The Use of Caveats in Coalition Warfare Derek Scott

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The Use of Caveats in Coalition Warfare Derek Scott (Somewhat) Willing & Able: the Use of Caveats in Coalition Warfare Derek Scott Ray Bachelor of the Arts, Baylor University, 2010 Masters of the Arts, American Military University, 2012 A Dissertation presented to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Politics University of Virginia August 2020 Committee: Phillip B.K. Potter (Chair) Dale Copeland Col Patrick H. Donley John M. Owen IV i The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. ii Table of Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 1 The Argument ......................................................................................................................................... 8 Brief Plan of the Dissertation ............................................................................................................... 10 Explaining Caveats in Post-Cold War Military Coalitions ......................................................... 13 National Preferences Regarding the Use of Military Force .............................................................. 14 Caveats as the Result of Preference Divergence ................................................................................ 31 Case Selection ........................................................................................................................................ 46 Afghanistan ............................................................................................................................................... 50 Background on the ISAF Coalition ..................................................................................................... 52 Afghanistan from the American Perspective ..................................................................................... 56 The Netherlands in Afghanistan ......................................................................................................... 58 Overview of Dutch Caveats .............................................................................................................................. 62 Examination of Theory ..................................................................................................................................... 62 Belgium in Afghanistan ........................................................................................................................ 75 Overview of Belgian Caveats ............................................................................................................................ 77 Examination of Theory ..................................................................................................................................... 78 Danish Involvement in Afghanistan .................................................................................................... 86 Overview of Danish Caveats ............................................................................................................................ 88 Examination of Theory ..................................................................................................................................... 92 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 98 Iraq ............................................................................................................................................................ 101 Background on the Iraq Coalition .................................................................................................... 104 Iraq from the American Perspective ................................................................................................. 108 The Netherlands in Iraq ..................................................................................................................... 110 Overview of Dutch Caveats ............................................................................................................................ 113 Examination of Theory ................................................................................................................................... 115 Denmark Contribution to Iraq .......................................................................................................... 121 Overview of Danish Caveats .......................................................................................................................... 122 Examination of Theory ................................................................................................................................... 123 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 127 Libya ......................................................................................................................................................... 129 Background on the Libya Coalition .................................................................................................. 130 Libya from the Lead Nation Perspective .......................................................................................... 132 Belgium in Libya ................................................................................................................................. 134 Overview of Belgian Caveats .......................................................................................................................... 136 Examination of Theory ................................................................................................................................... 137 The Netherlands in Libya .................................................................................................................. 145 Overview of Dutch Caveats ............................................................................................................................ 147 iii Examination of Theory ................................................................................................................................... 148 Denmark in Libya ............................................................................................................................... 155 Overview of Danish Caveats .......................................................................................................................... 158 Examination of Theory ................................................................................................................................... 158 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 163 Conclusion & Policy Recommendations ........................................................................................ 164 On the Netherlands: ........................................................................................................................... 165 On Belgium: ........................................................................................................................................ 168 On Denmark: ...................................................................................................................................... 173 Policy Recommendations & Way Forward ...................................................................................... 177 Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 181 1 CHAPTER ONE Introduction Today, NATO needs to cover the full spectrum of operations, from combat to peacekeeping. That’s why putting caveats on operations means putting caveats on NATO’s future. - NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, November 6, 2006 On August 11, 2003, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assumed leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The alliance set out to enable the Afghan government to provide effective security across the country and to develop new Afghan security forces to ensure their country would never again become a safe haven for terrorists.1 Three years later, there was a growing sense of anxiety within the alliance about Afghanistan’s future as frustration with ISAF’s ineffectiveness grew. Despite fielding a military coalition comprised of some 37 nations from across the globe, including some of the richest and strongest militaries in the world, the Taliban proved resilient and a weakened security situation stymied nation-building efforts. By the end of 2006, both the Commander of ISAF, British General David Richards, and NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer pointed to interference at the operational and tactical level by individual coalition governments in the form of caveats, or national restrictions on forces within a military coalition, as a problem undermining ISAF’s effectiveness in Afghanistan.2 Nations imposed caveats on their military contingent in a coalition to restrict the behavior of these troops by limiting how, where, and what those forces can do. For example, 1 NATO, “ISAF's mission in Afghanistan
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