economy. For the political right, on the other hand, the task with regard “ (…) Jean-Claude Juncker (…) claimed in the European Parliament that 20 to emigration is first and foremost combating the negative consequences million Poles lived outside of Poland as a result of economic and political of limited economic opportunities so that people are not “forced” to leave emigration, with which he implied that Poland should therefore accept their country and their culture in search of financial stability. Even in the a large number of illegal immigrants who are pressing towards Europe context of the most urgent problem at present, the shortage of skilled at the moment. (…) The Germans accepted a relatively small group of labor in medical professions – which could cause a collapse of the health refugees in Munich, but do you remember what happened next? Later, system within a few years – not one of the parties has seriously considered the Germans closed their border and suspended rail connections with preventing the medical personnel from leaving the country. their southern neighbors. This is German policy. They say one thing and then do something else. We are to pay their debts; the countries of Remarkably, a link is seldom made between emigration and immigration in Central Europe are to pay their debts.” debates. The most recent influx of approximately 1.5 million predominantly Both quotes are a good representation of the attitude of PiS towards refugees and underline the differences in the perception of the Polish emigrants on the one hand and the Syrian migrants on the other. At 6 “Junk contracts” (umowy śmieciowe) is a colloquial term in Poland to denote all sorts of precarious employment. the same time it illustrates that, in Poland, the idea that the West did

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the country a favor by accepting its emigrants, is firmly rejected. What The issues of emigration and the diaspora are traditionally addressed RETURN MIGRATION AS A TASK OF is more, the responsibility is placed completely on the West: Accepting in the exposés of newly elected Prime Ministers. It is usual for every THE STATE the refugees is not, as Juncker had indicated, a chance for Poland government to pursue a policy which creates incentives for return to reciprocate in light of the support it had once received. Rather, for migration. Thus there is a certain level of continuity, e.g. with the Poland and other Central European countries, it is seen as the forced governmental programs to support repatriation (called the “stork and costly result of Western European policies including Germany’s. programs” because of the red and white coloring of storks and their Since emigration from Poland helps the individuals and the receiving seasonal migration pattern) or the state-run online portal, which contains countries, yet is detrimental to the Polish state itself, Polish migration comprehensive information for people who are contemplating a return is seen as Poland doing the Western countries a favor, rather than the (https://pwroty.gov.pl/). In addition, there are programs which provide other way around. financial support for those returning, although on closer examination it is apparent that it is more a case of measures to simplify access to NOT A CENTRAL TOPIC IN THE In the most recent elections in October 2019 emigration was not a central general social welfare benefits. Currently, however, on the macro level MOST RECENT ELECTORAL topic. In the electoral manifestos it was primarily the ruling ‘Law and the government is focused in particular on simplifying access to foreign MANIFESTOS Justice’ (PiS), that concentrated on the issue more than the other parties. labor markets, improved recognition of qualifications, the avoidance of Only the extreme right ‘Konfederacja’ mentioned as an aside the need to double taxation or the protection of the labor rights of Polish workers support migrants returning to Poland and to reform the return programs. abroad (Stefańska 2017: 108-112). A closer look at the framing of emigration in the PiS manifesto reveals a pattern: Although the causes of emigration and many of the solutions are The state also fulfils the task of taking care of and protecting the Polish portrayed as being of an economic nature, the consequences of emigration diaspora and the Polish minorities in other countries. Both chambers of on the other hand are presented in a clearly cultural-nationalist context. the parliament, Sejm and Senat, have standing committees on maintaining The party takes the view that Polish citizens are forced to leave their own contact with the diaspora. It is also expected of the embassies and country to live and work in a foreign environment. And consequently consulates that they not only deal with the legal and organizational they are seen to be forced to contribute to the development of a foreign matters, but that they also provide support to local Polish organizations country instead of their own. in their respective area of jurisdiction. The protective task of the state is also reflected in the introduction of the Karta Polaka (Pole’s card) in Although none of the other parties mentioned emigration in their 2019 2007, which was intended to be for people with a Polish background but electoral manifestos this does not have to be an indicator of a lack of without Polish citizenship. The card confirms that the holder belongs consideration of the issue; it is more a reflection of the low urgency of the to the Polish nation and entitles the holder to various privileges (e.g. topic at the time. For example, although it is not mentioned in the electoral exemption from the obligation to apply for a work permit). The card manifesto of the coalition Lewica, one of its constituting parties, Partia was originally intended only for Poles in 15 post-Soviet states but the Razem, promises better representation of the diaspora in domestic politics. law was changed in 2019 in order to include Polish nationals from all countries (Gazeta Prawna 2019). Furthermore, the new citizenship bill EMIGRATION IN EARLIER From the analysis of the electoral manifestos since the EU accession from 2012 (Dz. U. 2012 poz. 161) was given a chapter (Chapter V, Art. 38- ELECTORAL MANIFESTOS (2005, 2007, 2011 and 2015) three important findings have emerged. 45) on regaining Polish citizenship, for people who were forced to give it First, in the period from 2005 to 2007 all parties addressed the topic of up before 1989 as a condition for emigration. This was widely considered emigration. Second, above all parties from the right spectrum focused as making amends for past wrongs of the state towards its citizens (cf. on the topic – the further to the right the more pronounced the focus. Senat 2019). Neither Civic Platform nor the left parties (SLD and Ruch Palikota 2011, Unified Left 2015) mentioned emigration in 2011 or 2015; the current Polish citizens abroad are also allowed to participate in the national THE RIGHTS OF POLISH CITIZENS coalition partner of Civic Platform, Nowoczesna, only did it in passing when elections and do not lose this right, regardless of how much time has ABROAD talking about simplifying return migration (p. 39). Third, it is striking that, passed since their departure. Although there is regular indignation in across all parties, there are hardly any concrete policy proposals. A few do social media about the fact that people not living in the country have in fact exist, for example the “return” program (p.56) announced by PiS in an influence on who is to govern it, neither political parties nor any 2007 or the aforementioned proposals made by Nowoczesna with regard other organizations publicly express a resentment of this kind. In the to the support of school children. In most cases, however, emigration is most recent presidential elections in June 2020 more than 0.5 million only portrayed as a secondary problem stemming from problems like voters abroad registered to vote (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza 2020a). mass unemployment, insufficient economic development, a housing This number is considerably lower than the estimated 2.54 million Poles shortage or low wages. As a result, most proposals aimed at preventing who live abroad (although this number also includes persons who are emigration focus on tackling fundamental problems and not emigration not eligible to vote). Although historically voting behavior has in general in particular. reflected that of the homeland, only with a tendency to be somewhat more liberal, in the most recent elections the incumbent president Since the parties are largely in agreement about having a pro-return and eventual winner, Andrzej Duda, only received 25.9 percent of the migration policy and maintaining the relationships to the diaspora, the votes in the electoral districts abroad, while the opposition led by Rafał topic is primarily in the hands of the government, as only it has the Trzaskowski was able to achieve an overwhelming majority with 74.1 instruments for the realization of these aims. Therefore, to a certain percent of the votes (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza 2020b). extent, emigration is not even the subject of political competition, but rather a part of the administrative tasks of the state. However, although a few of the initiatives are aimed at the cultural and social needs of the (mostly older) emigrants, the majority deal more with the emigration rates themselves.

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INFOBOX – Migration in times of the Corona pandemic If the new migration trends in Poland remain unchanged, then in a couple of decades Poland will – in terms of its migration patterns and share of In the public discourse there has hardly been any connection made foreign-born population – look more like one of the Western countries. Until between the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and emigration. As a matter now Poland’s dominant self-image has however been that of an emigration of fact the measures to contain the virus – in particular the suspension country, and it will be a long process to reconcile this self-image with the of all international train and air connections and the compulsory 14- new reality. day quarantine for citizens returning from abroad (March until June) – kept Polish emigrants out of the country. Polish citizens with residence in other countries accordingly often decided to remain abroad. The state-organized repatriations were predominantly used by stranded tourists. The only emigrant group that was heavily affected by the coronavirus pandemic was the local cross-border commuters, as they were now cut off from either their place of work or residence. After numerous protests at the Polish-German and Polish-Czech borders, in early June the state waived the compulsory quarantine requirement for those who could present documents confirming employment in other EU member states. The fight against the spread of the coronavirus pandemic was therefore clearly formulated as a European matter and the closed borders were interpreted not only as a violation of the freedom of movement and the spirit of European integration but also as an obsolete and ineffective measure to contain the pandemic. Here, reference was made to the fact that local commutes of a few kilometers (e.g. between Görlitz and Zgorzelec or Cieszyn and Těšín), which could often be traveled in one’s own car or by bike, were forbidden, yet journeys with a much higher risk of exposure to the virus (e.g. train trips from Stettin to Warsaw or Krakow) were allowed.

OUTLOOK

It is difficult to predict how the discussion about emigration will develop in future. On the one hand it seems improbable that those who have left the country will return to Poland in the short or mid-term. The wages and working conditions in Poland, despite some improvements in the last years, are still not attractive enough. Although the times of mass immigration are a thing of the past, it still seems unlikely that emigration will come to a complete halt.

On the other hand, the new developments could certainly change the pattern of migration in Poland. Firstly, the overall pace of emigration has continued to slow down. Secondly, the return rates in recent years are the highest they have been since 2004. Thus, all things considered, a situation will probably emerge in which the balance of migration of Polish citizens is only slightly negative. Thirdly, the demographic situation – above all the low fertility rate and the aging of society – will make the Polish economy more dependent on immigration (and return migration). The influence of the most recent immigration to Poland should not be underestimated here: the Polish economy is opening up for immigrants and Polish work permits are some of the easiest to obtain in the EU. As a result, a significant number of migrants have moved to Poland, which has effectively turned the country into an immigration and emigration country.

If a new crisis rocks the country, a reverse of the migration flows is possible. The Poles who already have experience of emigration could once again leave the country in large numbers. The nature of the crisis also plays a role, as the Poles emigrate not only because of economic but also because of political reasons. The current protests against the de facto ban on abortion show that if a new government does not take office, then others could also feel compelled to emigrate.

128 129 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES POLAND

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(retrieved: 14.08.2018). px/table/tableViewLayout1/?rxid=2bd3edd3-cb25-44c4- pl/artykuly/1415892,karta-polaka-rozszerzona-na- abc5-b47e014b6e0d (retrieved: 20.07.2020). wszystkie-kraje.html ([retrieved: 21.07.2020). NBC News 2020: Polish LGBTQ People Leaving as Post- Vote Mood Grows Hostile; August 6th, 2020; available at: Statistics Norway 2020: Immigrants and Norwegian-Born to Grzesiczak, Łukasz 2020: „Precz z Kaczyńskim”, „Morawiecki, https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/polish-lgbtq- Immigrant Parents; available at: https://www.ssb.no/en/ oddaj mi miesiąc życia”. Cieszyn protestuje. OKO.press; people-leaving-post-vote-mood-grows-hostile-n1236004 innvbef (retrieved: 20.07.2020). available at: https://oko.press/precz-z-kaczynskim/ (retrieved: 06.09.2020). (retrieved: 6.09.2020). Statistisches Bundesamt 2017: Bevölkerung mit NBP (Narodowy Bank Polski) 2019: Polacy pracujący za Migrationshintergrund – Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus GUS (Główny Urząd Statystyczny) 2018: Methodological granicą w 2018 r. Raport z badania; available at: https:// 2017; available at: https://www.destatis.de/DE/ Report - Migration of Population. Aspects of Migration www.nbp.pl/publikacje/migracyjne/polacy_pracujacy_za_ Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/Migration- Surveys Used in the Development of Population Balances; granica_2018.pdf (retrieved: 20.07.2020). Integration/_inhalt.html?__blob=publicationFile available at: https://stat.gov.pl/en/topics/population/ (retrieved: 20.07.2020). internationa-migration/methodological-report-migration- Nowoczesna 2015: Program. Nowoczesna Polska dla of-population,7,1.html (retrieved: 26.10.2020). każdego. Renata, Stefańska 2017: Between West and East: Diaspora, Emigration and Return in the Polish Emigration and Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza 2020a: Frekwencja w drugiej Diaspora Policy; in: Weinar, Agnieszka (eds.): Emigration and turze wyborów Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w 2020 Diaspora Policies in the Age of Mobility; Springer, Stuttgart, r.; available at: https://wybory.gov.pl/prezydent20200628/ p. 101-120. pl/frekwencja/2/Koniec/pl (retrieved: 21.07.2020). Stokes, Donald E. 1963: Spatial Models of Party Competition; in: American Political Science Review 57 (2), p. 368–377.

130 131 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES PORTUGAL

7 PORTUGAL

Summary

Portugal’s recent wave of emigration is largely an outcome of its economic troubles following the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis. Between 2010 and 2016, more than 300,000 people permanently left the country.

The increase in emigration aggravated what had already been a challeng- ing demographic outlook, given Portugal’s low birth rates, rapidly aging population, and consequent negative rate of growth. Net migration rates were negative for six consecutive years (2011-2016), with the country losing the equivalent of 3 percent of its population in 2010 during that time.

Although emigration is far from a new phenomenon in Portugal, it became a matter of political dispute during the crisis years. The salience of emigration increased both in the media and in the political debate. In es- sence, opposition parties blamed the austerity policies of the right-wing governmental coalition for driving people out of the country.

Emigration is predominantly seen in negative terms, resulting from the economic crisis context. Emigration is also considered to have negative consequences (namely in terms of demographic and fiscal impact as well as loss of human capital). This contrasts with the overwhelmingly positive tone towards the Portuguese diaspora.

DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE OF EMIGRATION

Portugal has more than two million citizens living abroad, the equivalent of ONE FIFTH OF POPULATION more than 20 percent of its resident population. If one adds the descend- LIVING ABROAD ants of emigrants to that number, the total is over five million (Pereira/ Azevedo 2019: 3). This means that Portugal has one of the largest shares of emigrants in proportion to its population among EU countries, together with Croatia and Malta. There are several countries with a sizeable Portu- guese immigrant community, both in Europe and in the Americas. This is most notably the case for France and Switzerland, where the Portuguese constitute the third largest immigrant community respectively, but also for Brazil and Luxembourg, where the Portuguese are the largest immigrant group. France and Switzerland are also the two foreign countries with the highest percentage of Portuguese nationals (or those who were born in Portugal), followed by the USA (in the case of countries with the most people born in Portugal) and the UK (with regard to countries with the most foreigners with Portuguese citizenship). If one looks only at ‘EU mobile citizens’ of working age (20-64), the share of Portuguese residing abroad within the EU accounted for about 10.8 percent of the Portuguese resident population in 2019, which places Portugal fourth in the EU in terms of the most mobile citizens within the EU (Eurostat 2019).

Emigration is far from a new phenomenon, as Portugal has historically PORTUGAL AS A been a ‘country of emigration’. Migration scholars usually point to three or ‘COUNTRY OF EMIGRATION’ four large-scale waves of emigration in Portuguese history (Pereira/Azeve- do 2019). The first one covers the period from 1850 to 1930, the so-called transatlantic cycle, as part of the wider European labor dislocation to the EMIGRATION IN American continent following decolonization. About 2 million people left EUROPEAN COUNTRIES the country in this period, with Brazil as the main destination. C 133 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES PORTUGAL

Country Factsheet recent economic uptick –, even today they are still more than three times higher than before the crisis. To put it in different terms, 7.5 people per GDP per capita: 19,827€ 1,000 inhabitants left the country in 2019. This is less than the 12.9 registered in 2014, but significantly higher than the 2.1 emigrants per 1,000 EU accession year: 1986 inhabitants registered in the year 2000 (PORTDATA 2020a).

Population in 2019: 10,286,263 Note that these numbers refer to permanent migration only – if one adds Population in 1990: 9,983,220 temporary migrants to that total, the numbers spike to more than double Population projection for 2060: 8,910,843 (PORTDATA 2020b). Among temporary migrants there are the so-called ‘posted workers’. Though there is little research in this regard, so far it Share of foreign citizens (with resident status): 5.7% seems that European companies take advantage of lower Portuguese Foreign born population: 9.3% wages, using Portuguese subcontractors who ‘post’ contingents of laborers, for example, to construction sites (King, 2019: 273). It is estimated Young population: 13.7% (EU average: 15.2%) that between 2007-2011, Portugal had more posted workers than any Working age population: 64.5% other nation within the EU, averaging over 60 000 per year (ibid.). Note Aged 65 and over: 21.8% (EU average: 20.2%) also that the numbers in Figure 1 are known to be conservative and to underestimate the real number of emigrants. The Portuguese Emigration Fertility rate: 1.42 (EU average: 1.55) Observatory, which adopts a different method from INE for calculating the number of emigrants, typically produces higher estimates, with the difference being particularly striking in the period from 2000 to 2010, The second wave is the one most salient within Portugal itself, often in- with estimates more than five times (!) higher.1 voked during debates on emigration. In order to highlight the severity of the present situation, media and political actors often argue that the The scenario described above had a significant impact on net migration NEGATIVE NET MIGRATION RATES current wave of emigration is reminiscent of this past one. It comprises rates (the difference between the number of immigrants and the num- LEADING TO the period from 1950 to 1974, in other words the final decades of the ber of emigrants), which were negative from 2011 to 2016 (Figure 2). POPULATION DECLINE authoritarian regime and the era of colonial wars. Even though reliable This is not only an outcome of increasing emigration, but also declining statistics are hard to come by (in part because many left clandestinely), it is estimated that more than 1.8 million people emigrated during that time. Two-thirds of them left to industrialized European countries, most Fig. 1: Emigration per year (in absolute numbers) notably France and, to a lesser extent, Germany, with the rest choosing Emigration (total) Emigration of Portuguese citizens the Americas (Venezuela, Canada, the USA, and Brazil) and Africa (South 70,000 Africa, Angola and Mozambique).

Some scholars speak of a third cycle of emigration from 1980 to 2000, 60,000 when an average of 20 000 people per year left the country, most notably to Western Europe. A key feature of this phase, particularly during the 1990s, is that Portugal actually also experienced increasing immi- 50,000 gration (as well as returns), registering positive net migration rates from 1993 onwards. While still very much defined by emigration, Portugal has 40,000 also become a country of immigration, the scale of which has, however, remained lower than for the rest of Southern Europe. Overall, Portugal continues to register a much higher total number of emigrants than im- 30,000 migrants.

CRISIS TRIGGERED Finally, the fourth and current wave started at the beginning of the 21st 20,000 LARGE WAVE OF EMIGRATION century and became drastically more accentuated from 2011 onward as a result of the recession provoked by the Eurozone crisis and subsequent austerity measures. Growing unemployment rates will undoubtedly 10,000 have played a role here as they disproportionally affected young people: In 2013, the total unemployment rate reached a peak of 16 percent, 0 among young people however it was at a staggering 38 percent. The recent migration flows are largely concentrated with the European conti-

nent. In addition to traditional destination countries, such as France, the 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 United Kingdom became a major new destination and, to a less extent, Source: Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE) / own representation Spain too. Figure 1 shows the official statistics, capturing what is referred to as ‘permanent emigration’, that is, individuals who leave the country for a period longer than one year. It shows how Portugal went from an average of less than 10 000 permanent emigrants per year prior to 2008 to around 50 000 between 2011 and 2014. Though emigration numbers 1 While INE uses the Labour Force Survey to estimate the number of emigrants, the Emigration Observatory compiles data on the entry of Portuguese immigrants in destination countries. http:// have been steadily, albeit modestly, declining ever since – mirroring the observatorioemigracao.pt/np4EN/Dados/

134 135 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES PORTUGAL

immigration (there were less than 15,000 permanent arrivals in 2012, in (Justino 2016: 9). There are, however, some reasons to be cautious about contrast to about 30,000 per year in 2007-2008). This had a direct impact this. To begin with, it is important to state that reliable statistics in this on population numbers, as the resident population fell from 10,573,100 regard are hard to come by. Unfortunately, the most reliable data for individuals in 2010 to 10,283,822 in 2018 – a result of negative migration Portugal is only available up to 2011, which prevents us from assessing rates, but also of negative and deteriorating rates of natural increase the most recent migratory wave and whether the predominant public (the number of births minus the number of deaths). As immigration has and political image of the ‘highly qualified migrant’ can be confirmed. been quicker to recover than emigration, it is largely the former that has been sustaining positive net migration rates since 2017 and, impor- On the one hand, OECD data from 2010/11 shows that, among the total LOSS OF tantly, mitigating the decline in population. Since the rate of natural in- emigrant population (including ‘old migrants’), only ~10 percent had a HIGHLY QUALIFIED WORKERS crease has decreased significantly over the past decade (with no signs high level of education (~150,000 people), whereas 62 percent had a of improvement yet), it is thanks to immigration that population levels low level – thus depicting Portugal as a country of predominantly low- have somewhat stabilized in the past few years. One needs to bear in skilled migration2. On the other hand, the estimated emigration rate mind, however, that immigration statistics are more accurate than for among those with tertiary education was far from negligible: ~12.9 per- emigration and that the underestimation of the number of emigrants cent (Pires/Pereira 2018). In other words, even though a large majori- thus translates into de facto net migration rates that are more negative ty of emigrants had low qualifications, a few hundred thousand highly than those presented. skilled emigrants still represent a substantial fraction of the total pool in a country with an overall low level of education (in 2011, only 15 per- RAPIDLY AGING Emigration has a negative demographic impact not only because of the cent of the population had a university degree). Moreover, OECD data POPULATION obvious decrease in population, but also because migrants are mostly also showed that, among those who had moved in the year 2010/11, working-age, thus contributing both to population overaging and declin- 33 percent could be classified as highly qualified, a greater percentage ing birth rates, aggravating the problem of the sustainability of the wel- than among the total population (ibid.). It is thus very likely that high- fare state. Note that Portugal has one of the most rapidly aging popula- ly skilled migrants are overrepresented in the recent migration wave, tions in the EU – after Italy and Greece and together with Finland, it has even if the actual majority of emigrants continues to be low skilled.3 the largest share of population over 65 and one of the highest old-age dependency ratios (Eurostat 2020a). While emigration is mostly discussed in terms of its negative impacts, the positive ones also deserve recognition. This is most apparent in the case HISTORICALLY, EMIGRATION In addition to that, it is often assumed that emigration is particularly of remittances, the total sum of which has a significant impact on the MOSTLY BY LOW-SKILLED damaging when it involves a substantial share of highly qualified peo- Portuguese economy. Figure 3 shows how much Portugal benefits from WORKERS ple, contributing to what has been popularly termed ‘brain drain’. This is because of the loss in tax revenue (coming from higher tax brackets), the loss of potential entrepreneurs or of people capable of adding value Fig. 3: Remittances – total and in percentage of GDP to the economy, the possible shortage of skilled professionals, etc. Al- Remittances received from emigrants Remittances sent by immigrants Total in % of GDP though Portugal has historically been a country of low-skilled migration (in line with the generally low levels of education of the total population), 4,000 3 the recent wave of migration has commonly been associated in the me- 3,500 dia and in political discourse with the outflow of highly skilled migrants 2.5 3,000 2 Fig. 2: Population development and annual migration rates 2,500 Immigration Emigration Net migration Total population 2,000 1.5 100 11 1,500

Million Euro 1 80 10.8 1,000

60 0.5 percentage share of GDP 500 10.6 40 0 0 20 10.4 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Source: PORDATA / own representation 0 10.2 -20

Migration (in thousand) 10 -40 Total population (in million)

2 Recent Eurostat data (2019) are very similar, showing that only 13 percent of Portuguese ‘EU mobile -60 9.8 citizens’ between 20-64 have completed tertiary education. 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 3 Among highly qualified migrants, a sector that sometimes attracts media attention is the health sector, in particular nurses. Between 2010 and 2017, it is estimated that more than 14 000 nurses Source: Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE), PORDATA / own representation left Portugal, though it should be said that this was not only due to the crisis but also aggressive recruitment campaigns by foreign agencies, most notably from the UK. See Expresso, 12.09.2017, ’14 mil enfermeiros saíram de Portugal desde 2010’; available at: https://expresso.pt/revista-de- imprensa/2017-09-12-14-mil-enfermeiros-sairam-de-Portugal-desde-2010

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remittances, even when the remittances sent by migrants living in the evolution of references to ‘emigration’ in one of the leading newspapers CENTER-RIGHT PROFITING country are substracted. In 2019, remittances amounted to the equivalent in Portugal, Jornal de Notícias. The use of the word increases significant- THE MOST OFF EXPATRIATE VOTE of 1.5 percent of the Portuguese GDP. ly during the ‘crisis years’, with more than double the number of yearly references in 2013-2015, compared to pre-crisis years. The difference is EMIGRATION IN THE POLITICAL DEBATE more striking in the case of parliamentary debates (Figure 5), where the use of the word ‘emigration’ is at least four times higher in that same peri- The treatment of emigration at the political and institutional level fun- od. Though these numbers constitute only a very rough approximation of damentally depends on what exactly one is speaking of when speaking the actual salience of emigration, the trend is clear and illustrative. of emigration. As Portugal has a long history of emigration and a very substantial fraction of its citizens live abroad, the treatment of the Por- Though many of the references to emigration do not directly address the OPPOSITION BLAMING tuguese diaspora has long been an object of political engagement. It is issue and only mention it in passing, the increase in the use of the term GOVERNMENT FOR EMIGRATION therefore important to distinguish between the political treatment of in the political arena is unmistakably linked to the context of soaring emi- the diaspora – understood as citizens permanently settled abroad – and gration and to its use as a political tool by opposition parties to blame the the treatment of emigration as the (current) exiting of people. The next section deals with political engagement towards the diaspora, while the subsequent ones address emigration in general, distinguishing whenever possible between the two dimensions above and focusing predominantly on the second. Fig. 4: Relevance of emigration in the media

POLITICAL CONSENSUS ABOUT Emigration is an issue than has never been entirely absent from the polit- 300 DIASPORA TIES ical arena in Portugal – even if it has been of low salience most of the time –, given the large outflows of migrants in the recent past and the presence 250 of a very substantial diaspora abroad. It is not uncommon for parties to dedicate a small section of their manifestos to what is most commonly 200 referred to as the “Portuguese communities” (Comunidades Portuguesas) abroad. Parties have largely converged around the idea of maintaining or 150 strengthening the ties with the diaspora, including the protection of what 100 are unanimously considered their rights – such as representation rights and ensuring the teaching of Portuguese language to their descendants. 50 Therefore, issues related to the Portuguese diaspora periodically make it to parliament. 0

DIASPORA The government has a specific consultative body (Conselho das Comuni- REPRESENTATION dades Portuguesas) in charge of representing the communities abroad and 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 advising the government on policies related to them, although its pow- Number of news pieces that included the word ‘emigration’. ers and functions are limited. Moreover, emigrants are entitled to elect Source: Jornal de Notícias. Retrieved via Factiva / own representation members of parliament through two specific voting districts (‘Europe’ and ‘Outside Europe’, each with two representatives). Although the number of seats is limited and the proportion of total seats allotted is significantly lower than the proportion of the population living broad, this neverthe- Fig. 5: Relevance of emigration in parliamentary debates less allows emigrants to have a direct voice in parliament because their representatives often raise some of their concerns. Portugal was in fact 200 one of the first countries to grant voting rights to citizens abroad, follow- 180 ing the establishment of democracy in 1974 (Lisi et al. 2019: 74). 160 140 CENTER-RIGHT PROFITING Traditionally, the center-right (Partido Social Democrata – PSD) has bene- 120 THE MOST OFF EXPATRIATE VOTE fited the most from the emigrant vote, particularly the one from outside Europe, something that has been explained by, among other factors, 100 (1) the proximity to emigrant communities and party working groups 80 abroad, as well as (2) the dominant profile of migrants in the first and, 60 to an extent, second emigration waves, coming from rural areas with 40 low levels of education (Lisi et al. 2019: 81). This also accounts for the 20 greater importance which the party has historically placed on emigra- 0 tion-related themes, which in turn has reinforced its strength among emigrant communities. 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

EMIGRATION WAVE Despite the fact that the outflow of Portuguese migrants never truly came Number of pages that contain the word ‘emigration’ in parliamentary debates. CAPTURED MEDIA AND to a halt, emigration per se – i.e. the exiting of people – was rarely a topic Source: http://debates.parlamento.pt/catalogo/r3/dar/01 POLITICAL ATTENTION in the political debate until the most recent wave. A cursory look at media data and parliamentary debates illustrates this: Figure 4 shows the yearly

138 139 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES PORTUGAL

right-wing government coalition4 for the wide-reaching consequences of its Fig. 6: Relevance of Emigration in Electoral Manifestos austerity policies. The topic became particularly visible and hotly debated near the end of 2011, when several government actors, most notably the 3.5 PS PSD CDS-PP BE PCP Prime Minister, made declarations that unequivocally suggested emigration 3 as a viable alternative for the unemployed. These statements were widely taken as an invitation to emigrate and were therefore met with much po- 2.5 litical and public backlash. From then on, rising emigration rates were one 2 of the various negative indicators that opposition parties repeatedly drew 1.5 attention to in order to denounce the so-called ideologically-driven austerity policies of the incumbent right-wing government, insistently pointing fin- 1 gers at the government for inviting or even forcing young people to leave. 0.5 0 The peak in the usage of the word ‘emigration’ in parliamentary debates in 2014 and 2015 is largely due to this dynamic, whereby opposition par- 2001 2015 2019 ties used emigration to discredit the right-wing coalition, ahead of the 2015 Percentage of words devoted to emigration and emigration-related statements in party manifestos. general elections. At a time when employment rates were finally showing Source: Manual coding/own representation positive signs of recovery – and the government was taking this as an indicator of success –, opposition parties refused them credit by recurrently referred to emigration as the main reason why unemployment rates were the European refugee crisis. As shown in Figure 7, their relative importance decreasing, an accusation the government denied. The 2015 electoral man- varies significantly over time. Whereas in 2011 neither of the two topics were ifesto of the main opposition party, the center-left PS, serves as a good particularly important in party manifestos, in 2015 much more attention was example of the ‘blaming tool’ dynamic described above: to the issue of emigration, in line with the negative net migration rates of that time. The only party that consistently devotes more attention to immigration “The strategy of the PSD-CDS government of ‘going beyond the troika’ led to in its manifestos is the Left Bloc (radical left), in line with its progressive policy an explosion of unemployment and emigration, provoking a sharp downfall on immigrant rights and integration, e.g. regularizations, voting rights, jus soli in birth rates.” (p. 78) citizenship. In 2019, three out of five parties devoted more attention to immigration than emigration, though it should be noted that the topic remained “…as a result of the crisis and the emigration wave promoted by the auster- unpoliticized and was only rarely brought up during political debates (see ity policy of the PSD-CDS government, many Portuguese – particularly high- Mendes 2019). There is consensus among the two largest parties (PS and ly-qualified young people – were forced to abandon the country and search PSD) about the positive demographic and economic contribution of immigra- for employment elsewhere.” (p. 88) tion and most of their manifesto space on the topic is dedicated to ways of improving their integration into Portuguese society. EMIGRATION IN ELECTORAL In line with this, the issue became more salient during the 2015 electoral MANIFESTOS campaign, as all parties to the left of the government devoted more at- Parties do not appear to differ significantly in their positions towards emi- DIASPORA PERCEIVED tention to it than usual. Figure 6 shows the salience of emigration-related gration, neither does the topic seem to generate a great deal of political con- POSITIVE statements in the electoral manifestos of the main parties for the three troversy, unless it is part of the ‘blame game’ whereby parties attack the in- last legislative elections. Tellingly, in 2015, the main opposition party, the cumbent for policies that drive people out of the country. This is particularly center-left PS dedicated more than 3 percent of its electoral manifesto to statements connected to emigration. The use of a socioeconomic lens to Fig. 7: Frequency of emigration- and immigration-related keywords in electoral understand and frame the emigration issue could be observed across all manifestos parties, as well as the strategy of highlighting its negative impact on various Emigration Immigration levels, particularly in terms of demography, social security sustainability 3.5 and loss of qualified human capital. It should be noted, however, that pol- 3 icies aimed at the diaspora continued to occupy a significant space within party manifestos. In fact, the reason why the topic appears somewhat sali- 2.5 ent for the center-right in 2011 is almost entirely due to a section dedicat- 2 ed to different proposals to ‘value the Portuguese Communities’. In 2011, 1.5 emigration per se was still mostly off the radar and was only mentioned in 1 passing. This is different from 2019 where, despite being less salient than 0.5 in 2015 (perhaps because of the context of economic recovery and decreas- 0 ing emigration), emigration was negatively associated to socioeconomic causes, with some parties speaking of incentives to encourage the return of emigrants. PS 2011 PS 2015 PS 2019 BE 2011 BE 2015 BE 2019 PCP 2011 PCP 2015 PCP 2019 PSD 2011 PSD 2015 PSD 2019 EMIGRATION MORE SALIENT One way of assessing the relative salience of emigration is by comparing it CDS-PP 2011 CDS-PP 2015 CDS-PP 2019 THAN IMMIGRATION to immigration, a topic that usually attracts more attention, particularly since Percentage of words devoted to emigration and immigration (and emigration and immigration-related statements) in party manifestos. Source: Manual coding / own representation 4 Said coalition was composed of the center-right PSD and the conservative right CDS-PP and governed from 2011 to 2015.

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evident in their discourse regarding the diaspora, as parties largely overlap 2015). The ‘new radical left’ (Left Bloc) instead – more in line with its high- in their positive view of the Portuguese communities abroad, the expressed ly-educated voting basis – puts the emphasis on specific sectors, such as (1) desire to strengthen ties and exchanges, and the economic and cultural researchers, and the need for more investment in higher education to avoid potential they are said to represent, both to Portugal directly (e.g. through brain drain, and (2) nurses, whose mass emigration is taken as a symptom remittances, investment, promotion of Portuguese exports, etc.) and to the of insufficient investments in the health system (Electoral Program 2015). diffusion of Portugal’s positive image throughout the world. It is interesting The fact that the right is more agnostic about the economic impact of mi- to note that the positive tone towards the diaspora in the discourse stands gration primarily has to do with its incumbency during the most severe in stark contrast to the negative tone towards the recent wave of emigration. migration period. However, critics of the right-wing government have often pointed out that emigration was, in the short-term at least, beneficial to the EMIGRATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE Nevertheless, the government and opposition did clash over their rhetoric government as it impacted positively on unemployment numbers and took TO UNEMPLOYMENT on emigration. As mentioned above, the topic became controversial in late some of the pressure off the welfare system by decreasing expenditure. 2011, when several governmental representatives suggested emigration as This would explain why some members of the government seemed keen a valid alternative for the unemployed or for those seeking better opportuni- on encouraging young people to migrate. ties. After a governmental representative stated that “if we are unemployed, we must get out of our comfort zone and go beyond borders” – a declaration An aspect all parties agree on is that the loss of qualified human capital is he later denied –, the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs came to his defense, particularly damaging for the country. As noted above, highly skilled mi- affirming that “whoever is in a position to find [opportunities] abroad, in grants are often brought up both by parties and media outlets, whereas a more or less short term, and always with the prospect of returning, can less skilled migrants are rarely the object of attention. Though there is little strengthen his education and get to know other cultural realities, which is doubt that the share of highly qualified migrants has increased over the extraordinarily positive” (Meireles 2013). He further accused the opposition years, the (meagre) existing statistics show that an overemphasis on the of having a poor and backwards vision of emigration. This line of thought latter and the ‘invisibility’ of the low-skilled is a gross misrepresentation of seems to have been shared by the Prime Minister at the time who, speak- reality. An illustrative example of this is the fact that, in its 2011 electoral ing of teachers in particular, declared that in the absence of opportunities manifesto, the main opposition party at the time (PSD) claimed that the in Portugal, they could look to other Portuguese speaking countries as an migration wave that Portugal was experiencing “falls mostly upon highly alternative. Naturally, these statements were met with a hefty backlash. The qualified young people, representing the largest brain drain in the whole opposition interpreted the Prime Minister’s statement as an open invitation of the OECD”. This is false, because in 2010 the OECD reported higher em- to emigrate, accusing him of giving up on his country and adopting emigra- igration rates of the highly-skilled for countries like Ireland (20.3 percent), tion as an official policy line (Jornal de Notícias 2011). From then onwards, the Luxembourg (22.4 percent), or Iceland (14.2 percent) (Arslan et al. 2014). government repeatedly denied having made such an invitation and chose to largely avoid the topic. In addition, there is overwhelming consensus among the parties that there are no easy solutions to tackle emigration and that the only effective rem- RELATIVE CONSENSUS ON Note, however, that parties do not clash significantly over their interpretation edy is a more attractive labor market (though they naturally differ in the CAUSES OF EMIGRATION of the causes of emigration, as the government itself recognized the absence ways they would attempt to achieve this). Nevertheless – and in apparent of opportunities in Portugal. In this sense, all parties agreed that, during the contrast to the positive contributions that the diaspora is said to make –, all crisis, emigration was an outcome of citizens being pushed by socioeconom- political forces agree that the return of emigrants should be encouraged. ic conditions rather than a simple expression of freedom of movement. As Although this is one of the most agreed-upon avenues for tackling the de- the subsequent center-left Prime Minister stated, “freedom of movement mographic challenge, parties differ with regard to the emphasis placed on is great, but there is an enormous difference between the freedom to leave immigration as a complementary solution in this regard. While the left is and the necessity to leave due to not having a job in Portugal” (TVI24 2014). explicit in pointing to immigration as one of the various avenues to counter However, parties do occasionally differ in terms of their interpretation of the depressing demographic indicators, the conservative right does not explic- root causes of emigration, which tend to be in line with their general socioec- itly refer to this in its electoral manifestos, focusing instead on family and onomic outlook. While for the left emigration is a clear symptom of the gen- fertility policies. eral precariousness of the Portuguese labor market, the conservative-right CDS-PP sets itself apart by also putting the blame on a ‘work culture’ that does What is also interesting to note in this regard is that Portugal’s historical not value productivity, effort, and individual merit, thus driving talent out of and present condition as a ‘country of emigration’ is often invoked dur- the country. Its 2019 electoral manifesto stated the following: ing parliamentary debates on immigration policies. This is a rhetorical tool often used by parties, particularly on the left, to justify a particular moral “Culturally, the Portuguese blockade, in terms of productivity, also resides in an responsibility towards immigrants, that is, to justify a ‘humane’ immigration aversion to individual merit, ‘socializing’ or in the leveling down of effort and policy for those who choose to come to Portugal, in light of the country’s remuneration. This culture, resultant of the permeability of the values dom- nationals own experiences of being immigrants elsewhere. inant in left-wing egalitarianism, is so destructive of life expectations and of individual projects (…) that it is also responsible for the new highly-qualified Also relevant is the fact that, perhaps because of the absence of a populist emigration.” radical right party with parliamentary representation (until recently), emigration has rarely been framed in nationalist terms. When it is, it is always THE LEFT IS MORE RESOLUTE As far as the consequences of emigration are concerned, parties seem to dif- in connection to the Portuguese diaspora and always in positive tones – IN STRESSING THE NEGATIVE fer most of all in terms of what they choose to emphasize. While they agree such as to emphasize the emotional and national ties of the diaspora to ECONOMIC IMPACT OF on and often highlight the negative demographic impact of emigration, the Portugal or its role in projecting Portuguese identity and culture abroad. EMIGRATION left more resolutely stresses the negative economic impact of emigration. There is no obvious ideological cleavage in this regard (as the Communist The Communist Party, for example, explicitly links emigration to a significant Party or the Socialist Party adopt this type of discourse too), even if it is likely loss of fiscal revenues and social security contributions (Electoral Program that it is more accentuated on the right.

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LAUNCH OF A In light of the context described above, in 2019 the Portuguese government has been disproportionally affected by COVID-19, partly because of pre- ‘RETURN PROGRAM’ launched the so-called ‘Return Program’ (Programa Regressar) which offers carious housing and working conditions (Lopes 2020). On the other hand, emigrants who have resided elsewhere for at least three years monetary and unemployment has increased the most in sectors where immigrants are fiscal incentives to move back, provided they can secure a work contract. numerous, e.g. restaurant and food services. Consequently, voluntary re- These incentives include a 50 percent reduction in income tax for five years, patriation requests before the respective embassies (such as Brazil and a cash payment of 2,614€ and additional aid in covering relocation and other Ukraine) have increased (Expresso 2020). associated costs up to a maximum of 7,879€. By February 2020, according to governmental data, at least 1,300 people had already taken advantage of the program. Many, however, remain skeptical about the effectiveness of this OUTLOOK type of program, as such incentives cannot possibly make up for the large wage gap and relative lack of opportunities differences compared to other It is evident that there is a strong correlation between migration to and developed countries – the average yearly income in Portugal is less than half from Portugal and job market dynamics (Pires 2019: 34). The future evo- that of the Euro-area average. One of the novelties of this program is that it lution of both emigration and immigration is therefore greatly dependent intends to attract emigrants regardless of their qualifications. This novel re- on the socioeconomic conditions and the disparities between the sending turn program now exists in addition to a number of policies aimed at highly and receiving countries. It must be noted, however, that emigration from skilled migrants – that is, professionals in so-called ‘high value-added activi- Portugal was not only a relevant phenomenon in times of deep econom- ties’ –, which have already been in place since 2009, establishing a 20 percent ic crisis: Outflows continue to be significant today and, if one takes the flat tax rate on earned income for ten years.5 statistics of the Emigration Observatory into account, they were far from negligible during the period before the Eurozone crisis as well. It is thus This is on top of the existing policies directed towards the Portuguese com- unlikely that emigration will stop being a relevant phenomenon, given the munities abroad, such as those that relate to the promotion of Portuguese persistently significant gaps in income and living standards between Por- language training, the social protection of vulnerable emigrants, the promo- tugal and the most advanced economies in Europe. Moreover, the exist- tion of associative initiatives, and the maintenance of a media channel for the ence of a large diaspora directly facilitates emigration networks and indi- emigrant community, among others. rectly promotes a ‘culture of emigration’ that has long existed in Portugal and that was recently revived by the economic crisis.

INFOBOX – Migration in times of the Corona pandemic Though the development of migration flows is hard to predict, the same cannot be said for other demographic trends. The most realistic demo- Emigration, as understood in this report, has not been a salient topic dur- graphic scenarios for Portugal all look grim, with low birth rates and a ing the Covid-pandemic. There was no visible impact on the debate on rapidly aging population.6 Not only is the country set to lose population, European internal migration or otherwise. Nevertheless, the government but according to Eurostat, it will have the highest old-age dependency ra- has shown some concern about the situation of Portuguese communities tio in the EU by 2050, that is, 63 elderly people per 100 people of working abroad and how the pandemic could affect them, namely when it comes age (Eurostat 2020b). Only the most optimistic migration scenario – a pos- to the disruption of the social and consular services usually provided itive and high net migration rate – is capable of abating such tendencies (Almeida 2020). Moreover, as emigrants usually return for vacations dur- and mitigating the disastrous consequences for the sustainability of the ing the summer, governmental representatives were keen on mitigating welfare state. This is, however, plausible only in the unlikely event that the decrease in numbers of incoming emigrants (Lusa 2020). Portugal manages to overcome the deep-seated structural weaknesses of its economy and labor market. Border closures were unanimously endorsed by all political parties, always justified on public health grounds, however, there were certain exceptions, including for ‘cross-border workers’. In general, the government and opposition parties were keen on following EU guidelines on mobility and lockdown measures. There were, however, conflicts with other EU member states. This was most obviously the case with the UK, as it decided to impose restrictions on travelling to Portugal during part of the summer. This created tensions between the two countries, as the Portuguese tourism industry is heavily dependent on UK tourists.

Finally, when it comes to immigration, the Portuguese government took the unprecedented step of granting temporary residence to immigrants and asylum seekers with pending applications before the Immigration and Borders Service, in order to ensure their access to health care and social security services (Henriques 2020). Immigrants are a particularly vulnerable group during the current crisis, both in health and economic terms. On the one hand, there is evidence that the immigrant population

5 The so-called Fiscal Regime for Non-Habitual Residents, which also applies to foreign 6 See INE, Projcções de População Residente 2018-2080. Available at: https:// pensioners. See: https://www.portaldascomunidades.mne.pt/images/GADG/IRS__Regime_Fiscal_ www.ine.pt/xportal/xmain?xpid=INE&xpgid=ine_destaques&DESTAQUESdest_ Residente_N%C3%A3o_Habitual.pdf boui=406534255&DESTAQUESmodo=2&xlang=pt

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REFERENCES

Almeida, São José 2020: PS debate os efeitos da pandemia Lisi, Marco / Belchior, Ana Maria / Abrantes, Manuel / TVI24 2018: Costa promote ‘incentivos fortes’ para na emigração; in: Público, May 14th, 2020; available at: Azevedo, Joana 2019: Portuguese Emigrants’ Political emigrantes regressarem a Portugal, August 25th, https://www.publico.pt/2020/05/14/politica/noticia/ps- Representation: The Challenges of the External Vote; in: 2018; available at: https://tvi24.iol.pt/politica/ debate-efeitos-pandemia-emigracao-1916406 Pereira, Cláudia / Azevedo, Joana (eds.): New and Old antonio-costa/costa-promete-incentivos-fortes-para- (retrieved: 06.11.2020). Routes of Portuguese Emigration; Springer Open, Cham, emigrantesregressarem-a-portugal p. 73-94. (retrieved: 06.11.2020). Arslan, Cansin / Dumont, Jean-Christophe / Kone, Zovanga / Moullan, Yasser / Ozden, Caglar / Parsons, Christopher Lopes, Maria João 2020: Imigrantes mais vulneráveis: / Xenogiani, Theodora 2014: A New Profile of Migrants são um quarto dos infectados em Lisboa e 16% no in the Aftermath of the Recent Economic Crisis, OECD Porto; in: Público, July 9th, 2020; available at: https:// Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, 160; www.publico.pt/2020/07/09/sociedade/noticia/ available at: https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/wp160.pdf imigrantes-vulneraveis-sao-quartoinfectados-lisboa-16- (retrieved: 06.11.2020). porto-1923721 (retrieved: 06.11.2020).

Eurostat 2019: EU Citizens Living in Another Member State Lusa, Agência 2020: Governo envia palavra de conforto - Statistical Overview; available at: https://ec.europa.eu/ a emigrantes afectados por pandemia; in: Diário de eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/EU_citizens_ Notícias, June 8th, 2020; available at: https://www. living_in_another_Member_State_-_statistical_overview dnoticias.pt/2020/6/8/48180-governo-envia-palavra-de- (retrieved: 06.11.2020). conforto-a-emigrantes-afectadospor-pandemia (retrieved: 06.11.2020). Eurostat 2020a: Population Statistics; available at: https:// ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/populationdemography- Meireles, Ana 2013: Como Passos e outros governantes migration-projections/data (retrieved: 06.11.2020). apelaram à emigração; in: Diário de Notícias, January Eurostat 2020b: Projected Old-Age Dependency 17th, 2013; available at: https://www.dn.pt/politica/ Ratio; available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ amp/como-passos-e-outros-governantes-apelaram-a- databrowser/view/tps00200/default/table?lang=en emigracao-2999901.html (retrieved: 06.11.2020). (retrieved: 06.11.2020) Mendes, Mariana 2019: The General Elections in Portugal Expresso 2020: Milhares de emigrantes pediram ajuda 2019. MIDEM-Report 2019-5; Mercator Forum Migration para sair de Portugal nos últimos meses; July 3rd, 2020; und Demokratie, ed. by Hans Vorländer, Dresden. available at: https://expresso.pt/sociedade/2020-07- 03-Covid-19.-Milhares-de-imigrantes-pediram-ajuda- Pereira, Cláudia / Azevedo, Joana 2019: The Fourth Wave parasair-de-Portugal-nos-ultimos-meses of Portuguese Emigration: Austerity Policies, European (retrieved: 06.11.2020). Peripheries and Postcolonial Continuities; in: Pereira, Cláudia / Azevedo, Joana (eds.): New and Old Routes of Henriques, Joana Gorjão 2020: Governo regulariza Portuguese Emigration; Springer Open, Cham, p. 1-26. todos os imigrantes que tenham pedidos pendentes no SEF; in: Público, March 28th, 2020; available at: Pires, Rui Pena 2019: Portuguese Emigration Today; in: https://www.publico.pt/2020/03/28/sociedade/noticia/ Pereira, Cláudia / Azevedo, Joana (eds.): New and Old governo-regulariza-imigrantes-pedidospendentes-sef- Routes of Portuguese Emigration; Springer Open, Cham, 1909791(retrieved: 06.11.2020). p. 29-48.

Jornal de Notícias 2011: Um primeiro-ministro que Pires, Rui / Pereira, Claudia 2018: Migrações, qualificações aconselha a emigração não acredita no seu país; e desigualdade social; in: do Carmo, Renato Miguel December 22nd, 2011; available at: https://www. / Sebastião, João / Azevedo, Joana / da Cruz Martins, jn.pt/politica/um-primeiro-ministro-que-aconselha-a- Susana / da Costa, Antonio Firmino (eds.): Dsigualdades emigracao-naoacredita-no-seu-pais-2201286.html Sociais: Portugal e a Europa; Editora Mundos Sociais, (retrieved: 06.11.2020). Lisboa, p. 335-352.

Justino, David 2016: Emigration from Portugal. Old Wine PORDATA 2020a: Emigrantes por mil habitants; available in New Bottles?; Migration Policy Institute, Washington. at: https://www.pordata.pt/Portugal/Emigrantes+por+m il+habitantes-832 (retrieved: 06.11.2020). King, Russell 2019: New Migration Dynamics on the South- Western Periphery of Europe: Theoretical Reflections on PORDATA 2020b: Emigrantes: total e por tipo; the Portuguese Case; in: Pereira, Cláudia / Azevedo, Joana available at: https://www.pordata.pt/Portugal/ (eds.): New and Old Routes of Portuguese Emigration; Emigrantes+total+e+por+tipo-21 Springer Open, Cham, p. 267-281. (retrieved: 06.11.2020).

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8 ROMANIA

Summary

During the last decades Romania’s international net migration has been negative. Emigration became one of the major aspects of social transformation and demographic shrinkage processes.

Emigration was initially framed in positive terms, perceived as beneficial due to remittances and the reduced pressure on the welfare system. Subsequently, however, another perspective emerged. This perspective focused primarily on the emigration of (highly) skilled workers trained in the country and its long-term social and economic consequences.

Romania‘s image abroad has also played a central role in public debates about emigration, with the question of the ethnic affiliation of those who emigrated. Here, even state agencies were repeatedly at pains to emphasize a differentiation, strongly tainted with prejudice, between ‚ordinary‘ Romanian emigrants and emigrated Sinti and Roma of Romanian citizenship.

The issue of (mostly) children and elderly left behind was of interest to all political parties and the media. Despite this issue being highly visible, no substantial policies have been adopted to address it.

DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE OF EMIGRATION

After the fall of the state socialist regime in 1989, migration was identified as one of the biggest transformation processes in Romania, accompanying the political regime shift towards democracy and the passage from a state planned to a market economy (Iftimoaei/Baciu 2018; Petrescu/Bâc/ Zgură 2011). Half a million Romanians emigrated during each of the peak years of migration - in 1991, 2001 and 2007. After joining the European Union in 2007, Romanian citizens benefited from the freedom of movement, including labor mobility, in some member states (MS), while in others they were subject to temporary work restrictions. From 2007 there was a downward trend in terms of migration which persisted until 2013 when the lowest negative net migration rate was registered. While the median monthly nominal salary increased by 128 percent from 1042 RON (approx. 215 Euro) in 2007 to 2383 RON (approx. 493 Euro) in 2017, it still left Roma- nian employees as the lowest paid workers in the EU (Iftimoaei/Baciu 2018: 174). Despite the increase of salaries, a steady increase in emigration was registered after 2013 (Figure 1).

The negative net migration made Romania a workforce provider country, partially accounting for the drastic decrease in population, from 23.2 million people in 1990 to 19 million people today. While emigration accounted to a great extent for Romania’s demographic decline during the last decades, the decrease of birth-rates aggravated it. The fertility rate has been trending down- wards since 1970, reaching 2.2 in 1990, then steadily falling to 1.8 in 2018. The population projection shows that a demographic decline of almost 20 percent is expected over the period from 2010 to 2060. Between 1991 and 2002, 62 percent of migrants were part of the most fertile age group (Ghetau 2009). EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES While the risk of poverty and social exclusion of employed people decreased C148 149 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ROMANIA

Country Factsheet Fig. 2: Destination countries of Romanian emigration 2004-2019

GDP per capita: 27,310€ Australia Austria 1% other 6% EU accession year: 2007 15% Canada 8%

Population in 2019: 23,200,000 Switzerland 1% Population in 1990: 19,410,000 Hungary France Population projection for 2060: 17,308,000 3% 4%

Share of foreign citizens (with resident status): 0.6% Foreign born population: 3.2% USA 8% Young population: 18.8% (EU average: 15.2%) Working age population: 73.6% Germany Aged 65 and over: 18.5% (EU average: 20.2%) 16%

Fertility rate: 1.76 (EU average: 1.55)

Greece Spain 1% from 35.3 percent in 2007 to 22.8 percent in 2018, it still remains high. Roma 18% people are exposed to a much higher degree of extreme poverty, given that Israel 3% racism, residential segregation and discrimination hinder their employment and education. In 2011, the unemployment rate for people aged 15 and Italy above was three times higher for Roma than for non-Roma (FRA 2014: 22). 16%

PROFILE AND DESTINATION In 1990 emigration had a more pronounced diversity in terms of nation- Source: Institutul National de Statistica / own representation OF EMIGRATION ality, before a high percentage of Germans and Hungarians leaving the country. After 2000, the proportion of ethnic Romanians among those who emigrated exceeded 90 percent (Suditu/Prelipcean/Virdol/Stangaciu 2013: and 2019 the most common destination for Romanian emigrants was 131). Between 2008 and 2018, 76.72 percent of Romanian temporary emi- Spain – 18 percent, followed by Italy and Germany, each accounting for 16 grants were part of the working age population (15-64). Women represent- percent of the emigrants. Canada and the United States each received 8 ed 52.68 percent and men 47.32 percent of those who emigrated. During percent of the Romanian migrants during this period, followed by Austria the first wave of migration it was engineers, technicians and doctors who and France (Figure 2). emigrated, followed by computer scientists, economists and professors. Af- terwards, there was massive migration of the unskilled and average-skilled Among the consequences of emigration, scholars distinguish between POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EFFECTS workforce (Suditu/Prelipcean/Virdol/Stangaciu 2013: 153). Between 2004 two periods. Before the accession to the European Union, emigration is said to have helped adjust the supply and demand of the workforce affected by de-industrialization, while after 2007, emigration supported Fig. 1: Yearly net migration rate and total population economic growth through remittances and diminished the state budget

Immigration Emigration Net migration Total population deficit (Iftimoaei/Baciu 2018). As a negative consequence, Romania expe- 30 22,5 rienced a growing shortage of labor, which could not be compensated by immigration. 20 10 In terms of human capital, identified effects of emigration are the so-called ‘brain drain’ and ‘brain waste’’. Studies showed that for some migrants, em- 0 igration led to a decrease of professional status in the receiving country, -10 compared to their previous employment in the country of origin thereby making poor use of or ‘wasting’ their skills (Sandu et al. 2009). The ‘brain -20 drain’ involved the migration of specialists from the IT and health-care -30 sectors, engineers and technicians, researchers and teachers. For example, in 2013, more than 14,000 physicians were working abroad, which is -40 equivalent to 26 percent of the overall number of physicians in Romania. A Migration (in thousand)

-50 Total population (in million) positive aspect of the situation is that the highly skilled population that em- igrates has the potential to attract Foreign Direct Investments and to con- -60 18,0 tribute to research and development (Suditu/Prelipcean/Virdol/Stangaciu 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2013). Also the low-skilled labor force seems to potentially benefit from a Source: Eurostat / own representation superior professional environment abroad that can improve their qualifications and subsequently increase their salary in the country of origin upon return (Ambrosini/Mayr/Peri/Radu 2011).

150 151 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ROMANIA

Fig. 3: Personal remittances to Romania (percentage of GDP) Fig. 4: The salience of emigration in the Romanian news agency Agerpres

3.5 25

3 20 2.5

2 15

1.5 10 1

5 0.5

0 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Source: World Development Indicators / own representation Number of news pieces that included the word ‘emigration’ (1/01/2000 – 15/07/2020). Source: Factiva / own representation

Remittances, which are another positive effect of emigration, have an important impact on living standards. Their value has increased considerably since 2013 and reached 3 percent of the GDP in 2019 (Figure 3). remained low, agriculture workers (an overwhelming majority self-em- While the purpose of one third of remittances sent home to Romania ployed or contributing family members) preferred to migrate for higher is saving or investment, two-thirds are spent on consumption. A major salaries than to engage in low-paid waged employment in Romania. Even source of income for the migrants’ families, remittances are used to im- during periods of economic growth, the media reported about skilled la- prove the standard of the household, or to renovate or build new houses bor shortages and the difficulties experienced by multinationals wanting (Grigoras 2006). to employ workers from abroad.

EMIGRATION IN THE POLITICAL DEBATE Based on the analysis of newspaper data from the Romanian news agency, the political debates covered by Agerpress confirm a clear di- THE SALIENCE OF THE Based on the analysis of newspaper data from the Romanian news Agen- vision between the periods pre- and post-EU accession in terms of the EMIGRATION TOPIC IN THE MEDIA cy Agerpres1, the media salience of emigration peaked twice: in 2007 – framing of emigration. Before Romania entered the EU, emigration was the EU accession year – and 2015 (Figure 4). Emigration was discussed portrayed rather positively. The news agency reported the emphasis of mostly in socioeconomic terms, emphasizing the shrinking workforce political leaders on the benefits of remittances or the diminished pres- due to low salaries and poor working conditions. Although Agerpres has sure on the state budget. After 2007, a negative framing focusing on reported on the financial reasons that account for the trends in emigra- losses and costs prevailed. Political parties and government officials de- tion in general, it is the emigration of highly skilled and skilled personnel plored the enormous educational costs borne by the state to train a that has attracted most media attention, with the issue having a high labor force that was heading abroad, making it difficult to balance the degree of salience (Hutter/Kriesi 2019). welfare system, in the context of an aging population and youth emigration (Agerpres 2013a). Moreover, even in times of economic growth, the The media emphasized and deplored the loss of highly skilled person- media debate on emigration has been dominated by complaints about nel, such as healthcare and IT professionals or skilled workers from the the lack of skilled labor and the difficulties of multinational corporations construction industry. They reported that the poor working conditions in attracting new workers to Romania from abroad. in healthcare facilities, professionals’ dissatisfaction with low salaries, overtime and lack of support for research were all factors that motivat- Based on Agerpress media analysis, after 2015 the debate focused more on ed physicians to emigrate. Additional reasons for leaving the country proactive measures to tackle emigration. President Klaus Iohannis asked mentioned in media coverage were the lack of career recognition and for public policies and programs to make Romanian emigrants a national possibilities for professional development. priority, declaring that “well anchored by a careful state, a strong diaspora can become an important resource for Romania‘s modernization and Although unemployment continued to decrease after 2002, the emi- development” (Agerpres 2016a, own translation). Reversing the trend of gration rates remained high. Labor market participation was at a low negative natural growth, attracting immigration, getting migrants to return level and there was a big share of informal employment. Since salaries and extending the active life of those able and willing to work beyond the retirement age were measures deemed necessary by the chief-economist of the National Bank of Romania in 2015 in order to increase the Romanian economy‘s potential (Agerpres 2015). 1 Agerpres is the oldest Romanian news agency, established in March 1889. According to the Law 19/2003 Agerpres is an autonomous public institution, of national interest, editorially independent and under the control of the parliament.

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INFOBOX – Roma: A Romanian, European “problem”? there “will also be a substantial change in the structure of the population as we have the Roma minority that is extremely productive” (Agerpres 2013b, As far as Roma emigration is concerned, the political discourse was inflam- own translation). He was already known for racist remarks when, in 2007, matory and racist, and one of the central concerns in this respect was the he called a journalist a “stinking gypsy”. The content of the recording was distinction between ‘hard-working respectable’ Romanian migrants and shared on the internet and the National Council for Combatting Discrimina- the ‘unworthy’ Roma. Based on a racist construction of an internal other, tion issued an advertisement. Only after the 2015 bilateral negotiations with this differentiation became visible in the public debates when political au- the French authorities about the explusion of the Roma families, did the thorities issued memorandums and initiated campaigns to stop the con- Romanian authorities start to implement policies that would support the fusion between Roma and Romanians, because they felt that the former reintegration of the Romanian citizens of Roma ethnicity into the Romanian was tarnishing the image of the latter abroad. The Ministry of Foreign Af- society upon their return from France. fairs issued two memorandums addressing the confusion between Roma and Romanians, which was supposedly affecting Romanian migrants In Romania, institutionalized racism. Including obstacles on the labor mar- abroad; these memorandums were approved by the Prime Ministers at ket, the lack of access to housing, and forced evictions – has become more the time. The first one – Memorandum H (03)/169 from January 31st, 1995 politicized during the recent years, keeps some of the Roma people in vul- – asked state institutions to use the word “țaske” instead of “rom”, in or- nerable position or marginalize them even further. The Roma people’s mo- der to avoid confusion between the Roma and Romanians. The second tivation for emigration is both discrimination and the inability to access jobs. one – Memorandum no 5/6380 from September 4th, 2009 – discussed the influence of Roma migration, which was perceived by the authorities as having a negative impact on Romania’s image abroad (Rostas 2012). The In general, political parties did not address emigration in their political pro- EMIGRATION IN second memorandum came against the background of the Mailat case2 grams. In the few cases they did addressed the topic, they did so in relation PARTY MANIFESTOS in 2007 that amplified the negative coverage of Romanians in the Italian to the ‘brain drain’ phenomenon and, more specifically, the migration of phy- and Spanish media and triggered violence against Romanian Roma and sicians and other highly skilled professionals. While medium-skilled and low- non-Roma. The following year, the Romanian government implemented skilled workers have been left out of the political debates about emigration, an expensive national branding campaign in Italy and Spain, constructing the loss of health-care professionals was stressed as being a central priority the ‘respectable Romanianness’ based on a racialized construction of the by different parties during the last elections. In 2012 the Hungarian Demo- Romani other (Kaneva/Popescu 2014). cratic Alliance of Romania proposed the establishment of an alternative system of remuneration for health care employees in order to better motivate Agerpres did not cover these debates. When it covered Roma in Romania them and reduce their migration towards the West, whereas the Social Liber- in the context of emigration the Roma were persistently perceived as a al Union politicized health-care migration to demonize the previous govern- problem, especially regarding bilateral relations, pre- or post-EU accession. ment, claiming it had destroyed the health-care system. Measures proposed During a high-level meeting with the Romanian President, Foreign Minis- were stopping the migration of doctors and investments in the health-care ter and Prime Minister in Bucharest in 2002, the British Foreign Secretary infrastructure and pharmaceuticals. In 2016, included among the one hun- at the time, Jack Straw, said that “Romanies (…) filing for political asylum dred liberal measures for national reconstruction proposed by the National are a problem for both countries” (Agerpres 2002, own translation). The Liberal Party was the idea “to stop the migration of doctors by doubling their same year, discussing a potential bilateral agreement with France to “bring salaries from July 1st, 2017 and reorganizing the medical profession within back 200 Romanian gypsies caught begging on the Parisian streets”, Gen- the Romanian salary system based on a rational grid” (own translation). eral Geanta, first deputy of the Border Police Inspector General, wanting to show how well the police were doing their job, mentioned that the border Within parliamentary debates, the politicization of emigration translated EMIGRATION IN police in Romania “are carefully checking these physically challenged peo- into an increase of the salience of the issue, especially before Romania’s PARLIAMENT DEBATES ple, because most of the time those wanting to go and beg abroad pretend accession to the EU, but also during the 2012-2016 parliamentary term (Fig- to be physically disabled” (ibid.). ure 5). However, the analysis of the political declarations and public policy initiatives show that party positions on emigration are not polarized. In Starting in 2007, the Roma stopped being perceived as only a Romanian terms of expansion, looking at the number of actors approaching a spe- ‘problem’, but also as a European on. It added to the existing ‘Roma stain cific issue, emigration was addressed in a discontinuous and fitful man- Romanians’ image abroad frame. In a 2007 conspiracy theory-style editorial ner through various projects initiated by NGOs, such as “Te iubeste mama” with racist tones, the author deplored the fact that Romanians are mistaken (“Mom loves you!”) designed to facilitate free online audio-visual communi- for Roma, being treated as outcasts abroad - including footballer Adrian cation between children and remote parents, or actions by left-wing collec- Mutu, booed during a match in Italy - because of his darker skin. The author tives protesting the exploitation of Romanian workers abroad. used the word gypsy throughout the article, while mentioning that “nowadays they call themselves Roma” Blaming the Communist rule for not be- The salience of emigration in the parliamentary debates grew considerably ing able to solve the problems of Roma, the article absolves the post-1989 during the period prior to EU accession. The analysis below emphasizes governments that did not have enough time to solve the issues “deeply the main frames used by MPs in their political declarations or public policy engrained in the ethnic group of the gypsies” (Agerpres 2007, own trans- initiatives with respect to emigration. lation). Along the same lines, when discussing emigration, the 2013 president, Traian Basescu, lamented the decreased birth-rate, yet explained that Before 2000, debates and public policies concerning migration were scarce. CAUSES OF EMIGRATION Establishing a legislative framework for Romanian citizens abroad was the central aspect on the political agenda concerning emigration. During 2000- 2 The Mailat case made headlines in 2007. Romulus Mailat was convicted and imprisoned for the 2004, the socioeconomic dimension of emigration was emphasized in both murder of Giovanna Reggiani, who was attacked in Rome in October 2007. The facts of the case, the positive and negative aspects. The socioeconomic dimension of emigra- which were widely publicized, led to a wave of outrage and a series of attacks on Romanians in Italy, in their homes or on the streets. tion was mainly politicized by the far-right Greater Romania Party (PRM),

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Fig. 5: (E)migration in parliamentary debates the time made up of liberals and Hungarian democrats (UDMR) proposed a package of measures to evaluate the situation of Romanians working Migration Emigration abroad and an incentive scheme to stimulate the return of Romanian work- 300 ers from abroad. 250 As this mixture of partly contradictory proposals shows, no conclusive as- 200 sessment of the emigration problem had yet been found in government, parliament or the public. While some emphasized the benefits of emigra- 150 tion in terms of stimulating the economy or reducing pressure on the social budget, others pointed primarily to the shortage of both high- and low- 100 skilled labor, the decline of rural areas, and the social and psychological 50 pressures faced by affected family members. Although migrants perceive their emigration experience with regards to family relations in rather posi- 0 tive terms – emphasizing the economic benefits and financial support they 1996-2000 2000-2004 2004-2008 2008-2012 2012-2016 2016-present can offer to relatives at home – studies have underlined that emigration Source: Parliamentary Logs / own calculation4 increases the vulnerability of the children and elderly left behind (Alexe/ Horvath/Noica/Radu 2012).

especially in 2002, when countries included in the Schengen area removed It was during this legislature (2004-2008), that the situation of children left at SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES FOR visa requirements for Romanian citizens, making a valid passport sufficient home by parents working abroad, and the related situation of the elderly tak- CHILDREN AND THE ELDERLY for entry. In this context, a representative of the PRM deplored the con- ing responsibility for their upbringing, became highly politicized. However, straints and burdens that drive Romanians to work abroad – such as pov- while representatives of the major parties and independents acknowledged erty and a high rate of unemployment, but also the government’s apparent the issue of “home-alone children” and emphasized the necessity to act, the lack of concern regarding poor working conditions and the discrimination legislative proposals initiated at the time to ensure the protection of these of Romanians abroad, while it celebrated the reduced pressure on the so- children and to support them in their educational path, were rejected. cial welfare budget (Sonea 2002). In August 2007, a proposal was drafted by independent MP Meir Nati to The debate about the socio-economic causes of emigration peaked in 2004 oblige parents traveling abroad to inform the social assistance services when other parties joined the discussion, especially in the context of the Ma- (SPAS) of their departure and of the person who would be responsible for drid train bombings, when sixteen Romanians died. For the national-liberal the children left at home, or to make a monthly payment of 5 percent of their PNL and the right-wing nationalist PRM, this event was an occasion to ques- salary abroad to the social assistance fund (Meir 2007). In contrast, the Dem- tion the framework conditions which motivated Romanians to move abroad. ocrat (PD) Bogdan Cantaragiu‘s initiative of the same year proposed the crea- They came to the conclusion that in view of the growing gap between rich tion of an after-school program to which children whose parents were living and poor, there was in fact „no alternative“ to emigration, i.e., that those who abroad would have access to, and that would be supervised by specialized emigrate basically have no other choice (Arghezi 2004, Rădulescu 2004). commissions consisting of a teacher, a social assistant and a psychologist. In 2009, a group of Democratic Liberal Party (Partidul Democrat Liberal, PD-L) In particular, the Social Democrats (PSD) in government between 2000 and initiated a legislative proposal aimed at bringing together various govern- 2004 were subsequently attacked by the opposition for their alleged inabili- mental and civil society actors, such as child protection services and local ty to create attractive jobs in Romania and were therefore indirectly blamed councils, for the social and psychological condition of these children. Finally, for the deaths of Romanian ‘guest workers‘ in Madrid (Bara 2004). the 2013 initiative of the populist ‚People‘s Party Dan Diaconescu‘ (PP-DD) provided financial support in the form of vouchers to persons caring for chil- OPPORTUNITIES OF EMIGRATION During the years preceding the accession to the EU, the rights-based frame- dren whose parents are temporarily abroad.3 work, referring to the regime of free movement and the protection of Ro- manian citizens working abroad held a crucial place in the parliamentary Although the fate of the people who remained in their homeland in this way EXPERIENCE OF debates. In the context of transitional measures established by the Treaty but were nevertheless affected by emigration has always been a central sub- DISCRIMINATION ABROAD of Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania, some member coun- ject of political debates on emigration and has been taken up and lamented tries imposed temporary work permits on Romanian and Bulgarian citizens by countless political statements and emotionalizing speeches, the afore- (Annex 7, Title 1, Article 6 Protocol: Transitional measures: Romania). mentioned legislative initiatives ultimately remained unsuccessful. During the 2016-2020 parliamentary term, the interest in emigration dropped. While Although of peripheral interest, some PNL representatives questioned the still present in the parliamentary debates, the situation of children whose discriminatory nature of the work permits with respect to EU’s fundamental parents work abroad was less politicized. Nevertheless, PSD representatives freedoms. Emphasizing the positive effect of remittances on the Romani- emphasized the urgent need to create pilot-centers for “home-alone chil- an economy and their contribution towards reducing poverty, PNL insisted dren” in the North-East region of Romania, one the poorest in EU, with three that the government needs to strengthen the existing collaboration with times more “home-alone children” than the national average (Macovei 2019). other EU member states in the field of labor exchange in order to increase In fact, in the past 20 years, not only those left behind, but above all the fates the number of contracts and identify potential tenderers abroad. Party members also pleaded for labor rights to be respected, including access to social security, specifically health insurance, unemployment benefits and 3 Source of data: http://www.cdep.ro/. In order to assess the meaning of migration in general and contributions to pension funds – deploring the fact that these rights were emigration in particular in parliamentary debates, the frequency of use of the word stems of „foreign“ and „migration“ (in Romanian migra and strain) in each of the legislative periods from 1996 onward enjoyed only by very few Romanian emigrants. The coalition government at was determined here.

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of those who emigrated have been at the center of the Romanian discussion INFOBOX – Emigration in times of Corona on emigration. The experience of stereotypes, exploitation and discrimination with which Romanian emigrants were confronted in other European During the pandemic, romanticized public debates regarding emigration countries has repeatedly played a decisive role. Various cases covered by the oscillated between an initial condemnation of the Romanians working in international press triggered the indignation of certain representatives, such Italy, Spain or the UK, returning home after losing their jobs and the sub- as the case of three Romanians living and working in France who each owned sequent pride and appreciation for the Romanians going to work abroad an iPhone and were arrested on the streets of Paris in 2011, accused of steal- amidst the pandemic, coming to the rescue of Western European states ing them (Rigaux 2016). At the beginning of 2015, UK’s Channel 4 released the in need of seasonal agricultural or care work. The situation of the most documentary “The Romanians Are Coming” which triggered also indignation precarious migrant workers coming back home after being severely hit because of what was considered a disparaging and discriminatory portrayal by the pandemic and not being able to afford to pay their rent and quar- of Romanian workers. The Romanian community in the UK organized a silent antine abroad after losing their job was belittled by the press and raised protest in front of the media outlet in London, to express their discontent concerns among the governors. A distinction has been made in the public with the way they were depicted in the documentary and with the fact that debates between “thieves and criminals” and the “serious diaspora”, trig- they are treated as second-class European citizens (Digi24 2015). In addition, gered by the declarations of the MEP Rares Bogdan, a PNL candidate dur- the Romanian foreign affairs minister sent a letter to his British counterpart ing the 2019 elections and sitting for the EPP group. The MEP sparked con- to express his dissatisfaction, the Romanian ambassador to the UK publicly troversy after stating that some of those returning home are also “pimps, condemned the Channel 4 portrayal of Romanians and parliament repre- prostitutes, beggars and violent criminals” (Mediafax 2020). It was initially sentatives used diplomatic channels to emphasize the need to firmly inter- ignored that among the most severely hit by the Covid-19 crisis were Ro- vene to prevent this kind of denigration (Fonta 2015; Mazilu 2015). manian emigrants pressured to work abroad by poverty and lack of opportunities for survival who had then taken up precarious employment ROMANIAN However, not only cases of degradation, but also fraud, breaches of contract contracts or were engaged in illigal work; such as those working in slaugh- LABOR EXPLOITATION and slave-like working conditions, which the emigrants sometimes had to terhouses in Germany (Deutsche Welle 2020) or in care work in Austria suffer, were regularly the subject of political discussion in Romania. Labor or Italy and who found themselves unable to support themselves in the conditions and exploitation were brought under parliamentary scrutiny host country after losing their jobs. During the last decades emigration when the serious labour and sexual exploitation suffered by Romanian wom- was mostly celebrated as it lowered the pressure on the welfare budget, en working in greenhouses and fields in Ragusa hit the international press even though some of its severe costs have been acknowledged and po- in 2017 (Tondo/Kelly 2017). Romanian experts within the European Women’s liticized at various moments. The return of Romanian emigrants during Lobby (EWL) put the issue on the women’s rights organization’s agenda as the pandemic, after many lost their jobs, was unwelcomed, especially well and brought further the issue to European Parliament (EWL 2017; Stur those involved in “dishonest work” who “need to be brought to terms” as 2017). Outside parliamentary politics, the exploitation of Romanian migrant Bogdan declared (Mediafax 2020). The more appreciative framing came workers abroad was politicized by the left-wing collective Claca, for example when in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic – the government, managed when Romanian construction workers involved in the building of a mall in to create special clearways in agreement with Western European states, Berlin, subsequently called “the mall of shame”, were not paid for their work by means of a strict lockdown enforced by police and army as emergen- (Ana 2020: 199). Some placement agencies also came under fire for unfair cy state measures were implemented, in order to send cheap Romanian practices, false promises and fraud in placing people willing to emigrate. To labor abroad as the Western European states were in need of seasonal prevent abuses of Romanian workers abroad by foreign employers but also workers in agriculture or care. placement agencies, several deputies from different parties, proposed a law that would introduce an obligation for employment agencies to transmit the contact data of the workers they place abroad to the Romanian diplomatic OUTLOOK missions. The proposal was rejected.4 In the last two decades Romania’s demographic decline has been the result LABOR SHORTAGE However, not only the experiences of the emigrants, but also the economic of a complex evolution of birth rates, death rates and emigration, related IN ROMANIA consequences of their emigration for Romania have been discussed rath- to the socio-economic conditions after the fall of the state-socialist regime. er critically in recent years. Already during the 2012-2016 legislative period, The considerable deterioration of the structure of the age groups, includ- the situation in Romanian hospitals in particular came to a head due to a ing a declining ratio of young people has contributed to an increase in the steadily worsening shortage of personnel, which is why the Romanian par- old-age dependency rate from 15.8 percent in 1990 to 28.6 percent in 2019. ties increasingly addressed the emigration of health care personnel. The un- Although current demographic projections predict a slight increase in the derfunding of the health care system and its partial privatization as part of fertility rate during the next 50 years, this will not stop the decline in popu- austerity measures resulted in nationwide protests in the winter of 2011/12 lation numbers. The population projection shows a demographic decline of (Ana 2017). To encourage them to stay in the country, a supplement of 150 almost 20 percent by 2060, compared to a slight increase of 3.2 percent of euros was finally granted to practicing physicians in 2014, and the salary of the EU average. health care workers was increased by 25 percent in 2015. In 2016, young Romanians were even encouraged to return to the country through a “Di- Against this background, the consequences of the massive emigration move- aspora Start-up Program”. Despite these incentives, in a 2016 survey, more ments in Romania after 1990 are being discussed critically. Not only the con- than eighty percent of Romania‘s young physicians said they still consider tinuing exodus of well-educated young people, but also the loss of low-skilled emigrating. workers is already having a considerable impact on the Romanian economy and the capacities of the welfare state. The political consequences of this development are likely to become increasingly evident in the coming decade. A likely scenario is that the country will continue to educate and train cheap 4 Propunere legislativă 147/2015 (http://www.cdep.ro/pls/proiecte/upl_pck2015.proiect?idp=14187) labor for abroad, both skilled and unskilled and in this case will rely on im-

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Macovei, Silviu Nicu 2019: Regiunea de Nord-Est are Sonea, Ioan 2002: Visa Liberalization Intervention - the nevoie urgentă de un centru pentru copiii cu părinţii Chance for Romanians to Go Abroad; available at: http:// plecaţi la muncă în străinătate; March 13th, 2019; www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno2015.stenograma?ids=52 available at: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenog 49&idm=1,14&idl=1 (retrieved: 11.10.2020). rama?ids=8034&idm=1,013&idl=1 (retrieved: 11.10.2020). Stur, Beata 2017: S&D MEPs Address Exploitation of Women in Rural Areas of Sicily, New Europe; available at: Mazilu, Constantin 2015: Imaginea românilor în https://www.neweurope.eu/article/sd-meps-address- străinătate, o hologramă contrafăcută; March 10th, exploitation-women-rural-areas-sicily/ 2015; available at: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno. (retrieved: 11.10.2020). stenograma? ids=7469&idm=1,043&idl=1 (retrieved: 11.10.2020). Suditu, Bogdan Alexandru / Prelipcean, Gabriela / Virdol, Daniel Celu / Stangaciu, Oana Ancuta 2013: Perspectivele Mediafax 2020: Rareș Bogdan spune că 1% din românii politicii de migratie in contextul demografic actual din veniți în Diaspora nu au muncit cinstit. Trebuie să acționăm Romania. Studii de strategie si politici (SPOS), 2012 (1); clar și sa îi punem cu botul pe labe dacă pun în pericol Institutul European din Romania, Bucharest. siguranața noastră; April 23rd, 2020; available at : https:// www.mediafax.ro/politic/rares-bogdan-spune-ca-1-din- Tondo, Lorenzo / Kelly, Annie 2017: Raped, Beaten, romanii-veniti-in-diaspora-nu-au-muncit-cinstit-trebuie- Exploited: the 21st-Century Slavery Propping up Sicilian sa-actionam-clar-si-sa-ii-punem-cu-botul-pe-labe-daca- Farming. Thousands of Female Romanian Farm Workers pun-in-pericol-siguranta-noastra-19093760 Are Suffering Horrendous Abuse; available at: https:// (retrieved: 11.10.2020). www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/ mar/12/slavery-sicily-farming-raped-beaten-exploited- Meir, Nati 2007: Propunere legislativă privind protecţia romanianwomen#:~:text=Police%20say%20they%20 copiilor care sunt lipsiţi de îngrijirea părinţilor pe believe%20that, of%20exploitation%20on%20the%20 perioada în care aceştia se află la muncă în străinătate; island (retrieved: 11.10.2020) August 20th, 2007; available at: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/ proiecte/upl_pck2015.proiect?idp=8583 (retrieved: 11.10.2020).

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Rădulescu, Emil Grigore 2004: About the Underground Economy and Romanians Working Abroad; March 30th, 2004; available at: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/ steno2015.steno grama?ids=5642&idm=1,29&idl=1 (retrieved: 11.10.2020).

Rigaux, Marianne 2011: Policiers, un Roumain avec un iPhone ne l’a pas forcément volé; September 15th, 2011; available at: https://www.nouvelobs.com/rue89/rue89- nos-vies-connectees/20110914.RUE4338/policiers-un- roumain-avec-un-iphone-ne-l-a-pas-forcement-vole. html (retrieved: 11.10.2020).

Rostaș, Iulius 2012: Identitatea romani. Discurs, organizare și proiect politic; in: Horváth, Istvan / Nastasă, Lucian (eds.): Rom sau Ţigan. Dilemele unui etnonim în spaţiul românesc; Editura Institutului pentru Studierea Problemelor Minorităţilor Naţionale, Cluj-Napoca, p. 199-230.

Sandu, Dumitru 2009: Romanian Communities in Spain, Soros Foundation Romania (FSR); available at: http://www.soros.ro/ro/fisier_acord_publicatii. php?publicatie=82 (retrieved: 11.10.2020)

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9 SPAIN

Summary

The 2008 financial crisis, and the subsequent Euro crisis, had a substantial impact on migration flows in Spain. The increase in emigration and the decrease in immigration constituted a sharp break with the preceding period in which Spain’s foreign population swiftly increased and emigration numbers were low.

As a result, public and political attention partially shifted from immigration to emigration. The debate was mostly focused on the negative impact of the crisis on qualified young Spaniards, thus obscuring the fact that the vast majority of outgoing migrants were actually foreigners, that is, immigrants themselves.

Political parties framed emigration differently. While governmental representatives did not perceive emigration exclusively in negative terms, the left/ opposition framed it in a completely negative and often dramatic fashion, blaming the retrenchment policies and labor reforms of the right-wing incumbent for driving people away. This is in contrast to the treatment of the Spanish diaspora, which is a consensual issue among parties.

DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE OF EMIGRATION

According to its official statistics, Spain has an estimated 2.6 million citi- ONLY ONE THIRD zens living abroad, that is, the equivalent of about 5.5 percent of its res- OF EMIGRANTS ident population (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2020a). Of these, only BORN IN SPAIN 32 percent (~838,000) were actually born in Spain, which speaks for the proportion of (a) descendants of emigrants1 and (b) immigrants who ac- quired Spanish citizenship and returned to their country of origin. The number of citizens abroad has increased substantially over the past decade, as in 2010 the official statistics registered only a little over 1.5 million citizens abroad.

This is not solely an outcome of emigration, but it is also the result of the introduction of new pathways to acquire Spanish nationality.2 About 60 percent of Spanish citizens abroad reside in the American continent and 36 percent in Europe. The overrepresentation of the former is both the result of a historical tradition of emigration to Latin America – Argentina being the country with most Spanish nationals –, but also of the fact that Latin American citizens have privileged access to Spanish citizenship via residency (as only two years of legal residency are required to request nationality). After Argentina (~473,500), the countries with the most Span- ish nationals are France (~273,000), the USA (~167,000) and Germany (~167,000) (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2020a).

1 Spanish nationality law is to a large extent based on ius sanguinis, meaning that those born of a Spanish mother or father are automatically granted citizenship, regardless of where they were born (art. 17.1 Civil Code). Children of Spanish emigrants who lost their Spanish nationality can also request citizenship (if the parents were born in Spain) (art. 20.1 b Civil Code). 2 The so-called Historical Memory Law (52/2007) – meant to recognize and provide compensation for EMIGRATION IN victims of the Civil War and the dictatorship – extended Spanish nationality ‘by origin’ (1) to children of a mother or father who was originally Spanish even if not born in Spain and (2) to grandchildren of EUROPEAN COUNTRIES people who went into exile and lost Spanish nationality. C 165 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SPAIN

Country Factsheet Fig. 1: Population development and annual migration rates

Immigration Emigration Net Migration Total population GDP per capita: 25,854€ 1,200 47.5 EU accession year: 1986 1,000 47.0 Population in 2019: 46,937,060 800 Population in 1990: 38,881,416 46.5 Population projection for 2060: 48,385,094 600

Share of foreign citizens: 10.3% 400 46.0 Foreign born population: 13.9% 200 45.5 Young population: 14.8% (EU average: 15.2%) Migration (in thousand) 0

Working age population: 65.8% Total population in (million) 45.0 Aged 65 and over: 19.4% (EU average: 20.2%) -200

Fertility rate: 1.26 (EU average: 1.55) -400 44.5 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística / own representation SPAIN AS A TRADITIONAL Similar to other South European countries, Spain was traditionally a coun- ‘EMIGRATION COUNTRY’ try of emigration with little immigration. The first large wave of emigration, which started in the last third of the 19th century and continued until the gained more than 800,000 people since then. This is exclusively due to pos- 1930s, is part of the so-called transatlantic cycle, when about 3.5 million itive net migration rates – which started to pick up in 2016 and are now people left to the American continent, in particular to former colonies (only back to the level of 2008 –, whereas the rate of natural increase3 has been half of which returned) (Romero Valiente 2003: 225). Outflows came to negative in the last few years. In this regard, it is worth noting that Spain halt during the Spanish civil war (1936-1939), but its end forced more than has the second lowest fertility rate in the EU (after Malta), well below the 200,000 people into political exile, particularly to France. The subsequent replacement level. wave of migration took place from the 1960s to the mid-1970s, when peripheral European countries supplied workers to highly industrialized Figure 2 looks exclusively at the yearly number of emigrants and goes back MOST EMIGRANTS economies in Europe, while, at the same time, the predominantly rural to 2002, showing a clear and sharp rise in emigration, already starting in HAD PREVIOUSLY IMMIGRATED economies of the South struggled to absorb population growth. More than 2006-2007 and reaching a peak in 2013 – in that year alone, more than half TO SPAIN 50,000 Spaniards left yearly – mostly to France, Germany and Switzerland a million people left. What is equally striking is the large overrepresentation –, with some estimates placing the total number of emigrants in this period of foreigners in emigration statistics, showing that the immigrant popula- at 2 million (Santos 1999: 30).

Net migration rates turned positive from the mid-1970s onwards, most of Fig. 2: Number of emigrants per year (2002-2019)

all as a result of a drastic reduction in emigration and significant return Emigration - total Emigration - SP citizens rates. In fact, up until 1994, the majority of incoming migrants were people 600,000 of Spanish nationality returning to their home country (Romero Valiente 2003: 226). The flux of foreign migrants, however, progressively increased 500,000 from the late 1980s onwards, booming around the year 2000. Spain’s foreign population grew exceptionally fast, as the total number of foreign 400,000 residents went from less than 1 million in 2000 to over 5 million in 2008, corresponding to a period of sustained economic growth and job creation. 300,000 This largely accounts for Spain’s continued population growth (going from 40 million people in the late 1990s to more than 46 million in 2008) and 200,000 explains why the focus was mainly on incoming migrants. 100,000 ECONOMIC CRISIS LEADS TO This tendency was, however, reversed during the worst period of the recent LOWER IMMIGRATION financial and economic crisis, as Spain registered negative migration rates 0 for the first time in decades. As shown in Figure 1, the number of outgoing migrants was greater than the number of incoming ones from 2010

to 2015. Though the difference is not large – as the influx of migrants was 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 almost sufficient to offset increasing emigration rates –, it is nonetheless Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística / own representation noteworthy that this constituted a drastic break with preceding tendencies. Between 2010 and 2015, two and half million people chose to leave (in comparison to the almost 2 million that arrived). Figure 1 also illustrates how closely population growth follows migration rates (secondary axis). While Spain lost almost 400,000 people between 2011 and 2015, it has already 3 Number of births minus number of deaths.

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tion is the most mobile and the most heavily affected by the crisis.4 Out However, it does seem to be the case that, among those who are mobile IMPACT OF ‘BRAIN DRAIN’ of the total outgoing population between 2008 and 2019, only about 18 and hold Spanish citizenship, highly educated workers are in fact overrep- FAIRLY LOW percent (~747,000) were Spanish citizens (and this includes naturalized mi- resented. The same Eurostat data shows that the share of Spanish EU migrants). Over that same period, the number of incoming Spanish citizens grants with tertiary education was 47 percent in 2019, significantly above in immigration statistics amounts to a total of ~591,000 (particularly accen- the 37.4 percent observed for the general population in Spain. What is tuated over the last few years, coinciding with the period of economic re- more, this difference seems to have increased substantially over the last covery), which makes for a total loss of about 156,000 Spanish citizens (the ten years, as in 2009 the percentage of highly mobile citizens with tertiary equivalent of 0.33 percent of the country’s population). education was only slightly higher (32 percent) than that of the general population (29 percent). Labour Force Surveys in the UK or France corroborate OFFICIAL STATISTICS There are good reasons, however, to suspect that Spanish nationals are this, showing, for example, that between 2008 and 2012 about 60 percent UNDERREPRESENT THE NUMBER seriously underrepresented in such statistics and that the actual number of incoming Spanish migrants in those two countries held university de- OF OUTGOING SPANISH CITIZENS of Spaniards abroad is considerably higher. This is because (contrary to grees (Izquierdo Peinado/Jimeno/Aitor 2014). Such an educational gap is a the outflows of foreigners, which can be measured through other instru- commonly used indicator of `brain drain’ and can be observed most nota- ments), data on the emigration of Spanish nationals is based only on their bly for Spain, Italy and Greece within the EU, though the absolute magni- (voluntary) registration in Spanish consulates abroad. As there are no in- tude of this phenomenon remains limited nonetheless (Alcidi/Gros 2019: centives (or actual disincentives) to do so, it is estimated that the number 12). Taking into account net migration by education level, it is estimated of Spaniards migrating was more than triple that found in official sources that Spain has experienced a net loss of around 87,000 highly skilled peo- (González-Ferrer 2013: 17). There are several pieces of evidence that back ple between 2007 and 2017 (ibid.). The impact of this loss of human capital this up. A survey of high-skilled Spanish emigrants, for example, has shown might be relatively limited given Spain’s large share of tertiary graduates that only 36 percent of them registered at the respective consulate (En- and the fact that many were unemployed back home.6 ríquez/Romera 2018). Similarly, ‘mirror data’ on incoming migrants of Span- ish nationality in the UK or Germany show that the number of Spanish citi- Moreover, although it is true that to this day the outflow of Spanish nation- INCREASING zens who registered there is more than four times greater than the official als continues to be significantly greater than before the crisis, it is also the RETURN MIGRATION data released in Spain (González-Ferrer 2013: 6). case that the proportion of Spanish citizens among incoming migrants has increased in the last few years.7 This suggests that some of those who left As far as the main destination countries are concerned, it is no surprise to in previous years are returning. Temporary emigration may thus turn out see Romania and, to a lesser extent, Morocco, among the top destinations to be more of a blessing than a curse, relieving some of the pressure on in the last decade, given that the nationals of these two countries account the labor market in the short-term while avoiding long-term detrimental for the largest immigrant groups in Spain. At the peak of the economic cri- impacts, with the additional benefit that returning migrants will likely have sis, Ecuador was also on this list, attesting for the significance of ‘return’ accrued additional skills. movements. In the last few years the United Kingdom has become the second most important destination for the total emigrant population and the EMIGRATION IN THE POLITICAL DEBATE most important for Spanish nationals, followed by France, Germany and the United States. The treatment of emigration on the political and institutional level fundamentally depends on what kind of emigration one is speaking of. As Spain DISPROPORTIONAL FOCUS In light of the diversity of people leaving Spain, it is to be expected that has a long history of emigration and a sizable number of citizens abroad, the ON HIGHLY QUALIFIED their profiles also vary, especially when it comes to qualifications. Though treatment of the Spanish diaspora – in particular, its rights and the perpetu- EMIGRANTS statistics in this regard are meagre and incomplete, there is a common- ation or reinforcement of its ties to Spain – has long been an object of polit- ly held image, widespread among the general public and elites alike, that ical engagement. It is therefore important to distinguish between the politi- emigrants are predominantly talented and highly-qualified, a perception cal treatment of the diaspora – understood as Spanish citizens permanently that spurred much talk about ‘brain drain’ and a ‘lost generation’ with little settled abroad – and the treatment of emigration as the (current) exiting of alternative but to leave.5 To start with, it is doubtful that the magnitude of people. The next section deals with political engagement with respect to the this phenomenon warrants such fears given that Spanish citizens do not diaspora, while the subsequent ones address emigration in general. appear to be exceptionally mobile (or at least not across borders). Eurostat data on the mobility of EU citizens shows that Spain is among the countries Spain went as far as to consecrate the rights of Spanish citizens abroad in its CONSISTENT ENGAGEMENT with the least mobile workers percentagewise (about 1.1 percent in 2019). 1978 Constitution, including the right to vote as well as economic and social FOR SPANISH NATIONALS Even if one takes into account issues of underrepresentation in official sta- rights that are to be safeguarded by the Spanish state, establishing moreo- ABROAD tistics, one could still legitimately expect numbers to be higher in light of ver that the State will orient its policy towards their return. This happened the seriousness of the economic crisis in Spain and exceptionally high un- within the context of the transition from an authoritarian regime and the employment rates (only comparable to those of Greece). desire to reincorporate those who had fled under its rule. Administrative bodies charged with providing forms of representation and institutional participation to emigrants, functioning as consultative bodies, have existed

4 This is in part due to their overrepresentation in economic sectors heavily affected by the economic crisis, most notably the construction sector. 6 According to a survey of highly qualified Southern European emigrants, the Spanish were the ones 5 An anecdote illustrative of the alarm generated in this regard is the fact that all the large media outlets with the highest unemployment rate back home, corresponding to 48 percent of those interviewed reported in 2013 that 89 percent of Spanish emigrants were highly qualified. What they failed to (Enríquez/Romera 2018). mention was that this estimate was based on an e-survey, which was most likely non-representative, 7 Official sources indicate that in 2018 and 2019 the number of incoming Spanish citizens was higher as it was disseminated through social networks and the media, as the researchers behind the than the number of outgoing ones. Though outgoing migrants are on average younger, the age survey recognized themselves here: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/ profile of the incoming ones does not support the commonly held assumption that those returning ac4f48004469c16daee5bee307648e49/GonzalezEnriquez-MartinezRomera-Spain-migration-crisis. are older migrants coming back for retirement (as in 2018 and 2019 those over 65 years of age pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=ac4f48004469c16daee5bee307648e49 constituted only ~8 percent of incoming migrants of Spanish nationality).

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for three decades now, most notably the (1) General Council of Spaniards Fig. 3: Parliamentary Initiatives and Speeches on Emigration (2001-2019) Abroad (within the Ministry of Employment and Social Security) and (2) the Diaspora Emigration other Excluding written questions Councils of Spanish Residents (attached to Spanish consulates). The gener- 50 al duty to safeguard the rights of emigrants means that they have, at times, 45 been an object of legislative attention. Most notably, the Statute of Span- 40 ish Citizens Abroad (Estatuto de la Ciudadanía Española en el Exterior, Law 35 40/2006) consolidated the rights of citizens abroad and enshrined in law 30 that citizens abroad have the same rights as citizens on Spanish territory. 25 20 CONSENSUS Similar to other countries, Spain – and its political parties – has been keen 15 AMONG PARTIES on strengthening economic, political and cultural links with expatriates overseas. In addition to being a manifestation of ethno-nationalism, trans- 10 national ties with Spanish expatriates can help attract remittances and 5 economic investment, promote the language and culture of origin abroad, 0 or advance foreign policy interests in bilateral relations (Bauböck 2007:

2,400). Parties seem to be well aware of this, judging by the fact that they 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 usually reserve a (small) section of their electoral manifestos for Spanish Manual coding based on the keyword ‘emigration’. citizens abroad. In a similar vein, their rights – and the intricacies related Source: http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso / own representation to their safeguarding, enactment, consolidation, and adaptation – are a recurring topic in the Spanish parliament, particularly when it comes to (a) access to welfare or social security as well as (b) representation and voting ra’), to emigration as the present exiting of people (‘emigration’), or others. rights. There is little to no political conflict in this regard, as all major par- This unambiguously highlights that emigration as the exiting of people only ties agree on maintaining links with the diaspora and safeguarding their appears as a somewhat relevant topic during the crisis years, most notably rights. The only significant difference found in recent electoral manifestos in 2013 and 2014. Prior to that, issues related to Spanish citizens abroad is that the radical left, most recently Podemos, has been the only advocate are the only relevant ones, which is logical considering the low emigration for the creation of a specific electoral district for emigrants, proportional rates before the crisis. to their number. Moreover, the ethnic/nationalist logic that is often behind the protection of communities abroad – i.e., keeping their identities bound The peak in political attention in the early 2000s has to do with various to Spain – is not specific to any political group and seems to be endorsed circumstances, namely (a) voting-related issues (as there were suspicions across party lines. of electoral irregularities); (b) social assistance issues (including assistance to emigrants in Argentina in light of the dire economic crisis that country Cross-party differences are most often related to the emphasis and amount was going through at the time); and (c) issues related to migrants who had of attention. In general, the issue seems to be of greater concern for the returned and their descendants, such as ways of facilitating their integra- left, something that is most likely linked to its history of exile during the tion. The peak during the crisis years is obviously of a different nature. To Franco regime. This is visible, for instance, in the fact that the left is generally begin with, the high number of written questions in 2014 is due to the fact more active in presenting parliamentary initiatives on the issue. Out of the that the main opposition party (the center-left PSOE) repeatedly insisted on 298 parliamentary initiatives surveyed between 2001 and 2019, more than surveying the numbers of those who ceased to receive unemployment ben- half had been presented by the center-left party PSOE alone. Even excluding efits due to emigration (formulating separate questions for each province, those which focused on emigration as the exiting of people and focusing each month). This is of course valuable information for political parties, in only on the ones related to the diaspora, the PSOE presented 79 initiatives light of the limited availability of data on emigration as well as the fact that while the count for the conservative Partido Popular was 53. variation in unemployment numbers due to emigration – rather than due to job creation – has entirely different consequences for the political treat- POLITICAL SALIENCE Parliamentary speeches on emigration constitute a primary source of evi- ment of unemployment and the evaluation of the government. Apart from dence when it comes to assessing the political salience of emigration, that this, the opposition was naturally keen on confronting the government with is, the prominence of the topic in the political debate. Figure 3 shows the rising emigration figures – or what they shrewdly termed ‘economic exile’ –, yearly evolution of the number of speeches and initiatives related to emi- presenting a few initiatives with demands or proposals to prevent emigra- gration in the Spanish Congress of Deputies from 2001 to 2019.8 Note that tion and encourage the return of emigrants. this includes almost all types of initiatives (see fn. 10) – including written questions that simply have a supervisory or informative function –, which It is worth noting that the migration of qualified young people attracted par- THE FEAR OF ‘BRAIN DRAIN’ is why the numbers appear quite high. If one excludes written questions ticular attention, with the opposition speaking of ‘brain drain’ and ‘scientific PERMEATED PUBLIC AND (which are likely the least relevant type of initiative), variation in the number exile’. In this regard, the political debate was not immune to the widespread POLITICAL DEBATE of parliamentary initiatives and speeches is much less pronounced (yellow overemphasis on highly skilled migration. Indeed, it is sufficient to look at the line in Figure 3), suggesting that emigration-related issues were never high- evolution of the use of the term ‘brain drain’ in Spain’s best-selling newspaper ly salient. Figure 3 also breaks down those initiatives by sub-issue, accord- (El País) to witness a sharp rise in its use during the crisis years, particularly in ing to whether they deal with issues related to emigrants abroad (‘diaspo- 2012-2013 (Figure 4). Existing research confirms, based on a media analysis of the three top newspapers in Spain, that the image depicted by the media was both incomplete and distorted, with the main focus lying on the fate of young educated nationals and the ‘talent drain’ that was being ‘financed by 8 Based on the keyword search method, using the word ‘emigration’. All types of initiatives are included (law Spanish tax-payers for the benefit of receiving countries’ (González-Ferrer/ proposals, motions, oral questions, written questions, urgent appeals), except for ‘attendance requests’ (‘solicitudes de comparencia’). Initiatives that turned out to be about immigration were excluded. Moreno-Fuentes 2017: 452). This led to the situation being likened to the

170 171 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SPAIN

Fig. 4: References to ‘brain drain’ in the media The crisis years represent the only recent period in Spain where the salience of SALIENCE OF EMIGRATION emigration seems somewhat similar to the salience of immigration. This is not VS. IMMIGRATION 160 so much the result of an exceptionally high salience of emigration, but rather 140 of the accentuated decline in the salience of immigration in comparison to the pre-crisis years. Although more thorough research would be needed on this, 120 the crisis years – corresponding to the PP legislature from 2011 to 2016 – were 100 the only time period during which the number of parliamentary initiatives and 80 speeches on emigration appears somewhat similar to those on immigration, whereas before and after those years immigration is a topic of much greater 60 concern. This is visible in party manifestos too, where the space dedicated to 40 immigration-related issues is greater than that dedicated to emigration-related 20 ones, even in 2015 (Figure 5). Podemos is the only party (among the main ones covered) that devotes more attention to emigration than to immigration. 0

As mentioned above, there is little to no political polarization in terms of the FRAMING BY THE 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 protection of the rights of citizens abroad. However, when it comes to the re- POLITICAL PARTIES Number of news pieces that included the word ‘brain drain’. cent wave of emigration and to its political treatment, the tone was often one Source: El País. Retrieved via Factiva / own representation of confrontation and there were notable differences in how parties framed the phenomenon. The left, in opposition, was keen on characterizing emigration as nothing less than a drama, often speaking of ‘economic exile’, ‘forced exile’ or 1950s and 1960s, with the accompanying images of Spanish workers who, ‘forced expulsion’. Predictably, this was frequently a means to criticize the gov- induced by poverty and lack of opportunities, left with only their cardboard ernment of the conservative Partido Popular for its retrenchment policies and suitcases, with the aggravating difference that the migrants were now highly labor reforms, blaming it for the high unemployment rates, particularly among qualified (González-Ferrer/Moreno-Fuentes 2017). the youth. It was also a strategy of counter-framing, in reaction to statements of government representatives who framed emigration in a positive light. Existing research is also important in confirming that migration outflows were subject to intense media coverage and public debate, with attention The first and most obvious instance of controversy was in late 2012, when the CONFRONTATIONS peaking in 2012 and 2013 (ibid.: 449; Arango 2016: 2). This is important for Secretary General of Immigration and Emigration, Marina del Corral, stated that AND CONTROVERSY our purposes because, unfortunately, there is no non-time-consuming meth- emigration was not only an outcome of the economic crisis but also of ‘glo- od of empirically attesting for this. A media analysis based on the keyword balization, freedom of movement within Europe, the demand for profession- search method unfortunately does not work in this case, as the word ‘emi- als with good technical knowledge and qualifications, and “why not say it, the gration’ is often used in reports that, in fact, deal with ‘immigration’ to Spain.9 adventurous impulse of the youth”, among other factors’ (ABC 2012). Further- more, Corral insisted that emigration should be seen as something ‘essentially positive’ as qualified Spanish workers ‘have finally stopped being local’ (ibid.). Fig. 5: Relevance of Emigration and Immigration in Electoral Manifestos Needless to say, these declarations sparked heated debate, as well as biting Emigration Immigration commentary on social media. When confronted in parliament with such criti- 3.5 cism, governmental representatives did not engage directly with Corral’s words, 3 simply adopting the usual strategy of blame-shifting, reminding the center-left of how high youth unemployment rates had already been during the Socialist 2.5 mandate (DSCD 2012: 67). 2 Another instance of confrontation where the difference in framing was obvi- 1.5 ous occurred a few months later, when the Minister of Employment and Social 1 Security stated that the exiting of people in search of better work and training opportunities ‘is called external mobility’, also adding that there is an underlying 0.5 ‘exchange’ in this regard, as many British, Germans or Italian reside in Spain too 0 (El Mundo 2013). The opposition, instead, spoke of ‘economic exile’ and ‘brain drain’, directly blaming the government for ‘inviting young people to go away’

PP 2011 PP 2015 PP 2019 (ibid.). Its tone was invariably negative and often dramatic, recurring to images PSOE 2011 PSOE 2015 PSOE 2019 of the massive outflow of the 1960s to accentuate the severity of the circum- Podemos 2015 Podemos 2019 Ciudadanos 2015 Ciudadanos 2019 stances. Take as examples the following excerpts from parliamentary speeches: Percentage of words in party platforms (obtained through the Manifesto Project database and through Websites of the parties) devoted to emigration and immigration and statements on ‘Nowadays, we have as many young people leaving as in the 1960s. Young emigration and immigration people are not taking their backpack to go on excursions or because they Source: Manual coding / own representation have an adventurous spirit; They are taking their grandparents’ suitcase, the emigration suitcase. In the 1960s our grandparents left, but today, it is a generation of doctors, engineers and researchers (…) You are expelling the 9 This is why the years 2006-2007 are the ones where the word ‘emigration’ appears most often in best generation of workers and professionals that Spain has ever had. A lost El País, corresponding to the period where the foreign population of Spain grew most rapidly and generation, ladies and gentlemen, it is a disaster.’ to the so-called ‘cayucos crisis’ (boat crisis) in 2006 (a surge in the number of migrants reaching or attempting to reach the Canary Islands via sea). María González Veracruz, PSOE, May 29th, 2013 (DSCD 2013)

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‘These are young people who are disenchanted and who live with the agony break professional and administrative barriers to return. Among the stat- of not seeing any alternative. No alternative but that of exile in order to have ed goals of such measures are the ones of (1) connecting migrants and a professional future. (…) This is a generation that moves in a trilogy: unem- businesses, (2) facilitating employment in the public sector, (3) enhancing ployment, precarious employment and economic exile.’ support for scientific research careers, as well as (4) providing information Isabel Rodríguez García, PSOE, April 22nd, 2015 (DSCD 2013) and training assistance to entrepreneurs.11 Even though this program sig- nals a greater effort of the government in this regard, the diagnosis does GAP BETWEEN The ‘brain drain’ issue was also perceived differently by governmental rep- not seem to be substantially different from the one made by González and GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION resentatives and the left-wing opposition. While the latter inevitably framed Fuentes (2017: 466), who reported that governmental initiatives are main- it in a negative light, the Minister of Education considered that it should ly reduced to providing information on administrative procedures, some not be termed as such and that ‘the fact that there are young people with training opportunities and, in some cases, an online platform with job the capacity and will to move (…), and with the wish to broaden their pro- offers, or opportunities for young entrepreneurship. It should be noted, fessional horizons can never be considered a negative phenomenon’ (Pú- however, that there is variation in policies across the territory of Spain. Dif- blico 2010). The government qualified such statements, adding that ‘there ferent regional governments have specific policy incentives for the return should not always be a negative connotation’, as ‘many graduates return, of qualified migrants. Several of them offer financial assistance in covering once they have gained experience in other countries, which is enriching for relocation costs as well as fiscal incentives to businesses who offer return- Spain and valued by businesses’ (ibid.). The President of the Community ing migrants non-temporary contracts (El País 2020). of Madrid, and President of the Partido Popular in that same region, had made similar statements, considering that it was a ‘reason for optimism that for the first time many qualified young people are working abroad’ INFOBOX – Migration in times of the Corona pandemic and that this ‘will have a positive impact on Spain’s economy’ (El Mundo 2013). Furthermore, the Education Minister later considered that the ‘brain Emigration was not a relevant issue in Covid-19 times. The same is not drain’ issue was being overestimated and numbers misinterpreted (La Van- true, obviously, for movement of people in general. Spain imposed guardia 2014). one of the strictest lockdowns in Europe. The state of emergency was declared in mid-March and ended on June 21st. Internal and external Interestingly, the left/right (or opposition/government) divide in the fram- movement was severely restricted during that period. In general, Spain ing of emigration seems to be commonly shared by newspapers with differ- has followed EU recommendations on travel bans, opening up its bor- ent ideological leanings. While conservative newspapers tended to empha- ders to the list of states approved by the EU Council. Border closures size different kinds of motivations for leaving the country (such as capital have proven themselves to be particularly problematic in the Ceuta and accumulation or learning foreign languages), often perceiving outwards Melilla enclaves, fueling tensions between the Moroccan and Spanish mobility as a natural outcome of globalization and EU integration, left-lean- authorities. Morocco decided to close its land borders to Spain on March ing newspapers placed greater emphasis on the lack of choice due to mass 13th, and they have remained closed ever since. The consequences for unemployment and labor market precariousness (González-Ferrer/More- cross-border workers and for the economy of the region have been se- no-Fuentes 2017: 452 f.). vere. On the one hand, thousands of Moroccan workers who used to cross daily into the Spanish enclaves are struggling, and many have lost RETURN AS A Apart from the ideological underpinnings of such differences in framing, their jobs (France 24 2020). On the other hand, this development also POLITICAL GOAL there are good reasons to suspect that framing is also strongly conditioned left many Moroccans stranded in Spain as Morocco barred its own cit- by incumbent-opposition dynamics. Though governments are probably un- izens from coming home for more than two months (Voa News 2020). willing to publicly admit it (as this would constitute an unpopular position), Border closures and restrictions on movement will surely have an im- emigration in times of crisis can help mitigate economic shocks, as the out- pact on both emigration and immigration numbers in 2020. By compar- flow of people decreases social expenditure (especially if they are unem- ison to 2019, official projections for 2020 estimate that the number of ployed), as well as relieving some of the pressure on the labor market. It immigrants will decrease by 67 percent and the number of emigrants should therefore be of little surprise to see incumbents taking a more am- by 54 percent (Institudo Nacional de Estadística 2020b). Apart from this bivalent position on the exiting of people than the opposition, particularly short-term impact, a medium-term effect is expected as well, given the in times of economic crisis. upcoming economic crisis.

Alongside the legislation that deals with the rights of Spanish citizens Spain continues, however, to be an important destination for asylum abroad, the Spanish state has also taken some measures to support citi- seekers. Even though the number of asylum applications decreased zens that decide to return to Spain, particularly when it comes to specific drastically over the months of April and May (during lockdown), they social protection schemes for the most vulnerable.10 In addition, the Statute have picked up since then. Between January and August 2020, Spain of Spanish Citizens Abroad (Law 40/2006) created a ‘Spanish Return Office’ registered more than 60,000 applications (a decrease of 13 percent in (Oficina Española de Retorno), meant to assist those wishing to return to comparison to 2019). This is in large part due to the influx of Venezue- Spain, mainly by providing information on administrative procedures per- lan and Colombian citizens, who apply for asylum after entering Spain taining to multiple domains, including social security prerogatives. Specific as tourists. As for irregular migration, data from the Ministry of Interior policies to encourage return are, however, meagre. The most significant shows that, up until mid-September, 15,985 people have irregularly en- step so far has been the approval of a ‘Return to Spain Plan’ in March 2019, tered Spain, a 22 percent reduction in comparison to the same period with an initial budget of 24 million euro, outlining 50 measures meant to last year (Ministerio del Interior 2020). While there was a sharp decrease

10 For example, Royal Decree 1493/2007 deals with social assistance provisions for returnees, in situations of extraordinary necessity. 11 The official website can be found here:https://unpaisparavolver.es/

174 175 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SPAIN

in entries via Ceuta and Melilla, the number of sea arrivals to the Canary the return of Spanish nationals too. None of this is, however, independent Islands increased dramatically. As this sea route is more dangerous, the from the evolution of the Spanish labor market and in this regard Spain estimated number of deaths and missing persons is higher for 2020, continues to face serious structural difficulties (high unemployment rates, with 440 dead and missing by August (UNHCR 2020). a high degree of labor market duality, precarious contracts, low-wage traps, skills’ gaps and mismatches, a sizable underground economy, etc.). The Additionally, the pandemic seems to have exposed just how vulnerable country has, however, the comparative advantage of having a large pool immigrants are in times of crisis. On the one hand, given their overrep- of potential immigrants with considerable cultural affinity (Latin American resentation in sectors heavily affected by the pandemic (tourism, res- migrants), with positive consequences for integration and, hopefully, for a taurant and food services, etc.), they are at a greater risk of unemploy- comparatively smaller cultural backlash. ment. On the other hand, there are sub-groups among them which are particularly vulnerable, such as irregular migrants and workers in the underground economy – who may not be eligible for social protection schemes. As a result, NGOs have demanded the mass regularization of all irregular migrants in Spain, which they estimate to number at around 800,000 people (Sánchez 2020). The increase in poverty is visible on the streets, in soup kitchens, and in the significant rise in those who recur to organizations such as the Red Cross and Cáritas (Enríquez 2020). Oxfam estimates that one in every three people at risk of poverty are immigrants (RTVE 2020). The pandemic has also shed light on one particular type of migrant: the seasonal agricultural worker. Apart from migrants who usually travel from Eastern Europe or Morocco, there are thousands who migrate in a circular pattern between different harvesting locations in Spain, some of whom work and live in abysmal conditions. They were first an object of attention because of a potential shortage of workers in light of restrictions on movement – with the government adopting measures to facilitate the recruitment of the unemployed and immigrants already in Spain (El País 2020) – and second because several Covid-19 outbreaks occurred among seasonal workers.12

OUTLOOK

The Spanish case provides an excellent demonstration of the extent to which migratory flows are dependent on economic conditions. While Spain’s rapid development has transformed the country into a ‘receiving state’ in the last few decades, the Great Recession has shown that this trajectory is neither linear nor irreversible. Even though it is to be expected that Spain will continue to experience positive migration rates in the upcoming decades, the net rate is sure to change drastically in times of crisis. This has important consequences for Spain, particularly due to the over-reliance of the country’s demography on migration. It is now estimated that, because of the adverse effects of Covid-19, the net migration rate will not be as positive as expected in the upcoming years, with significant consequences for the aging population. Projections indicate that in 2030, 24 percent will be over 65 years (compared to 19.6 percent in 2020) and that the old-age-dependency ratio will reach 38 percent in ten years (it is 30.2 percent in 2020) – three points more than the projections made in 2018 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2020b). This is bad news for the sustainability of the welfare state, as Spain’s social security system was counting on higher immigration rates than the ones that are now expected (Jorrín 2020).

This is, however, not significantly different from the demographic scenarios faced by most EU countries, and in this sense the challenges are largely the same. Though policymakers are well aware that immigration is the most effective way to counteract the overaging of their populations, it is likely that the emphasis will be more on family and fertility policies, and perhaps on

12 The author would like to thank Katja Lindner for having done preliminary research on several aspects covered in this section.

176 177 EMIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SPAIN

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178 179 LIST OF FIGURES

A Emigration in Europe: Socioeconomic and political B Emigration, out-migration and right-wing C Emigration in European Countries consequences populism

1 Emigration and voting for the AFD in Germany: 2 Emigration and the election results of far-right 1 Bulgaria Shrinking regions – frustrated citizens? parties in Europe

Fig. 1: Population development in the EU coun- p. 12 Fig. 1: Does outward migration dynamics p. 20 Fig. 1: How does emigration impact on the share p. 33 Fig. 1: Population development and annual mi- p. 44 tries (2010-2019) strengthen the tendency to vote for the AfD? of votes for far-right parties? gration rates immigration

Fig. 2: Projected population development in the p. 12 Fig. 2: Net migration rates (left) and general pop- p. 22 Fig. 2: Data basis p. 34 Fig. 2: Age structure of Bulgarian population as p. 45 EU countries (2020-2050) ulation development (right) from 1991-2018 in of December 31st, 2019 percent Fig. 3: Parties analyzed p. 35 Fig. 3: Remittances (percent of GDP) – Bulgaria p. 47 Fig. 3: Net migration rates 1995-2018 in per- p. 23 Fig. 4: Relationship between the emigration rate p. 36 cent (left: German citizens; right: people with and the share of votes for far-right parties Fig. 4: Frequency of emigration-related keywords p. 47 non-German citizenship) in Bulgarian media Fig. 5: Relationship between the emigration rate p. 36 Fig. 4: Net migration rates 1991-2018 (left) and p. 23 and the share of votes for far-right parties de- Fig. 5: Frequency of emigration-related keywords p. 48 share of votes for the AfD in the 2019 Elections pending on the economic performance in the debates of the Bulgarian Parliament to the European Parliament (right) in percent Fig. 6: Key themes in Bulgarian emigration dis- p. 50 Fig. 5: Relationship between a district’s net mi- p. 25 course from 1989 to 2020 gration rate 1991-2018 and the share of the votes gained by the AfD in the 2019 European election (OLS regression)

Fig. 6: Relationship between a district’s net mi- p. 25 gration rate of German citizens 1995-2018 and the share of the votes for AfD in the 2019 Euro- pean election (OLS regression)

Fig. 7: Relationship between districts’ net migra- p. 26 tion rates of Germans 1995-2018 and the share of votes for AfD in the 2019 European Parlia- ment election in Eastern German and Western German districts

Fig. 8: Migration flows between Eastern and p. 27 Western Germany (in thousand)

Fig. 9: Migration losses of the eastern towards the p. 28 western states within Germany per 1,000 inhabitants according to age group (without Berlin)

Fig. 10: Relationship between the migration bal- p. 29 ances from different t ime p eriods s ince 1991 and the election result of the AfD in 2019

180 181 ABBILDUNGSVERZEICHNIS

C Emigration in European Countries

2 Czech Republic 3 Greece 4 Hungary 5 Italy

Fig. 1: Czechs living abroad as a proportion of p. 59 the total population (in in percent) Fig. 1: Population change (in percent) p. 74 Fig.1: Relevance of emigration in the Hungarian p. 90 Fig. 1: Population development and annual p. 104 parliamentary debates / number of mentions migration rates Fig. 2: Distribution of Czechs living abroad accor- p. 59 Fig. 2: Emigration in absolute numbers 2004- p. 75 (2000-2019) ding to country 2018 Fig. 2: Population development and annual p. 105 Fig. 2: Parties and emigration: frames and mea- p. 93 migration rates for Italian citizens Fig. 3: Population development and annual p. 60 Fig. 3: Frequency of emigration-related keywords p. 77 sures migration rates in Athens News Agency coverage Fig. 3: Emigration from Italy according to age p. 105 Fig. 3: Frequency of articles mentioning various p. 94 (2018) Fig. 4: Remittances to the Czech Republic 2018 p. 61 Fig. 4: Emigration and diaspora in the program- p. 79 migration-related keywords. Economic news ser- (in million EUR) matic documents of the main Greek parties 2019 vice of the Hungarian News Agency, 2001-2019 Fig. 4: The most important European destinati- p. 106 on countries (2018) Fig. 5: Number of emigrants from the Czech Re- p. 61 Fig. 5: Frequency of migration-related keywords p. 80 Fig. 4: Frequency of articles mentioning ‚emigra- p. 95 public according to type in parliamentary debates tion‘, Magyar Narancs, 2010-2019 Fig. 5: Number of changes of place of residence p. 107 within Italy (2017) Fig. 6: Number of cross-border commuters (in p. 62 thousand) Fig. 6: Are you more worried about people who p. 109 are immigrating to your country or about your fellow citizens who are leaving the country? (2019)

Fig. 7: Number of news items related to emigra- p. 109 tion and immigration in the newspaper La Re- pubblica

Fig. 8: Salience of emigration and immigration p. 110 in the parliamentary debate

Fig. 9: Salience of emigration and immigration p. 110 in the 2018 election programs (in percent)

182 183 ABBILDUNGSVERZEICHNIS

C Emigration in European Countries

6 Poland 7 Portugal 8 Romania 9 Spain

Fig. 1: Yearly net migration rate and total popu- p. 120 Fig. 1: Emigration per year (in absolute num- p. 135 Fig. 1: Yearly net migration rate and total popula- p. 150 Fig. 1: Population development and annual p. 167 lation (2009-2018) bers) tion migration rates

Fig. 2: Official declarations of the employment p. 121 Fig. 2: Population development and annual p. 136 Fig. 2: Destination countries of Romanian emigra- p. 151 Fig. 2: Number of emigrants per year (2002- p. 167 of foreigners (2009-2019) migration rates tion 2004-2019 2019)

Fig. 3: Largest populations of Polish citizens p. 121 Fig. 3: Remittances – total and in percentage of p. 137 Fig. 3: Personal remittances to Romania (percen- p. 152 Fig. 3: Parliamentary Initiatives and Speeches on p. 171 aboard GDP tage of GDP) Emigration (2001-2019)

Fig. 4: Relevance of emigration in the media p. 139 Fig. 4: The salience of emigration in the Romanian p. 153 Fig. 4: References to ‘brain drain’ in the media p. 172 news agency Agerpres Fig. 5: Relevance of emigration in parliamen- p. 139 Fig. 5: Relevance of Emigration and Immigration p. 172 tary debates Fig. 5: (E)migration in parliamentary debates p. 156 in Electoral Manifestos

Fig. 6: Relevance of Emigration in Electoral Ma- p. 141 nifestos

Fig. 7: Frequency of emigration- and immigrati- p. 141 on-related keywords in electoral manifestos

184 185 AUTHORS PROFILE

The Mercator Forum for Migration and Democracy (MIDEM) MIDEM‘s objectives: Ana, Alexandra Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa examines about the impact of migration on democratic • Practice-oriented research Romania institutions, policies and cultures and looks into political • Advising policy-makers and civil society decision making processes in the field of migration policies • Establishing international networks Angeli, Oliviero MIDEM, TU Dresden - in individual countries and in a comparative view of • Providing a forum for public debates Emigration in Europe: Socioeconomic and political consequences Europe. A spotlight is put on the relation between migration and populism. Chmelar, Kristina MIDEM, TU Dresden Czech Republic MIDEM examines: • Crisis discourses on migration and integration de Ghantuz Cubbe, Giovanni MIDEM, TU Dresden • Populism Italy • Migration policies • Migration in urban and regional contexts Herold, Maik MIDEM, TU Dresden Emigration and voting for the AFD in Germany: Shrinking regions - frustrated citizens?

Mendes, Mariana MIDEM, TU Dresden Spain Portugal

Kyriazi, Anna Università degli Studi di Milano Statale Greece Hungary

Kozłowska, Marta MIDEM, TU Dresden Poland All texts, images, and graphics are subject to copyright. MIDEM always strives to respect the copyrights of others. If, Otteni, Cyrill MIDEM, TU Dresden in spite of this, we were not completely successful in doing so, Emigration and the election results of far-right parties in Europe we ask any affected copyright owner to please contact us as Emigration and voting for the AFD in Germany: Shrinking regions - frustrated citizens? soon as possible.

Rone, Julia University of Cambridge Bulgaria

Vorländer, Hans MIDEM, TU Dresden ISSN 2748-8454 Emigration in Europe: Socioeconomic and political consequences Editorial Staff: Editor: Dr. Oliviero Angeli Prof. Dr. Hans Vorländer, Director Johanna Haupt Mercator Forum Migration and Democracy (MIDEM) Collaboration and assistance: Martin Fischer, MIDEM, TU Dresden TU Dresden Design: Eltje Kunze, MIDEM, TU Dresden Institute of Political Science Vollblut GmbH & Co. KG Rahel Marie Ladwig, MIDEM, TU Dresden Centre for the Study of Constitutionalism and Anna Siebenhaar, MIDEM, TU Dresden Democracy © MIDEM 2021 Manès Weisskircher, MIDEM, TU Dresden 01062 Dresden Annemarie Wünscher, MIDEM, TU Dresden Germany Larissa Zier, MIDEM, TU Dresden Phone.: +49 351 463 35811 [email protected] MIDEM is a research centre at the Technische Universität Translation: www.forum-midem.de Dresden (TUD), funded by Stiftung Mercator. Dennis Norton

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