American University Library

CONNECTIONS, CONUNDRUMS, AND CRIMINALITY: UNDERSTANDING LOCAL PERCEPTIONS ABOUT AND ATTITUDES TOWARD ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Christopher A. Corpora

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of Doctor of Philosophy

International Relations

Chair: , ^

Louise L Shelley

Z * Julie Mertus

# A Z 7, I Maryann Cusimafio Love Ivy (J -6 1 3 4?YL—- * Dean o f the College or School

Date v

2005

American University Washington, D.C. 20016 88 ^

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

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Christopher A. Corpora

2005

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This work is dedicated to my three beautiful, bright daughters—Shea, Stella, and Sydney—focus on life, love, and layered meanings. You will never go wrong.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CONNECTIONS, CONUNDRUMS, AND CRIMINALITY: UNDERSTANDING LOCAL PERCEPTIONS ABOUT AND ATTITUDES TOWARD ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

CHRISTOPHER A. CORPORA

ABSTRACT

Transnational organizedcrime and enabling corruption emerged after the fall

of the Soviet Union as an important empirical fact, forcing many social scientists to

address the issue in discussing transition politics and economies. A new literature and

series of practices developed in the course of these discussions, attempting to properly

account for the growth, endurance, and impact of organized crime and corruption in a

quickly changing world. The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, and in particular of

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) provided a unique forum for measuring these tools, as

organized crime and corruption emerged as key distracters in the development of a stable

democracy and market economy in the region. However, international organizations

dominate discussions and suggestions regarding organized crime and corruption in BiH,

making it difficult to fully assess the problems in context. Additionally, the problems

associated with these activities are not contained and, in some estimations, have increased

since the international community began explicitly addressing the issues. Few locally

produced studies or serious discussions about these problems are recognized or

acknowledged in the current debate. This research aims to fill a gap in knowledge by

bringing in the voice of local experts and measuringthe differences between them and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. international perspectives and attitudes. The goal is to suggest more contextually relevant

ways for addressing these issues by bridging these gaps and suggesting ways to produce a

mutually agreeable approach for analyzing and dealing with organized crime and

corruption — and possibly other issues that suffer fromthe same discord, inhibiting the

state building project — in BiH, and beyond.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Taking on a large and arduous task is never a one person job. It requires the

support, assistance, and motivation of countless others. I have always been curious to

understand the networks of people that go into the production of something ascribed to an

individual. The sense that credit is lonely and attached only to the name on a page belies

the truth and dimension of the indirect and direct influences any individual receives—

shaping the way they see and describe the world around them. What was Monet’s

inspiration? Who nudged him along when he felt his work was lacking? How did the

Curie’s get their minds around key questions and tasks? How many countless cups of

coffee on the streets of Europe, Asia, or America did it take before someone had that next

idea and then what was it that made them follow through? Small and great human

thoughts all find their genesis in and through interaction. The place of discovery is in the

combining forces of intellect, discourse, and practical application. My project lacked in

all of these places at very different times, and probably would not have continued beyond

a thought or two if it were not for many people who inspired me to think, talk, and act.

My interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) started with a deployment to

support NATO forces in 1995 and 1996, so I must first thank the US Army Reserve and

the Department of Defense for providing me with a great opportunity to see and interact

with people I never dreamed of meeting. More specifically, I should thank Gerald G.

Neill, David Kuhms, and Bob Smyth for great conversations and venting during this time.

They were patient in listening to ravings and half-thoughts that set the stage for this

project. I also must thank Ken Krantz and Frank Fishbaugh for, in 1999, making the fatal

mistake of signing my application for the Intelligence Regional Community Specialist

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Program. I am sure that they would have never signed if they had a clue as tohow long I

would be walking this road. Along the way many professional colleagues supported me

through direct engagement and tireless reading of early drafts and associated research

papers. Most prominent and interested among them was Ed Daley, James Noone, Roddy

McArthur and Gustav Otto.

American University (AU) introduced me to several important academic friends

and mentors. Most important among these is Louise I. Shelley, my Dissertation Chair,

who provided me great opportunities and solid friendship from my first semester at AU in

1994 - then a wondering MA student. Our discussions and interactions surrounding post-

Soviet organized crime captured my imagination and provided focus to my broad

interests. I am deeply in her debt for playing a primary mentoring role in a large part of

my professional and personal life and thankful for her consistent guidance and support

through all of these years. I am also grateful to Julie Mertus and Maryann Cusimano

Love for agreeing to be part of my dissertation committee and providing me with great

stewardship and advice as I navigated the long road of research and writing and more

research and rewriting (you get the idea). Although not an AU person or on my

committee, Peter Andreas continually provided me with great inspiration and

opportunities to discuss and comment on the issues of organized crime and conflict - a

shared passion that he has developed broadly and well.

My years at AU yielded a long stream of continued interaction and support.

Louis Goodman, Randolph Persaud, Nicholas Onuf (1994-95), Abdul Aziz Said, and

James Mittelman spent extra time with me and shared interest in the problems and issues

on which I focused. Their good guidance and clear suggestions helped make me a more

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. disciplined and careful reader, writer, and thinker. Several of those who suffered the

terminal fire of Ph.D. candidacy with me became crucial members of the “what i f 5

club—namely, John Picarelli, Ruth Reitan, Lynn Kunkel, and Amal Khoury. Finally, I

am grateful to Laura Covill for editing the final draft, which became a project unto itself.

In my many trips and excursions in and through BiH I met some of the most

phenomenal and courageous people. These hundreds of individuals formed the

substructure of my thoughts and approaches to the country and region. Chief among

these people are Vlatko Cvrtila, Bojan Zee Filipovic, Velibor Lalic, and Milos Salaja.

These friends and colleagues sparred regularly with me, never backing down or afraid to

politely tell me I was crazy. They opened important hidden doors—giving me access to

perspectives and activities rarely seen by non-locals. I apologize to their spouses for

keeping them out too late, too often.

Most importantly I want to thank my family for their undying belief and support

throughout these nearly 40 years. My father gave me confidence, passion,

communication, and the gift of reading—this cherished thing. One thousand good things

would never repay him for this great gift. My mother taught me perseverance in word

and life—finding strength and repose in the flurry of chaos, often created by me. My

brother and sisters put up with endless declarations and debate, sometimes even enjoying

the spectacle of the older brother being flat-out wrong. My wonderful wife, Kristine,

endured endless rounds of editing and late-night babble. She selflessly stood with me

and on the bad days propped me up - too often this was the case. Every time I quit, she

said keep going. Every time I found something else to do, she said focus. Every time I

left, she assured me that home would be waiting. These are the most crucial things any

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many good ideas to push the project along. Rarely are projects like these done for

ourselves, but for the future—so it might be a bit brighter or at least informed. We must

think and move—challenge is the enduring faculty of life.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract...... ii

Acknowledgments...... iv

List of Tables and Figures ...... ix

Chapter 1: Thesis and Literature ...... 1

Chapter 2: Research Methods ...... 63

Chapter 3: Open Question Findings...... 100

Chapter 4: Closed Question Analysis ...... 156

Chapter 5: Conclusions and Considerations ...... 186

Appendix A: Interview Questionnaire...... 215

Appendix B: Interview Consent Agreement...... 219

Bibliography...... 221

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Table 1:1 Organized Crime Literature Frame...... 25

Table 2:1 Questionnaire Frame...... 98

Table 3:1 Perception Overview...... 104

Table 3:2 Social Impact Perceptions ...... 106

Table 3:3 Organized Crime and Corruption Perceptions ...... 118

Table 3:4 Institutional Capacity Perceptions ...... 130

Table 3:5 International Responsibility Perceptions ...... 142

Table 3:6 Characterization of Analytic Gaps...... 149

Figure 4:1 Disclosures Signed ...... 158

Figure 4:2 Ethnicity of Respondents...... 160

Figure 4:3 Location of Respondents ...... 162

Figure 4:4 Respondent Category...... 164

Figure 4:5 Informal Social Relations ...... 166

Figure 4:6 Sociological Causes...... 168

Figure 4:7 Governmental Effectiveness...... 172

Figure 4:8 Foreign Contribution to Problems...... 175

Figure 4:9 Organized Crime Activities ...... 178

Figure 4:10 Most Serious Organized Crime Activities ...... 181

Figure 5:1 Gap Interaction ...... 187

Table 5:1 Final Data Frame...... 195

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CHAPTER ONE THESIS AND LITERATURE

Purpose

Organized crime and corruption are deep and prevalent problems in Bosnia

and Herzegovina (BiH) today. Almost all interested parties, international and local, agree

on this point. However, beyond this agreement, international and local experts begin to

slowly diverge in perspectives, ending in dissonant policies, ineffective governmental

institutions, and the ironic strengthening of criminal organizations and corrupt public

officials. This divergence begins with differing philosophical understandings of these

issues and quickly complicates as local and international analyses and perspectives echo

past one another with little notice of one another. Most directly, this is a story of poor

communication between international oversight and local actors. However, it is also a key

theme in a deepening problem of nation building, peacekeeping, and consolidating liberal

democratic and economic institutions in a way that maintains the Western promise of

stability and prosperity.

This research sets out to identify and investigate this apparent gap between

international and local perceptions of organized crime and corruption by giving direct

voice to the junior partners in this exchange: the local experts and interested parties.1

Almost all public statements, positions, and analyses of organized crime and corruption

'in my prospectusthe research question was: is there in fact a gap in perceptions and attitudes? If not why does there appear to be such a disconnect between local and international experts? If so, where do they specifically differ in understanding and how does this affect effortsto address the issues? The reformulation of these questions into a positive statement is a result of completing my research and concluding that there is a perception gap and it has profound ramifications on the assumptions, analyses and policy prescriptions coming from and within each side.

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in BiH come frominternational organizations, skewing the general perspective toward

these issues to this point of view. By giving voice to local experts and interested parties, I

aim to open a tightly sealed door to investigate what lies behind it and how the

perspectives and attitudes beyond it differ and challenge the popular, international

wisdom concerning these problems. In so doing, this research not only releases these

positions and understandings to a larger audience, but also points to a way for scholars to

evaluate, critique, and make solid recommendations about how future nation building

exercises might be better established to have quicker, deeper impacts on transition. As

criminal organizations and corrupt officials are adaptive and quick to leam, much like

water finding its way, international peacekeeping and stability activities must be

organized to construct more effective aqueducts. These are reservoirs of knowledge and

trust that flow together in a given context to establish the possibility of long-lasting

solutions—not just a few, desert puddles that are destined to dry up in frustration.

The purpose of this research is to identify and understand local perceptions

and attitudes about organized crime and corruption in BiH, and to compare these

positions with official international community perceptions. The goal is to test the

following hypothesis: international and local perceptions about organized crime, and the

proper ways to address the problem, differ significantly, contributing to the lack of

success in combating the problem in the region. The following five research questions are

designed to determine the exact nature of this gap m perception.

1. What is the scope and impact of organized crime on society in BiH?

2These questions form the basis of the topics to be discussed. Several specific questions, devoid of academic terminology, will be formed to address these topics and asked, ver batim, of all interviewees.

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2. What segments of the population are most vulnerable to organized crime

manipulation and collusion?

3. What segments of the population are most influential in shaping attitudes,

perceptions, and accommodations toward organized crime?

4. How do local attitudes and perceptions of organized crime compare to the

official positions of the international community?

5. To what extent are governments responding to these problems?

These questions provide the framework for an ethnographic research project,

using an open-ended qualitative interview methodology to capture and interpret local

perceptions and attitudes about organized crime in BiH.

Does this apparent disconnect between official international and local

community perceptions and attitudes about the impact and scope of organized crime in

BiH really exist? If yes, what is the nature of these differing points of view and how can

they best be systematically captured and analyzed? If no, why is there the appearance of

difference on the issue? In order to address these questions, I will review the existing

literature and official positions with an aim toward identifying keyissues of apparent

difference, interview a representative sample of people that fall into each of these

categories (and sub-categories to be discussed in the sample section below), and analyze

the data from a social networks perspective.

There is an insufficient number of detailed analyses and scholarly studies of

organized crime in BiH, given the high international and regional interest in the issue.

The few detailed studies that do exist tend to focus on international goals and pay little

attention to local understandings. The goal of this study is to address this knowledge

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deficiency by examining, in detail and with scientific rigor, the local perceptions and

attitudes toward organized crime in BiH. The results of this research will provide the

scholarly community with falsifiable data and analysis, based on open-ended interviews

and frame analysis. These results will not determine who is right or wrong, but rather

illuminate consistencies and inconsistencies in perceptions and attitudes, analyzing how

and why these overlaps and gaps came to be. Furthermore, the findings will be used

evaluate how these gaps effect the overall goals of democratic consolidation and

economic stability in BiH and beyond as the era of nation-building expands in ways few

foresaw in the early post-Cold War years and before 11 September 2001.

There are many definitional debates about the proper accounting for

organized crime and corruption. Many separate the two issues as distinct phenomena,

but I argue below that this is a false dichotomy that denies the close association of the

two activities in successful practice. For the purposes of this study I broadly define

organized crime as the intentional, coordinated, and ordered practice of illicit political

and economic activities, focused on building wealth and power outside of accepted

normative structures. In this way, corruption functions as a necessary business practice in

securing the goals of wealth and power—as wealth is difficult to sustain without having a

locus of power to protect the proceeds and position of the recipient. Additionally, this

broad definition allows one to evaluate the activities’ legitimate organizations, which are

used to generate illicit gain.

31faese definitions are built around the analytical models used by scholars to evaluate and discuss these issues and will be discussed in detail below. However, this study is not meant to provide once and for all the definitional characteristics and qualities of organized crime and corruption. Rather it is an attempt to bring together several views to demonstrate the wide range of effects organized crime and corruption have on the community of states, nations, local communities, and social relations.

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Plan of the Chapter

The balance of this chapter will begin the journey of tracing how various

waters find paths, framing the way we look at and understanding organized crime and

corruption in BiH. Section one establishes the intellectual heritage behind my specific use

of frameworks, citing several recent studies as examples. Section two begins the process

of frame building by categorizing and highlighting key conceptual differences (seen as

debate dichotomies), providing the communicative portion of the frame. Section three

focuses on disciplinary approaches with these debates in mind, thus constructing an

analytical framework - taking into account experiences and practiced scholarship.

Section four lends context to this conceptual framework by evaluating specific literature

in light of three relevant historical events, represented by long-through-short-duration

scopes of inquiry. The final section applies this framework toward understanding the

specific literature, tracing how scholars and experts capture and account for organized

crime and corruption in BiH. This exercise adds spatial context to the original framework

and provides a broad survey of a large, but overlapping, literature — allowing me to look

more closely at the specific literature on organized crime and corruption in BiH.

The tracing of these winding, often fordable streams will set the analytical

scene by identifying preliminary gaps between international and local actors and

organizations regarding this issue (the basis of my original research questions). The

framework described in this chapter works as a general analytical device for interpreting

the data collected in this study. The aim of this framework is to orient the reader to the

particular arguments and positions taken on the issues of organized crime and corruption,

accounting for this orientation as a basis for developing a pragmatic approach to the study

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of the problem in BiH—by acknowledging the roles played by the framework, but

transcending the limitations set by adhering to one specific position or approach, as each

tells us something about the problem and our scholarship.

The ultimate goal of this study is to identify three specific waterways that

need to be pooled and contained if there is any hope for addressing the issues in a

meaningful way. The reservoir built in this study will serve to collect related issues in

order to better address these problems in BiH. However, different tools are necessary for

building a series of dams and aqueducts that are mindful of the terrain and capabilities

found in the context of BiH—not by reinvention, but by purposeful and self-conscious

exploration of the terrain—using experience and imagination as a guide.

Pragmatism and Frame Analysis

Philosophical pragmatism offers an intellectual lineage useful for considering

the context, character, and impacts of a perception and attitude gap between local and

international experts and officials in BiH. In this way, the issues of organized crime and

corruption are incidental to a larger issue of peacekeeping and democratic institution

building. As these two issues emerge as lightening rods in describing and accounting for

the slow success of both in BiH, it is appropriate to analyze these problems from this

vantage point as both a philosophical and practical starting point. Much like Oliver

Wendell Holmes’ thesis that legal judgment precedes the hearing of a case, the context—

experiences, perceptions, and attitudes of those engaged-oftendisciplines the outcome of

an exchange (Menand, 1998). Put differently, causality is not simple externalities, but

must include the workings of the human mind—as it disciplines and creates context out of

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whole-cloth facts. The research in this study extends beyonda simple description and

analysis o f organized crime and corruption in a troubled region, pushing the analysis to

its natural conclusion: a survey and analysis of the growing move by international

governmental and nongovernmental organizations to export liberal democratic values and

institutions to a larger portion of the world. The BiH case functions well as an initial

point of analysis because it is the longest running, post Cold War attempt to follow

through on this agenda.

William James, Charles Sanders Pierce, and John Dewey went to great

lengths to describe how meanings are formed in the real world, making a broad critique

of the move to over-theorize these issues and to create an artificial division between

actions and ideas. In the pragmatist world view, fact and value are a co-constituted

formation of a basic social process: the formation of meaning (Menand, 1997).4 The only

meaningful dichotomy found in their approaches was the variation between word and

deed. The analytical development of this difference is how Pierce became known as the

father of semiotics: evaluating the way signs and symbols assist in the formation and

communication of meaning (Menand, 2002). In some ways, these seminal thinkers

provide early methods for establishing how social meanings are constructed in context.

The more current usage of social constructivism appears to be tied to more dogmatic

attempts to build research communities (Hacking, 2000; Pettman, 2000; and, Smith,

Booth and Zalewski, 1996).

4Although none of these three seminal thinkers used this contemporary language, it is fair to saythey might have in the present-day context. In fact, they would have applauded this use as clearly pragmatic application of their ideas on how one comes to analytically understand a given context, by which meanings are produced.

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James, Pierce, and Dewey likely would have frowned on this theoretical

discussion as a needless abstraction of a process we each find and participate in everyday

of our lives (Rorty, 1989 and Menand, 2002).5 This study is not a conscious effort to

enter into the seemingly endless contemporary debate over the proper ways to theorize or

articulate social construction. However, I fully endorse the concept as a useful tool for

understanding and analyzing social experiences from a holistic vantage point. I self

consciously refrain fromusing the terminology to avoid becoming embroiled in what is

sometimes seen as an academic exercise of hair-splitting, focusing on the utility of the

concept to discuss, in this case, the production of meanings surrounding organized crime

and official corruption in BiH. Simply put, this dissertation is a study about how experts

and officials in BiH understand and perceive these problems, and how different

categories of experts and officials differ in opinion and attitude.

Irving Goffman made great strides in establishing an analytic method for

understanding the production of meaning. His dramaturgical and frame analyses continue

to prove useful in applying pragmatist assertion in the study of the social experience,

regardless of the level of analysis (Brissett and Edgley, 1990). Gofftnan defines frames

and their analysis as an assumption that:

...definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events—at least social ones—and our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as I am able to identify.... My phrase ‘frame analysis’ is a slogan to refer to the examination in these terms of the organization of experience. (Goffman, 1986, 10-11)

Goffman,like James, Pierce and their peers, regarded social exchange and

relations as a combination of material and mental activities, incorporating both processes

5See Nicholas Onuf, John Shotter, and mostrecently Alexander Wendt for the emergence and debate over the theoretical implications and stances taken in the modem debate.

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as social operations basic to the production of meanings, facts, and truths (Menand, 2002

and Goffman, 1986). Goffman recognized two related, primary activities in every social

exchange that produced a context or frameworkthat those participating could use to

understand, exchange, and fool one another. In the first case, this was exactly what was

directly communicated through language. In the second case, this was about the

interlocutors’ actions. For Goffman, words mattered only in the context of the actions

surrounding them and, as such, created the frame of reference or understanding in the

exchange. This simple way of describing the production of social meanings is fully

influenced by the actors’ experiences, intentions, and beliefs: all contributing to what he

described as the signs and symbols of social exchange (Goffman, 1986).

The majority of Goffman’s own work consisted of accounting for the variety

of ways these exchanges influenced and shaped various social frameworks (Brissett and

Edgley, 1990; Goffman, 1986; and, Goffman, 1957). In these discussions he

demonstrated how the process was neither consistent nor readily discemable without

accounting for the variety of second case signs, and was further complicated by the

assumption of these processes in a given exchange. Without saying it directly, Goffman

was accounting for the continuum of intentionality to ignorance that shapes the

production of social meanings. Another way of understanding this is how one’s will,

purposeful or otherwise, guides the shaping of social understandings as much as language

does in the context of an exchange (Goffman, 1986).6

6Of course, this will anger any dogmatic thinker locked in the current debate over language (Jacques Derrida) and power (Michel Foucault) in international relations theory. However, Goffman, like the pragmatists before him, would see this as a waste of time in evaluating how real social experiences take form, transform, and discipline the larger social exchange. In some ways, this social exchange can be seen

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The distinction between verbal and nonverbal actions is analyzed along a

continuum of willful intentions through unintended consequences, which occur within a

certain context. This context is both temporal and spatial, establishing certain rules

around the exchange. Context is not always accidental. It can be manufactured by a

participant to establish an advantage. However, in most cases there are elements of both

will and accident in forming the context, especially in cases where space and time are

beyond the control of the interlocutors—for example, historical events or random

encounters. Where analytic differences are made between the verbal and signification,

Goffman’s triumph comes in discussing how these two spheres influence and shape one

another within a specific context—coming together to form meanings and reinforce

concepts (Goffman, 1986). In the course of such a survey, an analyst constructs

frameworks around specific exchanges that appear instrumental in the development of

social meanings (Kublakova, Onuf, and Kowert, 1998; and, Goffman, 1986).

Another key pragmatist assumption, insinuated by Goffman’s analytical

methods, is the role of experience, or history, in shaping meanings, perceptions, and

beliefs. One of William James’ primary goals was to transform the debate over the

existence of God beyond the never-ending debate over scientific proof, believing that the

way history was incorporated in the faith systems of people was crucial for understanding

the way meanings were constructed (Menand, 1997 and Goffman, 1986). In effect, it was

through the accumulation of regarded proof, through historical anecdotes and lineages,

that a position, opinion, attitude, and belief system attained rigor or coherent meaning. In

as the primary commodity in discussing social capital as each of the activities and groupings discussed in this literature are formed under these frameworkrubrics.

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the end, the proof is in the opinion or belief because it is instrumental in shaping both

action and language—reality and truth in a perceived, or constructed, context. Like

Goffman, James stopped short of the mentalist reduction by asserting that material

considerations played just as important a role in these formations (Menand, 2002).7 The

result is an evaluation of how ideas and experiences intertwine to create meaning and

discipline behavior, via a framing method that accounts for verbal and non-verbal

communication, experience, and context (Eco, 1999and Goffman, 1986,1959).

Applications of Goffman’s Method in Recent Scholarship

Four recent scholarly works, on similar themes to those investigated in this

study, use techniques similar to those suggested by Goffman for interpreting the frames

and keys used by interlocutors in a social exchange, as well as for framing an analysis of

these relations (Goffman, 1986).These studies use communication, experiences, and

context to frame their data, clarifying the meanings produced in complex interaction.

Each scholar illuminated inconspicuous and hidden aspects of the relations studied by

employing these methods. Although only one of the studies explicitly cites Goffman as a

source, they each employ a similar pragmatic technique that develops a fuller

understanding of the meanings produced in the evaluated social exchanges (Andreas,

2000).8 Each study proved instrumental in the way I developed my own frame analysis,

shedding clearer light on previously unobserved aspects of the relationship between

international and local discussants in BiH (Menand, 1997 and Goffman, 1986).

7For moreon the debate over the mentalist reduction see Husserl and Ponty’s analysis of the phenomenologist's struggleto deal with the problem 8 Ledeneva references Goffman in her bibliography, but does not explicitly use his work in her study.

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Peter Andreas directly applies Goffman’s methods and this notion of

historical constructions as disciplining devices in his work on the transformation of legal

regimes and debates over the United States-Mexican border (Andreas, 2000). By using a

similar example to the one investigated in this research, Andreas demonstrates how

language and actions compete on either side of this not fully tangible demarcation line to

create intended and unintended circumstances that shape the meaning of the border and

the activities of smuggling and immigration surrounding it. He focuses on the

inconsistencies and ironies present in the double move to both open the borders wider

through NAFTA and tighten the same borders through the increased capacity of the ‘war’

on drugs (Andreas, 2000). Andreas states:

The politics of opening the border to legal economic flows is closely connected to the politics of making it appear more closed to illegal flows. I argue that the escalation of border policing has ultimately been less about deterring the flow of drugs and migrants than about re-crafting the image of the border and symbolically reaffirming the state’s territorial authority. (Andreas, 2000, x)

Andreas addresses the border as both real and metaphor, establishing how the

reconstruction of the line in both word and deed signifies the process of negotiated

legitimacy. The “game” he describes is one of competing intentionality and unintended

consequential feedback. Andreas tells this story by bringing all relevant social activity

into the foreground of the “game,” using an aspect of Goffman’s dramaturgical methods

as an analytical device (Andreas, 2000, 10-11). In a simple way, his book is about two

very different understandings of what the border is and how it is used to shape social

differences. However, by putting the issue of legality in the background, he allows the

reader to see a wider angle of the issue, setting a dialectic scene that plays out differently

than more conventional approaches to the issue. This analytic move is one of re-blocking

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the play, rather than re-casting—as the actors are all the same, but several are made more

prominent by having their lines increased. This allows for a more complete and detailed

re-telling of the border story, incorporating information that is often overlooked by

others, but is crucial to fully understanding the dynamic (Andreas, 2000).

Janine Wedel, Alena Ledeneva, and Vadim Volkov use similar analytic

methods to describe a variety of social exchanges surrounding the issues of organized

crime and corruption. Wedel looks at the institution of Western aid giving, pointing out

several inconsistencies that shape two fairly different notions of Western aid regimes

(Wedel, 2001). She describes these different perceptions as a “disconnect” that lingered

and took on new shape with the fall of Communism, capturing the character of these

differences through the:

.. .ritual of listening to foreigners (her italics), in which the naive but self- assured Westerner would encounter the shrewd Pole, who deftly charmed his guest while revealing nothing of what he truly thought. The same Pole would laugh at the Westerner’s gullibility behind his back, as one might poke fun at a child. (Wedel, 2001, 2)

In this statement, and the unfolding of her descriptive argument, Wedel

captures a primary gap between Western liberals and transitioning states. This

“disconnect” is produced through a set of false assumptions made by Westerners,

perceiving they fully understand the Central European situation and know what needs to

be done to bring liberal democracy and market economy to the transitioning state (Wedel,

2001). These assumptions predetermine the course of social exchange in a direction that

frames such conversations by enforcing a teacher-pupil relationship. The lack of

flexibility in Western reevaluations of the situation and context positions the discussants

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in opposition to one another where there are differences in opinion because the Western

interlocutor resists the renegotiating of these base assumptions.

In such scenarios, the interlocutor from the transitioning state is forced to

“grin and bear” the position if they seek long-term goals, such as Western aid. This

resistance to re-looking at the context and generative aspects of the scenario stems from

the sense of Western victory over Eastern Communism. This perception places the

Western discussant, a priori, in the commanding seat, ultimately leading to the

“disconnect” and the kinds of purposeful deceit described in several of Wedel’s

interviews (Wedel, 2001). The experience of the local interlocutor in BiH is similar, as

the hierarchical formation of the relationship between the local and international

discussant (who is often Western) casts an immediate opposing cloud over the exchange.

This tension is found not only in official exchanges and dialog, but also in less formal

discussions because the practice is well established and reinforced through various public

and private outlets.9

Ledeneva and Volkov provide an internal, detailed look into two related

aspects of the social behavior that shapes organized crime and corruption in Russia

(Volkov, 2002 and Ledeneva, 1998). Ledeneva’s detailed analysis of the social practices

supporting Russian economic crimes provides a view into the complexity of the issue,

stemming from Russia’s informalinstitution of Mat—a non-translatable slang term

referring to a system of nepotism and informal social networking. Ledeneva describes

9This applies to the dynamic I experienced in the conduct of many of the interviews used in this study, and will be discussed in more detail in the methodological chapter.

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Mat as .the use of personal networks and informal contacts to obtain goods and

services in short supply and to find a way around formal procedures.” (1998, 1)

Ledeneva suggests this practice of informal social networking is not in all

cases a negative activity. In fact, it provided the basis for informal exchange and social

structure in Soviet Russia, where Mat functioned as a process for survival and cohesion in

a society that lacked appropriate formal mechanisms for such ordering. Ledeneva states:

.. M at should be considered as the ‘reverse side’ of an overcontrolling centre, a reaction of ordinary people to the structural constraints of the socialist system of distribution—a series of practices which enabled the Soviet system to function and made it tolerable, but also subverted it. (1998, 3)

Good and bad forms of Mat are differentiated by the goal of the exchange,

finding excessive personal enrichment as the negative. The exchanges and relations that

occurred in this context often helped solve “all kinds of everyday problems.” (1998, 3) In

each case the story can be muddled as the good aspects of Mat tended to cause long-term

deterioration of the Soviet governing structure, yet strengthened social ties and informal

practices. Ledeneva points out the tendency toward the more negative form as a

generative aspect of economic crime and corruption in pre-revolutionary Russia. This

form was part of the criminal jargon and a way to ascertain whether a person could be

trusted (1998,12). Similarly, in BiH the practices of veza,stela, and VIP function to color

the way organized crime and corruption emerged in the post-Civil War transition period,

pre-dating the Tito era and found as far back as the early 19th century (Jelavich, 1983).

Nepotism plays a role in Mat, like the BiH variants, but the practice captures more than

this form of corruption. The experience and process of absorbing the positive aspects

occur in a different historical and social context, which is often difficult for Westerners to

grasp (Wedel, 2001 and Ledeneva, 1998). The differing understandings in terminology

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play a crucial role in identifying the gap in perceptions between internationals and locals

toward organized crime and corruption in BiH-where specificity of practice guides

interpretation as opposed to breadth of relations. These two tensions—found in the

functioning of blat networks and the lack of foreign understanding-shape the story as a

survey that disentangles intended and unintended consequences and re-frames the way

we see the activity in broader social terms.

Volkov surveys informal mechanisms in the structuring of organized crime

and corruption in Russia, but from an institutional perspective—focusing on the

relationship between law enforcement, sports clubs, military veterans’ associations, and

organized crime (Volkov, 2002). Volkov describes how shared memberships and

attitudes structure the culture of transition by making the process especially violent,

despite classic sociological findings suggesting such organizations temper violence

(2002, 8). In each case, he describes and analyzes how these groups overlap in a way that

shape certain sets of social exchanges rudimentary to the current climate. Volkov finds

that the close association and mixing between legitimate and illicit social organizations

complicates the situation by creating “...an open field of possibilities with pre-given

choices.” (2002, 20) Along the same lines as Goffman, Volkov recognizes that the way

one frames a social exchange influences what is seen and heard by the observer.

Finding roots of current Russian criminal organizations in social clubs,

Volkov joins the other authors surveyed in the section by bringing the issue into the

foreground—viewing it as part of a larger whole:

Instead of dividinggroups and their activities into legal and illegal, this approach first distinguishes between those who provide institutional services, such as protection and dispute settlement, regardless if they are involved in a legal or illegal economy. (2002, 22)

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This institutional viewpoint leads to a particular reading of Thomas Hobbes’s

Leviathan and the concept of “predatory man.” (Volkov, 21-24) In this way, Volkov

shows how Westerners appear to forget their own past experiences of social transition

and consolidation. His findings lead tothe assessment that organized crime and

corruption are natural results of the particular kind of economic and social transition and

consolidation experienced in Russia, and that there are strong indications that the swing

back to more acceptable behavior is underway.10

These three assessments fall in line with the broader anthropological and

ethnographic literature on social networks in post-socialist societies, most closely

associated with the work of Caroline Humphrey, Katherine Verdery, and Martha

Lampland. These studies do not address organized crime in great detail, but discuss forms

of post-socialist corruption through ethnography.11 Humphrey, in The Unmaking of Soviet

Life: Everyday Economies After Socialism, paints a picture of society renegotiated to its

most basic level—systems of survival in line with Volkov’s Hobbesian assessment. Here,

Humphrey develops her earlier thesis of barter as a legitimate transaction form

(Humphrey, 2002 and Humphrey and Hugh-Jones, 1992). From this point, she enters a

discussion of corruption and economy at its base, everyday level-using ethnography to

10Volkov’s assessment is in line with the predictions and theories made by Francis Fukuyama in several recent books and articles. Although Volkov does not use the same language, the reorganization of trust structures in transitioning countries plays an important role in establishing a Western style civil society. This process affects each part of the transformation cycle and adds a subjective variable that often undermines what is seen as the implementation of best practices. This method of transferring lessons learned from one context to another is an important part of this study and will be discussed in detail below. "This second stream of literature brings in a complementary literature, important for identifying the social basis and experience of organized crime. The daily feel provided by this method in its purest form is useful for marking the pulse and structure of the problem, by putting a face on the effects. Although this is not a pure ethnography, I use these techniques to capture the everyday frustrationand cynicism I found in the conduct of this inquiry. The use of ethnography was the most powerful tool available to mark attitudes with specificity while keeping contexts intact.

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demonstrate how graft and violence reinsert themselves as a primary form of survival.

Humphrey’s interest in the illicit markets and their effects on society dates back to 1991,

where some of the early research she conducted for Unmaking yielded several fascinating

stories about early post-Soviet organized crime. In a 1991 AnthropologyToday_ article,

she recounts how diminishing faith in a spiraling ruble led to a wide range of ‘grifts,’

scams, and cons in provincial Ulan-Ude (Humphrey, 1991). The most interesting aspect

of this activity stemmed from the lack of currency as part of the take. Rather, she noted

how these activities were a corruption of the barter system, long an important form of

exchange in remote Russian areas. The corruption of this traditional form of exchange

appeared to lead growing levels of violence, giving way to an “aggressive particularism”

that formed the basis for protection rackets. Humphrey concludes: “This is not the night-

watchman of old, but new organizations and rackets; staffed often it seems by the very

dislocated people who have lost their footing in the ‘suzerainties.’ The old underworld is

prominent, but so are former soldiers and even ex-members of the KGB.” (Humphrey,

1991, p 13). Although not certain, at this point, of the primary actors, she clearly

describes how these activities emerge, in part, from the quickly changing provincial

Russian market.

Verdery builds a similar picture with different voices, stemming more from

the void of functioning civil society in many post-communist spaces. In her 1996

monograph, and again in 2002 in an edited volume with Michael Buroway, Verdery

examines the social toll taken on post-socialist societies. The stories she recounts

illuminate a larger narrativeof social malaise, lacking the compass of democratic civil

society. What takes shape is an un-tethered, authoritarian form of social relationships that

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congeal around street-based power buttressed by low-level corruption—found mostly in

municipal officials and law enforcement.

Lampland echoes many of these observations by recording the early post

socialist Hungarian experience. Like Humphrey and Verdery, Lampland posits the

traditional theoretical move to separate actors fromtheir actions is troubled by the

shifting forms of power in Hungarian society (Lampland, 1991, 461). As the web of

conversations unfolds, she situates an analysis of Hungarian collectivization in the

context of change, demonstrating the contingency of actor and action with relation to the 1 ? second economy. Lampland does not see the utility in the dichotomous reference and

delineates the case in her historical comparison of 1950s and 1960s collectivization with

the early post-Socialist period. She argues that what is termed the second economy was in

fact an aspect of the first economy—an aspect of the greater market. Here, like most of the

authors cited in this section, contexts are reformed by employing a variety of frames

(Lampland, 1991). The stories provide an overlapping distribution of contexts, allowing

for a comparative analysis that results in the identification of a meta-narrative. This larger

story demonstrates the continuity and learned behavior from earlier experiences and goes

some distance toward providing an explanation for current behavior in these societies.

Conceptual Dichotomies

In order to orient this research properly, effectively getting us from here to

there, one must survey the larger context of organized crime and corruption in traditional

12Even in these terms, Lampland discusses how over-categorization of economies—citing Hankiss’ notion of third and fourth economies, those of bribery and corruption—serves little purpose for understanding economic behavior (Lampland, 1991, 464).

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and contemporary terms. Identifying how these issues escaped technical criminological

and legal treatments, emerging as important issues in the current analysis of global trends

is both historical and theoretical.13 As part of this process, it is important to demonstrate

how the issues are understood in terms of the present intellectual debates, or conceptual

dichotomies. These concepts, coupled with historical settings and practiced approaches,

come together to provide the basic frame for this analysis.

The three primary historical events or processes that influenced the

emergence of organized crime as an important subject of inquiry are globalization, the

post-Cold War transition, and events surrounding the 11 September 2001 tragedies. In the

wake of these events, several scholars recognized the transformative effects of

technology and the spread of liberal and economic institutions, creating at once both

global stability and tension. The way these issues collide and divide in these historical

contexts perpetuates deep considerations and discussions about the organization of states

and principles of sovereignty. These debates are the subtext to any serious consideration

of organized crime and corruption in the contemporary world, setting the stage for

evaluating nation building and peacekeeping as related to non-state actors. This literature

marks a move away from over-specialized, narrow treatments that assume state

legitimacy that relegate discussions about organized crime to footnotes about capacity

building and prevention. What emerges in this literature is a useful framework to bring

organized crime and corruption out from this cloister and evaluate how it operates in the

larger social context. None of this is to say that organized crime and corruption are not

l3This distinction is analytical, as both history and theory are wrapped together inextricably - theorizing is almost always predicated on a sense of history.

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problems or negative activities. Rather, it is a re-evaluation of how and when these

pejorative terms should be applied to certain social activities, hoping to renegotiate and

refine the way the terms discipline our perceptions and policies for addressing these

issues.

A series of dichotomies surrounds the organized crime and corruption

debates and analyses. In direct studies of the issues, three such oppositions exist:

actors/structure, civil society/rule of law, and politics and economy/political economy.

The actor/social structure debate is the most theoretical and is found largely in the

globalization and sovereignty literature. Scholars commenting on these issues represent a

diverse group of practitioners and disciplines, weighing in on the current global state of

affairs by using these popular metaphors. Actor-focused analyses emphasize agency in

the group or institution. They tend to draw conclusions based on the interaction between

these groups, treating more structural issues as contributory, rather than causal elements.

Importantly, history is understood teleologically, with a focus on short duration cycles.

Scholars who look at social structures see actors as part of a longer-term historical

process. From this perspective, group actions and institutions are seen as responses to

larger and longer historical trends.14 The section below on globalization and challenges to

conventional understandings of sovereignty will look more fully at this literature and how

this debate influences the study of contemporary organized crime and corruption.

14Globalization and sovereigntyact as vehicles for continuing the classic debates of agent/structure, practice/theory, and nature/nurture. Strict adherence to one perspective or another forces an analyst to prioritize the weight given to certain empirical elements and to leave others to footnotes or completely out of consideration. See the ongoing debate in international relations theory journals between Steve Smith and Alexander Wendt, as proxies for a vigorous exchange along these lines.

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The civil society/rule of law distinction comes from the current, growing

literature on post-Cold War transnational organized crime, as an extension of the

democratization literature. Scholars who focus on civil society as the proper forum for

evaluating current trends in organized crime and corruption assume state weakness,

tending to favor the theoretical explanations of social structure theorists. Civil society is

recognized as both the key victim and way out of the problems presented by weak states

and strong informal groups. The rule of law is seen as secondary to establishing a strong

civil society because the former relies on the latter for legitimacy—an extension of

popular sovereignty claims. Conversely, scholars who emphasize the rule of law as a

necessary condition for establishing civil society see legal and governmental institutions

and practices as a primary concern. These studies tend to emphasize actors and allow for

consideration of the rule of law and good governance as something naturally separate

from organized crime and corruption. These scholars assume a basic, non-negotiable line

of legitimacy between the two worlds as a given, limiting the need to investigate the

relationship between the two. These approaches focus instead on ways to increase the

capacity and effectiveness of legitimate institutions in an effort to control illegitimate

organizations and practices. They tend to favor more institutional, short-duration

historical theories, focusing on security and economic dimensions of the issues.

The politics and economics/political economy division is a more recent

dichotomy, dividing political and economic approaches into separate analytical

categories. This follows from the Western trajectory of specialization in scholarship and

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15 • • • analysis. Dividing the study of power from that of markets creates a certain amount of

tension in the scholarly community, which represents the politization of social sciences

during the Cold War—where the way a scholar theorized and analyzed a set of social

issues indicated their political leanings. This political dimension tended to play a more

instructive role than the actual substance of the study, and, in policymaking circles, was

crucial for accepting one argument over another. The issue with this dichotomy is less

about the divisions and more about specialization versus holism or multi-disciplined

approaches. This separation falsely restricted the conduct of inquiry through a

politicization process, and, although receding, continues to play a role in the conduct of

social science. In some cases, scholars and practitioners do not recognize this political

role, which can lead to a tendency toward form over substance—marking the way

analytical exception and acceptation occurs.

Analytic Approaches

Three interwoven practiced approaches help explain the complex story

surrounding the study of organized crime and corruption in the contemporary world,

incorporating the dichotomies discussed above: criminological, security, and sociological

15This debate reflects the make-up of fields and disciplines in the current pantheon of social sciences, where more traditionally holistic approaches to the study of society gave way to specialization, and to some over- specialization. This Western, and most explicitly United States-based, tendency toward specialization plays a significant framing role in understanding aspects of the gap between international and local interlocutors. Dividing politics from economy plays an important theoretical role in supporting the liberal economic goal of limiting government controls over the market, symbolizing a division between Anglo and Continental views onthe role of power in the economy. Thus, the study of political economy carries an intellectual Marxist label by those who see the study as a political, rather than scholarly, activity. However, this trend is shifting as the blur between power and the market becomes more pronounced in the post-Cold War world.

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(see Figure l).16 These approaches represent the experience of various experts and how

they see the world around them. This viewpoint is crucial forunderstanding how theories

and policies are formedto address organized crime and corruption. As stated above, an

actor’s experience plays a primary role in the formation of meaning. In as much, these

general approaches direct where one falls in the debates discussed above and how this

comes together in the development of explanatory methods. An expert comes to a

problem with some basic stance on these debates, based on experience, place, and time.

These approaches represent the three major disciplines seriously discussing the problems

of contemporary organized crime and corruption, imposing their analytical framework on

the interpretation of the data. Within each of these approaches lies a continuum of

perspectives regarding the differences discussed above, which will be discussed in more

detail after this general introduction.

Figure 1 describes how these debates are addressed by each discipline,

highlighting a continuum of analysis, ranging from agent-oriented institutional analyses

to broad structural process-focused surveys. The figuredemonstrates how most of these

disciplines are transforming to address historical trends, accounting for more complex

understandings and explanations.

l6These categories overlap in important ways,but they are usefulfor describing the continuities of various dichotomies existing in the current debate. These dyads are discussed in descriptive terms, presenting a picture of the current literature that impacts on a full study of organizedcrime and corruption.

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Table 1.1: Organized Crime Literature Frame

Criminological Security Sociological

Actors/Structure Traditional focus on Traditional focus on Traditional actors and actors, leadership structural focus, but institutions, roles. More changing toward the personal recently, “soft” or middle: responsibility and non-conventional investigating how behavioral analysis issues move more actors and structures toward structural relate analyses Civil Society/Rule Emphasis on the Material power Civil society of Law ruleof law and emphasis with an primary focus, but capacity building: eye toward control. formal institutional focused on fighting Shifting toward behavior the problems more dispersed increasingly more understanding of important power: knowledge in society Politics and Politics and Both sides Political economy, Economy/Political economy tend to be represented during the market is Economy treated as separate Cold War by recognized as a issues and play ideology. Post-9/11 primary social different roles in focus shifting space. Affected by analysis toward political politicization of the economy Cold War, but less than security

Criminologicalapproaches take a specialized viewpoint on the study of

organized crime and corruption, assuming illegitimacy and focusing on legal institutions

and law enforcement. The security approach to organized crime and corruption focuses

on the threat posed by the activities to legitimate society. In most cases, these scholars

view the problems in terms of economic crimes and social parasites—emphasizing

negative economic impacts on the global liberal economic system. This literature tends

toward specialization, teleological, short-duration historical viewpoints that focus on

institutional capacity building or fixing as the practical goal. These oftenplay outas rule-

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of-law, economic-crime, and organized-criminal threats; tending to favor pro-Western

globalization and bolstered state sovereignty. Other theoretical works focus more on the

role of organized crime and corruption in a larger part of society, or the social experience.

These approaches tend to favor more structural, long-duration perspectives that highlight

connectivity and mutual causality—relational studies. The multi-disciplinary nature of

these approaches mark out wider explanatory spaces, but they lack the clear, linear logic

often found in the former approach.

Traditionally, the study of organized crime and corruption has been left to

criminologists, economists, and lawyers, assuming the illegitimacy of the activities in

these categories. A majority of the work surrounds issues of interdiction, prosecution, and

the processes and institutions best suited to isolate and remove these problems from the

larger social context (Rose Ackerman, 1999; Ryan and Rush, 1997; Pace and Styles,

1975). Until recently, few serious efforts existed to identify and explain the role

organized crime and corruption plays in the larger social experience. 1 This7 shift in

emphasis is based largely on three interwoven historical events that emerged in the past

20 years as organizing contextual themes for framing analyses: globalization, the end of

the Cold War, and the evolution of transnational terrorism, culminating in the events of

11 September 2001. Each of these events provides a slightly different context for

evaluating global organized crime and corruption, highlighting crucial aspects of the

issues that must be accounted for in a serious study of the problems.

17Some exceptions to this rule can be found in the worksof Joseph Albini and Robert Kelly. Both of these scholars began looking at organizedcrime differently as they realized the empirical data did not support the methods and findings of many works up to this point. However, even these scholars limit their analysis largely to the general areas of criminology, economics, and legal studies—focusing on ways to identify better control mechanisms. For an overview see, Ryan and Rush, 1997; Fiorentini and Peltzman, 1996; Albini and Kelley, 1986.

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Temporal Context

Globalization, the end of the Cold War, and the events surrounding the 11

September tragedies cut across each of these debates and disciplinary approaches in

important ways. Each event is unavoidable within this framework and is instrumental for

any discussion of contemporary organized crime and corruption. The emergence of

globalization as an organizing, temporal context forces most social scientists and experts

to account for changes in technology and related social transformations. The end of the

Cold War bolstered the strength of the globalization concept by casting it in terms of

democratization and free market economics. The combination of these two led to a new

debate between the positive and negative aspects of globalization across disciplinary

divisions. Criminologists and legal experts had to account for the globalization of crime,

focusing a growing number of analyses on how state, regional, and international legal

institutions needed to adapt to address this growing problem. Security scholars debated

the efficacyand need to address global threats as security issues, arguing over the proper

scope and breadth of the field. More sociologically oriented scholars embraced the

concept of globalization and the larger debate over its historical significance, giving the

most explicit attention to the matter and developing the concept as primary consideration

for the study of contemporary society in transition.

The horror of 11 September dealt the expert community a largely

unanticipated blow, as globalization in the post-Cold War world played out together in

the formation of new theories and debates over impact and causality. The evidence was

stark. Transnational terrorism supplanted its international variant, transforming further

the debates and analyses of globalization and the end of the Cold War. The methods and

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capabilities used by the Al-Qaeda terrorists were directly in line with many of the

globalization theories and the uncertainty surrounding the shifting power balance in the

post-Cold War era. The events of 9/11 made globalization an undisputed grand theory: a

new paradigm. Furthermore, it opened more analytical space for considering hidden,

sidelined or ignored issues in a broader context. In this way, organized crime and

corruption emerged on a larger stage as part of the listed global, non-conventional issues

that need to be further explored and addressed with more explicit and detailed policies.

This story sets the scene for the application of the analytical frame developed above and

the following literature review.

Globalization

The end of the Cold War and the recognition of globalization and transition

as historical processes presented a different view for several scholars and experts

interested in the transnationalization of organized crime. The emergent study of

globalization breaks into two large camps: those who see the phenomenon as a positive

way ahead and those who see it as riddled with tension and unintended negative

consequences. The positive group of scholars and experts present globalization as the

merging of several natural trajectories that allow for the global spread of democracy,

liberal market economics, and the technologies necessary to ensure their proper

proliferation (Micklethwaite and Wooldridge, 2000; Friedman, 1999; and Fukuyama,

1994).

On this side of the discussion, globalization is understood as the process by

which democratic and capitalist values are properly exported, assuming that the

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implementationof the Western experience is the proper and prudent course. These

scholars suggest that globalization is the natural end of the Cold War along a teleological

course that, for some, is an “end of History.”18This set of assumptions tends to minimize

the negative aspects of the process as anomalies that are best dealt with by empowering

state and international institutions to more effectively address and eliminate these

problems. They tend to discuss transnational organized crime and corruption as

illegitimate and parasitic—separate from the goals and trajectory of positive globalizing

processes.

The negative globalization scholars treat transnational problems differently,

suggesting that globalization is riddled with internal contradictions and tensions. This

group is represented by a continuum of experts who range from deeply negative to

optimistic. Organized crime and corruption are brought into the foreground of scholarly

studies by several of these experts, represented across the continuum. James Mittelman,

Maryann Cusimano Love, and Manuel Castells pay the most direct attention to these

problems, using notions of globalization as an organizing principle for understanding and

discussion.

Mittelman and Cusimano Love evaluate organized crime in an era of

globalization from different theoretical positions: critical and neoliberal.19 However, they

end up in similar places. Mittelman, one of the more pessimistic globalization theorists,

1sThis is a reference to Fukuyama’s bold claim that the culmination of the Cold War’s end along with globalizing processes represents a final phase in the evolution of human society. As such, History—the mapping of social evolutionary changes-no longer exists. Of course, history will continue along with time, but this will onlyaccount for the settling of democratic, liberal economic society across the globe. 19These terms merely describe the analytical methods used by both authors and are not meant to put them in a permanent box. More importantly, both of these scholars base much o f their analysis on the worksof weak state experts such as Susan Strange, James Rosenau, Robert Johnson, Stephen Krasner, and Jens Bartelson-each of whom makes important contributions to reassessing the state and the principles of sovereignty as organizing concepts.

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recognizes the interesting and complex role organized crime plays in the process of

globalization in stating, . .in the context of globalization, transnational organized crime

groups respond to the market incentives, but outside the structures of legitimate authority

and power” (Mittelman and Johnston, 205). The intermingling of Western political goals

and the global political economy troubles Mittelman because this positive spin of

globalization undermines both, and creates several layers of tension—power

transformations and resistance (Mittelman, 2000). He sees this tension in terms of a

Polanyian double move that represents a dialectic tension in social forces brought about

by liberal democratic globalization. This tension is crucial for understanding the

complexity of the issue as security services fight and use organized crime groups for

different ends in securing sovereignty and supporting national interest. Mittelman views

organized crime as a form of natural economic behavior, intentionally set outside of the

rules because they inhibit profit. In the end, Mittelman understands transnational

organized crime as an expected form of resistance not to globalization, but to the liberal

democratic qualifier that insists on preserving 18th century sovereignty. Organized crime

is a by-product of this larger structural tension that re-visits the problems of global

industrialization, albeit with faster and more compressed notions of time and space.

Cusimano Love similarly identifies organized crime as one of the “downsides

of globalization” (Cusimano Love, 2). She describes the issue as a “transsovereign

problem” that acts like a free rider on the positive side of globalization—the processes of

economic and political advancement. Both Mittelman and Cusimano Love recognize

organized crime as a negative activity that challenges traditional notions of sovereignty,

but Cusimano Love sees the liberal democratic guidance of the globalization process as

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crucial to addressing these problems (Cusimano Love, 2003). However, she believes the

liberal democratic world needs to be cognizant of how globalization affects its own

institutions and principles. She assesses the issue to be one of reflecting more fully on

globalization processes, turning then to fine-tuning and making the processes of liberal

globalization more self-conscious.

The “transsovereign” issues she highlights are problems that can be resolved

within a reflective liberal context, where Mittelman finds that the tension between liberal

concerns and globalization are in structural competition, explaining the tendency for one

to dominate the other Cusimano Love, 2003 and Mittelman, 2000). The difference here is

more complex than a simple Marxist/Liberal dichotomy, captured more precisely by

different historical measuring sticks—in Braudelian terms, respectively a long and short

duration picture. Each historical lens has its advantages, but sacrifices spatial or temporal

focus, respectively.

Cusimano Love presents a softer variant of negative globalization by

recognizing the processes of a fuller transformation in global order—not just in terms of

opposition and tension, but with an eye to transcending the debate by applying a wider

lens to the issue. She sees the fostering of public/private cooperation as the only way to

fully address these global issues, as both states and non-state actors change in the process

of globalization:

Transsovereign problems are difficult to solve for many reasons. First, states and the private sector have to figure out how to control or contain them without moving to close off economies, societies, or technologies. Second, because their very nature precludes unilateral solutions, transsovereign problems are harder to tackle because they require the cooperation of a greater numberof actors. Third, they are complex because they entail both state and nonstate actors, which creates coordination problems. (Cusimano Love, 8-9)

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Cusimano Loverecognizes the transformation of all global actors and

organizing principles such as the state and sovereignty under the present circumstances.

She suggests that both sides need to be fully considered to find a solution—forcing the

positive globalizationtheorists to take a step back and reassess how the processes of

globalization are changing Western, democratic states and institutions, as well as those

that failed.

Manuel Castells blends these two historical aspects with a middle-duration

approach toward understanding globalization. Castells accepts the lessons learned from

both 18th century industrializations and the unique nature of advanced information

technology that marks globalization.

Information technology is to this revolution what new sources of energy were to the successive industrial revolutions, from steam engine to electricity, to fossil fuels, and even to nuclear power, since the generation and distribution of energy was the key element underlying the industrial society.... What characterizes the current technological revolution is not the centrality of knowledge and information, but the application of such knowledge and information processing/communication devices, in a cumulative feedback loop between innovation and the uses of innovation. (Castells, 30- 31)

Castells uses this difference to mark a breaking point between industrial and

network society, arguing that changes on this level permeate “economy, society, and

culture” because the transformation is not exogenous (Castells, 29). The network-based

organization of information technology itself is what shapes the current revolution

because it changes the way we organize our daily lives through to the way we organize

thoughts.20 Furthermore, Castells posits that “.. .network society.. .cannot be understood

without the interaction between these two relatively autonomous trends: the development

20James Rosenau makes a similar observation about the technological revolution in his turbulence thesis. However, Rosenau tends to see the challenges coming fromthis transformation as deeply divisive, along the lines of Mittelman. Conversely, Castells appears to have a more positive outlook on overcoming the difficulties associated with the changes.

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of new information technologies and the old society’s attempt to retool itself by using the

power of technology to serve the technology of power.” (Castells, 60-61) Recognizing

this part o f the transition allows him to demonstrate how the move toward network

society, especially seen in the dramatic changes to the global economy, presented a series

of challenges to conventional notions of the state and statism (Castells, 139-144).

In the third volume ofThe Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture,

Castells directly assess the problem of transnational organized crime, using two case

studies—Russia and Colombia—to demonstrate how network society lent an advantage to

organizations that embraced the transformation. In the Russian case, Castells suggests:

(Technological underdevelopment made it difficult to keep track of movements of capital, goods, and services in a huge territory. Local Mafiyas took control of local states, and established their own connection networks. The Mafiyas, and their business associates, jumped into the Information Age much faster than state bureaucracies. (Castells, 188).

The characterization of transnational organized crime as more

technologically advanced than most state institutions is the first part of the story, but is

quickly overshadowed by the network structure of the organization—the way people

communicate, structure finances, and process information. In both cases, Castells points

to how actors and actions blur past conventional lines of legitimacy, illuminating a

complex picture where it is nearly impossible to discern businessman from politician or

organized crime member (Castells, 190).

Post-Cold War

Scholars who approach the issue of contemporary organized crime from the

perspective of post-Cold War transition break into two groups: security and society. Phil

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Williams and Louise Shelley represent these two approaches well. Nikos Passas and

Peter Andreas bridge several of these categories by respectively focusing on socio-legal

and political economic security. Each of these scholars comments on and evaluates the

problem o f organizedcrime in different ways, but they all address the problem in terms

of challenges to the state and sovereignty as organizing principles.

Although each of the authors discussed above recognizes the end of the Cold

War as important, they tend to see it more as a result of globalization than something tied

to traditional balance-of-power or neoliberal explanations. Regardless of the causal

relationship between the two historical events, the post-Cold War transition presented

deep challenges to sovereignty and the international community of states. Phil Williams

and Louise Shelley demonstrate two schools of thought in dealing with organized crime

in the context of the post-Cold War era. Each recognizes the errors of precipitous

declarations of Western democratic victory over communism, missing the signs of

change and challenge that ultimately came with the tumultuous transition. Furthermore,

each recognizes the role of the state, like the globalization theorists discussed above,

necessary for any proper analysis of the problem. However, they differ in the way they

capture and analyze the problem of organized crime and corruption in the Cold War’s

aftermath.

The rise of transnational terrorism further isolates these approaches-as I

categorize them, security and sociological. The rush to explain and analyze this related,

but moreemotive, issue has drawn the line between the two approaches deeper than

necessary or appropriate. Rather, the two approaches are marked by different research

goals. The security scholarship seeks to evaluate the rise of transnational organized crime

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in terms o f the threat that it posesto liberal democratic and economic stability, seeking to

prescribe ways to neutralize the problem and maintain a perceived equilibrium. Security

approaches tend to emphasize the rule of law and the need to retool and fight the

problem, reinforcing the pejorative assumptions without challenge. Sociological

approaches take a broader view of the issue, attempting to identify how it emerges within

and plays a transformative role in society as a whole, focusing on the effects on civil

society in this process. Sociological approaches to the study of organized crime do not

ignore the role of security in the discussion, but believe it should be accounted for in a

broader context. This normally places the security aspect of the problem in the context of

the political economy of states and regions—a factor rather than the factor.

Security Approaches

The majority of contemporary scholars, addressing transnational organized

crime as their primary subject, use security metaphors and theories to shape their

analyses. 'y i Roy Godson played a formative role in introducing the subject of

transnational organized crime as a national security issue. Godson’s research focuses on

identifying “...a clear understanding of the kinds of threats...” transnational organized

crime poses to sovereign states and the international community (Godson and Williams,

2000,112). His scholarship and work with the United States Government shaped many of

the current opinions held in Washington’s political circles. The mark of his influence is

21 Alongthese lines many journalistic experts have emerged, commenting on the rise and development of transnational organized crime. These books are useful for a general overview on organized crime seen from this perspective, but play little direct role in this study. See Claire Sterling, Stephen Handelman, Martin Friedman, and Jeffrey Robinson for good examples of this more journalisticvariant on the security approach.

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seen in recent books by Anthony Lake, the former National Security Advisor under

President Clinton, and Senator John Kerry: both of whom have written security oriented

books on the issue.22 Most recently, Mats Berdal and Monica Serrano published an edited

volume directly investigating the convergence of transnational organized crime and

international security. This volume pulls together several interesting views on the issue,

most notably the contributions of Peter Andreas and Phil Williams (Berdal and Serrano,

2002). However, Williams’ work best exemplifies the current thrust of the security

approach, in volume and energy, to cast the problem in terms of global security.

In his 1994 article in Survival, Williams argues for adding organized crime to

the growing list of post-Cold War international security issues, Williams states: “.. .that

TCOs (transnational criminal organizations) pose serious threats to both national and

international security, and are extremely resistant to efforts to contain, disrupt or destroy

them.” (Williams, 1994, 96). He suggests that the rise of transnational organized crime

came along with globalization; taking advantage of growing international

interdependence, less rigid borders, and improvements in micro-technologies that allow

millions of ordinary people to travel and communicate globally with greater ease and low

personal expense (Williams, 1994). Williams focuses on the formal threat posed by

transnational organized crime against states and formal institutions. He differentiates the

problem from traditional strategic studies, distinguishing the issue as a security, not

military issue (Godson and Williams, 2000, 112). However, he advocates the use of

military tactics in developing a way to stem the threat. In this threat-focused analysis,

22Recent works byJay Albanese, Ethan Nadelman, and Tom Kelly take a similar security view of the problem, but focus more closely on law making and enforcement as the object of scrutiny.

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Williams goes to great lengths to describe states’ vulnerabilities, exploited by organized

crime in: “(a) worldin which some states are experiencing a crisis of authority and

legitimacy, while many others are undergoing a difficult, painful, and protracted

transition toward liberal democracy and a free market economy.. (Godson and

Williams, 2000, 113). Williams recognizesthat the processes of globalization led to a

change in the ethno-centric, hierarchical character of many criminal organizations—

presenting circumstances where convenient cooperation increasingly is an efficient way

of doing business (Williams, 2002,68).

Williams recently turned his attentions to the Balkans, contributing an essay

about Kosovar Albanian and Serb organized crime to the recently published U.S. Institute

of Peace Special Report on the links between organized crime and political extremism

(USIP Special Report, 2002). Williams pulls together much of the press and official

statements about organized crime in this region and makes some astute observations

about the situation, including several policy suggestions that focus on capacity building

and bolstering the rule of law in the region. Unfortunately, Williams, like many other

scholars who explicitly treat organized crime as a security threat, overlooks equally

forceful sociological issues: culture, corruption, and social relations. By seriously

accounting for these issues one would be forced to reassess the nature of the threat posed

to society, rather than power structures, which in this case are primary participants and

beneficiaries from organized crime activity. Furthermore, this synopsis of English-

language and translated press articles does little to advance towards a total picture of the

problem. Instead there is an excessive focus on threats to the state and the region. By

placing a strong focus on preventative measures and capacity building, Williams silences

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first-order discussions about the genesis and character of the organized crime problem in

the Balkans. His assumption is that the problems are much like those we see around the

world, so the solutions should also follow the same logic.

Sociological Approaches

Louise Shelley represents a growing body of sociological-based research that

does not deny the threat posed by transnational organized crime to states and formal

structures, but suggests that this is only one component in a complex story that must

account for the role of society: as such the local context within which the issues emerge,

develop, adapt, and metastasize. Where security-focused scholars stress the need to

recreate the rule of law under new conditions of sovereignty, Shelley posits the effort

would be better served to recognize the changes in social relations, which are necessary

for developing strong institutions. She suggests, “(t)he complexity of transnational

organized crime does not permit the construction of simple generalizations; there is no

prototypical crime cartel (Shelley, 1995,464). In some ways this is an emphasis placed

on the other side of the same coin, but the focus on civil society allows for a deeper

treatment of the issue, incorporating the way social capital is built and invested.24 For

23This is not to say that Shelley does not account for the rule of law.In fact the weak and inflexible condition of state and international legal institutions and capabilities is a constant concern. However,she equally values the role and impact on civil society. Where she tends to focus on one more than another, it is usually in response to a lopsided analysis. A recent article co-authored with John Picarelli, questioning some of the hasty logic behind linking transnational terrorism and organized crime, exemplifies her desire to provide a wider, more balanced picture of the issue. 24Shelley’s approach to transnational organized crime has developed over the years since the early 1990s. In early articles, she highlights the rule of lawissues, but began to shift her emphasis to human rights and civil society. This change is marked most starkly by her analytical entry to the problem of human trafficking-specifically that of women and children for the international sex trade. Like drug trafficking for Williams, human trafficking is a hallmark example of the problems associated with transnational organized crime. This issue focus unfortunately placed an analytical wedge between Williams and Shelley. However,

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Shelley the rise of this problem is directly linked to the end of the Cold War, which

provided the political instability necessary, not only in the former Soviet Union, to allow

globalized criminal organizations to flourish. This is a generative factor that further

disturbs social relations in new and powerful ways (Shelley, 1995).

Shelley suggests that contemporary transnational organized crime represents

a new, non-state form of authoritarianism (Shelley, 1999). Through this metaphor Shelley

captures the complexity of the issue, stating:

The legal institutionsof the world are still bound to the nation-state, but the forces of coercion are increasingly transnational. Existing state-based legal systems, therefore, cannot protect citizens from the new authoritarian threat provided by transnational organized crime. (Shelley, 1999, 25)

For Shelley, the threat is to stable society and protections for normal citizens in everyday

life. This differs from Williams and the security scholars in focus, where they reflect the

threat to the state, Shelley and the sociological school focuses on society. This

conceptualization highlights the fact that:

Traditional authoritarianism is state-based and differs in many respects from the new transnational authoritarianism of organized crime. But both traditional and nonstate based-authoritarianism affect all aspects of society including economic relations, political structures, legal institutions, citizen-state relations, and human rights. (Shelley, 1999, 26)

Shelley strengthens the focus on social factors without sacrificing issues of

sovereigntyand formal institutions by treating the state as part of larger social processes.

This inclusive approach is most instrumental through the inclusion of a complex

conceptualization of corruption. Shelley demonstrates how the issue of corruption must

be seen as a constituent part of transnational organized crime’s complex nature,

incorporating Valerie Braithwaite’s trust-based analysis, Donatella della Porta’s market

the division in their analysis is more one of focus,rather than general premises-each taking a different fork after walking a long way on the same road.

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perspective, and Robert Putnam’s contextual focus (Braithwaite and Levi, 1998; della

Porta and Vannuci, 1999; and Putnam, 1993).25 These three variables come together in

different ways presenting a spectrum of corruption possibilities:

Transnational crime groupsthrive inall kinds of states—democracies, declining superpowers, and rising economic powers. In all of the countries where they are based, they infiltrate government, assume government functions, and neutralize law enforcement.” (Shelley, 1999, 33).

These corrupt practices and exchanges between the state and organized crime

create a protective mechanism by which illicit activities operate more freely within a

defined space. Taking this point one step further, the establishment of such processes,

maintained over time, begins to blur the distinction between corrupt and legitimate

politicians and businessmen, as the rules for success in each sphere depends on one’s

willingness to function within the framework of established practices. In these cases

“.. .some states become so thoroughly corrupted that scholars refer to them as criminal

states” (Shelley, Picarelli, and Corpora, 2003).

Peter Andreas has developed a hybrid analytical approach that deserves

closer attention than the analytical observations above. He bridges the gap between

security and sociological approaches to the study of organized crime by focusing on how

conflict creates circumstances advantageous to the growth and success of such groups.

Through a series of metaphors—illicit and clandestine political economy, Andreas

25Braithwaite’s trust thesis focuses on the larger end effects of corruption in society and how there exists a tendency to stagnate the development of a functioning civil society. Della Porta applies a market metaphor to describe the multidimensional processes of exchange between public and private actors, complicating the traditional views of corruption as largely a linear process by which public servants are corrupted by illegitimate actors. Putnam’s classic study of the social and historical division between Southern and Northern Italy presents a case for uneven distribution of corruption in certain social markets. These three approaches come together well in forming a complex conceptualization and analytic frameworkfor evaluating the role of corruption in society. Organized crime and illicit trade are clear participants in this process, by virtue indivisible from a full discussion of corrupt practices.

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investigates the problem with closer attention to origins and less obvious patterns that

shape the way these groups operate, adapt, and thrive. Andreas’ use of Goffman’s

dramaturgical analysis (a specific form of frame analysis applied by Goffman in his

applied sociological writings), represents his work on developing a theoretical tool useful

for discussing a wide-scope of activities that culminate in the construction of legitimacy

boundaries (Andreas, 2000).

Andreas investigates the blur suggested by Shelley, observing:

In a global marketplace dominated by transnational corporations from the industrialized world, criminal organizations stand out as some of the developing world’s most successful-though least celebrated-transnationals. Regardless of their illegal status, the economic activities of transnational criminal organizations are in many ways the quintessential expression of the kind of private sector entrepreneurialism celebrated and encouraged by the neoliberal orthodoxy. (Andreas, 2004, 37)

This statement has a certain irony, clearly stating the “grayer” aspects of the

issues seen in complex terms.26 Beyond the complex understanding of corruption

suggested in this statement, Andreas sees the security aspects of organized crime as

important, but not necessarily in the ways described by Williams and other more

traditional approaches. He notes the emergence of an empowered organized criminal

apparatus in states and regions where covert actions are taken as an incorporation of

capabilities (Andreas, 2004). In this way the clandestine political economy serves as an

26In this regard, Andreas also represents a growing group of scholars who attempt to analytically separate the moral issues fromempirical considerations. The idea is not to ignore the moral arguments, but to put them aside to allow for more objectivity in analyzing the issues. More dogmaticsecurity arguments tend to suggest that the threat to interests and immorality surrounding the actions of organized crime groups are part of the same problematic. This logic can quickly devolve into a circular argument; spiraling toward a final analysis that organized crime is bad because it is morally bad. See Tom Farer and Michael Dillon for further discussions about moralized logic in addressing organized crime and corruption.

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operational space used by a host of actors with consistent goals: legitimacy shifts

depending on the outcome of the conflict or political struggle.27

Most recently, Andreas applies this thesis to Southeast Europe, demonstrating

how liaisons established around a conflict shape the clandestine political economy.

Importantly, he straddles security and sociological approaches by reorganizing the space

of analysis, accounting for a broad range of variables, relationships, and practices-

depending on the emphasis of the treatment. In a forthcoming essay, Andreas suggests

that the roots of the current problems of organized crime in the former Yugoslav

republics are found in the rise of war profiteers and their utility in arming, feeding, and

supporting the needs of combatants (Andreas, 2004). This formulation demonstrates

further problems with the way corrupting influences flow, suggesting that political and

paramilitary actors play a formative role in the establishment and sustenance of organized

crime■ groups.28

Nikos Passas also incorporates security and sociological aspects in his

discussions of organized crime’s effects on society. However, Passas focuses on human

or individual security as opposed to more conventional approaches used by Williams and,

to some extent, Andreas. 20 Passas states that transnational crime is not a new

27There is a close link between Andreas’ approach and Robert C. Cox’s more recent analyses of “covert space.” Cox theorizes and presents this as a useful analytical space for explaining a wide range of activities in the post-Cold War world. Mittelman also uses this conceptualization indirectly in the way he discusses globalization and the rise of transnational crime. "8A parallel literature on warlordism suggests similar relationships of formation, cooperation, collusion, and complicity (for more see Paul B. Rich’s edited volume on the issue). Also, this approach plays well with Diego Gambetta’s and Raimondo Catanzaro’s portrayal of the early Sicilian mafia, where the end of feudalism and land redistribution created a need for protective services and economic oversight. 29The human security literature provides an interesting new window into the complexities found in a globalized world, investigating how the tension between liberal democracy and global economy challenge human rights. This literature is not comfortable with the processes of transition, noting the tendency toward a morelimited form of individual expression and exercise of rights despite growing connectivity and

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phenomenon; rather the post-Cold War interest in the problems represents the primary

change. Passas argues:

.. .that cross-border crime is the product of criminogenic asymmetries: conflicts, mismatches and inequalities in the spheres of politics, culture, the economy and law. Globalizationmultiplies and intensifies such asymmetries. At the same time there is no widely accepted and effective transnational law making and law enforcement body or mechanism.... Precisely when we need better controls, the world is characterized by dysonomie. (Passas, 1999,400)

Passas locates the threat in terms of society, suggesting that state and formal

institutional failures only compound the problems in a globalized world: where the

benefits of technology are more evenly distributed than the economic resources. He

believes that the focus on “control issues” belies the social roots of the problem, found in

the growing global wealth gap. Passas suggests, similarly to Shelley, that “.. .little

attention and virtually no systematic research has been devoted to understanding the

causes, structure, extent, and effects of serious cross-border misconduct” (Passas, 2000,

16). His concern lies in the dissonance between poorly understood factors and strong

responses, unintentionally creating an even wider social problem. In the end, Passas finds

that the threats are best mitigated through an internationalization of the rule of law,

bolstered by an active, global civil society (Passas, 2000 and 1999).

Post 11 September 2001

Passas’ concern with improper formal reactions provides a useful

foreshadowing for the current state of research and commentary about transnational

communities of understanding across state and national borders. This aspect of the debate does not play a direct role in my research and analysis. However, it is important to note, especially in the identification and mapping of conceptual approaches to the issues at hand. See Ken Booth and Ronnie Lipschuts for a theoretical overview and Julie Mertus and Michael Pugh for applications of the approach specific to the former Yugoslav republics.

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organized crime and corruption. Where both security and sociological scholars embraced

the role o f globalization—especially its post-Cold War variant—in the problems of

transnational organized crime, they found specific communities that preferred one

emphasis over another (Shelley, 1999, Naylor, 1995). This relatively smooth separation

in approaches came to an abrupt end with the events of 11 September 2001: where

transnational problems literally disturbed this quiet co-existence (Andreas and Price,

2001; Caulkins, Kleiman, and Reuter, 2001: Dishman, 2001; and, Sanderson, 2004).

Despite the rush of many to comment on the problems of organized crime and corruption

in the wake of these events, it is still unclear what ideas and concepts will emerge as

analytically useful. Security and sociological scholars were forced to reevaluate their

arguments in light of these events and further investigative developments.

The debate over the proper inclusion of non-conventional threats in the study

of security appears to have been overcome by these events, suggesting that a security

approach is the proper way to deal with these issues. Reactions by the United States

Government and other developed states’ governments suggest practitioners and

policymakers concur with this assessment. This concentrated focus on the formal threat

posed by transnational actors has reorganized the debate over the actions and

circumstances most instrumentally concerning cooperation between non-state actors with

complementary goals. Specifically the issue of cooperation between transnational

organized crime and terrorist groups emerged as a primary locus for analysis. The

strength behind these arguments rekindled the debate between those scholars that favor

one approach over another.

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A small number of security and sociological scholars have made a good case

for re-thinking the analytical division between transnational criminal enterprises,

incorporating aspects of each approach. This hybrid approach calls for a more networked

threat analysis, accounting for a broader range of contributing issues and interests

(Shelley and Picarelli, 2002; Charters, 2003; and; Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001). It is a

fuller view of threats, incorporating an understanding of the necessary circumstances

leading toward cooperation, collusion, and complicity. Although these discussions and

investigations are in the process of development, they stem from a broader pre-9/11

security literature that allows for a more nuanced and complex analysis of threat

formation. The emphasis in this literature focuses less on the actions and outcomes

associated with the threat and more on its formation, operational behavior and effects on

society and the state. These approaches shift the analytical leverage from a strict focus on

a “war” against these threats (and the draconian possibilities that worry Passas) to a first

thorough investigation of the threat posed—where it comes from, what specific problems

does it pose for the state and society, and how can the problem be best addressed.

Unfortunately, this more measured approach is at odds with the larger tendency toward

action, so the current is in favor of a “war” and control approach. However, as this

research and the experiences of post-conflict Afghanistan and Iraq are proving: the “war”

or control approach may only make matters worse in the long run.

30Continental European security studies have slowly been moving toward a more nuanced and broader perspective, branching out fromtraditional strategic studies. Barry Buzan’s important 1991 monograph People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War setEra, the tone for this transformation-based largely on the experiences of Europeanization on the continent. The ideas and practical experiences underpinning this move toward a critical or soft security approach came slowly to the United States, and is only now being discovered and put to use by some United States scholars.

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The post-9/11 perspective increasingly impacts the way the international

community andexternal scholars view BiH and the potential threats posed by non-state

actors. The growing blur between terrorists and organized crime groups in BiH is

exemplified by the cases of: the Orao scandal (Serb and Bosnian Serb sales of banned

military hardware to Iraq); the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Dzindzic;

and the round-up of Arab expatriates in BiH, suspected of plotting a terrorist attack

against the United States Embassy. Despite the growing scrutiny and concern by

international organizations and states, little is known about the genesis, background, or

social role played by those involved in these issues. However, it is clearly suggested that

organized crime played a role in each of these scenarios: increasing the calls for action

and control, as part of the United States-led, Global War on Terrorism.

Organized Crime and Corruption in BiH

Three basic positions capture the current, documented perceptions and

attitudes about organized crime in BiH: international organizations’ studies and

statements; international, regional, and local investigative media reports; and foreign and

domestic academic treatments. Most specific commentary on the problem comes from

international organizational sources, media responses to these studies, and actions taken

on their basis. Little detailed scholarly attention has been paid to the issue, highlighting

the lack of concern, or lower priority, the issue takes in intellectual circles. In the past

few years, only a small number of Western-authored essays appeared (discussed above),

mostly as conference papers, focusing on the security, political economic, and the

theoretical-ethical dimensions of the problem. My research project will be the first to

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explicitly address the ethnographic and sociological dimensions of the problem, filling

this visible gap in the literature.

InternationalOrganizations

International and local perceptions and attitudes about organized crime in

BiH appear to differ in two primary ways. Most international actors and commentators

see the problem as international in scope and having widespread impact on the countries.

Local community members, including media, academics, business owners, and law

enforcement personnel, see the problem as primarily domestic in scope and having

limited impact on the larger community. The Organization for Security and Cooperation

in Europe (OSCE) and European Union (EU) define the problem of organized crime in

BiH and Croatia as a direct hindrance to economic and democratic institutional

development. OSCE official decisions describe the problem as follows, “.. .new risks and

challenges to security have arisen globally and in the OSCE area, and these new

challenges—international terrorism, violent extremism, organized crime, and drug

trafficking.. .—represent growing challenges to security” (OSCE, Ninth Meeting of the

Ministerial Council, Decision No. 9). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

defines the problem in terms of its mandate to ensure regional stability, linking the

problem to political extremism, official corruption and, increasingly, to international

terrorism (Clark, 1998; and Naumann, 2001). In one of the alliance’s earliest public

statements about the problem, former Supreme Allied Commander, Wesley K. Clark,

describe these links in stating, “.. .(organized crime) smuggling and other corrupt

practices have provided funds to pay the policemen.” (Clark, 1998) This position

suggests that the funds raised through international organized crime are used to buttress

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the continuingproblem of corruption in the region, as smuggling and related activities are

seen as part of a transnational activity. The United Nations (UN), via the UN High

Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and most recently the UN Children’s Foundation

(UNICEF), has parroted most of these concerns and recent funding of investigations into

the character and depth of the problems associated with organized crime.31 Many of these

studies and statements illustrate the destabilizing aspects of organized crime in the

region. The combination of official statements, organizational studies, and post-service

commentaries blends together, supporting the institutionally focused policies that

dominate the public record.32

To date, there have been few exhaustive studies of organized crime in the

former Yugoslav republics. Almost everything written on the subject is internationally-

focused, often based on anecdotal information and unreliable statistics. The handful of

larger international studies of the issue in the region tends to focus on activities

associated with organized crime, such as the 2002 UNICEF report on human trafficking

in the region. Even this, the most exhaustive international study to date, places little

emphasis on understanding the causes and social effects of the problem. The study’s

authors admit:

Access to reliable data and research is also problematic.... More accurate information is needed to assist in the development of appropriate responses.Generally,

3'in the last six to twelve months several organizationshave initiated aggressive programs to educate and combat the trafficking of women and children to and through the region. The issue gained high-level interest because of concerted NGO work and several high profile press pieces describing this sordid activity. Despite linking the activity to larger organized crime issues, these movements tend to be solely issue-focused. In addition to the UNICEF document, cited above, see the OSCE internet home page for a review of their extensive campaign to address the trafficking issue. 32Not surprisingly, an institutional, preventative focus appears to be an unspoken requirement to receive full consideration when applying for grants or contracts evaluating organized crime and corruption in BiH. The fiscal considerations clearly influence the types of studies and projects receiving support and, in as much, reaching a broader public.

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there are not enough prevention measures focusing on the root causes of trafficking, not enough activities to raise awareness.... (UNICEF, 2002, xvi)

This introductory statement confirms two important aspects about the

treatment of the topic. First, the focus is foremost on control and prevention, not on

developing a clear picture of the issue and those involved on all sides. Second, few

experts, international or local, devote the necessary time and energy toward developing a

proper analytical literature about the issues of organized crime and corruption in BiH.

These themes critically suggest that a number of unquestioned assumptions provide a

shaky analytical foundation. The non-problematic treatment of the organizing principles

and conditions emerges as an original crack in the wider discussion about these issues.

The UNICEF publication also suggests that dedicated regional efforts to

address this and related problems associated with organized criminal activity only

recently became a serious issue for governments. Mounting international concern and

initiatives, especially directed at influencing action against political extremism and

human trafficking, appear to be making waves in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Sarajevo, but

issues persist. The UNICEF report exemplifies a core problem in differing international

and regional perceptions in the case of human trafficking, where regional “police and the

judiciary” continue to view the problem as “illegal migration for the purposes of

prostitution, rather than a flagrant violation of human rights.” (UNICEF, xiv, 2002)

Despite the fact that prostitution is illegal in most of the countries in the region, including

BiH, the activity is legally classified as a low-level offense.

Two recent international studies, by the think-tanks International Crisis

Group (ICG) and US Institute of Peace (USIP), suggest a growing analytical

sophistication in addressing the issues of organized crime and corruption in BiH. The

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ICG report on the Oraoscandal presents a complex assessment of the convoluted affair,

where ethnic Serb governmentofficials maintained a long military procurement

relationship with Iraq and Liberia despite international sanctions and prohibitions (ICG

Balkan Report #136, 2002). The report described the affair as:

.. .open(ing) awindow to the real power structures inside Yugoslav politics. That the special relationship with Iraq (and with Liberia) continued indicates that civilian control over the military is still absent, that connections between criminal, military and political elements are extensive, and that the two strongmen of the post- Milosevic era, Kostunica and Djindjic, have thus far been impotent or unprepared to assert civilian control over the military or remove Milosevic cronies from top positions. (ICG Balkan Report #136, 2002, 3)

One of these important legacies was Serbian control over the Bosnian Serb

military apparatus, using criminals and intelligence operatives to facilitate transactions

and oversee cooperation. Although the criminal element is not deeply studied in this

piece, the acknowledgement begs for more substantial analysis.

USIP took a more direct look at the relationship between organized crime and

political instability throughout the former Yugoslavia (USIP Special Report 97, 2002).

The focus of the analysis was on locating ways to break these ties, illegitimate and

nationalist power structures, in order to isolate the activities. One primary

recommendation for achieving this was:

To dismantle these power structures permanently, the support of civil society must be mobilized. One avenue is public exposure of the damage these political- criminal elites have inflicted within their own ethnic communities. Even morebasic is the need to reassure moderate political forces and honest judges and police that they will not be abandoned as they undertake the long-term process of freeing themselves from these predatory structures. (USIP Special Report 97, 2002, 1)

The report clearly recognizes the links between political and criminal actors

and the need to involve civil society, somehow, in the solution. However, the report gets

lost in old habits of solutions through institution and capacity building. Furthermore, their

thin view of civil society (limited largely to independent media) undermines the

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emphasis, as much of the media is directly or indirectly a participant in the subversive

power structures discussed in the report. Finally, there appears to be a significant lack of

exposure to the BiH media, as these connections are part of an almost daily ritual of

intrigue and social fatigue—where the principal reporters overlook the need for successful

indictment and prosecution of these criminal politicians.

There is also a growing volume of post-service, international memoirs and

commentaries about BiH and the missions to bring peace and stability to the new State.

These statements range fromcritical reassessments and personal defenses (Corwin, 1999

and Owen, 1995) to behind-the-scenes accounts, supporting key points in international

involvement (Clark, 2001; Daalder, 2000; and, Holbrooke, 1999). Most of these

monographs acknowledge the issues of organized crime and corruption in their tenure,

but spend little time addressing it in substantive terms. The focus is primarily on high-

level exchanges and strategic visions. The overwhelming emphasis of most of these tracts

is on the goal toward building more stable institutions. Issues of accountability rarely

come into consideration in these treatments, except in an effort to support a preferred

position. These works tend to assume and reinforce an understanding that the

international community, represented by their perspectives, had the knowledge, moral

prerogative, and institutional capacity to address the issues—based on experience and a

faith in general principles about functioning democracies and market economies.

33An excellentexample of how this report misses the mark is found in the current status of the case against Hercegovcka Banka, which was raided and closed in Spring 2001 for being a clandestine source of finance for the Bosnian Croat Third Entity movement (See Festic and Rausch for more analysis on this event). The local press on the raid and the strong evidence was voluminous and made available via multiple public media. However,the case has turned into a sad joke (in a long list of similar episodes) because not one person has been indicted or tried for these activities. Also, as a participant in the formation of this report, I must take some responsibility for not more forcefully advocating this local viewpoint.

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Regional Views

Regional organizations, such as the Southeastern European Crime Initiative

(SECI), Southeast European Defense Ministerial (SEDM), and country governments play

a conflicting role in defining the problem of organized crime in BiH.34 In their official

capacity as delegates, ambassadors, and elected officials, their perspectives appear to

favor international positions. However, oftenin private conversation or in explicitly

domestic forums, they tend to voice concerns about the international focus on their

countries as places that harbor deeply problematic transnational criminal organizations.35

These informal conversations articulate the clearer views of these actors. One could

interpret this as something in between Goffman’s exploitive and indirect fabrications in

the framing process—telling your audience what you think they want to hear (Goffman,

1974, 103-108).36 Despite the analytical relevance of such an observation, it also

demonstrates a perceptual disconnect between international and domestic organizational

understandings about the scope and impact of the problem in these countries. The

balancing act played by many regional and local officials belies the tension between

international and local positions, increasingly straining the bonds of trust and authority

between society and the international community.

34SECI and SEDM are goodideas that have few teeth in practice. Each body functions almostexclusively as an administrative and coordinating body.The idea is to encourage and increase regional interaction over security and law enforcement issues. However, these institutions were so thoroughly involved in the wars surrounding the break-up of Yugoslavia that there is little trust between entities. These two bodies are clear examples of well-structured and intended institutions that lack the social fuel to achieve full capacity. 350ne clear example of this is found in the public statements of Croatian Prime Minister Ivica Racan, where the emphasis on the fight against organized crime in international press conferences becomes secondary in his domestic statements. This appears to be a recognition of the different understandings about the problem and an attempt to politically straddle the positions. 36Although I use Goffman to explain this type of exchange, Wedel also analyzes this Janus-faced tendency in her study of Western Aid regimes in Central Europe.

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After some attempts to downplay and sometimes deny its existence, the BiH

governments (state, entity, and local) re-examined their positions and began legislating

and re-organizing police units to address the organized crime issue more explicitly. Many

“moderate” governmentofficials like Zlatko Lagumdzija and Milorad Tesic have made

the fight against organized crime a cornerstone of their public platform. However, it is

difficult to assess the sincerity of these calls, given the lack of action taken by these

governments to aggressively address the problems. Recently, the High Representative,

Paddy Ashdown increased pressure on local politicians in response to growing concerns

about the escalation in organized crime and corruption (OHR Decision, 8 May, 2003;

and, OHR Open Letter, 27 May, 2003). Continuing along this line of analysis, many of

the statements made by public officials regarding a fight against organized crime are

generic, non-detailed comments, which appear to be more a bow to international funding

sources than direct attacks on the problem (Tomiuc, 2002; and, Avdic, 2003). In fact,

some government and law enforcement officials privately question the international

community’s apparent obsession with regional organized crime, opining that, despite its

existence, these groups tend to be local or regional and have little impact on the current

political climate.37 Evaluating these statements and the lack of direct action taken to date

supports a negative view of the region’s commitment to international concerns.

Taking this viewpoint a step further, little local support for an anti-organized

crime policy exists in BiH. In several recent polls asking what issues posed the largest

37I have heard these claims by a wide range of public officialsand opinion makers in BiH and Croatia, and these positions can also be found in the local press. For examples, see interviews with the BiH Federation and Republika Srpska Ministers of Interior, who initially recognize organized crime as a real problem, but go on to counter these statements by challenging the data used by international organizations to make claims about the political impact and range of these organizations.

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problem to regional stability, organized crime was rarely cited/8 Political corruption

registers high in these polls, but follow-up questions suggest this position is an extension

of a general public lack of trust in politicians. In fact, there is a long regional legacy of

public distrust in government that is aptly captured in the well-known Tito-era slogan,

“they pretend to pay us and we pretend to work” and its post-Yugoslav variants, such as

“they pretend to govern and we pretend to vote.” This public-govemment divide is

demonstrated further by the general impression that regional governments are controlled

by the international community and have little interest in local issues or needs -- beyond

those that solidify an official’s position in the eyes of international organizations. These

poles and statements suggest an understanding of organized crime as just one of the many

corrupt outlets available to BiH politicians—clearly inverting the conventional

understanding of corruption to authority corrupting the private space.

This divide accounts, in part, for the lack of local support for international (at

times in tandem with regional officials) actions taken against organized crime: whose

interests are seen as complicit with corrupt, local politicians. One need look no further

than the public turmoil caused by recent international efforts to arrest an array of people

from each ethnic group, allegedly involved in organized criminal activities (Vaskovic,

2001; Layne, 1999; and, James, 2000). Similarly, Stabilization Forces supported raids of

Bosnian Croat and Serb facilities in Mostar, Zvomik, and, most recently, Banja Luka,

that resulted in a public outcry and received little local support (Durmanovic, 2003; and,

Smith, 2001).

38See Demitrijevic and Divjak for more discussion on polling in BiH. For examples of polls see the BiH and Croatian political magazines Dani, Slobodna Bosna, Globus, and Nacional.

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In several preliminary interviews I conducted with local officialsinvolved in

or knowledgeable about these events, it was clear that the local perceptions about these,

and similar events, were that the actions had little to do with organized crime and more to

do with a continuation of ethnic tensionsor the consolidation of local fiefdoms, via the

political process. In many of these same conversations, local officialsand opinion makers

pointed to the lack of solid findings as a clear indicator that these actionswere more

about political harassment than organized crime. Conversely, local supporters of the

actions complained about the lack of political will to fully prosecute those apprehended—

putting many lives at risk for little more than a show of force and a photo opportunity

(Interview 14, 2001).

Finally, as suggested above, the 9/11 tragedies had a direct impact on the

focus and approach toward the problems of organized crime and corruption in BiH. The

Orao investigation and 2002 arrest of 14 Arab expatriates increased the international

concern and focus on organized crime and corruption in BiH, as these issues played an

instrumental role in the movement of weapons, money, and the acquisition of false

documents (ICG Report, 2003; and Terzic, 2002). However, the lightening-rod event was

the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister, Zoran Dzindzic, by members of the

notorious Zemun criminal organization, consisting mostly of current and former special

police and paramilitary members (Gajic and Tarlac, 2003; and Bujosevic, 2003). Several

reports suggested that the primary suspect, Milorad Lukovic, aka Legija (nee Ulemik, and

former commander of the Serbian paramilitary unit Red Berets), escaped Serbia and

traveled for some time in BiH, Croatia, and Montenegro—remaining at large to date

(Babic, Avdic, and Faslic, 2003). These events not only suggest a blur between

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organizations that are traditionally understood as distinct, but also challenge the

assumptions behind the international perceptions of incompatible ethnic divide. The full

effects of the 9/11 tragedies on the situation in BiH remain in flux, but it is clear that the

status quo of perspectives has been disturbed in several important ways.

Academic Community

The predominant scholarly literature discussing organized crime and

corruption in BiH tends to treat it tangentially as a historical or social bi-product (Kanin,

2003; Glenny, 2000; Papic, 2001; and, Sali-Terzic, 2001), or a partial cause of economic

and political instability (Veremis and Dainanu, 2001; Cohen, 1996; and, Vaknin, 2000).

In some ways, it appears that organized crime and corruption are so prevalent in BiH that

they go without comment. The assumption appears to be that the issue is either just part

of the normal transition process and works itself out with time and political

consolidation; or, that the problems will dissolve with investment and economic stability.

This formal, institutional perspective dominates the external literature culminating a high

volume of reified arguments for the strengthening of police and security regimes,

counterbalanced by the belief that this all must be done with statistical ethnic

heterogeneity. The result is that even civil society commentaries tend to over-focus on

developing a free and politically independent media as a mouthpiece for awareness and

prevention, despite a deep historical experience opposed to such a notion, predating

communism in the region (Sali-Terzic, 2001; Cigar, 2001; Gordy, 1999; and, Cohen,

1996).

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Another, growing trend in the literature focuses on international community

failures, using the problems of organized crime and corruption as clear examples. Some

of these studies over-sell international complicity and ignorance as part of a critical

agenda to change the face of policies developed and applied in BiH under international

direction (von Hippel, 2000; Chandler, 1999; and Chomsky, 1997). Most of these authors

make pointed critical arguments for re-evaluating the role of the international community

in BiH, but the strong, dogmatic language tends to undermine the possibility of wider

acceptance.39 Other critics take a more subtle track, suggesting that the theoretical

enterprise underpinning the international presence and policies in BiH are errant because

of their explicit favoring of institutional solutions and universalized approach to problem

solving (Pugh, 2004; Toal, 2000; and Campbell, 1998). However, these scholars tend to

focus their writing toward an academic audience and rarely discuss practical issues and

approaches.

One exception to this rule is the work of Michael Pugh. Pugh’s spring 2002

paper, presented to the Danish Institute of International Affairs and subsequently

published in Global Governance, makes several interesting recommendations with a

specific focus on the problems of organized crime and corruption in the region. Pugh

takes a critical theoretical (the Coxian version) look at conflict and transnational crime,

using the multiple cases of the former Yugoslav republics as a test-bed. Pugh asserts that

Amartya Sen’s thesis that “there is a connection between globalization, inequalities,

39In discussing someof these booksand articles with members of the international community, it is clear they have, by and large, developed a defensive attitude - where they interpret many of these comments as a reflection of idealism and a lack of on-the-ground experience. This “take a walk in my shoes before you talk” attitude is not always an accurate rebuke of certain studies, but it is sufficientfor largely ignoring these studies and commentaries.

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violent conflict, and transnationalcrime” is demonstrated in the case of the former

Yugoslav republics (quoted in Pugh, 2002). Where Pugh makes many excellent points

and ties these four concepts together through a wide swath of multi-lingual, empirical

evidence, his point is lost in a convoluted attempt to remain “true” to his initial critical

theoretical position (Pugh, 2004). However, he presents a compelling theoretical

argument with practical suggestions, making it an excellent contribution to the literature

and a useful approach for investigating the larger structural problems and finding broad

solutions.

Interestingly, the issue of organized crime and corruption has been all but

ignored by the Bosnian and Croat academic community.40 At best, organized crime is

listed as a non-military threat to national security in academic security journals like

Polemos. Most often, academic discussions about organized crime come in response to

internationally sponsored conferences (drawing from practitioner and academic circles)

that hope to increase interest in specific issues, such as the Spring 2002 human trafficking

conference in Zadar. However, in reviewing the article titles that mention organized

crime or a constituent function, like trafficking or money-laundering, in the small number

of Bosnian and Croatian social science journals over the past few years, I was hard-

pressed to find more than five essays of interest. The preponderance of these articles were

written in response to recent national security legislative initiatives in BiH and Croatia,

and tend to focus on the structure and potential utility of the proposed initiatives.

40In myexperience this does not indicate a lack of interest. Rather it is ofteneither a fear to deal so directly with dangerous actorsin society, or a sense that these problemsare attached to muchlarger problems that should be addressed first. Additionally, as suggested above, there is almost a uniform disinterest in the issue by some because it is so prevalent. One of myinterview respondents chuckled and said, “It’s like discussing the air - it’s there and we breathe it.” (Interview 18)

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However, in the end, organized crime played a supporting role in the analyses, which

were policy focused.

International and Local Media

Most explicit, formal discussions about organized crime in BiH and Croatia

occur in the regional media—via political commentary, investigative reporting, and

official public statements (international and regional). The bulk of these articles and

essays revolve around high-level exposes, official responses, and international

statements. As discussed above, some polling research has been conducted regarding the

issue, but most of these polls deal with a number of high-interest issues (i.e. displaced

person returns and war criminals) and are sponsored by international organizations or

foreign governments. In discussions about the published results of these polls with

several regional media members, almost all questioned the methodology and political

intent behind such funding41. In one case, a member of the Croatian independent media

related a story to me about polling assistance in a non-Croat area where respondents’

answers appeared to differ on the basis of the ethnicity of the interviewer. Much of the

investigative reporting on organized crime in the former Yugoslav republics focuses on

large personalities, like Zeljko “Arkan” Raznjatovic, or well-known politicians, for

example, the Summer 2001 string of articles in Croatian Nacional, Globus, and

Montenegrin Monitor, suggesting Milo Djukanovic and Zoran Djindzic were deeply

4‘While several of my interlocutors certainly believed that these polls represented thinly veiled attempts of international propaganda, most were concerned with the methods of question development and sample selection. Often times the questions are not developed by local media or social scientists, making the expected response obvious to participants. Also, there is a great deal of caution taken by many citizens who recall how polling data was used for political purposes during the Yugoslav era.

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involved in oil and cigarette smuggling. Despite the raising of many international

eyebrows, and little surprise about the information in the region, the essays were based

primarily on single source, non-corroborated information that did little but sting the

accused.42

A handful of monographs have been published by investigative reporters in

Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia, but these tend to be highly anecdotal and nearly impossible

to corroborate—stringing together a long line of articles previously published in

newspapers and political magazines (Knezevic and Tufegdzic, 1995; and, Petricic, 2000).

Several Westem joumalists have regularly addressed the issue of organized crime in the

region. Most of these articles describe high-level corruption or critique international

actions, often citing regional, anecdotal press pieces or international press releases to

substantiate analysis.43 A recent example of this is the echo of Macedonian reporting

(much of which is based on Kosovo reporting from 1999 and 2000) about Albanian

extremist links to organized crime (for examples see Shala, 2002; James, 2000; and,

Chossudovsky 1999). While it is generally accepted that there is a substantial Albanian

42TM s raises another problem with formerYugoslav investigative reporting: often it is difficult to distinguish between a factual story and a staged political slur. It is not uncommon to find journalists in the region retained by a certain political group to report on issues of their choosing. In Croatia, this has taken a moresubtle form, where political opponents “leak” what appears to be a classified document to the press that calls another politician’s behavior into question. This information is rarely verifiable, but the manner and format of the document are meant to persuade the author and editorial staff of the information’s authenticity. Unfortunately, this is not always the case, which calls all articles citing alleged official documents info question. 43Notably, Jeffrey Smith—Washington Post Bureau Chief in Rome 1997-2001—who commented at length on SFOR operations in Herzegovina and is writing a book on the links between political corruption and organized crime in the region. Additionally, John Schindler’s forthcoming book on the history of the Yugoslav “Secret Police” applies a large portion of media analysis in basing claims about connections between Yugoslav domestic intelligence and organized crime activities. This is not to suggest that Schindler’s findings have little merit, but they largely are based on circular media reports and commentaries, as opposed to archival research-which forms the basis for most of the historical treatment. The issue for Smith, Schindler, and other foreign j oumalists is developing multiple sources, giving conjecture a deeper basis of proof.

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organized crime network, linking these activities to political extremists tends to rely on

anecdotes and the same few investigative reports that substantiate a connection, but do

little to elaborate or evaluate this relationship.44

Plan of the Dissertation

With this broad literature and commentary in mind, the remainder of this

study will focus on the findings of my interview project, analyzing how these discussions

help build a clearer, broader picture of organized crime and corruption in BiH. This

research adds the voiced perceptions and attitudes of local experts and interested

practioners. This addition brings the gaps in perception and attitudes between local and

international interlocutors into crisper focus—where detailed analysis assists in

developing more specific policy suggestions. The remainder of the book is in four

additional sections.

Chapter 2 describes the methods used to develop the questionnaire and

conduct the interviews, explaining the reasoning and processes used to build and

administer the questions. Additionally, I use this chapter to discuss some of the

anticipated and unanticipated issues and problems that arose in the conduct of the

interviews. Therefore, the aim of the chapter is two-fold: an explication of methods and

practical issues that will provide a useful context for reading the findings and analysis

and a detailed disclosure that establishes the falsifiability and possible replication of the

methods in future studies by scholars who see these methods as useful.

^One exception to this is the 1996 article by Zupo in Transnational Organized Crime, which is largely based on a United States Department of State survey of Russian transnational criminal groups.

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Chapter 3 captures the qualitative aspects of the project, highlighting key

themes emphasized and emergent in the discussions. The themes are used to frame the

analysis, guiding the further interpretation of data. These themes, all of which have been

introduced above, will shed a certain light on the darker comers of the local-international

perception gap. This broad viewpoint assists in analyzing and evaluating the more

specific details suggested in the quantitative portion of the study by providing an

appropriate scope for data interpretation.

Chapter 4 is an explication of the ten “hard” data point questions, or more

quantitative portion of the study. These data provide detail for the thematic context

established in Chapter 2. The merging of concepts and empirically measurable

information is important for proper final analysis and policy prescription in the final

chapter.

Chapter 5 is the final evaluation of the primary source data in the context of

the larger literature and themes discussed in this chapter. The final goal is to move from

the description and analysis of the gap between local and international perceptions and

attitudes toward organized crime and corruption in BiH to a focus on addressing and

minimizing this gap. This is a necessary first step if there is any hope of building the

reservoir and aqueducts needed to create a more stable political, economic, and social

environment in BiH.

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CHAPTER TWO

RESEARCH METHODS

Overview

My interest in the issues of organized crime and corruption in BiH dates back

to 1995. At that time, my United States Army Reserve unit was ordered to active duty in

support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR—the initial post-Dayton Implementation Force

(IFOR) deployment. I came to recognize the importance of local actors, opinions, and

attitudes, through the various experiences I had in preparation and participation in IFOR.

Prior to my deployment, I was working on my Masters Research project in International

Relations, looking at some of the root causes of organized criminal activity in the Former

Soviet Union-specifically the former Soviet Caucasus region. Through this research it

became clear to me that the social and cultural attributes surrounding organized crime

and corruption were ignored, yet important, aspects of the phenomenon. This look back

to the Soviet experience led me to reach several different conclusions about the rise of

transnational organized crime originating in the former Soviet Union. It forced me to

acknowledge that historical experiences influenced and disciplined the post-Soviet

phenomenon in specific ways that were missed by most of the growing literature and

commentary on the infamous Russian Mafiya. It also encouraged me to carefully weigh

anecdotal information, which was the nature of most writings on the topic prior to 1997.

These two lessons—recognizing social roots and care with anecdotal

accounts-shaped the way I experienced and interpreted organized crime and corruption

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in BiH over the last eight years, and are crucial inductive building blocks for the methods

I use in this study. Implied in this influence is the need for special attention to social

factors and local understandings, balanced with rigorous methods for scientifically

capturing anecdotal information and transforming it into something measurable and

instructive. The philosophical pragmatism applied in Goffman’s methods and discussed

above, assisted in avoiding the treacherous waters of epistemologicalextremism that can

limit a scholar’s methodological choices. In anchoring this study in a frame analysis

context, I am able to fulfill these two objectives, blending them together through use of

multiple methodological tools-qualitative interviews and interpretation, backed by

quantitative analysis. Sections 1 and 2 of this chapter address how these methods were

employed, openly discussing the positive and negative aspects of the inductive-deductive

processes used in the construction of the project and analysis of the data. Section 3

discusses some of the problems encountered in conducting the research and how I

worked around and through these issues. Section 4 addresses the emergence of the key

themes from the interview project, establishing the framework used in the analysis.

Open Question Interviews and Interpretation

I conducted an ethnographic interview project using Herbert I. Rubin’s and

Irene S. Rubin’s technique of qualitative, open-ended topical interviews. This entails that

the interviewer . .seek out explanations of events and descriptions of processes (p 29).”

This type of interview method, “.. .often is basedon the interpretations of the researcher,”

sorting and balancing competing and complimentary accounts (p 30). This approach

allows the scholar to categorize, organize, and analyze the findings in a narrative form,

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which highlights the information relevant to the primary research questions. I coded the

data fromthese interviews, generating narrative and categorical models based on the

answers to the framing questions. Each category of interviewee was asked the same 30

questions, within different open-ended conversations, aiming to develop general statistics

and detailed, contextual information for analysis and commentary. This allowed intra-

and inter-category findings discussed in Chapters 3 through 5. Each interviewee was

asked unique questions meant to flesh out specific understanding of the issues raised in

the five research questions and to develop other potential sources of information. The

base study consists of 90 interviews (30 from each major category), with additional

interviews in each category totaling 266. Developed interviews were coded

independently, so as not to over-privilege a specific attitude or perception.

There are a myriad of interview techniques available to the researcher. These

techniques span from rigid, statistical based polling projects to loose, intuitive cultural

anthropological studies (Rubin and Rubin, 1995; Kvale, 1996; and, Arksey and Knight,

1999). Near the middle of this continuum lies a span of qualitative interview methods,

incorporating some of the rigor associated with polling and the flexibility of long

immersion cultural interview projects. The qualitative interview methodology literature

overlaps in important ways, and varies most in style. Most qualitative interview scholars

suggest that (1) interview techniques are rarely homogenous and usually depend on a

situation as much as the intent of the research project; (2) interviewing is fully

participatory, where the interviewer and interviewee are separated primarily by initiative-

-each playing a role in the process; and (3) general questioning techniques should be

determined by the type of issue the scholar wants to address. In my review of this

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literature, Herbert J. Rubin’s and Irene S. Rubin’s approach best suited this research

project. In their terms, I conducted a “topical interview project” structured between

“evaluative” (questions about specific issues and policies) and “oral history” (questions

about experiences and reasons for thinking a certain way, discussed in more detail

below—pp. 29-34).

I was influenced additionally in the construction of this interview project by

other scholars who conducted studies addressing similar issues. The four primary works

discussed in Chapter—Andreas, Wedel, Ledeneva, and Volkov-each used qualitative

interview techniques in their research. Andreas used targeted interviews to develop a

clearer picture of the ironies and paradoxes he found in the broader border issues between

the United States and Mexico (Andreas, 2001). Wedel and Volkov developed interview

categories around their theses that expanded upon previous mixed methodological

findings-expanding on puzzles folding out of other field research experiences (Wedel,

2001 and Volkov, 2002). Volkov and Ledeneva had to carefully identify their

interviewees given the sensitivity of the subjects they addressed in their research. I made

a conscious effort to address each of these aspects of primary source interviews in

constructing and conducting my research (Volkov, 2002 and Ledeneva, 1998). These

influences add detailed attention to construction of this research, going beyond Rubin’s

and Rubin’s nuts and bolts general framework and focusing the projects formation on

methodological issues specific to the study of organized crime and corruption in former

Communist Europe (Rubin and Rubin, 1995).

The interviews were conducted from late February to early May 2003, nearly

evenly in English and the local languages (Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian, where

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applicable), face to face (with several exceptions), and varied in time between as little as

half an hour to five hours.11 provided no direct incentives for participation beyond the

payment for a meal and beverages, which is the custom in the region (the one who invites

is obligated to pay in polite company). In many cases, both languages were used in the

interviews to clarify points, ensuring an agreed interpretation of a word, example, or line

of reasoning. I translated the original questionnaire and had a local language expert

review and modify the transcript for uniformity of meaning across languages.2 Local

speakers understand each other perfectly well, despite the current differentiation between

languages, as their respective histories and cultures coexisted for centuries.3 The

language used for note-taking and the questionnaire was determined by the initial

language used for dialog. The EUPM graciously provided me with local interpreters for

most of my police interviews, which expedited face-to-face interviews that had to be

conducted in short time-periods (normally a limit of one-and-a-half to two hours over the

112 of theinterviews were conducted electronically, where I sent a subjectthe questionnaire and they sent it back completed. In most of these cases, I responded with follow-up and clarification questions. I only used this method as a final recourse, where schedules could not be matched and the subject was an important addition to the study because of a specific role played in one of the target interview categories. The length of interviews varied mostly by venue and reception to the research. For example, I stopped at road-side markets and kiosks for several spontaneous interviews with people who openly sold smuggled merchandise-coded as business persons. In these cases, I often needed to ask the questions quickly and write down answers only after the discussion. Conversely, in more formal circumstances, where interviews were arranged well in advance, the interview took place over a meal and drinks, or, in some cases, resulted in a meal and drinks. 2My thanks to Nieves Fabecic and the translators at the Republika Srpska Ministry of Interior for respectively providing reviews with sensitivityto the subtle differences found between the primary local languages and preparing a Cyrillic version of the questionnaire. 3The issue of languages is deeply imbedded in the ethnic politics of the region and must be accounted for in this broader context to understand the full, important role of language in the region. Appreciation for the differences, however subtle to the non-native ear, is crucial for building respectful rapport with most people in the region. Those who do not respect these differences and treat the issue with disdain, do it at the peril of needlessly alienating oneself froma fuller understanding and discussion with local interlocutors.

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course of a few days).4 In the case of several high-level and sensitive interviews, I

brought a language assistant to ensure the interview was conducted in a timely fashion

and to help with interpreting specific information.5

Interviewee Selection

The goal of this interview project was to evaluate and measure local expert

opinions and attitudes to organized crime and corruption. By local expert, I mean people

who have a professional interest in the problems and educated or experiential views on

the issues. This broad interpretation of expertise allowed me to identify a wide range of

actors whose comments properly illuminate the local understanding. I developed my list

of primary contacts through colleagues, friends, and former interview research

participants—using the local logic of personal connections as the proper entry point for

introductions and open dialog. I developed secondary and tertiary contacts through this

network of primary interviews and cold calls. In the later rounds of interviews, I made a

concerted effort to break out of the various personal networks I worked through at the

beginning. The aim here was to avoid reification of positions based on a small circle of

4Some police interviews in Banja Luka, Brcko, and with the BiH State Border Service were administered by the EUPM, where time ran out and I needed additional responses. In these cases, the EUPM asked the police organization to identify furtherofficers, within the specifications I requested. After identification, the officers were asked to respond in written form to the questionnaire (I was the only one to conduct the interview orally) and provided their confidential responses to the EUPM supervisory officer, who subsequently sent the interviews to EUPM headquarters in Sarajevo. Lt. Col. Luigi Bruno and EUPM Deputy Director Pierre Mihallies were instrumental in ensuring these unsupervised interviews were administered with integrity and handled the results with sensitivity to the privacy of the respondents. I was hesitant to conduct any interviews in this manner; however the EUPM assured me that the matter would be handled professionally. On reviewing the results of these interviews it is clear that the officers did not feel intimidated by the process (as in the face-to face interviews) because many of the responses were frank, open, and extensive in some cases. 5I used three people to help me with this in three different places. I am honoring their requests for confidentiality by not naming them, but they are local experts whom I trusted forthis assistance. This assistance accounts for 15 interviews in this project.

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shared perspectives and opinions. I succeeded in diversifying in-group respondents

through informal spontaneous contacts (road-side and business district stops) and formal

introductions (mostly in the area of law enforcement and security with the assistance of

the EU Police Mission, OHR Officers, and others).6 The result is approximately two-

thirds of the interviews came from out-group (not from my original list of interviewees or

their referrals) respondents. Since this is a confidential interview project all

administrative data (name, contact information, and basic personal background

information) is separate from the findings. All interviewees were required to review, sign,

or waive their right to signature on a separate disclosure and confidentiality form.7 The

questionnaire write-ups were coded to represent data for sorting by geography, ethnicity,

interview category, sub-category, and whether the subject signed or waived signature

rights on the disclosure form.

The three categories used to code interviewee responses are opinion makers,

law enforcement and security personnel, and businesspersons. These categories provide

for a wide range of inputs from a variety of community perspectives, highlighting the

diversity of professional interest in the issues. I consciously decided to avoid public

surveys, as my goal was not to capture random, reflected opinions, but to talk with

individuals who had specific professional experiences with the issues and could better

articulate direct opinions and educated perspectives of the problems. Current survey

6I use the terms in and out-group to differentiate between previously identified respondents and their referrals, and personally developed contacts through spontaneous or more formal channels. 7See Appendix B: Disclosure and Confidentiality Statement for a detailed view of this form. As employment risks, family concerns, or physical harm could come to certain respondents based on their participation in this project, all interviewees had the option to waive signature of this form and provide only general administrative information for accountability purposes. This procedure was reviewed and approved within American University interview subjects research ethics standards. All disclosure forms will be filed at the American University, Bender Library for legal purposes and will not be available to the public.

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research was discussed in many of my interviews, especially with opinion makers, which

reinforced my decision to avoid this method of gathering data.8 In many cases,

interviewees believed that most of the public opinion polling data was flawed because of

sample selection (ethnically over-focused), question development (too broad and often

leading), and the fact that most of this research is funded and overseen by foreign

interests that tend to reinforce the first two problems. Foreign interests in desired results

often dictated how a poll is interpreted or if it is even published was the general

impression of my interviewees who commented on this issue. Additionally, local

respondents strongly believed that participants in these polls tended to answer questions

the way they thought they were expected, hoping for an incentive beyond those often

offered for participation.9

Ideally, I would have conducted this research in all the former Yugoslav

republics. However, Serbia, Kosovo, and Macedonia are problematic for conducting this

kind of study because the latter two are still very close to conflict (past and potentially

future), making full access to resources nearly impossible. In the case of Kosovo, there is

the further problem of the territory being under full United Nations administration, where

BiH has taken control over most of its own government with international oversight.

Serbia is difficult because it is dangerous (especially in regard to issues of organized

crime and corruption) and still not fully friendly to well-wishing United States academics

that are funded by the United States Department of Defense. The issues of organized

sThis is not to say that survey data is bad or useless, but rather my project aimed to say somethingabout educated local opinion, which I could not be sure of in a random study. Some of the questions in this research might prove to be useful for public opinion polling and I encourage anyone who might want to measure expert local opinions against the larger public position to use them as a basis for such useful work. 9This distrust in foreign control and personal motivation underlines deeper problems in what I call the accountability gap and is discussed at length in Chapter 3.

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crime and corruption have been much politicized in Macedonia as part of the discussions

surrounding the 2001 Albanian uprising that required NATO intervention to oversee a

cease-fire.10 It would make sense to add Slovenia and Montenegro to the study from a

geographical point of view (covering most of the western Balkans). However, I do not

speak Slovene and, although most people understand Serbo-Croatian very well in the

country, use of the language is frownedon—similar to speaking Russian in Lithuania or

Latvia (I know this from a personal experience that almost unwittingly landed me into a

fight). Montenegro presents difficulties similar to those found in Serbia, especially in

addressing the issues covered in this research.11 Initially, Croatia was part of this research

and I conducted nearly 50 interviews before I was forced to abandon this portion of the

interview project. However, the initial findings were of great use for developing a more

nuanced understanding of the differences and similarities in perspective and opinion

between the two states and regions within. My hope is to complete this portion of the

study at another time and continue with the project throughout the region with the

assistance of local scholars who are interested in this project and associated issues.12

The formal portion of the interview project yielded 266 interviews with local

experts from the three categories, evenly distributed in the cities of Banja Luka, Brcko,

,0In Macedoniaethnic Slavs refer to the Albanian militia movement (NLA) as organizedcriminals or terrorists and the Albanians point to the deep levels of corruption in the Slav-dominated government to identify their respective perceptions of one another. Most of the recent work on organized crime in Macedonia suffers froma difficulty to remove these political positions from verifiable criminal activities. 1 ‘This is especially true in the aftermath of the Djindjic assassination and a growing account of official Montenegrin involvement in drugs and human trafficking. ,2Alongthese same lines, it would have been useful to add at least four additional geographical areas to the research project. This could have provided more detailed understanding about how localities in BiH and within ethnic groups compare and differ regarding these issues. However, time and money constraints made it impossible to properly cover additional areas. It would be appropriate to expand this study in the future to measure for more detail regarding variation and consistency. This deeper study would be useful for determining more specifically how and where to focus aid, advise, and direct assistance.

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Mostar, and Sarajevo.13 The responses are measured against existing, published,

international positions onthe issues of organized crime and corruption in BiH. For

contextual relevance, I used the statements of two international organizations that have

unique presence in BiH and one larger organization, which has a larger program—Office

of the High Representative of BIH (OHR), Southeast European Stability Pact Initiative,

and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).14 In addition to the

formal statements and positions of these organizations, I informally discussed the

findings of my research, at various stages, with representatives of these groups. I used

these discussions to ensure my interpretation of the official positions was accurate, as

well as to determine if there were some deviant opinions among the various international

practitioners. These two points in the international position (statement and practice)

provided me with a more specified understanding about international positions and

helped strengthen follow-up questions to both local and international discussants. These

attempts to gather personal responses from the international community functioned as a

corrective for the international community’s position regarding the issues. For the

purposes of this study, the international positions are taken as a constant, based on their

official statements regarding the issues. This is not to say that the international position is

either fully coherent or uniform, but that this research seeks to shed light on local

l3I conducted over200 interviews, buthad to leave out the Croatian interviews because I could not complete the M l complement, due to a reversed decision in the Croatian Ministry of Interior to support my research. This will be discussed below in the issues section of this chapter. 14The European Union (EU) is not ignored in this study as it plays a key role in all three of these organizations, lending its positions and expertise on these issues mostdirectly to the OHR, as the EU will take M l control of the OHR mandate by fiscal year 2005 (and possibly sooner). Additionally, the Stability Pact program originated fromOSCE calls for a more focused, regional civil stabilization effort.In as much, OSCE plays a principle role in the funding and consultations of this organization.

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perspectives in response to official international positions.15 Therefore, it is appropriate to

hold international positions constant for the purposes of this study.

I constructed each category with a continuum of actors in mind. Opinion makers

ranged from journalists to formal experts in NGOs and academia to non-judicial or law

enforcement government officials overseeing aspects of the issue (ombudsmen,

legislators, and civil servants in agencies outside the law enforcement and security

continuum). The law enforcement and security personnel ranged from judiciary and

prosecution to police organizations to paramilitary and military organizations that

cooperated in or supported official investigations of or collection of information against

criminal organizations. Businessperson interviews ranged from large to small companies

of public and private ownership.16 The final breakdown of interviews by ethnicity,

interview category, and city of interview is:

• Ethnicity17: 31.2% Bosnian Muslim; 21.1% Croat; and 47.7% Serb

• Interview category: 28.6% Opinion makers; 56% Law enforcement and security;

15.4% Businesspersons

!5I recognize that this can be seen as a weakness in the study, as it mayoversimplify the international perspective. However, I am not arguing that the international community positions may not be more nuanced in practice, but rather that their statements represent a linear, generalized perception of organized crime. These assumptions mold international practices and policies in a way that appears inconsistent with the issues “on the ground,” appearing to lack effectiveness and clarity of purpose. This international understanding differs fromthe local conception, which is inter-related with other issues and more specific to the situation in BiH. 16It was difficult to get formal interviews with managers of large state-owned corporations. In the few cases where these corporations bothered to respond to my request, I was given a short formal statement about how the company does not condone or support any activities associated with organized crime or corrupt government officials. However, I anticipated this and developed several second-tier contacts in some of these companies who provided interesting insights into some of the larger state-level corruption scandals. 17There was a substantial frequency of mixed ethnic interviews. However, since ethnicity did not play a major role in this study, I used the ethnicity the respondent used to identify themselves to code the data. I provide this data for those interested in the ethnic make-up of the project-in no way should this emphasize the category, which I believe is over-used and a self-reinforcing concept. In several cases, individuals only identified themselves as Bosnians or Yugoslavs. I coded these individuals to an ethnic group based on their name and area of residence.

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• City of interview: 30.5% Sarajevo; 18% Mostar; 16.2% Brcko; 35.3% Banja Luka

In some cases, individual respondents’ roles overlapped categories. For

example, it was not uncommon to find government officials who also owned small

businesses or were part of an academic faculty. In these cases, I coded the interviewee by

the role for which I contacted them. The other roles play out in the discussion as they

influenced responses to certain questions. Using the example from above, an official who

also has a business interest was more specific on questions of business than other opinion

makers or law enforcement personnel. The overlap proved useful in some cases because I

could pursue several different lines of follow-up questions to test the internal coherence

and honesty of disclosure that was not indicated through the more basic redundancy and

rephrasing exercises. Additionally, there were several cases where intra-category overlap

existed. For example, it was not uncommon to find a media member who also

participated in an NGO, or conversely, some participants in local NGOs were freelance

writers or political-party organizers. In these cases, I used the same coding method for

categorizing the respondent, but it was more difficult to differentiate roles in the

interview because different questions elicited various responses. In order to differentiate

between split perspectives and interviewee deception, I asked respondents to answer

questions with their primary role in mind. I frequently asked these respondents if their

intra-group variation posed differing perspectives. For example, I asked several local

NGO persons who freelanced as journalists if their opinions about local media and NGO

performance changed depending on the view they took. These questions helped set a

baseline perspective for the individual that qualified for competing or overlapping

interest.

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These categories and subcategories provided a well-rounded distribution of

interested actors, representing a cross-section of the social stratus in each country. The

aggregate of this information established a solid, defendable basis for describing and

evaluating local perceptions and attitudes about organized crime in each country, as well

as allowing for micro-analysis (for example, cross city or category) and contextually

qualified regional generalizations (former Yugoslav republics and Southeast Europe). A

detailed description and analysis of gaps and similarities in understandings between the

international and local communities helps comparing international and local responses to

the five key research questions that were the basis for the questionnaire design. In as

much, these questions listed below were crafted to capture both specific information and

the processes involved in forming viewpoints and opinions.

1. What is the scope and impact of organized crime on society in BiH?

2. What segments of the population are most vulnerable to organized crime

manipulation and collusion?

3. What segments of the population are most influential in shaping attitudes,

perceptions, and accommodations toward organized crime?

4. How do local attitudes and perceptions of organized crime compare to the official

positions of the international community?

5. To what extent are governments responding to these problems?

These questions were developed through an extensive review of international and local

statements and press articles, illuminating significant doubt in the quality and quantity of

exchange and collaboration between internationals and locals in dealing with these issues.

The hypothesized gaps originated as differences in definitions and ways of understanding

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the problems. The international communityunderstands organized crime and corruption

as primarily economic crimes. The EU and OSCE definitions and protocols regarding

organized crime and corruption closely mirror the series of recent UN protocols

developed to deal with the problem—money laundering, arms trafficking, and human

trafficking each have a separate protocol beyond the general statements made in the

treaty. The money laundering protocol focuses on the most basic needs of a criminal

group, hoping to make the costs of security around profits too high. Most recently,

international definitions have focused on the ways organized crime feeds into

international terrorism (UN Light Arms Protocol) and human slavery (UN Human

Trafficking Protocol). However, even in these cases, the international focus is clearly on

the economic and criminal intentions of the actors. In each of these discussions, four

main assumptions stand out from the discussions. First, groups involved in these

activities are separate from larger society, functioning as parasites on the legal economy.

Second, following from the first dichotomy, organized crime impacts other parts of

society in a linear causal way—bad actors harm good societies. Third, organized crime is

based purely on greed and illicit profit making. Finally, the relationship between

organized crime and corruption follows from the second observation as criminals

corrupting public officials.

These four postulates form the core of the generalization used by the

international community to evaluate organized crime across the globe. The narrative is

standard: a small group of criminals, who do not care about their society or laws and only

want to profit at the expense of good citizens, organizes the sale of illegal goods or the

illegal sale of normally legal goods. They skirt security and tax regimes through the

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corruption of public officials and the use of violence, relying on a variety of money

laundering schemes to protect their profits. This picture is so familiar to most of us that it

seems silly to question it. The images conjured by the mere mention of organized crime

play directly into these themes as one imagines a scene out of the Sopranos or American

gangster films from the 1930s and 1940s. However, the picture on the ground is often

quite different. Even in the case of organized crime in the United States, the relationship

between communities and organized crime is symbiotic.18 These groups often provide

goods and services that community members want, both legal and illegal, often for less

money than through legal channels. In the cases of weak states or segments of state

territory, these groups often provide much-needed local services and can bring a certain

kind of stability to a region (Lampland, 2001; and, Shelley, 1999). In many cases, public

officials are on the ground floor of such enterprises because they have credibility and

recognized authority in the community. Although violence is a hallmark trait of

organized crime, it is often limited to a small sub-set of actors and tends to be internecine

rather than the random banditry assumed in the linear generalization. Even in cases of

forced extortion, the preferred methods of coercion are not always direct acts of bodily

violence, but also property damage and other acts that send signals to the victim. In the

statistical preponderance of human trafficking cases, the people being moved have agreed

i8A close look at early 20th centuryItalian immigrant communities in the United States demonstrates that organized crime groups often provided more diverse and better-paying job opportunities for community members. In these communities it was not infrequent to find people who thought of these leaders as ethnic heroes. Looking even further back, some of the greatest entrepreneurs and leading families in early colonial times built their fortune and fame from illegal or quasi-legal enterprises—one need only look at the biographies of the “Robber Barons,” or some early colonial heroes whose profit came through breaking the British embargos. See Organized Crime in America for a more detailed look at the history of the activity in the United States.

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to an association and have paid money for the services of illegal movement.19 Of course,

these arrangements do not always work out as believed, but there is a level of mutual

consensus involved. When a person steps out the back door of a pub in the West End of

London to purchase a pack of smuggled cigarettes, they are getting what they want, for

less.

The difference between the international generalizations and empirical facts

leads to greater diversions in policy and practice over time. The international position is

based on a set of dichotomies, addressed above, that caricatures organized crime as some

sort of disease, foreign to the healthy functioning of the social corpus.

The view from the ground is that these groups are in fact part of the larger

society and are bom out of them. Even in cases where foreign groups come to dominate

an area, it is often done with the nominal consent of local leaders and organizations. This

viewpoint requires a more relational and dynamic understanding of the actors and

activities associated with organized crime and corruption. This is not to say that the logic

used in the international definitions is invalid, rather it suggests that these causal

relationships are at play only at certain times in the larger scope of the activities

associated with organized crime and corruption. If the linear generalization is used to

develop laws and inform practice, it is likely that law enforcement and communities will

lack the full complement of tools necessary for addressing the issue. This type of myopic

policy may, in fact, lead to the unintended consequences of reinforcing the strength of

organized crime and corrupt relationships by drawing too stark a division between society

19Of course this does not include the cases of human slavery and kidnapping that feed the international sex trade. However, these victims appear to represent a minority of total persons trafficked. The nature of the activity requires a separate set of laws and studies to be properly understood. However, there is overlap in distribution chains and the use of certain clandestine routes.

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and the law. 20 The gap insinuated by these doubts is sufficientto damage most attempts

to address the problems of organized crime and corruption in BiH. Furthermore, it

suggests a larger systemic problem of exchange and cooperation between internationals

and locals, and thus a deep and troubling flaw in the existing practice of state building

across the globe. The purpose behind the construction of this questionnaire was to

develop a better tool for measuring these gaps, if they in fact existed.

Questionnaire Development

The questionnaire was designed to explicitly address these original five

questions, or doubts, that came from my earlier experiences and research—by definition

an inductive-deductive mixed method for generating the research questions and

hypothesis. The full questionnaire developed over time with inputs from many colleagues

from the United States and Southeast Europe. The process of refinement vacillated

between close readings of local and international press coverage and the few expert

reports that were published over the past seven years addressing issues of organized

crime and corruption; and discussions with knowledgeable colleagues about the facts and

20Democratic legal regimes are designed to serve the larger society. The individual sacrifices associated with acknowledging the rule of law must be seen in this way, if they are not to be ignored or by-passed with some less formal, local mechanism. In cases where it is notclear that laws will best serve the public, there is resistance. In many cases, seemingly disparate issues join together in the consciousness of local communities and build resistance to policies that are not intended to be referent. For example, in my interviews it was common for subjects to link unemployment and organized crime, as it is difficult to find a decent legal job and to afford legal prices for various goods and services. The suggestion was that normal people will resist the destruction of organized crime as long as they do not have better employment prospects. This was especially the case in Brcko and Mostar—as mirror opposites in someways.

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responses to these publicized affairs. The movement through these materials and

exchanges led to several early versions of this questionnaire.21

The final result was a 30-question script, combining open and closed-ended

questions addressing four ways of understanding organized crime and corruption in BiH:

sociological, institutional, legal, and empirical. These four categories capture the

preponderance of commentary on these issues and fostered the development of a

complex, detailed picture of the problems. This questioning framework also assisted in

developing follow-up questions for clarification and more detailed answers. Several

issues that were not explicitly addressed in the initial 30 questions, such as the corruption

surrounding the privatization process, were developed through follow-up questions where

appropriate. 99This theme-based approach allowed respondents to address and highlight •

different aspects of the issues and their effects on the local community in a substantive

way. Different portions of the questionnaire elicited stronger and weaker responses

depending on how the interlocutor understood the problems and believed solutions

should be developed. The results said as much about aggregate opinions as it did about

categorical viewpoints. For example, a subject’s role in law enforcement and security

2iI used one of these early questionnaires to conduct several dozeninterviews in Livno, Tomislavgrad, and Mostar in the summer of 2001—the same summer as the Hercegovacka Banka raid and the public exposure of the Bosnian Croat Third Entity Movement. The results of these interviews were combined with some earlier research and resulted in the writing and presentation of Tragedy, Transition, and Transformation: The Local-International Nexus of Transnational Organized Crime in the Former Yugoslav Republics on 4 April 2002 at the Woodrow Wilson Center’s East European Studies conference series. 22As a rule, I let the subject determine the importance of an additional or tangential issue, depending on their emphasis. Following some of these tangents proved useful for developing detailed examples of how local experts experienced and perceived the problems in their everyday life as well as in exceptional cases.

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played a stronger part in forming opinions than ethnicity, countering some of the

conventional wisdom on the issue.23

Several important practical issues required that the questionnaire not be made

uniform or strictly ordered by these question themes. Appendix A shows the thematic

categorization of the questions by using an initial, and parentheses to note overlap of

themes. First, the questions addressing each section are not distributed evenly because

certain lines of questioning required more developmental inquiries, or, in the case of the

institutional section, had a range of specific issues that needed to be addressed separately

to properly address roles. Second, the questions could not be ordered by theme because it

would not allow for correction, honesty testing, or for theme compliments.24 Third,

several of these questions address more than one theme. The overlap of themes is crucial

for defining the edges of a category or suggesting that the theme itself was a useful way

of capturing a set of perspectives and attitudes. Additionally, this played well with the

general cultural inclination for people from BiH to see issues as relational, rather than

linear (answers to question three greatly support this generalization). Finally, the more

common social, economic, political distinction was not appropriate for organizing the

23Ethnicity has become a touchstone issue, oftenover-used to explain behavior and opinions in BiH. While the issue is certainly important in the formation of perceptions and attitudes, it is not the only or even the most important variable to consider-as suggested by some of the responses in this study. The current literature tends to reify the importance of ethnicity for evaluating issues in BiH, making the issue an often unquestioned assumption in analysis. 24In these cases, corrections could be made by either myself or the subject. This was useful for letting some of the issues settle into the discussion and often a respondent would go back to an earlier question to qualify or amend a certain answer. The spread of thematic questions also allowed me to test the sincerity or personal conviction associated with an earlier question. This type of subtle redundancy allows also for spreading the question base, while requiring a subject to build on earlier comments. Occasionally, subjects would directly contradict themselves in later follow-up questions. This allowed for an easy and non- confrontational review of earlier answers that appeared to suggest different perspectives or attitudes. This kind of non-direct approach played well in professional and polite company throughout most of the region. It also went well with the cultural appreciation for complexity in problem solving, which was useful for smooth transitions across themes allowing for the development of complementary relations.

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themes o f the questionnaire because these aspects actually play a role in each of the

themes. Where it may seem odd to some readers that a study of organized crime and

corruption does not explicitly address the economic nature of the problems, it was more

important for the purposes of developing a full and detailed understanding of local

perceptions and attitudes to let respondents make that analytical move, if they saw fit. To

relieve this misgiving it is important to say up frontthat economic impacts and comments

were regularly discussed in the interviews across themes. The shift in methodological

attention, allowed for a clearer, more pronounced picture of the economic, social, and

political impacts to take form—bearing heavily on how the key themes took shape and

identified the gaps between local and international perspectives and attitudes.

Sociological Questions

The term sociological categorizes those questions that dealt with organized

crime and corruption as a part of a larger group of or in relation to other social problems

found in BiH. The terms “social order” and “disorder” framed this larger sociological

context. In this way, the issues could be discussed in relationship to other sociological

problems, such as unemployment, rising drug addiction among the youth of the country,

and suicide rates—to name a few of the most commonly discussed issues in this segment

of questioning. These questions also stressed an assessment of community impacts. By

discussing the problems of organized crime and corruption in the context of social

problems, I was able to prioritize the importance of the issue in the aggregate and develop

the logic used by local experts to draw relationalattributes and community effects. These

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questions measured effects at different social levels: personal, family, local community,

entity level, and state.25

InstitutionalQuestions

The term institutional is used here to refer loosely to recognized

governmental and nongovernmental organizations and departments involved in

addressing and commenting on the issues of organized crime and corruption in BiH.

These include the primary categories of international community, BiH governing bodies,

state and independent media, business organizations (Rotary Clubs and Chambers of

Commerce), non-governmental organizations, and think tanks—the last four groups

include local and foreign entities. Part of the goal behind using this category was to elicit

intra-group evaluations to measure how opinion makers, law enforcement and security

personnel, and businesspersons viewed each other in the context of the problems and

solutions. These questions asked for an assessment of key organizations and institutions,

commenting on their perceived effectiveness in addressing the problems. In the case of

organizing the questionnaire, I opted for a less technical understanding of the term.

However, in other parts of the study I use the term with more theoretical rigor. In this

regard, the term institutional can be interchanged with organizational or formal grouping.

25The entity level assessment is important in the context of BiH, which is a bifurcated state with two separate entities—Republika Srpska (majority Bosnian Serb in ethnicity) and Federation (predominantly Bosnian Muslim shared with the Bosnian Croats). The state is purposefully weak and the entities are structured to accommodate ethnic divisions, so recognition of these levels crucially allows for a variety of qualifications that are important in the case of BiH.

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Legal Questions

It is nearly universally accepted that criminal issues must be most explicitly

addressed through a legal framework. This is not in exclusion of other processes or

organizations, but highlights this function as a constant and necessary response by the

definition of criminal activity. So, this category is in some ways a sub-set of the

institutional category. However, the questions in this section are more specific to an

evaluation of actions taken in the legal realm, addressing the problems of organized crime

and corruption. Where the institutional questions focus on law enforcement and other

legal institutions as one organizational discussant in relation to several others, these more

focused questions aim to develop deeper detail about the unique functions of the legal

system to address and cope with the problems. These questions address the processes

used or missing in the practical application of the law. For these reasons, it is important to

highlight this area as both a commentator and as a direct actor in efforts to address these

problems.

Closed Questions

This term is used to capture those questions that deal directly with the

characteristics and functions of organized criminal groups and corrupt officials. These

questions required the subject to directly apply their perceptions and attitudes toward the

issue in concrete terms, using real examples. This line of questioning also allowed for

measuring the ratios of personal—not professional-experiences in relation to organized

crime and corrupt activities. This line of questioning was important for adding the hard

edges to local perceptions and attitudes, codifying how and why these issues are so

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important for stability and growth. These answers bring “softer,” theoretical answers to

everyday life and demonstrate how these problems affect individuals and society in basic

terms. The focus on respondents’ personal experiences with organized crime and

corruption, in real time, completes the full picture of local perceptions and attitudes,

allowing for the results to be better applied to real-world, grounded policy suggestions

and prescriptions.

These questions form the basis of the information needed to assess the local

perceptions and attitudes about organized crime in BiH and Croatia. They frame

important aspects of the conversation that correspond to descriptive understandings about

internal and external impacts on viewpoints and how these forces work in shaping the

positions. As each respondent had a different way of articulating their understandings, it

was important to locate common themes and direct supporting questions toward

investigating these points of topical convergence. These question themes led to the

development of the key themes discussed in Chapter 1.

The approach expanded the interviews in a significant second way (beyond

the technique of using open ended questioning methods), allowing for each discussion to

take its own course within the loose boundaries of the 30 questions. The way in which

interviewees responded, avoided, or re-configured answers to these questions are as

important as the actual words used to convey their perceptions and attitudes about

organized crime. The questionnaire design helped determine if an interviewee was

truthful or possibly a participant in organized crime and official corruption.26 The use of a

26Truthfulness of disclosure is a potentially difficult problem given the nature of the research issue. However, the range and scope of interviewees will providea sufficient sample to isolate anomalies. This approach is similar to those of Janine Wedel and Alena Ledeneva in their similar studies of East European

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quantifiable core of questions ensured that the project would generate basic, comparable

data—establishing the utility of the analytical frameworks.

Measurement and Explication

The measurement of the data took two forms: qualitative (Chapter 3) and

quantitative (Chapter 4). The blended results of these analyses lead to the conclusions

drawn in the final chapter of the dissertation. The interview data was coded and

interpreted with the development of several supporting frameworks in mind. As I began

to assemble the data, the framing matrices took form in a series of useful ways for

moving through the large amount of information provided by the subjects. These

frameworks should be understood as complementary in building a comprehensive and

detailed picture of local perceptions and attitudes—along the lines of cross-referenced

catalogs that hold different sets of complementary variables as constant and dynamic.

The following chapters are organized to apply these related frameworks to the task of

understanding and explaining local perceptions and attitudes toward organized crime and

corruption in detail. The final analysis develops a clearer appreciation for the gap

between these local and international perceptions about the issues, suggesting bridging

strategies. Policy suggestions and prescription are based on the goal of bringing these

different viewpoints together, not to say one is necessarily better than the other, but to

suggest that each is incomplete without a proper understanding of the other. The idea is to

perceptionsabout Western aid and the Russian tradition of blat. The only interest I have in those who may be participants in organized crime is the effect this may have on the truthfulness and bias of their disclosure. Again, in cases of this type of anomaly, I will have sufficient data to evaluate the veracity and intent behind such testimony. These issues may become keys for understanding how to navigate the framework of perceptions and attitudes. However, it is too early to be sure how or where these issues will be of most significance.

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transcend differences through the practice of realizing both viewpoints form the more

complete meaning of the problems and associated solutions.

In practical application, this method is a form of social network analysis,

building off Erving Goffman’s Frame Analysis Theory and the more recent works of

Louise Shelley, Peter Andreas, Janine Wedel, Vadim Volkov, and Alena Ledeneva. What

each of these works has in common (as well as Rubin and Rubin) is an implicit or explicit

epistemological position that social meanings are the product of interaction, and as such

need to be observed in a larger, more inclusive social context. This is not to say that

everything social is reduced to personal interaction, but that social practice informs both

ideational and structural aspects of social order and exchange. As Goffman aptly states,

“reality often eludes the interlocutors.” This is to say, meanings are produced through

interaction, but the subjects are always constrained by some internal and external rules

and structures. By rooting analysis in the measurement of social relations an observer is

better situated to recognize and account for the interplay or overlapping of these aspects.

Like the gap between local and international in BiH, the gap between ideational and

structural approaches is an unnecessary attribute of the current social scientific enterprise.

For purposes of this study, the key to fully understanding local perceptions and attitudes

in BiH lies in the ability to map the logic behind the positions-focusing on both the

interaction and the rules limiting these exchanges-which requires accounting for the role

of the international and the various ways it and the local collide, combine, and reflect one

another.

An important part of this process is understanding what local actors think

about organized crime and corruption, and how these perceptions come together to

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influence social practice in the form of an attitude.27 The reasons for holding a position

tells us a lot about the position itself, as the structure of a given context or framework

constrains the possibilities of the agent (Goffman, 1974; and, Giddens, 1987). An analyst

builds the basis for interpreting the range of possibilities by locating external and internal

structures in a certain context or relationship (or series of such). Social network analysis

helps shape the interpretation of perceptions and attitudes by demonstrating how external

and internal structures interact in forming and influencing the shape of a context (Arquila

and Ronfeldt, 2001; Wedel, 2001). This analytic form is crucial for being able to move

beyond a descriptive collection of detailed anecdotes—separating this research project

from most of those discussed above in the literature review.

Closed Question Analysis

The purpose of adding a quantitative tool was to add statistical rigor to the

qualitative findings with regard to the gaps between local and international perspectives

and attitudes and to conduct some intra-group comparisons in an effort to more fully

develop some policy suggestions. Ten of the questions in the questionnaire asked for

direct answers, either Yes/No or multiple choice formats. For the first part of this

analysis, I used general statistical tools to generate percentages and variance by city and

group. In the second part I applied similar tools to evaluate the intra-group difference.

Several of the questions were answered with near homogeneity. However, in the cases

27TMs is the reason for the separation of perception and attitude. A perception insinuates a viewpoint or a contextualizedidea about a certain experience. An attitude is the practiced expression of perceptions in a social setting-influencing interactions. The extent to which perceptions and their corresponding attitudes are accurate or acceptable to another matters little in actual social exchange. What counts is appreciating the attitude of the other to better situate responses and longer forms of exchange.

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where I saw variance, across and within the three categories and four cities, I measured

the difference to see if these answers had patterns that might tell something about a

specific category of interview subject or a geographical area. Although ethnicity was not

a theme of focus for this study, I did keep track of the each respondent’s ethnicity

(recognized by the subject), reorganizing my data by this variable to see if it presented a

different picture.

All interviews were coded by geographical location, ethnicity, questionnaire

category, sub-category, and fact of signature on disclosure and confidentiality statement.

I used an interview field notes worksheet (IFW) to write-up each interview, and

transferred the data to a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet along with the 10 quantifiable

•J O ' » » • questions. This system allowed for multiple sorting of information, cross-sectional

analysis, and the development of a network of matrices. All these helped to capture and

trace the perceptions and attitudes expressed in the interviews. The use of ethnicity and

signature codes allowed me to measure responses from the perspectives of ethnic

homogeneity and the effects fear of reprisal had on the answers. Surprisingly, ethnic

views did not appear to be as homogenous as the sub-category of the interviewee, and

few respondents declined signature. However, these tests are important for discussing

some common concerns in shaping effective and useful policies to address organized

crime and corruption in BiH.

28See Appendix A: InterviewFieldnotes Worksheet for a detailed explanation of the coding and field note system used in this project. The structure and schematic for coding was adapted from Robert M. Emerson’s, Rachel I Fretz’s, and Linda L. Shaw’s Writing EthnographicFieldnotes.

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Research Challenges

I encountered several challenges in the course of conducting this research.

The first two were expected: initial distrust from interview subjects and difficulties

securing the international community’s cooperation. The last challenge was a surprise in

the way it came about, but not completely unexpected: it comprised threats to my safety

and to the integrity of the project. Each of these challenges shares some common themes

that are important for understanding the circumstances and context of the issues. These

commonalities hook directly into the perspective and attitudinal gaps found between local

and international perceptions in BiH. There is a general atmosphere of distrust between

locals and internationals in BiH. Formal instruments exist for exchange and discussion

between the two sides, but these are rusted by years of ineffectiveness. This has led to a

jaundiced view of these structures from both sides, for similar reasons, but aimed in

different directions. Locals believe that the international community is just going through

the motions and is not truly dedicated to developing a stable and livable environment in

BiH. In fact, some local experts believe that stagnation is the plan for the region, so it can

be better manipulated and controlled by the international community. This viewpoint

careens back and forth across the line of conspiracy theory, but it informs the way most

local experts interact with internationals. In some cases it is impossible to move beyond

this wall of distrust. Internationals generally blame the locals for refusingto give up their

old ways, thus ensuring little success in BiH. This position reverts back to many old

myths and generalizations about the Balkans and the unique brand of ethnic hatred

supposedly found in the region. The combination of these two distrustful attitudes

combines in a thinly veiled finger-pointing blame game, where responsibility for negative

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issues is firmlypushed tothe other side. This culture ofdistrust has taken deep root and

influences even the most minor exchanges, suggesting a certain spitefulness in action and

private gleeful smirks when the other side fails-despite the fact that all suffer.

This atmosphere of distrust is difficult to avoid, even in cases where the best

of intentions are at play. The result is oftenfound in the galvanization of initially limber,

well intentioned, and open-minded positions. As an independent researcher, I fell victim

to this negative exchange more often than most. Although I am affiliated with the United

States Department of Defense (DoD), through funding and employment, my research was

conducted fully independent of the department with few of the normal assistances

provided to research sponsored by the United States Government. I purposefully arranged

my research project in this manner because my focus was on local perceptions and

attitudes beyond the regular circles of interlocutors found predominantly in the capital

cities of the region. My goal was to develop a broader base of respondents that more

accurately represent these perceptions and attitudes.29 However, my independence rarely

wore well with either local or international associates. My disclosure made it clear that I

was affiliated with DoD, but that the form and substance of the research was not affected

by this relationship. Locals, especially developed and spontaneous interview subjects,

tended to warm slowly to my requests for an interview. More often than not, the fact of

29Generally speaking people fromBiH are warm and hospitable, but there is a particular unease with internationals for the reasons discussed above.The local distrust was not toward all foreigners, but specifically to thosewho represented or were affiliated with the international community. As an independent scholar, I was automatically lumped into this group of those who come to BiH to assist in the international project. Other foreigners are obviously treated differently, as I experienced and had explained to me by several of my interview subjects. It is probably not surprising to some that locals can be a bit apprehensive in the aftermath of the war. However, it is rarely hard to find someone to talk about the war because it plays such a formative role in the way all citizens of the country see themselves and their communities. It is more difficult to get people to talk intimately about deep, social problems in their communities. In the course of my interviews, it was not rare to have someone become emotional—angry, sad, or comedic, depending on their personality and the topics.

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confidentiality and a quick review of the questionnaire satisfied most concerns. Most of

the interviews began a bit awkwardly due to this distrust, but often quickly transcended

this uneasiness, becoming quite animated and congenial in the exchange. Over half of the

interviews were conducted in the local language, or in some combination with other

languages. I believe my full disclosure and emphasis on confidentiality up front made

many of the interviewees curious, and thus willing to engage me—even if only to find out

what I was really up to. The excitement of exchange came with the recognition that I was,

in fact, up to no more or less than I said up front. In some cases, interviewees told me

directly, “I do not care even if you are a spy because you asked good and fair questions,

so go tell your government—who cares (Interview 27).” Additionally, I was lucky enough

to be conducting my research during the course of three events that severely shook BiH

and the region—the culmination of the Orao investigation and the SFOR raids on the

Bosnian Serb General Staff (GSVRS) Intelligence Section (G2); the assassination of

Serbian Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjic; and, the arrest of the notorious Bosnian Serb

organized-crime figure, Momcilo Mandic in Belgrade. These events were all

extraordinary, revolving around issues of organized crime and corruption and

encouraging people to speak more directly about the issues. Based on these experiences

and events, I developed a successful, standard two-minute pitch to secure interviews with

people whom I had no previous association.30

30In some cases, I was able to say a certain person recommended that I contact them for an interview. This helped sometimes, but not always. In fact, it hurt me in some cases, so I tried to be more generic, saying “several people recommended I talk with you because of your specific knowledge about these issues,” or something along these lines. Furthermore, my ability to function in the local languages was instrumental in overcoming many of these challenges because lack o f language skills is normally a primary disqualifier for cooperation—even where the local speaks excellent English or the international brings a translator. I have been told on many occasions, over the years that I was lucky I spoke the language because my discussant

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While successfully overcoming the problem of local distrust, I was not so

successful in eliminating international distrust toward independent researchers and my

United States government affiliation. I believe there were two independent reasons for

this. First, as I began the interview phase of my research, it was quickly becoming clear

that the United States was going to invade Iraq, despite significant European resistance.

In the region this tension took shape in the form of the Vilnius Ten document, used by the

United States government to secure written support for its intentions in Iraq from most of

the former Communist Europe. The fact of the Vilnius Ten put several of these countries

in poor standing with the EU, encouraging a wide range of hostile comments, mostly

from Paris, Berlin, and Brussels. The tension was most notable in the former Yugoslav

republics, where both the European Union and United States are actively engaged. I

believe my United States citizenship and governmental affiliation did not help with many

of the organizations I sought to conduct informal interviews. In fact, I was informally told

so much by an employee of OHR—which coincidentally was the most difficult place for

me to develop contacts.31 In the end, I was able to secure enough informal contacts within

each of my target organizations-OHR, European Union, and OSCE-to assess their

positions and responses to some of the perceptions I received from the local interviews.

Late in my interviews several other windows into OHR began to open, but I did not have

time or need to pursue them much further. I believe this late and gradual thaw in the OHR

rarely talked with foreigners. Interestingly, my command of the local languagesis largely functional, and not nuanced. However, this was sufficient to communicate a genuine interest and personal investment in understanding the people and region. jlThe exception to this rule was the support I received from several of the OHR Public Affairs officers, who provided me with much needed contact numbers and, in one case, some excellent feedback on my research at that point.

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was directly related to mygreatest success in cultivating direct support and an official

endorsement of my study from the European Police Monitoring Mission (EUPM).32

A second form of international community resistance is a more generic

apathy toward scholarly research. Much of this comes on the heels of a growing criticism

surrounding international efforts and the lack of structural success in BiH. Over the past

few years this criticism has moved from the editorial pages of major newspapers to a

growing scholarly literature that aggressively takes the international community to task

on several fronts. (Chandler, 1999; and, von Hippie, 2001) These critiques largely have

been dismissed by many international practitioners as personal slights and not accurate in

measuring successes in the region. Both parties have a point in this debate, as scholars

need to be more constructive in their critiques, rooting their practical solutions, so too the

international community needs to be more open to critique as a form encouraging growth.

However, despite this ideal view, the basic truth is that almost every international

community member I talked with groaned, deriding the arrival of yet another scholarly

“expert.”33

The support of the EUPM was essential for developing the necessary contacts

to conduct formal interviews with police officialsthroughout BiH.34 After some initial

32The EUPM replaced the UN-run InternationalPolice Task Force (IPTF) in December 2002. The organization was new to the mission, but many of the officerswere returning to the region after working with the IPTF and other UN sponsored police missions around the globe. The stand-up of the EUPM marked the first aggressive move by the EU to begin taking full control of the Bosnian mission, which is scheduled for handover in 2004. Paddy Ashdown is the first High Representative to wear the mantle of the five-country OHR and of the European Union. 330f course, this is the stuffof another, completely different study, but important to acknowledge in discussing practical methods for overcoming such bias. 34I developed other police contacts that proved useful, but nothing as expansive as what I received through their assistance. Each of the local commanders and liaison officers I worked with warmed up to the study fairly quickly and energetically supported the effort. However, most were a bit skeptical about the results. Fortunately, through the development of the questionnaire and several independent police sources, I was

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hesitancy, the EUPM became my most useful and trusted source for international

community assistance and dialog. I believe it was through my interaction with them that

other parts of the international community—most notably OHR—became more interested

in returning my phone calls and offering assistance where possible. However, much of

this emerged late in my field time and I was unable to fully capitalize on this relationship.

I hope to develop further these relationships more in future research, based on the fact

that this project was conducted responsibly with an eye toward better understanding BiH

on its own terms and despite the fact that many of my conclusions will trouble

internationals.

Even more so than internationals, my research apparently bothered several

locals, which presented a problem I could not overcome in the field.35 My problems

started in Mostar, where, after an excellent informal discussion with several opinion

makers, I became aware of the fact that few people in this subcategory and ethnicity

returned my calls or replied to email—despite the fact that the initial reception was

excellent. I cultivated several excellent contacts in the city through a variety of colleagues

and was encouraged by the reception and the results of my first round of interviews. As I

began to recognize a pattern in the ignoring and thinly polite rebuffs to my contacts, I

happened to make contact with one of my primary sources who should have had some

insight to the problem. This subject’s response was direct and fairly stark, “Mr. Corpora,

you had better be careful,” and click went the receiver. Needless to say, this was mildly

able to determine that a high majority of the formal police interviewees were truthful, even explicit beyond my expectations, in their answers and exchange. 35However, upon myreturn I was able to properly satisfy some of the concerns associated with these troubles and fully expect to return to Croatia to finish this part of the study—as well as throughout the rest of the former Yugoslav republics.

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intriguing and prompted me to make several additional inquires that suggested I had

raised the suspicions of several important people, but it was not clear who or why.

However, the uniform recommendation was that I had better be careful.

Approximately three days after this event I stopped receiving correspondence

from the Croatian Ministry of Interior (MUP), after having successfully secured their

support for formal interviews of police officers. At this same time, other colleagues,

acquaintances, and interviewees whom I contacted to inquire on my behalf suggested that

I might want to lie low for a while because there was some concern about my research

and affiliation with the United States government. I cannot say with any certainty that my

problems in Mostar were related to those in Zagreb, but it seemed suspicious. After

several attempts to reestablish contacts with the Croatian MUP, with little success, I

decided to return to BiH and complete my interviews there before trying to rekindle my

previously excellent contacts in that organization. After two weeks in BiH, I inquired

again with some success, but ultimately was asked to wait a bit longer for more

approvals.36 On the recommendation of several friends and my dissertation committee, I

decided to drop the Croatian portion of the case study (for the time being) and proceed

with the BiH case-which was rich with interesting information beyond my most

exaggerated expectations.

The lessons I took from these experiences can be generalized to anyone

conducting serious field research. First, the local context is the most important thing

when it comes to securing access to scarce and guarded information. A researcher has to

“ interestingly, I had phone interviews with fairly high-levelMUP officers who were in a position to approve and support my research, and promised as much. So, it was clear I was being stalled, if no longer ignored.

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know the environment they are entering and be ready to be flexible at odd times, if they

want to complete their study. Second, it is easy to get caught up in someone else’s

struggle. You cannot stopworld events or bias directed at you, based on presumption and

affiliation. It is easy to get angry and even indignant in these situations, but this will

likely result in worse circumstances and probably lead to an incomplete project.371 was

lucky in this regard because the way I developed my study, turned out to be two studies.

Where the Croatian data will be interesting for future comparison, it was not necessary

for setting this baseline, establishing the methods and developing one good case. Finally,

time is never on a researcher’s side. Something or someone, inevitably, becomes

available long after you configured a work-around or restructured the project. It is as

important to set rigid time limits on the scope of research, as much as one should be

limber enough to capitalize on new, unanticipated possibilities throughout the research

cycle. Although I wanted to extend my time in Croatia and work out a solution to the

problems I encountered, it was important to proceed to the next phase. Data is one of

those things that always seem to be in scarce quantity until you actually start sifting

through it. Despite my initial disappointment, I am glad I left when I did because the

silver lining to the cloud is a much more focused analysis of these issues in BiH.

Key Theme Framework Construction

The four categories of questions do not directly correspond to the key themes

developed in the conduct and analysis of the interviews. However, the question categories

37Along these same lines, there is a fine distinction between persistence and pestering. Unfortunately, this is a poorly designated place and highly contingent on atmospherics and personalities—two things that easily elude some social scientists.

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assist in telling a detailed story about these themes-how the local perceptions and

attitudes that emerged in the research identify and explain the gaps between international

and local understandings. The lack of exchange and cooperation on these issues only

proves that a gap exists. The details developed by overlaying the answers given in the

four sections with their comments on the key themes show that there are several gaps that

join and diverge in different ways and places. Figure 2 shows the general results of this

overlay and works as the frameworkfor analysis used in Chapter 3.

Table 2-1: Questionnaire Frame

Security Trust Responsibility Authority

Sociological Low for both Little chance of Moral decline, loss Inconsistent and domestic and inter change—conflict of values—actions sporadic—unclear national security institutionalized by a taken without con where it’s located, providers—low series of bad deci cern about others or both in domestic confidence in legal sions/policies and long-term effects and international system and change criminals, difficult to cases in other attitudes discern one from one another

Institutional Low trust in General skepticism Near uniform denial Abused at all security institutions of institutional re of culpability for levels—most ob sults—more trust of stagnant, ineffective vious and negative international efforts institutions— at local levels over domestic positives claimed, negatives passed on

Legal Few laws Near total distrust of Corruption at all Abuse of power enforceable— legal system, even levels—reflection of security in the with reforms— lost moral compass, hands of questions of personal gain individuals or functioning capacity emphasized informal powers

Chapter 4 will apply the statistical analysis of ten closed questions from the

questionnaire, articulating the empirical portion of the study. The summaries provided in

Figure 2 provide the synopsis of a master narrative surrounding the issues of organized

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crime in corruption in BiH. This table demonstrates the perceived situation and the

resulting attitudes. Chapters 4 and 5 aggregate to frame the local perceptions and attitudes

of these 266 interviewees. The many stories re-told in these chapters, through the frames

constructed to contextualize the data, paste together in a different voice from that heard

from the international community. Yet, the similarities of denial and blame-shifting are

clear at the individual level. The marked difference comes in the public discussion of

these issues,which polarizes between international goals and hopes and domestic

cynicism and growing malaise. The results of this analysis will provide more pronounced

detail to these gaps, assisting in moving the study from purely analytical to prescriptive in

Chapter 5.

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CHAPTER THREE

OPEN QUESTION FINDINGS -

CHARACTER AND CADENCE OF INTERVIEWS

Spring is struggling to find its way from beneath the Balkan winter. The

damp, foggy morning provides an appropriately eerie setting to begin my scheduled

morning activities. The drivefrom the Old City of Sarajevo down the broad Transit Road

(known as Sniper Alley during the Bosnian Civil War), past Ilidza and the airport, to

Camp Butmir’s entrance is uneventful; the standard 25 minutes with traffic and several

precarious exchanges. A “CD Alley” exists near almost every SFOR base in Bosnia, but

the one in front of Butmir is especially impressive. The stalls extend nearly a kilometer

from the main road to the main gate of SFOR’s headquarters base, and, depending on the

season, one can find upward to 20 different shops selling pirated music CDs, computer

software, and DIVX copies of the latest movies (sometimes before they are even in local

theaters). What started in 1996 as a shoestring venture capital effort, conducted mostly

from the hoods and back seats of VW Golf IIs, blossomed into a large, well-organized

business. Over the years vehicle-based sales moved to shabby wooden stands and then to

the odd CONEX container, left behind by an international organization. Today, in most

areas you will find these pirated CD’s sold in proper shops with excellent sound systems,

headphones for customer listening, and much appreciated heat and air conditioning.

When asked, the manager of one large CD shop near Butmir comments that “it is only a

matter of time before we have DVDs, soon.”

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It is clear from the development and current statusof these shops that SFOR

and the larger international community are the biggest customers of these illegal products

— an embarrassing illustration of the complexity of the organized crime and corruption

issue in BiH and the region. The CD Alley example highlights how the local and

international enable one another, and demonstrates a complicit relationship in this

syndrome and cycle of criminality and culpability. In cases like this, international

demand drives the supply of illegal music, software, and entertainment products. The

market produced by this relationship finds pirated CD formats as one example of a larger

relationship that exists in practice, but is denied in rhetoric, forming the basis of a

perception gap-where behavior is interpreted differently depending on one’s position or

role in the relationship. Despite this relationship, perception and attitude formation on

both sides—local and international—takes form in varied ways with specific

inconsistencies and weighted emphasis on determining factors, causal relationships. In

other cases the culpability is less direct, but the local interpretation is one of linkage.

The interviews in this study provide a detailed argument for understanding

the international/local relationship as a combined affair: not a sterile laboratory where the

international “surgeon” works as a dispassionate and objective external facilitator.

Rather, the internationals and their organizations enter and combine to become part of the

problem and solution set in ways oftendenied or diminished in the course of discussion

and action. This combined nature is primary to understanding and evaluating the dynamic

relationship between the international and local in BiH at its base. Furthermore, it

provides a useful focus for interpreting the data provided in the exchanges discussed

below. From this base recognition, the character and shape of local perceptions and

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attitudes toward organized crime and corruption come into finer focus and ultimately

make more sense. The demonstration is not only one of varied perception, but one of

rudimentary denial on both sides of these issues. Additionally, the perception gap is not

merely one of convenience, but conditioned through practice and discussion. It is clear

each side has a very different picture of the relationship—as it is, or should be, at this

foundational level.

This chapter discusses the open question results of the interview project in

two parts. The first, longer section focuses on the interviews themselves and the direction

taken in discussions, drawing together four common themes. Section 2 addresses these

themes more conceptually, as they pertain to the initial thesis and series of issues

discussed in the research project. The final result is a scheme for understanding and

addressing these gaps in an effort to make democratization projects better focused on the

specific issues not fully addressed in the BiH context. In this way, the results take us

beyond organized crime and corruption and speak to a wider division in perception,

shaping competing attitudes that serve different short and medium-term goals. Where one

sees a general consensus on the ultimate ends, the route to achieving these aims varies in

significant ways, ultimately impeding the possibilities of reaching the longer-term goals

of stability and harmonization of efforts with the wider European Union agenda.

Section One

Four analytic frameworks emerged from this research project, capturing the

data in a systematic manner that allows for detailed analysis and the generation of

specific findings. These findings are the basis for evaluation of these local perceptions

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and attitudes, generating practical suggestions for moving beyond the gaps detailed in the

analysis toward strategies for solution. These frameworks are based on a modified

application of Goffrnan’s frame analysis method, drawing from its foundations in

theoretical pragmatism. This combination and synthesis of theory and practiced analysis

sits on the bedrock position that belief systems provide a potent part of the formation of

social reality, equal to exogenous, observed facts. The continual interaction of belief

systems and external facts produce and fuel the processes of social invention and

reinvention, structuring perceptions and attitudes. The inductive/deductive loop of human

interpretation shapes the way we see and interact with the world around us.1 Table 3-1 is

an aggregated overview of the four analytic frames.

| The construction of social reality is not a new topic in the study of human organization, but it has taken on new interest in several fields that propose to understand and explain these phenomena. As stated in Chapter 1,1 claim agnosticism with regard to the various intellectual camps that sprung up from the reemergence of this discussion. This study finds its intellectual fuel in ideas and concepts established well before the current debate. However, the Onufian variant of what is termed constructivism comes closest to describing my position in that debate.

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Table 3-1: Perception Overview

Social OC and Institutional International Impacts Corruption Capacity Responsibility Opinion Linked and Highly associated Inconsistent and Denial and lack Makers cyclical — poor with social contributory to of local situation problems larger social knowledge— issues maybe complicit Law Problems often A problem, Uneven and Reinforcing old Enforcement linked — solvable generally split on macro-level— and creating new with difficulty association with driving negative divisions without social problems outcomes, recognizing organizationally results Businesspersons Generally high, High association Generally weak Seemingly but improve with with social and unable to unaware of economy situation—seen address negative results— everywhere fundamental largely inflexible, scope of on a fixed course corruption

The international community took its first concerted look into the problems

of organized crime and corruption in BiH in early 1998. Some of the first comments

made about the problem are seen in the official statements made by the Commander of

the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR), followed shortly by the Office of the High

Representative (OHR-Clark, 1998 and Meigs, 1998). Much of this came fromwitnessing

the splitting of Radovan Karadzic’s Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) through the summer

and fall of 1997. As the Republika Srpska (RS) President, Biljana Plavsic, broke from the

SDS, officially moving the locus of government from Pale to Banja Luka, a struggle for

control over the RS Ministry of Interior (MUP) emerged as the primary battleground.

MUP control was crucial for securing an internal security base that ensured both power

and profit, as the MUP acted as the primary Bosnian Serb entity controlling the

clandestine political economy. The institution was built around loyal party members who

provided exemplary support for the war-effort, including the establishment and

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maintenance ofclandestine means toweapons, fuel, foodstuffs, and ultimately party

members’ personal profit.

This behavior was not limited to the Bosnian Serb faction. In fact, each of the

three primary groups’ nationalist parties (Bosnian Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) and

Bosnian Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA)) developed this counter-embargo

and sanctions capacity, sustaining it for party and personal power and profit. The

informal political and economic structures that emerged from these activities function as

the backbone of organized crime and corruption in BiH. The international community has

had little success combating these destabilizing groups, despite many efforts to address,

transform, and overcome their potent, flexible influence on the fledgling state.

My interview project provides for a detailed picture of this complex situation,

where a triangulation of dependency among internationals, the informal power structure,

and average citizens stagnates legitimate stability and reinforces the informal, clandestine

political economy. The unexpected consequences that result from this entanglement

frustrate and retard many of the practices and policies aimed at enabling a legitimate rule

of law in BiH by allowing informal powers to function as facilitators between

internationals and the citizenry. The four issue areas explored in the interview project-

social, legal, institutional, and empirical-capture specific nuances of this troubled

relationship, detailing the complexity and showing some possible routes for dismantling

and transforming this process. These four categories assist in explicating the story of this

entanglement, demonstrating that the perception gap between international and local is a

primary enabling fuel for sustaining this problem-set.

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SocialImpacts

The social impact questions helped characterize if, where, and how the

respondents understood the issues as part of the larger social problem-set. In most of the

interviews, a long and detailed discussion was sparked by asking the subjects to rank in

order of seriousness a set of social problems, well established in the literature

surrounding the BiH case. The answers generally followed a course that detailed the

relationship between the issues and how criminal and corrupt actors facilitated these

problems.

Table 3-2: Social Impact Perceptions

Issues Connectedness Effects Opinion Makers Moral decline Very high Personal behavior unchecked, social disorder Law Enforcement Economic, Divided more than Personal gain, low unemployment other groups2 trust in formal institutions Businesspersons Economic, High Ineffective legal unemployment system and security apparatus

The majority of responses are well characterized by the following synthesis

of the interviews pertaining to the social aspect in BiH. Organized crime and corruption

are understood as a primary part of the social problem-set in BiH. General social disorder

2Legal professionals generally saw issues as more compartmentalized. In the cases of a majority of “no” answers to the connection between the issues, this group of respondents represented most of this minority perception.

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results from the lack of a clear sustainable peace between the former warring faction

(f ictions, surely?) and the primary political parties that represent those war interests.3

Ranking and describing social problems in BiH

In the public fall-out from the 1997 Bosnian Serb straggle, it became

apparent that the RS MUP was a primary force in the wealth and strength of the entity’s

leadership. Whoever controlled the MUP had access to a number of resources and the

security to exploit these opportunities at virtual will. What had been a “public secret” was

now recognized openly discussed and sparked the focus of many domestic and

international interests for a variety of well and ill-intentioned reasons. In this way, the

international community was able to isolate the problems of BiH organized crime and

official corruption as part of their own experience, separate from the international

presence. However, the international presence and participation in public policy

formation and negotiation of legitimacy made them a part of the process—despite official

denial through the lack of acknowledging their role.

This shared role ranging from responsibility to direct complicity highlights

the overall theme of the interviews conducted in this project, shedding bright light on the

different ways internationals and locals perceive these problems. The international

community rhetorically distances itself from the required accountability while their

3The notion of peace for locals is something morethan the mere cessation of hostilities and organized violence. There is an expectation of a deeper transformation that enables a fuller, more structural peace to take hold and shape a stable environment. In the minds of many of the interview subjects the war is not over. A number of subjects described the current environment in terms ofa foreign-sustained cease-fire, but far from a resolved conflict. This perspective provides the foundation for the way they interpret the current state of affairs in BiH—especially regarding their perspectives and attitudes about organizedcrime and corruption.

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actions on the ground-in practice and policy—suggest otherwise. The artificial distance

constructed by the international community is further complicated by the dearth of active

international/local cooperation in practice, creating a dependency situation where local

communities feel under-empowered. In fairness to international efforts, some elements of

the local community capitalize on this artificial separation as an excuse for locally

produced results. This complex macro-level exchange led directly to the current

stagnancy in BiH development, creating a climate of finger pointing that manifests itself

in the form of a blame-game.

Throughout this scenario the state remains weak and the parallel power

structures, provided for primarily through the nationalist political parties, maintain

control over the local situation. The corrupt and criminal practices reinforce a culture of

citizens’ dependency on informal structures for survival. The party-controlled black and

gray economy provides one of the only employment outlets in a state where the official

unemployment rate is 40%, rising to 60% in certain, high-impact areas. The employment

capacity of the clandestine political economy in BiH reinforces a second type of

dependency between citizen and informal power structures, where just enough illegal

profits trickle down to the desperate citizenry to ensure their participation and support. In

some cases, local power brokers invest some of their inordinate profits in the

infrastructure of a town or region. This quasi-philanthropic practice further reinforces the

relationship between illegal activities and the general citizenry, where the criminal and

corrupt official appear to be acting in the best interests of the local community. The

Bosnian Croat communities of Livno, Tomislavgrad, and Siroki Brijeg provide the best

examples of this complex illicit entanglement, where corrupt and Informal powers

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function like a legitimate government or lending institution. Many of my interviews in

Mostar detailed this complex dependency, where several respondents opined that tacit

local support for criminals and informal governance was based on the fact that these

groups were the only ones who consistently invested in the local community, providing

an atmosphere where all could profit—albeit disproportionately.

The stated separation of BiH problems from international presence and

action, reinforced a responsibility buffer zone, founded on the lack of official European

and United States culpability in the Bosnian Civil War. This transformed BiH into a

laboratory for well-gloved-and-masked international actors to save the fledgling state

from itself through the recreation of liberal democratic and economic institutions in a

proto-messianic manner. This rhetorical separation allowed, and perpetuated, the

international community’s passivity toward their own roles and responsibilities in these

activities and allows for hypersensitivity toward local roles and responsibilities.

Likewise, the BiH public and intellectual leadership used the same methods of action and

discussion to explain the problems, only reversing the emphasis. This lack of

cooperation, communication, and communal pursuit of effective policy developed into an

extensive “blame game” where each side continually sights examples and frameworks

that reified their general perspectives. The result was stagnancy, perpetuating a deep

division in public-private trust and rendering actions on either side muted for the lack of

communal action. In effect, different perceptions and attitudes transformed into political

and moral positions, entrenching attitudes in such a way that they function for their own

survival. It no longer matters who is right orhas a good strategy for addressing the

problems of organized crime and corruption because un-forced consensus would require

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a certain capitulation—in effect win-lose is the primary institutional rule at stake in the

debate. The issues are irrelevant, what matters is the success of the position.

The questionnaire used for this project was designed to elicit direct and

descriptive answers, capturing perceptions about organized crime and corruption in BiH,

and the formative logic used to establish and bolster these attitudes. In the four sections

of the questionnaire, I used question clusters to identify “hard” data points (yes, no, A, B,

C, answers) and surrounded these with open-ended questions, meant to give

contextualized explanations for these answers. The primary goal in this method is to

identify the lines of logic used to inform and buttress a perception and attitude (a series of

perceptions linked to form a coherent opinion structure). Perception and attitude

formation are crucial to the process of establishing social structures. The formation of

perceptions and attitudes play a reciprocal, cyclical role with norm and institutional

formations—where perceptions and attitudes lead to norm formation, so, too, do norms

influence and shape perceptions and attitudes. The relationship between these processes

is often uneven and difficult to map with any accuracy. However, the co-constitutional

logical processes are consistent with a holistic world-view, which is the ontological basis

for this project. In focusing on perceptions and attitudes, it is my hope not only to

demonstrate the theoretical necessity to consider these contextual ideas in social analyses,

but also as primary components for understanding social structure and its reconstituting

capacity.

The cadence and character of these interviews quickly took on a thematic

similarity. There were sets of questions that brought certain types of people more directly

into the problems discussed. There were sets of questions that indicated truthfulness or

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resistance to full disclosure, and a quality point (or as I liked to call it, the “take off’

point) quickly emerged in this cadence. Most of my interviews were pre-arranged,

scheduled events. However, in some cases, especially with interviews of small business

vendors, the interviews were more spontaneous and less formatted. In any case along this

continuum of conduct, the character and cadence of the interviews remained consistent.

This qualitative aspect of the interviews is crucial for understanding the logic and flow of

perception formation in BiH. These points represent Goffman’s second expression, often

non-verbal and difficult to control (Goffman, 1972). These qualitative cues are key

attributes in the formation of impressions-the recipient (researcher in this case), as well

as those of the interview subject. The subject may or may not want to communicate these

gestures to the recipient and they may or may not be intentionally involved in a deceit.

However, these gestures are pivotal for the context and logic of the perception and

attitude formation, giving the truism “actions speak louder than words” a twist away from

the more literal interpretation. In short, showing how the creation of meaning is

foundered in more than rhetorical logic, shaped through interaction and expressed in

social practices.

Social Foundations

The first set of questions in the project aimed at allowing locals characterize

the broader scene of the problem-set. In most exchanges and meetings addressing the

problems of organizedcrime and corruption in BiH the agenda is set narrowly around

problem-solving, failing to fully characterize the issues before developing strategies to

combat and contain the problems. The first series of questions in the interview—asking

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respondents to rank larger social issues, discuss their effects on society, relationship with

one another, and the government’s ability to cope with the problems—set a tone for the

interviews that most of the participants had not experienced with other discussions with

foreigners. This portion of the interview was oftenthe longest and most detailed part of

the discussion because participants appeared comfortable talking about these issues in

broader terms, as linked, and important for a more accurate perspective on the specific

issues of organized crime and corruption. One respondent articulated this general appeal

in saying:

Your approach is different than most foreigners who come here to discuss organized crime. It is such a sexy topic these days and when I first heard about your project, I thought—oh God, not another one. But, you clearly are more interested in what we think about these issues. You do not assume to know the problems and have not made up your mind about solutions. I think this is more scientific than most others, who normally just want to hear what they expect and ignore other issues we see as important. (Interview, 23)

This statement captures well the overt recognition that most of the

interviewees remarked upon—a primary goal of the project was to capture local

voices in such a manner so as they had a say in how the issues were discussed. In

a few cases discussants were uncomfortable with this approach because they

thought they might be tricked. The message in both the majority and minority

views was a suspicion of outside expertise: the outsider will either force

preconceived notions on the local or will try to trick them into arguing that same

point by manipulating the conversation. This skepticism speaks volumesfor the

negative state of cooperative discussion and planning in BiH.

Regarding the ranking of structural social problems in BiH, discussions

ranged along the continuum of options presented and the social malaise surrounding the

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problems. The open-ended nature of this question allowedlong, for qualified discussions

that touched on many of the issues addressed more specifically in other portions of the

interview. However, it served to engage the respondents and allow them to feel

comfortable in setting the agenda. A nearly universal theme in the ranking of issues was,

discussing the important connections between each of these issues—often blending into

question 2 and foreshadowing answers to questions 3-5. The predominant view was that

corruption, unemployment, and larger issues of social disorder were inextricably linked.

These linkages were captured through a series of specific examples that ranged from

discussions of bank fraud and poorly monitored privatization to the inability to establish a

truly transparent economic culture. In some cases, interviewees saw the problems as

follows:

This corrupt system feeds off unemployment and social disorder because it could not be sustained within a healthy environment. This is why corruption is the key to the problems here. If there were a way to break the hold of these corrupt politicians and their friends, it would allow for an opportunity to really change the social situation. But, now you have most of the population surviving through the corrupt system and they cannot afford not to participate. It is a sickness we cannot overcome because these corrupt people will never let go of that power and income on their own. (Interview, 12)

Other respondents saw the issues in a more, specifically political light:

Corruption is the best form of employment in this country because you do not have to pay taxes and there are many opportunities to increase your wealth-it all depends on how much morality you are willing to sacrifice. The dominant political parties put all this in place. They had to make money and count on loyalties during the war to keep fighting -this is on all sides. They did many bad things to ensure they had control and that those who supported the cause were properly taken care of. This process just continuedinto the post-warscenario—these parties run just about everything and if you do not stand with them you don’t have a chance. In many cases this is off-the-books employment or ad-hoc. It does not count toward any official statistic because it doesn’t legally exist and even where you might want to account for this gray market you can never really know its size and extent because it is difficult to see outside of the effects. For example, now they say we have over 40% unemployment in this country. Where are the starving people, bread lines, and obvious signs of this catastrophe? You do not see it because mostof these people survive by participating in the so-called gray economy. They have a vested interest in its survival and as such in supporting the politics that keep it all going. (Interview, 39)

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Despite the various anecdotes and interviewee descriptions of the

connectedness of these issues, most perceived the problems as directly linked and

embedded in the social structures of BiH. For many, like those cited above, this was a

functional relationship that retained an internal stability based on a common impetus

toward survival. In this way, many of the respondents that described the linkages

functionally perceived the problems as an extension of a broader human security issue-

set: where survival trumped moral underpinnings and higher principles. Several of the

discussants compared the problems and situation to that of Jean Valjean, the protagonist

in Victor Hugo’s famous Les Miserables. Several others pointed to the historical

tendency for people from the region to survive and thrive by their wits and the tightly

woven social circles found in local communities throughout the country. One academic

captured this foundational aspect as follows:

You and most Western Europeans see the world in a positive way. You interpret history based on victory and see the ideas and principles that make-up your societies as a walk toward progress. We do not have the same historical experience or sense of ourselves. We know on one level that corruption is wrong and should not be the norm, but we also know that many times in the history of our (fore)fathers we did not have the luxury of following these ideals. We would not have survived. In this way, we do not see the world in a positive light. We almost always expect the negative experience and so we plan and organize ourselves in a way that will minimize the injury that comes from this. More practically put, you think human beings are basically good and, if given the right chances, will generally make the best choices—rationally speaking. We see human beings in a negative light, basically conniving and taking advantage of every opportunity to better themselves at our cost. This is most often true of the foreigner, in ourcollective experience. (Interview, 83)

This viewpoint is an important cultural difference between the local and

international—as in many cases the international is a Westerner. The perspective is not

monolithic, but it resonates throughout these interviews in many ways. It is probably best

understood as a tendency, rather than a rule of division. In its most generic version, this

cultural difference in evaluating the social world explains some of the initial uncertainty

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and discomfort many discussants expressed in this project. More importantly, it begins to

open up the space of informal relationships and networks in BiH, which shapes and

conditions these local perceptions and attitudes. Rational explanations and expectations

do not succeed because they are based on a different sense of behavior. A Banja Luka-

based interviewee with an opinion maker and security background made this point fairly

clear in stating:

The ethnic ghetto is nearly always preferable to multi-cultural prosperity for most BiH citizens because there is security in the familiarity. Many people are disgusted by the corruption and the bleak outlook for the future, but when you tell them the way out is to radically change the way you understand the world-as is the case with many of these international initiatives—they would rather continue on, as is. It is not an excuse, but a matter of comfort. It surely does not make sense to you, but it makes the most sense here. It may be based on a certain kind of ignorance, but then again our collective memory and identity is assembled around these ideas. ...In some ways, you people (Westerners) don’t understand the way we see ourselves and maybe it is because we don’t want you to understand.. .maybe this is a defense mechanism. (However,) I am always amused by the response of foreigners to this description of our behavior. It ranges from total incomprehension to damnation. People in this region have always lived, loved, and fought together and with one another-sometimes it is religious, other times it is about money or prestige—but somehow we have muddled along. The biggest problems come when an outsider comes in and decides to help us solve our problems. No offense, but this is the case as we see it. (Interview, 15)

This attitude is hardened by the frustration of mixed expectations, despite

these cultural and historical explanations. A number of interviewees expressed deep

depression over existing circumstances and their initial hope that international

intervention could make a difference. This perception often brought in views about

international behaviors and abilities to address the problems. There is a general sense that

the international community uses its power in an uneven manner, suggesting a variety of

explanations fromineptitude and poor organization to criminal complicity. Often, in this

part of the discussion, interviewees brought up various rumors about international

involvementin corruption and criminality. The rumors included international profitfrom

the poorly monitored privatization process, kickbacks from corrupt state-runinstitutions,

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and international police and military involvement in the trafficking of humansand illegal

goods.4 In most cases, discussants backed away fromproclaiming belief that the

international community was systemically complicit in these problems. However, most

believed there was good reason for concern. One Mostar-based opinion maker summed

up this position well in stating:

The Office of the High Representative (OHR) has nearly unchecked power in this country, yet these high-level offenses continue to happen and no one is indicted or prosecuted—let alone sent to prison or forced to pay the money back. Everyday citizens read about these things on a near-daily basis and they cannot help but come to the conclusion that the OHR and other parts of the international community are somehow involved in the activities. I do not believe this is the case. I think there are some bad individuals in the OHR, like any organization. However, the organization is so inept and poorly run that they cannot do anything beyond issuing statements. They seem so focused on specific politicians and parties that they lose the larger picture of the problems. The only time they take action it is based on some ethnic hostility. In the meantime, the thieves are stealing the country blind. This is not to say that the nationalist politicians are not involved in the theft. They are the creators of this most recent version and they learned from Tito, who learned from many before him. But, they are smart. They rarely keep the money in their name. They spread it among their friends and families, but in the end retain control of it and the power that comes from being in the position to generate not only money, but influence—importance. Look, most of these politicians can’t spell their own names, let alone the name of their party. They were shoemakers and farmers before the war, but they were in the right place at the right time and so have the rewards associated with that chance. (Interview, 27)

In many interviews a finer point was put on these problems from a multi

ethnic and multi-disciplined spectrum of comments, captured well by this Sarajevo-based

opinion maker:

Look, in this country the worst thing that can happen to you is that you get removed from a political position. Then you walk away with all of the money and someone else in your network moves into the position. No one is tried, let alone sent to jail. The system of influence and insider deals is institutionalized with the full complicity of the international community. Internationals think if they make the governmental organs and laws stronger it will solve the problems. What they don’t understand is that this is like art in this country. It is a pretty picture, but not much more. (Interview, 43)

"‘Privatization ofbanks and poor management of state-run electricity and telephone companies were often cited as examples here and elsewhere in the interview where we discussed international activities. These issues were in the press at the time and were the subject of most cafe conversations. The trafficking of women for sex was an example often used because it is a common belief that the institution revolves around international demand. Also, there were several arrests of internationals involved in both the trafficking and the use of thesevictims in 2001 and 2002. See cited articles on Privredna Banka, Electroprivredna, HRT, and the Prijedor brothelraids.

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A Sarajevo-based opinion-maker with government affiliations went a step further:

These institutions appear to be impeccable and ideal, but they are based on a certain amount of personal responsibility and trust that just does not exist in this country. It is a clear example of the international naivety at the base of our problems. The OHR is always perplexed when these impeccable rules and legal standards are ignored and taken advantage of. It is this naivete that makes it easier for crooks to succeed because as long as they say the right things, they can do just about anything they want. If, by chance, they are caught, they are merely removed from office.Where is the personal responsibility and how would anyone expect common citizens to trust such a system? (Interview, 54)

From this perspective, the international community’s focus on institution and

capacity building is out of sync with cultural and practical realities of life in BiH. Most

interviewees commented on this issue in a variety of ways: likening it to giving a heroin

addict a house in the middle of a poppy field as long as he promised not to use or

building a beautiful city in a place where nobody chooses to live. The nearly universal

opinion was that these issues were linked, prevalent, known to most everyone, and had a

daily negative affect on normal citizens’ lives.

Organized Crime and Corruption

The second portion of the interview focused respondents on issues directly

related to organized crime and corruption in BiH. Although most of the interviews

touched on these issues in the social impacts portion, this section aimed to bring these

perceptions in line with the specific topic. In many cases, it was a natural and expected

narrowing of focus. However, in some cases discussants were uncomfortable talking too

directly about these issues. In the case of law enforcement and security personnel, the

hesitation vacillated between a need to guard open investigations and complicity of their

profession in the activities. The other two groups generally were more receptive to

discussing the issues related to the topic, but did not have the direct experience of

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professional legal and security personnel. In several cases, businesspeople would not

speak about these issues in any concrete way due to stated issues of personal security and,

likely complicity, as nearly all business respondents recognized a full merging of the licit

and illicit in the conduct of business in BiH. Table 3 characterizes the responses given to

this series of questions.

Table 3-3: Organized Crime and Corruption Perceptions

Organized Crime Corruption Law Enforcement and Security Medium association, seen as Clearly existent, most identifiable generally associated with local in the law enforcement and actors—not speculative judicial community Opinion Makers and High association, near universal Linked to OC in direct, specific Businesspersons personal and professional ways—part of the political process experiences

Law Enforcement and Securities Perspectives

Law enforcement and security personnel generally saw the specific problems

of organized crime and corruption in tax evasion and trafficking of persons and

commodities. The emphasis on a particular issue divided more along location than

ethnicity or specific role within the community. So, patrolling officers, special police,

prosecutors, and judges fromMostar saw problems in a similar manner, despite their

ethnicity. Perceptions understandably diverged as we discussed what portions of the law

enforcement, security, and judicial community were most responsible for failures to

curtail the problems. Additionally, the perceptions of international effectiveness and

responsibility for the problems varied more by position than ethnicity or region. So,

senior law enforcement administrators were more favorable to international actions than

lawyers and less so than average police officers.

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The regional perceptions about specific problems generally varied by what

they dealt with most. Brcko-based law enforcement and security personnel saw human

and commodities trafficking as the biggest issue in their region. Many of the interviewees

were concerned with the inability to secure the borders. The Brcko perspective was

noticeable based on the perspective that the problems proliferated outside of their

jurisdiction, due to the unique nature of the district police and legal system—a test region

for the country.5 For example one police officer commented:

Most of our problems come from the lack of professionalism we experience around us. Look at the Arizona Market, we cannot control the smuggling problem without the assistance of other jurisdictions. But, the Orasje and Loncari police make so much money from the activity (yes, Croat and Serb working in perfect harmony) that they will never fully cooperate. (Interview, 51)

The same sort of perspective is noted when discussing border controls by

another law enforcement member:

Ok, Gunja (directly adjacent to Brcko city) is well controlled because our department supports the SBS (state border police) and Carina (state customs service)6. But, what about to the south—near Bijeljina and Mali Zvomik — and north at Zupanje? We cannot be so sure.. .we can never know what they are doing. This goes beyond our control. (Interview, 63)

5As stated in Chapter 2, Brcko was an important part of establishing a wider view and falsiflabilityin the project because it is a fully internationally administered district. All public salaries are inflated several times above those of colleagues in other parts of the country, and a disproportionate amount of infrastructure rebuilding and external investment has been applied to the district. The goal is to establish Brcko, one of the most contested areas during and after the war, as an example of possible success. The exercise has had mixed reviews, most notably concerning eventual reintegration with the rest of the country, which is unforeseeable due to the disparity of investment and salaries between Brcko and the rest of the country. Interestingly, the perceptions of Brcko-based interviewees did not alter much from the other regions, despite their relative prosperity. 6The SBS and Carina are the only fully functioning BiH State law enforcement and security organizations at this time. A state-level security and intelligence agency (SIPA) was formed in 2002, but staffing, funding, and mission harmonization has not been resolved. After the 1 April 2003 SFOR raids on several Bosnian Serb intelligence and security units revealed a probable concerted, clandestine effort to circumvent international and state-level oversight, OHR stated SIP A may take on a larger, official role in the conduct of security and law enforcement. However, the details of this process remain to be seen and face serious resistance.

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-j Many m the judiciary and on the management side of the legal system take a

similar view, as one lawyer opined:

Our biggest problemscome from the corruption surrounding us. This is not to say we do not have internal problems, but significant pay-raises and moredirect international oversight have solved many of the smaller problems. Our special status presents an unforeseen challenge of dealing with our peers. These problems range from organizational differences and requirements to everyday human envy. Solutions are slow and hard to find. (Interview, 59)

In a more technical vein, this respondent and several others suggested that the

direct activity of internationals in the judicial proceedings (standardized, aggressive

international prosecutorial and judicial review), adds a necessary layer of scrutiny to the

process. However, this same oversight pushes external law enforcement and judiciary

members away from direct, systematic cooperation. The reasons for this lack of

cooperation range in anecdotal evidence, but appear to boil down simply to a fear of

being implicated in an illegal act—either directly or on the investigative procedure side of

the issue. As the standards continue to deviate there appears to be less of an opportunity

to use Brcko as a positive example and more of a chance to make it into an exception that

will not easily be reintegrated into the larger BiH.

Genuine concernappears to exist within the community (state-wide) of local

law enforcement and judicial technical experts—some of these people working directly

for the OHR in an advisory capacity. Several interviewees perceive what started as an

interesting and clearly successful experiment as to be slowly dissolving into a case of

negative exceptionalism, pushing Brcko into a position it cannot sustain without

significant international support. The artificial nature of Brcko’s status may create

circumstances where failure will have a particularly negative impact-given the historic

7It should be noted that most of these people are directly approved or hired by the international authorities in Brcko, which exercise much more aggressive oversight, due to the experimental status of the district.

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problems of the city and environs. Several interviewees stated a fear that Brckomay

revert into a much more problematic “Dodge City,” more so than it was before the

experiment—possibly to the point of being a flashpoint for organized violence.8

Law enforcement and security personnel perceived organized crime and

corruption as serious issues for Brcko, but not as directly as was the opinion in the rest of

BiH. Although members of this interview category voiced many of the same attitudes,

Brcko-based respondents generally saw the problems froma different vantage point. The

law enforcement and security perspective beyond this small, exceptional enclave was

much more unified and negative, breaking down similarly intra-group when discussing

law enforcement and judiciary effectiveness in addressing the problems of organized

crime and corruption.

As stated above, each geographical region generally recognized the problems

as systemic and interwoven with other social and institutional issues. Interviewees in this

category discussed a range of issues, demonstrating the character and scope of the

problems. Three specific issues stood out in this segment of the interviews: taxation and

employment, security, and administration. Each of these issues sets broad frames for

discussing analytical foundations.9 Furthermore, these categories directly foreshadow the

more elaborate frame analysis conducted in the second part of this chapter.

8Brcko wasa serious problem in all peace negotiation phases. In fact, the Dayton Peace Accord’s ultimate success was due, in some part, to putting Brcko (and several other similar enclaves) in a special category— the status of which would be determined at a later date. Nearly ten years after going into effect, Dayton and many other efforts to resolve the status of Brcko failed as the city became a symbol of ethnic survival for the Bosnian Serbs and one of justice to Croats and Muslims. Prior to the war, the city was deeply multi ethnic. Brcko was the sight for some of the most brutal, gruesome warfare and war crimes in BiH. In this way, it remains an important symbol of success or failure to many citizens. 9A s this analytical framework began to take shape, I tested it in the course of the interviews to see how it pertained to the problems at hand. The final framework, developed fully below, emerged through this process of active and passive (deductive and inductive)field testing.

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OpinionMaker and Business Perspectives

Opinion makers and businesspersons had similar, but more pronounced views

on the problems of organized crime and corruption in BiH. Most opinion makers were

more concerned with corruption and the political entanglements with criminal activities.

They generally believed that the international community over-focused on specific ends—

the criminal activities resulting from the corrupt association fostered by a variety of

political forces. For example one opinion maker in Sarajevo opined:

Human trafficking is a definite problemin this country, but its roots and reasons are poorly understood by the international community. They focus on STOP teams, victims’ rights, and other legal tools to prosecute offenders, but this is all looking at the problem after it blooms. The result is that brothel owners and men who use the services of these places are the focus of interdiction. The real problem is where the demand begins—driving the supply chain. Since the majority of people using women in this way are internationals, it makes most people here assume that this focus is a not so subtle attempt of the international community to ignore its own involvement, and probably direct responsibility, for this problem in BiH. Prostitution existed here in many forms before the war, but it was local-based and fairly small. The changes are in direct correlation to international demand. Look, this is not the only problem that the internationals brought with them, but it is very serious. Until there is public recognition of this fact (by the international community), there will be no real solution. (Interview, 21)

One local businessperson near Mostar gave a similar view, regarding a

different criminal activity:

Internationals, SFOR, the UN, and all of the others, love the fact that they can get the best and most recent music, movies, and computer programs for pennies. I am just helping them get what they want. If it is illegal, why don’t they close us all down? I am one of hundreds—if not more-people in this region who sell these products. I am an entrepreneur and through my hard work and investment have made a good living for myselfin a place where this is increasingly difficult. You can judge me if you want, but it is foolish and not just a little naive to think that this will ever really go away. The internationals are the law in this country. They can do what they want, and they have always wanted to buy inexpensive CDs and computer games. (Interview, 49)

This is not to say that locals see internationals as the only, or even main, part

of the problem associated with organized crime and corruption. However, there is a clear

impression that the international involvement is too oftenignored, downplayed, or swept

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under a rag. The impression of many is that the problems associatedwith official

corruption drive the problems. One opinion maker summarized this relationship well in

stating:

There was a general belief immediately after the war that the international communitywould come in and clean up the problems, teach us democracy, and re-fit our economy to function with the broader Western market. Unfortunately, the reverse seems to have taken place. The internationals came in here and quickly learned from us how to lie, cheat, and steal. I am not one to get involved in conspiracy theories, but look at the facts—and most importantly the missing pieces. If the international community were serious about fixing the problem of organized crime they would completely disenfranchise the corrupt politicians, put them in jail and see to it that opportunities were distributed beyond the Sarajevo metropolitan area. This would tidy up a lot of problems. Clean government would eliminate 75% of the problem So, why has the international community failed to do this? It seems that only two reasons are possible: they are naive and blind; or, they are profiting from the corruption and graft. I am inclined to believe number one, but most people in this country firmly believe it is number two. The press is increasingly coming up with stories that implicate an international community member in criminal activities-misuse of a position for personal gain to directly enabling criminal activities. The case of “a few rotten apples” is quickly becoming un-defendable. This is one of the most popular “public secrets” we have in BiH—the internationals are making a lot o f money to come here and help us, so why would they want to solve the problems too quickly. (Interview, 112)

The issue of selective blindness to the problems opens a third way of

interpreting the situation. This more nuanced and conspiratorial perception is held by a

number of businesspeople throughout the country. The logic behind this viewpoint is that

the internationals personally benefit from serving in BiH, so they do more to manage the

problems than actually fix them. If you understand the nature of this relationship between

internationals and corrupt politicians, a businessperson can more easily walk the tightrope

and succeed. One Sarajevo-based entrepreneur and opinion maker summed up this

complex perception:

I am certain that the donor countries and headquarters-level leaders of the multinational organizations funding the peacekeepers want to fix the problems and leave as quickly as possible. Clearly, there are several who unrealistically thought there were a 24-month solution, but just as much there those-mostly Europeans—who argue for a 50- year solution. Reality is clearly somewhere in between, but we have not even begun to address the core issues because there is a certain understanding between internationals and politicians that the game will follow certain lines. There are a whole series of explanations or better put as rationalizations for this slow and often retrograde scenario,

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but mostly it exists in the service of both these parties. Let me give you several examples: elected officials know how things need to be done to solve many problems, but for political and personal business interests—which are often the same thing in BiH—they cannot act. These legislators, government officials, and public servants often go their international counterparts and tell them that they support a certain policy, but cannot do anything without it looking like the international community forced them to vote or behave in said manner. This whole choreography of politicalbehavior goes well beyond Western notions of political quid pro quo or your United States version of “pork barrel” politics. Internationals gain from the farce of forced behavior as much as the local politician because it can be used to justify more resources, higher salaries, and extended tenure. The local gets certain favor and an ability to benefit on both sides of the field without having to take any real position. (Interview, 7)

This first example demonstrates the perception of a tacit collusive agreement

between local government officials and resident internationals. The understanding here is

that stagnancy is in the interest of both parties to perpetuate separate interests.10 The local

official can perpetuate personal wealth, power, and influence at the same time as the

international reinforces the need for their services. Each uses aspects of this tacit

agreement to strengthen their positions. The desire to avert direct criticism lies beneath

this duplicitous practice. The interviewee’s second example demonstrates how external,

skeletal changes in policy can reinforce corrupt practices.

.. .Second, and maybe more concretely, look at the state of the public tender laws. A supposedly transparent process for the awarding of public money for projects performed by the private sector was established and in print appears to address the corruption problems associated with this activity. However, these rules are easily circumvented and have institutionalized the “blue envelope” (a local euphemism for bribes) as the only way to ensure business. In fact, everyone involved in the bidding process-including those who have been pre-selected by the awarding official-must provide some incentive to ensure their paperwork is not lost or found administratively incomplete.In cases where a family member or friend has not been informally selected in advance, the amount of incentive can help you gain information, so you can better position your bid or receive forewarning of an audit. (Interview, 7)

10This idea became clearer in the course of the interviews. Some of the early discussions touched on this point, but the variety of ways respondents articulated and experienced the phenomenon is uneven. Additionally, the perception folds into the cultural foundation discussed earlier—where the base interpretation of human behavior is negative. These two aspects-unclear articulated experience and negative assumptions—often play an important role in the formation of local perception of issues beyond open observation. In many of these discussions this process of interpretation is critical in identifying and categorizing more complex attitudes.

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This example highlights the connection between institutional capacities and

will to conform—another component of this more nuanced perception of the problems. A

significant majority of the anecdotes and examples given by interviewees in response to

these direct questionsdealt primarily with this connection and the perceived lack of

international understanding of its regard. A businessperson in Banja Luka described this

structural gap as follows:

The international community can drive dump trucks loaded with 100 Euro notes into this country and it will not make much of a difference in solving the corruption or organized crime problem in this country. ...They can write the most eloquent constitution and pass laws of iron, and still nothing significant will change, as long as they ignore or remain blind to the fact that people here do not believe money or laws exist to help ordinary farmers and citizens. (Interview, 127)

This discussant went on to tell about how he made these same comments to

OHR and various NGO representatives, only to be told he didn’t know what he was

talking about or that his Communist attitude would do no good for promoting democracy

and economic growth in the region. These exchanges demonstrate a clear gap in thinking

about social change, made more rigid by reinforced misunderstanding. A Sarajevo-based

opinion maker and educator put finer definition to this gap by stating:

There have been no real changes here because common people do not believe democracy and growth can happen in BiH. This negative perspective is made more rigid by the failures of the last 10 years. We do not believe the parties or international community (members) are working for us. They are working for their own interests.... This is the perception, despite the truth of the matter, and this perception shapes the reality around us. .. .(T)here is a clear lack of understanding about democratic ideas here. (Interview, 141)

BiH’s civil society is not oriented around democratic principles, but rather a survival

instinct requiring informalsolutions. In this way the monikers of underdeveloped or

uncivil society are misleading.11 Rather the historical social experience in BiH led to the

’’This statement is made in recognition of a broader, non-idealized concept of civil society. For many civil society scholars the concept is treated as a constituent aspect ofthe democratic process. However, my use

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formation of a civil trust embedded in local networks, compensating for the lack of trust

in formal institutions and actors. This formation is consistent with the authoritarian past

of the region, detailing the local articulation of trust. In this way, formal institutions play

little part in the organization of day-to-day life. Furthermore, legitimacy is found in local

authority, rather than in formal sovereignty. The institutions and rules built at the higher

levels have little resonance at the local level, if they are not fully administered and trusted

by local authorities. These local authorities are not always serving in an official capacity.

In fact, it is not uncommon to find the primary local authority to be outside of the

governing structure—as it is historically is the case that strong local leaders who did not

support the sovereign will were deposed from official positions. In most cases, this is

seen as “a badge of honor,” reinforcing local trust in the authority of the individual or

group of actors.

Trust in these circumstances is vested in noted criminals and corrupt officials.

In the local context these activities are understood as bringing much needed resources to

the community. A Mostar-based opinion maker clarified this local truth with the

following anecdote:

lam a Croat, but I despise what the Siroki Brijeg faction is doing to this country.12 They are stealing fromtheir own ethnic group to benefit a few in that town and several others. Of course, the perception in Siroki Brijeg is very different. Before the war these people lived on the very edge of survival.Now they live in a prosperous place, full of money for everyone. I have somefamily up there and they say they know the town is full of thieves, but they are very prosperous thieves and share many of their spoils with their fellow citizens. (Interview, 12)

of the term is functionally agnostic in that all societies have a civil (non-governmental) component. These associations and activities do not always form or behave in similar ways, but every society has a locus for civil interaction. In this way, it is moreanalytically useful to differentiate between authoritarian and democratic civil society than using the modernization differentiation of (un)civil. This different definition, which is discussed in more detail below, significantly re-orients the way an analyst understand and uses the concept, making it more than a semantic move. l2SirokiBrijeg was a small village that did not rate mention on most maps before the war. However, now it is the seat of power for the Bosnian Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ—ultra-nationalist party).

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This notion of “our thieves” isinstructive for understanding the way loyalty

and legitimacy are advanced in BiH, going some distance in explaining the “ethnic

ghetto” concept. A Brcko-based opinion maker characterized the situation as follows:

Look, a Croat is not a Croat. I am a Slavonian, being from up here. I have little to nothing in common with a Herzegovian. However, I vote HDZand support their policies, knowing fully what kind of crooks they are because they are our only hope. Zubak is despised because he broke from the only institution that holds us together.13 He thought that international support would equal money, and would allow him to advance his party-build his own castle. The internationals thought the ideals were enough. The jokewas on Zubak, without an ability to reinforce his influence through gifts and jobs-- these are almost always illegal-he couldn’t secure even his own base. Now he is seen as a traitor even in Orasje, ironically, where he secured his initial influence and lined up with the HDZ. The international community does not understand our minds. This is not unique to Croats. This is the way we have always lived. (Interview, 142)

Kresmir Zubak’s authority was founded in his status as a local leader in the

historically Croat part of BiH known as Western Slavonia, yet his unsuccessful break hurt

his local status. In the estimation of this and several other interviewees, this came about

because he risked much of the money and power that brought resources to the local

community. The end result is a perception that the international community abandons

those who might be loyal to their cause. The list of examples is long and multi-ethnic,

including former high-level ministers and presidents—Zlatko Lagumdjia, Biljana Plavsic,

Milorad Dodik, and Haris Siljadzic to name a few. The near universal perception is that

“.. .it does not pay to put your lot in with the international community because they will

use you, and do nothing for you or your family once they have taken all they want. They

are like the Hapsburgs and Ottomans before them.” (Interview, 149)

13Kresmir Zubakwas once one of the most powerfulBosnian HDZ members, attending the Dayton Peace Summit and playing a documented role in the party’s activities after the signing. In 1998, Zubak broke with the HDZ over much debated circumstances. However, it is clear from most public accounts that he was considered one of the more moderate members of the HDZ leadership, and, as such, a possible foil in HDZ solidarity.

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The line drawn between corruption and organized crime by opinion makers

and businesspersons is not as easily demarcated as with law enforcement and security

personnel. Some of this difference is due to the proximity of corruption to the BiH law

enforcement establishment. Discussions of corruption with many in the law enforcement

and securitycategory brought on defensive responses. However, several were candid

about the issue among their own group:

Police, judges, and lawyers are corrupt in BiH. Probably, much more so than in the West. However, this is most often a matter of life, rather than a problem of greed. Of course, there are cases of greed, but it much less prevalent. The fact is we make so little money and take such great risks that it makes little sense to be in this profession. ... Everyone (in this line of work) is looking for some way to augment their salary-they have to. It is easy and often a good personal security decision to take some money to close one’s eyes to certain people or activities. This is not always a blanket bribe, but can be negotiated at different times. The fact is, this is perfectly understandable to act in this profession, at this time. Everyone understands, at some level, that it is wrong. However, it is necessary and in some ways helps everyone because the most serious crimes can be dealt with through these connections.... There often is a return of favors in the relationship—eyes and ears are shared. (Interview, 17)

In cases where respondents were comfortable enough to discuss these issues

openly, it was clear that there is a sense of hopelessness and dry mirth about the

problems. The general perception suggests that there should be no expectation of

controlling these problems given the extent of them. Most law enforcement respondents

smiled and shrugged at the discussion of internal corruption. Many tried to make a clear

distinction between the issues, admitting that there are corruption problems but believing

that these did not affect day-to-day policing. When asked to discuss organizedcrime in

these terms, many interviewees admitted that there probably was a more direct

connection, but they knew nothing about these activities. In many of these cases

discussants were uncomfortable and on several occasions they directly requested moving

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to a different topic. Another law enforcement member forwarded a less rationalized

explanation:

The facts that we are all under-paid, poorly organized, and overrun with all varieties of crime does not justify corruption. I believe it will hurt us more in the long term, and I do not participate in it directly. However, so manyothers are involved it is difficult to not know about it—I even see it most days, which indirectly makes me part of it. I cannot report any of this because the leadership is oftenthe primary benefactor and part of the problem. In fact, my refusal to participate directly has kept me on the street and stopped all promotion. I am just happy to have a job right now. I am not sure what will come of the situation, but I do not see it getting better any time soon. I understand the OHR is trying to address these issues, but it is bigger than them~and, I fear, too many of them benefit from the problems. (Interview, 55)

This minority law enforcement perspective is more in line with the opinion

maker and businessperson viewpoint. Most opinion makers point to political corruption

as the base of most problems. They see it as the engine behind a downward spiral of

problems. Most believe that anti-corruption campaigns are mostly smokescreens for

people to receive much coveted foreign funding. One Banja Luka-based interviewee

suggested:

This is all about moneymaking. There are just a handful of people in this city who get the majority of the funding. They know how to write up the proposals and in most cases they have already written the report-which confirms whatever the funding organization wants to hear. In many cases it is nine-tenths fabrication. Of course, there are good and honest people here, but most of them are poor and receive small funding from only a handful of international NGOs who take the time to review products and hire local representatives. This is a big part of the corruption problem in this country. It only serves to perpetuate problems. The police and judges don’t have a prayer (of reforming) if their independent auditors are thieves, themselves. (Interview, 92)

Businesspersons take a more resolute position on the issue:

I would go out of business, if I did not cooperate with these people (corrupt officials and criminal organizations). I have to pay. It is a cost of doing business here. Of course, I would prefer a better situation, but I cannot do anything about it and I do not see it changing any time soon.... It is a public joke that we have legitimate business in this country. Everyone is involved in someway or another. It is just the way our economy is organized, so you have to work with it. If you try to change it, you’ll be broken—likely in more ways than one. (Interview, 104)

The segue from these issues to the institutions and capabilities to address

them follows directly from these discussions.

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InstitutionalCapacity

The perceived ties between corruption and organized crime in BiH wash into

acute criticisms of institutional capacities to address the problems. The suggestion in the

more concrete discussions about organized crime and corruption leads to a critique not

only of the institutions themselves, but also of the misplaced expectations of these rules

and organizations to have immediate and direct impacts on the problems. The lines

between institutional capacity and international effectiveness are less pronounced than

the framing distinctions made above. However, there are two clear ways analytically to

divide the categories, making it a useful exercise for drawing detailed explanations of the

local perceptions and attitudes presented in this study. This framed differentiation follows

from the discussions of corruption and poor organization discussed above. A majority of

respondents did not blame the international community for bringing corruption to BiH.

Rather, they saw complicity and crossing connection, but had a clear picture of the prior,

historical precedent for a culture of corruption in BiH. Following fromthis distinction

was an internal criticism of the organic capacity to organize and implement rules outside

of an authoritarian model. Table 3-4 summarizes local perceptions about institutional

capacity.

Table 3-4: Institutional Capacity Perceptions

Efficiency Capabilities Effectiveness Opinion Makers Low Not inclined to serve beyond Little to none personal gains Law Enforcement Medium Improving, slow Low Businesspersons Low Inefficient Low

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The culture of corruption and its basis in informal social networks resonates

throughout the interviews. In many cases the issue of a certain disposition to conduct

most social activities via informal means acted as a touchstone for the discussions. These

internal organizational practices were conveyed through jokes, anecdotes, and specific

regional references. The colloquial references veza, stela, and VIP were used nearly

universally by discussants to describe the nature of informal social exchanges in BiH.

Although the words themselves do not appear in dictionaries as used in this context, each

word refers to a regional concept, which ranges from classic nepotism to loose informal

associations. A Sarajevo-based interviewee described the concept as follows:

Veza or stela, as we say more frequently in BiH, is literally a connection and functions as one of the most important social qualities in this country—even throughout the region. This is not just about favors and rarely includes bribes, although money and favors do exchange hands. It is a basis for community and exchange for us. Everyone is looking for a stela because it is a mark of social status, which is the most valuable currency in this country. .. .For example, if someone uses the formal, proper means to conduct business they do not have a stela, and they deserve to stand in line or pay more. If someone had a stela for some sort of business he would be seen as crazy to use formal means to meet his needs—it just would not make any sense to us. (Interview, 217)

Another Sarajevo-based opinion maker inadvertently described the scenario

in a similar way in discussing the formation of a new business:

I want to use the formal, legal ways to establish my business to show people that it can be done, but it takes patience. I have waited for nearly six months to get all of the proper documentation, and now I am stalled. I think the people (government officials) are waiting for some favor or money, but I am purposefully not using a stela because it would undermine the entire project. When this is over, I want to write an article showing it can be done, but I’m afraid the article may never come because this business maynot get off the ground. ... (Interview, 110)

The discussion of Ineffectiveinstitutions spanned the spectrum, depending

largely on the role of the respondent, rather than the ethnicity. For example, law

enforcement personnel were much more hostile toward businesspersons than opinion

makers-who saw businesses as largely trapped in the cycle of organized crime and

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or political institutions. Often these people were described as “opportunists”—war

profiteersor people who spent portions of the war outside of BiH—who sought their own

personal interests (understood as including the interests of family and close friends) over

the public good. The accumulation of formal power in the hands ofthese people appears

to be so universal that it begged the question whether personality or the emergent social

and governing structures in the post-war period was the true culprit. Interviewees found it

difficult to disassociate the two aspects and saw them as contingent, leading to a certain

form of corruption that came fromnot only opportunism, but the lack of professional

knowledge to do much else than exploit their positions.

This local opportunist was well described by a Banja Luka-based opinion

maker who observed that, “.. .most of the leadership in the Republika Srpska (RS) was

decided by SDS party loyalty. This was not just (limited to) the mayors and other elected

officials, but to administrative, public education, and law enforcement ranks. (Interview,

19) A law enforcement respondent from Banja Luka took this point further stating:

It was crazy. Professional background counted for little. The RS police were established around the remnants of military and paramilitary personnel who knew nothing about police work, but had to be rewarded. (Interview, 76)

This systematic patronage appears to have little basis in a specific ethnic area,

as interviewees in all four areas and across roles made similar observations. Police

dismissals, demotions and promotions allegedly continue to revolve around this logic of

political support. The result is that the police are at least indirectly involved in organized

crime and corruption because their livelihoods are directly linked to their political

actions. Many law enforcement and media respondents described how these political

positions are directly linked to their duty, as it impinges on who can be arrested for what

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offenses. One law enforcement officer fromSarajevo captured how these political

decisions are directly linked to organized crime, as in many cases local leaders are

complicit in or benefit directly from the illegal activities: . .We know exactly who is

involved in smuggling cigarettes, but we can nothing about this because we have no

jurisdiction beyond the Sarajevo Canton, and several prominent leaders make a lot of

money off of this.” (Interview, 163)

Another Sarajevo-based opinion maker suggested that this problem reaches to

the very top of the political order: “Look, you would be lucky just to lose your job over

such a bust. I know of a case that got very close to a certain Prime Minister, and was

immediately dropped with some very serious threats.” (Interview, 129)

The complicity between local officials and organized crime is a clear

articulation of classic corruption in all definitions (international or otherwise) used to

capture the problem. However, in BiH it appears that the corruptor is not normally the

criminal, but rather the political or government actor. An opinion maker from Banja Luka

captured this system of corruption in the following way:

After the war the government was the only legal employer, so all employment was based on patronageof some sort—even independentmedia did not exist. These people were almost always friends or family who had no background, experience, or expertise in public administration. The only other ways to make money were found in smuggling and working for the international community. In both of these cases government employees and leaders had a great deal of influence. They actually had full influence over the labor pool and control over it was crucial for ensuring survival. Since most of the smuggling was developed around sanctions busting and arming, feeding, and equipping the fighters and ethnic populations, politicians had a direct link to these activities and continued to influence it as a source of income and control. So, from these local perspectives, unemployment is directly linked to the political parties, as a form of control over these activities. (Interview, 133)

A law enforcement officer from Mostar described this problem as systematic

and continuing in “...getting everything backwards.... In your country, you have a dog (a

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reference to McGruff the Crime Dog) that says ‘crime does not pay.’ Here crime pays,

big time.” (Interview, 47)

Government Efficiency

Institutional concerns are not limited to issues of local, municipal leaders-

formal and otherwise. In many cases the perspectives of local involvement in organized

crime and corruption is understood and expected. Most of the blame is put on central

governing structures, the political party system, and to a lesser extent, directly on the

international community. Many interviewees described local officials’complicity in

smuggling, organized tax evasion, and the corruption necessary to facilitate and oversee

these activities as a result of higher-level criminality and corruption. Several respondents

clearly defined the political involvement and control or oversight of these activities as

part of an institutionalized process that corrupts all levels of government. Most of these

perspectives suggested political parties, especially those with nationalist orientations,

held nearly full control of all governmental activities. Where it was more subtle and

clandestine at the state and entity levels, due to increased public and international

scrutiny, the openness of influence increased through the Cantons/'Postings and municipal

authorities. However, it was clear that national-level party members were perceived as

the driving force behind these steering activities.

One Sarajevo-based opinion maker clearly described the relationship with the

following anecdote:

All nationalist parties, regardless of ethnicity, have a deep interest in these activities, as it is one of their most profitable ways of maintaining control and influence, sort of twobirds. The national leaders are careful in some ways not to be too obvious because there have been some attempts to curtail their activities. So, now they have

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family members and close associates (often not in public office) oversee the daily aspects of business. This ensures that the politician’s wealth and influence is saved if there is a problem down the road. In the end, his officeis the most important thing for success in business because it brings prestige and a certain level of control. If the politician loses his office, but is able to keep the business (through various connections), he can continue to operate through a surrogate. For example look at Prlic ofBiskakcic-these guys never go to jail and are now even more powerful in some ways because they are part of the inner circle and their problems reinforce their nationalist credibility in some ways. People read the papers and see the news programs and say, “what bastards, but they are smart and rich bastards and so should be feared in a reverent sort of way.” (Interview, 41).

Another Sarajevo-based opinion maker echoed some of these sentiments in a

less direct way in saying:

Today, the most popular personalities in society are not sports stars or famous artists. They are politicians; everyone just waits for Thursday AM when the newest editions of Dani and Slobodna Bosna come out. It is one of the biggest spectator sports in the country, which high-level politician is going to be implicated in a scandal next. (Interview, 13)

At this level many of the interviewees became deeply negative and described

the most insidious part of this “cycle” or “syndrome” as a near-total lack of public

accountability. Numerous examples of high-level corruption were cited as examples in

the interviews in all locations by each of the three categories or interviewees, hi nearly all

of these cases the accused were rarely investigated and in cases where a formal inquiry

was held the worst outcome seems to be the removal of the politician from their official

position. Few of these people were indicted or censured beyond a ban on holding future

public office, and, in some extreme cases, required removal from official participation in

a political party. However, they rarely are required to return stolen money or illicit

profits, and often continue to play an important, informal role in the political system

through their surrogates, status, and access to much needed funds. A Banja Luka-based

businessman summed this part of the “syndrome” up succinctly by stating:

Every single one of our (in the RS) current (elected) leaders would be in jail in any otherEuropean country, but here they are the most important people. If you are looking for the Godfather or Mafia in BiH you have to start here to find the clearest evidence. (Interview, 85)

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Another Sarajevo-based law enforcement official captured the institutional

dilemma behind this perceived problem:

When your bossor boss’ boss is the one running, financing, and protecting the criminal ring, how can you arresthim-or even investigate Mm? It isimpossible to do anything other than pray that the international community will comeout of its holelong enough to do something. But, in those rare cases where they do get involved they do little more than remove the person from office,which just lets the next guy take his place and continue with the program. The international community is either afraid to do anything substantial or they are in on it. I am not a conspiracy theorist, but I have to say, I am starting to wonder if this is not just some well-organizedeffort at the highest levels. No one can be so stupid to let this kind of activity just go on and on and then do their best to make it easier for the crooks to continue on. (Interview, 23)

A Mostar-based opinion maker echoed these concerns more directly:

How is that the High Representative (OHR) can claim that Prlic and the RS President (then holding the rotating position of the BiH State presidency) are good and productive members of society, when they were directly responsible for two of the worst scandals in the short history of the country? (Paddy) Ashdown commended Sarovic for stepping down. Come on, everyone knew that he would have been, and probably was, removed from his position. Where is the indictment? Where is the justice? What are we to believe from all of this? (Interview, 42)

Interviewees from Banja Luka, Mostar, and Sarajevo cited the recent removal

of the BiH Minister for Refugees as one of the best examples of this commonly perceived

problem. This Minister, whose office is to distribute scarce money and services to

indigent refugee families in the country, was found stealing direct from the budget:

“When you live in a country where the head of one of the most important state agencies,

assigned to help the poor, is stealing directly from them, it tells you something about the

level of the problem.” (Interview, 4)

The issue was further described as follows:

.. .not only a case where the guy was stealing from the state--taxpayers—but a case where he was forcing these poor people to pay for the goods and services they were supposed to receive freely! What twisted monster would steal from starving people? How do you think these people were able to pay for anything? Their only hope is to work in the black or gray market, and at this point they becomepart of the whole thing. Would you cut your own arms offand starve your family because the system was flawed? (Interview, 4)

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In many of these discussions a clear gap between principle and reality

emerged, highlighting the disconnect between public and personal goods. A

businessperson from Sarajevo described this situation and the paradox found in the

described behavior:

These people are put in a position where they are forced to act in ways that is normally against their better judgment, but does have a basis in the past—where favors and position were rewarded in some ways. However, this was a fairly stable and controlled system. Now, people are forced to become part of a larger system of criminality. The situation is upside-down, the normal behavior is in fact criminal, and anyone who acts on principle is either stupid or on a suicide mission. (Interview, 78) The same respondent later in the discussion likened this “syndrome” to

“.. .some kind ofLes Miserables, where Valjean is rewarded for the theft by being made

head of the bread company.. .it is like heroin addicts running the methadone clinic.”

(Interview, 78)

Law Enforcement

The lack of police and judicial impact on these problems was a key theme in

discussing domestic institutions and the poor placement of a system of rule of law in BiH.

Many law enforcement personnel, from various standpoints in the system, openly

described a legal system that is riddled, purposely, by inconsistencies, jurisdictional gaps,

and curbed investigative and prosecutorial powers. In several cases their was intra

category finger-pointing: where police officers blamed the courts and prosecutors for

slow processing, “burying,” and often losing cases and critical evidence collected. A

standard refusal to prosecute is stated in the standard slogan “insufficient material

evidence,” where no other information is given to an investigating officer when the case

is rejected. Most of the police officers who described these problems believed, although

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nearly all of them were quick to qualify a lack of clear proof (insinuating the irony in the

“insufficient material evidence” mantra), that this was a clear sign of little judicial

independence and in some cases direct corruption of the judicial process—despite the

great efforts made to transform the system.

On the other hand, prosecutors, judges, and magistrates put the blame on

internationally driven legal reforms forced by a United States-led effort to convert the

BiH legal system from a Continental Law basis to Common Law and down to the police

for being poorly trained and corrupt. In one discussion a member of the judicial system

stated:

Judges and prosecutors no longer have the power to ensure cases are properly investigated because the laws and procedures are servants to the international political desires to make everything multi-ethnic, even at the risk of inefficiency and strained justice. (Interview, 64)

All law enforcement members pointed to confusing jurisdictions as a key

culprit in the institutional ineffectiveness of the legal system. One Mostar-based law

enforcement member described it as:

“...the institutionalization of weak justice, (where).. .even if one were to ignore the issue of corruption, which does exist unevenly across the country, the institutions are so separated that it is nearly impossible to prosecute anything outside of strictly local, straight-forward cases. (Interview, 124)

The apparent confusion and inefficiency in law enforcement comes from two

issues: segmented jurisdiction and few overlapping or state/entity-wide authorities. Law

enforcement jurisdiction is split among the cantons with no entity level police force in the

Federation and a bare-bones structure in the RS. In the Federation, each canton’s police

force and judiciary has primacy and full control over their area of responsibility. There

are no formal ways of ensuring cooperation or information sharing across cantons. There

are no state or Federation-level agencies that have a broader mandate. Even in cases

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involving the State Border Service (SBS), jurisdiction is clearly separated by duty

responsibilities. Therefore, this state-level organization can only operate in a specific

area. In cases where investigations, logistics, or other operational concerns require

cooperation with a canton or opstina police force, there is little guarantee that this support

will be provided by the local authorities. As one Sarajevo-based law enforcement official

put it:

We have one state, two entities, three nations, and 27 police forces. None of these divisions is required to cooperate with another beyond the common-sense notion that it is in the best interest of all to do so. This is not to mention the problems of the Brcko District and municipal police forces. (Interview, 93)

The lack of a clear hierarchy of authority in the police and security structure

ofBiH makes it easy to undermine investigations and police activities, requiring

coordination and cross-jurisdiction approvals. This scenario favors corruption of the legal

system because it allows criminals to use certain areas as home bases, knowing that they

are protected by these walls. Even in cases where police forces try to cooperate across

jurisdiction, the processes of approval are often slow and heavily political exercises. A

Mostar-based law enforcement personnel summed this problem up well by stating:

If we have a problem in Mostar with a person fromTrebinje or Livno, we have little chance of doing anything about it unless we can catch them here. However, they do not have to come here often,and when they do they are fully aware o f what the local police are doing because they were most likely provided a copy of our request for investigative assistance. (Interview, 107)

The small size of the country and jurisdictions makes it almost impossible to

deal with large scale, trans-area crimes such as smuggling and trafficking. Even in cases

where someone is apprehended for a crime in a jurisdiction, the necessary supporting

information is slow to come or never obtained, making it difficult for a prosecutor to hold

and indict someone. In the end, the lack of material evidence must be cited and the

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detainee released. The inability to move fromarrest to prosecution has a deeply negative

effect on police morale and the perception of their ability to protect the public good. “It

used to be the case (before the war) that we would have 100 to 200 complaints a week

from general citizens. Now we are lucky to get two or three. The people do not trust the

police and those who might, believe that we are so ineffective it is not worth the risk of

making a complaint,” stated one official.This led to a lack of respect for the authorities

and a trend toward vigilantism,which is evidenced by the rise in private security firms

and other informal protection rackets. The lack of public protection plays directly into the

hands of organized crime groups that fill this void and use these jurisdictional and

bureaucratic inefficiencies to further limit legitimate policing.14

Government Efficiency

The lack of efficiency in legal institutions is the most direct comment on

government’s ability to address organized crime and corruption in BiH. These problems

are accentuated and furthered by a perceived general lack of efficiency across BiH

governmental institutions. Many interviewees across role and region perceived this

general problem to be so large that it seemed impossible to overcome within the current

system. In many cases respondents linked this problem to both personal interest and a

lack of competency. These two issues, as discussed above, took on a mantra-like quality

throughout the course of discussions. However, discussions of governmental efficiency

wThis is a common problemseen in most transitional countries, which actually slows the process of transition and punishes ordinary citizens. The Russian example highlights this process well, see Shelley, Handelman, and Volkov for specific examples in that case.

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oftenled to a discussion of international efforts to build democratic and liberal market

institutions in BiH.

Interviewees generally blamed the international community for many of these

problems, seeing the international effort as inconsistent and insufficientfor building

meaningful, functioning governmental institutions. In some cases, respondents went

further to suggest that the international community must be complicit in some of the

criminality that seems to be enshrined in and protected by the current governmental

system because they allowed it all to happen.

International Responsibility

Local perceptions and attitudes toward the international community’s

capability to tackle the problems of organized crime and corruption—as well as their

sense of responsibility in the matter—can be summed up as too little, too slowly, and too

uneven. The local responses to questions regarding the international role in solutions and

problems stemming from the issues ranged from the belief that the international

community was doing its best to open complicity and abetting the problems. However,

most interviewees described the scope, timing, and method of international actions as

critical issues in their evaluation. Table 3-5 characterizes these perspectives.

Table 3-5: International Responsibility Perceptions

Scope Timing Method Opinion Makers Narrow and Slow and inefficient Reflective, not functionally focused proactive Law Enforcement High-level, no Slow Rigid and confused follow-through Businesspersons Myopic and city- Inefficient and Impeding and based sporadic inconsistent

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Scope

Many respondents opined the international community was too narrow in its

approach to the problems of organized crime and corruption. The critiques of the scope

ranged from an over-focus on law-making to regional exclusion—rarely reaching beyond

Sarajevo. The functional responses were summarized well by a Sarajevo-based opinion

maker:

The OHR is very good at drafting, debating, rewriting, presenting, and pushing legislation—all shapes and sizes. But, they make nearly no effort to ensure the laws are effective or applied in any meaningful way. They may just be tired after all of the writing and fighting with our parliament, but it is clear to everyone that these laws function as little more than signposts. (Interview, 44)

Another Sarajevo-based opinion maker summarized this perspective with a

slightly different anecdote:

I have sat through meeting with OHR and the UNHCR, watching flow charts and diagrams go by. The international community is so focused on drawing pictures that they forget human beings are supposed to somehow fit into those little squares and circles. They expect process to be a solution, despite the fact that these pictures are very foreign to us in many cases. I understand their hope ofbringing discipline to our governing structures, but discipline must start within the person first-he must see the benefit. However, here there is no need for such discipline because they go through organizational charts like we go through beer.. .and often leave it, as we do. (Interview, 62)

These comments point to a perception that the international community’s

focus on institutions is missing substance. The humor laced into these comments is

common when opinion makers talk about the international community’s capacity to

address organized crime and corruption. One Brcko-based opinion maker made these

more specific comments:

The international community seems to talk incessantly about organized crime and corruption. They call for reforms and a more active police force. They insist on independent oversight and judicial inquiries. But, none of this leads to addressing the problems. More often than not, they just talk. The situation is becoming bleaker by the day because the people do not believe the international community really cares about

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these problems. This attitude has become very cynical. It is not uncommon to hear a new version of an oldcommunist-era proverb: “they pretend to care, and we pretend to be interested.” (Interview, 212)

The same interviewee went on to describe his understanding ofthis cynicism

toward the international community:

People are just tired. Everyone one here loves intrigue, gossip, and conspiracy, but we have so muchthese days-it is overwhelming. Now, it just doesn’t really matter what the international community says. Most of us just smile. We know nothing will really change. Why should anyone make the emotional investment in caring about such big issues, when we have so many day-to-day problems that will seemingly never be resolved? (Interview, 212)

Critiques of international community regional myopia came mostly from

Banja Luka-based and Mostar-based interviewees, perceiving an inordinate amount of

attention paid to Sarajevo. Discussants from these two cities question the legitimacy and

prudence o f such a focus.15 One Mostar-based opinion maker saw the disparity primarily

in terms of political influence:

This city (Mostar) is the most important city in the southern part of the country. Denying this city proper political visibility only reinforces the problems here. This goes well beyond organized crime and corruption, or, maybe, it is a key reason why these problems are so prevalent in this region. The OHR presence here is primarily for maintenance and monitoring. There are very few efforts, outside of several independent media programs, to build the esteem of the city and region. Look at the state of this city. Very little has been rebuilt and now we are almost in our 10th year of peace. How can they (the international community) expect us to move beyond the problems of the war, if they are allowed to linger so obviously? (Interview, 48)

A Banja Luka-based businessperson saw the issue in economic terms:

Banja Luka is historically the most prosperous city in BiH. The Laktasi economic trade zone was one of the most successful experiments with free market capitalism and entrepreneurialism during communist times. The international community refuses to recognize the raw potential of the city and region. We are naturally pre disposed toward free markets and prosperity. But, the OHR and donor countries continue to pour money into Sarajevo projects. This is like pouring money down the drain. Sarajevo has severe infrastructure limits. It is a beautiful place, but investment there will do little for our economy. (Interview, 72)

15In fact, there is a growing, organic movement in Banja Luka, arguing that the city is better suited to be the state capital because of its prime location to key lines of communication and travel. One of the main projects being forwarded to support this idea is a move to improve the Banja Luka airport and make it the preferred arrival point into the country.

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With regard to scope, law enforcement personnel were mostly concerned

with judicial reform and the way top-level changes came to the cantonal level. Nearly all

lawyers and judges were highly critical of the changes in legal procedure. One Sarajevo-

based lawyer summed up the issue as follows:

The international community has allowedthe United States to dictate our new legal system, but we haveno experience in orappreciation for CommonLaw. Our system was based on Continental Law, which continues to function well in most of Europe. These changes are being imposed and we have a very steep learning curve. I do not believe this system will ever sit very well with our legal system. But, no one ever asked what we, as resident experts, thought about the system Anytime we protest, they say things like ‘your communist law will not work in a new BiH.’ But, this was never the character of our legal system Yes, the system was abused by officials,but when allowed to function properly, it did so. It is the highest form of arrogance and narrow-mindedness for the Americans to come in here and tell us these things. I know for a fact, most of the continental Europeans are not happy with this forced change. (Interview, 96)

A Mostar-based law enforcement member summarized the general

impression that high-level changes rarely make it to the field because there is little effort

to ensure the rules are properly briefed or enforced:

We are often confused about where the international community wants us to focus our efforts. Priorities change, and requirements come down, but we have so few resources to follow through on anything more than the basic work. Also, ourpeople are not that well trained and they just don’t understand how to respond to some of these laws. We have the distinct impression that the international community has little to no understanding about our capacity to act or enforce these laws. (Interview, 37)

A Sarajevo-based police officer goes on to suggest the frequency of changes

present additional challenges to an already under-prepared law enforcement system:

Everything seems to be in constant motion. They (the international community) cannot choose one strategy. We have had so many required surveys to assess the applicability of laws and procedures. These seem to lead to endless changes and new initiatives. We are lost in the blizzard. Even EUPM, and IPTF before them, shrug their shoulders. If they cannot follow the changes, how should we be expected to do so? (Interview, 18)

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Time

A predominant criticism of the international community’s effectiveness in

addressing the organized crime and corruption problems in BiH revolves around the issue

of time—namely the length of time it takes for action. The perceptions voiced in this

regard ranged from a confused bureaucracy to a corrupt organization. A Banja Luka-

based opinion maker summarized the confusion perspective:

The international community is this massive octopus, and each tentacle has its own brain and interests. The animal spends most of its time wrestling itself. By the time it reaches some consensus, it is exhausted and forgets the original point. They are focused on their own fight and do not have the time or energy to really focus on our problems. This international forum seems to be more focused on outdoing one another than helping us. If it were not so serious and have such a devastating impact on us, it would be something to laugh at. .. .This is why it takes them so long to make a decision or take action. Normally, by the time they do something it is too late. (Interview, 193)

A Brcko-based businessperson captured the most negative interpretation of

the international community’s slow action in the following way:

If they wanted to fix any of these problems they could. Look, this is a collection of some the world’s smartest people and richest countries. You cannot tell me they cannot find a solution to this little country’s problems. There must be some personal benefit in it. Maybe they are afraid of prosperity finding its way to this region because they do not want the competition. Maybe they just want to keep us down, so they can use us like some South American or Asian country. Who knows for sure? But, I do know they could fix all of this if they really wanted it. (Interview, 135)

Method

The method critiques often encompass a portion of one of the prior

perspectives, but it is identifiable as a separate argument. A Sarajevo-based law

enforcement member summarized this perception as follows:

My experience with the international community is generally positive, but they seem to make things up as they go. They don’t always seem to have a plan. When they do seem to have a plan, at times it doesn’t have much relevance to our problems. This is especially true when we talk about organized crime. They seem to base most of their opinions and solutions on their experience or understanding of the problems. I see this often when we discuss methods for dealing with the smuggling issue. Most of these international experts have nosense of what we are up against. They say things like, ‘just

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do it, arrest them,’ but it is not that easy. This is notGermany or the United States. We are working in a very different place, under different circumstances. (Interview, 40)

The problem of Western mirroringin the assessment and solutions for the

problems o f organized crime and corruption in BiH were mentioned frequently in the

course o f the interviews. Interviewees highlighted this perception with sidebar comments

referring to the way . .this is not the Sopranos,” or, . .the Godfather wouldnot last a

day here.” The point of these comments was to identify the unique aspects of the

problems in BiH. However, most respondents were quick to recognize that there is

sufficient similarity in cases to use the terms organized crime and corruption to describe

related issues. A Mostar-based opinion maker captured some of the differences by

criticizing an aspect of the questionnaire16:

Ok, I understand the words you are using in these questions, but the way you present them is as if you already know the answer. If you know the answer, then why are you asking me? .. .Too many internationals come through this country, patronizing us, and thinking they will teach us the way. I’m sorry, but I’ve tried very hard to see this way, but all I normally see are foreigners who stay for a day or two, say a few smart things, and leave. They leave us with very little because the conversation is mostly about what they think—rarely about what we think. (Interview, 251)

This exchange continued in the same fashion for some time and ended with

an agreement to be more attentive to one another’s opinions. The discussion highlights

the issueof respect, or international disrespect, which echoed through manyof my

interviews. It was not uncommon for discussants to be openly resistant to the interview,

only to realize at some point in the discussion that the only goal of the project was to

catalog their perceptions. Interestingly, this realization often sparked a deeper, more

16I purposely used international jargon and characterizations in forming the questionnaire to elicit someof these responses, if in fact local discussants felt they might be misleading. A minority of interviewees challenged the wording of the questions, but the discussions with that minority were useful and shed some additional light on one part of the complex local perceptions. In fact, these challenges demonstrate that a significant minority of local professionals are insulted, to some degree, by the insinuation of international perspectives and experiences.

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candid conversation, requiring a return to earlier questions and issues. The belief that the

international community does not respect local, professional viewpoints, plays as an

instructive role in attitude formation as the issues of trust, culture, and history did in the

earlier segments of this chapter. These attitudes shape and perpetuate the corresponding

gaps between international and local in addressing the issues of organized crime and

corruption in BiH.

Section Two

There were several themes I addressed in the interviews: social impacts

(security and trust); institutional responsibility; and international effectiveness. These

themes were complemented by several others that respondents continually highlighted

and brought out as crucial issues: nepotism and societal malaise. These last two issues

can be incorporated into the three broader themes, but they cut across each in a unique

way and demonstrate a different way of approaching the local perceptions and attitudes. 17

Acknowledgement and incorporation of these themes into the project is necessary for

maintaining consistency in identifying the proper context and sub-texts of perceptions

about organized crime and corruption and how these problems are part of the larger social

experience. Each of these issue sets are related in numerous ways, but, for the sake of

description and analysis, it is useful to break these categories apart to demonstrate their

17In fact, my thesis and methods belie myown influenceby the international community. Despite the fact that my years of research in the region show me these profound disconnects in perception and attitude, I wanted to believe that the issue was not programmatic, but rather more personality based—some sort of subjectivity that addressed less structural and cultural antecedents.

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place as well as contingency in the larger syndrome of social problems in BiH.18 Over

90% of the interviewees saw the relationship between corruption, unemployment, and

general social disorder as cyclical in causality, as opposed to linear. In discussing the

nature of this cycle of social problems, many described the relationship between more

basic forms of social disorder (unemployment, etc.) and more developed forms (official

corruption) as interwoven and necessary for the perpetuation of each activity—each

causing the other in various phases of the activities. Table 3-6 identifies and characterizes

the active gaps in perception and attitude found between international and local in this

study.

Table 3-6: Characterization of Analytic Gaps

International Local Social Impacts Ethnic divide driving Connected issues, driven by separate issues corrupt politics (Trust) OC and Corruption Separate issues, like kind Veza and personal security (Culture) Institutional Capacity Reform and high-end Misunderstanding of capacity building process and reform- initiatives—process drives skeptical (History) substance International Laboratory, passing on best Lack of focus and rhythm- Responsibility practices and lessons cynical (Respect) learned

Table 3-6 summarizes the different ways international and local actors

perceive these issues. The parenthetical references describe the key aspect of the gap

found in these frames. Each of the gap characteristics is found to some extent across this

18In fact, many interviewees discussed unemployment, drug addiction, poverty, and suicide as clear indicators of this larger and contingent process that is in a reciprocal relationship with the issues of organized crime and corruption.

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framework used to analyze the data collected in the conduct of this project. However,

each respective gap characteristic appeared dominant in the context of the sectional issues

discussed.

Social Impacts

Questions related to this theme were meant to establish if the local

community understood the problems of organized crime and corruption as part of the

social experience or as a separate element, as insinuated by international positions and

policies—beyond the category of society and in its own place. The communal aspects of

organized crime and corruption were described best along a continuum of issues: ranging

from social contingency, through personal ethics and social norms, to the weakness of

trust in and function of government. The issue of social contingency is crucial for

understanding the first order placement of the problems—the origin and role of the

activities. In most recent descriptions of organized crime and corruption, a double move

of sorts is underway, as analysts tend focus on the negative results of the actions taken as

an external blow, blight, or sickness on society. The international perception is embedded

in this differentiation and institutionalized through legal dictates that draw a clear, if

arbitrary line between these actions and society at large. Peter1 Q Andreas’ study of

Mexican-United States border regimes underlines how a set of such frameworks tend to

play two roles in the social control—one is to discipline and shape behavior, the other is to

socialize or market the separation as natural and moral (Andreas, 2001). In most cases the

19This movement to separate and isolate criminality is a primary postulate of the rule of law, as the legal statute functions to discern universal rales. However, as pragmatic legal scholarship demonstrates the framing activity used in this way tends to be an institutional rationalization that emphasizes rule over individual action. The tension between the actions ~ be it judgment or criminal intent—minimizes the communal culpability in setting that specific framework.

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understanding of organized crime and corruption is one of a foreign body, parasite, or

disease that corrupts the naturally good or healthy society. This position acts to physically

and philosophically separate criminality and corruption from society. This first move of

separation leads to a motivational or marketing second move, which conditions or

privileges the way we see and experience certain social behavior as criminal—devoid of

responsibility or contingency to the activities.

The above dualistic description of the problem is a primarily Western, liberal

democratic viewpoint, and describes the way most of the international community

describes and addresses the problems of organized crime and corruption in BiH. The

definitions used by the United Nations, SFOR, OHR, and other multilateral organizations

emphasize this separateness or socially external aspect of these problems. The cure to

such foreign social ailments requires a certain isolation and specialized category. The

institution of the Rule of Law acts as the ultimate arbiter for isolation and categorically

differentiated treatment. Here, organized crime and corruption are on the wrong side of

legitimacy and as such cannot be treated as something within society, but as something

opposed to society, as it is in direct contradiction to the rule of law. The subtle shift made

by some in this exchange is in judgment of the action, where the law is static and the

group or individual chooses to be inside or outside society. This less Calvinistic approach

merely reverses the stressed object in the dualistic relationship from the nature of the

individual or group to the nature of the action. In any case, they are limiting exercises that

lead to the isolation of the actor or act—as somehow outside of society.

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Most of my respondents saw the relationship between society and criminality

as more holistic, contingent and consistent behavior in the context of their community.

One interviewee captured this difference well, stating:

You people see these crooks as somesort of invading army, butyou are the invaders. These crooks...comefrom ourcommunity. They are acting normallyand rationally given the situation. It only makes sense to do these things in a place where there is no effective government to enforce personal ethics. (Interview 46)

This person, like many others in this project, saw organized crime and

corruption as part of their social experience and the rule of law as a governmental tool

used to impose a certain moral code. Another respondent suggested that “social disorder

is part of the cycle we live in.. .it shapes our everyday life and forces us to behave in

certain (distinct) ways.” (Interview 104)

Another highlighted form of social contingency came in the discussion of

personal ethics, according to one politically active opinion maker in Sarajevo:

Where we all understand that things like smuggling and corruption are wrong at some level, we also understand that the system does nothing to deter such action.. .actually the worst thing that can happen is loss of a government position or, rarely, a short prison sentence. (Interview 215)

The issue of personal ethics and the paradox of integrity were highlighted by over 90% of

the BiH businesspersons responding to the questionnaire. Typically, they considered it

“economic suicide” to adhere to the rules, . .it is a guaranteed way to go out of

business” (Interviews 22 and 31). In almost all of these cases, respondents understood

personal ethics as an expression of communal moral values—contingent on the needs of

society and tied to the transformation of social life in the aftermath of the Bosnian Civil

War.

The personal ethic-social morality continuum was captured in the lack of a

clear transformational direction of BiH society. A Banja Luka-based opinion maker

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defined this as a gap or divide in terms of state weaknesses undermined by communal

needs in stating:

...the real challenge to society is in our blatant lack of confidence in the processes of change and the institutions that have come fromthis., .even our policymakers clearly do not believe in the system as they are the most egregious offendersof the code they supposedly sponsored or backed, through international dictate. (Interview 60)

This was further exemplified in numerous Mostar interviews, where the

governing structure remains in administrative limbo, . .our government has ceased to

exist as anything other than an administrative caretaker—focusing on ethnic consolidation

before society’s needs and improvement.” (Interview 114)

In these three cases—along the continuum of general social contingency

through personal ethics and weak governing structures—respondents were quick to

implicate the international community as culpable in these problems. The responses

tended to vacillate between extremes of the “.. .international community is doing the best

they can hope to do in a place like this,” and “they have purposefully created a muddle,

so they can maintain control—they want us to fail at some level, so they can reap the

rewards of our economy and territory (Interviews). In several well-articulated cases

discussants tied these viewpoints together, as demonstrated by this Sarajevo-based law

enforcement officer:

The sad ironyis that we enable one another toward weakness because no one is committed tomaking the hard decisions necessary to foster real change. The politicians do not want to give up their ability to make a lot of money and secure their families’ and friends’ futures, and the international community is not willing to put the time and money necessary into making real, effective and long-lasting change (Interview, 206).

The stagnancy demonstrated in this string of exchanges and commentaries

contrasts directly with international attitudes, using the issue of organized crime and

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corruption as the cause as well as the effect of the current stagnancy. In the end, the

“blame-game” is formalized and adheres to society, including intra-local and

international viewpoints. In this way, the “blame-game” unfolds to allow for denial

within these categories. Such is the case when OHR representatives complain about the

SFOR unitary agenda, as one Sarajevo-based officialfor over two years commented,

“They (SFOR) want to do whatever they want without coordination or discussion and let

OHR clean up after they have made a mess.”(Interview, 223)20

The clear message sent in this discussion is that local experts see these

problems as part of a larger set of social problems that must be addressed in tandem with

or prior to specific issues. This overall thrust of the discussion is tied directly to

discussions of nepotism and anomie as larger structural issues. The lack of attention to

these social facts reinforced the more specific problems of organized crime and

corruption and enabled them to isolate and separate the issues fromthe larger debate.

Although few respondents explicitly articulated the link between this isolation technique

and the removal of the international community from culpability, they often made the

negative observation that slow or deliberate moves by the international community made

the problems much worse than they need be and embedded them in the “normal”

behavior and daily lives of BiH citizens at all levels.

20I had many informal discussions with international representatives during my research, discussing my findings and eliciting their responses to measure specifics in these gaps. This comment came in direct discussion of the 2001 Herzegovacka Banka raids where SFOR and-late in the game-OHR raided a suspected Herzeg Bosna financial stronghold. In fact, the evidence for the raid is compelling, but to date there has not been a single indictment as a result, suggesting a lack of international will or non-material proof. In either case, the raid has turned into a public relations fiasco, especially in the ethnic Croat areas and has done more to build nationalist sentiments than most other direct ethnic attempts. This is another example of the unintended circumstances that result from legitimacy frame production outside of the larger social context and will be discussed in some length later in the paper.

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Chapter 4 continues with this analysis, focusing on the statistical results of

the project. These findings will assist in developing a more complete and compelling

picture of the perceptions and attitudes identified and analyzed in this chapter. The results

will be the building blocks for policy-oriented recommendations for addressing the gaps

identified through this study.

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CHAPTER FOUR

CLOSED QUESTION ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEWS

This chapter analyzes the data discussed and developed in Chapter 3 through

a purposefully narrow lens, assisting in further articulating and demonstrating the

findings of this research. As discussed in Chapter 2 ,1 adopted a mixed methods approach

to blend the data into a series of useful frames for a longer continuum of deliberation and

use. Theoretically, this approach represents the intentions of philosophical pragmatism’s

educational application—finding the “unity of knowledge” embedded in social practice.1

This second phase of analysis brings the study into a different sector of the social science

laboratory, demonstrating wider utility of the data and rich opportunities for further

inquiries. The closed questions discussed in this chapter represent a fraction of what

could be done with this data. However, the intent of this project is to use these methods to

evaluate, deepen, and reinforce the earlier, open discussion. This second phase of analysis

is meant to shed a different light on these data, pointing out key convergences and

puzzles that result from the different lenses.

The analysis in this chapter is organized into four main sections: basic

interviewee statistics; sociological responses; institutional responses; and functional

responses. Each of these sections will present the data captured in the 15 questions

'See Menand’s discussion of Dewey’sLaboratory School and the development of his conceptof unity of knowledge. This idea and practice is critical for understanding the evolution and broader application of philosophical pragmatism as a useful theoretical framework for discussing these issues.

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developed to elicit limited responses.2 These explanations are arranged in support of the

frameworkdeveloped earlier, generally enhancing the understanding of the key gaps

found between international and local perspectives. However, several anomalies present

themselves in this approach and provide a useful outlet for demonstrating both the

complexity of the interviews and the areas of falsifiability that are crucial for proving the

social scientific viability of this approach. These closed questions shed light into various

comers obscured by a purely open approach, lending more detail to the analysis. It also

illuminates areas of methodological concern discussed in Chapter 2, with an aim toward

transparently evaluating the project and perfecting the approach—aiming to develop a

robust research project applicable to further studies.

Interviewee Statistics

Ethnicity, location, disclosure, and categorical percentages are important for

understanding the actual breakdown of respondents through a variety of classification

lenses. The percentages generally reflect the demographics of BiH with several

exceptions, discussed below in turn.3 The baseline, described through these statistics,

demonstrates the complicated web of ethnic, demographic, and employment data which

feeds directly into this study. In each case, all efforts were made to develop interviews

2In several ofthese questions, after limited answers were given we discussed the issues in a more open manner. This helped me understand the logic used and tensions felt in answering a closed question in a specific way. However, I did not change any initial answers to closed questions based on the open discussions that followed—despite severalrequests to do so. 3According to the latest CIA World Fact Book data, the following indicators correspond with the statistics discussed in this section: population by ethnicity, Muslim, Serb, Croat; ethnic populations of cities used to frame analysis, Banja Luka, Brcko, Mostar, Sarajevo; and employment statistics. Additionally, the first Transparency International statistics, evaluating the level of public trust in government, support the disclosure numbers.

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that corresponded with the official demographics, while qualifying for the unique post

war population concentrations found in these primary metropolitan areas.

Disclosure Signatures

The breakdown of disclosure described in Figure 4-1 corresponds directly

with the latest Transparency International (TI) indicators, aimed at measuring public trust

in governmental institutions. It also corresponds with the increasingly low levels of local

trustin international institutions. These results are similar to those described by Wedel

and Verdery in their respective studies, highlighting a lack of trust and faith in

international efforts to evaluate and assist in transformation (Wedel, 2001 and Verdery,

2000). This interview project suffered froma general public distrust and jaundice toward

external evaluations, such as this and similar sociological investigations—ranging from

NGO surveys to scholarly studies.

Figure4-1: Disclosures Signed

Yes, 41%

In many cases, interviewees commented that they would participate in the

study, but believed that it would do little to no good in evaluating or solving the problems

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associated with the project, hi a few cases, respondents expressed direct and indirect

suspicion about the ultimate goals associated with this project. In one particular case, a

Banja Luka-based interviewee ended the discussion abruptly after a gradual elevation in

tension with the organized crime-specific question in the latter half of the interview. As

this particular interviewee quickly stood up, after a perfunctoryglance at his watch,

stating, “I have no more time for this. Go back and report to your government. I have told

you nothing.” (Interview, 166)4

The minority of disclosure signatures indirectly corresponds with

Humphrey’s discussion of problems associated with out-group access to informal

networks (Humphrey, 1991). More specifically, this result, coupled with the initially

reserved tone found in most of these interviews, supports Ledeneva’s experience in

developing information about blat networks in Russia.5 In many cases, interviewees

ruminated aloud over the option of signing the disclosure, often leading to pushing a

decision aside—leaving the final determination for signature. In several instances this

external dialog of internal option weighing, provided access to the predispositions and

attitudes the discussant brought into the interview.6

4In fact, this interview was immensely useful in establishing a continuum of non-verbal attributes that assisted in evaluating discomfort with certain topics. I used these attributes as framing and probing cues, in an effort to establish the root of the discomfort. These cues and probes assisted in exposing less than truthful responses and other issues, inhibiting direct and consistent answers. sLedeneva, an ethnic Russian, had difficulty getting people -even those she knew - to talk directly about their experiences within a structure of informal social networks. She found it was easier to get people to talk more openly in terms of third parties rather than about their own experiences. Access to this informal behavior is guarded in discussions of the details surrounding the associations and behavior. 6I intentionally went over the disclosure form with each interviewee before the formal questions as a way of putting them at ease about anonymity and to measure their comfort level with the topic and in an exchange with a foreign scholar. These pre-interview discussions were instrumental in preparing an initial assessment about the demeanor of the respondent, since in most cases, I had no prior relationship with the discussant.

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Respondent Ethnicity

Figure 4-2 highlights the most obvious inconsistency with BiH official

demographics, reversing the Serb to Muslim ethnic ratio.7 However, this inversion is

representative of the cities used to frame the project. Statistically, the four cities used in

this study should have rendered an ethnic distribution consistent with demographics.

However, polarity and access made this nearly impossible, given time constraints. Banja

Luka presented the most obvious case of polarity, where a huge ethnic Serb majority

continues to dominate the power institutions, academia, media, and business. Although I

was able to identify several ethnic Muslims for interviews in Banja Luka, these cases

were far rarer than anticipated.

Figure 4-2: Ethnicity of Respondents

Muslim, 31% Serb, 48%

Croat, 21%

7In the BiH context, Muslim is a term of ethnicity. In most cases an ethnic Muslim is someone who affiliates most closely with that religious orientation, butdoes not necessarily practice the religion. This is similar to the labels of Protestant and Catholic in Northern Ireland - affiliationhas little to do with religious practice and more to do with location and family ties. There is no choice associated with the label. It is something one is bom with, rather than into.

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Mostar and Sarajevo produced similar problems with polarity and the largest

challenges to access. Despite a nearly even split in ethnicity in Mostar and a

corresponding representation in official positions, the Croatian community is much more

involved in developing businesses and aggressively monitoring BiH governmental

activities through an activist press and NGO community. This explains the empirical

difference and hints at a key variable in its structure, adding to continued division in the

city. Mostar’s importance for each ethnicity is another reason for the disparity. Bosnian

Croats, especially those whoidentify themselves with Herzegovina, see Mostar as their

capital city, where Bosnian Muslims traditionally treat the city as important, but

peripheral—favoring Sarajevo and the central Bosnian city Zenica over the former. In this

way, Bosnian Muslim influence and investment is less concentrated than that of the

Bosnian Croats in the city—giving them a distinct advantage.

Respondent Location

Figure 4-3 displays the location of the interviews. These statistics roughly

correspond with the location most subjects called their home. However, in some cases

these cities were locations of work for the interviewees or where they traveled to visit

friends or family. These cities are considered important multi-ethnic hubs in the country

and were selected for this reason. However, as in the case of Mostar described above,

each location plays a weighted role in each of the ethnic populations. Banja Luka is

weighted toward the Bosnian Serbs, noted as the official capital of the Republika Srpska

(the officially separate ethnic Serb enclave in BiH). Despite a significant number of

Muslim and Croat returnees in the area around the city, it continues to be dominated by

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the ethnic Serb population and interests. Sarajevo is similar to Banja Luka, but serves the

same purposes for the Bosnian Muslims. Again, despite a number of official returnees,

both ethnic Serb and Croat populations reside largely outside the official city limits of

Sarajevo—primarily around Rogatica, Pale, and Kiseljak. Brcko interestingly is different

from the other three hubs used in this project, as it is an international test case for inter

ethnic union. The OHR fully oversees the administration of the city, forcing the

mandatory return of Muslims and Croats in the 2001/2002 time frame.8 The

internationalization of the city brought a more balanced ethnic population and a large

amount of concentrated investment for infrastructure repair and augmented civil service

salaries. Hoping to demonstrate the possibilities of development in BiH through the case

of Brcko, the IC unintentionally created a new case of disparity in the country—making

the city an artificial oasis for disproportionate wealth.9

Figure 4-3: Location of Respondents

Sarajevo Banja Luka, 31% 35%

Mostar, Brcko, 18% 16%

8OHR decided during this period that it could not continue to put off afinal decision on the status of Brcko- -inside either the Federation or Republika Srpska-which the city straddles. Tensions were raised each time status decisions were delayed, prompting the internationalizationof the city. 9To highlight this disproportion one need only look at the salaries of Brcko police officers, which are double and triple their peers’ pay in the rest of the country. Additionally, one OHR officer, who spoke confidentially, stated that the mayor and primary staff of the city make more than the tri-partite presidents and legislators at the entity and state levels.

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This divided reality, coupled with the regional importance of each city,

challenged interview conduct and analysis by making it difficult—especially in the case of

Banja Luka—to find multi-ethnic interviewees. I built in the necessary diversity to

evaluate the regional data by expanding the interviews into the suburbs surrounding the

cities, but the realities of division and effects this imposed on respondents is a necessary

factor to consider for understanding the local dynamic in each place. The elevated

percentages in Banja Luka represent a concerted effort to seek out Croat and Muslim

voices in the area, naturally enriching the data from that city without artificially skewing

the empirical realities of continued division and ethnic marginalization.

Respondent Category

The percentage of interviews by category is consistent with the focus of the

project. The legal category, 56% of all interviews, captures a wide range of official law

enforcement, judicial, and security professionals—fairly representing the variety and size

of the continuum of official effort. Correspondingly, the opinion maker and business

categories, respectively 29% and 15%, are smaller in the interview pool in proportion to

the size of each category. The number of opinion makers—journalists, political pundits,

and local NGOs—concentrating on issues of organized crime and corruption is a sub-set

of the larger pool. Potential opinion-maker interviews were screened and selected on the

basis of demonstrating a level of interest and expertise through their status (for example,

as a crime reporter for Crna Kronika) or through their written and oral record (NGO

reports). The business representation is smaller than the other categories because locally

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owned companies—public and private ventures—are growing, but continue to be a small

subset of total, legitimate business in BiH.10

Figure 4-4: Respondent Category

Business, Opinion maker

The range of business sector interviews, combined with the near-monolithic

responses on key questions suggests probable low variance, excepting those who may

have an interest in being less than honest and forthcoming in the exchange.

Sociological Responses

The sociological portion of the interviews addressed the social causes and

effects of organized crime and corruption in the daily life of Bosnian citizens. One of the

ancillary hypotheses of this project resulted from an apparent difference in the way locals

and internationals discussed these problems. The local perspective found in print and

electronic media appeared to focus on social issues, driving both the conduct and results

,0It would have been useful to do more interviews with business managers from the energy, large services, and banking sectors, as they play largely in corruption scandals. However, this fact made it nearly impossible to secure officialinterviews with these companies—such as some of the major telecommunications enterprises. In most cases, my requests were ignored. In the rare case where I actually talked with an officialI was told that they had nothing to say on the topic. Although I did secure several interviews with important managers in these sectors—they were arranged through intermediaries and mostly represented those who wished to clear their name or had clear frustration with organizedcrime and corruption in BiH.

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of organized crime activities. International perspectives, found in similar media and

officialstatements, focused on the need for better, more functional legal and security

institutions. The gray area came in the form of pamphlets and position papers released by

both local and foreign NGOs--lookingat issues related to political culture and the

impediments to real social transformation in BiH. These discussions often fell below the

dominant, more publicly accessible media presentations and interviews. However, they

highlighted a topic rarely addressed in the more apparent forum—the position that many

of the current problems in BiH were linked closely with an historical and cultural legacy

that informed political and economic behavior.

In most cases, these largely NGO-authored or funded tracts only scratched

the surface of these historical and cultural issues. Few spoke directly about the specific

form of informal social networks beyond the occasional pejorative sentence or short

paragraph addressing corruption. However, even in the most specific cases, such as

several reports from the nascent Transparency International, BiH, Chapter, discussions of

corruption were pitched at the most public level—rarely even mentioning how this

behavior relates to everyday Bosnian life. The questions posed in the sociological portion

of the interviews aimed at detailing the relationship between high-level official

corruption, organized crime, and everyday informal social networks. The cycle of

behavior captured in these discussions provided a micro-frame (Figure 4-1) for

generalizing the relationship and process of informal behavior in Bosnian society. This

model is useful for demonstrating the logic and flow of many interviews in this section

and should be understood as a reference for this section of the project.

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The categoriesdisplayed in Figure 4-5 represent levels of influence and

exchange in BiH informal social relations in response to the sociologically oriented

questions in this project. These four levels correspond with a widening audience, entering

into a moreformal social space—yet shaping the construction of that space and providing

a foundation for local interpretations and attitudes toward the problems associated with

organized crime and corruption. Veza and stela are roughly comparable with Alena

Ledeneva’s discussion of blat (the Russian slang term for informal favors and exchange).

Like blat, veza and stela play a specific role in the lives of BiH citizens as having a fairly

uniform, unwritten set of procedures. The concepts, whose use primarily varies in

regional flavor and not in meaning, play an active role in the humor and self-reflecting

culture. In most cases where I asked about veza, the respondent would chuckle before

giving a reply or ask how I knew of this “public secret.”11

Figure 4-5: Informal Social Relations

Veza/Stela Favors/Barter

Extortion/Entrapment Organized Crime/Corruption

The association between the Bosnian informal social processes of veza and

stela and those of barter and informal exchange are similar to those discussed by Caroline

1 'The notion of the “public secret” is a favorite way for people in this region to refer to obvious, but often not discussed issues or actions. It corresponds with a cynical reference to taboos--or that which polite society does not discuss openly.

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Humphrey’s studies of Soviet and Mongolian societies. The association between

extortion/entrapment and organized crime/corruption follows similarly from much of the

literature written on these topics. The problems associated with a need for closed

definitions of these terms make it difficult to discuss the relationship between each of

these seemingly discrete categories. Humphrey discusses this false disassociation by

pointing to the processes in terms ofNeedham’s “polythetic category” (Humphrey and

Hugh-Jones, 1992). This concept attempts to capture the inter-relational foundations

found in attempting to define social categories that are in themselves terms of reference

for a complex set of social behaviors. Humphrey captures the essence of this false

disassociation in stating that “attempts to produce a universal definition or model of

(organized crime or corruption) usually involve stripping it from its social context and

result in imaginary abstractions that have little or no correspondence to reality.”

(Humphrey and Hugh-Jones, 1992; p 2)

The associative nature of these concepts allows for a broader, more complex

picture of the relationship between these activities and draws the analyst closer to an

empirically correct lens for discussing these issues.12 The translation from informal social

behavior to more public, legally defined issues such as extortion, corruption, and

organized crime is often lost to foreign analysts, but it is a crucial assumption made in

local understandings. A lack of attention to or understanding of this relationship

represents an essential element in the communication gap between international and local

12In fact, this ploythetic move provides a much more robust environment for buildinganalytical frameworks that comport with the empirical context, while addressing the bias-laden aspects of most written and oral discussions about these issues in BiH.

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perceptions on these issues.13 The remainder of this section describes the data gathered to

fill-in these associations within the context of this study.

The first question asked in the interview set the tone for further developing

the specifics of the informal social networking cycle and its internal mechanisms and

external influences. This question presented the interviewee with a range of possible

causal explanations for the issue of organized crime in BiH.

Figure 4-6: Question 1 on Sociological Causes of Organized Crime

Other, 4.40% Social Disorder 11.70% Unemployment, Officia 52.30% Corruption, 31.60%

The clear majority of respondents selected unemployment as a crucial causal

phenomenon in the current problem-set. However, most discussed this in conjunction

with underemployment and the relationship between the need for work and the lack of

legitimate opportunities. These discussions often brought the interviewee into a

discussion of the broader lack of social order in BiH. For many of those who cited

13Beyond the communicationgap, this blank space in international commentsand policies toward organized crime and corruption in BiH, also points to a less obvious epistemological difference, which is highlighted by the way most interviewees answered questions 1 and 3. Respondent knowledge is based on relational and associative understandings versus the more linear, generalized discussions found in international treatments of the topic.

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official corruption as a prime mover in the problem-set, they described this aspect as

hooked directly to social disorder, resulting in the BiH unemployment crisis. The

interviewees who settled on social disorder or other as their choice most oftenassessed

unemployment and official corruption as aspects of social disorder or a wider culture of

illegitimate behavior—a socialized relic of the Tito era.14

Question 3 quickly demonstrates why this seemingly simple question took on

a life of its own in many interviews.15 96.6% of the interviewees stated they saw each of

the issues discussed in Question 1 as related—not a part of a linear progression. As in the

case of Question 3, Question 6 made it clear that most interviewees were fully aware of

the issue, with 90.6% of the respondents stating in the affirmative and citing the most

recent event. In most of these cases, information about organized crime was

communicated through multiple venues (Question 7, 36.9%)—most often ranging from a

mixture of print and electronic media, professional investigative experiences, and word of

mouth. Of those who cited one source of information as most dominant, print media

(26.7%) narrowly beat-out electronic media (23.7%).

14Very few interviewees saw the legacy of communism as a primary aspect of the current problems. However, most acknowledged it played a role in shaping a much longer tradition of informal behavior in the region. This directly contrasts with many foreign pundits and scholars who place the former communist legacy as a primary variable in discussing many problems facing BiH. This contrast articulates one of the primary divisions in the knowledge gap found between international and local perceptions. In many of my interviews respondents were quick to say foreigners over-emphasize the importance of communism in the former Yugoslavia. Among those who opined this position, most felt that the assumption of importance was a sign of weakness in arguments and intellectual laziness—whereby foreigners tend toward the application of other models before testing the utility of the tool. 15In several cases, we discussed Question 1 for well over an hour. Often these treatments resulted in the interviewee feverishly sketching out a relational model or listing a range of other associated issues. In some cases, interviewees told me directly that they were tired of foreigners coming and asking questions about organized crime in BiH. One jokingly stated, “Sometimes I think you people invented the problem, so you’d have something to study. I don’t know what’s worse, organized crime or those who are interested in studying it.” (Interview, 202).

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These questions were crucial for opening the dialog and marked not only a

key aspect of the communication gap, but also a divide in how knowledge is formed on

these issues. The relational aspect of local knowledge demonstrates the active role played

by informal activities. This aspect is lacking or, at best, under-treated in foreign, expert

studies and comments on organized crime and corruption in BiH. Where international

studies and policies highlight a divide between legitimate and illegitimate behavior as the

bounds of inquiry on these topics, local discussions are informed by a more holistic

understanding. In most cases, these are un-voiced assumptions that require direct

investigation and in the end prove pertinent to the ontological foundations of the

perceptions. These foundations inform the epistemological underpinnings of attitudes.

These early, often un-spoken, differences form the primary aspects of the communication

and knowledge gaps found between local and international on these issues. Similar to

projectiles, whose slight, early paths divide, the later stages of course deviation are more

observable, but nearly unintelligible without marking the initial instance of difference.

Questions 9 and 11 emphasize and reinforce the relational knowledge

informing local perceptions and attitudes toward these problems. 69.5% of the

interviewees perceived the initial set of issues as prevalent in BiH society and 55.6%

believed they often affected daily life. These numbers differ drastically from international

opinions and attitudes, which are marked by an increasing sense that organized crime and

corruption are primary elements in the slow development of post-war BiH.16 The divide

in the way these questions were answered—not as clearly weighted to one side—

16A survey of the literature on the topic nearly universally points to these issues as primary and endemic. See the project bibliography for a full capture of international reports and academic articles addressing the issues.

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demonstrates a more holistic understanding and attitude toward these problems, as

opposed to questions 1 and 3. The notion of prevalence and frequencyof occasion caused

many interviewees to pause because it suggested to them an inordinate weight would be

given to social challenges. In discussing their answers to these questions many

respondents grappled with how these issues related to economic, political, and other

issues in BiH. An opinion maker interviewee in Sarajevo summed up this position well

by stating:

Yes, these problems are important and affect society as a whole-probably on a daily basis—but you should be careful in thinking this somehow explains all of the problems in BiH. This is a mistake many foreigners make. You focus on one issue and believe it tells you everything. This is a part of bigger issues. You cannot say if it is the chicken or the egg. It is there and it is important and needs to be considered, but your question is too restrictive. You should ask about other issues, so you understand the bigger picture. (Interview, 56)

This kind of discussion and internal debate occurred often in the context of

limited (yes/no or A/B/C) questions. These kinds of questions made many interviewees

uncomforfigure because it forced them to make direct decisions that were perceived as

potentially too narrow, even for those who understood my intentional use of open and

closed questions.

Question 30 acted as a summary for the sociological context of the project,

often reviewing* and pulling together aspects fromearlier •••17 points m the discussions.

Although the issue of veza and stela often came up in the course of the interview, this

question was the only time I formally addressed the issue in the discussion. For those

who did not use the terms up to this point, the question played the role of reflection-

referencing an informal local colloquialism. For those who mentioned the terms, the

17In this way, the first and last questions framed the total discussion, providing a self-check dimension to the exchange and allowing the interviewee to recognize and address possible inconsistencies or expand on certain elements from earlier parts.

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question played a role of summary and amplification. Unlike the mixed responses to

questions 9 and 11, 90.6% of the interviewees stated that veza and stela played a direct

role in the problems of organized crime and corruption in BiH.

Institutional Responses

The three closed questions specifically asked to address legal and

institutional perceptions help develop themes discussed in the other closed-question

sections. The difference in these questions is marked by the intent to isolate these issues

to measure how they affect local perceptions outside the larger relational context of the

discussion. Similar to the other sections, this separation intends to test the utility of the

generalizations theorized for building a more structured understanding and provide a

detailed explanation for the difference in perception and attitude between international

and local views in BiH.

Figure 4-7: Perceptions of Government’s Effectiveness

Yes, 14.70%

No, 85.30%

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Respondents were asked if the government was effective in addressing the

issues of unemployment, officialcorruption, social disorder, and other issues discussed in

the first four questions. The response to this question resoundingly was negative—with

85.3% opining that the BiH government was ineffective in addressing these issues. This

percentage is similar to the perceptions of international experts, as evidenced by number

of commentaries and studies focused on this institutional problem. However, the reasons

for these answers starkly contrast by group. Most local perceptions attached BiH

governmental ineffectiveness to insufficient and uneven international support.

International analyses, with several important exceptions, see the problem as resident in

BiH governing itself.18 This division in emphasis highlights an important difference in

expectations—where locals expected the international community’s involvement as

cooperative, the internationals focused more on guidance. The divergence in emphasis

expanded quickly as international guidance fell short of the local expectation of

cooperation. This expectation gap, insinuated in the sociological section of the

interviews, becomes clearer in discussing institutions and the functional realities

associated with organized crime and corruption in BiH.

The response to Question 19, addressing the international community’s

helpfulness in addressing these problems, presented another easily misunderstood

statistical response -similar to the open question contextualization of the closed response

to Question 5. 64.7% of the interviews stated that the international community had been

18DavidCharters is one of the most pronounced critics of the international community on this account. However, his insightful criticism has been interpreted by many internationals as over-stated with a lack of suggestions to resolve the issues he presents. In essence, Charters’ spirited critique made many internationals defensive because they interpreted the analysis as a personal critique—versus an institutional analysis.

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helpful in addressing many of these issues in BiH, but almost universally stated their help

was not enough—marked by uneven policies and inconsistent actions. A Mostar-based

governmental respondent summarized this widely held caveat well in stating:

It would be foolish to say the international community has not helped. This question is unfair and requires more information. There is no more direct conflict.This is the most important thing. I will say yes, of course, butit (international community assistance) is not enough and just as often,not helpful. There are two important reasons for this that we can see here in Mostar. First, they do not help by making our regional government so useless. The ethnicity rules are more importantthan finding skilled people to do important governmental jobs. Second, they send too many mixed signals that make it difficult for residents to understand their true intentions. Just look at all of the money they put into building a nice office for themselves. They did this before they made any real progress in re-building this city. Most of our government still has temporary offices in buildings that would be condemned in most European cities. (Interview 172)

Two important points are highlighted in this quote—unease with limited

questions not considering the context and a deep concern with international priorities. A

Banja Luka-based businessperson put further specificity to these points in stating:

This is not a yes or no question. How can I say either, when international intentions are so unclear? For every good thing done, it seems like there are two stupid things that follow. OK, I’ll say yes because it would be impolite to say they have been no help, but it is more important that you understand our confusion. When NATO came after the war in 1995/96, normal people were happy for an end to the war and for help, but this quickly evaporated when we saw that you (the international community) had no real plan and that you were not going to work with us. This must be partly intentional because you cannot be that ineffective. (Interview 181)

The above hint at the international community wanting to keep BiH

unbalanced comes into more focus in answer to the final closed institutional question (26,

represented in Figure 4-7), addressing categories of foreigners that contribute to the

problems of organized crime and corruption in BiH. In some cases, interviewees

perceived the lack of international clarity and uneven enforcement as a conspiracy of

profit. This argument was found most often in the ethnic Croatian responses in Mostar,

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referencing SFOR’s Operation WESTAR and Hecegovacka Banka raids as examples.19

This question is institutional because it was intended to focus the interviewee on specific

parts of the international community, hoping to bring some specificity to the perception

of international institutional complicity.

Figure 4-8: Foreign Contribution to Problems

Military Peacekeepers 10.20% None, Civilian 21.80% Peacekeepers 19.20% Other, oreign 9.40% Foreign NGOs, TCOs, 4.90% 33.10%

The answers most given to this question predominantly referred to foreign

transnational criminal organizations (TCO—33.1%) and aggregate peacekeepers (29.4 %).

The TCO reference was predominantly a regional answer, coming mostly from Mostar

and Brcko-based respondents (87.3%).20 Interviewees referenced Serbian or Croatian

i9ManyCroats in and around Mostar commentedon the conspiracy surrounding these raids. In most cases, they recounted the many media stories in the ethnic Croatian press (both in BiH and Croatia), suggesting that then-OHR High Commissioner Wolfgang Petrische personally profited from the activities by making way for an inexpensive buy-out for an Austrian bank. Despite the lack of evidence supporting this conspiracy, there is a strong belief-even among the better educated—that international corruption in some form lies behind the actions. 20Of the 21.8% of respondents whoanswered no to Question 26, 37% believed the problems were mostly internally generated and could not be fairly blamed on the international community. However, the remainder used the answer as morethan one, or in several cases all the choices. Although allowed to rank order their answers, I initially requested they pick one answer that stood out. The none decision was made in frustration after discussing the question at length by several of the remaining 63% of the category- highlighting, again, the difficulty many had in answering closed questions on this topic.

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criminal organizations in almost all of these cases. In seven instances Albanian and

predominantly regional perception of the problem marks a contrast with some

international studies, focusing on international ties to regional actors, versus the regional

aspect of the issue.

The differing focus on levels (regional versus international) details another

substantive aspect of both the knowledge and communication gaps directly impacting the

gap in expectations. The stark line between local and foreign knowledge comes largely

from the lack of attention paid toward regional actors, evidenced by the few studies of

specific groups and activities conducted by foreign analysts and scholars. The foreign

focus on transnational tendencies is in direct contrast to local experiences, which suggest

the need for a regional viewpoint that does not overemphasize the post-Yugoslav state

maps.22 For many international analysts the information available from local sources is

difficult to acquire and ascertain. In most cases, these realities create research

circumstances that make the transnational analysis more attractive.

The difference in analytic view causes a situation where discussions about

organized crime and corruption do not synch up despite the use of similar categories and

terminology. The different lenses provide each discussant with a different empirical

2'interestingly, this differed from myCroatian interviews, where nearly half of the respondents (mostly in Split and Dubrovnik) referenced Italian, Russian, Albanian, and Serb groups as part of a larger structural problem in the south of the country. _2This emphasis on treating the region as a unitary whole is an interesting irony, given the extent to which ethnic difference is emphasized. When I asked several interviewees about this seeming contradiction, each answered similarly, emphasizing the political nature of ethnicity over the empirical divisions. One ethnic Serb stated, “We have lived together forever, our ethnicity is a product of history not genetics and even less culture~as Vuk Karadzic proved. Ethnicity was a political tool for all who have ruled this region, why do you expect that change? Or maybe better to ask, do you (the international community) really want it to change?”

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dataset, creating a situation where one talks across the other—despite the belief that they

are discussing the same issue. This cross-talk overlaps with the “blame game” discussed

earlier, in confusing communications—resulting in frustration and dissolving confidence

on both sides. With the challenges to knowledge and discordant communication,

expectations form in isolation of shared facts—reinforcing the confusion and suspicion

voiced by many of these interviewees.

Functional Responses

The four closed functional questions, dealing with attributes specific to

organized crime and corruption in BiH, segue well with the final institutional question

(26) discussed above. The first two questions (14 and 15) addressed the relationship

between known attributes as compared to how serious the problems were in society.

These questions vary only in reference to the key indicators—prevalence and seriousness.

These questions assist in marking a difference between organized crime issues that are

often discussed in the media and those that may not be discussed much, but present a

serious challenge to governance and society. This differentiation was crucial for

discussing the role of the media in shaping the organized crime agenda, as well as the

international control exercised over the larger media venues. There was a general sense

among interviewees that a perceived foreign-inftuencedmedia reported on the issues

OHR and other powerful international institutions wanted emphasized.23

23In fact, some interviewees(most in the media themselves) believed theinternational community actually controlled most of the media. A specific example of this was made by Bosnian Muslim respondents, who saw the ongoing public tension between SlobodnaBosna ’sChief Editor, Senad Avdic, and High Representative Paddy Ashdown. In some cases, interviewees saw OHR rhetoric and threats as a troublesome form of censorship.

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Figure 4-9: Most Prevalent OC-Related Activities

Human -Trafficking, 3.40%

Protection

Privatization Corruption, 19.90%

‘ommodities Trafficking, 7.90% Other, 3.40' \ Money ^Laundering, 4.10%

The answers to Question 14 (Figure 4-9) were weighted toward privatization

corruption and commodities trafficking.24 For a large majority of those picking more than

one (56.5%), both privatization and commodities trafficking issues were regularly cited.

Interestingly, many respondents perceived protection rackets as one of the most under

reported, yet prevalent issues seen day-to-day on the streets. The media reference in

Question 14 kept several intervieweesfrom choosing this function, and often pushed

them into more than one choice—again demonstrating their unease when forced to

compartmentalize the issues.

Discussions of media effectiveness in reporting on organized crime activities

addressed two key issues in the logic used to inform perceptions about the reporting and

shaping of local attitudes. First, the issue of foreign influence was marked by each ethnic

^Privatization corruption,at the time of these interviews, was a much-reportedissue - ranging from Serb- controlled Electroprivredna, a Croat-mn telephone company (Eronet), and Muslim trucking interests purposefully limiting rail services. A short review of media reports fromthe 2001-2002 time period shows more emphasis on commodities trafficking and the advent of the State Border Service.

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group in all four cities. These concerns regularly involved discussing the international

regulatory regimes and bodies created to police the media for accuracy and fairness in

reporting. In many cases, interviewees were suspect of international intentions, as they

appeared to unevenly apply the rules, seemingly based on the perspective pronounced in

the media piece—pro-international reports received much less scrutiny. Along these same

lines, the growing number of foreign owned media outlets—print and electronic-

concerned several respondents because of the perception that these foreign concerns

exercised too aggressive an editorial policy—shaping the substance of reports and closing

offcertain topics fromdiscussion.

The second issue troubling some interviewees was an intimidation and fear

factor that created self-censorship for particularly sensitive issues. One Sarajevo-based

journalist stated:

There is no way I can report on... (a certain high-level governmental figure from their ethnic group). I maynot be killed, but my company would lose its license. I would lose my apartment on some technicality, and my mother would be denied health care. All of this, despite the fact that I have confirmed information that this person is one of the dirtiest politicians in this country. (Interview 96)

Despite concernswith retribution, it is perfectly accepfigure to report on

high-levelofficials in a different ethnic group. This is the result of a highly stratified

media (especially in print), which continues to function along political and ethnic lines.

One important reason for this is a lack of belief in the possibility of a free and

independent media. Many interviewees, including active journalists, presented a cynical

view ofa media independent of political affiliation. In fact, many of those who

25Althoughthere are several exceptions to this rule- namely the Sarajevo-based weekly Dani and Banja Luka-based NoviReporter - the majority of print media is clearly slanted toward a specific political and/or ethnic interest.

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commented on this believed that media was naturally predisposed toward bias. This

perception was summarized well by a Sarajevo-based journalist:

My position on media is not so much influenced by Gramsci or a socialist understanding of mass communication, but based more on reality-human nature. Here (in BiH) we are obviousbecause we donot pretend to be unbiased. In your country it is less obvious to you because you want to believethat there is some detachment, but it is easy for me to see that your media is as biased as ours. It is probably even worse, in a way, because your countrymen do not see it. (Interview, 221)26

A Mostar-based journalist made a similar, but deeper distinction:

Journalism is about bias. It is like your “spinning.” Altering facts is always wrong, but interpreting them in favor of a particular group is my job. If people make up facts~as is the case in this country—it is wrong, but if I interpret facts along the lines of the group my company exists to support, I am just doing my job. (Interview, 241)

Electronic media are less obviously biased. However, a number of newer,

independent electronic media outlets emerged to challenge the more vanilla—

entertainment oriented—state or entity-owned stations. A series of new political

magazine-oriented programs has emerged over the past 18 months—introducing hard

hitting investigative journalism to BiH’s electronic media. In the end, these points

reinforce another aspect of the knowledge gap and articulate a different problem in the

communication gap—literally in the meaning behind public communication.

The most interesting aspect of answers given to Question 15 (Figure 4-9) is

the variation in percentages in answers—marked mostly by a near halving of the “more

than one” answer (56.4% down to 28.6%). This shift in specificity allowed respondents to

bring in their perception of the problem, in some cases mitigating what is being reported

by the media — in other cases amplifying the concern. On the positive side, the large

percentage increase concerning human trafficking (8.3%), privatization corruption

26Whenever this subject came up I challenged interviewees with the notion that they have more difficulty with this concept because they were taught that mass media was a tool of propaganda. This discussion often brought up the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, and his influence on European Socialists like Tito.

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(29.7%), and commodities trafficking (17.7%) point to corresponding concerns

highlighted in the open question phase: social deprivation, elite entitlements, and massive

tax evasion.

Figure 4-10: Most Serious OC-Related Activities

Human Trafficking, 8.30%

More than Protection Rackets, One, 28.60% ' 50% Privatizatio Other, Corruption, 5.90% 29.70% Money Commodities Launderin Trafficking, 5.30% 17.70%

Discussions surrounding human trafficking addressed two important

distinctions between those trafficked for the purposes of illegal immigration and those for

sex slavery (predominantly women, in the case of BiH). In most cases, interviewees

articulated a clear understanding of the distinction. For those who perceived this problem

as the most serious organized crime activity in BiH, there was near universal focus on sex

slavery. The most pressing concern with this aspect of the human trafficking problem

focused on the decline of social norms. A Sarajevo-based opinion maker described the

issue as follows:

Before the war we had none of these problems associated with the trafficking of womenfor sex. We barely had prostitution. Of course, we had prostitution, but it was limited to a few larger cities and was not an obviouspart of life. Bosnians, regardless of ethnicity, are simple people—very provincial, farmers and laborers. We led simple lives, but the war educated us on all sorts of nasty things that did not exist here before the war. One of the worst things is this trafficking of women. It is common

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knowledge that this, like many other problems, came with the foreigners. Initially, you had the money and the appetite for this. Local women were above it, so entrepreneurs brought it in for you. Look at how many international organizations are caught up in this scandal—notjust IPTF (the UN-run International Police Task Force), but certainly they are the most obvious. On any given day, you can drive by one of these nightclubs and see OSCE, SFOR, OHR, and UNHCR vehicles parked nearby. The saddest part of this is that we have learned fromyour bad habits and now, even small villages that do not even have a butcher have a brothel with Romanian or Ukrainian women. Local men have learned and now the problem is well beyond mere foreign appetites. (Interview 157)

Social-deprivation bridges reach across from the human trafficking issue to

commodities trafficking, linked by the act of trafficking for many respondents. A Brcko-

based law enforcement person clearly summarized this connection:

Traffickers of anything—women, children, cigarettes, you name it—bring all sorts of extra treats to the party. We are now seeing one of the largest escalations in local drug use. In the past, drugs normally just transited the country. Now, there is all of this illegally earned money—mostly in the hands of those affiliated with some sort of trafficking. I believe drugs originally came here for foreign aid workers, who wanted and could afford the drugs. Now, we have our own problem and this is across the state. Despite all of the good things happening in Brcko, we are seeing a massive increase here- -mostly because of the illegal money and pressures being put on the Arizona Market.27 As we squeeze Arizona, all of the problems squirt to other places—including Brcko. (Interview 173)

A similar perception is held widely in Mostar, across ethnic groups. Many

police and government officials see the growing drug problem in their region directly

linked to trafficking by criminal organizations. One Mostar-based official stated:

We have five borders within 40 kilometers of Mostar. Go north and you quickly leave Herzegovina. To the east, Jabalanica starts another world. To the west and south are Croatia and Serbia—and we should not forget our brothers in Montenegro. The contusion surrounding these entity, state, and sectarian borders makes this a great place to traffic anything and everything. Add to this nearly 100% corruption and it is a criminal heaven. (Interview 84)

Commodities trafficking has a sfigure foundation built upon a strong

resistance to taxation. Some of this is historical, where payoffs helped curb high

government taxes. More recently, this is the result of massive and poorly deployed state

27The Arizona Market is a commercial space established in the zone of separation by then-Multinational Division Commander, MG David Grange, and the Tuzla Canton Governor, Selim Beslagic. The intent of form ing this free economic zone was to encourage inter-ethnic trade in a safe place. However, the market, and others like it, became the haven for inter-ethnic illegal activities-providing the seeds for new criminal organizations to take root.

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and entity tax regimes in the new BiH (Chandler, 2000). In many analyses, international

and local, the second, illicit economy is cited as one of the worst post-war manifestations-

-institutionalizing the practice of tax-avoidance. Peter Andreas views this, and other

aspects of illicit behavior, as directly linked to wartime sanctions and the organizations

and strategies developed to circumvent these international rules (Andreas, 2004).

Andreas’ premise draws a straight line between organized evasion and elite complicity—

where sanction busting plans and the behavior associated with this activity were overseen

and sponsored by war-time political elites.

The association between illicit economic behavior and elite sponsorship

highlights another aspect of concern stated by many interviewees: elite entitlement. There

exists a general perception of political power in BiH that elites have a right or entitlement

to make the most of their position. This complicates the local perception of official

corruption—interpreting it as a serious problem, yet recognizing it as a realistic part of

power. This perceived tension is similar to Ledeneva's and Humphrey’s discussion of

informal exchange in former Soviet Russia and Mongolia. In these studies, victims of

officialcorruption appear to both abhor and expect the behavior (Humphrey, 2002 and

Ledeneva, 1998). There is a sense of predetermined inevitability that manifests itself in

the sort of disanomie described by Nikos Passas. The result is an aggressive acceptance

of the problem, offering no real local solution (Passas, 1999).

The frustration voiced by many interviewees along these lines folds into the

expectation gap—where many locals expected the international community to stop and

disallow this behavior by elites. In many cases, a large part of the local consternation

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revolves around the accidental nature of some current BiH elites. One Mostar-based

businessperson described this as follows:

There is a veryimportant Bosnian Croat politician whowas nothing before the war, unemployed and no education beyond grammar school-another was an assistant butcher. How can these peopleassume positions of importance? Educated people left this crazy country and left the lunatics and losers to run it. Now we are paying an even higher price than war itself~we have to suffer incompetence and open thievery in the leadership of our country. It is almost a requirement to hold political office here. Why does the international community allow this to happen? (Interview 192)

This articulation of the expectation gap insinuates a knowledge gap voiced by

several respondents across ethnicity, location, and disciplinary category and paraphrased

as: “Why doesn’t the international community see these problems that are so obvious to

us?” Following this logic, one can trace a further relationship with the communication

gap as a lack of telling and asking. In this way, a key conversation about local realities is

not taking place or is misunderstood on both sides—where the local does not properly

articulate the problem and the international misunderstands or ignores the concern.

The final three questions in the closed functional portion of the interview

dealt with direct issues: the extent to which organized crime plays a role in the problems

discussed above and is a major problem in BiH (16 and 17) and personal knowledge or

experience of the problems (29). 95.1% of interviewees perceived the issues discussed in

questions 14 and 15 as directly related to the problem of organized crime in BiH. 73.3%

opined that organized crime was a serious problem in their country; but a significant

minority voiced caveats—suggesting that organized crime was an aspect of deeper,

structural problems in BiH. A Banja Luka-based opinion maker captured this caveat in

stating:

This brings us back to the beginning and everything we discussed with your first question. Organized crime is a symptom of the bigger social, political, and economic problems we have here. To focus on only organized crime is to treat the runny

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nose and let the pneumonia continue to drownus. These problemsare bigger than us. They are a regional responsibility, but also an international one because you are not outside of the problems. The longer you pretend to be (outside of the problem), the longer we will suffer and probably we will have another war. (Interview 139)

This sense that organized crime was overemphasized and misunderstood by

the international community was a widely held perception. The intensity of the position

varied, based on the level of voiced frustration and conviction about the matter.

Question 29 presented some challenges similar to those of Ledeneva when

she asked interviewees to talk directly about personal experiences of blat (Ledeneva,

1998). Respondents in my project often answered shortly in the affirmative (57.9%) or

negative (42.1%) as knowing anyone directly affected by organized crime. In some cases,

answers were followed by either a strict interpretation (“not in my immediate family”) or

a quick closing of the topic (“yes, but I do not want to talk about it”).28 The anticipated

tension associated with asking such a direct question puts useful punctuation on each of

the gaps described in this project. In communication, such direct questions are not to be

asked. In knowledge, such revelations are avoided, yet understood through indirect

inquiry. In expectation, we should already know the answers to these questions because it

largely is part of everyday life in BiH-in some fashion and location.

28It was somewhat ironic that many of these discussants talked at length about the issues in deeply personal ways, when the focus was on the issues. However, when personal affirmation was directly addressed, interviewees often became visibly uncomforfigure. In several cases, respondents half-jokingly referred to my being a spy who was probably going to report to the local authorities. Conversely, several interviewees were significantly energized by the discussion and found the question uselessly redundant, stating of course they have personal knowledge of the problem. One went so far as to blurt out, “Weren’t you listening for the last two hours!” (Interview 4). In these cases, as in other similar situations, I stated that I had to ask all of the questions for the interview to be administered fairly. This usually placated the discussant.

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CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS

The aim of this project was to confirm, identify, and detail the gaps between

local and international perceptions about organized crime and corruption in BiH. The

hypothesized and hinted gaps took shape through the course of the interviews that

provide the bulk of data for the analysis. Goffman’s frame analysis provided a set of tools

for shaping these data and making sense of the many perceptions and attitudes exposed in

the project. The three gaps discussed in this analysis likely could be reconfigured, using a

different series and sequence of categories. However, these three—communication,

knowledge, and expectation—leap out as obvious separators in the study. Furthermore,

they provide a useful dichotomy, allowing for analysis of the differences, as well as the

similarities and overlapping aspects found in the interviews.

The Venn diagram in Figure 5-1 symmetrically displays the nature of the

difference and similarity found between each gap. The differences are manufactured in an

effort to generalize about the distance found between local and international perspectives.

The act of isolating certain instances where one category is highlighted functions like a

photograph—freezing a moment for investigation and analysis. However, the frozen

image is most useful when put together with other frames examining other aspects of the

viewed landscape. Two series of images emerge: those that mark the perimeter and depth

of a given category and those that discern the relationship and role played between

categories. The former allows an analyst to create a moving picture of one category in

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action. The focus is concentrated on the one aspect, but a variety of images are captured

and assembled to help mark the nature and structure of the category. The later form

provides contexts of infinite possibilities, as variables begin to amass, depending on the

angles and speed at which the issues overlap.

Figure 5-1

Communication

Expectation Knowledge

This chapter addresses the final analytic frame, further detailing the gaps

hypothesized at the onset of this project. In explaining the gaps and their association with

critical aspects developed earlier, a map is provided to the analyst and interested reader-

allowing these perceptions and attitudes to be brought forward and directly interact with

the more dominant international perspectives. In the final reflection, I will assess the

possibility of using the methods and analytic lenses developed here to look at

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comparative regions and discuss how this project might be seen as a guide for creating

richer datasets—enabling robust structural analyses of both the illicit and legitimate social

space together and in context.

Communication

The focus on communication is most clear in the way each side talks about

organized crime and corruption. At the structural level, the internationals emphasize

similarity and comparative value analyses—where the locals talk in terms of context and

contingency. Predictability and explanation are not primary goals from a local perception.

It is more important to understand the foundations of the problems and how they hook

into mechanisms far larger than the Bosnian, Herzegovinian, or even former Yugoslav

experience. The causal factors for these structural issues are embedded in both local and

global phenomena. In this way, it is not odd to hear a BiH citizen talk about globalization

in terms of victim-hood.

The communication gap is, in some ways, the primary issue for

understanding and potentially addressing international and local differences in perception

and attitude. The lack of effective, multi-level communication between the two limits the

possibility for building knowledge and managing expectations. As communication is a

fundamental function of human interaction, it is not surprising that this gap exists. What

is interesting is the near ignorance or denial of the problem—especially at the

international level. I had several opportunities to discuss some of my interviews with

internationals throughout BiH. These people came from many countries and represented a

wide range of professions-ranging from working journalists to senior officials in

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international organizations. The response, in most cases, to the voiced local perceptions

was one of near-complete denial. This defensive reaction interested me because it

demonstrated part of the reason for the rigidity of this gap. Of course, reasons for this

problem exist on the other side of the equation—namely a cultural inclination toward

obscure and indirect discussion, formed around a desire not to upset the international

“apple cart” because there is money and influence there. This follows closely with

Wedel’s experiences and analysis of Polish deception toward international aid workers

(Wedel, 2001).

The limitations of language and travel are more practical reasons for and

reinforcing of this gap. Only a small percentage of internationals working in or studying

BiH speak the local languages with any real proficiency. This is a classic problem in

peacekeeping and other modem international aid missions. Poor language skills and

reliance on interpreters severely limits the number and type of people one might interact

with in the conduct of an investigation or study. The tendency to gravitate toward those

locals who speak English or German is high simply because it is easy. This is one reason

why internationals rarely travel outside major cities, congregating mainly in Sarajevo.

This creates another specific communicative problem—where internationals interact with

the same “Sarajevo 100” (as described by one of my interviewees) most regularly. These

people developed a disproportionate amount of power—in recommending local vendors or

having an inside track in getting international contracts-formed into control over access,

especially to information.

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Knowledge

Access to knowledge is only one facet of the communication gap, and in

some ways, an aspect of the more fundamental part of the problem: lack of interest.

Understanding local knowledge assumes an interest in pursuing it, which appears to be a

primary challenge to internationals. It also requires some access or an attempt to reveal

itself, which is a challenge for locals. The structure of this gap is reinforced by two

different worldviews—an international approach that focuses on the institutional and

regulatory superstructure and a local focus on connectedness and foundational sources.

Clearly, this is a simplistic way of stating the gap’s structure. However, these

generalizations are important ‘ideal types’ for explaining the nature of the problem.

The ontological and epistemological welding of this structure is largely

created through role specification. In this way, the international enters the situation as

somehow above the problems associated with the place—one apt metaphor might be that

of a doctor. The locals take on the role of the observed patient. Self diagnosis is not so

much forbidden, as it is seen as lacking in credibility. This insinuation of roles reinforces

the structure of the gap, making it painfully difficult to overcome or observe with

specificity.1 These roles explain the general tendency of internationals to discount

information based on ill-conceived and underdeveloped assumptions, such as the lack of

'This explains the regularsuspicion I met in conducting these interviews. Ina very real way, I was breaking the unspoken rules by inquiring into local perceptions. I believe many walked away from the exchange still trying to figure out my angle. It did not make sense to them that I was there to hear what they thought and explore their perceptions. Although I was still the doctor, I was asking the patient to help diagnose his own ailment. These roles are further described in some sections of the international development literature, which is not a part of this particular project but would be an excellent addition to the literature-if some other scholar were so inclined.

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credibility to be found when one ethnicity talks negatively about a person or situation in a

different ethnic group.2 The exception to these structured roles is when an international

talks with a trusted local—often this leads back into an overlap with the communication

gap, where a small number of people from specificgeographical areas control and

validate access to local knowledge.

The practical end result is a thin understanding—because of limited interest

and access—of local knowledge and perceptions. The deeper implications are diverging

trajectories of information and methods for obtaining and validating those data. This

overlaps again with the communication gap because common terminology—such as

organized crime and corruption—takes on two very different meanings for the

international and the local. This divergence in meaning and the lack of an established

mechanism to obtain and understand, let alone address, these differences directly skews

the expectations of both parties.

Expectation

The expectation gap, in some ways, logically results from the prior gaps.

However, it also influences those gaps because expectations often precede interaction and

can bias research, inquiry, or peacekeeping missions.3 The reflexive nature of this gap

makes it the most difficult to apprehend—as such, it is probably the most interesting

because it speaks to basic human tendencies in trying to construct meaning in a chaotic

world. In both ideal types-local and intemational-the primary expectations shape the

2Interestingly, the reverse logic is usedwhen assessing intra-ethnic positive information. 3The problem of managing expectations is an age-old issue in the conduct of scholarly inquiry, but tends to be ignored in institutionally oriented activities like peacekeeping missions.

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research, planning, and implementation phases of interaction. The gaps in communication

and knowledgenegatively enhance confusion—reinforcing rigidity demonstrated in the

“blame game.” The problems are normally articulated in a lack of understanding as to

why or why not some person did or said something. The natural fallback is not to

challenge or recalibrate ones own lens or assumptions, but rather to fix blame on the

other’s perceptions and actions.4 The finger pointing associated with non-synchronous

expectations is clearly articulated fromthe local perspective in this study. The

befuddlement voiced by many of my interviewees in discussing the international

community—focused on uneven and ineffective action—lingers long and, in turn,

reinforces the communication gap through the evaporation of trust.

Trust is a critical aspect of expectation because the two processes are

indivisibly linked. An expectation often is formed in the context of trust, or confidence,

in the position. In this way, the trust gap discussed earlier is actually a subset of both the

expectations gap and the communications gap—a large portion of the pigment in the solid

color in the overlapping of the two gaps. Trust challenges influence the will and desire to

communicate or understand the other’s perspective—leading to paranoia, conspiracy

theories, and reinforced oversimplified generalizations.

4This aspect of the problemis supported by rich and growing epistemological literature in international relations theory that aims to address and understand the structure of perspective or as R.B.J. Walker refers to it, “othering.”Specific to BiH, the author of Writing Security has contributed several essays addressing inter-ethnic “othering” issues. David Chandler addresses this aspect between local and international tangentially in his study, much as I do here. This makes it another interesting project that would develop the broader literature.

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Overlaps

Several common themes reverberate throughout the discussion of these gaps. The

fact of international intervention (in this case peacekeeping) makes a distinct mark on

each of these gaps—not only in terms of ascribed roles, but also in terms of anticipated

outcomes associated with the “healing” power of liberal democratic institutions. Mixed

understanding and assumptions about both of these common aspects point to the larger

structural issues associated with modem international intervention. The pacifying power

of liberal democratic norms and institutions underscore the way international intervention

is shaped, especially in the post-Cold War world.5 This expectation comes packed with a

standard set of assumptions and lenses, pre-loading the activity with notions of equality,

pluralism, justice, and legitimacy that are beyond reproach for the implemented Recipient

resistance or differing interpretation is perceived as obstructionism at best and criminal

activity at worst.6 Recognition of the resistant phenomenon is crucial for shaping and

selling international intervention—especially when the intervention is largely a non-lethal

and voluntary exercise, as in the case of BiH. The gray nature of the action provides for

the construction of a cloudy context-ripe for the kind of dissonance observed in this

study.

Another common theme, associated with the first theme described above, is

the interpretation of history and identity by both ideal types. Historic and cultural

differences and similarities play a significant role in practical interaction. All three gaps

5It is too early to say exactly what impact the events of 11 September 2001 have on international intervention.The early result appears to be an increasing tension-along the lines of Karl Polanyi’s Double Move-reinforcing both the tendencies to assert and resist liberal democracy. ^hese observations are not meant to challenge the utility of liberal democracy, but rather to suggest the imposition of any fixed model on another is often perceived as coercive and can lead to the gaps developed in this project-even if it is the best-known solution and desired intention.

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are surrounded by these issues, as they are sub-text for explaining much of the problem-

most oftenwithout observance of the divides they cover. In each gap, the issues take on a

different meaning. Communication is practically hampered if there is not an appreciation

ofthe histories and cultures of the region. The international tendency to gloss over

perceived differences in the interpretation of key events and crucial decisions offends

many locals, who look at history as a primary aspect of their social existence. Knowledge

is curbed by the same oversimplification, and aggregation of interest. Rational

interpretations of Southeast European history and culture do not resonate with locals, as

they see their history as the very essence of their identity, shaping their culture. In this

way, rational discussions of history can quickly devolve into a shouting match, if some

perceived minor issue or incident is brushed off or left unacknowledged. Finally, local

expectations are deeply cynical, especially when it comes to international intervention.

As so many of the people identify themselves and their culture through their troubled

history, there is a hard tendency toward fatalism, skepticism, and an almost innate distrust

of foreign power—regardless of the merits and good intentions. This, coupled with a

strong pride in resisting foreign power over the past 1000 years, can add up to a difficult

context for exchange. In its softest form,it leads to “pranksterism” — giving foreign

drivers who have lost their way directions to the most treacherous roads, and then

meeting up with them later to charge them outrageous amounts of money to tow or repair

the vehicle.7 At its worst, it leads to the formation of self-sufficient paramilitary

7Luckily I have never been the victim of this kind of prank. However, Ihave met many foreigners who have been less lucky. I’vealso witnessed similar events being constructed and deployed.

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organizations—many of which act as key referents in the march through Southeast

European history.

Final Frame

All of this leads naturally to the formation of a final, macro frame (Table 5-

1)—an identifying structure this layered set of data developed in the course of the project.

The frame associates the key categories used in analyzing the data gathered not only as a

synoptic device, but also as a referential tool that could be used for modest prediction or

policy adjustment. 8 This • frame is assembled from the local perspective only because I

intentionally did not collect similar data from internationals. I was able to better focus on

the local voice—the largely missing perspective—by using international proclamations and

policy statements on organized crime and corruption in BiH as an accurate portrayal of

the international ideal type perception, and its policy implementation as attitude.

Table 5-1: Final Data Frame

Communication Knowledge Expectation

Sociological Uneven and limited- Unaware of and unconcerned Focused, collaborative— missing in important with real everyday impact attention to linked discussions problem sets Institutional Poor guidance and Uninformed application of Direct assistance in cooperation-structured out norms—poor deployment of addressing and resolving of context, cumbersome resources, based on low problems—education at understanding all levels and effective oversight Functional One way discussion- Assumed expertise not Regional management branding and blaming organically present in local of the issues—targeted,

8In an effort to focus on the task of completing an acceptable dissertation, I will refrain from usingthis frame for policy prescription. However, I believe it can be a useful practical device for developing a detailed plan for re-wiring the international approach to addressing the problems of organized crime and corruption in BiH, as well as many other issues that suffer from these same gaps between local and international perceptions and attitudes.

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1 community. Assumed joint operations and universal solution-no sense investigations j of context and history

Communication Gap

The social, institutional and functional aspects of the communication gap are

the most apparent in the findings of this project. In many ways, this gap is the most

obvious tip of a far larger iceberg—submerged beneath a sea of competing voices,

policies, and positions. The texture and dissonance found in the sociological aspect of the

communication gap is uneven and difficult to map. However, a common theme runs

through the various local perspectives, articulating substantial crosstalk. The lack of full

understanding and engagement between locals and internationals buttresses the social

character of this aspect and creates an unfamiliar environment. This lack of familiarity

provides a recognizable portion of the material that aids actors in developing the

structural distrust found between locals and internationals in BiH.

The institutional aspect of the communication gap further defines the uneven

nature of the discourse between the two interlocutors. The local perception of

contradictory and half-stated guidance, accompanied by a sense that the internationals

over-generalize about the BiH experience creates a layer to this aspect. As the local

perceives a lack of focus and certainty of commitment in the statements and policies of

international institutions, local confidencein international capabilities begins to diminish.

This lack of confidence j aundices future local interpretations of international action

because the receiver is less and less likely to pay objective attention. The attitude that

emerges and takes shape around this practice is one of constant critique-

institutionalization of negative communication and jaundiced interpretation.

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One risks being analytically lost in these poorly charted waters, merely

skimming the surface of the complex environment. Fora variety of methodological and

epistemologicalreasons the communication gap is oftenthe limit of most inquiries.

David Chandler’s detailed critique of the Bosnian problem set exemplifies the ease with

which one can be lost in the swirl of conflicting positions and activities.9 The issues

challenging better Bosnian integration into the regional and global environment converge

and diverge at an uneven tempo in odd places. Chandler’s primary mistake is found in the

range of issues he addresses across the complex of problems in the country - inhibiting

clarity and focus (Chandler, 2000). The islands dotting the sea surface emerge as a fairly

substantial mountain range when one traces the depths of a given landmass—in this case

the charting of local perceptions and attitudes toward organized crime and corruption.

The larger range of connected issues becomes clear in detailing the views of this problem

and the way it informs surface finger-pointing from both locals and internationals. The

“blame game” is the most vocal part of the distrust found between the two perceptions,

resulting in the formation of rigid attitudes.

Knowledge Gap

The articulation of distrust described above finds a portion of its foundation

in the knowledge gap. The dimensions of this gap begin to take shape in the apparent lack

of respect found between locals and internationals in BiH. The lack of respect from the

9Chandler’s detailed mapping of parts of the communication gap—namely the lack of consistencyfound between international words and actions—over-focuses on the international aspect of the issue. This focus unintentionally reinforces the weighted attention toward the international, peppering the reader with small anecdotes fromthe local perspective. This project counters Chandler by putting most of the weight on local perceptions and attitudes—aiming to bring balance to the discussion.

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local perspective takes shape in the belief that most internationals have little knowledge

or desire to understand the history and culture of the region. Most interviewees in this

project made reference to this perceived lack of respect on the part of internationals. This

perception takes form around an interpretation of the inconsistency found in international

statements and actions and in the uneven contact with peacekeepers and their surrogates.

The logic of the prevailing local attitude follows from a perceived lack of meaningful

contact, over-reliance on interpreters, and little depth in studying the region. The local

perception of the international community is one of a disengaged physician, attending to

a patient using rote methods to treat symptoms—while doing little to diagnose the ailment.

The international, in this context, focuses on personal goals, justifying received

knowledge and applying it universally. At a critical point, the perceived international is

forced to address the applicability of his or her paradigm—local contexts and

considerations are rendered epiphenomenal, reinforcing the paradigm aside from the

evidence.

In the social setting, this lack of respect creates a hard shell around the softer

center of uncertainty about solutions to the problems of organized crime and corruption.

The sensitivity exhibited around the knowledge gap makes for an often-defensive

posture. The conversations that most illuminated this aspect of the gap appeared like

sharp chords struck in the conversation—usually stemming from a discussion of solutions

to the problems and means of preventing them. These conversations sometimes became

circular-a veritable catch 22-where I would represent the contradictions in the

discussions. In these cases, respondents often sharply pointed to the lack of logic in

application and relevance of the international approaches. This display of raw emotion

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clarified the extentto which many interviewees felt rebuffed and demeaned by

international approaches and rhetoric surrounding the issues of organized crime and

corruption in BiH. The perceived lack of respect is an important aspect of the distrustful

nature of the relationship between local and international discussants o f these issues—

underpinning and linking each of the respective gaps detailed in this project.

This local interpretation of the intemational’s logic forms rigid attitudes,

making it difficult for a foreign professional to effect change in the country. The

perceived lack of meaningful contact between local and international reinforces this bias

and takes two overlapping forms. First, irregular contact is a claim made by many locals

outside Sarajevo. The lack of interaction makes for difficult acceptance at the local level.

This provides the foundation for the institutional part of this gap. Many of communities

are traditionally insular—making it difficult for someone from 40 kilometers away, let

alone 400 kilometers or more, to gain trusted access to the communities. Beyond this

quantitative aspect is a qualitative perception that forms a solid underpinning for these

attitudes—the lack of equality in exchange. Many of the respondents in this study voiced

an overwhelming negativity about the way many internationals approach locals when

discussing issues like organized crime and corruption in BiH. From the local vantage

point, internationals enter into these discussions as if talking with a child, undermining

the possibility of an equal exchange of ideas and perceptions about the issues.10 This

international “holier than thou” approach jaundices the exchange of ideas, making it

qualitatively difficult to build contextual knowledge.

l0The issue of respect reappeared throughout many of the interviews, but this aspect of belittling by internationals played a strong role in the examples given by the interviewees. Several examples are cited in the body of this analysis, but it is worth noting that over half of the respondents referenced an anecdote exemplifying the lack of respect for local expertise—in several cases where the positions were similar.

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The general lack of language skills limits the range and scope of

communication, highlighting the functional aspect of the gap. The relatively large-scale

employment of educated local nationals as interpreters has had a positive impact on local

economies, but has done little to address the substantive divide between local and foreign

interlocutors. The local perception is that internationals generally are too lazy to learn the

local languages and have enough money not to bother. Again, there are both physical

and subjective effects associated with this problem. The extra time and awkward nature

of three-way conversations oftenforce both parties to simplify their dialog and spend less

time building crucial rapport. The exchanges tend to be direct, lacking sensitivity to the

nuances and conflicting meanings associated with the delivery of language. The

appearance of an international with a local interpreter in tow presents a far more resilient

problem in conditioning a local perception of a lack of knowledge on the part of the

foreigner. The local interpretation of these exchanges often leaves the local with a deeper

sense of occupation and foreign control. Historically, BiH is a place known to resist

habitual foreign domination of their territory through subterfuge, violence, and

establishing hidden power networks. The cultures of each recognized entity capture this

resistance in a varying series of songs, stories, and local sayings that shape the core of

each identity.11

uTMs is true even in the case of those who identify most strongly with Yugoslav nationalism—based on the glorificationof agreed similarities (common traits?) foundthe as basis of the early kingdom andlater patriotic actions associated with the World War II Partisan movement.

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Expectation Gap

The gap between perceived international delivery of positive ideas and

solutions and that expected by locals is the most persistent aspect of the larger problem

set. The communication and knowledge gaps link the disparity in expectation to the

foundation of local perceptions and attitudes in BiH. A resolute attempt to minimize the

knowledge and communication gaps should have a direct effect on the expectations of

local professionals. However, it appears the international community’s attempts to

manage expectations are based on message projection (unidirectional, aimed at re

education). The local interviewees for this project identified this trend in most of the

discussions and rejected it, mostly because of their perceived sense of disrespect

associated with lack of interaction. The local formula for proper adjustment of

expectations followed a logic of collaborative and negotiated understandings—creating a

shared knowledge set that would provide a joint foundation for progress and change.

From this local position, the emphasis was placed on international adjustment, but in the

details of these discussions it became clear, in most cases, that there would be a need for

local openings to change.

The social underpinnings of expectation are made most clearly in the works

of Humphrey’s and Passas’ descriptions of how social behavior is formed in practice

(Humphrey, 2002, and Passas, 2000). Whether these practices are cases of exchange or

legal codes,the result is the etching of a pattern of expected social behavior.12 Shelley’s

and, to a lesser degree, Andreas’ work looks at the transformation ofthese practices

l2Both Humphreyand Passas discuss the habit-forming attribute of practice—regardless of whether the activity is appropriate or positive. Clearly, Lampland, Wedel, Volkov, and Ledeneva indirectly recognize the reinforcing nature of structured social relations in a variety of contexts, but theirs is less emphasized.

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(Andreas, 2004 and Shelley, 1999). Shelley’s focus on authoritarian limits to democratic

civil society and the proper formation of the rule of law pushes her analysis to find ways

of breaking this degenerative practice—structured in the daily institutional behavior of

states with a deep authoritarian history (Shelley, 1999). Andreas makes a similar

suggestion by exposing the warped metaphor of the United States-Mexico border.

Andreas points out the series of inconsistencies between United States and Mexican

policy and the practices of border control with a detailed look at the social structures that

reinforce this conceptual gerrymandering (Andreas, 2003). Both scholars assess that a

change in practice can impact or reform the habits formed around deficient practices.

These challenges are more easily recognized than changed. In the BiH case,

collaborative practices could be phased in at all levels of international and local

discourse. However, the habit of practiced social structure will negatively influence the

way this new talk is perceived. The attitudinal habits of all discussants deeply influence

the way talk of any kind is perceived and then rationalized into context. Expectation, in

this sense, is part bias filter and part interpretive adjustment. If expected behavior

presents an anomaly to the recipients of the information, they are in the habit of either

setting the information aside, or interpreting the data in a way that is more accessible to

the attitudes etched by practiced social structures. These attitudes are resilient because

they tend to cut grooves of social structure and over time can become nearly

indistinguishable from one another. The reinforcing and reflexive nature of social habit

and attitude are a clear marking of embedded behavior. 13

13This relationship is crucial for understanding the wayovergeneralization of the social space can lead to falsely antiseptic policy formation.The analyst’strick of taking apart the social engine to better understand

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This behavior leads to an institutional “piece by piece” approach that often

lacks sensitivity to the complementary nature of the whole. Many of the discussants in

this project talked about perceptions and institutions in an associative manner—focusing

on how “buy in” to cooperation was key for institutional success. In this way, local

expectations for the construction of new institutions assumed a participatory role. When

this participation was perceived as limited or non-existent, the locals had no real stake in

the project—serving to reinforce the attitudes associated with the lack of international

communication and knowledge. In terms of organized crime and corruption, a confused

collection of unilateral (both on the local and international sides) and partially

multilateral institutions was developed with little clear link to a phased, strategic plan. As

many interviewees opined, it appeared that many internationals believed that the mere

creation of an institution that functioned well in another place would solve the larger

complex of problems.

The local perception of internationally emphasized institutional solutions

with little local participation affected the functional capacity of these projects in two

different ways. First, the lack of association discouraged active participation in the

project-creating a passive local interest.1* “Buy in” is often best secured by some level of

ownership at the generative level of a project. In this way, the international community

might fund and guide the discussion, but the details of construction and proper tailoring

its activities and relationships can be improperly re-tooled by social engineers who do not take the time to appreciate the whole capacity of society. “jThis can be seen in a series of organized crime and corruption-related projects, such as cantonal law enforcement reform and on-the-job training provided by the IPTF and more recently by EUPM; introduction of oversight and statutory reforms (such as the creation of the Ombudsman’s Office); and, indirectly linked projects like Buldozer—aimed at developing small businesses in an effort to overcome the proliferation of low-level corruption. In each of these cases, the institution or code was introduced by the international community with the fullexpectation of local compliance and implementation. However, these institutions were not formed with much direct local involvement

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to the BiH context would be largely led by local professionals—at multiple levels. The

lack of dynamic and original local participation in the formation of these institutions

created an initially passive attitude toward the projects. This disassociation led to the

second, active challenge to the functionalapplication of these institutions—the deliberate

and intentional exercise of undermining the project.

Increasingly, segments of the local community appear to enjoy witnessing

internationals’ failure—a failure that in turn reinforces their perceptions and attitudes

about international expertise and involvement in BiH reconstruction.15 Coupled with this

growing appetite for international failure is the functional necessity of black and gray

market activities in most of the country. The criminal and corrupt practices associated

with these informal institutions provide an economic and political outlet for many who

perceive themselves as disenfranchised by the internationally led reconstruction of BiH.

As more people come to rely on the illicit economy and informal relationships to survive

and thrive, they develop a more obvious interest in undermining international efforts to

curtail crime and corruption. Along these same lines, they are encouraged to support the

political parties that reinforce these mechanisms of illicit behavior.16

The cycle of reflection between the primary areas within the expectation gap

reinforces the interconnected nature of each gap and associated aspect. The web of social

15In several discussions, acrossregion, ethnicity, and role, respondents openly laughed about perceived international ineffectiveness in addressing organized crime and corruption. These participants opined that this only proved that the international community was more involved in the conduct of organized crime in the country—as it was one of the only ways for anyone to make money. 16 As discussed earlier, the nationalists’ political parties played a generative role in establishing the infrastructureof illicit trade and behavior in BiH, as it was instrumental in pursuing war goals. The reemergence of these and affiliated parties reinforces the observation that many citizens have lost confidence in the international community’s ability to transcend these wartime relationships and transform the country. Several interviewees made statements to this effect—highlighting the lack of hope and general climate of cynicism in present-day BiH.

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reality is constructed and reinforced by the practiced structure—ensconcing the

perceptions and attitudes discussed in this analysis. The way out of this web, if one

accepts its characterization in this study, can be articulated in an equally relational plan.

However, the realization of change likely will be hard fought, slow, and uneven in the

most optimistic scenarios. Practiced patience and strategic resolve are key flags to wave

over the top of retro-fitting the transformation strategy in BiH. A more collaborative,

contextually informed plan is necessary to shape and properly assemble the blocks of a

trustful relationship. The map for this kind of progress and change can only be drawn

with full and proper involvement by all interested parties—creating a broad boulevard of

ideas and new habits at all levels of engagement.

Broader Implications

As I conceived, began, and completed my research into local perceptions and

attitudes toward organized crime and corruption in BiH, many important events unfolded

around the globe. The post-Cold War haze broke to find a clarity of rising global

antipathy toward the United States and more generally, Western hegemonic expressions

of democracy and the global economy. Some scholars anticipated the resistance to this,

but most Western thinkers followed in some proximity to Fukuyama’s pronouncement of

History’s demise. 17 This resistance is most evident in the events surrounding the 11

September 2001 tragedies and ensuing conflicts, but is not limited to this most obvious

manifestation. My project provides a useful portal for comment on several of these

1’History in this sense is not the end of time and social enterprise, butrather the notion that the trajectoryof major human socio-political accomplishment had been met with the end of organized Communism. The largest criticism to Fukuyama’s assertion came from both more conservative and radical theorists who saw the suggestion as evidence of the limits of liberal thought.

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issues—shedding light on the character of the larger challenges to the enlightened liberal

democratic project—as BiH represents one of the first post-Cold War attempts to bring,

directly, Westem-style institutions into a broadercontext.

The rise of attention to international poverty and the associated, contravening

tendencies witnessed by many scholars and pundits as the tensions found in liberal

democratic understandings of economic globalization provides an interesting backdrop

for this project (Sen, 2002; Mittelman, 2002; Newman, 2001; and, Rosenau, 1997). Much

of what interviewees said in the course of this project and social practices witnessed

support theories of globalization resistance, articulated most effectively by Rosenau,

Mittelman and Castels (Castels, 2000; Mittelman, 2000; and, Rosenau 1997). Each of

these scholars recognizes a deep structural tension in the movement toward a more

globalized economy, although each varies in approach and subjects of focus. Cusimano

Love boils down this tension in a pragmatic fashion by focusing on functional areas of

concern—organized crime and corruption being one of several (Cusimano Love, 2003).

This functional focus leads Cusimano Love to look more closely at ways to re-structure

legitimate practices to better identify boundaries. She suggests the very nature of public

and private space be reconsidered, and possibly reconstructed to both better

accommodate those accidentally left out of the globalization project and properly focus

streamlined efforts to address those that purposefully intend to undermine or take

advantage of this transformation (Cusimano Love, 2003).

BiH might prove to be an excellent test bed for such an approach, as it does

not have a clear, organic role in the process of globalization—but appears

disproportionately to suffer from the associated trends. In this way, it is clear that the

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more developed nations, rich with either resources or ideas, have the upper hand in the

benefits fromthe globalization game. BiH’s former and current economies are not in a

position to receive a large boost fromthe positive aspects of globalization—market, labor,

technological, and information accesses amplifying output and streamlining competitive

efficiency. BiH is a prime candidate for raiding—losing sovereignty and reinforcing illicit,

local countermeasures to this negative trend. The void created in BiH, and other places in

similar circumstances, provides most of the necessary ingredients to create a weak state

as the husk for anti-globalization practices and informal institutions.

The realization ofBiH’s position in the larger process of globalization begs

one to look for comparable cases across the globe that bring in the additional components

of geopolitical importance and similar regional conflict. Afghanistan and Iraq are

potentially comparable cases, where projects similar to mine could provide a clearer

contextual view into the associated problem set—specific to organized crime and

corruption, as well as broader social issues. Areas of comparability between the three

cases are found in the blur of religion, ethnicity, and extended familial relationships—

coupled with protracted conflict and a longstanding unique position of geographic

importance. Each of these cases exemplifies the often-confusinggray area found between

normally fixed indicators of religious affiliation and ethnicity. In Afghanistan and Iraq, as

is the case in BiH, religion and ethnicity are so closely interwoven that identities are

affixed and taken on regardless of specific applicability.18 In each of these cases the terms

18In Iraq and Afghanistan, it is difficult to disassociate the extended family fromthe religious sect. In BiH, the referents are religion and ethnicity. However, various labels are used to identify a person without necessarily reflecting their personal views. In this way, an atheist with nationalist inclinations will still be categorized by the religion, tribe, or region he or she affiliates with. The labels used to identify people in these contextsdo not necessarily correlate with a literal, universal interpretation of the terms-significance

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ethnicity, religion,tribe, and family need tobe understood as interwovenconcepts,

ascribed to individuals regardless of personal inclination.

The mix of complex identity and internal conflict stultifiessocial structures

and reaffirms traditional social divisions. Conflict, in these cases, is ofteninternal or

regional to the modem state structure, which is superficially reflective of history—a

legacy of colonialism.19 The ethnic map of modem BiH and the former Yugoslav region

largely is molded around tribal affiliation with various stronger powers. In this way, the

Mediterranean and South German affiliation of the groups now forming the Croatian

people shaped their modem identity and affiliation with Roman Catholicism. Conversely,

the interior tribes and families are affiliated more closely with Byzantium—taking on the

mantle of Christian Orthodoxy. As conflicts rose and fell between the areas that fought

over this initial Christian schism, Southeast Europe was a key geopolitical crossroads.

Similarly, with regard to Greek, Ottoman and Persian conflicts with opponents to the

north, modem Iraq and Afghanistan proved to be battlefields hosting periodic violent

exchanges.

The geographic importance of each of these modem states largely is the

accident of location. However, the troubles created by conflict may have more to do with

is built into the contextual use of the term. This is —1~y —any see the problems between Serb, Croat, and Bosniac(Muslim) as primarily of religiousdifference, in fact, religion is often just a convenient excuse to further differentiate the self from another. I purposely do not use the term Bosniac in this study because it is understood by Serbs and Croats as a false term, referring directly to Islamist politics. In fact, the term is a rallying cry by and for Bosnian Muslims, harkening Bosnian nationalism. The international often interprets this as a form of Bosnian citizenship, transcending religious and ethnic difference. However,the term was not coined with this idea in mind, but rather as a way to describe a group of people—Bosnian Muslims-who were largely, officiallyignored since the Austro-Hungarian Empire re-acquired BiH in the 18th century. 19This is the reason why globalization is often referred toas a new form of colonialism. In the eyes of these observers and scholars, globalization ironically reinforces the imposed structure of false borders instead of breaking them down—as participation in the formal global institutions requires a recognized state as signatory or participant.

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Conclusions and a Look Ahead

This project clearly falls into the sociological approaches to the study of

transnational organized crime and corruption. It lines up most closely with the work of

Louise Shelley, Nikos Passas, and Peter Andreas. The lines between this study and the

work of Shelley is clear in the structure and approach applied to capturing and analyzing

unique data, making a fuller case for examining the way these issues take shape in the

larger social context. Shelley’s application of the methods and spirit of Italian and

English-language scholarship studying the Southern Italy and Sicilian cases to the former

Soviet experience helped develop a fuller understanding of these cases. Her work from

the late 1990s and early 2000s investigated the structural aspects of the organized crime

and corruption problem within the former Soviet Union and its apparent global extension.

Throughout this project, I referred to similar studies of associated issues in

different countries by Alena Ledeneva, Vadim Volkov, Jenine Wedel, and Caroline

Humphrey. These works help validate methods I used to conduct this investigation and

analysis through the insights they observed, analyzed, and described. Different aspects of

each of these studies also assist in building the final frame described in this chapter.

Volkov gave a specific voice to Russian law enforcement and security personnel, rarely

heard or considered by non-Russian scholars (Volkov, 2002).21 Ledeneva’s investigation

of the informal social mechanisms surrounding the practice of Mat in Russian society

encouraged me to look more deeply at veza as a social concept important for

understanding the rudimentary mechanics of corruption in BiH. My study of veza led me

21There are several strong exceptions to this statement, mostof which are referenced throughout this study. However, Louise I. Shelley’s studies of Soviet lawyers and policeare noteworthy in this regard.

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to the discovery of the similar term stela—predominantlyused in the central and southern

parts of BiH (Ledeneva, 1998). The role these terms play in understanding and explaining

the foundation and context of these problems is central to constructing the proper tools

for entering the normally hidden space of informal social customs, norms, and

terminology.

Volkov’scandid interviews provided a rich source of unique data, which he

tied to specific historical and cultural structures in Russian society (Volkov, 2002). The

blending of these data and structures provided the reader with an important way of

understanding the problems of organized crime and police corruption in Leningrad (now

St. Petersburg) and Moscow. The new knowledge he provided, by constructing this lens,

kindled important ideas for the formation of my research questions—focusing on locally

constructed contexts and analyzing how these resonate with other views and various

levels of analysis (Volkov, 2002). The ideas I received from Volkov for the conduct of

this inquiry were more in line with style and the possibilities for bringing a wide range of

data into a multi-level study.

Wedel’s expose of Polish and Hungarian deceptive practices in dealing with

international aid organizations provided a useful way for analyzing what is common

knowledge to many field researchers (Wedel, 2001). Often these facts are ignored or

treated as expected dissonance in the study. The filter often used is a simple discounting

of what appeared to be purposefully misleading. Wedel investigates and analyzes this

practice of deception in a way that provides a scholar with new insights and potential

tools for addressing and possibly circumventing the problem. A primary finding in her

work was that local knowledge, and even fair communication (in the local languages),

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was crucial for opening a door into the activity (Wedel, 2001). Her focus on the effects of

this practice on policy implementation drove home the practical need for developing such

knowledge—the same type of knowledge I provide in this study. Finally, but importantly,

Wedel successfully pulls together data that some stricter methodologists might disregard

as anecdotal, in a meaningful and focused way. Observing her practice helped me craft

the way I recounted my data (Wedel, 2001).

Humphrey, admittedly a late find in my research, built an important series of

frames in her studies of the anthropology of local political economies. Her vignettes

come together to present a tableau of structural analysis that lends rigor to the study of

local contexts Humphrey, 2002 and 1991). Her interest in informal exchange and bribery

provide crucial, foundational studies that demonstrate the importance of uncovering the

base mechanisms driving illicit behavior (Humphrey, 1991). Her work provided

confidence for me in the utility and importance of this study at a time when I had some

doubts. As I fumbled with hundreds of possible frames, categories, and ‘ideal types’ in

the two months I spent reading and re-reading Humphrey, and several of her guild, many

of the frames began to emerge (Humphrey and Hugh-Jones, 1992). The spirit and

creativity of her projects provided inspiration through the practical impact of her work.

Her work challenges thinly constructed studies and those who oversimplify the massive

complexities found in local realities. By treating these contexts seriously, she exposes the

weakness of many top-heavy studies of post-socialist societies—namely Eastern Russia

and Mongolia (Humphrey, 2002 and Humphrey and Hugh-Jones, 1992).

Each of these scholars used primary source interviews to study different

aspects of illicit social behavior. Each used a series of framing mechanisms to traverse

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various levelsof analysis. Although none of them directly cite Irving Gofftnan, his notion

of framing issues in a series of connected, overlapping matrices helps a reader more fully

understand the analytic motor behind their works (Goffinan, 1974). My use of explicit

framing mechanisms represents a small fraction of those I used to develop the final set

used in this analysis. The detailed attention required when handling data in this way

helped me see new and interesting aspects of the data and how it related with other

information. This familiarity is exposed more directly in my project, but the less

emphasized frames used by these scholars is apparent in the rich descriptive tone and

ease with which they analytically glide from individuals and local contexts to structures

and ideal types—all this without overstating the method.22

Stitching these lessons together, this scholarship effectively communicated

new knowledge for me, which re-shaped my expectations, hypotheses, and the way I built

and conducted this study. This realization reinforces the findings discussed in this project.

The information derived through this project and these cited studies provides a window

into a place rarely observed—the perceptions and attitudes of everyday professionals in

BiH, despite the obvious critique of strict methodologists. The validation of this approach

comes with the rich data that not only challenges certain conventional and well-rehearsed

positions, but also opens an obscured door to the analyst—providing information

necessary for a full understanding of organized crime and corruption in BiH. Thinly

constructed institutional studies, which dominate the inquiry of organized crime and

corruption, provide little utility to an analyst because they block out or ignore these

22It is necessary for me to be very direct with my analytic methods because this is a dissertation, not a book. I intend to mask much of my intellectual scaffolding when I fashion this project into a book, for better flow of information and hopefully an easier read for the interested researcher.

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important data, voices—referring to them as phenomenological and peripheral. This study

helps fill a clear gap in the literature on organized crime and corruption in BiH. However,

it goes further still in validating the utility of such work, as it will hopefully sit well with

works such as Ledeneva, Volkov, Wedel, Humphrey, and others that helped construct an

important space for the documentation of local contexts, voices, perceptions, and

attitudes in the sociology of illicit behavior.

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APPENDIX A: Interview Questions

1. From the choices below,what is the most serious social issue in Croatia/Bosnia today? Rank these issues in order of most to least serious and qualify your answers as very, somewhat, or not serious.

A. Unemployment B. Official Corruption C. Social Disorder D. Other (if, so define and discuss)

2. Have any of these issues affected you or someone you know, explain?

3. Do you see these issues as related, how and why?

A. Yes B. No

4. How do you describe the government’s efforts to address these issues and why?

5. Has the government been effective in addressing these issues, and why?

A. Yes B. No

6. Are you aware of any scandals involving corruption or organized criminal activity?

A. Yes B. No

7. If yes, which scandal is most familiar and how did you become aware of the scandal?

A. Newspaper B. Radio/Television C. From a friend D. Other

8. If no to Q4, are you aware of any public scandals in your country that call into question social order?

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9. Regarding the recent events surrounding the Orao (or INA, FBiH Army, or other issue discussed in Q6) case, do you believe these are isolated cases or examples of a prevalent problem in the country and why?

A. Isolated B. Prevalent

10. What do you believe are the main problems of social order that affect your community?

11. To what extent do these issues affect your daily life?

A. Often B. Occasionally C. Rarely D. Never

12. How do these issues affect daily life, including family and work?

13. How do these issues affect your community?

14. Of the issues listed below that are discussed much in the media, which is most prevalent?

A. Human Trafficking B. Illegal Protection Rackets C. Privatization Corruption D. Commodities Trafficking (such as cigarettes and oil) E. Money Laundering F. Other G. More than one

15. Of these same issues, which do you think is most problematic for your community today?

A. Human Trafficking B. Illegal Protection Rackets C. Privatization Corruption D. Commodities Trafficking (such as cigarettes and oil) E. Money Laundering F. Other G. More than one

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16. Do you think organized crime plays a role in these activities, how and why?

A. Yes B. No

17. Do you believe that organized crime is a major problem in your community today and why?

A. Yes B. No

18. Do you think the media, government, or international community has exaggerated the severity of the problem, why?

19. Do you believe the international community has been helpful in addressing these issues?

A. Yes B. No

20. Do you think the international community has done things to make these problems worse?

21. What is your opinion of local government, law enforcement, and international efforts to address any of these issues?

22. To what extent does official corruption obstruct solutions or make these issues more problematic for your local community?

23. To what extent has the media or expert studies and commentary had an impact on these issues?

24. To what extent have the local business community had an impact on these issues?

25. To what extent have foreigners caused this problem for your community?

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26. Fromthe list below, what category of foreigner has contributed most to this problem?

A. Military Peacekeepers B. Civilian Peacekeepers C. Non-governmental organization workers D. Foreign organized crime groups E. Other F. None

27. To what extent has the international community had an impact on these issues?

28. What do you believe needs to be done by government, law enforcement, the media, expert analysts, and the international community to address any or all of these issues?

29. Do you know anyone who has been affected by official corruption or organized crime?

30. Do veza and stela play a role in the problems of organized crime and corruption in BiH? If yes, what is the relationship?

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Agreement of Consent for Scholarly Research and Interview Project Regarding Local Attitudes and Perceptions About Social Issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Interviewing Scholar: ChristopherA. Corpora American University School of International Service 4400 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington DC 20016 (202) 885-1600 Email: [email protected] or [email protected]

Overview of Research Project: The research project will investigate local

perceptions and attitudes about various social issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina and

Croatia through qualitative interviews with opinion makers, businesspeople, and security

personnel in the two countries. The aim of the research is to clearly identify local

positions and the processes involved in the forming of such understandings.

Disclosure: The information obtained through these interviews will be used

to produce a full, public study of local understandings about social problems in the

region. Interview participants will meet a minimum age of 16 and agree to answer all

questions to the best of their truthfulability. All participants will have access to the final

product by contacting the author or American University in Washington DC, USA.

Confidentiality: Interviews will be conducted in full confidentiality, affording

anonymity to those who feel they cannot speak openly about certain social issues. All

steps will be taken to insure any confidential comments or anecdotes are relayed in a way

that will not reveal the identity of the interviewee. All interviews will be sealed and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 2 0

maintained in the Bender Library at American University, 4400 Massachusetts Avenue

NW, Washington DC, USA. All confidential interviews will be sealed im pepertum. The

information developed in the course of this research project is not for official or law

enforcement investigative purposes and cannot be directly used to initiate any legal or

judicial proceedings. This statement has been reviewed and approved by the American

University, School of International Service Human Subjects Officer.

Consent: By signing this statement, I acknowledge to understanding the

scope and confidentiality of the research project and voluntarily agree to participate as an

interviewee. I understand that my name will in no way be associated with the content of

the discussion beyond the interviewer’s personal notes, which will be sealed and

maintained at the American University in Washington DC, USA. I am 16 years of age or

older and agree to answer all questions truthfully.

I decline to sign this waiver or provide any personal information due

concerns about my security. However, I understand the contents of this disclosure and

agree to participate as a fully confidential interview subject.

NAME (print and signature):

DATE:

ADDRESS AND CONTACT INFORMATION:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 221

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