Extract from ‘Westcountry Regiments on the Somme’ By Major (Retired) Tim Saunders MBE (Late D and D) This book covers the part played by both the Devonshire and Dorset Regiments in the 1916 Battle. It covers the arrival of the battalions on the Somme, preliminary operations and the part they played in the various phases of this grimmest of battles from the disaster of 1 July through to the very final attack in mid November. The extract below is on the attack of 2nd Battalion the Devonshire Regiment on Ovillers la Boissele on 1st July 1916; the blackest day in the long history of the British Army. Introduction Of the five Westcountry battalions in action on the first day of the battle, 2/Devon was one of the two battalions that attacked or ‘went over the top’ in the first wave at Zero Hour. They had arrived on the Somme, to join the Fourth Army, at the end of March with 8th Division joining III Corps. Along with the remainder of the Army, the Devons worked hard training and preparing for the great offensive. Meanwhile, the Germans, with only the questions of time, date and boundaries of the British attack to determine, continued to strengthen their position. The German Positions Opposite III Corps, the Germans 26th Reserve Division occupied positions on three spurs that ran down from the Pozieres Ridge. The two fingers of high ground of significance to 8th Division and the Devons were the Ovillers Spur and the la Boisselle Spur. Both were crowned with German held villages that had been developed into fortresses within the front line trench systems. The Official Historian commented that: ‘Owing to the enemy’s front position being on the forward slopes, it was completely exposed to fire … but the enemy front line was singularly well adapted to defence, being sited, as the ground demanded, as a series of salients and reentrants being particularly strong.’ Behind the front line lay two intermediate lines and further in depth, was the incomplete Second Position. Here the trenches and wire were both less well developed and, consequently, lacked the comprehensive defensive properties of the front line system. A further three miles back was the beginnings of a third position, which was being worked on, as German time resources were available. In July 1916 it was still patchy but was clearly marked out for development. Realizing that they were astride what was likely to be the Fourth Army’s axis, the German 180th (10th Wurttemberg) Regiment put a great deal of effort into improving the area's defence. They dug the usual deep shelters, linked up the strengthened cellars of Ovillers, with the fighting trenches and ensured that their positions were covered by overlapping arcs of machine gun fire. These guns were sited in considerable depth and were very well camouflaged, with battle positions by the British had not located. 180th Regiment was holding the front line from the Ovillers Spur to Leipzig Salient with two battalions. Each of these battalions had three companies in the first and second lines of trenches, with individual companies covering a frontage of approximately four hundred yards. Their fourth companies occupied the support line, while the 1 reserve line was in each case occupied by a company from the Regiment’s third battalion, with the remaining companies being positioned to the rear in the Intermediate Lines. Approximately 1,800 men were facing 8th Division’s infantry element of 9,000 men. However, calculating the number of enemy machine guns that 8th Division was facing is more complicated, as the machine gun’s effective range was over 2,000 yards. Up to six guns belonging to 110th Regiment, dug into the hillside behind la Boisselle, were able to sweep 8th Division’s positions and no-man’s-land in the Ovillers area. British Plans III Corps was to attack between the Nab and Mash Valley with 8th Division on the left and with 34th (New Army) attacking astride la Boisselle. 19th Division was Corps Reserve, initially located around Albert. This division’s task was to move up securing the forward divisions’ gains, to complete the capture of the German’s third position and deepen the penetration. 8th Division was to attack with all three of its brigades, each with two battalions in its leading wave. The Division’s New Army brigade, 70 Brigade, were on the left attacking the northern flank of the Ovillers Spur rising from Nab Valley. In the centre of the Spur, 25 Brigade were to attack the crest line. This brigade was considered to have the easiest initial objectives, as they were not so likely to be engaged by flanking machine gun fire. On the Division’s southern flank 2/Devon, with 23 Infantry Brigade had to attack what was perhaps the strongest part of the enemy line. The divisional history1 describes the ground in the following terms: ‘… no division was more difficulty placed than 8th Divisions. Except for a short space in the centre of the section, no-man's land was everywhere exceptionally wide. Particularly was this the case on the right, where both our own and the German lines were somewhat recessed. Here the 23rd Infantry Brigade had before it an 1 The Eighth Division in War 1914 - 1918. Boraston and Cyril. The Medici Society Ltd, 1926. 2 appalling stretch to negotiate before it gained contact with the enemy trenches. Furthermore, the advance of the right brigade [23 Brigade] lay up a valley [Mash Valley], dominated to the left by the higher ground of Ovillers and on the right even more dangerously threatened by the German Salient at la Boisselle. If all went not well elsewhere [i.e. the 34th Division], it was obvious that both from Ovillers and from la Boisselle spur a deadly flanking fire could be brought to bear on our troops as they struggled up that desolate valley towards their distant objective. ... The village of Ovillers was a solid and terrible obstacle. It will readily be appreciated that unless the results of the final intense bombardment covering the assault were such that the defence was for the time being completely out of action, and unless the progress made by troops on either flank was rapid and successful, the 8th Division was likely to find its task beyond the powers of human accomplishment.' 8th Division's objective lay beyond the village of Pozieres, some four kilometres distant. However, as far as the 8th Division were concerned, they had been impressed by the barrage and 'hope ran high that the results would be so to pulverise the enemy's defences that a legitimate chance would be given to the infantry to press forward to success'. The essentials of Brigadier General Tuson’s plan for 23 Brigade, namely that he was to attack with two of his four battalions, had been laid down by 8th Division. 2/Devon and 2/Middlesex were to provide the leading assault waves, who were to break into the German front line trench system and fight through the southern portion of Ovillers and capture the enemy’s two intermediate lines. At this point, the Brigade’s reserve battalions, 2/Scottish Rifles and 2/Middlesex, following closely behind the leading battalions, were to take the second and third objectives in the German Second Position and around the village of Pozieres respectively. 2/Devon’s commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Sunderland, had also been given comprehensive orders and had little to do other than allocate his troops to the specific tasks given to him in his orders. He decided to attack with A and B Companies, who were to advance in columns of platoons i.e. in four waves, at a distance of fifty paces apart. This formation, one of those recommended in Forth Army Tactical Notes, was adopted because of the distance of the objectives behind the German front line. They were to be followed by C and D Companies. A part of each company was detailed as carrying parties, who would bring up defence stores, such as pickets and sandbags, and ammunition in order to consolidate trenches taken by the assaulting infantry. Also planned to move up behind the assault waves, were sections of Vickers guns from 23 Brigade’s Machine Gun Company, Royal Engineers and artillery observers. During the initial stages of the attack, Battalion Headquarters were to remain in the trenches at the junction of Rycroft Street and Farness Street, as instructed by Headquarters III Corps. This was in order that they could report the progress of the attack, as the chain of command depended on field telephones and wire. Once away from the cable head at the end of the deeply dug in lines, they could only pass their reports by vulnerable runners or unreliable pigeons. However, commanders were confident that the infantry could reach their objectives without the intervention of Battalion Headquarters, as the well-schooled companies knew their part in the battle, having repeatedly practised the attack on the divisional training area. The Devon’s Battalion Headquarters would cross no-man’s-land during the consolidation phase, with signallers laying vulnerable line as they went. In subsequent phases, Battalion Headquarters would follow a bound behind the forward troops, ready to command in what was accepted would be a more fluid battle. 3 Before the Attack On 6 June, C and D Companies of 2/Devon had taken part in an important preliminary operation: the digging of New Trench. They went out into no-man’s land and deployed to cover a large working party, which dug a ‘jumping-off trench’, designed to reduce the width of no-man’s-land.