Master Thesis

MASARYK UNIVERSITY, BRNO

MASARYK UNIVERSITY

MASTER THESIS

2018 Jeffrey van Dooren Faculty of Social Studies Department of International Relations and European Studies

What is Viktor Orbán’s position towards the

European Union?

Master thesis for the course Thesis writing seminar

Author: Jeffrey van Dooren

Supervisor: Vratislav Havlík, Ph.D M.A. in European Politics II Year, III semester

This thesis is dedicated to my grandmother, Jenny Schepers-Kuik

She passed away on 12th May 2015, which was the same day I got accepted in the European Politics master’s program. I still miss you every day and I wish you were there to witness how most of my dreams came through the last three years. These dreams came though thanks to Masaryk university.

I want to specially thank my supervisor Vratislav Havlík. For his undying support and advise during this process. I also would like to thank Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem, András Schweitzer and Sophie Hochrath. ELTE accepted me on an Erasmus scholarship, to do my research in Budapest. András Schweitzer provided me with the contacts of the specialists for my empirical chapter. Lastly, I would like to thank my girlfriend, Sophie Hochrath. We met during my first semester at Masaryk, while she was on Erasmus. We moved together to Budapest and there are no words to describe her support during my moments of doubt during this process. I mentioned that most of my dreams came though. I managed to do two internships the last Academic year. The first one was at the European Parliament. To the Dutch delegation of the Socialists & Democrats. The second and current one is at the embassy of the Netherlands to Albania. I set out three goals/ambitions during my gap year in 2015. I wanted to do a master abroad, and work one day at either the European Parliament or at a Dutch embassy. I would like to thank Masaryk for the possibility to follow these dreams. During this process I got fascinated by Hungarian politics. I hope you will enjoy my work and that you will better understand the political position of Viktor Orbán and the geopolitical climate in Hungary.

Abstract: What is the position of Viktor Orbán towards the European Union? Why is the Hungarian Prime Minister reacting in a certain manner towards the European Union? Is there a cultural explanation related to the Hungarian society? Are political decisions being made to please a certain voter's base? Or is it simply political opportunism? And if so, where do these motivations come from? It is necessary to understand the geopolitical position of Hungary within the European Union and the specific role of Viktor Orbán within. I want to understand and explain Viktor Orbán’s position towards the European Union. In order to do so, the following four research questions are formulated:

A. What are the theoretical explanations of Viktor Orbán´s Eurosceptic policies? B. What are the motivations of Viktor Orbán’s Eurosceptic policies? C. Does the position of Viktor Orbán towards the EU change in time? D. Is there difference between Viktor Orbán´ and Fidesz´ positions towards the EU?

Key Words:

Viktor Orbán, European Politics, Hungary, European Union, Fidesz, Nationalism-Universalism Cleavage, Potential Bridge between East and West

Table of Contents Chapter 1 Introduction ...... 7 1.1 Research questions ...... 8 1.2 Methodology ...... 9 Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework ...... 13 2.1 Literature Review Hungarian Foreign policy ...... 13 2.1.1 .Hungarian Foreign Policy toward the EU after 1990 ...... 13 2.1.2 Hungarian Foreign Policy toward the EU after 1990 ...... 16 Period 1999-2010 ...... 16 2.1.3 Hungarian Foreign Policy toward the EU after 1990...... 19 Period 2010-Recent ...... 19 Chapter 3 Empirical Chapter ...... 37 3.1 Theoretical Explanations ...... 37 3.1.1 Nationalism-Universalism Cleavage ...... 37 3.1.2 The Bridge between East and West ...... 43 3.2 What are the Motivations of Viktor Orbán ...... 48 3.2.1 Pragmatism ...... 48 3.2.2 Power ...... 53 3.2.3 Financial Gain ...... 56 3.3 Does the Position of Viktor Orbán towards the EU change in Time? ...... 57 3.3.1 Losing the 2002 and 2006 parliamentary election is the reason for the change ...... 57 3.3.2 The European Union and Hungary; An ongoing Cat and Mouse Game ...... 59 3.3.3 From Federation to Europe of Nations ...... 63 3.4 The difference between Fidesz and Orbán ...... 64 3.4.1 Lack of Freedom of Expression ...... 64 3.4.2 Opportunism ...... 66 Chapter 4 Conclusions ...... 67 4.1 What are the Theoretical Explanations of Viktor Orbán´s Eurosceptic Policies? ...... 67 4.2 What are the Motivations of Viktor Orbán? ...... 69 4.3 Does the position of Viktor Orbán towards the EU change in time? ...... 70 4.4 Is there difference between Viktor Orban And Fidesz Position towards the European Union? ...... 71 4.5 Overall Conclusion: What is the Position of Viktor Orbán towards the European Union? ...... 72 References ...... 73

Chapter 1 Introduction

The final chapter of Paul Lendvai’s Viktor Orbán Uber alles-Hungary at a dead end book covers Hungary Between Democracy and authoritarianism back in 2010. Mention the name Orbán to a Hungarian; they will be sure to express an opinion. This is not strange, considering that he has been a leading figure in Hungarian politics since the late years of communism. He has made an interesting transition however, from liberal student leader towards perceived autocrat. The political career of Orbán began in 1987 as a young protestor. He began to shift towards the right- wing spectra, adopting an intensifying national conservative ideology.

Despite alienating Hungary from most of its neighbours with the controversial “Status Law”, the party sought European integration. His first cabinet had worked towards European integration; the country joined the European Union in 2004. After an eight year absence, Orbán and his party returned to power in 2010 and held an absolute majority. With this majority he has been able to change the Hungarian constitution.

Besides the internal and controversial politics from within, Orbán has become the subject of debate outside Hungary as well. The relationship with the European Union has been everything but ideal since his takeover.

The repayment of the IMF loan, the controversial media law, the critical stances during the migration crisis and the announcement to close the Central European University have stirred complete disbelief from Brussels. In May 2017 the European Parliament backed a resolution on the situation in Hungary. This rapport could eventually lead to the activation of Article 7 of the Lisbon Treaty. Article 7 is a procedural mechanism whereby the voting rights and representation of a member state in the European Council could be suspended for failing to maintain the values of membership as stipulated in Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty1.

1 Article 7 Lisbon Treaty: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12012M007

But what is the position of Viktor Orbán towards the European Union? Through research, the purpose of this Master’s Thesis is to deeper understand Orbán’s position political positions and motivations.

I want to analyse why certain stances are perceived as Eurosceptic and determine if there are explanations for certain decisions. Might there be an ethnic or cultural explanation, or it simply political opportunism? Has the approach has changed over the years?

To answer these questions, I will aim to provide explanations relying on available literature and by interviewing experts in the given fields. These local experts will consist of Hungarian journalists and political scientists.

1.1 Research questions

The aim of this thesis is to analyse and better understand the position of Viktor Orbán towards the European Union. Therefore, the following four research questions need to be analysed:

These are selected since they are all beneficial in trying to better understand where Viktor Orbán stands when it comes to the European Union.

A. What are the theoretical explanations of Viktor Orbán´s Eurosceptic policies? There should be a theoretical explanation for certain political decision over the last years. The two most importing theories in this case study will analyse the party system cleavages and the geopolitical position between East and West. The most important part is if the position of Orbán related to party system cleavages. And if a nationalism-universalism cleavage can be hold accountable as an explanation. Also important is the geopolitical position between East and West. Can we speak of a bridge between East and West?

B. What are the motivations of Viktor Orbán?

What drives this politician? What are the motivations of a man that was once a radical liberal law student that despised communism? Fidesz originally started as the most liberal and pro-EU party in the country with Orbán being the main orator. Then in 1993 there was a consequent switch. The party and its leader adapted a more nationalist-conservative right wing rhetoric. How can this change being explained? And, if Orbán is flexible in shifting his opinions, can this explain his way of viewing the European Union? Are these motivations accountable for his politics?

C. Has the position of Viktor Orbán towards the EU changed over the years?

As previously stated in the research question, there was a change of heart in his politics after 1993. Yet, it was Fidesz who moved Hungary towards the European Union membership in 2004. The rhetoric of Orbán’s first term is completely different than that of his second and third term as Hungarian Prime Minister. So, has the position changed over the years? And, if so what are these changes?

D. Is there difference between Viktor Orbán´ and Fidesz´ positions towards the EU? A small part of the thesis is to understand the position of the Hungarian Prime Minister in combination with his party policies. Is the influence of Orbán so strong that he controls the party’s view? Whether or not this is the case, is there a difference in attitude towards the EU between his top Fidesz politicians? This research question is also there to explain his dominance on Fidesz in the early days.

1.2 Methodology

The second chapter consists of a literature review and theory. The review consists of literature regarding the Hungarian foreign policy towards the European Union. It is necessary to understand the geopolitical position of Hungary within the European Union and the specific role of Viktor Orbán within. It will be divided over chronological parts:

- Hungarian Foreign Policy towards the European Union after 1990 – Period 1990-1998 - Hungarian Foreign Policy towards the European Union after 1990 – Period 1998-2009 - Hungarian Foreign Policy towards the European Union after 1990 – Period 2010-2017

Because there is limited English literature concerning more recent years, it will also consist of small elements of foreign news sources and speeches given by Orbán. The accounts by experts will form the basis of the empirical research. The other part of the second chapter consist of theoretical explanations. Namely the potential Nationalism-Universalism Cleavage and the bridge between East and West.

The sub-chapter of nationalism explains the geopolitical history of Hungary and the character and history of Hungarian society. This will feed into the sub-chapter about the explanation of cleavages, analysing the origin of a Nationalism-Universalism cleavage, and if that could be an explanation for certain stances. The theory of the bridge will focus on the geopolitical position of Hungary within the Heartland between the European Union and Russia. It will analyse how much Orbán is looking at alternatives for the European Union.

The third chapter focuses on nine Hungarian specialists who will be interviewed about certain specific situations since they will know the position of Viktor Orbán. There will be seven political scientists and four journalists from various ideological backgrounds. I will use these sources because it provides the most up-to-date information about the position of Viktor Orbán. By choosing to interview ten different specialists from a variety of sources it’s possibly get concrete answers for certain positions being taken. It will not limit me to available literature in English because it will provide first hand information of people who of people who are professionally engaged in Hungarian politics and are thus experts on this field.

The most important factor is the different perceptions of this political position. For Political Scientists I will interview ELTE and Péter Pázmány, two specialists from the Central European University which is the most advanced university in the region. It is also under investigation by the government and could be possibly closed during the process of this thesis.

Therefore, the research naturally assumes there may be some negativity from experts here towards the Hungarian government under Orbán. As for the other two Budapest universities ELTE (the former university of Viktor Orbán) & Péter Pázmány experts from these will attempt to balance the testimonies of those experts from CEU As for the Journalists, I will interview two from Magyar Nemzet which used to be the major conservative newspaper of Hungary, until it’s closure in 2018. The left side is more complex, especially after the media law which restricted liberal media in the country. Therefore, I will interview a journalist from 444.H.U., and a publisher. 444 is a news forum known for its critical and direct approach towards Fidesz officials. The publisher is a former communist dissident and historian that has personally known Orbán and has published articles and magazines in Germany, Austria and Hungary.

The following questions will be asked:

Question 1: “Where do you think Viktor Orbán stands when it comes to European integration? What kind of European cooperation would he prefer?'

Question 2: Can you explain Viktor Orbán’s shift in his EU positions over the years, is there a shift in his positions towards the EU?"

Question 3: In what way would you consider Viktor Orbán’s policies Eurosceptic?

Question 4: What are Viktor Orbáns motivations when it comes to European politics?

Question 5: Viktor Orbán has been at the top of Hungarian politics for over twenty years now. What do you think drives and motivates him?

Question 6: If you take a look into Hungarian history, especially in regard to the Trianon Treaty, can we speak about a nationalistic cleavage within Hungarian voters? And if so, could that be an explanation of Viktor Orbán Eurosceptic policies?

Question 7: Over the last years the bond between Hungary and Russia has become tighter. How much of an alternative for the European Union can Russia be in the future for Orbán?

Question 8: Is there a difference between Orbán and his Fidesz party in EU positions?

Based on their responses, the following four research questions will be answered: A. What are the theoretical explanations of Viktor Orbán´s Eurosceptic policies? B. What are the motivations of Viktor Orbán? C. Does the position of Viktor Orbán towards the EU change in time? D. Is there difference between Viktor Orbán´ and Fidesz´ positions towards the EU?

Many of the expert interviewees provided an interview on the condition of anonymity. Therefore, I will refer to the experts as follows:

Codename Function

CEU 1 Political scientist

CEU 2 Political scientist/former minister

CEU 3 Political scientist/former minister

ELTE 1 Political scientist

ELTE 2 Political scientist

Peter Pázmány 1 Political scientist

Magyar Nemzet 1 Journalist

Magyar Nemzet 2 Journalist

444 Journalist

Publisher Journalist/publisher/historian

The fourth chapter will provide an overall conclusion.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

2.1 Literature Review Hungarian Foreign policy

2.1.1 .Hungarian Foreign Policy toward the EU after 1990 Period 1990-1998

On the 4th of November 1956 , the Soviet Union invaded Hungary and made an end to any dreams of freedom independency. János Kádár became the new communist leader of Hungary. Meanwhile the former communist leader and face of the uprising Imre Nagy was executed.” One important term describing Kadar’s regime is “Goulash Communism”, since there were more economical options in Hungary than in other communist states. Kádár stayed in power till 1988 until he was forced to resign (Molnár, 2007: 334). The following year the communist regime was over for good, it was impossible to maintain power without the backing of the Soviet Union. On 21 May 1989 the new president Miklós Nemeth surprisingly made the decision to dismantle the iron curtain on the border with Austria. Hungary would finally be a democracy. From now on Hungarian foreign policy was more aimed towards the West and the European Union.

(Körösényi, 1999: ) explains that there were different forms of opposition towards communism that were divided based on ideology, personality and culture. Consequently, this division led to three ideological camps, all with different ideas and beliefs. The MSZP became the party of the Socialist camp and had split from the old communist party. There was a conservative camp with the catholic KDNP, the independent smallholders Party and the Democratic Forum better known as MDF. The liberal camp at the time consisted of the SZDSZ and Fidesz. Körösényi explains that at the time of the foundation in 1988 Fidesz mainly consisted of young and ambitious students that went to elite Budapest universities. The party members were besides liberal also fierce critiques of the one-party system. The main issue of that first election was the potential neutrality of Hungary for in the future. The election was won by Josef Antall of the Democratic Forum. Antall was open about the foreign policy and ambitions for his country by stating that the important aims are the accession to the European Union and to NATO within the decade. This was very clear about EU membership.

According to him the advantages outlined the disadvantages. Nevertheless, the MDF was still a conservative party with a nationalistic character. Antall never made it a secret that he was the prime minister of all Hungarians, not just the inhabitants of the actual country. The situation of Hungarians has always been an issue of Hungarian foreign policy (Lendai,2010).

During the early 1990’s under the MDF and Antall’s vision was advocating a vision within ‘Free Europe’. This happened in many ways, the first of which was joining international organizations such as the Council of Europe in 1990. Yet, the most important of all was establishing regional cooperation with other Central European states, of which Antall was instrumental in the formation of the Visegrád Group. The Visegrád Group was established in 1991 by Hungary, Poland & Czechoslovakia (by 1993 the velvet divorce and the country split into Czech Republic & Slovakia). The formation of the Visegrád Group ushered in a new era of cooperation between Central European states this time in a market economy.

The Visegrád Group was aimed at promoting political cooperation (Lukáč: 2001). Economic cooperation came in the form of the CEFTA agreement 1992 between Central European States. The success of CEFTA was disputable according to (Agh, 1999: 841) as the trade volume between its members was not great. Nonetheless, it did pave the way for liberalization and opening of markets which were required for accession. Staying with the subject of economics and Antall’s reforms internally the MDF government decided to provide the Hungarian Central Bank ‘Magyar Nemzet Bank’ with independence in 1991 seen as an important step towards liberalizing the economy (Agh, 1999: 842). These were important steps, but an action plan to join the European Union was installed under Antall’s MDF government. The “Programme of national renewal” with the goal of achieving an association agreement with the European Union. This was achieved by 1994 (Batory,2002). The tool to achieve European integration and NATO membership was to cooperate with countries in similar situations. Pavol Lukáč (2001) explained the origin perfectly. In order to understand the group, understanding its history is crucial. Lukáč starts with the optimistic early nineties, when Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland were about to start a new era without communism.

Joszef Antall had died in 1993 and was succeeded by Peter Boross until the 1994 election, in which the MDF only became the third biggest party. The big winner of the election would be former communist Gyula Horn and the MSZP. In coalition with the liberal SZDSZ they pursued their goal of European integration and the creation of better relations with neighboring countries with large Hungarian minorities. Especially reaching out to Romania and Slovakia. Interesting fact is that Horn expressed that he was the prime minister of just 10 million Hungarians. Clearly distancing himself from Antall and other more nationalistic politicians. A more neutral approach that at the time was useful, because of tensions in neighboring Romania with the Hungarian minority. He also holds a referendum where the Hungarians voted in favour of Europe. The Horn Cabinet had achieved economic reforms, media policies and moved foreign policy initiatives forward. Besides, it also got a corrupt image over the years (Littvay,2010).

(Fowler, 2004) looks at the origins of the Hungarian centre-right parties of within the period between 1994 – 2002. Fidesz started as a liberal party, in 1993 the party’s liberal leader Gabor Fodor made way for Viktor Orbán (Fowler, 2004: 85). However, as the disintegration of the MDF began post 1994 Election, space for competition between liberal and right parties opened up within this period which was mainly between the Independent Smallholders Party FKgP and Fidesz (Fowler, 2004: 86). Fidesz in this period under Orbán moved to a more centre-right position over the course of this period, but the party unlike the FKgP was not confined by the urban-rural cleavage to which FKgP the party was more free than the FkgP. In 1997 formed an electoral pact with the Christian Democratic People’s Party KDNP in 1997 (Fowler, 2004: 86). The results from opinion of Fidesz polling between 1994 – 1998 when the party polled at around 5% - June 1994 to 17% - March 1998 (Fowler, 2004: 86-87). The polling shows a growth in the party between this period to become the leading opposition to MSZP going into the 1998 Election.

A crucial step in joining the European Union, is when the current member states forward the application towards the European Commission. To prepare an opinion on the condition of the country’s application., also known as an Avis. The first relatively positive Avis was achieved in 1997, under the Horn government (Bathory, 2002).

Overall, what is clear is within this period there was a lot of optimism for Hungary as clearly stated. With reference to (Agh, 1999), (Körösényi 1999), (Bathory, 2002) all were written around or not long after this time period which is important to provide a view of what authors thought at this time and then lead us to reflect later when it is compared to later events. The most important themes are the state building and democratic system and origins of establishing international cooperation post-Communism whether. It is reasonable to assume that this period – represented an era of hope. At this time what is clear from the authors and also the 1994 Election was that Fidesz and Orbán were beginning to shift to become an established force on the centre-right and main opposition to MSZP as (Fowler,2004). Still what we still don’t know enough about from the literature is about Fidesz and Orbán ’s position towards the European Union within this period. Yet, it appears that for most other parties there was a consensus on making preparations to join the European Union.

2.1.2 Hungarian Foreign Policy toward the EU after 1990 Period 1999-2010

It took four Hungarian legislative elections before membership was achieved in 2004. After winning the 1998 elections, Viktor Orbán became prime minister in 1998. The coalition of Fidesz, MDF and the Independent Smallholder Party(Lendvai:2012). They moved forward to improve conditions for membership. Administrative and judicial capacity improved well. The main issues and concerns of the European Union were more regarding agriculture, transport, regional policy and financial control2.

Like stated in the conclusion of the regular rapport of 2002 on Hungary. Hungary is generally meeting the commitments it has made in the negotiations. However, delays have occurred with regard to the transposition of parts of the veterinary acquis, legislation on the size control of imported fish, the adoption of the gas law and several pieces of environmental legislation (national climate change strategy, National Waste Management Plan, regional and local waste management plans, packaging and packaging waste and waste oils). These issues need to be

2 European Commission (2003) - Monitoring Report on Hungary's Preparations for Membership (http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/organisation/docs/CMR_HU.pdf)

16 addressed. Bearing in mind the progress achieved since the Opinion, the level of alignment and administrative capacity that Hungary has achieved at this point in time, and its track record in implementing the commitments it has made in the negotiations, the Commission considers that Hungary will be able to assume the obligations of membership in accordance with the envisaged time frame. In the period leading up to accession, Hungary needs to continue its preparations in line with the commitments it has made in the accession negotiations. Hungary was making rapid progress regarding policy reforms. By 2002 26 of the 31 chapters of the acquis were completed. The setbacks turned out to be mainly in Agriculture and in financial control: As part of its continuous monitoring, the Commission services addressed letters to Hungary in February and June 2003 expressing concern over its preparedness in the fields of financial control and agriculture and calling for urgent action to remedy these shortcomings.

Fidesz took the initiative in achieving most of these chapters. Just like the parties on the left, Fidesz realized that securing membership of the EU and NATO were the most important matters. Having changed from liberal party into conservative party over this period, it still was pro-EU at the time(Oltay:2013) While also aiming at the corruption scandals of the MSZP, it won the 1998 election and ruled Hungary in coalition with the Smallholders party and the MDF. The coalition was forced to put on neo-liberal policies to need the requirement of the Maastricht treaty, but the first cabinet was perhaps best known for the Status Law. Despite working on hard on moving forward towards European integration, this cabinet will be mostly remembered for internal policies that would hurt the Hungarian relations with neighboring nations.

Where Horn worked hard for European integration and making sure there would be no post- Trianon diplomatic issues, Orbán went the other way. While Horn made a clear stance against the ambitions of the Hungarians outside Hungary, it only made the position of Fidesz stronger. From here on Fidesz slowly became the party of defending the rights of Hungarian minorities. After securing victory, Viktor Orbán strengthened the position of the Hungarian diaspora with the status law of 2001.This would improve the lives and opportunities for Hungarians living close to the border by enabling them to work in Hungary and giving more opportunity for students to come to their “ancestral” home. By declaring themselves as Hungarian, these people would align themselves with the state, receiving aide.

This would also improve the position of the minority parties, since this would give a new sort of legal status to all Hungarians of the neighbouring countries minus Austria. As expected the other nations were not exactly this antagonized the neighbouring states (Bradaton,2007). And this is where Fidesz became different from the other Hungarian parties. Not only are they willing to assist likeminded parties, they also put their words into action. The status law had divided people and had harmed the relationship between Hungary and its neighbors3.

It is this mixture of internal policies with moving forward towards European integration that reflect the first cabinet of Viktor Orbán . Fidesz would lose the 2002 elections narrowly to the MSZP and Peter Medgyessy became the new prime minister. Under his temporary and unpopular guidance Hungary entered the European Union eventually in 2004.

Furthermore, the people were asked in referenda about the Status Law and joining the European Family. In 2003 the Hungarians voted in favour of joining the European Union with 83 percent, but Zsolt Enyedi (2007) states that back there were already signs that it would be a rusty partnership. Despite an overwhelming Yes-Camp victory, the voting turnout was very low. Even though all other major parties were in favor of joining, Fidesz was still very hesitant. The 2004 referendum about the status law would be an even bigger disappointment for Orbán and his party. In 2004 Hungarians were asked one simple question in a referendum: Should extraterritorial non-resident citizenship being offered towards ethnic Hungarians in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia & Montenegro and Ukraine (Kovacs,2006) Despite a strong PR campaign of Fidesz, the law did not pass, because of a very low turn-up. This while the parties on the left were against this status law.

Enyedi (2007:11) claims that in 2003 Fidesz anti-EU period was short-lived. They had realized that their nationalism had been proved inferior to the left-wing populism of the MSZP. With their party program for the European election of 2004 focused on nation-centred themes with a program named Hungary is our future, Hungary is our home, Fidesz easily won the election. Four parties had made it into European Parliament. Fidesz and MDF joined the Christian Democratic European People’s Party. A centre-right euro-party.

3 Van Dooren,J (2016). How transnational is Fidesz?. P10. Unpublished manuscript. Masaryk University

Runners-up MSZP joined the social-democratic Party of European Socialists, while the SZDSZ joined the Alliance of Liberals. After the election Medgyessy stepped down, to be replaced with Ferenc Gyurcsány. The coalition of the MSZP and the SZDSZ won the 2006 parliamentary election, but at a terrible price. During a party congress the MSZP leader admitted to its members that his party had lied about the economics, changing the micro economic statistics of the country. In doing so Laszlo Maracs (2013) explains that the MSZP put Hungary at risk of not being able to keep on with the requirements of the Maastricht treaty. Hungary was on the verge of economic collapse and Hungarians started protesting and rioting against, demanding that the prime minister would step down. Gyurcsány refused this and would stay in power till 2009. The IMF saved the situation temporally by borrowing Hungary money. Gyurcsány resigned in 2009 in favor of Gordon Bajnai. But the decline of MSZP was already eminent in the European Parliament election of 2009 where it lost 5 seats. But the biggest shock come in 2010.

Not only would Fidesz in coalition with the KDNP win the election, but the Social-Democrats lost 156 seats. The MDF and SZDSZ lost their representation and dissolved their parties in respectively 2011 and 2013. Newcomers would be the far right Jobbik party and the green-liberal Politics Can be Different or LMP. With 236 seats the Fidesz-KDNP coalition hold a two-thirds majority in the Hungarian Parliament. Making the parties mathematically unbeatable and being able to pass every law or issue they want. (Maracs:2013).

2.1.3 Hungarian Foreign Policy toward the EU after 1990. Period 2010-Recent

The first two chapters regarding Hungarian foreign policy towards the European Union are relatively positive. The Status Law was controversial, yet overall a paragraph in contrast to the attempts to join the European Union. The change in attituded comes during the second term of Orbán as prime minister. “During the described period, Hungarian politics towards the EU got problematic in several terms. In general, the country has been seen by scholars as Eurosceptical (Magyar, 2015).

The main reason is probably the following controversies: Changing the Hungarian constitution thanks to his two-third majority, adopting a strict media law, his treatment of the IMF and the decision to charge banks and multinationals, His tough stance during the migration crisis and by literally putting a wire on the Schengen border with Serbia, Claiming that he is the defender of a Christian Europe, Attempting to close down the Central European University and balancing between East and West.

Kati Piri is a Hungarian born Member of the European Parliament. Representing the Dutch Labour Party she is a member of the AFET committee. She states that there is an ongoing cat and mouse game going on between Orbán and the European Union: “You can speak of a certain ongoing cat and mouse game. Orbán comes with a draconian law. Then he gets criticism and takes off the sharp edge of that law. My biggest frustration comes from before I was elected in 2014. In a fairly early stadium he has adapted the basic principles. All media is owned by Orbán . Although he would theoretically lose elections, he has laid down in the Constitution that his people are in it”4.

Where the Status Law was the most important issue during the previous Orbán administration, it was one of the first issues that passed this term. With Fidesz passing a law in 2010 finally securing the chance to opt for dual Hungarian citizenship. Fidesz has changed the constitution and has names it “God bless the Hungarian”. It values the Christian identity of Hungary and has been changed several times.

But the new constitution also started the beginning of a bad relationship between Hungary and the European Union. Marácz(Maracs:2013,58) points out that by 2013 there are two main conflicts: namely with the Financial world and the European Parliament: Orbán finds that the foreign multinationals have too much influence in his country.

4 J.van Dooren, Brussels, 31 Januari, 2018

Not wanting the average Hungarian to pay the massive state debt, he decided to let the banks pay for it. By creating a special bank taxation. Making it very undesirable for foreign banks to remain in Hungary, caused controversy with the European Commission Orbán started by requesting for the practical doubling of the budget deficit in 2010 by 6-7 percent. Something that both the IMF and the EU did not agree with (Lendvai, 2012). Neither did they agree with an extra loan in 2013. By putting taxations on foreign banks and multinationals, it would create extra money to pay of the loans. By doing so it would not only scare of foreign investors, it would also eventually cut the ties with IMF. Just like the EU, the IMF has the opinion that central banks may not be intervened by the state. After long pressuring and multiple heated discussions within the European Parliament Fidesz decided to make some chances on the influence on the national bank in 20125.

The second problem is more complex(Maracz:2013). Many left-wing parties opposed the changes. Starting with the Christian name “God bless the Hungarian”, potentially being an indication for the repression of Atheists, Homosexuals and Single parents. But the constitution has more deeper roots, like for instance the media law. That makes it easier for the state to control the media. So far almost every constitutional change made the members of the ALDE, S&D and Greens challenged the Hungarian policies. With the biggest critic being the Belgian ALDE chairmen Guy Verhofstad, who keeps arguing against the “Orbánisation of Europe”. Despite multiple sanction threats not much has changed. Hungary has reviewed some laws and the Venice commission has not been able to make a case against Hungary or Orbán.

While Challenge 1 and 2 are a case between Hungary and the European Union, number 3 is a lot broader. Namely The Migrant crisis. It has caused a rift within Europe, with Orbán seeming to appear as the face of opposition. Yet it is not strange that the Hungarian government is concerned, since it can be stated that Hungary is a popular destination to get into the Schengen zone. It is known that a lot of refugees enter through Serbia into Hungary. Unlike Hungary, Serbia is not an EU member and simply does not hold any obligations regarding Schengen. To make the situation more tense is the situation with the two-other neighboring southern nations:

5 Van Dooren,J (2017). The Relationship between the IMF and Hungary. P10 Unpublished manuscript. Masaryk University

Romania and Croatia. Both are EU members, but not in the Schengen agreement yet. That leaves Hungary in a difficult position.

The country could get overwhelmed with Visa requests. Fearing that the EU was working to slowly, the Hungarian administration came up with a controversial solution on their own. Namely a fence. Starting with the Serbian border, the Hungarians planned on building a 110- mile-long fence, causing disbelief from the international community. From its creation, up until 2004 the main goal of Visegrád group was membership of the European Union and NATO. But know it stands together against any form of lenience towards migration.

It was not long after the Visegrád group came together for the first time that the Visegrád group offered Hungary police officers to patrol Hungary’s southern border. The controversy did not stop after a similar plan regarding the Croatian border followed. The situation kept exploding to the neighboring countries. Slovenia being in the Schengen zone makes it even more controversial. The whole situation with border fences and potential border fences have probably been the most controversial aspect of the entire refugee crisis, with the creation of potential fences in 20156.

A good indication where Orbán stands are usually his speeches. Like his addressing of the current geopolitical situation on the 15th March 2017: “In the past year the nations have rebelled once again. They have rebelled against the hypocritical alliance of Brussels bureaucrats, the global liberal media and international capital, with its insatiable appetite. First the British rebelled, then the Americans – and there is more to come this year”(Orbán,2016)

At the same time Orbán openly questions the foreign policy in regards to the Migrant Crises, Like on his latest speech on the congress of the European People’s Party on 30th March 2017: “The countries of the region were not controlled by fine gentlemen before our crooked intervention, but the situation wasn’t nearly as bad as it is now. We acted like pyromaniac fire- fighters.

6 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/hungary/11680840/Hungary-orders-100-mile-Serbia- border-fence-to-keep-out-migrants.html 28-03-2017

All I’m saying is, if we kick an anthill we should not be surprised if the ants overwhelm us. We have to wake up and proclaim a new European foreign policy that focuses on stability. This stands for Erdogan’s Turkey also Orbán,2016

Hungarian Domestic Changes – EU Reaction

Article 7

The latest report on the situation in Hungary from Rapporteur Judith Sargentini of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. Shows the areas in which the European Parliament has concern:

(1) the functioning of the constitutional system;

(2) the independence of the judiciary and of other institutions;

(3) corruption and conflicts of interest;

(4) privacy and data protection;

(5) freedom of expression;

(6) academic freedom;

(7) freedom of religion;

(8) freedom of association;

(9) the right to equal treatment;

(10) the rights of persons belonging to minorities, including Roma and Jews;

(11) the fundamental rights of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees;

(12) social rights7.

In total from these areas there were 52 breaches of EU and ECtHR legislation. The report only aims charges it does not provide recommendations to the problems.

7 Report On Hungary Calling Article 7 (2017/2131(INL)) pg.2

The report states that: ‘This is the first time since its founding that the Parliament has decided to write a report investigating the need to trigger an Article 7(1) TEU procedure. As such, your rapporteur has taken this opportunity to set out the steps taken in reaching the conclusion that there is indeed a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values referred to in Article 2 TEU8.’. The Parliament has yet to vote on triggering Article 7 in regards to Hungary, but in March the EP voted by 422 to 147 to trigger Article 7 Against Poland9. This could force the Fidesz to change its approach. Hungarian-born Dutch MEP Kati Piri thinks Article 7 would be the right approach, and she criticized Orbán : “He uses the European Union as something that Hungary is only a member of. This is. because he always talks about decisions where he just sat at the table. We have used Article 7, but the question is whether we have a majority for that in the end. But we have set a majority. It is the first time in history that there is a 2/3 majority. Principle, Stand for your own values. Unfortunately, it is so slow to respond. It appears from OLAF that there is just fraud to family members. But it takes so slow to respond then. The funds are still fast, still negative. We have set a majority. It is the first time in history that there is a 2/3 majority.”

Bálint Magyar describes in his work that Viktor Orbán his regime is a big problem for the European Union. But at the same time it is unable and unwilling to intervene in Hungary’s domestic policies. Despite the widespread criticism Orbán has faced. In 2013 the committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs come with a report of critique of the regime. But claims that bureaucratic issues are the reason that the European Union does not intervene (Magyar,2016: 275).

8 Report On Hungary Calling Article 7 (2017/2131(INL)) pg.20 9 Politico 3/1/18. MEPs back triggering Article 7 against Poland

European Parties Response

According to (Magyar, 2016) There is three bureaucratic dilemmas for the EPP – Fidesz relationship:

- Dirty Party Solidarity

- Coalition-related interest within the EU

- Minimalizing Conflict effort that will always protect the economic interests of the problematic country in question

So far, the relationship between the EPP & Fidesz has been come under pressure. In 2017, EPP leader Manfred Weber so far resisted frank criticism of Fidesz, Stating: “Freedom of thinking, research, and speech are essential for our European identity… The EPP group will defend this at any cost10.” Although the EPP within the lower ranks have addressed the threat of Article 7 as spokesperson Siegfried Muresan MEP said: “The EPP will hold in-depth internal discussions and will follow the outcome of the European Commission’s assessment on the legality of the latest Hungarian law... If the situation with Hungary continues, Article 7 might be put on the table11.” The EPP appears to be hesitant for a few reasons. The first is Coalition-related interest within the EU, as the number of EPP MEPs dropped from 274 -- 2009-2014 to 219 – 2014 – Present. Dirty Party Solidarity has been a problem for the EPP and Fidesz relationship.

When Viktor Orbán was announced as the candidate for the Hungarian Election, Manfred Weber tweeted: ‘Congratulations to Viktor #Orbán , re-elected Chairman of #FIDESZ. Let’s keep on our cooperation for a strong Hungary in a strong Europe.12’

10 Manfred Weber Euractiv EPP warns Budapest with Article 7 ‘nuclear option’ Apr 7, 2017 11 Siegfried Muresan Euractiv EPP warns Budapest with Article 7 ‘nuclear option’ Apr 7, 2017 12 Manfred Weber, Twitter @ManfredWeber 9:45 AM - 12 Nov 2017.

Again this time when Orbán won the Hungarian Election, Weber tweeted: “Congratulations to Viktor #Orbán and #Fideszmpsz on their clear victory in the #HungaryElections. I look forward to continuing working with you towards common solutions to our European challenges. @EPPGroup #EPP13” Tweets like this have received a lot of criticism, most of all from Guy Verhofstadt who tweeted in response: ‘By congratulating Orbán without calling on him to respect European values, the EPP legitimises his vile campaign, his attack on the rule of law & attempt to install authoritarianism14.’ This could be problematic for the EPP in the long run as Dirty Party Solidarity could see it possible losing its values and may encourage other member parties to behave in a similar manner. However, for Weber it clearly seems as if he is more interested in keeping unity in the EPP at the moment. Dirty Party Solidarity is something which isn’t unique to only the EPP – Fidesz relationship. As there is also the case of SMER and the S&D. As Gianni Pittella warned former Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico alliance with the SNS could see it kicked out of the group15. Therefore, the Fidesz – EPP relationship provides an interesting case of for the groups in the European Parliament and their member parties. About how much they can influence their domestic policies.

The EU Institutional Response

In order to counter Hungary and other nations going rogue, it has 3 options in the long-run according to that same (Magyar,2016:276)

13Manfred Weber, Twitter @ManfredWeber 8:59 AM - Apr 9, 2018 14 Guy Verhofstadt Twitter @GuyVerhofstadt 12:00 PM - Apr 9, 2018 15 Slovak Spectator 17th March 2016: Socialists and democrats alliance warns Fico about coalition with SNS: https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20119292/socialists-and-democrats-alliance-warns-fico-about-coalition-with-sns.html

- Change nothing. The result could mean regimes like Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz will keep blackmailing the EU with National interest

- The dominant and rich countries will leave the other nations out of decision making when it behaves like this

- A federal Europe

Clearly the last option would be a nightmare for Fidesz and Viktor Orbán . But at the moment there does not appear to be an appetite for it. Even though senior politicians such as Martin Schulz during the German Election 2017 called for it. Considering that the EU has to deal with Brexit and does not want to force any other members to be in a position to leave otherwise it could be a disaster for the EU.

This leads to Change Nothing. The Commission has stated that it will not reduce funding in its budget proposals for either Hungary or Poland as a result of the reports on Article 7. Therefore, change nothing would appear might appear to be an option. As for Option two it depends, only if Article 7.1 is triggered can the three step procedure begin to strip Hungary of its voting rights and that requires 4/5ths of the EP. If breaches were to continue you or become more persistent then Article 7 could see Hungary lose its voting rights and representation in the European Council and all duties. But Hungary would only be suspended as there is no provision to expel a member state. Therefore, this is the only way in which Hungary could reasonably be excluded from participating in decision-making in the EU.

Given what we already know it is unclear, but probably not the case that Hungary will move this far, if anything the report by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and EP vote against Poland seems to be a warning shot in order to get them to clean up their act. According to (Athanassiou, 2009: 34) that in treaties sanctions are generally not punitive against the member state. Instead they tend to encourage the member state to clean up its act.

Chapter 2.2 Theoretical explanations

Chapter 2.2.1 Nationalism-Universalism Cleavage

The situation of Hungarians outside Hungary has always been an issure of the country’s foreign policy. Following the unrests in 1848 the Austrians came to a compromise with the rebelling Hungarians in 1867 to the creation of what we call nowadays the Austria-Hungarian Dual MonarchyThe Hungarian part of the monarchy was named Transleithania and would last till the end of World War 1 when the empire lost. For Hungarians, there has been no bigger tragedy than the Trianon treaty of 1920. Hungary lost land to Romania, Czechoslovakia, The kingdom of Slovenes, Serbs and Croats, Austria and Italy. In other words: almost 3,5 million Hungarians were now living outside of their country (Molnar, 2007: 261). To this day there are still sizable minorities in Serbia, Romania and Slovakia, with smaller ones in Ukraine, Slovenia, Croatia and Austria. The implications of these loses are ongoing nationalism since the Treaty. Something that is still an active thing in Hungarian politics. After winning their representation into the Hungarian parliament in 2010, the Austrian newspaper Zur Zeit interviewed Jobbik leader Gabor Vona When Jobbik leader Gabor Vona was questioned over the influence of Trianon:

“The loss of strategically, culturally and economically important territories and its peoples results in a demographic, cultural and economic loss that our country feels even today. Not to mention the psychological-spiritual damage that Trianon has inflicted on our “collective unconscious”. Trianon, however, was not only a Hungarian tragedy but a tragedy of Europe as a whole. Trianon and the other peace dictates destabilized Central and Eastern Europe and were the source of a series of still unsettled conflicts in the region”(Vona, 2010).

Interesting to mention is when the Austrian reporter asked Vona about the situation of Burgenland, he answered as follows: “Losers? With respect to Burgenland, Austria was a winner as it gained territory from Hungary. From a Hungarian perspective it is rather odd that we lose territory to Austria after a war fought in alliance. I think the reason why Burgenland is not a source of tension between the two states is that Austria does not look upon the Hungarian minorities as a threat against the integrity of the nation and the state. Unfortunately, this hostility is all very common in Slovakia, Romania, Serbia or the Ukraine” (Vona ,2010). But it

28 are not just ultra-nationalist parties like Jobbik or MIÉP that are focussing on the political situation of these people. Fidesz can be seen as the biggest manifestation of this broader kind of nationalism. As it is evident with the Status Law and Fidesz granting Hungarian citizenship after 2010 to ethnic Hungarians. It are these kinds of laws and strategies, that appear to please the party’s supporters. It is this kind of nationalist rhetoric that is heard during national holidays, like the remembrance of the 1848 Hungarian revolution.

“The struggle for Hungary’s sovereignty will never end, and in this cause we have only ourselves to rely on. We know because we have learnt that unity, faith in the truth and perseverance will lead us to victory. Only the strong survive. We Hungarians are on the threshold of a great era. The name of Hungary will be great again, worthy of its old, great honour. Honour to the brave!”(Orbán,2017)

It is a small fraction of the speech of Orbán, where he emphasized on the sovereignty of Hungary and the fact that the name of Hungary will be great again Oltay already mentioned in 2012 that at the time it would the big question if Jobbik would not disappear the next elections, because of similar topics and a strong voting treshold. With Fidesz focusing on citizenship for Hungarians abroad and the Trianon treaty, topics that are very important for Jobbik (Oltay, 2012).

This however did not happen. In the 2014 election gained 23 seats stayed the third-biggest party of the country. This while the list combination Fidesz-KDNP easily won the election with 133 seats. So with 156 of the 199 seats going to parties with nationalistic rhetoric, we can state that his is a big element of Hungarian politics.

But could there be something as cleavage or voting block that involves nationalism and universalism? And if so, could this be an explanation or motivation for Orbán’s Eurosceptic policies? Just like in Poland, Hungary used to have a semi-authoritarian government that controlled the outcome of the elections during the interbellum. The tensions grew with the Hungarian revolution of 1956.

Despite failing, the elements of national pride and will to self-govern never disappeared. In book work Oltay (2012) also points out Kitschelt’s work, stating that the intellectual elite had no

29 change in pre-world war 2 Hungary to challenge the historic divisions because of a lack of social modernization. When modernization was forced under the communists, their party manipulated the divisions as well (Kitschelt, 1999:99) .

So where does this all reflect into potential cleavages? Körösényi (2011) points out three cleavages in Hungarian society when it comes to voting.

1. Religious/Secular cleavage.

Religious/Secular cleavage is probably the most explainable cleavage. After decades of communism suppressing religion, it is logical that a part of the population became non-religious. Nevertheless, a big part of the population remained Christian. Consequently, this resulted in the creation of a clerical conservative side with parties like the KDNP, MDF and the Smallholders party and an anti-clerical camp with the MSZP, the SZDSZ and also Fidesz.

2. Political class Cleavage

Because Communism had destroyed the difference between working class and middle class and abolished private property, the social structure has become more important. At the top of the communist rule was the Nomenklatura, with the main communist officials at the top. The closer someone was to the old communist party and the old system, the more likely it is that the person will vote for the MSZP.

3 The Urban/Rural Cleavage

With farmers and agrarians mostly vote for the Smallholders Party and to a lesser extent the KDNP. Körösényi points out that an economically driven cleavage is missing.

Fidesz however, once started as the most liberal party on the Hungarian ballot. It was the only party who didn’t try to focus on the “Cleavage” vote in the 1990 elections according to Oltay (Oltay,2012:44) . They consisted of young and ambitious student from ELTE University. But the young and ambitious group had only achieved 9 percent in the 1990 election. Realizing that their radical form of liberalism did not reach as much voters as wanted/as they wished for, led to an internal battle in 1993. The group around Orbán was known as the Realists. They understood that the success of the conservative MDF was due to the religious cleavage. Furthermore they realized/understood that it’s voters deeply cared for the Hungarians outside of Hungary. Those

Realists/The group around Orbán conflicted with the group around Gabor Fodor, which wanted to stick to the liberal ideals.

This group around Fodor would split themselves from Fidesz and join the SZDSZ. Fidesz started to capitalize on the loss of the MDF and developed a more conservative character. It moved away from liberalism and became more nationalistic and conservative, resulting in huge success. While winning the elections in 1998, it gained a lot of former MDF, KDNP and Smallholders. This election could prove that there is some sort of a nationalist-universalism cleavage. Beside the overall victory of the conservatives, the Hungarian Party of Justice and Life (MIÉP) made it into the parliament as well. This party was founded by expelled MDF party members, who are characterized by being far-right and still being obsessed with the history of the Trianon treaty. When Fidesz became more conservative in 1998, it took over 1 percent of the MIEP voters (Oltay, 2012).

Because of this MIÉP would fall under the Hungarian Threshold. But Fidesz’s conservative turn had more effects on other parties. Oltay describes that a lot of high ranking politicians of the KDNP and the Smallholders party switched their allegiance towards Fidesz, in the hope of being elected

While historically these three cleavages are important, we can state that after the communist transition, these nationalist feelings are being more expanded into a new cleavage. On a more extreme level you can realize that with the parliament entrance of Jobbik and MIÉP in combination with stronger nationalist positioning of a mainstream party like Fidesz. We state that these parties are reflection of this nationalism cleavage. MIÉP consisted of disgruntled MDF politicians that were still obsessed with Trianon.

Jobbik is notorious for her anti-Semitic and anti-Roma rhetoric while praising Hungarian nationalism and supremacy. Fidesz benefited on the decline of MDF in the mid-nineties and became more nationalistic in the process. It was Fidesz who fought for the rights of Hungarians in neighboring countries. The same Fidesz party that is now making stances against Brussels and European integration. The party and its leader also have a habit of combining this on days of

31 national sentiment like the 15th of March, when Hungary celebrates the start of the 1848 revolution against the Habsburg empire. It are these elements that can solve as prove that there is such a cleavage and that he is pleasing the subsequent voters. Viktor Orbán also takes and uses elements of nationalism and universalism in his speeches: It is forbidden to say that the masses of people coming from different civilisations pose a threat to our way of life, our culture, our customs, and our Christian traditions. It is forbidden to say that, instead of integrating, those who arrived here earlier have built a world of their own, with their own laws and ideals, which is forcing apart the thousand-year-old structure of Europe(Orbán,2017).

This new “nationalism” cleavage has become more eminent after the election of parties like Jobbik and MIÉP. But it is more than that. Both the rise of Fidesz and the mere existence of MIÉP can be traced back to the demise of MDF. It has opened a lot of free space on the right spectrum of the political scale. The MDF and the Smallholders party both do no exist anymore. The KDNP lost its representation in 1998 and could only return in 2006 thanks to its allegiance with Fidesz. The biggest representations of the religious and rural cleavage do not exist anymore or have become a small fraction of what it used to be. But the believes of the people in this political class still exist. The question is if the rhetoric of Fidesz can be seen as a strategy to please the people with nationalistic tendencies.

Fidesz-KDNP – A Hungarian God fearing combination ?

By aligning themselves with the KDNP, Fidesz works together with the Hungarian Religious Right. The KDNP had become a marginal party, not winning seats in the 1998 and 2002 elections. It now serves as Junior Party to Fidesz and could potentially still attrack religious voters. The speeches and statements of Orbán raise the question if all the moves against Europe are just to please his party supporters. Besides nationalist rhetoric, Orbán also focuses on Cristian-Democratic values in his speeches. This could be to all please the people that belong to this cleavage. It might also aim to please the people belonging to the universalist-nationalist cleavage. Fidesz seems to try to address the god-fearing Christian Hungarian that is proud and

32 nationalistic. While MIÉP only had marginal success from 1998-2002, Jobbik has proved to be a bigger challenger to Fidesz(Oltay:2012).

The Hungarian left sees herself as the embodiment of modernity and European progress, while while the Hungarian right is convinced that the left will always ignore the interests of the country. With the demise of the Smallholders Party and the KDNP it has taken over most of the religious and rural votes. Fidesz needs to please its voters base to stay in power and at the same time it needs to attract Jobbik voters. The big question is if the quest to please the nationalistic cleavages can be seen as a theoretical explanation. In what extend is it possible to speak of a so called. called ideological pyramid scheme around the words god, family and nation. If Hungary can be deemed as a country that is still plague by these sentiments.

A good example of this nationalistic cleavage is the treatment of refugees. While a marginal portion of these people think of Hungary as an end-destination, they still have a function. By being overly critical and building gates at the borders with non-Schengen neighbors, Orbán will send a clear message to nationalistic Hungarians. The same pool of people that will most likely either vote for Jobbik or Fidesz during the following parliamentary election in 2018.

The same can be said about religion. Viktor Orbán now is a member of the Hungarian Reformed Church, yet he used to be an atheist during his youth. Of course there could be a Christian commitment in withholding Muslim refugees from Hungarian land. But it appears to be more pragmatic than this. It is merely a strategy to please his target audience, the ones of a nationalistic-religious cleavage (Magyar,2016:235-240.)

When thinking about Nationalism in Hungary all too often the political, cultural and historical aspects. These have been discussed before and include as ethnicity, language and irredentism are what comes to the forefront of any analysis. But within the Nationalism as a New Cleavage there is the matter of ‘Financial Nationalism’ (Johnson & Barnes, 2015). What these authors mean by ‘Financial Nationalism’ is one which differs from the traditional economic nationalism. Which is mainly uses trade policy as a means of furthering its nationalist agenda. Of course this is incompatible with EU membership. Rather ‘Financial Nationalism’ is one which uses monetary and financial policies to promote a nationalist agenda (Johnson & Barnes, 2015: 537). Within the literature review of Hungary between 2010 – 2017.

I explained the policies of the Orbán and Fidesz government in order retain stability of Hungary rejected foreign intervention both in the form of loans from the IMF and advice from the EU, and also undermined the independence of the Magyar Nemzet Bank.

The idea behind this was that they were all foreign, including the MNB as there was a perception that Central Bank officials serve the interests of the international banking community rather than the country itself (Johnson & Barnes, 2015: 539). Hungary did have a problem with foreign capital and investors in the view of Fidesz, to which their rationale for this lies somewhere in their general nationalistic ethno-centrism discussed before.

However, it is curious this has extended to the Hungarian economy, as Orbán himself stated in reference to the transaction tax: “Hungary is governed by the Hungarians. If parliament decides there will be a transaction tax, there will be a transaction tax… This is natural, since Hungarians are rebellious and at the sametime innovative in character… I believe we have won the battles that we started through our unusual or innovative solutions [but] there are serious interests. Most of them are foreign.” Orbán refers to a really us vs them mentality in this extract which I would argue serves as the underpinning of ‘Financial Nationalism’ in the sense that he pays compliment to the ethnic character of the Hungarian people and accuses most the interests as foreign, namely: the EU, IMF and perception of Central bankers at the MNB.

However, the ‘Financial Nationalism’ of the Hungarian government in this time period appeared to have been a trend setter across the spectrum in Central Europe, as both to some extent the Polish and Czech governments have followed suit, with Hungary being outside the Banking Union and both Poland and Czech Republic not ratifying the agreement (Méró & Piroska, 2016).

On this form of ‘Financial Nationalism’ I would argue theoretically it fits within the new Nationalist Cleavage, in that it is a confined nationalism which exists within the boundaries of EU membership and aims to maximize control of Hungarian government over financial policy. However, its roots are based in an ethno-centric mind-set of the Fidesz and Hungarian nationalism. Furthermore, due to the either the successes of Hungary’s financial management or the illiberal tendency within the V4 some of this idea of Financial Nationalism has been adopted by Poland & Czech Republic. Yet, I would argue these are mainly illiberal protectionism, whereas Hungary’s is based on a deep ethno-centrism and distrust of foreign interference.

2.2 The bridge between east and west

"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; who rules the World Island commands the world." It is the famous quote of Halford Mackinder about the heartland and the position of Eastern Europe within it. Uro Kekkonen was the most defying statesman of Finland from the Cold War. He became the the faces of bridge building between east and west. Having to take a strategic position where it can do business with the Western World, without upsetting. But is Orbán like Kekkonen? I will ask the specialists about how much of an alternative Russia can be for Orbán in order to better analyze the position of Hungary and by doing so, if we can speak of such a bridge.

Under the first Fidesz administration Hungary joined NATO. Being a former communist state, this was not ideal for Russia. Nevertheless, it was nothing special, since the same can be said about most nations that joined the organization during the fourth and fifth NATO enlargement. The opening up towards the East is more something of the latter years. In his book the Post- Communist Mafia State, the case of Hungary Bálint Magyar (Magyar: 2005) perfectly describes the whole process. Stating that a lot of this has to do with the economic gain for the political elite around Orbán. Firstly, Fidesz changed the diplomatic corps after claiming the victory in 2010. Within a year over forty ambassadors either retired or were replaced for Fidesz loyalists. The author claims that this switch to the East started with the appointment of Peter Szijjártó as Secretary of State for foreign affairs and foreign trade policy in 2012.

He sees Szijarto as the personification of the interest group surrounding Viktor Orbán, stating that under Orbán, the Hungarian foreign policy is against the transatlantic obligations of the European Union. The author also states that the emphasis for this strategy is wealth and power for the political family. Magyar describes that the origin of this switch lay in the financial problems to repay the IMF debt in 2011. In hope to come with financial alternatives it tightened the relations with Russia, China and former authoritarian Soviet states as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan (Bálint ,2016:275-277). Bálint points out an interesting quote of Orbán during his state visit to Kazakhstan: “The European Union treats us an equal partner in political terms, but we do not belong there. When we are in Brussels, we have no relatives. But in Kazakhstan we have relatives. It is strange that one has to move to the East to feel at home” This seems to suggest a detachment from Europe as a whole and a view towards the wider world.

Particularly Central Asia where the Hungarians first originated from before settling in the Carpathian basin just over one millennia ago. Whilst Orbán may see himself as the Bridge between East and West, another view is that of the Trojan Horse (Orenstein & Keleman, 2016). The argument is that whilst being a member of the EU and being part of CFSP this does not prevent member states from having foreign policy and relations which go against that of the group. The crisis in Ukraine was a real test for CFSP as it occurred within the boundaries of it. The EU is likely to have Trojan Horses and Russia targeting specific member states who it deemed to be the weakest or have some baggage with Brussels. Hungary, Cyprus, Greece and Italy were the four who were identified as being the most likely to be Trojan Horses (Orienstein & Keleman, 2016). From a Russian point of view Hungary, Fidesz and Orbán that combination are extremely useful to the idea of the Trojan Horse.

Hungary is a member of the EU and NATO, Fidesz is a member of the European People’s Party and Orbán attempts to maintain friendly relations with Moscow. When it came to sanctions Orbán initially opposed them, but it was pressure from the EPP on Fidesz MEPs which made its way back to the Hungarian government which forced Orbán to concede and agree with them (Orenstein & Keleman, 2016: 97). Overall this is the bite back power to which the EU tries to exert over any of its Trojan Horses it does not tend to be open criticism of their foreign policy rather it tends to be subtle blackmail in other areas (Orienstein & Keleman, 2016).

Nevertheless, Orbán is trying to maneuver a position between East and West. During the latest meeting in November 2017, Orbán stated that “Anti-Russian politics have become fashionable in the West”. During the meeting with Putin he explained the economic reasons for having closer ties with Russia: The world is in the process of a substantial realignment and we believe that this realignment will create more favorable conditions for the EU-Russia. It’s hard to foresee global economic prosperity without Russia” (South Morning Post,2017).

But what are those economical strategic steps? Bálint Magyar summed up the most important deals in his book. Namely:

- A 10 billion Euro loan for the Paks Nuclear Power Plant

- Hard support for the South Stream Pipeline, an issue where the European Union which the European union is against. At the moment the plan is cancelled by Russia

- A certain number of lucrative contracts for Magyar Villamos Művek, the Hungarian public electricity company.

But Magyar points out that these deals do not come without political consequences. This became mainly evident in 2014, when Hungary cut off Ukraine’s gas supply.

Based on these occurrences I believe that Viktor Orbán tries to be a bridge between east and west. There are two potential motivations for this. The first one is that by doing so, he is trying to inforce Hungarian geopolitical independence within the European Union. The second one is that by doing so, he could potentially blackmail the European Union to strengthen his position. This position is useful to Russia who seek to target weak or unpopular states to become Trojan Horses. However, as we have seen the EU bites back by putting pressure on Orbán to fall in line with the rest of the block. In the future this will continue to be a challenge to for the EU, as Orbán attempts to balance Hungarian foreign policy and establish geopolitical independence

Chapter 3: Empirical Chapter

3.1 Theoretical Explanations

3.1.1 Nationalism-Universalism Cleavage

Most interviewees agree that there is a nationalism cleavage. This motivation has been best explained by one of the experts of ELTE: “Nationalism versus non-nationalism has been the single most important cleavage in Hungarian politics for the last 100 years. This means the security of the Hungarian state and the well-being of ethnic-Hungarians, Hungarian nationalism is almost exclusively ethno-nationalism as opposed to civic nationalism. This certainly explains partly the anti-EU rhetoric and actions.

They agree on the fact that not only there is such as a Nationalism cleavage, but that is a strategy that Orbán uses win a certain voters percentage under Hungarian voters. A strategy that he applies. Like stated by Péter Pázmány: “For him nationalism is a tool, nothing else.. He cleverly uses nationalism. “I remember when he was the strongest opponent of nationalism. In term of his rhetoric’s, he always tries to please the actual partner.

For people around him, it is a different story. You find some real nationalists in his circle, but they do not have influence. He plays on nationalism”16. It is this combination between an existing cleavage and the consequent opportunism that explains certain policies. During the explanation of my theoretical chapter about the nationalism, I mentioned the parties MIEP and Jobbik. This is for a reason, because they are the proof that there that is certain segment of the Hungarian voting population that will vote in certain ways.

All that Orbán has to do is change his rhetoric towards these voters. Or again in the words of the expert of Péter Pázmány: “The target audience has certainly changed. When he is speaking to people of lesser educating playing on nationalistic sentiments is a very easy tool. Especially in regards to the migration crisis. The need to protect Hungarian culture has become way more stronger”17.We see a certain patron emerging where Orbán takes a more staunch nationalistic rhetoric where Orbán attempts to swing over the people doubting between his Fidesz party and Jobbik A good latest example is the speech of February 18 2018 he called “Christianity is Europe’s last hope”. Stating that: With mass immigration, especially from Africa, “our worst nightmares can come true. The West falls as it fails to see Europe being overrun.”Besides stating that Hungary is a Christian bastion against Mass Immigration he also states that the danger for these “worst nightmares” are not in Africa, but in Brussels, Berlin and Paris. Taking a clear aim against the European Union and the governments of Germany and France. Not only does Orbán state that this influence will be stopped with legal tools. He also states that the first target will be the “Stop Soros” law.

In one speech of 2018 he flirts with religious fanatics who oppose western policies and targets something that could potentially be perceived as “anti-Semitic”18. Orbán is not an anti-Semite, neither are the core of Fidesz officials. The same cannot be said about political actions and sentences of Jobbik and its parliamentarians.

16 J.van Dooren, Budapest, 25 April, 2017 17 J.van Dooren, Budapest, 25 April, 2017 18 Viktor Orbán “State of the Nation” address February 19, 2018 (http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime- minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/viktor-orban-s-state-of-the-nation-address)

By talking in a specific way and mentioning strong terms he might try to sway away voter from the nationalism cleavage. This tactic has become firstly most obvious in 1998 election that was mentioned in the chapter regarding Hungarian foreign policy, where by labelling Fidesz as the party that will protect the rights of ethnic Hungarians in Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine, the party took over a percentage of MIEP voters. The percentage that made the party move under the electoral threshold. MIEP took a clear focus on the loss and regaining of Trianon territory. Fidesz does this only when it is applicable for its strategy at the time. As stated by an expert of CEU: “ I think it is all contrary, nationalistic policies are always there but it was never at the forefront of his politics. Perhaps with his followers, but not with him. It’s all symbolic, with the passports and all. If you look at Jobbik’s policies, yeah they want it back. Nationalism is always important, it was always there. Trianon was never Fidesz policies. Now it is more a split between Jobbik and Fidesz”19.

The majority of experts interviewed state that Orbán’s politics is a façade full with symbolism to please his supporters. Especially since those supporters are more on the right spectrum of Hungarian Society. They also explain that Fidesz never truly cared about the consequences of the Trianon Treaty in the current situation. Explaining that this is more in line with the policies of Jobbik and MIEP in the past. But clearly stating that in nowadays politics this is more shared by Jobbik and Fidesz.

This kind of nationalistic showing are perfect examples of aiming for the attention of the cleavage. It is this kind of nationalistic flexibility that explain internal policies like the status law in the nineties and anti-European measures post-2010. The experts believe that Viktor Orbán was always a nationalist, yet that he is not driven by nationalism. As stated by another expert of CEU: “He always was a nationalist, he always talked about Hungarianess yet he is not driven by it. He only uses it when it is applicable. He uses Trianon only when he needs it. It is opportunism, not typical nationalism. I doubt that he is even a conservative. More of a nationalist/populist that uses opportunism. Against multinationals, Brussels and migrants’20.

19 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 11 april,2017 20 J.van Dooren, Budapest, 24 April 2017

We may conclude that Orbán is not driven by nationalism, but we conclude that a large portion of the Hungarian population is driven by it. The expert of 444 explains that this “chauvinism” is in combination with frustration. And that Orbán uses this frustration and nationalism. The frustration lays within the Hungarian history that goes back to the middle ages. It lays within the all those believe that Hungarian should be closer to the west and that it feels superior to her other neighbours

“If you see the Hungarian history and what Hungarian student learn. It is full of miserable stories that everyone always attacks us. We are the bastion of Christianity and the Hungarian language. Against Mongrels, Turks, Russians, Germans. Everyone is against us and everyone wants to kill us. It is very deep in the Hungarian society. We are attacked and no one helps us. He was the first strong personality after the communist regime who says. Yes, this is happening, and I am goanna protect you against the world”21.

The expert explains that on one side, the Hungarian society is one that beliefs to be under constant attack. In all fairness, we must admit that the country had a turbulent history. The other interesting aspect is that of the Trianon treaty. By constantly reminding Hungarian students from a young age in education that Hungary used to be a gigantic empire, this has created a side- effect. That of superiority against the neighbouring countries that gained Hungarian territory and the consequent minority living now in another country. This could be said to have created a mindsight that, based on the dual monarchy with the Austria, believes that this country should be a lot closer financially than for instance Slovakia. Although the expert states that this sense of superiority already goes back to the middle ages.

“Very important is that since the middle ages the Hungarian society feels that we should have the living standards like in the west. We should live like the Austrians. When we entered the EU in 2004 our prime minister Peter Medgyessy said that we should live soon like the Austrians. So there always is frustration. Orbán played this frustration quite well. By saying it is there mistake by robbing our markets and infrastructure”22.

21 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 17 april,2017 22 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 17 april,2017

Despite the criticism and scepticism regarding the freedom of its own markets, the journalist of 444 claims that the average Hungarian is pro-European. He claims that he or she over values it’s country, believing that the country is three times bigger than the actual size of Hungary. He also stretches out that the superiority towards Slovakia is being replaced by the complete shock that the economy of Slovakia, surpassed the Hungarian one.

“But still the Hungarians are pro-Europe. They are happy with their leader having a strong voice and believe they should get more respect than their size shows. It is because the country thinks three times bigger than it really is. This in combination that deep inside many people think that our other neighbours are lower people. There was a very popular t-shirt named I am older than Slovakia… But now they make more money than us and it is a shock to Hungarians23”.

The experts of Magyar Nemzet dig even deeper in this financial point. Stating despite the existence of the cleavage, it only attracts a certain voter’s base. The financial surpassing of recent times hurts a lot more than the history: “You can only grip a certain number of voters. Yeah there is a cleavage, but it is not because of Trianon. They are annoyed because Slovakia uses the Euro and having a higher standard of living since the transition of living. Same with the Romanians. When people see in the news that the average salary of Slovakia is higher and the Romanian is catching up it frustrates them. It is not because of Trianon, it is more about recent times”24.

This however does not mean that some of the “envy” is for no reason. Stating that we should diverse nationalism with patriotism, and that the latter is completely justified when the governments of Romania and Slovakia restrict minority laws: “We have to make a difference between the nationalism and the patriotism. I think that most of the loud nationalists neither have a real historical basis in their head nor real experiences in the neighbouring countries. In the other hand the patriotism could be very important, if we see that the Romanian or Slovakian authorities restrict the minority laws”25.

23 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 17 april,2017 24 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 14 april,2017 25 J.van Dooren, Budapest, 20 april, 2017

This journalist of Magyar Nemzet points out that excessive nationalism is not the problem. It is the consequent fanatism that comes with it. This is combination for the admiration of it’s leader: Viktor Orbán “In the past, the radical Jobbik used nationalistic slogans, now Fidesz "overwhelmed" them. The biggest problem is not the excessive nationalism, rather the fanatism. If Viktor Orbán tell for the fans, that you must fight against Heineken, because the red star, they do. You must hate Brussels, they hate. You should wave flags, they do. And they can forget everything very quickly”26.

Whether we call it nationalism or patriotism, does not matter when it comes down to the cleavage, because it exists. Hungarian-British author Frank Furedi explains in his work that Orbán himself sees this nationalistic behaviour and consequent euro criticism are a form of historical legacy of European Cultural Norms. In his own perspective his government promotes the traditionalist system of values(Furedi,2018:13).

Furedi names the following speech as an explanation: “Our ideals are undoubtedly Christian and based on personal responsibility: we find national sentiment to be an important and positive thing and we believe that families are the foundations of the future. It may be that a great many people believe otherwise, but that makes our position no less a European one. It may be that with this we are in a minority in Europe, but this position is no less a European position, and we are free to represent this conviction” (Furedi,2018:13).

As it is often the case in politics, the devil is in the detail. Because what Orbán is doing here is doing more than just giving an explanation for the patriotism of him and his countrymen. What he is doing here, is pleading towards his voter’s base. It is part of a strategy that dominates his European agenda.

26 J.van Dooren, Budapest, 20 april, 2017

3.1.2 The Bridge between East and West

One of the CEU respondents mentions that “In the last 25 years the majority was in favour of EU and NATO and both prime minister Kader and Horn went straight for Europe. In 1998 you could it already see the countryside had switched to Orbán, but the EU negations went on.

So he inherited a pro Atlantic foreign ministry. But in 2010 he makes a huge U-turn”27. What we now need to establish is where this U-turn lays, when we talk about Russia. While the experts agree that Nationalism and the consequent opportunism is a legit strategy and explanation for Viktor Orbán his more Eurosceptic policies, the results show otherwise when we talk about the bridge.

The reason why Hungary is not a bridge according to the clear majority of specialists, can be summarized with the following arguments:

- Hungary is not a bridge, if there is such a thing within the European Union, then it is Germany - There is no thrust on the Russian side - There is no alternative for the European Union - Hungary voted in favour of sanctions against Russia - There might be financial gain for Orbán for positioning himself to the east, but this is not in the interest of Hungary

The expert of Péter Pázmány claims that in order to be a mediator there need to be a certain level of thrust. He stretches out that there that this already automatically disqualifies Hungary as a potential partner. During his first term as Hungarian prime minister, Orbán was the most anti- Russian leader in Central Europe. Stating that the relations were so bad that the Russian ambassador had to be called back towards Moscow. Secondly, the relationship between Brussels and Budapest has been everything but ideal since the takeover of Orbán in 2010. Because of this, Hungary is not a very ideal “bridge” partner28.

27 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 12 april,2017

28 J.van Dooren, Budapest, 25 April, 2017

The other experts also stress out that what makes Hungary interesting for Russia, is the fact that it is a member of the European Union and NATO. If Hungary would leave the EU, it would not be an attractive partner for Russian foreign diplomacy. Especially the experts of CEU stretch out that there is not alternative for Europe. As one stretches out: “If it is the case that they move towards Russia.

Fidesz is really in trouble and does it out of desperation, and that is not good for Hungarian society”29. This while his colleagues stretch out that neither Russia nor China can give an alternative towards the European Union.

An interesting subplot is explained by the journalists of Magyar Nemzet. That perhaps Orbán only tries to be a bridge when it comes to Ukraine: Maybe he wants to be a bridge as in being mediator in regard to Ukraine. But he has realized that Hungary is in no position to mediate between big power.

I do not think Orbán sees his government as a bridge between Russia and the west. But he himself believes these bridges exist. When you speak with Fidesz officials, they always speak of especially Angela Merkel and Germany making double agreements30.

It is an interesting angle. Following the Crimea crises in 2014 Viktor Orbán and his foreign minister Peter Szijjárto often mentioned that sanctions against Russia are too harsh and that it will cost Hungarian export branch billions of forints. Firstly, we can state that this is a false assumption since only 1.6 percent of the Hungarian export market is to Russia. Secondly, there is not much sympathy among the Hungarian population for the move towards east.

One of the journalists of Magyar Nemzet once attended an ambassadors meeting where Orbán spoke on the existence of Ukraine. During this meeting he literally said that it is in the main interest of Hungary that there should be a buffer zone or state of at least 300km between Hungary and Russia. Whether or not this should be an autonomous Ukraine really does not matter. As long as there is something between the Hungarian border and the Russian.

29 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 11 april,2017 30 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 14 april,2017

Hungary does not want to share borders with Russia. There is not much sympathy towards Russia from the Hungarian population, that sees itself as Central-European positioned between east and west. And economically Russia is not a big trader. Then why is that representatives of the Hungarian political elite like Orbán or Szijjártóare pushing in favour of the country?

There are two potential conclusions. The first one is that it is a legit strategy to gain geopolitical influence. This strategy might be understandable. The following years the relationship between the Visegrád group and the rest of the Union has been far from ordeal. It is perfectly understandable for Viktor Orbán to position himself between both fronts. One of the CEU experts stretched that there is a good reason why Montenegro joined NATO in June 2017. It is because the members states of both NATO and the European Union realize and understand that the Russian Federation of Vladimir Putin is an existing reality31. Multiple experts stretched that ever since the Russian Imperial times until the times of the Soviet Union and beyond, that Russia is an empire. And that part of being an empire is having an imperialist agenda.

All recipients feared the politically motivated Russian soft tactics in the region. Many mentioned the power plant in Paks, that can be seen as the ultimate creation of Russia trying to re-take dominance in the region. They were all convinced that is it not in the interest of Hungary to become a “Russian Client State”. And that certain “bridge” aspirations have no political conscience. They only see the pro-Russian tactics as a way for the Orbán and the Fidesz to financially profit themselves any further and as a potential plan B. Hungary is the biggest recipient within the European Union when it comes to funding.

Or as it is described the journalist of news channel 444: We had this huge amount of money from the EU which we will still get till 2020, we get 20 billion Euro. I think if there could be a situation where this will stop. Then he needs a new sponsor. If you look to the new powerplant it will be Russia. Which is not as good as the European Union. Because it is not free money. There

31 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 12 april,2017

45 are certain strings attached to it. That is Plan B, if the EU will stop financing his plans. Plus, he also has some private business with the Russians”32.

But another journalist, from Magyar Nemzet, claims that it was a strategy of Orbán to have a weaker European Union:.

“Popular in Hungary to say that he turns Hungary into the corner of Russia. That is madness. He is dedicated to Europe. He really wants a weaker union. He likes the European Union as a scapegoat. Like the ridiculous Stop Brussels billboards. But when he goes to Brussels he votes with the main stream. If you look to the records Fidesz votes in 98 percent in favor of the European People Party’s po1licies. So, in a way he is a main supporter of the European Union”33.

With the experts believing that there is no alternative towards the European and the pro-Russian actions are strictly seen as a financial guarantee we can state that unlike the nationalism cleavage. The bridge is not a theoretical explanation for Orbán his more Eurosceptic policies. Furthermore, we can state that there is not much thrust on the Russian side, to ever aspire to be a bridge. But despite critique on the Russian sanctions, the Hungary of Orbán voted in favour of the Russian sanctions. The experts also agree that even if there is such a thing as a bridge, then it is the Germany of Angela Merkel.

From a conspiracy point of view, multiple experts mentioned another, more sinister explanation for the new admiration towards Russia. Namely the “kompromat”, as explained by one of the specialists of ELTE: There is another theory voiced in Hungarian and international media: that Russian government circles may have a “kompromat” on him either from the 1980s, being allegedly an informer to the Communist state security, of from the mid-1990s when he could have been involved in money transfer between a certain Russian mafioso-like businessman operating in Hungary and high-ranking local officials protecting him”.

32 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 17 april,2017 33 J.van Dooren, Budapest, 20 april, 2017

The journalist from 444 admits a similar view: “My unproven opinion is that he became involved in the Russian mafia and politics. He cannot escape from that”34. From a political science point, this seems far-fetched. And as political analysts we should stick with facts. Therefore, it is difficult to include this speculation. But in his work Post-Communist Mafia State the case of Hungary, Balint Magyar mentioned the following three occasions:

- A 10 billion Euro loan for the Paks Nuclear Power Plant - Hard support for the South Stream Pipeline, an issue where the European Union which the European union is against. At the moment the plan is cancelled by Russia - A certain number of lucrative contracts for Magyar Villamos Művek, the Hungarian public electricity company

There are parallels with Russian money and the personal interests of the Fidesz inner cycle. As the expert of ELTE continues: “Based on this speculation, his foreign policy moves may be coordinated with Moscow. According to one theory Putin obtained the kompromat in 2009, which corresponds to the time when Orbán switched to a Russian-friendly tone”35.

So, can we speak of Viktor Orbán as a Trojan Horse? The question is not yet. The experts explain that Russia has a use for Hungary. This use will move away when Hungary would lose its EU privileges. The actions of Viktor Orbán could potentially hurt Hungary with the consequences of Article 7. That would not help Russia geopolitically. Despite the specialists agreeing on the fact that it is in Russia’s interest to destabilize Europe, it is on the other hand not in Hungary’s interests to focus on Russia. Unless the funds run out. And with the new budget for the next European commission being published it is clear that Hungary will receive a lesser amount of funds. Under those circumstances it could move towards that situation.

34 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 17 april,2017 35 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 15 april,2017

3.2 What are the Motivations of Viktor Orbán

The previous subchapter explains the theoretical explanations for the policies of Viktor Orbán. It explains that there is a nationalism cleavage that dominates the current political agenda of Hungary. It explains that certain political decisions are being done to please a certain amount of the Hungarian voters.

In regard to the Bridge theory it also explains why certain decisions are being made towards the European Union. But what makes this subchapter so interesting is that the experts expressed their belief that Viktor Orbán himself does not believe in these policies, despite that clear dominance of it on his political agenda.

But if patriotism is not his motivation, one would question what it is. This subchapter will take a deeper look at the three main motivations behind the Hungarian prime minister. Namely:

- Pragmatism - Power and Personal ambition - Financial gain

I have chosen to focus on these three angles because, in combination with the answers of the interviewees, it explains Orbán ’s motivations. It will point out that the political actions lack an ideological explanation.

3.2.1 Pragmatism

Like explained in chapter. Fidesz however, once started as the most liberal party on the Hungarian ballot. It was the only party who didn’t try to focus on the “Cleavage” vote in the 1990 elections according to Oltay (Oltay,2012:44). They consisted of young and ambitious students from ELTE University. Realizing that their radical form of liberalism did not reach as much voters as wanted/as they wished for, led to an internal battle in 1993.

The group around Orbán was known as the Realists. They understood that the success of the conservative MDF was due to the religious cleavage. Furthermore, they realized/understood that it’s voters deeply cared for the Hungarians outside of Hungary. Those Realists/The group around Orbán conflicted with the group around Gabor Fodor, which wanted to stick to the liberal ideals.

One must be either pragmatic or opportunistic to make this change. According to the specialists Orbán is both, but you can classify his policies and the main reason for his motivation as pragmatism. One of the ELTE experts state that this kind cunning and desire to be on top, that defines his character:“He is clearly the most ambitious, most cunning and most fit for a Hungarian audience.

And he loves politics, he loves to be on top. He and his followers shrug of the idea that he changed ideology for personal/political motivations. To grab and remain in power36.

Although some experts point out that he is better with this when it comes domestic policies, as explained as one of the experts of ELTE: “He is overall skeptical of liberalism in general and the EU is the embodiment of liberal politics. MR Orbán became an anti-European in the early nineties and it got worse in the early 2000’s. it became very obvious during the refugee crisis. In my opinion. Orbán is a good populist when it comes to domestic politics. When it comes down to foreign policy, his thinking is very short term and opportunistic.

The individual Viktor Orbán has proven to be a very adaptable politician. All three CEU experts compared his strategy to his love for football. Stating that he uses an “Us versus Them” strategy. That it is this divided and conquer strategy which divides his country: “Some people say that this is because he is a football player and he only knows the playground when there are two teams and one side has to win. So he is cutting the country and whole world in two camps. We and Them. We have to defeat them. The big contradiction in this strategy is what he needs the most is the EU and what he attacks most is the EU37.

The same CEU expert described mentioned football as one of the more bizarre motivations of the Hungarian prime minister: “He likes power first, then money. For his daughters, his neighbours, his supporters and himself. Than he has some childish dreams. Putting a football stadium in his little village, it is like a child”38.

It is this pragmatic football mentality that appears to be his signature move. It was a key element in the nationalism-universalism cleavage explanation for Eurosceptic moves. Orbán is using a lot

36 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 15 april,2017 37 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 12 april,2017 38 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 12 april,2017

49 of symbolism and the image he maintains for his voters’ base are essential. During European council meetings he can show his “victories” to his followers.

That does not mean that Viktor Orbán is against the European Union, although that he lately desires a Europe of Nations as an CEU expert explains: “Originally, he was pro-Eu between 1998-2002. Most of these EU negotiations came under the Orbán government. Therefore, he was pro-EU. But when he came in power in 2010 he started to say that the EU should not be a federalist state but a Europe of Nations. This is his vision now. He wants to somehow loosen the tight control of Brussels, he is fighting with the federalists39.

The same expert refers to his love for football in his own county of Fejer. Orbán is a supporter of FC Videoton, a club from Szekesfeherver. The farm team or youth team of the club is Puskás Akadémia FC. Named after the legendary footballer of the fifties, Ferenc Puskás. This junior team plays since 2012 in the Pancho Arena. A brand-new stadium located in the village of Felcscut, the birth place of Viktor Orbán. Hungarian midfielder and son, Gaspar Orbán, played for Puskás Akadémia from 2012 till 2014. Or as explained by the same CEU expert: “He controls his party, he stated that his MEP’s are his employees. So, he believes he controls everything. Football is the only thing that interests him besides politics. I wish him to back from politics forever and just run the Hungarian football association. That way he would do less harm”40.

We can conclude an obsession for the beautiful game in combination with some inconvenient locations. ALDE leader Guy Verhofstadt also referred to this stadium: “If you don't want to

39 J.van Dooren, Budapest, 24 April 2017 40 J.van Dooren, Budapest, 24 April 2017

50 respect European values, you should not expect our money either. European money cannot longer be misused to enrich your family our finance a football stadium in your constituency.41”

But the football mentality that life only has winners is becoming evident in his politics. Like mentioned by the previous expert of CEU:

“He likes European Council meetings, because it is the perfect way to communicate back home about his victories. Or sending messages after these meetings. You have to understand that the bigger the scandal there is, the better it is for Orbán. So he is mainly misusing it. What he dislikes is the discipline of the EU. Mainly listening to the rules and being controlled. Which his conflictual strategy from the beginning he is building his political strategy on the spot”.

How does this reflect in political moves? By creating enemies, a home and abroad. The enemy at home is clear: the rival that fell from grace, MSZP. This is not strange. The left and the right have been challenging each other ever since the collapse of communism, as pointed out in the chapters regarding Hungarian foreign policy. Just like that the leaders of the MSZP have constantly criticized Orbán. That is normal political behaviour and consequent opportunism.

Or as it was state by György Schöpflin, Fidesz MEP of the European Parliament, back in 2013: “It is hard to find a political cleavage line as deep as the one that divides left from right as the one in Hungary. It has all the qualities of an ethnic polarization, in the context of which each side attributes the worst to the other and, consequently, there is no dialogue between the two sides.” (Schöpflin, 2013).

But Schöpflin also elaborates on that other opponent: the European Union. “The financial commissioner, Olli Rehn, a Finnish liberal, sought to impose an austerity policy on Hungary, which the government was entirely unprepared to accept. Instead of restrictions, the government planned to impose taxes on banks, telecoms, and other large-scale enterprises (usually foreign- owned). This was a heresy and set a very bad example from the viewpoint of those affected and had to be stopped; “stopping” would include the toppling of the Fidesz government”.

41 Guy Verhofstadt Twitter @GuyVerhofstadt 06:26 AM-May 2,2018 https://twitter.com/guyverhofstadt/status/991670367415685121

Schöpflin explained that following the financial mismanagement of the previously led MSZP government, Viktor Orbán asked for a normal procedure, to make ensure that the Hungarian economy would recover. Olli Rehn was not open for it. The Magyar Nemzet journalists confirmed these accusations. With one of the journalists stating that Orbán asked Angela Merkel and Jose Manuel Barosso for lesser restrictions, stating that he could not start his second term under the current circumstances: “Fidesz people admitted that when Hungary was far over the 3 percent deficit Orbán visited Merkel and Barroso to ask for some time. That as a new prime minister he cannot start his term with austerity measures.

He got No as an answer. That became a huge frustration and the first crisis. That lead to the first campaigns against Bureaucrats from Brussels”.

One could argue that in this particular case, Viktor Orbán, was in his right. This was also my conclusion in the academic paper “The relationship between the IMF and Hungary”, (van Dooren:2017).“The main problem for me personally with the IMF is that the richest countries will dictate the austerity ways over the recipients. I do not blame Viktor Orbán for at least trying to change the rules. Just like I do not blame him for trying to influence the Hungarian national bank or forcing foreign investors to pay more. For me these matters seem like a logical step when you are fighting for economic survival”.

Most of the specialists stated that the politics are just reactions to political moves, that lack a certain ideological motivation behind it, like stated by the expert from Péter Pázmány: “I think it is mostly a reactive turn. As every politician. Mr. Orbán. Is focusing primary on domestic policies. You see his relationship with Europe getting worse, when they started to react on domestic policies in Hungary. If you look chronically you find that as Mr. Orbán is changing Hungary with a new constitution and media law, the EU was critical. Because these chances go against the norms of the EU. As a response to criticism Mr. Orbán beefed up his anti-EU rhetoric. He wants to rule Hungary the way he wants, and if the EU is critical of this, he becomes more anti-European himself. So, it is a reactive criticism42.

This ongoing cat and mouse game that will be further explained in the following research question. What you see is a political move that will shock Brussels. Or as is it explained by

42 J.van Dooren, Budapest, 25 April, 2017

Member of the European Parliament Kati Piri: “He fought against the USSR, know he pretends that the European Union and the Soviet Union are similar. You can speak of a certain ongoing cat and mouse game. Orbán comes with a draconian law. Then he gets criticism and takes off the sharp kiss43”. This is however a category where you can see the “footballer” personality of the Hungarian prime minister. Like it was previous stated by the CEU expert : “ He likes European Council meetings, because it is the perfect way to communicate back home about his victories”. And a “striker” needs to be visible, which you can see with the reactive politics of Viktor Orbán. What is left is a continues paradox, or “cat and mouse game” between the European Union and Hungary.”

3.2.2 Power

We have established that Viktor Orbán is great in manoeuvring and using consequent opportunism. But what are his motivations? According to the recipients his main motivations are power and wealth. The expert from Péter Pázmány gave the perhaps explanation for his quest for power: If you look at his long career he is the ultimate pragmatist. He started his career as a pro European anti church extreme liberal. From there her on he turned in what we have now. The prime interest for him is his own power. Everything is less important. I do not see much values that are constant in his case”44.

In this subchapter we will analyse the desire for power, which can be categorized in the following three categories based on the answers of the respondents:

- Maintaining as Hungarian Prime minister until he retires - Being a European leader - Being the leader of the Visegrád region

Especially the experts from CEU were very clear about their assessment. Losing power in 2002 has turned out to be a crucial step in his change towards Europe: “In 1998 he was the youngest prime minister in Europe at 38 and he lost in 2002. Then he decided to change his strategy. He decided that whenever he was back in power again he would never repeat his mistakes from his

43 J.van Dooren, Brussels, 31 January, 2018 44 J.van Dooren, Budapest, 25 April, 2017

53 first term. He would occupy the whole political arena, stabilize his positions for ever, push down all political resistance and make a lot of money for his family and friends”45.

With Orbán being back in control since 2010 he put his goals towards a leadership position beyond Hungary.

The CEU specialists point out that his populist rhetoric is combined with an attempt to get more noticeable. “Staying in power forever, excluding any competition and making a lot of money. Typical eastern way of governing. At the same time Orbán believes this Populist turn in politics would the majority within the EU and in Russia, Turkey and the USA. He believed that as one of first politicians to turn in that reaction he would be big and famous.

The CEU specialist also points out that part of his ambition is being an counter balance to German Chancellor Angela Merkel: “He is a very ambitious guy and sees himself larger than Hungary. He likes to present himself as a counter balance to Angela Merkel. He is working together with figures like Kaczynski and Cameron, to make himself more influential. By provoking the consensus and the EPP he wants to make himself more of a player.

His position within the European People’s Party remains an interesting one. In the previous chapter I explained the relationship of EPP leader Max Weber towards Orbán. Stating that the Christian democrats simply need the 12 Fidesz MEP’s. The Magyar Nemzet journalists back up this statement: The EPP means a strong cooperation and still protection for him. And the EPP needs the 12 Hungarian MEP’s, and don’t need really tension among their rows. In this base, of course he can try to change the EU, he is interested in a soft, slack and more incompact cooperation46.

The experts also point out that, despite having the aspirations to be a leader. His name is too much surrounded by controversy. Especially the specialists of CEU do not foresee a European career like Donald Tusk: “He will not become another Donald Tusk, because he had too many

45 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 12 april,2017 46 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 14 april,2017

54 problems with the democratic framework. This he cannot do because he is perceived as a radical in the European Union. Closing a university for instance is simply un-presidential”47.

With limited options for being a European leader, Orbán excels a lot more successful as a regional leader. In particular as being very visible within the Visegrád group. One of the journalists of Magyar Nemzet made the comparison between Orbán and former Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico: “When he realized than back as a liberal he could not be prime minister, he simply changed his ideology. Fico from Slovakia is another good example.

They are currently working together, while before he was in coalition with the Slovak National Party. It used to be fiercely anti-Hungarian. Now that is no longer a problem. They have a similar mindset48.

The comparison between with Fico and his SMER party is also interesting, when you take a look at Dirty Party Solidarity. As Gianni Pittella warned former Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico alliance with the Slovak National Party could see SMER removed from the S&D group. The Fidesz – EPP relationship provides an interesting case of for the groups in the European Parliament and their member parties. About how much they can influence their domestic policies? The answer in the case of Fidesz in Hungary is not that much, and in the case of regional dominance, Orbán is very successful in laying out the differences.

The same journalist also explains that he is a master in claiming that the Visegrád group is different from the European Union: “At the same time he says than European bureaucrats cannot understand that we, Visegrád, are slightly difference. The European Commission wants to uniform all the countries and nation states. And then there is obviously the political correctness. It drives us to a catastrophe. He likes to demonstrate himself as the men who opens up the eye of the EU. I am not popular, but someone needs to say it49”.

This is becoming most evident during the stances during the refugee crisis, where there was a clear difference between the V4 and the rest of the European Union.

47 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 12 april,2017 48 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 14 april,2017 49 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 14 april,2017

3.2.3 Financial Gain

The financial gain we need to divide within two categories as well. Namely receiving money for Hungary and for his own bank account and the oligarchs around him. As explained by the expert of Péter Pázmány: “Get the money. That is the most important thing. With the fewest political string possible. That and a freedom of action. The primary is the Financial one. I remember when Orbán was the biggest European when Hungary was heard of the European Union in 2011. He is involved with European politics since 1987.

That is thirty years. If you look at his long career he is the ultimate pragmatist. He started his career as a pro European anti-church extreme liberal. From there here on he turned in what we have now”50.

Hungary requires the funds and Orbán believes that the country deserves this funding, as stated by one of the journalists of Magyar Nemzet: “It is rhetoric from Fidesz that we deserve this money because we joined the European Union. We opened the door of market for competitive western companies. A lot Hungarian companies could not hold on with the competition. So as a compensation we deserve the structural funds51”.

Besides the nationalistic rhetoric, the experts stretch another reason. That despite needing the EU funding, Orbán does not want to be controlled by the European Union. The expert from Péter Pázmány also think that power and money are the main key points, but also adds in corruption: “I think the prime motivations are power and wealth. And since 2014 corruption related to the government circles has become so critical that it has become a must to stay in power. Because in case that he would lose this power he might end up at court. He might end up in jail52” But the expert goes also deeper into the financial schemes of the Hungarian Prime Mininster: “He has a puppet oligarch, a gas repairmen of his own village, Lőrinc Mészáros. This guy acts as his cover. This Mészáros is literary a gas repairmen. He became in just a few years one of the richest people in Hungary. The wealth of Mr. Mészáros is growing faster than the wealth of Mark Zuckerberg. This guy is barely able to read and write. Literally, if you would listen to him

50 J.van Dooren, Budapest, 25 April, 2017 51 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 14 april,2017 52 J.van Dooren, Budapest, 25 April, 2017

56 during an interview you will really hear a simpelton gas repairmen. Yet he gets all the public and building contracts. There is no proof yet, but there is a widespread saying that if Mr. Mészáros is attending a meeting, Orbán is. Basically, he is the one that is managing the prime minister’s finances53”

3.3 Does the Position of Viktor Orbán towards the EU change in Time?

Now that the theory and motivations are explained we have to look to the evolution of Viktor Orbán and Fidesz over the years. Gyorgy Schöpflin claims that Fidesz is not and never was an anti-EU party. He states that it was not Fidesz, but that it was the European Union that has changed(Schöpflin:2013).

The experts claim however that there most definitely was a switch, which I will analyse with the following three sub paragraphs:

- Losing the 2002 and 2006 parliamentary election is the reason for the change - The European Union and Hungary; an ongoing cat and mouse game - From federation to Europe of nations

3.3.1 Losing the 2002 and 2006 parliamentary election is the reason for the change The CEU experts explain express that key factor for his change is because of narrowly losing the 2002 elections. That loss of power is essential: “He decided that whenever he was back in power again he would never repeat his mistakes from his first term. He would occupy the whole political arena, stabilize his positions for ever, push down all political resistance and make a lot of money for his family and friends”54.

The experts explain that this inner desire to return to power can be explained by the fact that he is a career politician without a civilian career, like explained by this expert from CEU: “It is

53 J.van Dooren, Budapest, 25 April, 2017 54 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 12 april,2017

57 really hard to understand from a democratic point of view. Started young, he does not have a career in civilian life.

He has a law degree, but he never practiced law. So, he cannot do anything else than politics. He controls his party, he stated that his MEP’s are his employees. So, he believes he controls everything55”.

The fact that Orbán controls the entire party is an interesting angle, considering that a political leader usually either voluntary resigns or be forced out after losing two consecutive elections. Not only did Viktor Orbán managed to keep his position within Fidesz, he has created an environment where he is in complete control. The previous subchapter taught us that that both Orbán and his party have been extremely adaptable when it comes to political changes. During the mid-nineties, Fidesz realized the potential voter’s base among that it could take if it moved the right. We can speak from a similar move in this regard. The expert of Péter Pázmány states that most of his focus goes towards domestic issues. These domestic issues have left to an ongoing cat and mouse game between the European Union and the government from Fidesz. Orbán himself is reactionary in this regard, when the EU criticizes Hungarian domestic policies, Orbán responds by becoming more anti-European.

But Orbán used to be in favour of the European Union. The expert of 444 attended the Fidesz party congress about the referendum about membership in 2003: He had a speech where he said that he was happy of joining but will never forget the people who voted against. It was a very strange vibe. There were some Eurosceptic speakers that made me and colleagues wonder why they were there”56.

This is typical for the opportunistic character of Orbán. Where despite aiming for European Union Membership, he kept the door open for eventual criticism and political manoeuvring. The 444 expert also stretches out that the political change went incredibly fast after the takeover in 2010: “Right now it is just absurd. When Imre Vejkey of the KDNP made a speech that Europe is

55 J.van Dooren, Budapest, 24 April 2017 56 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 17 april,2017

58 the new dictatorship the Fidesz members were clapping their hands. I am covering EU relations for many years and I still do not get how that change went that quick”57.

3.3.2 The European Union and Hungary; An ongoing Cat and Mouse Game

The cat and mouse game cut both ways, with the European Union’s responses to Hungary and vice versa. Let us take a deeper look by looking at the main problems between Hungary and the European Union. Guy Verhofstadt has stated that under the current situation, Hungary and Poland would not have been accepted into the European Union.

Starting with the financial problems. Both Schöpflin and the journalists of Magyar Nemzet mention the request of Viktor Orbán towards Barroso and commissioner Olli Rehn for leniency, which they refused. The result has been described in Chapter II. Not wanting the average Hungarian to pay the massive state debt, he decided to let the banks pay for it. By creating a special bank taxation. Making it very undesirable for foreign banks to remain in Hungary, caused controversy with the European Commission Orbán started by requesting for the practical doubling of the budget deficit in 2010 by 6-7 percent. Something that both the IMF and the EU did not agree with (Lendvai, 2012).

Neither did they agree with an extra loan in 2013. By putting taxations on foreign banks and multinationals, it would create extra money to pay of the loans. By doing so it would not only scare of foreign investors, it would also eventually cut the ties with IMF. Like the EU, the IMF has the opinion that central banks may not be intervened by the state. After long pressuring and multiple heated discussions within the European Parliament Fidesz decided to make some changes on the influence on the national bank in 201258. This is a clear example how Orbán does something, receives criticism, and then maintains most of the move. One of the journalists of Magyar Nemzet explains the receiving the answer no from Merkel and Barroso led too the first

57 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 17 april,2017 58 Van Dooren,J (2017). The Relationship between the IMF and Hungary. P5.Unpublished manuscript. Masaryk University

59 campaigns against the European Union: “That became a huge frustration and the first crisis. That lead to the first campaigns against Bureaucrats from Brussels”59.

As Kati Piri stated: “You can speak of a certain ongoing cat and mouse game. Orbán comes with a draconian law.

Then he gets criticism and takes off the sharp kiss60”. That is exactly what happens. Orbán takes off the “Sharp kiss” and makes changes, but the initial result is there. He gains the attention that makes his vote base believe that he is the Prime Minister that Hungary deserves and will lead them

Let us take a look at another “Draconian Law”, re-writing the Hungarian constitution. (Furedi, 2018) claims that the Hungarian constitution of 1989 was a creation of the liberation of the Soviet Union and communism. In the euphoria of “political freedom” it was written in a western and neutral fashion, instead of a traditional one in the Hungarian context. In his work Furedi also mentions that former Minister of Culture, Andras Bozoki, praised the constitution, because of its neutrality (Furedi,2018).

If you would make up the argument from a nationalist Hungarian and right-wing point of view, Orbán and Fidesz could be in their right to make this change. To fix something that they deem unworthy of the Hungary that they want. At the same time, actions like this have constantly led to criticism in the European Parliament of groups ALDE, S&D and the Greens. One could argue that this could be expected because the opposition parties are being represented in the S&D and Greens.

European Parliamentary S&D Green-European Alliance Election 2009 MSZP - 2014 MSZP, Democratic Coalition LMP, Dialogue for Hungary

59 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 14 april,2017 60 J.van Dooren, Brussels, 31 Januari, 2018

In his work, (Furedi, 2018) claims that European policy makers give the impression that national constitute will result in cultural loyalties. And that from that point of view, federalists oppose the idea of a more nationalistic constitution. In this case, the Hungarian. It is no secret that ALDE, S&D and the Greens are the most pro-European Union factions in the European parliament. So, some parliamentarians could be classified as “federalists”. One could argue that in order to protect their view, they will oppose actions like this.

Despite starting out as a liberal party, the experts claim that Orbán has a disdain for liberalism, as explained by one of the experts of ELTE: “Liberalism, a key ideology on which the European idea is based, is a derogatory term to him in every sense: liberal economic policies, privatization, decentralization and deregulation. mean the destruction of the national economy; liberal world order means foreign intrusion against national sovereignty; individual liberties and rights go against the cohesion and order of the society; the democratic (inclusive) idea of political correctness is portrayed as not being honest61.

Whether political correctness is honest our not does not matter. But what does matter is how Fidesz perceives the left and responds to it. For instance, by challenging the morality of these politicians by stating that they display a double standard. A good example of this is the difference the European commission judges’ Nazism and Communism. Stating that both ideologies are responsible for mass murderer. Therefore, they find it unbelievable that there is a holocaust Remembrance Day, but no Gulag victims day.

We can conclude that there is different point of view. Where Fidesz focuses on the Hungarian identity and analyzes the situation from their perspective. As we can see with the reference towards communist history. The title of this new constitution was “God bless the Hungarian”, potentially being an indication for the repression of Atheists, Homosexuals and Single parents. It is an indication for sure, but you can question whether it is unconstitutional. Unlike for instance the media law. Which makes it easier for the state to control the media.

Kati Piri is clear about this media law is been most disturbed by the amendment of the constitution. “In an earlier statement he has adapted the basic principles. All media is owned by

61 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 15 april,2017

Orbán. Although he could theoretically lose elections, he has laid down in the Constitution that his people are in it”62.

But despite multiple sanction threats not much changed. Hungary has reviewed some laws and the Venice Commission has not been able to make a case against Hungary or Orbán. Where we can again talk about the “sharp edge”.

Normally the Venice Commission and Council of Europe would bring a case against Hungary for these breaches, but so far have yet to do so. Furthermore, according to Piri, the creation of the European Union focused too much on the economic establishment. The European Union is not prepared on sanctioning against the Rule of Law, because it is not prepared for it in its foundation. Therefore, it limits the European Union in reacting. As a result, you can only attack Orbán from the Economic corner.

“The best Example is the retirement age judges that went down to fifty-five. That was a huge violation of the judiciary, but we could only tackle it on age discrimination. You come from the economic corner”63.

And that is the core of the geopolitical cat and mouse game that is happening. The European Union lacks the tools to properly respond, this while Orbán uses the audience and consequent media attention for his own benefits. Then the European Union has to look for potential angles from an economic point of view how to tackle the “draconian law of Orbán”. In this case, age discrimination. There were 52 breaches of EU and ECtHR legislation in the rapport of Judith Sargenti about the possibility to trigger Article 7. But the one where Orbán got most criticism for is the European Migrant Crisis.

The CEU experts stress out that this is the issue is most unhappy about, but mainly from a symbolic point of view. As explained before, he is mainly using reactive politics: “On the issue of refugees he is unhappy. But any kind of centralized powers above the nation state he is

62 J.van Dooren, Brussels, 31 Januari, 2018

63 J.van Dooren, Brussels, 31 Januari, 2018

62 against. Somewhat of a Eurosceptic position, but beyond that I do not think he is Eurosceptic. He just need to fight something. It feels like everything he does is just symbolic”64.

His colleague stretches out that Orbán in many regards is not Eurosceptic, but pain anti- European: “It is more than Eurosceptic. Eurosceptic is if you put some questions.

You say it is good but there are some questions. This is Eurosceptic. What Orbán does his anti- European and anti-modernization”65.

The Migrant crisis was the perfect change to both rise as a regional leader and to please his nationalistic voter base by acting as the protector of western values and Christianity against migrants. Above all, because it fits his strategy of “us versus them”. By scapegoating the European Union for the current “chaos”, he creates the image of an enemy, while at the same time it is Orbán who looks like the protector. Orbán wants to govern Hungary the way he wants. If that leads to criticism, he responds to it.

3.3.3 From Federation to Europe of Nations

The problem Orbán is facing is that he does not like the European Union criticizing his domestic issues. That is his main motivation for a Europe of Nations. To guarantee that he himself can govern Hungary, while at the same time still receiving the EU funds. Is Orbán against the European Union. No, far from it. As explained by one of the CEU experts: “He has strong support of European Union as long as they send the money, especially in regards to construction. He sees it as a nice tool to fight against. He thinks he needs the European Union for both those reasons. What he says beyond that, I do not think he is against the European Union. And would prefer to be an opinion leader of the European Union. Would like to see a federation of states, not a local state level. Almost secondary to getting the cash”66.

64 J.van Dooren, Budapest, 24 April 2017

65 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 11 april,2017 66 J.van Dooren, Budapest, 24 April 2017

His colleague at CEU agrees on this as well. Explaining that Orbán wants to loosen the tight control of Brussels: “He wants to somehow loosen the tight control of Brussels, he is fighting with the federalists. He wants to get the money from Brussels on one hand,but on the other hand wants have space for manoeuvring as possible. That’s why he is opening to the east while keeping the inflow of money from the west.

So he is the type of person who is maximizing the advantages. It just to be pragmatic but now he is radicalizing. He hates Liberals He is slowly moving away from the European People’s Party. So he is in favor of a Europe of Nations67”.

All the experts agree that the best position Orbán would be a Europe of Nations with the financial guarantees. The creation of this desire for a different Europe lays in the fact that he his policies are pragmatic, but that he is to reactive in his criticism. The problem lays in the fact that the critique is aimed at his domestic policies. Orbán simply does not want that and the last years have radicalised him in these beliefs. When he first became Prime Minister in 1998 was Pro-EU but turned out to be no federalist. What is left is the embodiment of someone who desire a Europe of Nations with financial guarantees.

3.4 The difference between Fidesz and Orbán

3.4.1 Lack of Freedom of Expression

The experts agree on the fact that Orbán is in complete control of Fidesz. The expert of Péter Pázmány states that Fidesz is a highly centralized party with low party membership. Orbán controls a party that has members that derange from moderate liberals to far right nationalists: “Fidesz is been built up as an extremely centralist party, even more than the United Russia. But just like in any other Central-European party, membership is low. Meaning there there are not many members, besides the officials. So while Orbán complety controls the party, there is variety within the party. Fidesz membership deranges from moderate liberals to far right nationalists. So far Viktor Orbán can keep the camps together”68.

67 J.van Dooren, Budapest, 24 April 2017 68 J.van Dooren, Budapest, 25 April, 2017

Viktor Orbán has a deep grip on these camps within the party. One of the side effects of this is a lack of freedom of expression. It has become obvious that disagreeing with the official line Fidesz line, can leave to immediate replacement.

One of the CEU experts mentions a good example of 2017 of this tight grip: State Secretary for Foreign Economic Relations in the Ministry of National Economy Zsolt Becsay and Hungarian ambassador to the United States, Réka Szemerkényi. Becsay disagreed with the Chinese financing of the Budapest-Belgrade train project69.

Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi was previously the face of the pro-EU and pro-NATO faction of Fidesz According to one of the ELTE experts, But states that this factions has been replaced. He also stretches that there is a lot of infighting between oligarchs within Fidesz and that Orbán is great in using this to his advantage70.

Another interesting figure is Tibor Navrasics, who is the commissioner for Education, Culture, Youth and Sport in the European commission. Where the vast majority of Fidesz had no problems with condemning The Central European University’s connection George Soros, he emphasized that the Central European University is one of the most important higher education institutions not only in Hungary, but also in the European higher education system71. However, Navrasics is a former official, who made his career working for the European Commission. The vast majority of representatives in the Hungarian parliament vote uniformly, while internal debates stay away from the public.

While the strict party rhetoric could be seen as a strong act of leadership to keep a party ranging from liberals to far right nationalists in line, a lot of experts even state a bigger concern. That Viktor Orbán orders the Hungarian secret service to monitor Fidesz officials and that by blackmailing certain individuals, he keeps the party discipline.

69 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 12 april,2017 70 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 15 april,2017

71 CEU 04/02/2017 https://www.ceu.edu/article/2017-04-02/navracsics-stands-ceu.

3.4.2 Opportunism

A lack of expression and potential replacement being eminent, the experts agree that opportunism is the biggest explanation for sticking to tough party discipline.

ELTE 1 even describes the average Hungarian parliamentarian as button pushers: The guys who are sitting in parliament are just button pushers who do not know anything. If you would speak Hungarian you will see that when they are questioned in interviews they don’t know anything. Everyone is just following orders72”.

ELTE 1 is not the only expert who stretches the consequent “incompetence” of certain parliamentarians. The best example of this is Lőrinc Mészáros. Just like Orbán, Mészáros hails from Székesfehérvár. Unlike the esteemed Prime Minister and Lawyer Orbán, Mészáros is a gas repairman. He is also the 5th richest man of Hungary. Or as explained by Péter Pázmány: The wealth of Mr. Mészáros is growing faster than the wealth of Mark Zuckerberg. This guy is barely able to read and write. Literally, if you would listen to him during an interview you will really hear a simpleton gas repairmen. Yet he gets all the public and building contracts. There is no prove yet, but there is a widespread saying that if Mr. Mészáros is attending a meeting, Orbán is.”

Let us assume for a second that Mészáros is the cover-up of Orbán. It is not possible that the other 116 Fidesz members of Parliament are childhood friends from Székesfehérvár. So what kind of opportunism would reflect the other representatives? ELTE 1 stated that we can speak of a clique of 12 people who are ruling Hungary. Around the individual of Orbán.

CEU 3 stretched that The Fidesz base is shrinking and the only people than can stay are the ones that are nodding machines that will approve anything Orbán proposes. Some of these quotes on quote nodding machines can be described as followers of the earlier described nationalism- universalism cleavage. They believe in the certain world view that is protected by Viktor Orbán and the Visegrád Group in general. They will follow Orbán and will vote according to party

72 J. van Dooren, Budapest, 10 april,2017

66 discipline. For the others there is financial gain and prestige. But it is this same financial interest why the people behind and around Fidesz have no reason to break with the European Union. Hungary is after all a net recipient of European Union funding.

Chapter 4: Conclusions

The aim of this thesis was to analyze and better understand the position of Viktor Orbán towards the European Union. In order so, the following four research questions where analysed:

A. What are the theoretical explanations of Viktor Orbán´s Eurosceptic policies? B. What are the motivations of Viktor Orbán? C. Does the position of Viktor Orbán towards the EU change in time? D. Is there difference between Viktor Orbán´ and Fidesz´ positions towards the EU?

4.1 What are the Theoretical Explanations of Viktor Orbán´s Eurosceptic Policies?

The conclusion is that the nationalism cleavage is indeed an explanation. There is a certain amount of Hungarian voter’s that think a specific way. Viktor Orbán uses several tactics and nationalistic theory that dominates his European Agenda. When we look at the Trianon Treaty and other nationalistic sentiments, you can see certain elements that dominate Hungarian politics.

Trianon is more of an issue for Jobbik. But since Orbán is trying to reach out to the people who tend to vote for this far-right party, this makes sense. What has become obvious according the experts that he is always in the need of an opponent. Which can be explained, because he needs to keep his voters base motivated and active. Orbán and his Fidesz party have proven to be extremely flexible when it comes to party positions. They had no problem with moving towards the right, when they saw the potential voters during the nineties. After consulting with the specialists the research am doubts if Viktor Orbán himself is a nationalist.

But he is an opportunist for sure, one that excels at using this strategy. Hungary is haunted by it’s past. If you come up with the right tools, the majority of voters will follow. Orbán has proven himself to be the ultimate strategist when it comes down to this theory

The bridge between east and west is debatable. Because Hungary should not aspire to be a bridge. There is not enough trust on the Russian side for that.

Unlike the nationalistic-universalism cleavage, the bridge between East and West is not a theoretical explanation for Eurosceptic behaviour. The respondents are all sceptical of the closer ties with Russia. Especially the Paks power plant faces scepticism. They also emphasize a difference between the interests of Hungary and the personal interests of Viktor Orbán and the top echelons of Fidesz. The problem lays in the fact that they do not believe that Hungary is capable of being a bridge.

Or as explained by one of the CEU experts: “Hungary is not a bridge, he needs to stay in touch with the EU partners. He voted for the Russian sanctions. He receives billions of dollars if there is a new Russian power plant. He believes that the money keeps him in power73”. The research would indicate a lack of evidence for the idea of the bridge. Viktor Orbán has proven himself an individual who is perfect in guarantying himself to be in a position, where he will receive all the benefits. We saw that with his switch mid-nineties and we are seeing it post 2010.

The research would argue Orbán is politically savvy enough to realize that he burned to many bridges with the European Union following the financial unrest with the IMF and by changing the Hungarian constitution. He realizes that Russia is perhaps not at an alternative, but an ally to improve his position. Since he adapted this strategy to maneuver around important geopolitical decisions, that he knows that after all the criticism Orbán received from the European Union, article 7 might be a reality. This in combination with the fact that the EU funding will change after 2020, makes him very well aware to keep every option open. From a financial point of view, which will be analysed further during motivation, it can be a reason to be Eurosceptic. It is this financial connection that leaves widespread speculation and conspiracy theories alive.

But based on the data, the concept of being a bridge between east and west, it is not a theoretical explanation. Political opportunism appears to be more of an explanation. Therefore, only the nationalism-universalism cleavage is a theoretical explanation.

73 J.van Dooren, Budapest, 24 April 2017

4.2 What are the Motivations of Viktor Orbán?

What is most interestingly is the fact that most of the specialists explain that Viktor Orbán is mainly about rhetoric.

In other words, he uses this to his advantage whether it is questionable if he believes in it. The main characteristic that can be added to Viktor Orbán according to the experts he is a pragmatist. It is this pragmatism than can be hold accountable for most of his political maneuvers, decision and strategies. His Euroscepticism is mainly explained by his reactive policies.

Generally conventional wisdom at the beginning of the research was that Viktor Orbán was a patriotic leader with integrity. His actions against the IMF were notable, with the IMF is that the richest countries will dictate the austerity ways over the recipients. No blame can be laid at Viktor Orbán for at least trying to change the rules, just like one cannot blame him for trying to influence the Hungarian national bank or forcing foreign investors to pay more. These matters seem like a logical step when you are fighting for economic survival. Despite losing most of this respect after his stance during the refugee crisis and the attempts to closure the Central European University, he still remains an enigmatic figure of intrigue

As can be read in my introduction, I always kept opportunism as one of the possibilities for certain political stances. But to come to the conclusion that Orbán ’s entire motivations are based on opportunism to gather more wealth? That was not what was predicted. However, the research paints a picture of a man who is motivated by power and wealth. Losing the power in 2002 has turned out to be influential in his change of motivations. In order to do so, he changed the political arena in Hungary. Creating an environment where like-minded individuals and party prominents florish. By changing the Hungarian constitution, Orbán has been able to make a surrounding where he will never lose an election again. With friendly judges on judiciary places and where the majority of the media sector is behind him. The two journalists I interviewed from Magyar Nemzet write their political articles from a pro-Orbán and pro-Hungarian point of view. But, given the anonymity of the interview, they provide a complete different view than in their articles. It is all part of the environment that Orbán created to stay in power.

As apart from this desire for power, Orbán aspires to be a European leader, but his relationship with the European Union has tarnished any long-term ambitions. Instead he is trying to emerge as a regional leader, in this case the Visegrád group. In this aspect he is successful. The key to it is influence is to be outspoken and euro critical. It is this “footballing” mentality that he uses in domestic politics. Creating an environment where it is “us versus them”. That appears to be his signature move. It was a key element in the nationalism-universalism cleavage explanation for Eurosceptic moves. Orbán is using a lot of symbolism and the image he maintains for his voters’ base are essential. During European council meetings he can show his “victories” to his followers. That does not mean that Viktor Orbán is against the European Union, although that he lately desires a Europe of Nations.

4.3 Does the position of Viktor Orbán towards the EU change in time?

Not only is the answer yes, it has become clear that losing the elections in 2002 and 2006 have changed Orbán and his party even more than before. The previous change in the early nineties had more to with attacking a certain number of Hungarian voters, as described under the nationalism cleavage. But despite the switch from liberalism towards social conservatism, the party and its leader were pro-EU. The government of Orbán worked for years on the EU accession and did a great job, almost achieving its goal. negotiations.

By 2002 26 of the 31 chapters of the acquis were completed. The setbacks turned out to be mainly in Agriculture and in financial control: As part of its continuous monitoring, the Commission services addressed letters to Hungary in February and June 2003 expressing concern over its preparedness in the fields of financial control and agriculture and calling for urgent action to remedy these shortcomings. If it would not have been for financial control and the agriculture sector, it would have been most likely that there would have been Orbán ’s signature under the EU accession treaty. The European Commission had good riddance for being sceptical about the financial control of the country. As the country would eventually get into economic turmoil under the consequent MSZP led governments.

The relationship between the European Union and Hungary is starting to get weaker almost immediately following re-election in 2010. Orbán, not wanting to start his term with austerity measures, asked for leniency. Which was refused by the European Union. This marks the beginning of the first anti-Brussels campaigning. We can speak of an ongoing cat and mouse game between the European Union and the Hungary of Viktor Orbán ever since. Viktor Orbán is coming up with so called “draconian laws” where, after receiving criticism from the European Union, he takes the sharp edge of.

In his first term Hungary worked hard towards European Union accession. Back then Fidesz and its leader had not much problem with the European interference. But this has changed over the course of time. After the ongoing cat and mouse game, based on his reactive policies, the leader of Hungary wants a weaker form of the European Union. The so called: Europe of Nations. This is easily explainable. The vast majority of Orbán ’s decisions are about domestic affairs. He simply does not want to be interfered in this regard. We can state that Orbán is the ultimate pragmatist that adapts to a situation, as long as there is an opponent”. The so called “Us versus Them” strategy.

4.4 Is there difference between Viktor Orban And Fidesz Position towards the European Union?

After this research there is no doubt that the policies of Orbán and Fidesz are the same. The presence and dominance of Viktor Orbán is unquestionable. Two things have become eminent. Firstly, there is a lack of freedom of expression with potential blackmailing. Secondly, there is a high level of opportunism with a questionable lack of political skills. The party is under very strict control and he knows everything about his MEP’s. Some experts even claimed that Viktor Orbán is using the secret services to control his followers, while blackmailing them as well. Viktor Orbán is in complete control since his “realist” wing won the ideological battle within Fidesz in the early nineties. Most politicians would disappear from the political stage after losing back to back elections. Not only did Orbán survive the 2002 and 2006 election fiasco, he is by 2018 still in the ultimate power position.

4.5 Overall Conclusion: What is the Position of Viktor Orbán towards the European Union?

The aim of this thesis was to analyze and better understand the position of Viktor Orbán towards the European Union. The research questions have been answered to understand the position of Orbán. This thesis proves how important opportunism, pragmatism and reactive politics in the mindsight of the Hungarian prime minister. There is a nationalism-universalism cleavage in Hungary. Orbán is using nationalism based on this cleavage.

Nationalism matters, because this cleavage exists. Orbán makes certain stances based on this cleavage. He makes moves to please his supporters, while at the same time he is not much of a nationalist himself. He is a functional opportunist that uses tools to its advantage. In this case nationalism.

But, what is the position of Viktor Orbán towards the European Union? As it appears it as the moment to create a Europe of Nations, while still getting European Union funds. These funds must come without criticism from Brussels. The strategy of Orbán is to always have an “opponent”

Viktor Orbán has no desire to have a so called “Hunxit”. The European Union gives financial guarantees after all and it provides a perfect scapegoat. What he wants is a looser form of federation. One where his domestic policies while not criticized. The European agenda of Orbán can be more described as a reaction towards criticism. Power and wealth seem to be the true objective of this fierce critic of the European Union. His past experiences made Orbán change his domestic policies to maintain his power. This had led to criticism from Brussels. As a reaction, Orbán has beefed up his rhetoric. His system needs to have an enemy at all time.

References

Interviews by author:

J. van Dooren, Budapest, 10 april,2017

J. van Dooren, Budapest, 11 april,2017

J. van Dooren, Budapest, 12 april,2017

J. van Dooren, Budapest, 13 april,2017

J. van Dooren, Budapest, 14 april,2017

J. van Dooren, Budapest, 15 april,2017

J. van Dooren, Budapest, 17 april,2017

J.van Dooren, Budapest, 20 april, 2017

J.van Dooren, Budaest, 21 april. 2017

J.van Dooren, Budapest, 24 April 2017

J.van Dooren, Budapest, 25 April, 2017

J.van Dooren, Brussel, 31 Januari, 2018

Non- Published manuscripts Author:

Van Dooren,J (2016). How transnational is Fidesz?. P.10.Unpublished manuscript. Masaryk University

Van Dooren,J (2016). The Hungarian approach in the context of the Refugee crisis P7. Influential within the Visegrad Group?

Van Dooren,J (2017). The relationship between the IMF and Hungary?.P.10 Unpublished manuscript. Masaryk University

Books:

Enyedi,Z (2007) Playing with Europe: The Impact of European integration on the Hungarian Party System.

Furedi, (2018): Populism and the European Culture Wars. The Conflict of Values between Hungary and the EU. New York: Routledge Taylor&Francis Group London and New York

Magyar, B (2016). Post-Communist Mafia State The case of Hungary. Budapest: Central European university Press

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Molnár, Miklós (2007): A concise history of Hungary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

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Agh Attila (1999) Europeanization of policy-making in East Central Europe: the Hungarian approach to EU accession, Journal of European Public Policy, 6:5, 839-854

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News Articles

Politico 3/1/18. MEPs back triggering Article 7 against Poland: https://www.politico.eu/article/european-parliament-triggering-article-7-poland-judicial-reform- voting-rights/

Politico 1/9/18 Juncker rejects cutting funds to Poland: https://www.politico.eu/article/eu- commission-president-jean-claude-juncker-rejects-cutting-eu-funds-to-poland/

Euractiv EPP warns Budapest with Article 7 ‘nuclear option’ Apr 7, 2017: https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/epp-warns-budapest-with-article-7- nuclear-option/

Euobserver 12th April 2017: EU gives Hungary time for dialogue https://euobserver.com/institutional/137577

Slovak Spectator 17th March 2016: Socialists and democrats alliance warns Fico about coalition with SNS: https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20119292/socialists-and-democrats-alliance-warns-fico- about-coalition-with-sns.html

CEU 04/02/2017 https://www.ceu.edu/article/2017-04-02/navracsics-stands-ceu.

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Interviews http://www.jobbik.com/gabor_vona_europe_kept_silent_-_interview (used on 22-Jun-2017)

76 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/hungary/11680840/Hungary-orders-100- mile-Serbia-border-fence-to-keep-out-migrants.html (used 28 March -2017)

Speeches

http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/viktor-orbán -s- speech-on-the-anniversary-of-the-hungarian-revolution-of-1848 used 18-march-2017) http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister- viktor-orbán -on-kossuth-radio-s-programme-180-minutes20170331 ( used 7 July 2017)

Viktor Orbán speech on the anniversary of the 1848 Revolution,15 March 2017, Budapest (https://parizs.mfa.gov.hu/page/viktor-orbans-speech-on-the-anniversary-of-the-1848-revolution- 15-march-2017-budapest

Viktor Orbán at the EPP Congress March 30, 2017 (http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime- minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/speech-of-viktor-orban-at-the-epp-congress)

Viktor Orbán “State of the Nation” address February 19, 2018 (http://www.kormany.hu/en/the- prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/viktor-orban-s-state-of-the-nation-address)

Twitter

Manfred Weber, Twitter @ManfredWeber 9:45 AM - 12 Nov 2017. https://twitter.com/manfredweber/status/929767178525700096?lang=en

Guy Verhofstadt Twitter @GuyVerhofstadt 12:00 PM - Apr 9, 2018 https://twitter.com/guyverhofstadt/status/983283480443355137?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref_url= https%3A%2F%2Fwww.express.co.uk%2Fnews%2Fworld%2F943675%2FEU-news-Viktor- Orban-Hungary-election-result-Guy-Verhofstadt-Twitter-Manfred-Weber

Guy Verhofstadt Twitter @GuyVerhofstadt 06:26 AM-May 2,2018 https://twitter.com/guyverhofstadt/status/991670367415685121