Special Feature (Article)／特集（論文） Political Orientations of the Egyptian Public Based on the Result of Opinion Survey 2008 Political Attitudes of the Egyptian Public in a Regional Context(1)

INO Takeji, IWASAKI Erina, and KATO Hiroshi

Ⅰ . Introduction Ⅱ . Egypt at the Crossroads Ⅲ . Regional Differences in Political Attitudes Ⅳ . Interaction between Political Attitudes and Socioeconomic Factors Ⅴ . Conclusion

エジプト国民の政治態度 地域比較を中心に

伊能 武次 岩崎 えり奈 加藤 博

本稿は、エジプト国民の政治意識を定量的な分析により明らかにする。その際、焦 点は政治態度とさまざまな社会経済的・文化的な要素との関係を検証することにおか れる。依拠するデータは、ニーズ対応型地域研究推進事業「アジアのなかの中東」（代表： 加藤博）の一環として、「エジプト研究訓練センター」（所長：アブデルハミード・アブ デラティーフ）により 2008年に実施されたアンケート調査から得られた。この調査は、

121 Political Attitudes of the Egyptian Public in a Regional Context (Ino, Iwasaki, Kato)

2011_27-1.indb 121 2011/06/30 17:05:51 18歳以上のエジプト国民1000人を対象とした、全国規模のアンケート調査である。 本調査の独自性の一つは、地域的な比較が可能になるように設計されたことである。 ここでの「地域」とは、都市県（カイロ県、ポート・サイド県）、下エジプト（メヌフィー ヤ県、カフル・シェイフ県）、上エジプト（ベニー・スエフ県、ソハーグ県）のことであ る。本稿では、この調査から得られたデータに依拠し、地域的な違いを重視して、エ ジプト国民の政治態度とその社会経済的背景要因との関係を明らかにすることを目的 とした。地域的な違いを重視するのは、これまでのエジプト政治研究では、地域的偏 差が考慮されてこなかったからである。しかし、本稿では、今日のエジプト政治状況 と今後のエジプト社会の展望するにあたって、地域的偏差を重視する必要があると考え、 上記の３つの地域における政治態度の比較分析を試みた。 分析の結果は、次の四つである。第 1 に、多重対応分析の結果から、エジプト国民 の政治態度が地域によって異なることが確認された。第 2 に、因子分析の結果から、 社会開発が政治態度を左右する重要な要因であることが判明した。なかでも学歴が重 要である。第 3 に、社会開発が重要であるとはいえ、その重要性の度合いならびに社 会開発の中身は地域によって異なる。したがって、社会経済環境と政治態度の関係は 単線的ではなく、地域によって異なるパターンをとる。第4に、三つの地域に共通する 傾向として、社会開発が必ずしも積極的な政治態度を助長するわけではない。通説に 反して、社会開発は政治参加の促進力とはなっていない。実際、最も高い生活水準を 享受し、学歴の高い都市県の住民は、最も社会的不満をかかえ、政治参加が低い。

I. Introduction

A number of fault lines exist in modern-day Egypt. The country has shown strong macroeconomic performance, but it is faced with growing socioeconomic discontent. The sharp contrast between gated communities and areas of slum housing is an example of such a fault line. This economic fault line complicates the political situation, in which political reform and the problem of President Mubarak’s succession have been accentuated by opposition groups in the post-Iraq War period. In recent years, voices of socioeconomic discontent have emerged among the Egyptian public. This is a well- known fact but one that has not been empirically surveyed to any great extent. All of these voices appear to be saying that Egypt is now at a historical crossroads as a consequence of the far-reaching transformation of the Egyptian state and society since

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2011_27-1.indb 122 2011/06/30 17:05:51 the mid-1970s(2). To examine how this transformation is reflected in the political attitudes of the Egyptian public, an opinion survey, on which this paper is based, was carried out in 2008, two years before the national parliamentary elections of 2010, which would decide the future direction of Egypt(3). Using the data collected from the survey, this paper provides a quantitative analysis of and explanations for the voices of socioeconomic discontent among the Egyptian public by focusing on the relationships between political attitudes and various social, economic, and cultural factors.

II. Egypt at the Crossroads

1. The Traditional Image of Egyptian Society Conventional wisdom holds that Egypt is historically a centralized state whose capital city plays a dominant role in every aspect of its inhabitants’ lives. Therefore, Cairo (Misr) is regarded as Egypt (Misr) herself; in other words, we only need look at Cairo if we wish to understand Egyptian society, since everything in Egypt is represented in Cairo. This traditional, predominant image of Cairo in Egyptian society was common from the beginning of the twentieth century, when more than 80% of the population lived in the countryside, up to the Second World War. This image has also been characterized by a prevailing dualism. The first dimension is center–local relations, that is, the contrasting description of the differences between Metropolitan Cairo and other local communities. This dimension may equally be regarded as an urban–rural dualism. The second is the Lower–Upper Egypt divide, that is, the socioeconomic and regional differences between Lower and Upper Egypt. These dualisms are deduced from the traditional image of Egypt, which can be summarized as follows. Egypt in the Nile Valley is composed administratively of two regions, the Lower and Upper regions(4). The Nile River is divided into two branches, which form the delta at Cairo. Lower Egypt is the northern part from Cairo to the Mediterranean. Upper Egypt is the southern part from Cairo to the border between Egypt and Sudan. Although it is well known that Egypt is a hydraulic society dependent on the Nile, this image of Egypt is clearly partial, because it only takes into consideration the

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2011_27-1.indb 123 2011/06/30 17:05:51 oasis region where the different irrigation systems and the Nile Valley social structure have developed. However, this image is so dominant that it has been repeatedly reproduced. As such, an image of Egypt has emerged as a centralized society with two significant but seemingly contradicting corollaries, namely, the urban–rural dichotomy and the cultural uniformity in Egyptian society. The urban–rural dichotomy has influenced the literature on Egyptian society. For example, in the studies on poverty, migration, and employment, which have been key topics in studies of the Egyptian economy, the rural areas have been regarded as a space of poverty with limited job opportunities and out-migration. On the other hand, the urban areas have been perceived as a space of affluence with job opportunities and in-migration. Cultural uniformity has been emphasized in the lifestyle of Egyptian people across history, symbolized in the phrase “al-shakhsiya al-masriya” (Egyptian personality). In fact, it is well known that Egypt is an exception among Middle Eastern states̶almost all of which have artificial boundaries because they were established after the First World War by the European Great Powers̶in that it has historical boundaries and traditions that have helped instill a mature “national” consciousness in the population. The formation of the Egyptian “nation-state” begins with the “Egyptians,” that is, the people of the communities that grew up along the Nile River, and then moves to the political formation of the “Egyptian state.” The consequence of this traditional image of Egypt is the neglect of a regional perspective. Indeed, studies on Egypt generally use only one regional distinction: that between Lower and Upper Egypt. However, the adequacy of these regions as socioeconomic categories has not been examined, and explanations of regional differences have been limited to political and cultural descriptions. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to examine critically this simplistic view of Egyptian society as homogeneous [Iwasaki 2009b; Kato and Iwasaki 2011].

2. Economic and Demographic Changes in Egyptian Society Prevailing descriptions of the regional divide in Egypt have been challenged by the political and socioeconomic transformations that have taken place since the mid- 1970s. The immediate impetus for these transformations was the introduction of new public policies oriented toward economic liberalization by the Sadat regime. Regarding center–local relations, the relative decline in the importance of

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2011_27-1.indb 124 2011/06/30 17:05:51 Metropolitan Cairo as the political center of Egypt has been an important trend. As the flow of migration into Cairo continued, it had to deal with enormous problems related to urban services such as housing, traffic, health, and sewage facilities, as well as the emerging religious radical opposition and sociopolitical unrest. On the other hand, regarding the Lower–Upper Egypt divide, a noteworthy trend emerged at the local level. Prominent families and rich peasants who were regarded as the main beneficiaries of the land reform process under the Nasser regime succeeded in maintaining and consolidating their influence under Sadat’s economic liberalization [Dyer 1997: 83–94]. This trend appears to have been accelerated under the Mubarak regime by the enactment in 1992 of a new law to liberalize the relations between landowners and tenants. After five years’ grace, in October 1997, tenant fees were predominantly placed under the control of market mechanisms. Therefore, tenants had to face serious situations where they might have lost their long-guaranteed rights to their lands and their tenant contracts might have been cancelled [El-Gawhary 1997: 41]. This new law has sensitive political implications for Upper Egypt, where, traditionally, the minority Coptic population is concentrated, and landowners were, in many cases, Copts, because landowner–tenant tensions could easily develop into sectarian conflict between Coptic landowners and Muslim tenants. As radical Islamic groups developed their bases in urban and rural localities in the 1970s, Upper Egypt became a focus of interest with the groups’ strong presence in Asyut and Minya Governorates, and Upper Egypt was paid particular attention to as a special problem area. Small-scale sporadic riots at the end of the 1990s and local unrest in the first decade of the 2000s need to be understood partly in this context. Among the government’s responses to the problems in Upper Egypt, several initiatives are worth mentioning. First, the government placed a priority on regional development to improve lagging economic development. Second, the government attempted to control localities with the amendment of local administration laws in 1979 and 1988, although this did not necessarily apply only to Upper Egypt [Center for Political and Strategic Studies 1989: 461]. The government’s intention to contain local unrest was indicated by the amendment of the law concerning the village head and chief. In 1994, with the amendment of the village head and chief law, the government changed the system of selection from one of election to one of appointment (Law No. 26 of 1994, especially articles 4, 6, and 7). In Lower Egypt, various phenomena reflected socioeconomic transformations.

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2011_27-1.indb 125 2011/06/30 17:05:52 Port Said, for example, has been engaged since the mid-1970s in preventing smuggling and trafficking as the town has expanded its Free Zone trade services and increased transactions with Israel. From the beginning of the 1990s, when Egypt embarked on new economic reforms under the strong influence of neoliberalism, other Lower Egypt towns also felt the impact of economic globalization. In 1995, Egypt signed the Economic Partnership Agreement with the U.S., and in 2004, it concluded the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) agreement with the U.S. and Israel. The agreement was expected to encourage Egyptian textile exports to the U.S. The QIZ covered the areas of Greater Cairo, Alexandria, the Suez Canal region, and other governorates in Lower Egypt [Business Today Egypt 2009: QIZ Heads South]. When we look at demographic changes at the local level, significant changes in the growth of provincial cities continued. According to the demographic statistics published by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) in Egypt, a distinctive trend was apparent between the two census years, 1966 and 1976, with the increasing concentration of migrated population in Greater Cairo as well as the growth of local cities through increased social mobility and migration [Tanada 1986]. We can follow the growth trend of local cities with the 1986 census and confirm that this trend became stronger. The census indicated that not only small local cities increased but also medium-sized local cities began to emerge, particularly in Lower Egypt and the Suez Canal region [Ino 1993: Part 4, chapter 2]. At the beginning of the 2000s, the number and populations of these medium- sized local cities with 300,000 to 500,000 inhabitants increased.(5) Today, these cities have strengthened their capacity as local centers. The population growth of Greater Cairo and its environs has continued and has forced the government to establish new governorates. In 2008, Governorate and the 6 October Governorate were established, and Luxor City was promoted to the status of governorate in 2009. As a result of the demographic changes resulting from the overconcentration of population in Greater Cairo, the growth of medium-sized local provincial cities, the development of new communities in the desert, and the expansion of tourist resort towns along the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and in Sinai, the traditional demographic map with its population densely settled along the Nile river is now changing. As far as Egypt’s regional economic disparity is concerned, uneven distribution of poverty across the regions clearly exists. According to a report by the World Bank published in 2006, the Upper Egypt rural region is designated as “the most severely

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2011_27-1.indb 126 2011/06/30 17:05:52 affected by poverty” of all the regions in the country. The report notes that the Upper Egypt rural region represents the highest percentages in the indexes of both incidence of poverty and geographical distribution of the poor among regions. Although the region’s population makes up 25.4% of Egypt’s total, the incidence of poverty within the Upper Egypt region is 39.1%, which constitutes about 50% of the poor in Egypt [World Bank 2006: 1–2].

3. Political Paralysis During the first decade of the 2000s, Egypt has witnessed a series of notable events that have had significant influence on the political attitudes of the Egyptian public. Among other issues, the public has become aware of the political paralysis resulting from the uncertainty surrounding the prospect that who will succeed President Mubarak. The aging President’s health and the uncertain succession process have hindered prospects for a clear political outlook. The issue of succession has been studied within the regime ever since the National Democratic Party embarked on modernizing efforts in 2000 to restructure party organization with the recruitment of the younger generation, as represented by the President’s younger son, Gamal Mubarak [Ino 2005: 130–133]. Within a short time, Gamal Mubarak has been promoted to a leading position in the party and is regarded as the President’s successor, although he himself continues to deny his succession, and President Mubarak has not appointed a successor. As a consequence, this protracted process of succession suggests a relative decline in the capacity of the regime to govern, and the growing wave of labor unrest and a new generation of protest movements are signs of this decline. Under the neoliberal economic reform agenda, the phenomenon of “the rich got richer” appeared, as poverty has grown despite rapid macroeconomic growth. A typical manifestation of the outcome is the contrasting images of two towns: gated communities and other of areas of ordinary housing. Protest actions to demand wage increases expanded beyond the conventional sphere of the labor unions into various civil service and public sectors. Local tax collectors, teachers, university professors, and judges expressed their demands on the street or in public places(6). The Iraq War appeared to open a Pandora’s box in regime–opposition relations in Egypt as the first ever anti-Mubarak demonstrations took place in public side-by-

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2011_27-1.indb 127 2011/06/30 17:05:52 side with antiwar demonstrations after the beginning of the Iraq War. In December 2004, “the Egyptian Movement for Change” (Kifaya movement) organized anti- Mubarak protest demonstrations in Cairo, publicly expressing their opposition to dynastic succession by the Mubarak family. Although the Kifaya movement attracted only limited followers and exerted limited influence, the movement appears to have had two significant roles in the development of a social movement in Egypt: it is regarded as the forerunner of various protest actions in the public domain, and it is also the first movement to succeed in directly challenging the “red lines” that the regime had imposed upon civilian life for a long time. The movement to mobilize for a national strike in protest against soaring food prices in Mahalla Kubra in April 2008, called the “April 6 Movement,” was an example of a new type of movement organized by labor unions, professional syndicates, and activist networks. Kifaya and other new protest movements contributed to the expansion of the public space that the government had attempted to narrow from the beginning of the 1990s [Shehab 2008]. It is worth noting that the wave of labor protests and emerging new protest groups was partly encouraged by remarkable statements and actions expressing critical positions on the war and on the President immediately before the Iraq War and afterward. There were antiwar demonstrations in Tahrir Square in central Cairo and sit-ins at the Bar Syndicate; a statement directly criticizing President Mubarak was issued by leading intellectuals, as well as a statement from the president of the Judges Club. The actions of Tareq al-Bishry, a former judge and distinguished historian, and of other leading judges contributed to the expansion of public space in civilian life [International Crisis Group 2003: 7–10]. Persistent sectarian tensions suggest the ineffective handling by the government of the situation and indicate the relative decline in the regime’s capacity to govern. Muslim–Coptic sectarian relations during the neoliberal economic reform period have been turbulent. After sectarian tensions occurred in an Upper Egyptian village from December 1999 to January 2000, the demonstration by Copts that took place in Cairo in June 2001 was the first ever in contemporary Egypt [Ino 2002: 29–31]. To pacify the complaints of the Coptic community, the government responded to the crisis with the issue of a presidential decree in December 2002 stipulating Coptic Christmas as a national holiday from 2003. Furthermore, in Upper Egypt, the first Coptic governor was appointed in in January 2006. However, the wave of sectarian

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2011_27-1.indb 128 2011/06/30 17:05:53 tensions persisted not only in Upper Egypt but also in Alexandria and other regions [El Amrani 2006: 1–2]. Most recently, a bomb attack on the Two Saints Church in Alexandria on New Year’s Eve of 2011 increased Coptic grievance. It is necessary to highlight here the resurgent security problems in Egypt. The increase in bombing incidents in the first decade of the 2000s heightened people’s fears about security. Bombings occurred in the Sinai Peninsula, where serious incidents took place in Taba in October 2004, in Sharm el-Sheikh in July 2005, and in Dhahab in April 2006; there was also a series of bombings in Cairo in April 2005. Although Egypt had witnessed similar events in the 1990s, there were notable differences. The scale of destruction was much larger in the 2000s, and Bedouins became key players with the smuggling of weapons and with their connections to foreign militant groups. Until the 1990s, Upper Egypt had been a marginal region in every sense of the word and was a major source of militant Muslim groups. In the first decade of the 2000s, however, the Sinai Peninsula emerged as a new marginal region to challenge the government. The Sinai region has two key features: it is a rapidly developing region and it is a sensitive frontier region adjacent to Israel and Palestine. Bedouins have deep grievances with the way the government has dealt with them and are counterparts to the radical Muslim groups in Upper Egypt that emerged in the 1970s, and as a result, the security challenges in today’s Egypt are more complicated.

III. Regional Differences in Political Attitudes

1. Why Study a Regional Context? As previously described, Egyptian society has undergone rapid changes, and the speed and pattern of changes are thought to be different according to region. The differences between regions, especially between Lower Egypt and Upper Egypt, have already been highlighted; however, these are largely viewed from political and cultural perspectives without socioeconomic analysis based on empirical data and information. In fact, reference to regional differences is very rare, and this is a reflection of the traditional image of Egyptian society. As is repeatedly pointed out, Egypt is described as having a homogeneous nature as a hydraulic society, totally dependent on the Nile. However, real Egyptian society is spatially diverse in socioeconomic terms,

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2011_27-1.indb 129 2011/06/30 17:05:53 historically and contemporarily. There are differences in terms of income, employment structure, and educational levels, not only between Cairo and the provinces but also between and within Lower and Upper Egypt. Cluster analysis is a statistical method used for grouping objects into categories or clusters according to the similarity of their attributes. In a previous paper [Kato and Iwasaki 2008], cluster analysis was conducted to create a regional categorization of Egypt. The study used 28 variables on income data and relevant factors of spatial information: employment (employment situation, sector, economic activity, and employment status) and educational level, taken from the Population Census 1996 and the Income & Expenditure Household Survey 1999/2000 undertaken by CAPMAS. The data were collected at the level of the smallest administrative unit (shiyakhat and qarya). The analysis produced seven clusters, and based on the geographical distribution of each cluster, Egypt is categorized into four regions, with two regions composed of subregions, as follows. (1) Greater Cairo is composed of the downtown area in and suburbs in Giza and Qalyubiya Governorates. Cairo is the primary city in terms of size and the urban functions of administration, commerce, and industry. Moreover, the class of the urban rich is found exclusively in Cairo. Thus, Cairo can be identified as the preeminent center for administration and economy. (2) Lower Egypt is composed of Central Lower Egypt and Peripheral Lower Egypt. Central Lower Egypt is composed of provincial cities and villages in Menufiya, Gharbiya, Daqhaliya, and Qalyubiya Governorates. It is characterized by the predominance of government-sector employment and a relatively high educational level. Peripheral Lower Egypt is the area outside the two branches of the Nile River in Beheira and Kafr Sheykh Governorates and the eastern part of Sharqiya Governorate. Their villages differ from those in central Lower Egypt because they have a relatively high income level and because agricultural employment is predominant. (3) Upper Egypt is composed of Northern Upper Egypt (or Middle Egypt) and Southern Upper Egypt. Northern Upper Egypt (or Middle Egypt) is composed of cities and villages in Fayyum, Beni Suef, and Minya Governorates. These villages are characterized by low income and educational levels, and the agricultural sector is predominant. In these areas, poverty appears to be associated with the agricultural

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2011_27-1.indb 130 2011/06/30 17:05:53 sector. Southern Upper Egypt extends from Sohag to Aswan Governorates, where residents appear to depend on nonagricultural employment opportunities in local factories and through migration to distant large cities. (4) This is an oasis region that has similar characteristics to central Lower Egypt, although it is distant from the Nile delta.

2. The Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008 Are regional socioeconomic differences reflected in the political attitudes of the Egyptian people? To address this question, and given the lack of existing data on this issue, we conducted a nationally representative opinion survey in 2008 by means of a questionnaire(7). Sample data are given in Table 1. One thousand Egyptian men and women aged 18 years or above were randomly selected from six governorates with reference to the findings of a cluster analysis of the regional categorizations described above: Cairo, Menufiya, and Kafr Sheykh Governorates in Lower Egypt and Beni Suef and Sohag Governorates in Upper Egypt. In addition, Port Said was selected as a special case, as it is (along with Suez) the frontier of the market economy in Egypt where an “economic free zone” has been established. Administratively, it belongs to the Urban Governorates with Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez Governorates and appears to have different characteristics from the provincial cities in Lower Egypt.

The questionnaire consisted of the following items.(8)

(1) Mother language and language ability (2) Experience of staying abroad (3) Preferred country for living and working (4) Interest in political issues (5) Frequency of discussion of political issues (6) Frequency of using the mass media (7) Attitude toward foreign intervention in Middle Eastern politics (8) Opinion on the contribution of foreign countries to Middle Eastern politics (9) Participation in civil society (10) Participation in community and civic activities, NGOs, and associations (11) Perceptions of freedom and power

131 Political Attitudes of the Egyptian Public in a Regional Context (Ino, Iwasaki, Kato)

2011_27-1.indb 131 2011/06/30 17:05:53 (12) Opinions on political trends (13) Interest and participation in elections (14) Support of political parties (15) Assessment of the government (16) Subjective social class (17) Satisfaction and change in living standards (18) Opinion on social issues (19) Attitude toward Japan (20) Basic attributes (age, birthplace, educational level, household size, religion, employment, household income, etc.)

3. Political Attitudes in a Regional Context Although it would be easy to assume that political attitudes differ across regions, the factor of regional differences has not been explicitly examined in political studies of Egypt. The previous paper [Iwasaki 2010] was an attempt to examine whether there are regional differences in political attitudes in Egypt, and its findings confirmed this. However, this study did not analyze the regional relationships between political attitudes and socioeconomic environment. Hence, here, we focus on this question. Based on the results of analysis in the previous paper, we first summarize regional differences in political attitudes. The method used to examine the factor of regional differences in political attitudes in Egypt is a multiple correspondence analysis (MCA). MCA is used in this section as an exploratory technique designed to analyze multiway cross-tables containing some measure of correspondence between their rows and columns. The results provide information about the degrees of similarity that allow one to analyze the patterns of relationships in several categorical variables. Interpretation in MCA is

Table 1: Sample Numbers in the Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008 Region Governorate Urban Rural Total Urban Cairo 250 250 Governorates Port Said 200 200 Lower Egypt Kafr Sheykh 50 100 150 Menufiya 50 100 150 Upper Egypt Beni Suef 25 100 125 Sohag 25 100 125 Total 600 400 1000 (Source) The Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008 data.

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2011_27-1.indb 132 2011/06/30 17:05:54 often based upon proximities between variables in a dimensional map. When variables are closer to each other, they tend to show higher correlations; correlations are lower when variables are further from each other. The advantage of using MCA is that it allows researchers to visualize relationships among categories of categorical variables of large data sets. However, it would be difficult to detect relationships on a dimensional map if there were too many variables; variables used in the analysis are therefore limited to the following: (a) subjective (self-reported) social class perception, b) satisfaction with living standards, (c) awareness of inequality, social instability measured by the question on changes in (d) family ties and (e) morals, (f) preference of lifestyle, (g) ideal boss, (h) political stability versus democracy, i) interest in politics, and (j) participation in elections.(9) The answers to these questions are simplified into three or four categories to make them easier to visualize. Table 2 shows the results of MCA using these variables related to political attitudes. Figure 1 is a two-dimensional map displaying the scores (correlates) of each variable, with the first axis in the horizontal and the second axis in the vertical direction. It also plots the location of the governorate, which was added as a supplementary variable. The total inertias of 55.8% and 25.6% are explained by the first and second axes. Since the remaining total inertia is 18.6%, it is understood that the relationships between the variables are mostly explained by these two axes. Since the total inertia of the second axis is one fifth of the total inertia, the relationships in this second axis are also important. In other words, it is not sufficient to judge the political attitudes of Egyptians only by a single dimension. In Figure 1, Beni Suef and Sohag Governorates are symmetrically located in relation to Cairo and Port Said Governorates. On the right-hand side of the first axis, where Beni Suef and Sohag Governorates are located, respondents who prefer political stability to democracy a good deal (“much”), who are very aware of inequality and social instability (“much”), who prefer “spiritual life” or “everyday life,” and bosses who “look after” employees are plotted in proximity. On the left-hand side of the first axis, where Cairo and Port Said are located, awareness of social instability becomes keener, since those who answer “very much” are located there; those who are highly aware of social instability (“very much”) are in proximity to those who prefer “money or fame” and to bosses who work “to the rules.”

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2011_27-1.indb 133 2011/06/30 17:05:54 Table 2: Coordinates of the First and Second Axes First axis Second axis Satisfaction with living standards Very satisfied 0.734 1.883 Satisfied 0.389 -0.239 Dissatisfied -1.416 -0.867 Perception of social class High class 1.046 0.220 Middle class 0.502 0.309 Low class -2.393 -1.312 Agree with the opinion that morals are declining Very much 1.081 -0.701 Much -0.932 -0.613 No -1.282 2.818 Interest in politics Interested -0.402 -0.217 No 0.396 0.214 Ideal boss Rule 0.469 0.559 LookAfter -0.922 -1.100 Political stability rather than democracy Very much 1.003 -1.014 Much -2.186 -0.390 No 0.036 2.210 Agree with the opinion that family ties are weakening Very much 0.674 -0.576 Much -2.399 0.590 No -0.772 8.019 Preference of lifestyle Become rich, make name 0.606 0.158 Everyday life -0.968 -0.090 Spritual life -1.014 -0.913 Awareness of inequality Very much 0.877 -0.431 Much -2.213 -0.176 No -0.033 3.617 Participation in elections Yes -1.028 -0.237 No 0.706 0.163 Governorate Cairo 1.379 0.264 Port Said 1.499 -0.148 Menufiya 0.731 1.878 Kafr Sheykh -0.054 1.783 Beni Suef -3.200 -3.098 Sohag -4.472 -2.006 (Source) The Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008 data.

Political interest, participation in elections, class perception, and estimation of living standards also vary between the right- and left-hand sides of the first axis. Interest in politics and participation in elections become negative toward the left-hand side. Estimation of living standards and class perception shift from low levels on the right-hand side to high levels on the left-hand side. On the other hand, Menufiya and Kafr Sheykh Governorates are plotted on the negative side of the second axis. They are in proximity to the preference for democracy, the highest level of satisfaction with living standards, and low or no levels of inequality awareness. Except for Menufiya Governorate, and with respect to the highest satisfaction with living standards, these variables are not correlated with the

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2011_27-1.indb 134 2011/06/30 17:05:54 Figure 1: Multiple Correspondence Analysis: Projections on the First Two Dimensions 5

BeniSuef

Sohag

Lowcls LookAfter Vmuch Spirit Dissat Vmuch Vmuch Much Vmuch Much Satis Interest Yes 0 PortSaid Everyday Much Cairo HighclsNoRicMhi,Ndncaolms e Rule Much s

x i VMseantuisfiya KafrSheikh a No

o n d No c e S No Satisfaction with living standards Social class 5

- Morals are declining Interest in politics Ideal boss Political stablity rather than democracy Family ties are weakening Preference of lifestyle Awareness of inequality Participation in elections Governorate

No 1 0 -

-2 0 2 4 6 First axis

(Source) The Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008 data.

first axis because they are located on the origin of the first axis. The alignment of variables on the second axis also tells us that political attitudes become acute only when there is awareness of inequality, since all other variables are located on the positive side of the second axis. This is the case for Cairo, Port Said, Beni Suef, and Sohag. Thus, we may judge that there are large differences in political attitudes between Cairo and Port Said (Urban Governorates), Beni Suef and Sohag (Upper Egypt), and Menufiya and Kafr Sheykh (Lower Egypt), and that there are three spatial variations of political attitudes between these three regions. (1) U rban Governorates are characterized by the perception of high social class, high satisfaction with living standards, greater awareness of social instability and inequality, and low level of participation in elections. (2) U pper Egypt is characterized by the perception of low social class, low satisfaction with living standards, awareness of social instability and inequality, and high level of political interest and participation in elections. (3) L ower Egypt is characterized by the perception of middle social

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2011_27-1.indb 135 2011/06/30 17:05:55 class, the highest satisfaction with living standards, low awareness of inequality, low level of political interest, and with a preference for democracy(10).

IV. Interaction between Political Attitudes and Socioeconomic Factors

1. Methods of Analysis and Variables Used As noted in Section III, the three regions of the Urban Governorates, Lower Egypt, and Upper Egypt differ in socioeconomic environment. Indeed, indicators related to socioeconomic attributes of the respondents in the 2008 opinion survey indicate considerable regional differences. Although there were few question items in the survey on socioeconomic attributes because it was designed to study political attitudes and not socioeconomic factors, items nevertheless showed clear regional differences in terms of household income, educational level, and employment situation. For household income level (“What is your household’s usual monthly income?”), the proportion of households with the highest income level is largest in Cairo, followed by ; the proportion with the lowest income level is largest in Beni Suef, followed by Kafr Sheykh and Sohag Governorates. Therefore, the income level is highest in the Urban Governorates, followed by Lower Egypt, and lowest in Upper Egypt. The educational level also shows clear regional differences. The percentages of respondents who had no schooling are 9.3% (Cairo), 6.0% (Port Said), 13.1% (Menufiya), 23.1% (Kafr Sheykh), 45.6% (Beni Suef), and 40.8% (Sohag). Therefore, there is a large gap in the educational level between the Urban Governorates and Upper Egypt. For the employment situation(11), a difference is observed between the respondents in Upper Egypt and other respondents: 49.0% and 47.4% of the respondents in Beni Suef and Sohag, respectively, work in agriculture, compared with only 3.4% and 3.8% in Menufiya and Kafr Sheykh, respectively. In these two governorates of Lower Egypt and in the Urban Governorates, more than half of the respondents work in education as schoolteachers. Responses to the question of media also differ by region: 40.7% (Menufiya),

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2011_27-1.indb 136 2011/06/30 17:05:55 38.4% (Cairo), and 35.0% (Port Said) read “regularly” or “mostly” local (= Egyptian) magazines and periodicals, compared with only 4.8% in Sohag and 12.8% in Beni Suef. On the other hand, local (= Egyptian) terrestrial and satellite TV stations from other Arab countries are much more “regularly” or “mostly” watched in Upper Egypt than in the Urban Governorates and Lower Egypt. In fact, local terrestrial TV is watched by 92.0% and 88.0% of the respondents in Sohag and Beni Suef, respectively, compared with only 39.2% in Cairo. It would therefore be natural to assume that differences in political attitudes are related to socioeconomic environments. Next, we conduct factor analysis to clarify the relationships between political attitudes and socioeconomic factors. Factor analysis serves to clarify the underlying factors that influence a set of responses. Here, it is performed to examine what features are most important in determining the interactions between political attitudes and socioeconomic factors. Then, the extracted factors are rotated using the Varimax method. This method has the advantage of yielding solutions that are simple to interpret, with each factor interpreted by its loading value. Here, factor analysis is chosen because it fits with our aim of examining the political attitudes and socioeconomic factors in the Egyptian context. As pointed out in Sections I and II, it appears that the relationship between these two dimensions is not one-way, as has been assumed in modernization theory. Therefore, factor analysis is a suitable method to examine the underlying factors in the relationship between these two dimensions without prejudice. Variables used in the analysis are as follows. Variables of the political attitudes are those used in Section II, except for questions on corruption and frequency of discussion of politics, which were not included in the MCA analysis(12). Variables on socioeconomic factors are: (1) age, (2) household income level, (3) educational level, (4) sector of employment, (5) place of residence (urban or rural), and (6) use of local (= Egyptian) magazines and periodicals, and local (= Egyptian) terrestrial and satellite TV stations from other Arab countries(13).

2. Results of Analysis Factor analysis using the abovementioned variables derived three dominant factors. The decision regarding the number of factors to retain was based on the eigenvalue criterion, according to which the amount of variation explained by each factor must be greater than one. Therefore, the first three factors with eigenvalues

137 Political Attitudes of the Egyptian Public in a Regional Context (Ino, Iwasaki, Kato)

2011_27-1.indb 137 2011/06/30 17:05:55 Table 3: Factor Loadings with Varimax Rotation for Items on Political Attitudes and Socioeconomic Factors (N = 680) Factor Loadings Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Age -0.132 0.028 0.569 Government sector 0.119 -0.059 0.442 Household income level 0.522 -0.029 0.031 Education 0.722 0.162 -0.045 Local magazines 0.578 -0.015 0.060 Local terrestrial TV -0.091 -0.270 0.169 Satellite TV from other Arab countries 0.346 -0.039 -0.050 Perception of social class 0.599 0.068 -0.052 Satisfaction with living standard 0.223 0.036 0.003 Awareness of inequality 0.091 0.293 0.020 Interst in politics 0.202 -0.017 0.347 Participation in elections -0.052 -0.142 0.455 Ideal boss “to the rule” 0.138 0.120 0.008 Political stability rather than democracy 0.050 0.263 0.031 Opinon on decline in morals 0.152 0.537 -0.092 Opinion on women's social participation -0.001 0.188 0.043 Opinion on weakening of family ties -0.022 0.581 0.083 Opinion on corruption 0.109 0.711 -0.052 Discussion of politics -0.067 0.201 0.044 Preference of lifestyle “money or fame” 0.195 0.110 -0.009 Urban 0.290 0.217 -0.095 Eigenvalue 1.931 1.568 1.020 % of Total Variance 0.40 0.32 0.19 Notes (1) Factor loadings over 0.40 appear in bold. (2) Factors selected are those with eigenvalues above 1.00. (3) Factor 1 = social development level, Factor 2 = social dissatisfaction, and Factor 3 = government–citizen relationship. (4) The responses were recorded in reverse order for easier observation of question items with responses with the option of an ordinal scale. (5) All variables are scored as follows: age 1–5, government sector 0–1, household income level 1–4, education 1–5, local magazines/local terrestrial TV/satellite TV from other Arab countries 1–4, social class perception/satisfaction with living standards/awareness of inequality/interest in politics 1–4, participation in elections 0–1, ideal boss 0–1, political stability versus democracy and opinion on morals/women’ s participation/family ties/corruption/discussion of politics 1–4, preference of lifestyle 0–1, and urban 0–1. (Source) The Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008 data.

greater than one are retained. These three factors explain 96% of the total variance of the original variables. The derived three-factor structure is shown in Table 3. The eigenvalues shown in this table are the correlation values between each of the variables and factors. Factor 1 accounts for 40% of the total variance and is thus the most important factor. It has a high positive factor loading on the variables for household income

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2011_27-1.indb 138 2011/06/30 17:05:55 level, educational level, and class perception, which means that this factor has a strong positive correlation with a household’s economic level. It also exhibits a high correlation with the educational level of respondents. In addition, it manifests a high positive factor loading on the variable “local magazine” (frequency of reading Egyptian magazines and periodicals), which is related to educational level. Since educational level is not only a matter of economic level but also an indicator of development, Factor 1 can be referred to as the “social development level.” Factor 2 explains 30% of the total variance. It is strongly associated with the opinions on “corruption,” “family,” and “morals.” Therefore, Factor 2 can be referred to as the “social dissatisfaction.” Factor 3 explains 26% of the total variance. It is strongly and positively correlated with age. In addition, it is strongly associated with government-sector employment and participation in elections. The correlation between age and government-sector employment is a result of the fact that the older generation benefited more from government-sector employment. With economic liberalization and the decline in the role of government in providing job opportunities, the younger generation has to depend on the private sector for jobs. An interesting fact is that participation in elections also exhibits a high positive correlation. “Interest in politics” indicates a weaker but positive correlation, which implies that political attitudes are related to the provision of jobs by the government that the older generation benefited more from than does the younger generation. Therefore, Factor 3 can be referred to as the “government–citizen relationship.”

3. Regional Differences The fact that the “social development level” is the most dominant factor that affects political attitudes may lead us to believe that regional difference is a mere geographical representation of the social development level. However, the plotting of the derived factors by region suggests that the relationship between social development and political attitudes is not that simple. In fact, Factor 3, the “government–citizen relationship,” which has a high correlation with the variable of political attitudes in their narrow sense, does not have a positive correlation with Factor 1, the “social development level.” Looking at the relationship between these two factors by region, the correlations between Factors 1 and 3 generate the following two regional patterns: the population of the Urban

139 Political Attitudes of the Egyptian Public in a Regional Context (Ino, Iwasaki, Kato)

2011_27-1.indb 139 2011/06/30 17:05:56 Figure 2: Scores of Factor 1 against Factor 3 by Region 2 " l e v e l

t n e 1 m p o l e v e d

l 0 a i c o s "

1 r o t c - 1 a F r o f

s Cairo Port Said r e

o Menufiya Kafr Sheykh - 2 S c Beni Suef Sohag

-2 -1 0 1 2 Scores for Factor 3 "government-citizen relationship"

(Source) The Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008.

Figure 3: Scores of Factor 1 against Factor 2 by Region 2 " l e v e l

t n e 1 m p o l e v e d

l 0 a i c o s "

1 r o t c - 1 a F r o f

Cairo Port Said s r e

o Menufiya Kafr Sheykh - 2 S c Beni Suef Sohag

-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 Scores for Factor 2 "Social dissatisfaction"

(Source) The Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008.

Governorates (Cairo and Port Said) with a higher “social development level” has a negative attitude toward the government, whereas Upper Egyptians with a lower

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2011_27-1.indb 140 2011/06/30 17:05:56 Figure 4: Scores of Factor 2 against Factor 3 by Region 1 " n o i t c a 0 f s i t a s s i d

l a - 1 i c o s "

2 r o t - 2 c a F r o f

s Cairo Port Said - 3 r e o Menufiya Kafr Sheykh S c Beni Suef Sohag - 4 -2 -1 0 1 2 Scores for Factor 3 "government-citizen relationship"

(Source) The Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008.

“social development level” have a positive attitude toward the government (Figure 2). Figure 3 plots the respondents by governorate of residence according to Factor 1, the “social development level,” and Factor 2, “social dissatisfaction.” The figure shows two clear patterns: the population of the Urban Governorates (Cairo and Port Said) with a higher “social development level” are socially dissatisfied, and Upper Egyptians with a lower “social development level” are less socially dissatisfied. Figure 4 shows another aspect of regional difference: respondents of the Urban Governorates are clustered together and share common features of being socially dissatisfied and having a negative view of the government. On the other hand, the respondents of Upper Egypt are socially satisfied and demonstrate a positive attitude toward the government. Lower Egyptians are in between. Taking these regional differences into consideration, the next question is whether each region exhibits a different relationship pattern between social development and political attitude. To examine this question, factor analysis is conducted for each region using the same variables as in Table 3. The results for each region demonstrate that the relationship between social development and political attitudes differs by region (Table 4). In fact, as illustrated in Figure 4, the most dominant factor is “social dissatisfaction” for the Urban

141 Political Attitudes of the Egyptian Public in a Regional Context (Ino, Iwasaki, Kato)

2011_27-1.indb 141 2011/06/30 17:05:57 Governorates. The “social development level” appears as Factor 2. The “social development level” did not appear as the most dominant factor, perhaps because of the homogeneity of household income and educational levels within the region. Factor 3 has a strong correlation with the variables of “local magazines,” “local terrestrial TV,” and “interest in politics.” “Age” and “government sector” did not show a correlation with Factor 3, perhaps because most of the respondents in the Urban Governorates work in the private sector. For Lower Egypt, the most dominant factor is the “social development level,” followed by “social dissatisfaction” and the “government–citizen relationship,” as shown in the correlation of variables. Therefore, it can be said that Lower Egypt has a pattern similar to that at a nationwide level. For Upper Egypt, on the other hand, the most dominant factor is the “social development level,” since the variables of “educational level” and “local magazines” have high positive correlations with Factor 1. “Interest in politics” also has a positive correlation, which implies that those with a higher level of education tend to read more magazines or newspapers and take a greater interest in politics. Factor 2 in Upper Egypt has a high correlation with satisfaction with living standards and “urban.” Household income level and social class perception have a weaker but positive correlation. Therefore, Factor 2 can be referred to as the “economic level.” Factor 3, on the other hand, can be labeled “social dissatisfaction,” since it is highly correlated with “political stability versus democracy” and “family ties.” It is also associated with “corruption” and “discussion of politics.” In summary, the key findings from these results are as follows. First, social development is an important factor for all three regions, since it appears as the most dominant factor for Lower and Upper Egypt and as the second factor for the Urban Governorates; educational level in particular has key importance. Second, the relationship between social development and political attitudes differs by region, as is illustrated in the order of the three factors and their components, which differ by region. Indeed, in the Urban Governorates, “social dissatisfaction” is the most dominant factor, whereas in Lower and Upper Egypt, it is “social development level.” Moreover, the components of “social dissatisfaction” and “social development level” are not the same for these three regions. Third, what seems common for the three regions is that social development does not lead to positive political attitudes, in contrast to the conventional wisdom that assumes social development is the driving force behind political participation. In fact, the populations of the Urban Governorates

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2011_27-1.indb 142 2011/06/30 17:05:57 Table 4: Factor Loadings with Varimax Rotation for Items on Political Attitudes and Socioeconomic Factors in Each Region Urban governorates Lower Egypt Upper Egypt Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Age 0.039 -0.133 0.090 -0.276 0.073 0.573 -0.163 0.064 -0.007 Government sector -0.023 0.128 0.112 0.098 0.122 0.428 0.345 0.039 -0.052 Household income level -0.044 0.551 0.005 0.519 -0.043 -0.002 0.215 0.339 -0.035 Education 0.047 0.645 0.162 0.689 0.039 0.042 0.793 0.172 0.149 Local magazines -0.105 0.306 0.616 0.545 -0.067 -0.014 0.779 0.189 0.021 Local terrestrial TV -0.196 -0.224 0.483 0.133 -0.037 0.063 -0.132 -0.140 -0.058 Satellite TV from other Arab -0.064 0.209 0.338 0.505 0.089 -0.145 0.245 0.040 0.092 countries Percepion of social class -0.034 0.517 0.036 0.578 -0.040 -0.154 0.364 0.388 0.002 Satisfaction with living -0.125 -0.034 -0.041 0.163 -0.035 -0.063 0.305 0.576 0.071 standards Awareness of inequality 0.265 0.045 -0.103 0.092 0.311 0.112 0.008 0.278 0.069 Interst in politics -0.016 0.055 0.470 0.124 0.028 0.242 0.610 -0.127 0.039 Participation in elections 0.039 0.104 0.115 0.099 -0.046 0.391 0.097 -0.141 0.089 Ideal boss “to the rule” -0.112 -0.021 0.079 0.027 0.050 0.047 0.046 0.022 0.032 Political stability versus 0.234 -0.057 -0.007 0.010 0.172 0.061 0.324 -0.030 0.615 democracy Opinon on decline in morals 0.587 0.055 0.033 0.043 0.408 -0.023 0.042 -0.130 0.119 Opinion on women's social 0.212 -0.043 0.032 0.050 0.229 0.107 0.025 -0.137 0.030 participation Opinion on weakening of 0.655 -0.020 -0.170 -0.036 0.528 0.128 -0.006 0.128 0.641 family ties Opinion on corruption 0.769 -0.015 -0.038 -0.002 0.626 0.012 0.144 0.280 0.370 Discussion of politics 0.180 -0.033 -0.020 -0.085 0.316 0.011 0.145 -0.138 0.357 Preference of lifestyle 0.059 0.223 -0.241 0.114 0.132 0.125 0.086 0.256 -0.173 “money or fame” Urban -0.101 -0.046 -0.003 0.179 0.700 0.049 Eigenvalue 1.662 1.286 1.119 1.831 1.180 1.084 2.303 1.508 1.160 % of Total Variance 0.32 0.25 0.22 0.393 0.253 0.180 0.322 0.211 0.162 N 329 197 154

(Source) The Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008.

who benefit from the highest standard of living appear to be the most socially dissatisfied and the least interested in politics. Therefore, we should assume that the pattern of relationships between socioeconomic environments and political attitudes is not uniform across the nation. Instead, we may argue that it is the relationship between social development level and social dissatisfaction, which is an expression of how people perceive social change and their relationship with the government, that underlies the regional variations of political attitudes.

143 Political Attitudes of the Egyptian Public in a Regional Context (Ino, Iwasaki, Kato)

2011_27-1.indb 143 2011/06/30 17:05:58 V. Conclusions

(1) Results of the analysis attest that there are many differences between the Urban Governorates (Cairo and Port Said), Lower Egypt (Menufiya and Kafr Sheykh), and Upper Egypt (Beni Suef, and Sohag). Thus, it may be concluded that the regions in Egypt each have different political attitudes. It appears that Upper Egypt in particular has different political attitudes from those of the Urban Governorates and Lower Egypt. (2) Interestingly, the relationships between the components of political attitudes can be observed in our findings: for example, the perception of a middle social class status together with a higher satisfaction in living standards does not lead to greater interest or participation in politics and a preference for democracy. (3) Social development is an important factor for all three regions since it appears as the most dominant factor for Lower and Upper Egypt and as the second factor for the Urban Governorates; educational level in particular has key importance. (4) The relationship between social development and political attitudes differs by region, as is illustrated in the order of the three factors and their components, which differ by region. Therefore, we should assume that the pattern of relationships between socioeconomic environments and political attitudes is not uniform across the nation. (5) What seems common for the three regions is that social development does not lead to positive political attitudes, in contrast to the conventional wisdom that assumes social development is the driving force behind political participation. In fact, the populations of the Urban Governorates that benefit from the highest standard of living appear to be the most socially dissatisfied and least interested in politics. (6) The results of our analysis raise some interesting questions. For example, as mentioned in Section I, Egypt today faces a kind of political paralysis, a situation that presents difficulties for the future prospects of the country since people in the Urban Governorates are more acutely aware of the present situation than the populations of Upper Egypt are.

Notes

(1) This paper was written as part of the findings of the Need-Based Program for Area Studies, “The

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2011_27-1.indb 144 2011/06/30 17:05:58 Middle East within Asia: Law and Economics.” Sections are written by the following authors: II 1 by Ino and Kato, II 2 and II 3 by Ino, III 2 by Kato, III 1 and 3 and IV by Iwasaki, and I and V by Ino, Iwasaki, and Kato. (2) Immediately after the collapse of Tunisian regime, the government of Egypt was faced with a serious challenge by an unprecedented large scale of protest not only in central Cairo but also in other local major cities such as Alexandria and Suez. These protest demonstrations were mobilized mainly by a Facebook network of young people at first. Through the two weeks’ revolutionary protest movement, their demand for “stepping down of the President” succeeded to enforce the President to resign. It is remarkable in the context of sociopolitical change that a new type of protest movement has emerged in contemporary Egypt. However, it remains to be seen if people’s enthusiasm supporting for this historical protest will encourage the process of reform in the next stage. (3) According to the formal results of the National Elections issued by the Committee of Higher Election, the National Democratic Party (NDP) succeeded in winning more than 80% of seats, thereby excluding the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood from the Assembly. However, election observers from human rights NGOs indicated that these elections were unprecedented in the degree to which there were irregularities and obstructive actions against opposition candidates and their supporters. Immediately before the second round of elections, major opposition parties such as the New Wafd Party and the Muslim Brotherhood announced their intention to boycott the second round. (4) Egypt is administratively divided into three regions: the Lower, Upper, and Frontier regions. However, the Frontier region is excluded in this paper because it was not included in the Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008. Frontier Egypt is composed of oasis regions in the Eastern and Western Desert and the Sinai Peninsula. (5) In 1986, there was only one city with a population between 400,000 and one million. However, this number increased to four cities in 2001 [UNDP 2003: 39–46]. (6) See Mitchell [1999]. (7) See Administration Office, ed. [2009]. (8) For details of the questionnaire, see http://www.econ.hit-u.ac.jp/~areastd/egypt.htm. (9) Social class perception is measured by asking, “Which social class do you think you belong to in terms of living standard?” The estimation of living standards is demonstrated in answers to the question “How do you feel about the quality of life in the area where you live?” The question “What do you think about the lack of equal opportunity between rich and poor in Egypt?” asks about the awareness of inequality. Social instability is measured by the answers (agree: 1 very much, 2 much, 3 moderately, 4 not much, and 5 not at all) to the three questions asking for opinions on social issues: (1) “Family ties are weakening in your country”; (2) “Morals are declining in your society”; and (3) “Women should take more active roles in your society.” Preference of lifestyle is assessed by the question “There are many ways to live. Which of the following ways of living would you say comes closest to your way of life?” The categories of

145 Political Attitudes of the Egyptian Public in a Regional Context (Ino, Iwasaki, Kato)

2011_27-1.indb 145 2011/06/30 17:05:58 response are “work diligently and carefully, and it will make you rich” for preference for money; “study diligently and carefully in order to make a name for yourself” for fame; “just live the way you like the best” and “live each day as it comes, cheerfully and worry free” for maintaining everyday life; and “resist all evils in the world and live a pure and just life” and “never think of yourself, everything is in the service of society” for spiritual life. The question concerning one’s ideal boss̶“If you are working now (or in the past) in a firm or workplace, which of the following department chiefs would you prefer to work under?”̶has two responses. One is “a person who always sticks to the work rules and never makes unreasonable work demands but who, on the other hand, never does anything for you personally in matters not connected with the work” and represents a preference for rationality. The other is “a person who sometimes demands extra work in spite of rules against it but who, on the other hand, looks after you personally in matters not connected with the work” and represents a preference for paternity. Preference for either political stability or democracy is estimated by asking for opinions on the statement “Political stability is more important than democratic change.” Interest in politics is measured by the question “How much are you interested in political issues, such as the new ministerial formation, and living conditions in your country, such as unemployment, prices, salaries, etc.?” Participation in elections is measured by the question “Did you vote in any previous elections or referendums?” (10) A similar finding is made by Tessler [2002: 17]. “Residence is related to both dependent variables to a statistically significant degree in Egypt and Algeria, but in the former country pro- democracy attitudes are associated with residence in smaller towns and in the latter country they are associated with residence in larger towns and cities.” (11) Questions on employment are those on employment situation, economic activity, sector of employment, and occupation. (12) Frequency of discussion about politics is judged by the opinions on the statement “I often discuss politics like pricing of bread and its substitutes with friends and relatives.” The question on corruption asks how much respondents agree with the viewpoint, “Corruption is a serious problem in your country.” (13) The question “How many times do you use the following media?” (regularly, mostly, moderately, rarely, not at all, and do not know) relates to the following media: (1) local magazines and periodicals, (2) other Arabic magazines and periodicals, (3) non-Arabic magazines and periodicals, (4) local terrestrial TV stations, (5) satellite TV stations from other Arab countries, (6) non-Arabic satellite TV stations, and (7) local radio stations.

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2011_27-1.indb 146 2011/06/30 17:05:59 ac.jp/%7Eareastd/). Business Today Egypt. 2009. August (http://www.businesstodayegypt.com/). Center for Political and Strategic Studies. 1989. Arab Strategic Report 1988. Cairo. Dyer, Graham. 1997. Class, State and Agricultural Productivity in Egypt. London: Frank Cass. El-Amrani, Issandr. 2006. “The Emergence of a ‘Coptic Question’ in Egypt.” Middle East Report Online, April 28 (http://merip.org/mero/mero042806.html). El-Gawhary, Karim. 1997. “‘Nothing More to Lose’: Landowners, Tenants and Economic Liberalization in Egypt.” Middle East Report 204 (July–September): 41–48. Ino, Takeji. 1993. Modern Politics in Egypt. Tokyo: Sakuhokusha (in Japanese). ―――. 2002. “The Ibn Khaldun Trial and Egyptian Politics in the 1990s.” Gendai no Chuto (The Contemporary Middle East) (32) (January): 16–34. ―――.2005. “Regime and Development Strategy.” In Development Strategy and FTA Policy in Egypt. ed. Toshikazu Yamada, 125–149. Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies (in Japanese). International Crisis Group. 2003. The Challenge of Political Reform: Egypt After the Iraq War. Cairo/Brussels, 30 September. Iwasaki, Erina. 2008/9. “Regional Categorization of Egypt by Income Level, Employment and Education.” Ajiza Keizai (Asian Studies) 49(9): 22–44 (in Japanese). ―――. 2009a “Spatial Income Gap and Structure in Egypt: The Urban–Rural and Cairo–Provincial Divides Reconsidered.” Aziya Kenkyu (Asian Studies) 55(2) (April): 85–106 (in Japanese). ―――. 2009b. Egyptian Society in Transition. Tokyo: Hayama Shoseki Kobo (in Japanese). ―――. 2010. “Regional Differences in Social Consciousness within Egypt: An Analysis Based on the Egypt Attitude Survey in 2008.” Journal of Political Science and Sociology (12): 1–26. Kato, Hiroshi and Iwasaki, Erina. 2008. “Rashda. A Village in Dakhla Oasis, Egypt.” Mediterranean World. 19:1–55, Tokyo: Mediterranean Studies Group (Hitotsubashi University). ―――. 2011. “Village Map in Egypt.” Hitotsubashi Economics 4 (1): 131–172 (in Japanese). Mitchell, Timothy. 1999. “Dreamland: The Neoliberalism of Your Desires.” Middle East Report (210) (Spring): 28–32. Shehab, Shaden. 2008. “Riding the Storm.” Al-Ahram Weekly. 10–16 April. Tanada, Hirofumi. 1986. “Development of Local Cities and Population Mobility in Egypt” Shakaikagaku Tokyu 31(3) (April): 883–916. Tessler, Mark. 2002. “Do Islamic Orientations Influence Attitudes Toward Democracy in the Arab World? Evidence from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria” (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.com). UNDP. 2003. Egypt Human Development Report 2003 (in Arabic). World Bank. 2006. Arab Republic of Egypt: Upper Egypt̶Challenges and Priorities for Rural Development. June 15.

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2011_27-1.indb 147 2011/06/30 17:05:59 ABSTRACT INO Takeji, IWASAKI Erina, and KATO Hiroshi Political Attitudes of the Egyptian Public in a Regional Context

This paper provides a quantitative explanation about the voices of socioeconomic discontents among the Egyptian public, focusing on the relation between the political attitude and the various kinds of social, economic, and cultural factors, using the data collected by the Opinion Survey in Egypt 2008. The survey is conducted by ERTC (Economic Research and Training Center) within the framework of the Need-Based Program “Middle East within Asia” (at Hitotsubashi University). It covers 1,000 Egyptians aged 18 and above. The originality of this survey is that it enables to investigate the Egyptian public’s political attitude at a regional level. The regional level, here, means the Urban Governorates (Cairo and Port Said), Lower Egypt Governorates, and Upper Egypt Governorates. Using the data obtained from this survey and analyzing at regional level, this paper clarifies the characteristics of the Egyptian public’s political attitude and its relationship with socioeconomic background at the regional level.

Wayo Women’s University, School of Humanities, Professor 和洋女子大学人間・社会学系教授 Kyoritsu Women’s University, Faculty of Arts and Letters, Associate Professor 共立女子大学学芸学部准教授 Hitotsubashi University, Graduate School of Economics, Professor 一橋大学大学院経済学研究科教授

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