The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions John M

The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions John M. Owen, IV

International relations research has paid little attention to why states often spend precious resources building and maintaining domestic institutions in other states. I identify 198 cases of forcible domestic institutional promotion, the most costly form of such interventions, between 1555 and 2000. I note several patterns in the data: these interventions come in three historical clusters; they are carried out by states of several regime types; states engage in the practice repeatedly; target states tend to be undergoing internal instability; states tend to promote their own institutions; and targets tend to be of strategic importance. The most intensive periods of promotion coincide with high transnational ideological tension and high international insecurity. I argue that these two conditions interact: forcible promotion is most likely when great powers (1) need to expand their power; and (2) find that, by imposing on smaller states those institutions most likely to keep their ideological confreres in power, they can bring those states under their influence. Although in periods of high insecurity domestic variables alone may account for institutional impositions, such impositions may nonetheless extend the promoting states’ influence and thereby alter the balance of international power. Some assert that, if institutions did not affect international relations, then states would not devote valuable resources to their creation and preservation.1 Among international relations scholars this assertion carries some weight. Its primary opponents, structural realists, agree that wasteful, irrational behavior by states is

I thank the University of Virginia’s Sesquicentennial Fellowship and the Center of International Studies at Princeton University for generous support, participants in the CIS Visiting Fellows’ Seminar at Princeton, and participants in Paul Stephan’s and John Setear’s seminar on international relations at the University of Virginia Law School for comments on the data and arguments. I am grateful to Jorge Benitez, Rachel Brewster, Mark Haas, Howard Hechler, Gideon Rose, Kenneth Schultz, Randall Schweller, Paul Stephan, Mira Sucharov, Topher Turner, David Welch, Mark Zacher, three anonymous referees, and especially Jeffrey Legro and the editors of IO for comments on previous drafts of this article. For research assistance, I thank Rachel Vanderhill and Eric Cox. Any errors are the author’s sole responsibility. 1. See, for example, the exchange between Keohane and Martin 1995; and Mearsheimer 1995.

International Organization 56, 2, Spring 2002, pp. 375–409 © 2002 by The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 376 International Organization selected out by the international system. If building and maintaining institutions were wasteful, then states would be socialized into stopping the practice, especially in a competitive security environment.2 The institutions at issue are usually international, but the same reasoning may be applied to states’ promotions of domestic institutions within other states. Domestic institutional promotion is arguably as common as, and sometimes more costly than, the construction of international institutions; it certainly has a longer pedigree. Since the dawn of the modern states system in sixteenth-century Europe, states have used bribery, coercion, and brute force to modify and maintain other states’ internal regimes. The Counter-Reformation (1550–1648) was partly constituted by the efforts of Catholic and Protestant princes to forcibly overturn the established (institutional) religion in one another’s states. The French Revolution and reaction to it (1789–1849) and the ideological struggles of the twentieth century (1917–91) involved more clusters of forcible domestic regime promotion. In calmer times governments have offered material inducements to foreign states to alter or keep their institutions; they have also used various covert means to the same ends. Since the end of the Cold War the United States and its allies have used economic incentives to promote liberal institutions in Russia and China, and force to impose them in Haiti and the Balkans. In spite of its historical, theoretical, and policy importance, we have little literature on the causes and consequences of the promotion of domestic institutions. Historians and political scientists have examined U.S. efforts to promote democracy, but none has subsumed such efforts under this more general phenomenon. This article focuses on forcible promotions, or what I call impositions, for two reasons. First, uses of force to promote domestic institutions are particularly puzzling because our theories on the use of force tend to be least concerned with states’ domestic institutions. Second, using forcible interventions reduces selection bias because such interventions are the easiest to identify. In this article I identify 198 cases of forcible institutional promotion, the most costly variety, since 1555. The data show the following: The great majority of cases have occurred in one of three historical clusters (1600–50, 1790–1850, and 1917–today). Legitimist (absolute) monarchies, constitutional monarchies, republics, dictatorships, and communist states have all often promoted institutions. Most promoting states are great powers. Most promoters engage in the practice repeatedly. Almost half of the target states border the promoting states; another quarter are close neighbors of the promoters. A signiﬁcant number of targets are undergoing civil unrest. States usually promote their own institutions. Finally, the incidence of forcible promotion rises with transnational ideological strife, and especially sharply when such strife coincides with high international insecurity. Of the 198 cases, 141 take place in such periods. Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that variables stressed by competing theories of international relations—ideas and institutions on the one hand, power on

2. See Waltz 1979, 128; and Walt 1996, 3. Imposition of Domestic Institutions 377 the other—are all necessary to an explanation of the phenomenon. I argue that the majority of foreign impositions of domestic institutions are explained by an interaction of ideology and power. Transnational ideological struggles cause ideologues across states to favor close relations with great powers ruled by their chosen ideology. A country that needs to increase its power—such as one involved in a hot or cold war—may pull lesser states into its sphere of inﬂuence by promoting in those states the institutions called for by the ideology; such institutions make it more likely that the ideologues supporting them will rule. Thus domestic institutional imposition can alter the balance of international power. It may also exacerbate the security dilemma and provoke counter-promotion by rival states. This argument may not explain all cases of forcible institutional promotion. Some historical periods feature moderate amounts of promotion yet low systemic insecurity or ideological tension. Domestic-political factors alone, including moral norms and fear of ideological subversion, may account for many cases. Even then, states may alter the balance of power, wittingly or not, by imposing domestic institutions. U.S. policymakers promoting democracy abroad today need to be mindful that, in helping people in the Balkans and elsewhere, they are also extending U.S. power, which as always incurs costs as well as beneﬁts.

The Puzzle of Domestic Institutional Promotion

Institutional promotion has been little studied as a general phenomenon. In separate studies, Werner3 and Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson4 have identiﬁed conditions under which a war victor is likely to overthrow the government of a vanquished state. Both studies advance our understanding of institutional promotion, and some of their ﬁndings are corroborated here. But both begin only in 1816, use data sets that include a higher threshold of violence than that included here, and omit most of the variables examined in this article. A number of scholars have analyzed the causes of one particular set of institutional promotions, namely, U.S. efforts to promote liberal democracy in other countries.5 None of the scholars treat U.S. democracy promotion as an instance of a broader empirical phenomenon, and so the explanations they offer are hampered by selection bias. Domestic institutional promotion is any effort by state A to create, preserve, or alter the political institutions (as distinguished from the ruler or government) within state B. Although imperial states often promote their institutions in regions they annex or directly rule, I study only those states that retain juridical sovereignty. Why an imperial state imposes institutions upon areas it directly rules—that is, non- sovereign territories—is an interesting question in its own right. But institutional promotion in (otherwise) sovereign states is particularly interesting because it is a

3. Werner 1996. 4. Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1996. 5. See Smith 1994; Robinson 1996; and Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi 2000. 378 International Organization matter for mainstream systemic international relations (IR) theory. Yet systemic IR theories cannot explain it, inasmuch as they abstract from states’ domestic properties. For all of their disputes with structural realists, many liberal neo and construc- tivist theorists agree that IR theory should be systemic, inasmuch as theories that include domestic variables such as internal institutions are reductionist. For structural realists, the only domestic property that belongs in IR theory is material power, which is reformulated as a distributional variable. Neoliberal institutionalists include international institutions as systemic variables, but these institutions evidently succeed or fail at fostering cooperation regardless of the domestic properties of their members’ states.6 Constructivists reject the rationalist assumption of exogenous preferences assumed by neorealists and neoliberals. But many constructivists do accept the starting assumption that states are unitary inasmuch as they are “con- structed” by international rather than domestic norms.7 Systemic theorists do not assert that domestic institutional type is never consequential. Structural realists acknowledge that domestic factors may help cause individual events, such as wars.8 Because neoliberals’ primary concern is the effects of information on bargaining, they have explored the notion that states with transparent institutions (namely, democracies) are more cooperative since they are less able to disguise their true capabilities and intentions.9 Systemic constructivists acknowledge a potential causal role for domestic norms.10 Theory aside, most IR scholars would probably acknowledge that domestic institutions do matter. But to explain how, they must go beyond the current range of mainstream systemic theories. IR theory before Waltz had its inadequacies, but it was better equipped to integrate domestic and international politics. Even realists joined these levels of analysis. For Thucydides, Athens’ democratic institutions gave it a vigor that oligarchic Sparta lacked. For Machiavelli, republics were the states best suited to imperialism. For Rousseau, constitutional states were the most secure.11 More recently, realists of the 1950s and 1960s incorporated ideological differences among states into their theories.12 Today, evidence is mounting that domestic properties, in particular political institutions, do affect international relations in generalizable ways. To name two prominent examples, liberal democracies seldom ﬁght wars against one another,13 and states with similar domestic regimes tend to be allies.14

6. See Keohane 1984; Axelrod 1984; and Oye 1986. Notable recent liberal attempts to theorize about domestic-international links include Putnam 1988; Milner 1997; and Moravcsik 1997. 7. See Finnemore 1996; and Wendt 1999. Among the exceptions are Reus-Smit 1999 and several of the contributors to Katzenstein et al. 1996. 8. Waltz 1989. 9. Keohane 1984, 258–59. Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998 and 1999; and Martin 2000 have developed this insight. 10. Wendt 1994, 385–86. 11. Doyle 1997, 75–80, 103–105, 145–50. 12. See Aron 1966; Hoffmann 1965; and Kissinger 1964. 13. See Rummel 1983; Doyle 1986; Russett 1993; and Owen 1997. 14. See Siverson and Emmons 1991; Werner and Lemke 1997; and Haas 2000. Imposition of Domestic Institutions 379

Domestic Institutional Promotion as a Regularity

If domestic institutions do have generalizable effects on states’ external behavior, it is no surprise that states spend costly resources trying to alter one another’s institutions. Such policies were common, Thucydides tells us, in Greece in the ﬁfth century B.C. During the Corcyræan civil war, Athens intervened on behalf of the commoners, Sparta on behalf of the oligarchs.15 In medieval Italy, the Guelfs promoted republican institutions, the Ghibellines autocratic ones-often in one another’s cities.16 Institutional promotion has also been common in the modern state system. Means of promotion include rhetoric, subversion, economic inducements such as aid or sanctions, and the threat and direct use of force. Tables 1 through 3 present a compilation of the universe of cases since 1555 in which one state forcibly intervened in another to alter or preserve its internal political institutions. I present only forcible institutional promotions for two reasons. First, notwithstanding the general consensus that liberal democracies rarely attack one another, the dominant school of thought in security studies continues to be realism. In recent decades, realism has elided any meaningful role for states’ domestic institutions and hence cannot suggest an explanation for the foreign imposition of domestic institutions. Second, use of force is the easiest intervention to identify. States used other means to promote institutions throughout this period. For example, Louis XIV paid subsidies to England’s Charles II and James II in return for a secret Anglo-French alliance and the establishment of absolute monarchy and Catholicism in England. A century later, the British used subversion to try to overturn the French republic.17 Identifying the universe of non-forcible promotions, particularly of covert action, would be impossible; it would also be difﬁcult to characterize the biases in such a sample. (The set of cases presented here would be biased if we were seeking all possible conditions under which one state’s institutions were of interest to another.) I have compiled as many cases as possible from what is generally known as the modern states system. I thus exclude the ancient Chinese, classical Greek, medieval Italian, and pre-Columbian American systems.

Criteria for Case Selection Full criteria and justiﬁcations for case selection are given in the appendix. An internal political institution is any norm, or predominant rule, governing the relation of rulers to ruled within a given state’s borders, that is, governing the administration of the state’s domestic coercive power. I do not include interventions to replace one

15. Thucydides 1982, 193–202. 16. Strictly speaking, Guelfs and Ghibellines were identified according to whether they backed the papacy (Guelf) or empire (Ghibellines) in the great struggle for political authority in Western medieval Christendom. But Guelfs tended to favor republicanism and Ghibellines autocracy. Weart 1998, 40–41. 17. Duffy 1983. 380 International Organization ruler or government with another under the same institutions. Uses of force must be direct, and are thus limited to invasions, sieges, military occupations, naval attacks or blockades, and aerial bombardments by the assets of the intervening state. The promoting state may impose new institutions upon a conquered territory, or may simply intervene for one side in a civil conflict with the intent of promoting one set of institutions over another. The promoting state may or may not succeed. Cases in which multiple states intervene on the same side are counted once; when two or more states intervene on opposite sides, the cases are counted separately. Target states must be sovereign after the intervention. Sovereignty means a combination and modification of what Krasner calls Westphalian sovereignty, or “exclusion of external actors from authority structures,” and international-legal sovereignty, or “mutual recognition.”18 Impositions of institutions by a state within its own borders, its own formal empire, or areas it directly ruled are excluded. A majority of cases in Table 1 come from the Thirty Years’ War. The absolute numbers are high in part because the number of political units was high: the Holy Roman Empire comprised approximately 1,000 semi-autonomous estates at this time, including secular and ecclesiastical principalities, duchies, free cities, and other territories. Each time an army attempted to cross a hostile border, with the intent of altering or preserving some subset of the target’s institutions, counts as a separate case. Almost all invasions, excluding those of the Turks, were so intended. Even the French armies, who fought against Catholic states on behalf of a Catholic country, intended to overturn regimes that persecuted Protestants in favor of regimes that tolerated all varieties of Christians. The inclusion of intra-imperial uses of force during this period requires some justification. Even if, as Voltaire said, the Holy Roman Empire was no empire (never mind its being holy or Roman), the sovereignty of its estates was something less than most states enjoy today. Certainly the emperors considered the Catholic- Protestant contests to be roughly equivalent to a modern civil war. But few contemporaries considered, and no scholars of the period today consider, the empire after the thirteenth century to be a single sovereign state analogous to Spain or France.19 In the Religious Peace of Augsburg of 1555, particularism took further root as the emperor gave up the right to enforce Catholicism as the official religion throughout the empire; under the formula cuius regio, eius religio, Lutheran rulers could establish Lutheranism in their estates. In Table 1, therefore, imperial estates that were not directly under Habsburg rule are treated as sovereign. Lands under direct Habsburg rule, including the Austrias, Silesia, Bohemia, Moravia, and Royal Hungary (all labeled “Habsburg lands”) are not treated as sovereign.20 Only invasions of these Habsburg lands by powers other than the Empire are included.

18. Krasner 1999. 19. See Krasner 1999, 79; and Asch 1997, 18–24. 20. Kann 1974, 1–24. Imposition of Domestic Institutions 381

TABLE 1. Forcible institutional promotion 1555–1700

Great Close Promoter’s Target Counter- Case Promoter Power? neighbor?a institutions? Target unrest?a Year(s) promotion?

1 France X X Scotland X 1559–60 2 England X X Scotland X 1559–60 X 3 England X X France X 1562–63 4 France, X X Low Countries X 1572 England, X X Scotland, X Nassau X X 5 Spain, X X Ireland X 1578–80 Papal States X (England) 6 H.R.E. X X X Aachen X 1581 7 Spain, X X X Cologne X 1583–89 Bavaria X 8 Palatinate, X X Cologne X 1583–89 X Dutch Rep. X 9 England X X France X 1585 10 Spain X X X France X 1589–98 11 England X X X Netherlands X 1585–1611 12 England X X X France X 1590–91 13 H.R.E. X X Aachen 1598 14 Poland X X Sweden 1600–29 15 H.R.E. X X X Transylvania 1604–1606 16 H.R.E., X X X Donauwo¨rth X 1606–10 Bavaria X X 17 Passau/Strassburg X Cleves-Ju¨lich 1609–10 18 Nassau, X Cleves-Ju¨lich 1609–10 X England, X X France X 19 Protestant Union X X Strassburg 1609 20 Catholic League X X Strassburg 1610 X 21 H.R.E. X X X Transylvania 1611–13 22 U.P. X France X 1616 23 Spain, X X Habsburg lands X 1618–22 Bavaria X X 24 Protestant Union X X Habsburg lands X 1618–22 X 25 Transylvania X X Habsburg lands X 1619 X 26 Poland X X X Habsburg lands X 1619 X 27 Transylvania X X Habsburg lands X 1620 X 28 Spain X X X Palatinate 1620 29 U.P., X Palatinate 1620 X England X X 30 Catholic League X X Palatinate 1620–25 X 31 Spain, X X X Palatinate 1621 X Catholic League X X 32 Spain, X X Valtellina X 1620–26 H.R.E., X X Genoa X 33 Grey Leagues, X X Valtellina X 1621 X Bern, Zu¨rich X Venice 34 Baden X X Palatinate 1622 X 35 Spain X X X Ju¨lich 1622 36 Transylvania X X Habsburg lands 1623 37 Spain X X X United Provinces 1624–29 38 Denmark X Lower Saxony 1625–29 39 England X X Palatinate 1625 X

(continued) 382 International Organization

TABLE 1. continued

Great Close Promoter’s Target Counter- Case Promoter Power? neighbor?a institutions? Target unrest?a Year(s) promotion?

40 France X X Valtellina 1624–25 X 41 Transylvania X X Habsburg lands 1626 42 Bavaria X X Habsburg lands 1626 X 43 Spain, U.P. X X X France X 1627 44 England X X X France X 1627–29 X 45 France X X X England 1627–29 46 Catholic League X Denmark 1627–28 47 England, X X Denmark 1627–28 X U.P. X 48 Catholic League X X Mecklenburg 1627 49 Catholic League X X Pomerania 1627 50 Catholic League X Holstein 1627 51 Denmark X X Mecklenburg 1628 52 H.R.E., X X Magdeburg 1629–31 Catholic League X X 53 H.R.E. X X Halberstadt 1629 54 H.R.E. X X Augsburg 1629 55 H.R.E. X X Bremen 1629 56 Sweden X X Magdeburg 1630 X 57 Catholic League X X Saxony 1630 58 Sweden X X Frankfurt 1631 59 Sweden X X Mainz 1631 60 Saxony X X Habsburg lands 1631 61 Sweden X X Bavaria 1633 62 H.R.E., X X Wu¨rttemberg 1634–38 Bavaria X X 63 France X X Valtellina 1635 X 64 Sweden X X Habsburg lands 1639–45 65 Transylvania X X Habsburg lands 1644–45 66 H.R.E. X X X Transylvania 1644–45 67 France X X Netherlands 1672–78

Sources: Asch, 1997; Encyclopædia Britannica Online, 2000; Holborn, 1959; Kohn, 1999; Leurdijk, 1986; Luard, 1986; Maland, 1980; Parker, 1997; and Pennington, 1989. a During the Thirty Years’ War, central Europe experienced general civil discord; cases only count here if violence clearly triggered promotion. Habsburg lands denotes areas directly ruled by the Habsburgs. The Catholic League and Protestant Union each comprised various German princes. H.R.E. refers to the troops of the Holy Roman Emperor. U.P. refers to the United Provinces of the Netherlands.

Between 1555 and 1700, states forcibly promoted institutions mainly having to do with the relation of government to adherents of various branches of the Christian religion. At stake was usually which confession—Catholic, Lutheran, or Calvinist— would be established, and what rights were to be retained by dissenters. In a typical case, an army would attack a country or city with the object of altering or preserving its ofﬁcial religion. The religious question arose from the Protestant Reformation, which in addition to challenging Catholic doctrines posed a threat to the unity of most states in Central and Western Europe. The Reformation quickly spread from Imposition of Domestic Institutions 383

Germany in all directions, in the process fragmenting into various branches— Lutheran, Zwinglian, Calvinist, Anabaptist, and others—whose members disagreed over central doctrinal questions. Many princes converted to Protestantism and made their new confession their state’s official religion, usually disallowing worship by Catholics (and other varieties of Protestant). In an age when princes bore some responsibility for the souls of their subjects, most considered it obligatory to establish one confession as true. At various points in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, popes called for a Counter-Reformation, which often involved the use of force by Catholic princes to eradicate Protestantism within their own and other states. The Peace of Augsburg in 1555, which recognized the right of Catholic and Lutheran princes to determine the religion of their states, was an early attempt to freeze such forcible promotions within the empire while the Church reunited. But Augsburg failed beginning in 1581 when the emperor intervened in Aachen to preserve the Catholic establishment. Meanwhile, outside the empire, a few years earlier England and France had both intervened in Scotland over the official religion of that state. England, France, Spain, and the emperor intervened in various other cities and states in northwestern Europe toward the end of the sixteenth century, including in the French civil war.21 The seventeenth century saw the rate of such interventions accelerate, as Prot- estant insurrections erupted in various imperial lands and Catholic and Protestant powers intervened. Typical were the interventions in Cleves and Ju¨lich, free cities in northwestern Germany that had officially declared for Protestantism. In 1609 the bishop of Passau and Strassburg seized the towns and re-imposed Catholicism; the following year England, France, Nassau, and the United Provinces marched at least 12,000 troops into Cleves and Ju¨lich to re-establish Protestantism.22 In 1618 a Protestant revolt in Bohemia drew a reaction not only from the emperor (who directly ruled Bohemia and thus was not engaging in foreign intervention) but also from Spain and Bavaria on the Catholic side and the Protestant League (German) and Transylvania on the Protestant side. In the ensuing Thirty Years’ War, various regions of the empire were ravaged by military interventions intended to alter or preserve established religion. These actions were not motivated solely by religious zeal—Catholic France, for example, could hardly be called zealous for the Protestantism of its allies—but rulers did intend to promote Catholicism, Protes- tantism, or toleration in targets, and did so upon victory.23 Most strikingly, in 1629 the Emperor Ferdinand II issued the Edict of Restitution declaring that all conquered lands in the empire would be forcibly returned to the Catholic fold. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) ended this savage wave of forcible institutional promotion. Embers of the Counter-Reformation remained, flaming up on occasions such as Louis XIV’s war against the United Provinces of the Netherlands in the 1670s, in which the French king intended to restore Catholicism to the republic he

21. For a discussion of this history, see Philpott 2001. 22. Maland 1980, 41–42. 23. Asch 1997, 62–97. 384 International Organization so hated.24 Louis promoted official Catholicism by other means in other places—for example, by subsidies to Charles II and James II of England—but forcible attempts to affect foreign states’ internal political institutions fell off sharply for more than a century. Table 2, covering the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, shows that the rate of institutional promotion remained flat until the French Revolution of 1789. In the War of Spanish Succession (1702–13), a secondary issue was Louis XIV’s declaring for the Catholic son of James II as heir to the English throne, and so his attacks on England qualify as a case.25 So does Prussia’s invasion of Silesia (Austria) in 1740, since Frederick the Great announced that he would liberate Silesian Protestants (then disabled under Austrian law).26 France and others intervened in Geneva in 1782 to restore the constitution after a domestic revolt;27 more significantly, Prussia carried out a similar action in the United Provinces in 1787,28 and another in Lie`ge in 1790.29 In 1792 Russia invaded Poland to overturn the latter’s liberal constitution, ratified the previous year.30 The War of the First Coalition against the French Republic had as one stated goal the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy; in turn, the French made clear their intention to export republicanism to their enemies.31 In the latter half of the 1790s, France imposed republican institutions on the various monarchies and oligarchies of Italy and northwestern Europe it conquered.32 These many promotions, and the even greater number by Napoleon Bonaparte in the following decade, make up the bulk of forcible promotions in this period. Details varied, but in general Napoleon forced states in Germany, Italy, and elsewhere to adopt his legal code, abolish feudalism, and rationalize and centralize administration. He also replaced with Bonapartist monarchies the republics that France had established in the 1790s.33 The coalition that defeated France in 1814–15 restored the Bourbon monarchy, albeit this time as a constitutional regime; the victors allowed the liberated countries to establish their own institutions with the exception of Switzerland, whose constitution was included in the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna.34

24. Pennington 1989, 508–509. 25. Black 1999, 327–30. 26. Ibid., 324. 27. Ibid., 512. 28. Schroeder 1994, 41. 29. Ibid., 62. 30. Ibid., 83–85. 31. This goal was controversial in Britain, but it remained ofﬁcial policy from 1793 until 1815. Cf. Duffy 1983, 11. 32. For details see Schroeder 1994; and Blanning 1996. 33. For details see Esdaile 1995, 72–90; Broers 1996b, 61–69; and Schroeder 1994, 377–82. 34. Schroeder 1994, 571–72. Imposition of Domestic Institutions 385

TABLE 2. Forcible institutional promotion, 1701–1900

Great Close Promoter’s Target Counter- Case Promoter Power? neighbor? institutions? Target unrest? Year(s) promotion?

1 France X X X England X 1702–13 2 Prussia X X X Austria 1740–48 3 Russia X X Poland X 1768–72 4 France X Poland X 1768–72 X Turkey X 5 France, X X Geneva X 1782 Sardinia, Bern X 6 Prussia X X Netherlands X 1787 7 Prussia X Lie`ge X 1790 8 Russia X X X Poland X 1792–93 9 Austria, X X France X 1792–97 Prussia, X X Great Britain X X X 10 France X X Austria 1792–97 11 France X X Prussia 1792–97 12 France X X X Britain 1793–97 13 France X X X Netherlands 1795 14 France X X Lombardy, etc. 1797 15 France X X X Genoa 1797 16 France X X Rome 1798 17 France X X X Switzerland 1798 18 France X X Naples 1798 19 Great Britain X X X France 1798–1802 Austria, X X Prussia, X X Portugal, X X Turkey X X 20 Great Britian X X Naples 1799 21 France X X Tuscany 1800 22 France X X Cisalpine Rep. 1803 23 France X X X Helvetic Rep. 1803 24 France X X X Italian Rep. 1804 25 France X X X NW Germany 1804 26 France X X Wu¨rzburg 1805 27 France X X Tyrol 1805 28 France X X X Batavian Rep. 1806 29 France X X X Neuchaˆtel 1806 30 France X X X Wu¨rttemberg 1806 31 France X X X Baden 1806 32 France X X Bavaria 1806 33 France X X Frankfurt 1806 34 France X X X Nassau 1806 35 France X X Hesse-Cassel, 1807 X Brunswick et al. 36 France X X Poland 1807 37 France X X X Spain 1808 38 Britain X X Sicily 1811 39 Austria, X France 1814–15 Prussia, X Russia, X Great Britain X X X 40 Great Britain X Switzerland 1815 X 41 Austria X X Naples X 1821 42 Austria X X X Piedmont X 1821

(continued) 386 International Organization

TABLE 2. continued

Great Close Promoter’s Target Counter- Case Promoter Power? neighbor? institutions? Target unrest? Year(s) promotion?

43 France X X X Spain X 1823 44 Great Britain X X Portugal X 1826 45 Spain X X Portugal 1826 46 Great Britain, X X Greece X 1827–32 France, X X Russia X 47 Russia X X Turkey 1828–29 (Romania) 48 Austria X X X Modena X 1831 49 Austria X X X Parma X 1831 50 Austria X X X Papal States X 1831–32 51 Great Britain, X X Spain X 1833–39 France X X X 52 Great Britain, X Portugal X 1834 Spain X X X 53 Great Britain, X X Portugal X 1846–47 Spain X X 54 France, X X Papal States X 1849 Austria, X X X Two Sicilies, X X Spain X 55 Prussia X X X Saxony X 1849 56 Austria X X Tuscany X 1849 57 Prussia X X Bavaria X 1849 58 Prussia X X Baden X 1849 59 Russia X X X Transylvania X 1849 60 Austria X X Sardinia X 1859 61 France X X Mexico 1862–67 62 United States X X X Cuba X 1899–1901

Sources: Black, 1999; Esdaile, 1995; Holsti, 1991; Kohn, 1999; Krasner, 1999; Leurdijk, 1986; Lu- ard, 1986; Schroeder, 1994.

In the three decades following the Vienna settlement, the legitimist (or “absolute,” as distinguished from constitutional) monarchies35 of Austria, Prussia, and Russia sometimes invaded small states in Italy and Germany to suppress constitutional or republican revolutions. The three even established such interventions as normative in the 1820 Troppau Conference, when they stated that the “Great Alliance” reserved the right to use arms to restore European regimes overthrown by revolution.36 When governed by legitimists, France carried out similar interventions, as in Spain in 1823.37 Even Britain, which loudly disavowed any right to

35. A legitimist monarch was formally unconstrained by a constitution, ruling, as in Louis XIV’s motto, by “Dieu et mon droit,” or “God and my right.” A constitutional monarch admitted to being constrained to govern according to law. 36. Artz 1934, 149–52. 37. Schroeder 1994, 623–28. Imposition of Domestic Institutions 387 intervene in another state’s internal affairs, used its military to maintain or change domestic institutions in Portugal, Greece, and Spain during this period.38 Following the multilateral suppression of the revolutions of 1848–49, forcible institutional promotion mostly ceased until the close of the nineteenth century, apart from Napoleon III’s ill-fated imposition of monarchy in Mexico between 1861 and 1867. Table 3 lists forcible institutional promotions in the twentieth century. The list of promoters is more diverse than in the other tables. The United States attempted to impose institutions in Mexico and the Dominican Republic early in the century (not included are U.S. depositions and restorations of speciﬁc leaders in Latin American states that left institutions untouched). The communist coup in Russia in 1917 led to a number of attempts at forcible regime promotion: the Allies in the Great War tried to overturn the Bolshevik regime; France and Romania intervened to the same end in Hungary in 1919; and the Soviets tried to force revolution in Finland, Poland, and Iran. In the 1930s Germany, Italy, and Portugal forcibly intervened in Spain on behalf of the Nationalists; the Soviets intervened on behalf of the Republicans. During World War II, Germany imposed various fascist institutions in those states it conquered; included here are those targets allowed to retain their international legal sovereignty. In Croatia (Yugoslavia) the Germans helped establish an authoritarian state that persecuted Jews and Serbs.39 Denmark retained its monarchy, but the Germans forced the government to censor the press and outlaw communism.40 The Allies liberated these states to defeat Germany, but in the process they supplanted the institutions imposed by the Nazis. The Soviet Union used various means in states it occupied to impose Marxist-Leninist institutions.41 The Western Allies used force to overturn Nazi-imposed institutions in France, the Low Countries, and Scandinavia, and (under U.S. leadership) to impose liberal democracy in West Germany, Italy, and Japan. During the Cold War the Soviets used force to promote particular institutions in targets in northeast Asia, central Europe, the Middle East, and central Asia. Soviet allies China (in the Korean War), North Vietnam (in Indochina), and Cuba (in Angola) carried out similar interventions. The United States forcibly promoted institutions in northeast and southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Assorted minor powers forcibly promoted institutions in the Middle East and Africa. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has led its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in interventions in the Balkans to force institutional- ization of human rights.

38. See Ibid., 710–21; Krasner 1999, 157–63; Leurdijk 1986, 239–40; and Encyclopaedia Britannica Online 2000. 39. Lemkin 1944, 252–60. 40. Ibid., 157–64. 41. The stories have been told many times; one useful early source is McNeil 1952. It should be noted that the Soviets did not directly impose communist institutions on Czechoslovakia or Hungary (the Red Army withdrew from the former in 1945); still, they did liberate these and all countries in central Europe with the intention of eliminating the institutions established by the Germans during the war. 388 International Organization

TABLE 3. Forcible institutional promotion, 1901–today

Great Close Promoter’s Target Counter- Case Promoter Power? neighbor?a institutions? Target unrest?a Year(s) promotion?

1 Great Britain, X X Albania X 1912–13 Russia, X Germany, X X France, X Austria-Hungary, X X X Italy X X 2 United States X X X Mexico X 1914 3 United States X X X Haiti X 1915–19 4 United States X X X Dom. Rep. X 1916–24 5 U.S.S.R. X X Finland X 1918 6 Germany X X X Finland X 1918 7 Great Britain, X X U.S.S.R. X 1918–22 United States, X X France, X X Japan, X X Italy X 8 France, X X X Hungary X 1919 Romania X 9 U.S.S.R. X X Poland 1920–21 10 U.S.S.R X X Iran X 1920–21 11 Germany, X X Spain X 1936–39 Italy X 12 U.S.S.R. Spain X 1936–39 X 13 Germany X X X Slovakia 1939–45 14 Germany X X X France 1940–45 15 Germany X X X Denmark 1940–43* 16 Germany X X X Croatia 1941–45 17 Great Britain X X Greece X 1944–45 X 18 United States, X X France 1944–45 X Great Britain, X X Canada X 19 United States X X Italy 1944–47 20 U.S.S.R. X X X Bulgaria X 1944–48 21 Great Britain, X X X W. Germany 1944–49 United States, X X France X X X 22 U.S.S.R. X X X Poland 1944–48 23 U.S.S.R. X X X Romania 1944–48 24 U.S.S.R. X X Albania 1944–46 25 U.S.S.R. X X X E. Germany 1945–49 26 U.S.S.R. X X X Yugoslavia X 1945 X 27 U.S.S.R. X X X Czechoslo. 1945 28 U.S.S.R. X X X Hungary 1945–47 29 United States X X Japan 1945–52 30 U.S.S.R. X X X Iran X 1945–46 31 U.S.S.R. X X Austria 1945 32 Western Allies X X X Denmark 1945 X 33 Western Allies X X X Belgium 1945 34 Western Allies X X X Netherlands 1945 35 Western Allies X X X Norway 1945 36 Western Allies X X X Luxembourg 1945 37 Syria X X Lebanon X 1949 38 United States et al. X South Korea 1950–53 39 China, X X South Korea 1950–53 X U.S.S.R. X X X South Korea 1950–53

(continued) Imposition of Domestic Institutions 389

TABLE 3. continued

Great Close Promoter’s Target Counter- Case Promoter Power? neighbor?a institutions? Target unrest?a Year(s) promotion?

40 U.S.S.R. X X X E. Germany X 1953 41 U.S.S.R. X X X Hungary X 1956 42 United States X Lebanon X 1958 43 Egypt X X North Yemen X 1962–67 44 N. Vietnam X X Laos X 1964–73 45 United States, Laos X 1964–74 X Thailand X 46 France X Gabon X 1964 47 United States, X S. Vietnam X 1965–73 S. Korea, X Thailand, X X Philippines, X X Australia, New Zealand 48 United States X X Dom. Rep. X 1965–66 49 U.S.S.R., X X X Czechoslo. X 1968 Poland, X X Hungary, X X Bulgaria, X X E. Germany X X 50 South Yemen X X Oman X 1968–75 51 Great Britain, X Oman X 1968–75 X Iran, Jordan 52 France X Chad X 1969–71 53 N. Vietnam X Cambodia X 1970–73 54 United States, X Cambodia X 1970–73 X S. Vietnam X 55 Cuba X Angola X 1975–91 56 South Africa X Angola X 1975–88 X 57 Syria X Lebanon X 1976– 58 Tanzania X X Uganda 1979 59 U.S.S.R. X X X Afghanistan X 1979–89 60 Iraq X X Iran 1980–90 61 Iran X X Iraq 1980–90 62 Israel Lebanon X 1982–85 63 United States X X X Grenada X 1983 64 United States X X Panama X 1989 65 United States et al. X Somalia X 1993–94 66 United States X X X Haiti X 1994 67 United States, X X Bosnia-Herz. X 1995– Great Britain, X France X 68 Nigeria X Sierra Leone X 1997 69 United States, X X Yugoslavia X 1999– Great Britain, X (Kosovo) France, X Canada et al.

Sources: Encyclopædia Britannica Online, 2000; Holsti, 1991; Kohn, 1999; Krasner, 1999; Lemkin, 1944; Leurdijk, 1986; and Luard, 1986. 390 International Organization

FIGURE 1. Foreign Impositions of Domestic Institutions, 1550–1999

Patterns in the Data

Three Clusters of Institutional Promotion

It is clear that the frequency of forcible institutional promotion fluctuates widely over time. Part of the variation coincides with changes in the numbers of states. Decolonization following World War II increased the units in the international system, and we would expect institutional promotions to increase accordingly. Yet much of the variation holds even when the number of states is held constant. Although the number of states did not change in 1648, the number of promotions between 1600 and 1649 was far greater than that between 1650 and 1699. Furthermore, when Napoleon abolished the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 he reduced the number of states in the system (namely, in Europe and the New World) to approximately 40, and yet the incidence of promotion remained high. Promotions decreased markedly after 1849, and yet the number of states did not shrink until Italian and German unification in the 1860s and 1870s. Measured in raw numbers, the great majority of cases take place in one of three historical clusters. The first cluster occurs between roughly 1580 and 1650; the second, between 1790 and 1850; the third, between 1910 and the present. During other periods, forcible institutional promotion was rare. Figure 1 presents these clusters by grouping interventions according to decade. Promotions that straddled two or more clusters are included in each decade in which they continued. The third cluster, still under way albeit at reduced intensity, is longer than the previous two. Imposition of Domestic Institutions 391

FIGURE 2. Foreign Impositions of Domestic Institutions 1555–1999 (excluding counter-impositions)

A number of cases, particularly in the first and third clusters of cases (roughly the 1620s and 1940s), are counter-impositions, namely, cases in which one state intervened in a target to counteract a previous attempted or completed promotion by a third state. Most of these interventions likely would not have occurred without the initial promotion. (The precise number cannot be demonstrated, inasmuch as when the target was undergoing a civil war the second foreign promoter may have intervened in any case.) Although counter-impositions are theoretically significant, demonstrating that counter-promoters care about others states’ domestic institutions, they inflate the number of impositions. Counter-impositions are indicated in the last column in the tables. (Note that, under the coding rules, interventions intended to counter a state’s efforts to annex a target, such as the U.S.-led intervention in South Vietnam, are not counted as counter-interventions.) Figure 2 does not include counter-impositions.

Not Only Democracies The tables show clearly that it is not only liberal democracies that promote their own institutions in other states. In the twentieth century, communist, fascist, and theocratic-Islamic states each engaged in the practice. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, monarchies, republics, and dictatorships (namely, Napoleonic France) promoted institutions by force. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, monarchies (here including all principalities) were the most powerful political units, and they imposed institutions freely. 392 International Organization

Repeat Offenders Even so, the set of states that uses force to promote institutions is no random sample. The same states tend to engage in the practice time and again in a given period. Table 1 shows that six states (Spain, the Empire, France, England, Sweden, and Transylvania) were responsible for 43 of the 66 promotions. One or more of three states (France, Austria, and Prussia) initiated or were included in 51 of the 60 promotions (Table 2); as already noted, France alone accounts for 33 cases. Table 3 shows that the United States, the Soviet Union, or Germany promoted in 49 of 67 cases.

Great-Power Promoters Not only is a disproportionate amount of promoting done by a few states, most promoting states are great powers. Those that are not tend to be regional powers. From 1555 through 1648, Spain was Europe’s leading military power; it forcibly promoted institutions ten times. The Holy Roman Emperor, the other Habsburg power, did so in nine cases. France, which regained its status at or near the top of Europe after its civil wars ended in 1598, forcibly promoted institutions six times.42 England, a minor power until the late 1580s, at which time it joined the great powers, did so in eleven cases.43 Table 2 (1701–1900) shows that France was promoter in 34 of the 62 cases. In most years prior to 1815, France was Europe’s leading power; between 1799 and 1814, when 17 of its promotions took place, it bade fair to conquer Europe. Most of the remaining promotions in this period were carried out by Prussia, Russia, Austria, and Britain, the other four great powers. Occasionally a minor Iberian or Italian state would participate in a forcible promotion as an accomplice to a great power. In the period covered by Table 3 (1901–today), great powers also participated in a majority of the 71 impositions. The United States has been a great power throughout the period and imposed institutions in 25 cases. The Soviet Union, a great power from 1917 until its disintegration in 1991, imposed institutions in 20 cases. Germany, a great power until 1945, imposed institutions in six cases (plus the two Balkan cases in the 1990s). Great Britain and France, great powers until the 1940s and arguably to the present day, each imposed institutions in twelve cases. In contrast to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, minor states such as North Korea, North Vietnam, Cuba, and Syria imposed institutions by themselves (although with Soviet support in the case of the ﬁrst three). In all three periods, then, the most powerful states were responsible for the great majority of forcible institutional promotion. A related point is that imposing states

42. France’s promotions during this period may be undercounted. I only included interventions in which the evidence of intent to modify or preserve the target’s institutions was clear. In many French military actions in Africa the evidence of intent was inconclusive. 43. Here great power status is based on statistics on military manpower in Kennedy 1987, 56. Imposition of Domestic Institutions 393 tend to be much stronger militarily than target states.44 This is especially true during the second and third waves of institutional imposition. France was the predominant intervenor between 1790 and 1815, a period when it was Europe’s most powerful state. During the Concert of Europe period, when the five powers were roughly equal, each invariably promoted institutions only in much weaker states. In the twentieth century, almost all imposers targeted weaker states. Measuring power differentials during the first period is difficult, although in many cases, such as when the emperor, Spain, France, or the confessional leagues intervened in a small German state, it is beyond doubt that imposer was more powerful than target. In a few cases it is probable that the target had more aggregate power than the imposer did, for example, when in 1562–63 England’s Elizabeth I sent troops to aid the Huguenots in the French civil war. What made France weak at this time was that same civil war. That point leads to the next general finding: namely, that targets are usually experiencing civil unrest.

Target Instability In at least 22 cases shown in Table 1, intervention was preceded by an uprising, revolution, civil war, or coup d’e´tat in the target.45 England and France intervened in Scotland in 1559 after the heavily Calvinistic lower Scots nobility declared a Protestant kingdom.46 Spain and England intervened in the French and Dutch civil wars. In Donauwo¨rth, a free town near Bavaria, the emperor and Bavaria invaded after Catholics began rioting against the Protestant town council.47 During the Thirty Years’ War, targets were almost always internally divided between Catholics and Protestants, often violently so. Table 2 shows that 27 cases were preceded by civil unrest in the targets. Strikingly, between 1815 and 1849, all 20 impositions were carried out following rebellions in the target states. Table 3 shows that 41 of the targets were experiencing civil strife. Early in the twentieth century, targets in Latin America and Europe were all torn by domestic wars or insurrections. During the Cold War, following an insurrection in East Germany, the Soviets invaded. In most southeast Asian, Middle Eastern, African, and Latin American cases, targets were undergoing civil wars (often exacerbated by outside ﬁnancial and logistical support). By no means did all forcible institutional promotions follow civil unrest or reforms in the target. Republican and Napoleonic France usually invaded states with no violent internal conﬂict. Nazi Germany’s forcible promotions were similar, as were most of those of the Soviet Union and United States in the 1940s. The Soviets

44. Werner 1996 ﬁnds that regime imposition increases with the power differential between victor and vanquished. 45. Civil unrest may be underreported in Table 1. In general, all of central Europe was in political ferment between 1618 and 1648, but only when the evidence was clear did I record a target as undergoing political unrest immediately before an intervention. 46. Sutherland 1984, 74–80. 47. Maland 1980, 15. 394 International Organization invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia after reformers peacefully began altering institutions. Even in a majority of these cases, however, target states had a cohort of elites who desired the institutions that the intervenor was imposing.

When Security Is Scarce The incidence of institutional imposition rises steeply during periods of hegemonic struggle, either hot or cold wars. Figure 1 shows that three spikes come in the Thirty Years’ War, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and the World War II and early Cold War (the last is not a spike in Figure 2, which excludes counter- impositions); in each of these, forcible institutional promotion exceeded ten cases per decade. The middle and late Cold War featured ﬁve or more cases per decade. Periods of relative international security, such as 1815–1914, feature moderate or low amounts of institutional imposition. The correlation with high systemic insecurity is far from perfect. Most notably, the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when Louis XIV’s bid for mastery of Europe was opposed by a coalition of states, featured very little institutional imposition. Furthermore, the Concert of Europe period (1815–49) and post-Cold War period (1991–today) feature moderate amounts of imposition even though states were relatively secure.

In Times of Ideological Ferment The three clusters of institutional imposition that I have identified correspond roughly with periods of history generally thought to be ideologically charged. Portions of the states system were afflicted with transnational ideological struggles, or contests that (1) concerned domestic societal order and (2) spanned two or more states. The first cluster corresponds to the Counter-Reformation (early sixteenth through mid-seventeenth century), when Western and Central Europe were con- sumed with the question of which form of Christianity was true and ought to be established by rulers. After the Peace of Westphalia, Catholic-Protestant struggles continued, but the link between religion and politics was attenuated. The second cluster corresponds to the French Revolution and reactions to it (1789–1849), in which constitutionalism and republicanism erupted to challenge absolute monarchy and lingering feudalism. Across states in Europe and the New World, societies were preoccupied with whether legitimism, republicanism, or the “third way” of constitutional monarchy was the best regime. The failure of the European revolutions of 1848–49 brought on a period of ideological calm, as revolution was supplanted by gradual reform in most Western countries. The third cluster corresponds roughly to the ideological contests of the twentieth century. These were initiated by the Bolshevik coup d’e´tat in Russia in 1917, which generated anti-communism in the liberal democracies and later fascism in Italy, Germany, other parts of Europe, and Japan. After fascism’s defeat in 1945, the Cold War continued the struggle between communism and liberal democracy, which Imposition of Domestic Institutions 395 ended in the victory of the latter in the 1980s. As Francis Fukuyama has famously declared, liberal democracy at present faces no system-wide competitor, and thus we label this period one of low ideological tension.48 Yet, ideological struggles continue on a regional scale, as actors in many regions resist, often violently, liberal secularism and market capitalism.

In Their Own Backyards In Table 1, we see that 32 out of 67 promotions were in states either bordering the promoter or across a narrow body of water from it; in Table 2, 27 out of 60; in Table 3, 28 out of 60. Sweden promoted Protestantism in German lands across the Baltic Sea (see Table 1). England or Great Britain imposed institutions on France (Tables 1-3) and the Low Countries (Tables 1 and 3). The United States forcibly promoted institutions on Caribbean islands four times (see Table 3). Many more promotions were carried out in states in the promoter’s general region. Distant impositions are relatively rare. They include Spain and the Papal States in Ireland in 1600–01; England and Spain in the Palatinate in 1620 and 1621; and Sweden’s promotions in southern Germany in the 1630s (all shown in Table 1). Table 2 shows distant promotions by France and Turkey in Poland 1768–72; Prussia in the Low Countries in the late 1780s; Austria, Prussia, and Russia in France, and vice versa, through most of the 1790-1814 period; Britain in Naples in 1799; France in Poland in 1807; Britain in Sicily in 1811; Britain in Portugal in 1826, 1834, and 1846–47; and France in Mexico 1862–67. Distant promotions shown in Table 3 include the Allies in Russia 1918–22; France in Hungary in 1919; Germany and the Soviet Union in Spain in 1936–39; Britain in Greece in 1944–45; the various U.S. promotions of liberal democracy in Europe and Japan after the World War II; U.S. promotion of anticommunist authoritarianism in South Korea, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s; France in Gabon in 1964; Britain in Oman in 1968–75; Cuba in Angola from 1975 to 1991; and the United States and others in Somalia 1993–94, Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995–present, and Yugoslavia (Kosovo) 1999–present.

Strategic Targets Across time, many targets stand out as having geopolitical consequence. Some coincide with vital military, naval, or trading routes. Valtellina, a valley of the Adda River in Lombardy (now Italy) that was a target several times during the Thirty Years’ War, was of consequence to Spain, France, and the emperor because it provided an east-west passage through the Alps. Britain and France intervened in Spain in the Concert of Europe period, as did Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union in the late 1930s; that target’s signiﬁcance to Mediterranean trafﬁc is obvious.

48. Fukuyama 1992. 396 International Organization

Targets also hold strategic importance because of their natural resources. A number of twentieth-century impositions were carried out in the oil-rich Middle East. One should note too that the strategic importance variable has an endogeneity problem: aside from its physical characteristics, state B may acquire strategic importance for state A when A’s rival state C treats B as if it already has such importance.49 Thus the aggregate data may not capture the strategic importance of many targets. Of course, the strong association, identiﬁed above, between the propinquity of two states and the probability that one will promote institutions in the other, may also be attributed to strategic interest.

In Their Own Image

In most cases, intervening states promote their own institutions.50 In the ﬁrst cluster, Catholic states generally sought to establish Catholicism, Protestant states Protes- tantism. France was ofﬁcially Catholic but tolerated Protestants under the Edict of Nantes (in effect from 1598 to 1685); in Valtellina it promoted toleration.51 In the seventeenth century, absolute monarchies occasionally promoted their institutions against oligarchy and republicanism; then Republican France imposed republicanism upon small border states, and the monarchies at war with France tried to re-establish monarchy there. Napoleon imposed his legal code and other rational- izing institutions. Following his defeat, absolute monarchies imposed their institutions on Italy and Germany, while Britain and France (when the latter was constitutional) imposed constitutional monarchy. In the twentieth century, communist states generally promoted Marxist-Leninist institutions; fascist states, fascist institutions; and the United States and other liberal democracies imposed their institutions more often than not. Exceptions do occur, however. France intervened on behalf of the Calvinist Dutch in the late sixteenth century. In Lie`ge in 1790, Prussia intervened ostensibly to restore the prince-bishop, but in the end preserved the liberal revolution.52 Follow- ing Napoleon’s defeat, the legitimist monarchies joined constitutional Britain in setting up a constitutional monarchy in France.53 In South Korea, South Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, and Cambodia, the United States forcibly promoted authoritarian institutions. (As is well known, the United States used various other means to support anti-communist dictators in many other states during the Cold War.)

49. Schelling 1966, chap. 2. 50. This ﬁnding is compatible with Werner’s ﬁnding (1996) that the incidence of postwar regime imposition increases with the distance between the institutions of the victor and the vanquished. 51. Maland 1980, 107. 52. Schroeder 1994, 62. 53. Broers 1996a, 13. Imposition of Domestic Institutions 397

What Causes Institutional Imposition?

Table 4 presents the patterns in the data that illuminate the causes of forcible institutional promotion I have identified. Certain of these patterns will come as no surprise to students of international politics. The three historical clusters of violent institutional promotion (pattern1), for example, will be familiar to those who know their diplomatic history, and such history informs the realism of such scholars as Aron, Hoffmann, and Kissinger. Yet, some of the patterns are inconsistent with or at least problematic for various explanations of U.S. democracy promotion and of international relations in general. Pattern 2 suggests a serious limitation of neo-Marxist explanations of U.S. democracy promotion. Such explanations have little or nothing to say about the vast majority of institutional promotion in the past 450 years, but must rather treat U.S. (or democratic-capitalist) foreign policy as unique. Before declaring any country’s policies unique, however, we must try to subsume such policies under a more general phenomenon involving non-democratic, non-capitalist states. Pattern 2 also may be inconsistent with a finding of Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson54 that democracies are more likely than dictatorships or monarchies to impose new institutions upon a defeated enemy. My finding would be consistent with theirs only if democracies were significantly less likely than dictatorships or monarchies to be war victors. I do not control for the total number of war victories by each regime type, but it is worth noting that a scholarly consensus has emerged recently that democracies are as likely as other regime types to be involved in wars, and more likely to win the wars they fight.55 Presumably, their finding differs in part because their data begin only in 1816 and they use a higher threshold for violence. My finding calls into question their claim that democratic governments are under greater domestic pressure than non-democratic ones to impose institutions. Either non- democratic states are likewise under such domestic pressure; external pressure is partly responsible for institutional promotion, a possibility explored below; or both. Patterns 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 all suggest that a purely normative explanation of institutional promotion is inadequate. Norms—prevailing notions of right and wrong—are frequently cited in public and scholarly debates as causes of intervention to promote democracy for example. Political and journalistic proponents use moral language to try to compel such interventions, while critics deride the policies as moralistic. Many scholarly treatments of U.S. foreign policy also at least emphasize a normative impetus, even if they recognize that other variables are consequential.56 The data show that the incidence of forcible institutional promotion varies with several familiar material factors. Relative power influences which states will do the promoting (pattern 4). States are likely to become targets when undergoing civil unrest (pattern 5), which implies that promoting states act when the

54. Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1996. 55. Lake 1992. 56. Cf. Smith 1994; Doyle 1983; Owen 1997; and McDougall 1997. 398 International Organization

TABLE 4. Patterns in the data

1. Institutional imposition has occurred in the modern states system in three clusters: 1600–48; 1790–1849; and 1918–today. 2. Monarchies, republics, fascist states, communist states, liberal democracies, and theocracies all promote domestic institutions. 3. In all periods a few states do a majority of the promoting (that is, a few states do it repeatedly). 4. Promoters strongly tend to be great powers. 5. Targets tend to be undergoing civil unrest. 6. Promotion correlates to scarcity of international security. 7. Promotion correlates to transnational ideological strife. 8. In the great majority of cases, the target is located near the promoting state; in a majority of these cases promoter and target share a border. 9. Many targets are of objective strategic value. 10. In the great majority of cases, the intervening state promotes its own institutions in the target.

marginal utility from a “unit” of force is highest: the less civil unrest occurring in a potential target, the greater the amount of force needed to bring about the change desired by the potential promoter. States are especially likely to promote institutions during hot or cold wars (pattern 6), suggesting that they take the security environment into account. States are especially likely to promote institutions in neighboring states (pattern 8), which suggests that they are constrained by material costs and beneﬁts: neighbors tend to be cheaper targets, and implicate a promoter’s interests to a greater degree, than distant states. The latter also is true of states with strategic value (pattern 9). Although morality may motivate some interventions, in most cases it takes more than moral intentions to bring about forcible institutional promotion.

An Anomaly for Structural Realism Because it ignores domestic institutions, structural realism is inadequate to explain foreign institutional imposition. Even a realism that takes account of the consequences of internal institutions for state power cannot account for the phenomenon. States might promote centralizing institutions to strengthen allies, but such promotions are not explained by structural realism, inasmuch as they contradict the theory’s central claim that states seek relative gains in an anarchical world. Why would a rational state spend valuable resources strengthening an ally, knowing that the ally might become its enemy if the distribution of power in the international system were to change?57 Being unable to account for this type of policy, structural-realist theory must attribute it to domestic politics—for example, ideological crusading or parochial interests. But the theory asserts that domestic politics affects a state’s foreign policy

57. Cf. Grieco 1990. Imposition of Domestic Institutions 399 in inverse proportion to the amount of security competition it faces.58 The less secure a state, the less freedom it has to indulge domestic actors who want it to intervene in other states on behalf of ideology or commerce. If that were so, then institutional promotion would be least common during major wars. The data reveal the opposite: the highest incidence of forcible institutional promotion takes place during such wars, when security is at a premium. Pattern 3 (see Table 4) makes the anomaly even more severe: the same states repeatedly promote institutions, including during major wars (Tables 1–3), suggesting that the international system rewards rather than punishes them for the practice when security competition is acute. The data thus present a puzzle: how can one state increase its power or security by promoting particular institutions in another state?

The Interaction of Power and Ideology As patterns 6 and 7 reﬂect (see Table 4), the highest incidence of forcible institutional promotion occurs when international insecurity and transnational ideological tensions are highest. Figure 1 shows that 140 of the 198 cases came during the Thirty Years’ War, wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, and the World War II and Cold War, when values were high for both the insecurity and ideological variables. High transnational ideological tension coincident with low to moderate insecurity is associated with moderate amounts of promotion: the 1600–1619 and 1820–49 periods featured between ﬁve and ten per decade. High insecurity in the absence of ideological tension is not associated with forcible institutional promotion: the wars of Louis XIV (late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries) featured little of it. Finally, the current period (1991–today) has seen a moderate amount of promotion even though insecurity and ideological tension are relatively low. Forcible institutional promotion does not correlate perfectly with any of these variables. It evidently has multiple causes, a full consideration of which is beyond the scope of this article. Because nearly three-quarters of the cases are associated with high insecurity and ideological strife, however, and because the association with the former variable is anomalous for structural realism, I now consider the causal relations among insecurity, ideology, and high amounts of promotion. Transnational ideological tension is tension among two or more ideological movements that cross state boundaries.59 Adherents of one ideology feel a degree of solidarity with one another regardless of nationality. Ideologues also feel solidarity with states ruled by their particular ideology. During the Counter-Reformation, devout Catholics tended to look to Spain, the Empire, and Bavaria for leadership; Protestants looked to England, Sweden, Denmark, and the Palatinate.60 In the late

58. See Krasner 1978; Waltz 1979; and Walt 1987. 59. For extended treatment of the effects of such movements on international politics, see the essays in Skidmore 1997; see also Owen 2001/2002. 60. Luard 1986, 38. 400 International Organization eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, actors who wanted to apply Enlighten- ment rationality to politics tended to look to France; conservatives who did not, looked to Austria, Russia, and Prussia. In the twentieth century, communists felt varying degrees of solidarity with the Soviet Union, fascists with Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy, and liberal democrats with the United States. It follows that if one of these ideologically exemplary states wanted to increase its influence over a country, it could do so by promoting conditions under which ideologues sympa- thetic to it would rule that country. One such condition is that the target country have the institutions prescribed by the ideology.61 It stands to reason, then, that state A, an ideological exemplar, may increase its power by promoting in state B whatever institutions are likely to place and keep in power ideologues who desire B to have close relations with A.62 Consistent with this hypothesis are the findings of several recent studies that allies tend to have similar domestic regimes.63 Most to the point, Siverson and Starr have found that domestic regime changes are often followed by alliance changes. The effect is enhanced when foreigners impose the change in regime.64 As Stanley Hoffmann writes, “If one wants an actor to behave in a certain way on the world stage, what better method is there than to see to it that it has the ‘right’ kind of government?”65 The promotion of domestic institutions, then, can alter the balance of power by extending promoting states’ influence. But here the familiar logic of the security dilemma may sometimes apply. In extending its power by promoting institutions in state B, state A may make state C feel less secure, leading C to promote institutions in state D so as to extend its own power, and so on. A security dilemma may also face ideologues across states. By helping one faction in state B to win, state A weakens the rival ideology within other states as well, causing its adherents to feel more threatened and thereby heightening transnational ideological tension. The promotion-insecurity and promotion-ideological tension relations are recursive: domestic institutional promotion is both cause and consequence of insecurity and ideological tension. This explains the spikes in the data and the dozens of counter-promotions during major international conflicts.

The United States, Italy, and the Soviet Union, 1943–49 As early as July 1943, Franklin Roosevelt announced that, following the defeat of fascism, the Italian people would be free to set up their own democratic institutions.66 Following the fall of Mussolini, the U.S. government used the leverage afforded by its occupying troops to promote Italian democracy in several stages. It

61. Cf. Kaplan 1964. 62. Cf. Krasner 1999, 154. 63. See fn. 14. 64. Siverson and Starr 1994. 65. Hoffmann 1984, 11. 66. Miller 1986, 131–32. Imposition of Domestic Institutions 401 supported the pluralistic provisional post-fascist governments. It pressured the provisional government in 1946 to reject the communist-socialist plan for an all-powerful, popularly elected costituente that would set up a postwar regime, and to accept instead a plan that made a radical regime much less probable: local governments would be elected first, making centralization more difficult; a refer- endum on whether Italy would retain the monarchy would follow, simultaneously with costituente elections that would write the constitution; then finally national elections would be held.67 By 1947 a liberal-democratic constitution was in place. In the crucial national election of April 1948, the United States acted covertly to lengthen the odds of victory for the communists and socialists, who were less committed to the new constitution. Finally, Washington offered extensive economic aid to Italy, adding credibility to the U.S.-supported regime. U.S. officials clearly believed that liberal democracy was the best form of government for Italy, but they were evidently motivated by a desire to heighten U.S. national security. Both the Roosevelt and Truman administrations felt significant pressure from the rising Soviet threat. Virtually all actors involved—U.S., Italian, and Soviet—understood that Italy’s foreign alignment was at stake in the contest over its domestic political structures. As Leffler and Painter write of Europe in general: U.S. policymakers worried that wherever and however Communist groups attained power they would pursue policies that served the interests of the Soviet Union. The potential international impact of internal political struggles in- vested the latter with strategic significance and embroiled the United States and the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of other nations.68 A liberal-democratic Italy was more likely to become a U.S. ally and economic partner, thereby enhancing American power and security. The Roosevelt and Truman administrations were presented with incentives to promote liberal-democratic institutions in Italy by the conditions within Italy itself. A transnational struggle raged in Europe between state socialism and its enemies, including constitutional monarchy and liberal republicanism. In Italy, the communist and socialist parties had huge followings, especially in the industrial north. Both parties were openly pro-Soviet and anti-American. Both called for a rejection of Marshall aid and NATO membership. Both defended Stalin’s domestic and foreign policies, including even the communist Prague coup of 1948.69 The communists’ leader, Palmiro Togliatti, had just returned from twenty years’ exile in Soviet Russia. Meanwhile, the largest party was the Christian Democratic party, which comprised not only democrats but also monarchists who, for religious and cultural reasons, mistrusted American-style institutions.70 In spite of that mistrust, Christian

67. Ibid., 155–58. 68. Lefﬂer and Painter 1994, 7. 69. Ledeen 1987, 29–49. 70. Sassoon 1995, 194–97. 402 International Organization

Democrats greatly preferred the United States to the Soviet Union; in the pivotal April 1948 election, the Catholic Church presented the contest as “Christ versus communism.”71 It was imperative that Washington keep the center-right in and the left out. A 1945 State Department memorandum, approved by Truman, stated Washington’s goals for Italy: Our objective is to strengthen Italy economically and politically so that truly democratic elements of the country can withstand the forces that threaten to sweep them into a new totalitarianism. Italian sympathies naturally and traditionally lie with the western democracies, and, with proper support from us, Italy would tend to become a factor for stability in Europe. The time is now ripe when we should initiate action to raise Italian morale, make a stable representative government possible, and permit Italy to become a responsible participant in international affairs.72 For the Truman administration, a democratic Italy would ipso facto be pro-Western, a stabilizing force in Europe, and a status quo state. Although in principle the Italian left could have gained power through democratic elections—and such was the strategy of its theoretician Antonio Gramsci73—its support of the Soviet Union cast into doubt its own commitment to democracy and thus its legitimacy. Intentionally or not, Washington impaled the Italian left on the horns of a dilemma. The problem was evident in the 1948 elections, which the Christian Democrats won with 48.5 percent of the vote (compared to 31 percent for the communist-socialist Popular Front).74 The election took place two months after the Prague coup. Communism’s methods were the central issue in the campaign.75 As Sassoon writes: The Italian communists could not remain neutral between East and West. Like their comrades in the rest of western Europe, they lived through the beginning of the Cold War as something imposed upon them from the outside....Asa minority force they defended stubbornly and consistently all the civil rights which western democracy afforded them; as communists they defended equally stubbornly all the infringements of these rights in the eastern “people’s democracies.” Seldom had a political force found itself so entangled in such a schizophrenic predicament. They could not remain socialist or communist without identifying with the generally acknowledged Soviet model of communism. They could not become credible as democrats without disowning that model.76 Washington certainly pres-

71. Miller 1986, 243–47. 72. Warner 1972, 47–48. 73. Urban 1986. 74. Pridham 1988, 42, 52–53. 75. Miller 1986, 147–50. 76. Sassoon 1995, 198. Imposition of Domestic Institutions 403 sured the Christian Democrats to keep pro-Soviet parties out of power. But the task was made easier by the liberal-democratic regime it had helped install in 1946–47. The socialists did not enter an Italian government until 1963, after they had broken with the Soviet Union over the 1956 invasion of Hungary and embraced Italy’s membership in NATO.77 Two points must be stressed in conclusion. First, even as U.S. policymakers were extending their country’s influence at Soviet expense, Stalin was spreading Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and elsewhere by imposing communism. Each super- power, then, in considering whether to promote domestic institutions, faced a classic security dilemma: such promotions would degrade the adversary’s security and give it a powerful incentive to engage in its own promotions. (Recent evidence suggests that Stalin would have imposed communism in any case.)78 Second, although the United States acted to enhance its security, Italy was no unitary rational actor. Italy joined the NATO alliance not because the Soviet Union threatened it per se, but because the Soviet Union threatened the version of Italy envisaged by the Christian Democrats, and the latter (with U.S. help) dominated postwar Italy. For the Italian left, Moscow was a champion, not a threat. There was no “Italy” apart from a specific vision of its domestic order.

Other Cases

Similar stories can be told about the forcible promotion of institutions by other states in other periods. Prima facie, it is difﬁcult to gainsay that in the Thirty Years’ War the Holy Roman Emperor sought to restore Catholicism in central Europe to restore imperial power, and that various Protestant princes wanted the opposite. That the French Republicans and Napoleon treated those states on which they imposed institutions chieﬂy as sources of wealth and troops suggests strongly that they were promoting French institutions for the sake of French power.79 Few would challenge the notion that Soviet, German, and U.S. promotions in times of high insecurity in the twentieth century were instrumental to the power of the promoters. Each of these states used a non-(structural)-realist method to achieve a realist end, and generally succeeded in doing so. And each thereby typically aggravated the security dilemma and triggered promotions by other great powers.

Conclusion

For students of international relations, study of the forcible promotion of domestic institutions presents an opportunity for a synthesis of insights from realism,

77. Ledeen 1987, 80–83. 78. For example, Gaddis 1997. 79. See Blanning 1996, 169; and Esdaile 1995, 72. 404 International Organization liberalism, and constructivism. That powerful states promote institutions in weak ones affirms Thucydides’ realist dictum that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Yet, as Thucydides showed, what the strong often do is to alter or preserve the internal institutions of the weak. As liberal IR theory has always maintained, domestic politics affects international politics, and not just when states are secure enough to indulge the preferences of domestic actors. Under certain conditions, one state’s internal institutions can enhance or degrade another states power and thereby the international balance of power. Consistent with constructivism, these conditions include the presence of transnational struggles over domestic norms. When disagreements over the right way to order society are sharp and span state boundaries, institutional promotion makes sense and is most likely. Although this argument emerges from analysis of periods of unusually high forcible institutional promotion, it may also explain cases in other periods. States seek power even when secure. Yet, it may not explain many cases during periods of more modest amounts of promotion. Structural realism may be correct that, in times of low insecurity, domestic variables cause forcible institutional promotion. The Concert of Europe period (1815–49) was a time of relative security among the great powers yet high ideological tension throughout Europe and Latin America. Rulers of the legitimist great powers worried (with reason) that, if unchecked, transnational liberalism would topple the crowned heads of Europe. As mentioned above, Metternich and his Russian and Prussian (and sometimes French) counterparts sent troops to various Italian, German, and Iberian states to overturn liberal revolutions. Also, as noted, the post-Cold War period features moderate institutional promotion yet both low insecurity and low ideological tension. It is plausible that the recent forcible promotions by the United States of liberal democracy in Haiti and the Balkans are caused by ideological and moral pressure from within U.S. society. Americans may not fear for either the physical security of their country or the future of democracy, but may find that in the so-called unipolar moment their country is able to mold the world into something more in keeping with their liberal norms. Indeed, because most promotions since 1980 have been carried out by the United States, unipolarity might explain why the third cluster of forcible promotion is lasting longer than the first two. Even so, the nexus of power, domestic politics, and ideology does not evaporate in times of security. Even if the United States is acting from virtuous motives in intervening on behalf of democracy and human rights in the Balkans, the historical evidence suggests that it is also knowingly or not expanding its influence and hence its power. Certainly the anti-liberal Chinese government and anti-liberal actors within Russia and the Muslim world see it that way.80 Not without reason: upon becoming democratic, most of the former Soviet satellite states of central Europe have sought to join NATO, with three so far having gained membership. The United States already enjoys an imbalance of power unprecedented in modern history.

80. On China see Shambaugh 1999; on Russia see McFaul 1999. Imposition of Domestic Institutions 405

Democracy promotion, however, can exacerbate that imbalance and aggravate the security dilemma. Although promoting democracy may still be the right policy, those doing the promoting must give power its due.

Appendix on Data Selection

The phenomenon under study is the direct use of force by one state with the object of constructing, preserving, or altering one or more political institutions in another state. A state is a territorial entity enjoying sovereignty. I limit targets to sovereign states because such cases are most relevant to IR theory. By sovereignty I mean a combination of what Krasner81 calls Westphalian sovereignty and international-legal sovereignty. Westphalian sovereignty is “political organization based on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given territory;” and international-legal sovereignty is “mutual recognition, usually between territorial entities that have formal juridical independence.” Excluded from the data set are not only annexations of territory but also those forms of imperialism wherein a target entity has some variety of autonomy, such as its own constitution, but is ultimately ruled by the intervening state, for example, through a viceroy or governor general. Also excluded are attempts to annex a target, such as North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in 1950. In the Holy Roman Empire, the Habsburg hereditary lands such as Bohemia are not targets when the promoter is the empire (that is, the emperor); they are targets, however, for outside powers such as Sweden or Transylvania. Other lands in the empire—those not directly ruled by the emperor—are targets for the emperor as well as any non-imperial power. Among Napoleon’s conquests, those that he ruled directly, such as Flanders, the Balkans, or north-central Italy, are excluded; territories ruled by others are included, even though Napoleon exerted inﬂuence in such areas.82 Territories the Soviet Union annexed, such as the Baltic states, are excluded. Among Hitler’s conquests, those ruled by a military commander or governor general, such as Poland and Norway, are excluded; those ruled by a sovereign government, such as Vichy France or Denmark (until 1943, when Berlin took direct control), are included. Being militarily occupied per se does not disqualify a state from target status; such occupations are traditionally treated in international law as temporary situations to be resolved at a subsequent peace conference.83 By internal political institution, I mean any norm, or predominant rule, governing the relation of rulers to ruled within a given state’s borders, that is, governing the administration of the state’s coercive power over its own subjects and their property. Examples include liberal democracy, state socialism, absolute monarchy, federalism, the Napoleonic Code, and established Calvinism. Not included are interventions to replace one ruler or government with another under the same institutions. Thus wars over monarchical succession do not qualify; neither do U.S. interventions that were intended simply to save or overthrow one leader or faction, such as in Cuba in 1906–09 or Guatemala in 1954. Interventions in civil wars in which no ideological differences among factions are evident are not included as cases. Thus French and Libyan interventions in Chad in the 1980s are not included.

81. Krasner 1999. 82. Broers 1996b. 83. Lemkin 1944, 12–13. 406 International Organization

Uses of force must be direct applications of violence, and are thus limited to invasions, sieges, military occupations, naval attacks or blockades, and aerial bombardments by the assets of the intervening state (as distinguished from those of allies or nationals in the target state). A state may use any amount of its own forces or mercenaries. I set no threshold for numbers of troops or battle deaths. Interventions may or may not succeed, so long as the intervenor understood that one object of the intervention was to promote institutions in the target. Concerning the intent of the promoting state, there are two types of cases. In Type I cases, the promoting state seeks to defeat the target state militarily and explicitly states its plan to alter the target’s institutions. Typical examples are the uses of force by the French Republic in the 1790s. In Type II cases, the promoting state seeks to aid one side in a civil war, and among its reasons is that the side it favors would set up or preserve certain institutions. A typical example is the intervention by several World War I allies in Russia from 1918 to 1922. When an intervenor favored one side but appeared indifferent or opposed to the institutions of that side, such as the French intervention on behalf of the Patriots in the United States from 1778 to 1783, I do not include the intervention. Motives are of course difficult to assess, but when the intervenor’s motive was in doubt, I did not include the intervention. Not included are implicit or explicit threats to use force, such as military, naval, or aerial exercises. Thus Germany’s 1944 threat to rule Hungary directly unless it began handing Jews over to the Nazis (thus establishing Nazi-style anti-Semitism) is not included, since the Hungarian government complied with the demand. Neither do covert actions such as material or intelligence support for coups d’e´tats or revolutions qualify, unless those actions also involved forcible application of the intervenor’s own military assets.84 A state that sends military advisors, subsidies, or mate´riel for use in a target is not applying force directly; thus the U.S. use of lend-lease prior to its joining the World War II does not count as forcible regime promotion in Germany and Italy. The main justification for these criteria is ease of application. Doubtless, unexecuted threats, covert actions, subsidies, and other means of institutional promotion would enhance our understanding of institutional promotion. But identifying the universe of cases of these events, particularly covert action, is prohibitively difficult.85 Looking only at forcible promotions prevents our answering some important questions. For example, under what conditions will a government use economic sanctions, international institutions, or covert action, rather than military force, to alter or preserve a foreign country’s internal institutions? This question and others must await further research. The primary motive of the intervenor need not have been to alter or preserve particular institutions in the target; I do not claim that all, or indeed any, of these interventions were motivated by norms, although neither do I rule that out. The intervenor need only have clearly intended, for principled or instrumental reasons, to promote particular institutions (its own or otherwise) in the target. Evidence of this intent is found in statements before or during the intervention, in actual behavior following the application of force, or both. Cases in which multiple states intervened on the same side are counted once; cases in which two or more states intervened on opposite sides are counted as two cases.

84. If the general question is, “Why do states promote institutions in other states by whatever means?” then omitting covert actions (as well as economic sanctions, diplomacy, and other methods) biases the sample. 85. Krasner 1999, chaps. 6, 7, analyzes a number of cases in which great powers coerced new states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to adopt particular institutions without directly applying violence. Imposition of Domestic Institutions 407

Any event may be categorized in several ways. Depending on the purpose of analysis, World War II may be classiﬁed as a war, a hegemonic war, a global war, an ideological war, an imperialistic war, a moral struggle, or a tragedy. Many of the cases in the data set could be (and have been) classiﬁed as wars, interventions in civil wars, aid to secessionists, or instances of informal imperialism. What they have in common are the features described above.

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