Ensuring Data Confidentiality Via Plausibly Deniable Encryption and Secure Deletion – a Survey Qionglu Zhang1,2,3, Shijie Jia1,2*, Bing Chang4 and Bo Chen5*
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Zhang et al. Cybersecurity (2018) 1:1 Cybersecurity https://doi.org/10.1186/s42400-018-0005-8 SURVEY Open Access Ensuring data confidentiality via plausibly deniable encryption and secure deletion – a survey Qionglu Zhang1,2,3, Shijie Jia1,2*, Bing Chang4 and Bo Chen5* Abstract Ensuring confidentiality of sensitive data is of paramount importance, since data leakage may not only endanger data owners’ privacy, but also ruin reputation of businesses as well as violate various regulations like HIPPA and Sarbanes-Oxley Act. To provide confidentiality guarantee, the data should be protected when they are preserved in the personal computing devices (i.e., confidentiality during their lifetime); and also, they should be rendered irrecoverable after they are removed from the devices (i.e., confidentiality after their lifetime). Encryption and secure deletion are used to ensure data confidentiality during and after their lifetime, respectively. This work aims to perform a thorough literature review on the techniques being used to protect confidentiality of the data in personal computing devices, including both encryption and secure deletion. Especially for encryption, we mainly focus on the novel plausibly deniable encryption (PDE), which can ensure data confidentiality against both a coercive (i.e., the attacker can coerce the data owner for the decryption key) and a non-coercive attacker. Keywords: Data confidentiality, Plausibly deniable encryption, Secure deletion Introduction Spahr LLP: State and local governments move swiftly to Modern computing devices (e.g., desktops, laptops, smart sue equifax 2017); Third, it will directly violate regulations phones, tablets, wearable devices) are increasingly used like HIPAA (Congress 1996), Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to process sensitive or even mission critical data. Protect- (Congress 1999), and Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sarbanes and ing confidentiality of those sensitive data is of paramount Oxley 2002). The data confidentiality should be ensured importance because: First, data leakage will endanger data not only during their lifetime (i.e., the data are preserved owners’ privacy. For example, the data leakage of iCloud in the devices), but also after their lifetime (i.e., the data in 2014 disclosed almost 500 private pictures of various have been removed from the devices). This is because, celebrities (Cbsnews: Apple’s celebrity icloud leak proba- by recovering sensitive data which have been deleted, the bly has mundane causes 2014).Second,itwillruinrepu- attacker can achieve a similar gain compared to success- tation of businesses. For example, Equifax data breach in fully attacking the confidentiality of the data being pre- July 2017 caused a leak of 145,500,000 consumer records; a served in the devices. For example, by recovering a naked few local governments like cities of Chicago and San Fran- picture deleted by a victim, the adversary can still use it to cisco, as well as the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, embarrass the victim or ask the victim for ransom money. have filed enforcement actions against Equifax (Ballard Correspondingly, the research efforts for protecting data confidentiality can be divided into two categories: *Correspondence: [email protected]; [email protected] encryption and secure deletion. Encryption can protect 1Data Assurance and Communication Security Research Center, Chinese confidentiality of the data stored at rest by transform- Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China ing them into another format using some secrets (e.g., 2State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China keys), such that the adversary is not able to correlate 5Department of Computer Science, Michigan Technological University, the transformed format to the original format without Houghton, USA obtaining the secrets. All types of existing encryption Full list of author information is available at the end of the article mechanisms like symmetric encryption and asymmetric © The Author(s). 2018 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. Zhang et al. Cybersecurity (2018) 1:1 Page 2 of 20 encryption can achieve the aforementioned security prop- against both the coercive adversaries and the non-coercive erty. Secure deletion is to ensure that once the sensitive adversaries. We summarize the research for PDE the- data are deleted, the probability of recovering them is ory and systems (including both the desktop systems and negligibly small. This requires special techniques to com- the mobile systems). For the second case, we summa- pletely destroy data, eliminating any traces which may lead rize secure deletion approaches in various storage media to a full/partial data recovery. includingharddiskdrives(HDDs)andNANDflashmem- To protect confidentiality of the data stored in a com- ory. We also outline the new direction of secure deletion puting device, conventional encryption may not work approaches by eliminating impacts of operation history. when both the computing device and the device’s owner are captured by an attacker, since the attacker can coerce Organization. In “Background”section,weintroduce the owner to disclose the secret (i.e., a coercive adver- the background knowledge of flash memory, the architec- sary). Once the secret is disclosed, the transformed format ture of a storage system, PDE as well as secure deletion. created by encryption will be reversed, and the sensitive In “Models and assumptions” section, we unify the adver- data will be leaked. A novel encryption technique, plau- sarial model for both PDE and secure deletion, and also sibly deniable encryption (PDE) (Canetti et al. 1997), has summarize the assumptions required by PDE. We then been designed to complement the traditional encryption summarize the literature for PDE in “Protecting data con- to handle such a coercive attack. The high-level idea of fidentiality against coercive adversaries via PDE”section PDE is, the original sensitive message is encrypted into and for secure deletion in “Ensuring confidentiality of ciphertexts in a special way, such that during decryption, the deleted data via secure deletion”section,respectively. if a true key is used, the original sensitive message can In “Future directions”section,wediscussafewfuture be recovered, but if a decoy key is used, a plausible mes- directions of PDE and secure deletion. We conclude in sage will be generated. Therefore, upon being coerced, “Conclusion”section. the owner can simply disclose the decoy key to protect confidentiality of the original sensitive message. Background To protect confidentiality of the data deleted from Flash memory a computing device, the deleted data should be made Flash memory is a solid-state non-volatile computer stor- completely unrecoverable. Conventionally, this is ensured age medium that can be electrically erased and repro- by carefully over-writing the storage medium storing grammed. It can eliminate mechanical limitations and the data using garbage information (Joukov and Zadok latency of hard drives, achieving a much higher I/O 2005; Wei et al. 2011; Garfinkel and Shelat 2003;Sun throughput with a much lower power consumption. et al. 2008; Gutmann 1996) or deploying encryption Therefore, it gains popularity in main-stream mobile using ephemeral keys (Perlman 2005a, b,Geambasu devices like smart phones, tablets, wearable devices. In et al. 2009,Tangetal.2012, Reardon et al. 2012,Zarras addition, a lot of high-end laptops like Apple MacBook use et al. 2016). This unfortunately was shown to be insuf- flash memory as external storage. Even cloud providers ficient, since past existence of the deleted data will cre- allow their users to choose solid state drives (SSDs) as ate impacts on both the data organization (Bajaj and the underlying storage media (Amazon: New SSD-Backed Sion 2013b) and the other data which have not been Elastic Block Storage 2016). The flash memory being used deleted (Bajaj and Sion 2013a). Those impacts can then as the storage medium is mainly NAND flash. NAND be utilized by the adversary as an oracle to derive sen- flash stores data using an array of memory cells, which are sitive information about the deleted data. In the worst grouped into pages (each page can store 512-byte, 2KB, case, the adversary is able to completely recover the data or 4KB data), and multiple pages are further grouped into being deleted (Chen et al. 2016). Therefore, recent secure blocks (can contain 32, 64, or 128 pages). deletion approaches focus on eliminating those impacts Compared to traditional mechanical disks, NAND flash (Bajaj and Sion 2013a, b,ChenandSion2015;Chenand has several unique characteristics. First, NAND flash has Sion 2016;Jiaetal.2016). an erase-before-write design. Specifically, to overwrite In this work, we aim to conduct a thorough literature a flash page, the page needs to be erased before any review on data confidentiality protection. We believe that new data can be programmed to it. Second, the unit of data confidentiality should be always ensured no mat- read/program of NAND flash is a page, but the unit of terthedataarepreservedinthecomputingdeviceor erase is a block, which