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Cambridge Companions Online http://universitypublishingonline.org/cambridge/companions/ The Cambridge Companion to Modern Jewish Philosophy Edited by Michael L. Morgan, Peter Eli Gordon Book DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521813123 Online ISBN: 9781139001489 Hardback ISBN: 9780521813129 Paperback ISBN: 9780521012553 Chapter 4 - Jewish Philosophy after Kant The Legacy of Salomon Maimon pp. 53-7 9 Chapter DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521813123.004 Cambridge University Press P1: SBT 0521813123c04.xml CUNY742/Morgan 0 521 81312 3 March 8, 2007 13:10 4 Jewish Philosophy after Kant: The Legacy of Salomon Maimon paul w. franks Blessed be God, who has given of His wisdom to Kant. Isaac Breuer1 Since the end of the eighteenth century, no non-Jewish philosopher has been more central to Jewish philosophy than Kant. The major Jewish philosophers of late modernity have worked out their positions in rela- tion to Kant, sometimes through the mediation of post-Kantians such as Hegel, Schelling, and Schopenhauer – just as the major ancient and medieval Jewish philosophers worked out their positions in relation to Plato, sometimes through the mediation of post-Platonists such as Aristotle, Plotinus and Alfarabi.2 What is the cause of Jewish philoso- phy’s intimate relation to Kant? One explanation is that Kant’s career coincided with the entry of Jews into German academic and intellectual life, a development to which Kant was openly sympathetic and for which justification could be found in his philosophy, with its doctrine of equal respect for each rational being.3 When Moses Mendelssohn visited Kant’s lectures in Konigsberg,¨ Kant is said to have silenced the students’ anti-Semitic jeers by greeting the great Jewish philosopher with a show of respect.4 Kant had several Jewish students, including Markus Herz, whom he chose to defend his (Kant’s) inaugural dissertation in 1770. These students, to whom an academic career was open only if they converted to Chris- tianity, chose instead to promote Kantianism from within the Jewish community. After emancipation, when the ban on Jewish professors was formally lifted, Jews such as Otto Liebman and Hermann Cohen – the latter the first Jewish full professor in Germany – were at the forefront of the “back to Kant” movement. In the early twentieth century, when I gratefully acknowledge the assistance and comments of Robert Gibbs, Peter Gordon, Yitzhak Melamed, Michael Morgan, Hindy Najman, Benjamin Pol- lock, and Eliot Wolfson. 53 DownloadedCambridge from Cambridge Collections Companions Online Online © by Cambridge IP 130.253.4.14 University on Wed Mar Press,12 12:06:07 200 GMT7 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521813123.004 Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2014 P1: SBT 0521813123c04.xml CUNY742/Morgan 0 521 81312 3 March 8, 2007 13:10 54 Paul W. Franks Neo-Kantianism predominated within the intellectual establishment of Wilhelmine Germany, Isaac Breuer, the intellectual leader of “indepen- dent” German Orthodoxy, joined the Kant Society and wrote texts advo- cating “Torah-true Judaism” at a desk over which Kant’s portrait hung.5 This explanation has little to do with the details of Kant’s thought, so I will offer a complementary but content-based explanation, arguing that between Jewish philosophy and Kant lies a genuine affinity, which is due to Jewish philosophy’s longstanding involvement with the Pla- tonic tradition. Kant himself emphasizes his intimate relation to Plato, and this alone suffices for the development of a Kantianism deploying characteristically Jewish terms. However, some distinctive features of Kant’s Platonism are especially susceptible to interpretation in terms of such central Jewish concepts as divine unity, law, and messianism. Moreover, Kant’s Platonism is quickly radicalized by Salomon Maimon, who explicitly injects Jewish philosophy into post-Kantianism and post- Kantianism into Jewish philosophy. It is Maimon, above all, who facili- tates Jewish philosophy’s intimate entanglement with post-Kantian tra- ditions such as German Idealism, Neo-Kantianism, and critical theory. While Maimon’s role in the development of post-Kantianism is well- known, his centrality in the history of modern Jewish philosophy has hitherto been unacknowledged.6 1. foundations of jewish kantianism Kant’s Platonism plays a crucial role in Hermann Cohen’s argument for what he calls “inner relations” between Kantianism and Judaism.7 To acknowledge this point, however, we need not agree with Cohen’s particular interpretations of Kant or Plato.8 We need only note, first, Kant’s efforts to position himself as Plato’s true heir and, second, the long history throughout which Platonism has been intertwined with both Judaism and Christianity – so closely that someone brought up in either religion can encounter certain Platonic themes for the first time and immediately feel at home. 1.1. Kant and the Ideas Plato is the author about whom Kant famously remarks in his 1781 Critique of Pure Reason “that when we compare the thoughts that an author expresses about a subject, in ordinary speech as well as in writ- ings, it is not at all unusual to find that we understand him even better than he understood himself”.9 When Kant enters uncharacteristically into a polemical controversy in 1796, it is to fend off a competing claim to inherit Platonism.10 DownloadedCambridge from Cambridge Collections Companions Online Online © by Cambridge IP 130.253.4.14 University on Wed Mar Press,12 12:06:07 200 GMT7 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521813123.004 Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2014 P1: SBT 0521813123c04.xml CUNY742/Morgan 0 521 81312 3 March 8, 2007 13:10 Jewish Philosophy after Kant 55 Kant makes his 1781 remark when he is insisting, at the beginning of Division Two of the Critique of Pure Reason (the Transcendental Dialectic), on the distinction between concepts – even those pure or a priori concepts called categories – and ideas: Plato made use of the expression idea in such a way that we can readily see that he understood by it something that not only could never be borrowed from the senses, but that even goes far beyond the concepts of the understanding (with which Aristotle occupied himself), since nothing encountered in experience could ever be congruent to it. Ideas for him are archetypes of things themselves, and not, like the categories, merely the key to possible experience.11 In a passage that could easily surprise someone who has been reading the Critique sequentially, and for the first time, Kant protests that ideas “that go much too far for any object that experience can give ever to be congruent, but that nonetheless have their reality . are by no means merely figments of the brain.” The popular portrait of the Platonic repub- lic as “a dream of perfection that can have its place only in the idle thinker’s brain” could hardly be further from the truth.12 By defending ideas as essential to both epistemology and ethics, Cohen argues, Kant joins the Jewish tradition in opposing both sensu- alism and materialism.13 Indeed, (1) Kant himself recognizes an affinity between the Jewish prohibition on representing God and his own insis- tence on the sublimity of the ideas,14 which entails a prohibition on the methodological naturalization of reason.15 But the affinity between Kant and Judaism is not only negative. As we will see, (2) notwithstanding the distinction between theory and practice, the reason whose naturaliza- tion Kant opposes is one, and he regards this unity as manifest primarily through the concept of law. Moreover, (3) Kant’s concern for reason as law funds his teleological conception of history, which is at once both political and religious. Kant’s defence of Platonic ideas at the beginning of the Dialectic can surprise readers because his argument in the preceding Analytic seems so Aristotelian. He argues that concepts – regarded as forms of thought char- acteristic of the faculty of understanding – can be used to think of objects only in combination with “the matter of cognition”, which is given to us humans only through sensibility. Concepts such as “fortune” and “fate,” for which there is no appropriate sensible matter, lack objective valid- ity and should, it seems, be jettisoned.16 In order to save the categories from the fate of “fate,” Kant undertakes the torturous task of showing DownloadedCambridge from Cambridge Collections Companions Online Online © by Cambridge IP 130.253.4.14 University on Wed Mar Press,12 12:06:07 200 GMT7 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521813123.004 Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2014 P1: SBT 0521813123c04.xml CUNY742/Morgan 0 521 81312 3 March 8, 2007 13:10 56 Paul W. Franks that these a priori concepts – of substance, causality, and so on – can be combined with appropriate sensible matter by means of the struc- tures of space and time, which he argues are sensibly given, yet a priori. This uncompromising, quasi-Aristotelian hylomorphism can leave one unprepared for the quasi-Platonic argument that ideas – separate forms, incapable of combination with any sensible matter whatsoever, even if it is a priori – are nonetheless essential to our cognition. An idea, as Kant uses the term, is a representation of a “totality of conditions to a given conditioned thing,” made possible by an uncon- ditioned condition or absolute.17 In other words, it is the representa- tion of some given thing as intelligible without residue, so that there is an answer to every possible question as to why the thing is as it is. Though an answer may also invite further why-questions, these too can be answered, until at last an answer is reached that is either self- explanatory or in need of no explanation whatsoever.