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Comparison of Disk Encryption Software 1 Comparison of Disk Encryption Software

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Comparison of Disk Encryption Software 1 Comparison of Disk Encryption Software Comparison of disk encryption software 1 Comparison of disk encryption software This is a technical feature comparison of different disk encryption software. Background information Name Developer First released Licensing Maintained? ArchiCrypt Live Softwaredevelopment Remus ArchiCrypt 1998 Proprietary Yes [1] BestCrypt Jetico 1993 Proprietary Yes BitArmor DataControl BitArmor Systems Inc. 2008-05 Proprietary Yes BitLocker Drive Encryption Microsoft 2006 Proprietary Yes Bloombase Keyparc Bloombase 2007 Proprietary Yes [2] CGD Roland C. Dowdeswell 2002-10-04 BSD Yes CenterTools DriveLock CenterTools 2008 Proprietary Yes [3][4][5] Check Point Full Disk Encryption Check Point Software Technologies Ltd 1999 Proprietary Yes [6] CrossCrypt Steven Scherrer 2004-02-10 GPL No Cryptainer Cypherix (Secure-Soft India) ? Proprietary Yes CryptArchiver WinEncrypt ? Proprietary Yes [7] cryptoloop ? 2003-07-02 GPL No cryptoMill SEAhawk Proprietary Yes Discryptor Cosect Ltd. 2008 Proprietary Yes DiskCryptor ntldr 2007 GPL Yes DISK Protect Becrypt Ltd 2001 Proprietary Yes [8] cryptsetup/dmsetup Christophe Saout 2004-03-11 GPL Yes [9] dm-crypt/LUKS Clemens Fruhwirth (LUKS) 2005-02-05 GPL Yes DriveCrypt SecurStar GmbH 2001 Proprietary Yes DriveSentry GoAnywhere 2 DriveSentry 2008 Proprietary Yes [10] E4M Paul Le Roux 1998-12-18 Open source No e-Capsule Private Safe EISST Ltd. 2005 Proprietary Yes Dustin Kirkland, Tyler Hicks, (formerly [11] eCryptfs 2005 GPL Yes Mike Halcrow) FileVault Apple Inc. 2003-10-24 Proprietary Yes FileVault 2 Apple Inc. 2011-7-20 Proprietary Yes FinallySecure Enterprise SECUDE 2006 Proprietary Yes (SECUDE) FREE CompuSec CE-Infosys 2002 Proprietary Yes [12] FreeOTFE Sarah Dean 2004-10-10 Open source Yes [13] GBDE Poul-Henning Kamp 2002-10-19 BSD Yes Comparison of disk encryption software 2 [14] GELI Pawel Jakub Dawidek 2005-04-11 BSD Yes KryptOS The MorphOS Development Team 2010 Proprietary Yes loop-AES Jari Ruusu 2001-04-11 GPL Yes n-Crypt Pro n-Trance Security Ltd 2005 Proprietary Yes [15] PGPDisk PGP Corporation 1998-09-01 Proprietary Yes [16] Private Disk Dekart 1993 Proprietary Yes R-Crypto R-Tools Technology Inc 2008 Proprietary Yes McAfee Endpoint Encryption McAfee, Inc. [17] 2007 Proprietary Yes (SafeBoot) [18] SafeGuard Easy Sophos (Utimaco) 1993 Proprietary Yes [19] SafeGuard Enterprise Sophos (Utimaco) 2007 Proprietary Yes [20] SafeGuard PrivateDisk Sophos (Utimaco) 2000 Proprietary Yes SafeHouse Professional PC Dynamics, Inc. 1992 Proprietary Yes Scramdisk Shaun Hollingworth 1997-07-01 Open source No [21] Scramdisk 4 Linux Hans-Ulrich Juettner 2005-08-06 GPL Yes SecuBox Aiko Solutions 2007-02-19 Proprietary Yes SECUDE Secure Notebook SECUDE 2003 Proprietary Yes SecureDoc WinMagic Inc. 1997 Proprietary Yes [22] Sentry 2020 SoftWinter 1998 Proprietary Yes [23] softraid / RAID C OpenBSD 2007-11-01 BSD Yes SpyProof! Information Security Corp. 2002 Proprietary Yes [24] svnd / vnconfig OpenBSD 2000-12-01 BSD Yes Symantec Endpoint Encryption Symantec Corporation 2008 Proprietary Yes [25] TrueCrypt Foundation 2004-02-02 Proprietary TrueCrypt TrueCrypt [26] Yes License 3.0 Aloaha Secure Stick Aloaha 2008 Proprietary Yes Name Developer First released Licensing Maintained? Operating systems Comparison of disk encryption software 3 Name Windows Pre-Windows Windows FreeBSD Linux Mac NetBSD OpenBSD DragonFly NT-based NT Mobile/Pocket OS X BSD PC ArchiCrypt Live Yes No No No No No No No No BestCrypt Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No No BitArmor DataControl Yes No No No No No No No No BitLocker Drive Yes No No No No No No No No Encryption Bloombase Keyparc Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No No CenterTools DriveLock Yes No No No No No No No No CGD No No No No No No Yes No No Check Point Full Disk Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No No No Encryption CrossCrypt Yes No No No No No No No No [27] Cryptainer Yes No Yes No No No No No No CryptArchiver Yes No No No No No No No No [28] cryptoloop Yes No No No Yes No No No No Discryptor Yes No No No No No No No No DiskCryptor Yes No No No No No No No No DISK Protect Yes No No No No No No No No [28] cryptsetup/dmsetup Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes [28] [29] dm-crypt/LUKS Yes No Yes No Yes No No No Yes DriveCrypt Yes No No No No No No No No DriveSentry Yes No No No No No No No No GoAnywhere 2 E4M Yes Yes No No No No No No No e-Capsule Private Safe Yes No No No No No No No No eCryptfs No No No Yes Yes No No No No FileVault No No No No No Yes No No No FileVault 2 No No No No No Yes No No No FREE CompuSec Yes No No No Yes No No No No [30] FreeOTFE Yes No Yes No Partial No No No No GBDE No No No Yes No No No No No GELI No No No Yes No No No No No loop-AES No No No No Yes No No No No n-Crypt Pro Yes No No No No No No No No PGPDisk Yes No No No No Yes No No No PGP Whole Disk Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Encryption Private Disk Yes Yes No No No No No No No Comparison of disk encryption software 4 R-Crypto Yes No No No No No No No No McAfee Endpoint Yes No [31] No No Yes No No No Encryption (SafeBoot) Yes SafeGuard Easy Yes No No No No No No No No SafeGuard Enterprise Yes No No No No Yes No No No SafeGuard PrivateDisk Yes No No No No No No No No SafeHouse Professional Yes Yes No No No No No No No Scramdisk Yes Yes No No Yes No No No No Scramdisk 4 Linux No No No No Yes No No No No SecuBox No No Yes No No No No No No FinallySecure Yes No No No No No No No No Enterprise (SECUDE) SecureDoc Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Sentry 2020 Yes No No No No No No No No softraid / RAID C No No No No No No No Yes No SpyProof! Yes No No No No No No No No svnd / vnconfig No No No No No No No Yes No Symantec Endpoint Yes No No No No No No No No Encryption [32] TrueCrypt Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Aloaha Secure Stick Yes No No No No No No No No Name Windows Pre-Windows Windows FreeBSD Linux Mac NetBSD OpenBSD DragonFly NT-based NT Mobile/Pocket OS X BSD PC Features • Hidden containers: Whether hidden containers (an encrypted container (A) within another encrypted container (B) so the existence of container A can not be established)[33] can be created for deniable encryption. Note that some modes of operation like CBC with a plain IV can be more prone to watermarking attacks than others. • Pre-boot authentication: Whether authentication can be required before booting the computer, thus allowing one to encrypt the boot disk. • Custom authentication: Whether custom authentication mechanisms can be implemented with third-party applications. • Multiple keys: Whether an encrypted volume can have more than one active key. • Passphrase strengthening: Whether key strengthening is used with plain text passwords to frustrate dictionary attacks, usually using PBKDF2. • Hardware acceleration: Whether dedicated cryptographic accelerator expansion cards can be taken advantage of. • Trusted Platform Module: Whether the implementation can use a TPM cryptoprocessor. • Filesystems: what filesystems are supported. • Two-factor authentication: Whether optional security tokens (hardware security modules, such as Aladdin eToken and smart cards) are supported (for example using PKCS#11) Comparison of disk encryption software 5 Name Hidden Pre-boot Custom Multiple keys Passphrase Hardware TPM Filesystems Two-factor containers authentication authentication strengthening acceleration authentication [34] [34][35] [34][36] ArchiCrypt Live Yes No No Yes No No No ? Yes BestCrypt Any [37] [38] Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes supported Yes by OS BitArmor NTFS, DataControl FAT32 on No Yes No Yes Yes No No No non-system volumes BitLocker Drive [39] [40] [41] [42] [41] Chiefly [44] No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes [43] Yes Encryption NTFS Bloombase No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No ? ? Keyparc CGD Any [45] [46] [45] [] No No Yes Yes Yes No No supported Yes by OS CenterTools Any DriveLock No Yes No No Yes No No supported Yes by OS Check Point Full ? Yes Yes Yes Yes ? ? ? Yes Disk Encryption CrossCrypt No No No No No No No ? No CryptArchiver No No No No ? No No ? ? cryptoloop Any [47] No Yes Yes No No Yes No supported ? by OS DiskCryptor Any [48] [48] No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No supported Yes by OS [49] [49] DISK Protect ? Yes ? Yes ? ? No ? ? cryptsetup/dmsetup Any [47] No Yes Yes No No Yes No supported No by OS dm-crypt/LUKS Any [47] No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No supported Yes by OS [50] DriveCrypt Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No ? Yes DriveSentry Any GoAnywhere 2 No No Yes No Yes No ? supported Yes by OS E4M No No No No ? No No ? No e-Capsule Private [51] No No [] No Yes No ? ? Safe Yes Yes [52] eCryptfs No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Comparison of disk encryption software 6 FileVault ? HFS+, Two [53] No No No [53] Yes No possibly No passwords others FileVault 2 HFS+, [54] No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No possibly No others FREE CompuSec Any No Yes No No No No No supported No by OS FreeOTFE Any [55] [56] Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No supported Yes by OS GBDE Any [57] [58] [58] [57] No No Yes Yes No No No supported Yes by OS GELI Any [57] [59] [59] [57] No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No supported Yes by OS GuardianEdge NTFS, Hard Disk No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes FAT32 Encryption loop-AES Any [60] [60] [60] [60] [60] [61] No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No supported Yes by OS [62] n-Crypt Pro No No No No N/A No No ? ? [63] [64] PGPDisk No Yes ? Yes Yes ? Yes ? Yes Private Disk Any No No No Yes Yes No No supported Yes by OS R-Crypto Any ? No ? ? ? ? ? supported ? by OS McAfee Endpoint Any [65] Encryption Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes supported Yes (SafeBoot) by OS SafeGuard Easy Any [66] No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes supported Yes by OS SafeGuard Any [66] Enterprise No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes supported Yes by OS SafeGuard Any [67] PrivateDisk
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