The Universalizability of the Categorical Imperative
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THE UNIVERSALIZABILITY OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE Re-examining Kant’s Maxim of Duty A Dissertation Submitted to the University of HeidelbergHeidelberg in Partial FulfilFulfilllllmentment of thethethe Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (PhD) in PHILOSOPHY Researcher Krishna Mani Pathak Supervisor /First Reader Prof. Dr. Peter McLaughlin Second Reader Prof. Dr. Andreas Kemmerling Submitted to Philosophische Fakultät Reprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg Germany MAY 2010 THE UNIVERSALIZABILITY OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE Re-examining Kant’s Maxim of Duty Krishna M. Pathak [email protected] [email protected] Philosophisches Seminar Reprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg MAY 2010 TO My Late Grandmother And The people of Sant KaKabirbir Nagar TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ……………………………………………………….…….….…... i Preface ……………………………………….……………...………….. ii-iii Acknowledgements …………….…………………...……...….…..……iv-vi Abbreviations ………………………………………………...…...………vii CHAPTER 1: Introduction………………………………..……..…... 1-10 1.1 Moral Universalism vs. Moral Relativism: The Problem 1 1.2 Immanuel Kant: A Devoted Son of Konigsberg 5 1.3 The Structure of the Dissertation 7 CHAPTER 2: Local Determinants and Moral Orientation: A Critique of Moral Relativism………….…………………..….. 11-51 2.1 Introduction 11 2.2 Alasdair MacIntyre 12 MacIntyre on Kant 13 MacIntyre’s Anti-universalizability Thesis 18 2.3 Charles Taylor 28 The Notion of Morality 29 I. The Concept of Modern Identity 29 II. Strong Evaluation 31 III. Self As an Interlocutor 34 What is wrong with Taylor’s notion of Morality? 37 Taylor’s SIM-theory As a Moral Web 41 2.4 Cultural Morality vs. Moral Culture 45 2.5 The Foundation of Moral Orientation–Reason or Tradition ? 47 2.6 Summary 51 CHAPTER 3: Agent, Autonomy, and Reason: The Locus of Moral Legitimacy…………………..………………………. 52-85 3.1 Introduction 52 3.2 What is the Source of Moral Agency? 52 3.3 Kant on the Concept of Autonomy 54 The Role of Freedom 57 The Nature of an Autonomous Agent 60 3.4 Three Accounts of Personal Autonomy 64 The Hierarchical View 66 The Reason-responsive View 70 The Coherentist View 73 3.5 The Kantian Account of Personal Autonomy Re-examined 75 3.6 Local vs. Global Autonomy 78 3.7 The Problem of Moral Legitimacy 83 3.8 Summary 85 CHAPTER 4: The Doctrinaire Kant and his Moral Absolutism: From Pure Philosophy to Impure Ethics…...…………... 86-132 4.1 Introduction 86 4.2 The Human Mind: A Complex Unity 87 Speculative vs. Practical Reason 91 Understanding vs. Reason 95 4.3 Practical Reason and Freedom 98 4.4 Law (Gesetz ) and Morality ( Sittlichkeit ) 102 The Concept of Law and Maxim 102 The Concept of Morality and Moral Law 109 4.5 The Source of the Categorical Imperative 120 Is God a Source? 124 Is Nature a Source? 124 Is Reason a Source? 125 Is the Categorical a Causal Relation? 126 4.6 Problems with Kant’s Moral Theory 130 4.7 Summary 132 CHAPTER 5: Duty: A Moral Vocation of the Rational Will…...133-152 5.1 Introduction 133 5.2 Three Proposals to Kantian Ethics 134 The Phenomenal World: The Only World of Morality 134 Pure and Practical: One Reason 136 The Categorical Imperative: A Moral Calling 138 5.3 An Interpretation of Duty As a Moral Calling 142 5.4 Human Universalism As a Postulate 147 5.5 Ethical Decision Making 150 5.6 Universal Attitude or Universal Moral Law? 151 5.7 Summary 152 CHAPTER 6: Why Kantianism? A Concluding Remark…….... 153-159 APPENDIX I: Nishkama Karma and the Categorical Imperative: A Philosophical Reflection on the Bhagavad-Gita..161-177 I. Introduction 161 II. The Bhagavad-Gita: A Philosophic-religious Text 162 III. The Notion and Nature of dharma 163 IV. Svadharma and Nishkama karma 167 Svadharma (Realization of Self-nature) 167 Nishkama Karma (Duty without Desire) 169 V. Nishkama Karma and the Categorical Imperative: A Moral Path to Perfection 174 VI. Summary 176 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………….. 178-187 AAAbstractAbstract In this dissertation, I defend Kantian ethics in terms of the universalizability of moral duties as moral laws against relativistic ethics like traditionalism and communitarianism. The problem I deal with, in special reference to Kant, is whether our actions are or should be judged by local moral determinants like individuality, community, religion or society, or by universal determinants of Kantian spirit. Those who follow local moral determinants, criticize Kantian universalizability. But I consider universality to be a strong moral determinant and therefore I defend it, and Kant. My argument, which I develop comprehensively in this dissertation, is two- fold: Firstly , local determinants are based on historicism and therefore limited in scope; they leave room for partiality and discrimination among individuals. They are also dually-standardized – one for the first person (I use the term agent) and another for the second and third agents, all of whom differ from each other. Secondly , local determinants considered to be moral criteria are challenging to justify: Their projection of what a person is is not the only or real picture of a person as a moral agent. In other words, local determinants don't affect––or their proponents like MacIntyre and Taylor overlook––our deep sense of moral orientation, which deems every human being as the same . Our deep sense of morality has a need for a common standard of morality. With these arguments, I claim that the Kantian model of morality, in contrast, presents a real picture of a person and his sense of morality, though it is quite hard to find a person in the real world who acts in accordance with this moral sense. But our failure in following our deep moral sense does not mean that morality is a matter of individual choice or is merely locally-determined. The universal moral law is, after all, supreme and something to be achieved in the realization of what we are as moral and autonomous beings. The concept of local moral determinants is in fact weak in the sense that one can justify a wrong and irresponsible action as a right action, whereas, universal determinants prohibit us from following such a justification of a wrong action as right. In brief, this dissertation aims to critically evaluate the two kinds of determinants and their link to our practical life from a moral point of view. Another crucial dimension does remain in the debate at hand––the epistemic dimension––but due to the specificity of the project shall remain untouched in this dissertation. i PrefaPrefacececece I am extremely pleased to submit my doctoral research work, in original , on the Kantian moral theory of the categorical imperative. Much work has been done on this topic throughout the academic world – some in favor of and some against it – spanning from the early 19 th century till the present. Those who favor Kant’s moral theory, favor it as is. Those who are against it find it impractical or unacceptable. I have found no one daring enough to modify Kantian moral theory, particularly the notion of the categorical imperative, to make it workable for the phenomenal world. I do not know why. I can only guess only one reason for this, i.e. perhaps most Kant scholars think that there is no scope for change or modification to the theory and that if we make any change to it, it will lose its soul. However, I do not completely agree with this thought. I propose that there is scope for change and modification to Kant’s account of the categorical imperative as the supreme moral principle in terms of practicing rational capacity, and that without any harm to its soul. For this reason, I dare to critically examine Kant’s moral theory. I provide a number of proposals for the universalizability of the categorical imperative based on the claim that if those proposals are accepted then Kantian moral theory will be, practically speaking, more feasible and stronger. This dissertation is in fact a result of my philosophical endeavor to understand, explain, and correct the role of human reason in terms of the source of ethical decision making in Kant’s moral theory that I began developing at an early stage of my post–graduate studies at the University of Delhi (India). However, my understanding of Kant and his moral theory has been greatly enriched during these last three years while working at the University of Heidelberg. The aim of this dissertation is not to take any particular philosophical position; rather its aim is to comprehend and convey the essence of Kantian ethics from a different perspective, namely by exploring rational capacity in everyday life. As a Kant scholar, I defend moral universalism and that it is derived from human reason. Most of the chapters of the dissertation attempt to either respond to objections against Kantian ethics or to show why it is superior to any other theory, particularly to moral relativism. ii Moreover, the dissertation offers insight useful in understanding Kant’s notion of duty as moral laws in daily life. 21 May, 2010 Heidelberg K. M. P. iii Acknowledgements Let me first express my heartiest and deepest gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Peter McLaughlin for accepting my research proposal for the doctoral degree at the Philosophisches Seminar at the Universität Heidelberg, for having faith in me for the success of the dissertation, and for his affection, encouragement and guidance throughout my research. He has been my supervisor, elder brother, a good friend, and my Godfather throughout my stay at the University of Heidelberg. I have learned so many good things from his gentle personality and commitment to his academic profession: I am very grateful to him. My deepest gratitude also goes to Prof. Dr. Andreas Kemmerling, who accepted my request to be my second supervisor and whose valuable guidance I have greatly benefited from.