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Journal of Homeland and Emergency Management

I olume 3, luue 4 2006 Artic:le 2

A Precis of Suicide

Daniel B. Kennedy ..

• Um\crsuy of Detroit \lcrcy. daniclbkcnncdyra comcasl.net

Copyright (c)2006 The 13crkclcy flcctroruc Press. All rights reserved

TSA 15-00014 - 001364 A Precis of Suicide Terrorism

Daniel B. Kennedy

Abstract

Smce the early 19~0s, su1c1de bombmgs have become the deadlle'>t form oftcrromm. Suic1dc bomber.. arc not generally chmcally demnged and arc soc1ally and pohllcally mOII\ated. rurther­ morc, the motives ofsu1c1dc bomber.. can be considered scpamtely from those ofthc1r sponsoring organintions. Secunty personnel arc adv1scd to watch for seven signs of terrorist act1vity and to be mmdful of ccrtam bcnanoralmd1cator., of subjects ubout to attack. Terrorism must be prevented at the source, during pre-attack phase-.. and at the target

KE' WORDS: tcrmrbm, suicide bombings. terrorism sign'>, profiling

TSA 15-00014 - 001365 Kennedy Suicide Tcrruri\m

INTRODUCTION

Broadly defined, terrorbm i., the u~e of extreme again~t innocent <, in order to create fear for the purpo~e of forcing political, social, or religious change. Terrori-.m has been defined in numerous way<, by academics, political leaders, and the popular pres-.. Cooper (200 I) and Hoffman ( 1998) dic;cuss the debate' surrounding the multiple definllion~ of terrori~>rn. Although terromm will lik.ely remain a "conte..,tec..l concept" (Smelser and Mitchell 2002). Crenshaw ( 1983) ha.., c;uggested that terrorism can be distinguished from by the former's emphlli.i~ on nonmilitary targets, unconventionaJ weaponry, and unlikelihood of VICtory in the traditional sense of the word. Suicide terrorism is a particular!) virulent strain of terrorism in which terrorists destroy themselve~ during the act of murdering others so as to rnaximiLC both the number of ca..,ualtie!-> and the emotional impact liuch a seemingly desperate anack. will have on a broader audience. For example. a ..,uicide terrori<,t may drive an explosives-laden \'Chicle down the crowded street of a mark.et area and purposefully detonate his next to a crowd of men, women, and children innocently shopping for vegetables. Certainly, the attacf..s of September I I con..,tituted o;uicide terrori..,m in that the aircraft hijacker' fully intended to destroy thcm.,clve' in order to large number., of civilian .... Suicide terronsm often results in maximal carnage since the suicide bomber can guide or carry the to the particular place and at the particular time he or .,he may determine a detonation wi ll produce the greatest number of casualties. Although over 70 percent ofterrorilit attacks utiliLe ..,, ..,uicide terrori'i!'> rna) also c;elect biologicnl, chemical. or incendiary weapon., of rna..,., destruction. In o;pi te of the fact that terrorist groups motivated by religious belief!. arc more likely to !.eek ma.,.., casualtie., through of mas<, de~truction than nationali!>t groups, there well rna)' be certain consideration\ which have so far limited their willingness to do .,o. Arguably, thJ<,I'> becau<,e the Identities of the "martyrl>" would remain unknown and uncelebrated,thcirdemh-; may be slow, painful. and lc!.s dramatic, and retaliation again'it remaining terrorist!. would be massive (Dolnik 2003). ln a wor.,e ca.se !.cenario. terrorists and !.uicide terronsts may also a nuclear explo<,lon or otheNi..,e .,pread radioacti\'C materials by combining conventional explo-.ivcc; with radioactive wa-.te. Although the world has ..,o far been spared an attack of this nature, suicide terrorism remains subMantiaUy more fatal than other acts of . Since the beginning of modem c,uicide terrori<,m in Lebanon in the early 1980..,, suicide tcrrorhm hac; become the most deadly form of terrori'>m. Although suicide attach amounted to ju'>t three percent of all tcrrori•.t incidents from 1980 through 2003, the'>c attach were responsible for 48 percent of all fatalitic!., not even

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TSA 15-00014 - 001366 2 JIISEM Vul. 1 ~0061 No.-1. Art1clc 2 counting September I I (Pape 2005). Unfonunately, suicide terrorism i., practiced becau<,e it has <,ucce.,sfully forced troop withdruwals and other concessions in Lebanon, , the West Bank, Sri LanJ...a, , and . Dershowil! (2002) provides .,cveral explanations as to why terrorist attacks of any nature shoult.l not be rewart.lct.l.

EXPLANAT!Or-;S

Becnuc;e o;uicide terrorism is a complex social phenomenon, at con'>tructing demographic, motivational. pcr.,onality, and behavioral profiles have met with only lim11cd succe.,.,. Some ofth1., conceptual confu.,ion derives from a fai lure to clarif; the type of suicide terrorism under discuo;<,ion. for example, whether of a nmionalitate-spomored, or ideological nature. Also, the Pale:.-.tinian .,uicide bomber of the I980., may be different than the second generation Engli-.hman of PaJ...istani de.,cent who blow-; up a London bu'> in 2005 (Soibelman 2004). The female C'hechen 'luicide bomber may be a ''Black. Widow" whose motivations differ from those of a male egyptian expatriate living in . training in , and murdering thousand., in the . Members of a suicide terrorist organitation occup)' different ., such as recruiter'>, indoctrination and logi!.tics ..,peciali-.ts. explo-,•ve<., technician-., and the homicide-suJcJde bomberhim-,elf. While they may have overlapping motives and share other per<.,onal charactcri">tic<.,, '>Ome play a more domimmt role than others. and their personalities may well reflect this difference. Nevenhelc..,.,, '>ignilicant progres<., ha., been made in both cla.,.,ifying and clarifying the most promising explanation<; of o;uicide terroric;m to date. ContrJ.ry to popular opinion, suicide bombers are not simply deranged fundamentalist~ driven to irrational aw. by ignorance and crushing poverty (Atran 2004a). Nor arc they uniform!} ridden with psychose<,, profound per<,onality dio;orders, and other defects of character wh1ch readily explmn their violent acts again'>! noncombatants (SiiJ....e 1998). Instead, some current research sugges t ~ that suicide tcrrorii'>m i~ a response to the occupation or troops from democratic nation~ of land claimed by the militarily inferior ethnic or rcltgious groups to which the terrori...ts belong. Suicide auacJ....s often prove politicall)' effective against the<.,e larger force., and con'>titutc a form of altnlistic suicide on the part of individuals deeply committed to their cause and to each other (Pape 2005). Sageman (2004) further details the strong social bonds fonncd by membero; of terror cells as the)' deal with the alienation they feel o;ometimec; after moving to foreign countries. It should be noted. however, that the debate continue., as to whether suicide tcrroriMs do, indeed, possc.,s cenain pathological traits or states of mind which contribute to their decisions to ki II

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TSA 15-00014 - 001367 Kennedy Suic1de Terrnri'm them.,elves and murder other., at the same time. For example, Lester, Yang, and Lind'>ay (2003) believe many ob.,ervers too readily conclude that .,uicide terrorist'> lack '>Uicidal trait~'.. Indeed, they conclude that many pos.,el'.s personality traits, e.g., authoritarian per~o,onality, which may help explain their actions. Other commonly cited deficicncie~o, include anti<.,ocial, borderline, dependent, narcis~istic, and paranoid personality di'>order'> or tendencie'>. Meloy, Mohandie. Hempel. and Shi va (200 I) offer envy. dependency. omnipotence, entitlement. emotional detachment, paranoia. and various other dc<.,criptors to explain the "llomkidal and Suicidal States of Mind" po'>sessed by the 9/1 1 murderer'>. Post ( 1986) explains terrorism as the manifestation of an allempt to consolidate identity and a need to belong. This notion of a need to belong i., remin1.,cent of Hoffer·., ( 1951) cla.,.,ic worJ... on the ''true believer." Victororr (2005) and Miller (2006a, 2006b) have reviewed psychological explanations of terrori'im, ami Turk (2004) has done the same from a I'.Ociologicnl per!-tpective. Stern (2003) offer~'. a multifaceted undcrl.tanding oftcrrori\m based on extcn'live fieldwork coupled with a comprehen.,ivc analy'ii., of the liter.uure. Personal crises generated by financial prc.,!-tures. shame a~sociated with sterility or extramarital pregnancy, and a desire for rl!venge may ul'>o contribute to suicide bombings (Pedah;ur 2005). Other ex pia nations ror !-.U icicle terrori ..,m range from analysis of child-rearing practice!-. (de Mau<,c 2002) and cultural l.upport and contagiOn (Reuter 2002) to the competition between rival terrorist group., for publicity (Bloom 2005). Some analysts point to the nature of Islamic religiou~ tenets themselves, or their various interpretations, as rationaJitationl'. utililed by terrorists for the juMification of their violent acts (CooJ... 2004; Spencer 1002). A radical interpretation of Mu-;lim theology may prove decisive in the deci-;ion to become a suicide terrorist although the l'.uicide bomber~'> of the Tamil Tigerl> 1n Sri Lanka are generally Hindu -., though other ::.uicide terrorist group'> arc not particularly motivated by at all. According to Atran (2004b). c;upport for <,uicide tcrrori'im ari<;es primarily from the relative deprivation generated b} mtng aspirauon-. followed b} dwjndling expectation::., cl'.peciall} regarding civil libertiel..

INDICATORS

Military, police. und security personnel are encouraged to monitor critical infnl'>tructure target propertie., for evidence of terrorist activity in general, as well as indicators of the presence of a ~'>Uicide bomber in particular. Survei llance, elicitation, te~t., of o,ecurit}'. acquiring supplie<.,, prc!-tence of suspiciou., people, dry runs, and deployment of a<,sch constitute seven common signs of tcrromt activity. For example. terrori'>t'> will most likely closely observe a given target for quite '>Ome time before an auacJ.... They do thi!> in order to determine target strengths

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TSA 15-00014 - 001368 JIISEM: Vol. 3 ~006J No.4, AnJcle 2

and weal..n e.,~e~ a~ well as the behavior of liN responders. Target defenders ~ho uld be trained in <,urvcillance detection and be on the aJcrt for anyone recording or monitoring activities. annotating maps. or drawing sketches. Terrorist~ may also attempt to elicitwformalion about a place, pcr~on, or operatiOn and make mquiric~ concerning de Ii vencs. guard capabtlities. or other relevant activit ie\ pcrti nent to ~set protection. They may also auempt to place "key'' people in sensitive work. locations in on.ler to gather thts information. Te rrori st~ may abo test the security of an installation or property by moving into sensitive area'i and judging police or security responses to these incursions. They may trigger an aJarm to U'>SC~s emergency response protocol!.. Another area of which to he cogni!Unt i'> the acqui-.ition of -.uppl ie-.. Police and -.ecurity l.hould watch for unu~ual purchase'> or of , ammunition. or chemicals. Any unusual cache of llight manuals, mtlnary uniforms, police equipment. flight plli>ses, counterfeit per-.onal identificauon. and other items may signal terrori'lt activity. S~.:cu rity personnel should be on the alert for suspicious appearing people who seem out of place. This may mean monitoring someone in the workplace or commercial center who does not fit in because of irregular behavior. language usage, or unusual questions they are asl..ing. Terrorists will also engage in "dry runs," or practice exercise'>, before their final a<,sauiL. It is during this ··rehearl.al" exercise that defender., may have their best chance of preventing an auack \ incc multiple dry runs arc normally conducted at or near the target area. The '>eventh and finaJ '> ign to watch out for is an individual or individuah deplo}tng a'>'>et'> and gelling into po.,ition to strike. Becau'>e thi., and olher pre­ incident indicator'> rna} come week.<, or month'> apart, it i'> important to document and report each in'>tance of suspicious activity. even though it may appear to be an isolutcd and, therefore. in~ignificanl act. Although these seven sign-, of terrorist activity do not nccc\sarily portend a murder-suicide bombing per se. \uch suicide terrorism wi ll often be preceded by the~e '>arne '>tep<,. In other word'>, '>Uicide terrorism h gcnera.l ly preceded by the same tndicator., a., other terrorist attack-.. There arc. however. certain behavioral profile., which may allow defender\ to intercept the fanatic about to murder others in the proce:-.., of taJ...mg his own life. Although no single profile ha., proven applicable to all act\ of suicide terrori'>m, a numher of terrorists have been intercepted ba'>ed on behavioral clue.;;. For example, security and police personnel have been advised to watch for young. Middlc-Ea-.tcrn appearing males who arealo ne and dressed in loose orbuiJ...y clothing inappropriate for the weather. and seemi ng nervou., or under the inn uence of a drug of some '>Ort. However, women and children have also been involved in acts of sutcide tcrrori<,m. Bombing suspect\ may tightly grip a bacJ...pacJ... or other luggage. be unrc<,pon..,he to .,alutation., or voice command<;, and seem deliberate and focused

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TSA 15-00014 - 001369 Kcnnctly: Suacitlc Tcrrori'm 5 on their route of travel. They could be per'>piring and exuding a nowery scent from freshly applied body oils, and the lower part of their faces may \cern paler from ha' ing rccentl) \haved off a beard. They may even be smiling broadly due to the joy they anttctpate as the)' ··took upon the face of Allah:· Suicide bomber., about to detonate may be avoiding eye contact. staying av.ay from security personnel. and mumbling under their breath a., they attempt to position themselve!'. near a crowd of people or VIPS. Their mid-sectton\ may appear stiff or rigid from the lED, and wires may even be v i ~ible . Chemical stains and odors have abo been detected in association with prior suicide bombings, and the usc of disgui\e!'. is certainly not unknown. The International Association of Chiefs of Police ha., recently developed Training Key., #581 and #582 (BunJ...er 2005a. b) to help in the idcntilication and response to \uicide terrorism. Jt mu!'.t be cautioned, however, that \Utcide bomber characteri.,tic'> arc drawn from multiple sources and have not been formally or empirically validated. While their predictive valtdtl} ha., yet to be proven. behavioral proliling itself is 'ieen to be far more productive than "hard" ethnic or . As suicide terrorism evolves, more WcMern, female and prison converts to radicall!.lam <.ts well as second-generation citii'en!'. of non-Islamic nations, may commit murder-suicide. Behavioral proliling must adapt to thi s evolving threat. II i., doubtJulthat any suicide terrorist wi lJ manifest all or even most of the!->e behavioral characteristics. Conversely. man) perfectly innocent cititen'> will manife.~ t 'lOme of thec;e same characterio;tics. thus authorities mu\t expect an eoormou'> "fat...e posiuve'' problem (erroncou!>ly identifying someone a.., a bomber who actually i~ not). Neverthele~!'., police and ~ecurity per~onnel mu'>t consider the totality of the circumo;tances which present with the subject and proceed cauti ously in any event

PROSPECI'S

Although -.uicide tcrrori-.m ma} ultimately be the last dec;J.,tOn of a sol itary individual. it ha-. generally been made po'>'>ible by the efforts of <,everal terrorists, each performing a ~pecialiLed functton. Recruiters seek out lit...ely murder-suicide candidates in madru'>sa'> and mosque\ or otherw i\e receive volunteers. "Minders" sequester and train the bomber\ in safe houo.,e!>. Quartermaster~ obtain explosives and other materials such as nuts, bolt, nails, and the like. Film crew~ preparl.! <, to help en~ure the bomber docs not bact.. out, and may even lilm the explosion itself for propaganda purpo!-.es. Other terroriMs select an array of targets and conduct surveillance and intelligence-gathering activities. Practice e>.erci!.es may also take place. Technician., prepare theexplo.,ive!'.. and handler!-> tran<;port the o,uicide bomber to the target area. In some cases. handlers may even detonate the !'.uicidc bomber's

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TSA 15-00014 - 001370 6 J IISEM: Vol. 3 ~0061 No. 4, Aniclc 2 payload rcmotelj. These effort'> mu'>t all be financed including pos'>lblc payment'> to the murder-suicide bomber·~ family. The point, of course, is that a suicide bombing itself is generally a fairly complex undcrta"ing relying on a sophi!>licated infra.'>tructure which is well-establio.,hed in and ba\ically tolerate to its host community. Although there\\ ill be ino.,tances of"Lonc Wolf' -.uicide attack-. and the occa-.ional depredations of ··self-starter" cells, murder-suicide campaigns are generally far morl! imricate than initially they appear to be (see generally, Hoffman 2003; Deputy Chief of for Intelligence 2005). Some expert'> believe a substantial terrorbt infra<;tructure already exio;;ts in the United States. Emerson (2002), Hamm (2002). and Kushner and Davis (2004) describe what they perceive to be the \\ idespread nature of tntemalterroristthreats. Becau\e of the difficultie'> in establishing <;uch complex -;uicide terrorism infrastntctures in Western countnes geographicallj remote from Middle-Eastern and Asian .wnes, it is likely that future s uicide bombings perpetrated against the West may differ <.omewhat from the predominant patterns thus far observed. For example. while man)' Middle-Eastern suicide bombers resemble DuriJleim's "altruistic'' \uicide ljpe or a hybrid "fatali-;tic altrui..,tic'' type (Pedahtur, Perliger and Weinberg 2001; sec. also. Kha!-.han 2003 and Oliver and Steinberg 2005).the middle­ class. alienated <;uicide bomber projected to appear in the West may be described a!. more ··egoi!.tit:" in nature (Nunn 2004). The sometimes associated with migration and cu ltural marginality may also play a role in extremi!-.tthint..ing (Patai 2002). To the extent such individuals are particularly su~cept ibl e to "suicide contagion .. (Coleman 200-+; Phtlltps 1974) the locations and growth in the number of murder-suicides by bombing may well dcpcml partially on the nature of press coverage afforded these atrocities. Given the complexities of tcrroril>m itself, governmental rcspOnio,es to this problem nw.t be multi-faceted as well. Global. long-term efforts to modify the demographic, political. and cultural (including theological) wellsprings of terrorism and suicide terromm mu!.t be undertaken. Prevention "at the source" entails dbrupting '>tagtng areas in the several countries that harbor terrorist\. Prevention at the "end ofthe line .. entails target-hardening ofcritical infrastructure targets. "Along the way" antiterrorism can be implcmemed by controll ing the movements of people and weapons at national borders. Certainly, these preventive activities must be accompanied by rc.<,ponse and recovery apparati which will mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack (Smelser and Mitchell2002). More !\uccinctly. it is the responsibilit)' of legitimate governments everywhere to prevent, protect. reo.,pond, and recover from the o.,cou rge of terromrn and -.uicide terrorism.

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and social sciences. Washington, DC: The National Academics Press. Soibelman, M. (2004). Palestinian suicide bombers. Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling 1, 175- 190. Spencer, R. (2002). lslcun unveiled: Disturbing questions about the world's fastest­ growing faith. San Francisco: Encounter Books. Stem, J. (2003). Terror in the name ofGod: Why religious militants kill. New York: Harper Collins Publishers. Turl , A. (2004). of terrorism. Annual Review ofSo ciology, 30, 271-286. Victoroff, J. (2005). The mind of the terrorists: A review and critique of psychological approaches. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49, 3-42.

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