Remarks on the Ancient Evidence for Democratic Peace Author(s): Spencer R. Weart Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No. 5 (Sep., 2001), pp. 609-613 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/424778 . Accessed: 10/03/2011 14:37

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http://www.jstor.org ? 2001 Journal PeaceResearch, )r^^^^Q^M of vol. 38, no. 5, 2001, pp. 609-613 SagePublications (London, Thousand Oaks, CAand New Delhi) [0022-3433(200109)38:5;609-613; 019471]

Remarks on the Ancient Evidence for Democratic Peace

SPENCER R. WEART

Center for History of Physics, American Institute of Physics

Responding to Eric Robinson, it is argued that evidence from ancient Greece is inadequate to provide reliable counter-examplesto the democratic peace proposition, provided that the proposition is cor- rectly defined. For the best-documented case, the Athenian invasion of Syracuse,the preponderanceof evidence does make Syracusea well-establisheddemocracy like . But there is contradictoryevi- dence not addressed by Robinson. More important, it is arguable that the decisionmaking body in Athens (the majority of the assembly) did not perceive Syracuseas behaving like a fellow . That is what matters, according to an explanation of the democratic peace based not on institutional or normative causes but on the decisionmakers'perception of a shareddemocratic political culture. In more modern cases where such ambiguities can be checked against primary evidence, the proposition that this sharedperception prevents war holds almost without exception. Other ancient cases cited by Robinson, including all those tabulated by Bruce Russett and William Antholis, involve either (1) regimes even less likely to have perceivedeach other as ,or (2) conflicts that apparently fell below the level of 200 combat deaths, which is a thresholdfor violence between democracies.Finally, Robinson fails to addressthe theoreticallycrucial finding that peace has also held with high consistency between oligarchic republics, from ancient times to the present.

Evidence on Syracuse with Robinson'simpressive case for a demo- cratic Syracuse. Yet the case is far from What can we learnabout war and democracy certain, for all evidence from the period is from the history of ancient Greece? As flimsy. Robinson (2001) understands,the surviving Consider a single passage in informationis so limited that at most we may (6.32-41), which Robinson has not men- find hints that could modify arguments tioned, although a significant fraction of the based on more modern evidence. Robinson historians' debate has revolved around it. It has attempted just that, moving the dis- is no firsthandaccount, but a literaryrecon- cussion forward usefully. However, he has struction based on unknown sources missed some key points. (perhaps Thucydides' notes of talks with Discussions of the democratic peace in Spartanswho recalled what they were told ancient Greece have mostly focussed, as by Syracusans?).Weak as it is, this passageis Robinson does, on the search for counter- the best, indeed the only, surviving descrip- examples and particularlythe single case of tion of political activity in Syracuse at the the Athenian expedition against Syracuse. time of interest. The passage summarizes a Historians have long debated whether Syra- session in the assembly of Syracuse after cuse should be classifiedas a 'democracy'in rumors arrived of Athenian plans for an the Athenian sense, and most would agree invasion. A democratic faction argued that

609 610 journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume38 / number5 / september2001

no military preparations were needed, for plistic view of democracy,which there might the Athenians were friendly. Apparently be enough ancient evidence to support. open debate:score one point for democracy. The debate ended without any vote, and Perceptions and Peace Syracuse'sgenerals went ahead on their own authority to make military preparations. I have arguedthat neithertype of explanation Apparent control by an elite: score one for the democraticpeace is valid.A more reli- point for . The other passages able explanationlooks to the political culture known to historians, all far briefer, add of leaders,by which I mean their accustomed points for one side or the other, most but practicesas shaped by both institutions and not all for democracy. norms. Democratic leaders climb to power Robinson makes clear that using these and stay there through negotiation and sources (Diodorus Siculus, for example) puts accommodationwith their peers, ratherthan us in the position of someone trying to by forcing one another into exile, jail, or understand 12th-century English politics death. When such leadersare in conflict with using a 16th-century condensed history of foreign counterparts,they follow the normal the world, known to be unreliable.The pit- human conservatism,well known to cogni- falls become visible by comparison with tive, behavioral, and social psychologists: study of more modern cases. In respected they attempt first to solve the problem in secondaryhistories I have found mentions of their accustomed way, namely, peaceful severalearly modern conflicts that sound like negotiation. Violence enters only when they counter-examples,but here one could inspect confront foreign leaderswhom they believe detailed primarysources. This closer inspec- do not themselves adhere to this political tion consistently finds that in the particular culture. year when the war broke out, the democracy In my book Never at War (Weart, 1998, of one side or the other was very new and hereinafterNAW) I do not assertthat democ- scarcelyestablished (less than four yearsold), racies have never made war on their own or else it had just that year fallen under some kind. I assertthat leadersof well-established kind of autocratic or elite-junta control. democracieshave never made war on leaders Thus, a touch of historiographicalmodesty they perceived as their own kind, that is, might curb confidence that the Athenianwar sharing their culture of political behavior. against Syracuseis a sure counter-exampleto The distinction holds high significance for the propositionthat 'well-establisheddemoc- understandingthe causesof wars.A largepart raciesdo not make war on one another'. of NAW is given to studying how leaders But is the validity of that bald proposition decide whether the foreignersthey confront the central question?Yes, accordingto some can be dealt with as fellow-democrats.The explanations of the democratic peace. key is always whether a foreign regime Perhaps democratic executives don't go to appearsto be forciblysuppressing its domes- war because they are constrainedby fear the tic democratic opponents. In a few border- public will vote them out of office, or because line cases where the other regime'sdomestic legislaturesdrag their feet, or for some other behavior was ambiguous, a democracy did institutionalcause. Or perhaps democracies indeed attackwhat some objective observers don'tgo to war becauseordinary folks or their might call a fellow democracy. chosen leaders despise bloodshed, or some Did the Atheniansperceive the Syracusan similar normativecause. In either case, the regime as behaving democratically? proposition standsor fallsaccording to a sim- Emotionally, the Athenians were motivated Spencer R. Weart REMARKS ON ANCIENT EVIDENCE 611 partlyby learninghow their allies, the demo- Greek history. This oligarchic restraintalso cratsof Leontini, had been brutallyrepressed prevailed in periods where the historical by the regime of Syracusein collusion with documentation is far better. The pattern of Leontini's oligarchic elite (Thucydides 5.4, peace between similar republicanregimes - 6.6, 6.19). In more practicalterms, there is but only between similarones, for there have good evidence that the Athenians believed been many dreadfulwars between democra- they would be welcomed and aided by a cies and - undercuts both insti- democratic faction within Syracuse itself. tutional and normative explanations of the Indeed without that hope the invasionwould democratic peace, but leaves the political have been entirelyfoolish, for invadersrarely culture explanationstanding. got through the walls of a Greek city unless Robinson has also missed the key point in they were helped by internaldissidents. As it his discussion of work by Russett & Antho- turned out, nobody did betraythe city to the lis (1992, 1993). These authors themselves Athenians. Perhapsthe pro-Atheniandemo- emphasized a significant limitation of their craticfaction was too weak. Or perhapsSyra- work. Following the canons of statistical cuse was in truth a happy democracyand the studies, they took a set of cases and Athenians were disastrously mistaken. demanded that each case be put in one of a Another old debate among historians asks very few mutual exclusivecategories: democ- whether Athenians were grossly ignorant racy,oligarchy, or other?war or peace?They about Syracuse,a place far distant by sea and fully understood that in most cases the evi- politically complex. PerhapsAthens (that is, dence was so scanty that the assignmentshad the decisionmakingbody, the majorityof the a high level of error. For statistical studies citizens in assembly)utterly misread the situ- this is reasonable,in the hope that errorswill ation there. In any case, the evidencedoes not cancel one another. I do not fault Russett & clearly refute, but tends if anything to Antholis for forcing every case into a cat- support, the actual proposition in NAW- egory. But we should not take their statisti- namely, that the decisionmakersin democra- cal results as demonstrating that extreme cies do not go to war against people they violence was common between democracies, believe act politically in their own fashion. or indeed existed at all. Russett & Antholis Robinson's failure to address this key issue forced a 'conservative' interpretation, renders his discussion of NAW almost deliberately leaning toward a democratic irrelevent. reading, in order to avoid bias towards their preferredhypothesis. Such a procedureis not applicable to the kind of question we are Other Cases asking here: can we be certainwhether any A still more importantpoint that I would like Greek democracies went to war with one to see Robinson address is the peace that another? held, not between democracies,but between To answerthis question, I requestedfrom oligarchicrepublics (regimes where members Russett & Antholis their data, which they of an elite minority hold equal voting rights, kindly furnished, and reviewed the ancient but forcibly repress would-be democrats). evidence. Russett & Antholis list 14 cases The surprising discovery that oligarchic where one could argue that Greek democra- republicshave practicallynever made war on cies fought one another. As reported in their own kind, a central proposition in NAW, on inspection the cases all turn out to NAW is perhaps the most theoreticallysig- fall into two classes. For some, the sources nificant thing to be learned from ancient leave the natureof at least one regime highly 612 journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume38 / number5 / september2001

ambiguous - by an entirely reasonable likewise oligarchies)that rise above the rela- reading, some look much more like tribal or tively low level defined by 200 deaths. monarchicalregimes than democracies. In Sicily, Robinson points out correctly, For cases where the regimes were less therewere perhapstrue bloody wars between ambiguous, the hostility involved no serious true well-established democracies. Or recorded combat. For example, Russett & perhapsnot: we have reasonto be wary.Time Antholis count as 'war'a case in which demo- after time in my researchinto better docu- cratic Megara was formally at war with mented cases,such as the oligarchicrepublics democratic Athens, but I could find no of RenaissanceItaly or the HanseaticLeague, record of full-scale battle - only raids and a report in a reputable history of a war skirmishes.Perhaps there were many combat between republics faded away on examin- deaths, so many that the conflict was as ation of primary sources. In the rare cases serious as anything we call war, but it is no where both sides actually had been compar- less likely that there were not. Robinson has able well-establishedrepublics in the year in passed over the central issue. I apologize if I question, the chroniclesshowed that the 'war' have misled by pushing a rhetoricalpoint in had been merely a matter of formal declar- writing that there have been no 'wars' ations and nearlybloodless skirmishes.Until between democracies,when the real issue is such possibilites have been excluded for the to determineexactly where the boundariesof Sicilianand other Greekcases - which would violence lie. It turns out that democracies require the discovery of some vast trove of (and oligarchies) sometimes have indeed primaryevidence - these cannot be accepted moved violently against their own kind. But as reliablecounter-examples. this seems alwaysto have halted around 200 combat deaths.That number is not arbitrary, Conclusions but a limit set by extensiveevidence. Looking from modern times back through the None of this sayswe can be certainthat there populardemocracies of medievalSwitzerland never was a realwar between two well-estab- and on to ancient Greece,I repeatedlyfound lished Greek democracies (or oligarchies). I cases of 'wars' between democracies where agree that Syracuse may have been such a armies marched about but somehow case, and there may have been dozens more, managed to avoid killing more than a few scarcelyrecorded. Yet I do feel confident that dozen opponents. Greece offers no stock of reliable counter- Robinson rightly remarksthat even 100 examples for those who would deny the deathscould be a tragicblow to a small Greek democraticpeace, providedthe termsfor that polis. Yet if one insists on a relativescale, this peace are carefullydefined in terms of per- is still a low level for the ancient Greeks: ceptions of political culture and the level of unlike more modern nations, they could fear violence reached. that a lost war would mean the death of every A more fruitful investigation might go last man plus enslavement of their women deeper into how the Greeks perceived and children. I don't mean to disparage regimes. Russett & Antholis suggest that clashes that kill scores of soldiers;the policy around the time of the Syracusanexpedition of even the huge USA has been diverted by (perhapseven in reactionto its destruction?), such tragedies. But we must set a cutoff the Greeks became aware that fundamental somewhere, and the important fact remains differences of political behavior separated that history recordsscarcely any casesof con- types of regimes.This would have markedthe flict between unambiguousdemocracies (and emergenceinto history of the forcesthat may Spencer R. Weart REMARKS ON ANCIENT EVIDENCE 613 bring about peace among democracies. I forces weighing upon decisions for war or agree with Robinson's skepticism about the peace? role of generalized ideology, but this leaves open the more specific problem of how the References Greeks classified regime behaviors and how such thinking shifted over time. Robinson, Eric W., 2001. 'Readingand Misread- Robinson is surely right that we can learn ing the Ancient Evidence for Democratic much by studying ancient regimes precisely Peace', Journal of Peace Research 38(5): 593-608. to the degree they were fundamentally differ- Russett, Bruce & William Antholis, 1992. 'Do ent from modern ones. An explanation of the Democracies Fight Each Other? Evidence democratic peace that focuses on the political from the PeloponnesianWar', Journal of Peace culture of leaders does need to be reconsid- Research29(4): 415-434. ered for Greek democracies, where, as Robin- Russett, Bruce & William Antholis, 1993. son reminds us, mass votes were as important 'Chapter 3. The Imperfect Democratic Peace as decisions by any leadership elite. As Bruce of Ancient Greece',in Graspingthe Democratic Russett has pointed out to me, by compari- Peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University son with modern structures the lack of insti- Press(43-71). tutional checks on the swift Greek assembly Weart, Spencer R., 1998. Never at War: Why votes gave special weight to possible biases DemocraciesWill Not Fight One Another.New CT: Yale Press. and misperceptions. Perhaps the surviving Haven, University evidence is too scanty to allow us to see how outcomes were affected by the perceived ten- SPENCER R. WEART, b. 1942, PhD in dencies of another regime to suppress oppo- Physics & Astrophysics (University of Col- sition. Yet one pictures the democrats exiled orado, 1968); postdoctoralat CaliforniaInsti- from Leontini who begged the assembly of tute of Technology (Solar Physics) and Athens for succor against the oppression of University of California, Berkeley (History); Syracuse, promoting the vote for war. Does Director, Center for History of Physics, this tell us anything in general about the American Institute of Physics (1971- ).