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North Korean Cyber Capabilities: in Brief
North Korean Cyber Capabilities: In Brief Emma Chanlett-Avery Specialist in Asian Affairs Liana W. Rosen Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics John W. Rollins Specialist in Terrorism and National Security Catherine A. Theohary Specialist in National Security Policy, Cyber and Information Operations August 3, 2017 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R44912 North Korean Cyber Capabilities: In Brief Overview As North Korea has accelerated its missile and nuclear programs in spite of international sanctions, Congress and the Trump Administration have elevated North Korea to a top U.S. foreign policy priority. Legislation such as the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-122) and international sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council have focused on North Korea’s WMD and ballistic missile programs and human rights abuses. According to some experts, another threat is emerging from North Korea: an ambitious and well-resourced cyber program. North Korea’s cyberattacks have the potential not only to disrupt international commerce, but to direct resources to its clandestine weapons and delivery system programs, potentially enhancing its ability to evade international sanctions. As Congress addresses the multitude of threats emanating from North Korea, it may need to consider responses to the cyber aspect of North Korea’s repertoire. This would likely involve multiple committees, some of which operate in a classified setting. This report will provide a brief summary of what unclassified open-source reporting has revealed about the secretive program, introduce four case studies in which North Korean operators are suspected of having perpetrated malicious operations, and provide an overview of the international finance messaging service that these hackers may be exploiting. -
الجريمة اإللكرتونية يف املجتمع الخليجي وكيفية مواجهتها Cybercrimes in the Gulf Society and How to Tackle Them
مسابقة جائزة اﻷمير نايف بن عبدالعزيز للبحوث اﻷمنية لعام )2015م( الجريمة اﻹلكرتونية يف املجتمع الخليجي وكيفية مواجهتها Cybercrimes in the Gulf Society and How to Tackle Them إعـــــداد رامـــــــــــــي وحـــــــــــــيـد مـنـصــــــــــور باحـــــــث إســـتراتيجي في الشــــــئون اﻷمـــنـــية واﻻقتصـــــــــاد الســــــــياسـي -1- أ ت جملس التعاون لدول اخلليج العربية. اﻷمانة العامة 10 ج إ الجريمة اﻹلكترونية في المجتمع الخليجي وكيفية مواجهتها= cybercrimes in the Gulf:Society and how to tackle them إعداد رامي وحيد منصور ، البحرين . ـ الرياض : جملس التعاون لدول اخلليج العربية ، اﻷمانة العامة؛ 2016م. 286 ص ؛ 24 سم الرقم املوحد ملطبوعات اجمللس : 0531 / 091 / ح / ك/ 2016م. اجلرائم اﻹلكرتونية / / جرائم املعلومات / / شبكات احلواسيب / / القوانني واللوائح / / اجملتمع / مكافحة اجلرائم / / اجلرائم احلاسوبية / / دول جملس التعاون لدول اخلليج العربية. -2- قائمة املحتويات قائمة احملتويات .......................................................................................................... 3 قائمــة اﻷشــكال ........................................................................................................10 مقدمــة الباحــث ........................................................................................................15 مقدمة الدراســة .........................................................................................................21 الفصل التمهيدي )اﻹطار النظري للدراسة( موضوع الدراســة ...................................................................................................... 29 إشــكاليات الدراســة ................................................................................................ -
Paradise Lost , Book III, Line 18
_Paradise Lost_, book III, line 18 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% ++++++++++Hacker's Encyclopedia++++++++ ===========by Logik Bomb (FOA)======== <http://www.xmission.com/~ryder/hack.html> ---------------(1997- Revised Second Edition)-------- ##################V2.5################## %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% "[W]atch where you go once you have entered here, and to whom you turn! Do not be misled by that wide and easy passage!" And my Guide [said] to him: "That is not your concern; it is his fate to enter every door. This has been willed where what is willed must be, and is not yours to question. Say no more." -Dante Alighieri _The Inferno_, 1321 Translated by John Ciardi Acknowledgments ---------------------------- Dedicated to all those who disseminate information, forbidden or otherwise. Also, I should note that a few of these entries are taken from "A Complete List of Hacker Slang and Other Things," Version 1C, by Casual, Bloodwing and Crusader; this doc started out as an unofficial update. However, I've updated, altered, expanded, re-written and otherwise torn apart the original document, so I'd be surprised if you could find any vestiges of the original file left. I think the list is very informative; it came out in 1990, though, which makes it somewhat outdated. I also got a lot of information from the works listed in my bibliography, (it's at the end, after all the quotes) as well as many miscellaneous back issues of such e-zines as _Cheap Truth _, _40Hex_, the _LOD/H Technical Journals_ and _Phrack Magazine_; and print magazines such as _Internet Underground_, _Macworld_, _Mondo 2000_, _Newsweek_, _2600: The Hacker Quarterly_, _U.S. News & World Report_, _Time_, and _Wired_; in addition to various people I've consulted. -
Gothic Panda Possibly Used Doublepulsar a Year Before The
Memo 17/05/2019 - TLP:WHITE Gothic Panda possibly used DoublePulsar a year before the Shadow Brokers leak Reference: Memo [190517-1] Date: 17/05/2019 - Version: 1.0 Keywords: APT, DoublePulsar, China, US, Equation Group Sources: Publicly available sources Key Points Gothic Panda may have used an Equation Group tool at least one year before the Shadow Brokers leak. It is unknown how the threat group obtained the tool. This is a good example of a threat actor re-using cyber weapons that were originally fielded by another group. Summary According research conducted by Symantec, the Chinese threat actor known as Gothic Panda (APT3, UPS, SSL Beast, Clandestine Fox, Pirpi, TG-0110, Buckeye, G0022, APT3) had access to at least one NSA-associated Equation Group tool a year before they were leaked by the Shadow Brokers threat actor. On April 14, 2017, a threat actor called the Shadow Brokers released a bundle of cyber-attack tools purportedly coming from the US NSA, also referred to as the Equation Group. Among the released material there was the DoublePulsar backdoor implant tool, which was used alongside EternalBlue in the May 2017 destructive WannaCry attack. DoublePulsar is a memory-based kernel malware that allows perpetrators to run arbitrary shellcode payloads on the target system. It does not write anything on the hard drive and will thus disappear once the victim machine is rebooted. Its only purpose is to enable dropping other malware or executables in the system. According to Symantec, Gothic Panda used the DoublePulsar exploit as early as in 2016, a full year before the Shadow Brokers release. -
Reporting, and General Mentions Seem to Be in Decline
CYBER THREAT ANALYSIS Return to Normalcy: False Flags and the Decline of International Hacktivism By Insikt Group® CTA-2019-0821 CYBER THREAT ANALYSIS Groups with the trappings of hacktivism have recently dumped Russian and Iranian state security organization records online, although neither have proclaimed themselves to be hacktivists. In addition, hacktivism has taken a back seat in news reporting, and general mentions seem to be in decline. Insikt Group utilized the Recorded FutureⓇ Platform and reports of historical hacktivism events to analyze the shifting targets and players in the hacktivism space. The target audience of this research includes security practitioners whose enterprises may be targets for hacktivism. Executive Summary Hacktivism often brings to mind a loose collective of individuals globally that band together to achieve a common goal. However, Insikt Group research demonstrates that this is a misleading assumption; the hacktivist landscape has consistently included actors reacting to regional events, and has also involved states operating under the guise of hacktivism to achieve geopolitical goals. In the last 10 years, the number of large-scale, international hacking operations most commonly associated with hacktivism has risen astronomically, only to fall off just as dramatically after 2015 and 2016. This constitutes a return to normalcy, in which hacktivist groups are usually small sets of regional actors targeting specific organizations to protest regional events, or nation-state groups operating under the guise of hacktivism. Attack vectors used by hacktivist groups have remained largely consistent from 2010 to 2019, and tooling has assisted actors to conduct larger-scale attacks. However, company defenses have also become significantly better in the last decade, which has likely contributed to the decline in successful hacktivist operations. -
Cryptographic File Systems Performance: What You Don't Know Can Hurt You Charles P
Cryptographic File Systems Performance: What You Don't Know Can Hurt You Charles P. Wright, Jay Dave, and Erez Zadok Stony Brook University Appears in the proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Security In Storage Workshop (SISW 2003) Abstract interact with disks, caches, and a variety of other com- plex system components — all having a dramatic effect Securing data is more important than ever, yet cryp- on performance. tographic file systems still have not received wide use. In this paper we perform a real world performance One barrier to the adoption of cryptographic file systems comparison between several systems that are used is that the performance impact is assumed to be too high, to secure file systems on laptops, workstations, and but in fact is largely unknown. In this paper we first moderately-sized file servers. We also emphasize multi- survey available cryptographic file systems. Second, programming workloads, which are not often inves- we perform a performance comparison of a representa- tigated. Multi-programmed workloads are becoming tive set of the systems, emphasizing multiprogrammed more important even for single user machines, in which workloads. Third, we discuss interesting and counterin- Windowing systems are often used to run multiple appli- tuitive results. We show the overhead of cryptographic cations concurrently. We expect cryptographic file sys- file systems can be minimal for many real-world work- tems to become a commodity component of future oper- loads, and suggest potential improvements to existing ating systems. systems. We have observed not only general trends with We present results from a variety of benchmarks, an- each of the cryptographic file systems we compared but alyzing the behavior of file systems for metadata op- also anomalies based on complex interactions with the erations, raw I/O operations, and combined with CPU operating system, disks, CPUs, and ciphers. -
Basics of Ethical Hacking – Manthan M. Desai
Hacking For Beginners – Manthan Desai 2010 Legal Disclaimer Any proceedings and or activities related to the material contained within this book are exclusively your liability. The misuse and mistreat of the information in this book can consequence in unlawful charges brought against the persons in question. The authors and review analyzers will not be held responsible in the event any unlawful charges brought against any individuals by misusing the information in this book to break the law. This book contains material and resources that can be potentially destructive or dangerous. If you do not fully comprehend something on this book, don‘t study this book. Please refer to the laws and acts of your state/region/ province/zone/territory or country before accessing, using, or in any other way utilizing these resources. These materials and resources are for educational and research purposes only. Do not attempt to violate the law with anything enclosed here within. If this is your intention, then leave now. While using this book and reading various hacking tutorials, you agree to follow the below mentioned terms and conditions: 1. All the information provided in this book is for educational purposes only. The book author is no way responsible for any misuse of the information. 2. "Hacking for Beginners” is just a term that represents the name of the book and is not a book that provides any illegal information. “Hacking for Beginners” is a book related to Computer Security and not a book that promotes hacking/cracking/software piracy. 3. This book is totally meant for providing information on "Computer Security”, "Computer Programming” and other related topics and is no way related towards the terms "CRACKING” or "HACKING” (Unethical). -
Steve Wozniak
Steve Wozniak. http://www.woz.org http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steve_Wozniak http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_box http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_computer Steve Wozniak’s patent: Microcomputer for use with video display. Apple 1 manual. Apple 1 manual (PDF). http://apple2history.org/ http://www.digibarn.com/ http://www.macmothership.com/ http://www.multimedialab.be http://www.mast-r.org Wozniak’s early inspirations came from his father Jerry who was a Loc- kheed engineer, and from a fictional wonder-boy: Tom Swift. His father infected him with fascination for electronics and would often check over young Woz’s creations. Tom Swift, on the other hand, was for Woz an epitome of creative freedom, scientific knowledge, and the ability to find solutions to problems. Tom Swift would also attractively illustrate the big awards that await the inventor. To this day, Wozniak returns to Tom Swift books and reads them to his own kids as a form of inspiration. John Draper explained to Wozniak the Blue Box, a device with which one could (mis)use the telephone system by emulating pulses (i.e. phone phreaking). Although Draper instructed Woz not to produce and especially not sell the gadgets on account of the possibility of being discovered, Wo- zniak built and sold Blue Boxes for $150 a piece. Wozniak met Steve Jobs while working a summer job at HP, and they began selling blue boxes to- gether. Many of the purchasers of their blue boxes were in fact discovered and sure enough John Draper was linked to their use. 1975. By 1975, Woz dropped out of the University of California, Berkeley (he would later finish his degree in 1987) and came up with a computer that eventually became successful nationwide. -
Comparison of Disk Encryption Software 1 Comparison of Disk Encryption Software
Comparison of disk encryption software 1 Comparison of disk encryption software This is a technical feature comparison of different disk encryption software. Background information Name Developer First released Licensing Maintained? ArchiCrypt Live Softwaredevelopment Remus ArchiCrypt 1998 Proprietary Yes [1] BestCrypt Jetico 1993 Proprietary Yes BitArmor DataControl BitArmor Systems Inc. 2008-05 Proprietary Yes BitLocker Drive Encryption Microsoft 2006 Proprietary Yes Bloombase Keyparc Bloombase 2007 Proprietary Yes [2] CGD Roland C. Dowdeswell 2002-10-04 BSD Yes CenterTools DriveLock CenterTools 2008 Proprietary Yes [3][4][5] Check Point Full Disk Encryption Check Point Software Technologies Ltd 1999 Proprietary Yes [6] CrossCrypt Steven Scherrer 2004-02-10 GPL No Cryptainer Cypherix (Secure-Soft India) ? Proprietary Yes CryptArchiver WinEncrypt ? Proprietary Yes [7] cryptoloop ? 2003-07-02 GPL No cryptoMill SEAhawk Proprietary Yes Discryptor Cosect Ltd. 2008 Proprietary Yes DiskCryptor ntldr 2007 GPL Yes DISK Protect Becrypt Ltd 2001 Proprietary Yes [8] cryptsetup/dmsetup Christophe Saout 2004-03-11 GPL Yes [9] dm-crypt/LUKS Clemens Fruhwirth (LUKS) 2005-02-05 GPL Yes DriveCrypt SecurStar GmbH 2001 Proprietary Yes DriveSentry GoAnywhere 2 DriveSentry 2008 Proprietary Yes [10] E4M Paul Le Roux 1998-12-18 Open source No e-Capsule Private Safe EISST Ltd. 2005 Proprietary Yes Dustin Kirkland, Tyler Hicks, (formerly [11] eCryptfs 2005 GPL Yes Mike Halcrow) FileVault Apple Inc. 2003-10-24 Proprietary Yes FileVault 2 Apple Inc. 2011-7-20 Proprietary -
Copyrighted Material
INDEX Abene, Mark (Phiber Optik), 70 Appearance points (AP), wireless Access key, 72 networks, 73, 74 AccessData, 40. See also FTK Appendixes, inclusion in report, 56 ActiveX, 77 Apple Computer, 6 ADC (analog-to-digital conversion), 21 Application and file analysis, 123–125 Adleman, Len, 51 Application suites, 39, 40, 55 Admissibility of evidence ARPANET, 4 acceptable alteration of evidence, 29 Arrest and arraignment, 60 chain of custody, 119, 134, 135 ASCII (American Standard Code for and choosing course of action, 29, 30 Information Exchange), 18, 39 and goal of computer forensics, 13 Assembly language, 3 hearsay, 135–137 Asymmetric keys, 48, 49 and record keeping, 53 ATA disks, 118 Attorney-client privilege, 61 relevance, 132–134 Auction fraud, 97–99 reliability, 26, 131, 132, 135, 136 Authentication, wireless networks, 72 Adware, 75, 77, 78 AvantStar Products, 124 American Standard Code for Information Exchange (ASCII), 18, 39 Analog-to-digital conversion (ADC or Backdoors, 77–79, 112 A/D), 21 Backus, John, 3 Analog versus digital, 17, 18, 21 Bait-and-switch fraud, 98, 99 Analysis Base-2, 19 Base-10, 19, 20 application and file analysis, 123, 124 Base-16, 19 data encryption, 47–49 Basic input output system. See BIOS deleted files, 43, 44 http://www.pbookshop.comBasic integrated operating system. See execution files, 41 BIOS file extensions, 44, 45 Best evidence rule, 26, 135 file slack. See File slack Binary system, 17, 18, 20–22 file structures, 45, 46 BIOS, 32, 33, 116, 123 hidden data,COPYRIGHTED 123 Bit-stream MATERIAL images, 119 password -
Cyber Attack Campaigns in Political Conflicts
CYBER ATTACK CAMPAIGNS IN POLITI- CAL CONFLICTS A case study of Anonymous hacktivists’ campaign against ISIS Master´s Thesis in Information Systems Science Author: Otto Sulin Supervisor: Jonna Järveläinen 16.02.2018 Turku Turun kauppakorkeakoulu • Turku School of Economics Turun yliopiston laatujärjestelmän mukaisesti tämän julkaisun alkuperäisyys on tar- kastettu Turnitin OriginalityCheck -järjestelmällä. The originality of this thesis has been checked in accordance with the University of Turku quality assurance system using the Turnitin OriginalityCheck service. Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 9 1.1 Internet, the new frontier of conflicts ............................................................. 9 1.2 Scientific motivation for this study .............................................................. 10 1.3 General overview of the study ..................................................................... 11 2 POLITICAL CONFLICTS AND WARFARE IN THE CYBERSPACE ............. 13 2.1 Conflicts in the Cyberspace.......................................................................... 13 2.1.1 Perspectives on different types of conflicts ..................................... 13 2.1.2 Analyzing conflicts .......................................................................... 14 2.2 Evaluation of existing cyber conflict models ............................................... 16 2.2.1 Cyber Early Warning Model ........................................................... -
Kobold: Evaluating Decentralized Access Control for Remote NSXPC Methods on Ios
Kobold: Evaluating Decentralized Access Control for Remote NSXPC Methods on iOS Luke Deshotels Costin Carabas, Jordan Beichler North Carolina State University, University POLITEHNICA of Bucharest North Carolina State University Samsung Research America [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Razvan˘ Deaconescu William Enck University POLITEHNICA of Bucharest North Carolina State University [email protected] [email protected] Abstract—Apple uses several access control mechanisms to posed to other applications. However, several features (e.g., prevent third party applications from directly accessing secu- dynamic dispatching for method calls) make data flow rity sensitive resources, including sandboxing and file access analysis less practical for iOS binaries. To the best of our control. However, third party applications may also indirectly access these resources using inter-process communication (IPC) knowledge, there exists no systematic enumeration of iOS with system daemons. If these daemons fail to properly enforce remote methods accessible to third party applications. The access control on IPC, confused deputy vulnerabilities may closest related work is existing IPC fuzzers for iOS [2], result. Identifying such vulnerabilities begins with an enumer- [22], [30] that probe for code flaws such as type confusion ation of all IPC services accessible to third party applications. or dereferencing vulnerabilities, which can be exploited However, the IPC interfaces and their corresponding access control policies are unknown and must be reverse engineered at to obtain arbitrary code execution. However, these fuzzers a large scale. In this paper, we present the Kobold framework do not attempt to enumerate remote methods or identify to study NSXPC-based system services using a combination confused deputy vulnerabilities.