Contents

Foreword ...... 5 Grigore Silaºi Editorial ...... 7 Martin Geiger Forms and Features of the Post-Enlargement Migration Space ...... 9 Paolo Ruspini Managing Migration for an Enlarging Europe — Inter-governmental Organizations and the Governance of Migration Flows ...... 19 Martin Geiger Balkan Migrations and The European Union: Patterns and Trends ...... 31 Martin Baldwin-Edwards Workers’ Mobility’: Europe’s Integration and Second Thoughts ...... 45 Peter van Krieken Romania's External Migration in the Context of Accession to the EU: Mechanisms, Institutions and Social-Cultural Issues ...... 55 Luminiþa Nicolescu, Daniela-Luminiþa Constantin Migrations et incidence sur la répartition spatiale de la population en Roumanie au niveau national et régional ...... 65 Vasile Gheþãu

Foreword

With six articles focused on migration, the pres- University, the School of High European ent issue of the Romanian Journal of European Comparative Studies and the Centre of Excellence Studies precedes the publication of a specialist 'Jean Monnet'. Journal of Migration Studies, a new initiative in the academic environment of Timiºoara. I hope that all readers will enjoy this special issue.

Some of the articles in this issue were already pre- sented at the International Colloquium “Romania and the EU in 2007” held in Timiºoara on the 6th of Grigore Silaºi, Professor May 2005 through the joint efforts of the West Editorial Board Coordinator

Editorial

Migration and European challenges

Being a short-term migrant to Romania, I feel trade area of the European Union have been expand- honored to contribute to this journal's issue and ing quickly, the mental picture of a 'common Europe therefore would like to thank the editors for this nice and identity' for most citizens remains rather unde- opportunity. veloped and is often blurred by exaggerated expecta- European studies as a subject, analyzing tions or already nearly destroyed by a growing EU- European developments in the present, past and pessimism. Although Europe's final borders and the future, certainly can't avoid the multi-facetted sub- future neighborhood are currently discussed and the ject of study called 'migration.' Decision-making on 'frontier' thereby slowly becomes demarcated, the migration issues is still defended by Member States overall progress towards a stronger European self- as their prerogative as migration directly affects the identification has been extremely limited. The conse- grounds on which European 'nation-states' have quences of a globalizing world and the uncertainties been created. The reluctance of Member States to of the 'EU-project' are raising fears among European transfer decision-making power to supranational citizens. The possible negative effects of globalization European institutions is maybe one of the most and enlargement have often been illustrated by using important indicators that the European Union is the picture of 'uncontrollable waves of migrants' struggling hard on its way forward. Like in other landing at Europe's shores and threatening the aspects of the integration process there are two (or income and social security of native citizens — even more) velocities involved: while the polity and cheaper and cheaper, everywhere available Samsung The Romanian Journal of European Studies 8 TV sets seem for our 'globalized European village' and first step of a Europe growing together and a less worrying. Europe that tries to deal with (rather than denies and One can say that the fear of uncontrollable migra- neglect) future challenges. tions and resulting resentments against future fellow (EU or non-EU) citizens and neighbors, unfortu- Migration is crucial for Europe's future develop- nately, is and has been a close companion of the ment and an interesting subject for the discipline of European project. Policy-makers and EU bureau- European studies. I am therefore happy to introduce crats failed to prepare their constituency, maybe to a journal that is full of interesting articles, high- should have given the enlargement more time and/or lighting important features of the migration phe- neglected opportunities to make the whole 'project' nomenon in Europe, and having a special focus on more socially sustainable and mentally manageable Romania as a new Member State: for individual citizens. On the other hand, policy- The bigger European picture is drawn by Ruspini makers repeatedly have been quick to react to public who questions and outlines the linkage between fears against potential immigrants (from the new national and supranational governance on the way Member States or from elsewhere) and to gain votes to a common immigration policy that will be the out of this fear-induced pre-form of xenophobia: they underpinning framework of the evolving post- quickly agree on restrictions — although destroying enlargement space. The impact of international hereby the original ideal of free movements between organizations and mostly informal consultation new and old Member States and introducing a sec- processes that led to the pre-construction of an area ond class of EU citizens. Unfortunately, however, of Justice, Freedom and Security is portrayed in the decision-makers seem rather incompetent and slow to article of Geiger. Baldwin-Edwards dedicated his accept mid-term and long-term European realities article to the next EU enlargement in line: the former and neglect new historic opportunities to actively Yugoslavia and Albania as an area that was and part- prepare their citizens for Europe's severe transforma- ly still is synonymous with voluntary and forced tions - resulting from extremely low fertility rates, a 'mass emigrations.' This year's 'Year of Worker's quickly ageing European population, a decreasing European competitiveness and an implosion of social Mobility', promoted by the EU Commission, in the protection systems e.g. Of course, the solution can't context of the whole European project is reflected in exist (solely) in increased immigration to Europe, the article of van Krieken. Paradoxically, although but to a certain extent Europe will be depending from the mobility of workers inside the EU is actually still a labor influx in the near future. Despite this fact, very low, the new (mostly unfounded) fear of mass migrants from the new Member States or from Third movements from the new Member states recently led Countries still have to pay the negative side-effects of to the introduction of mobility restrictions inside the restrictive policies that are based on election-inspired enlarged EU. The challenge for the EU in the near rhetoric and a generally badly informed electorate future certainly has to be to promote, encourage and rather than these policies are fact-based and future- tolerate more mobility inside the EU and across its inspired. external borders. Finally, two articles highlight the In summary, Europe should (and is) more than a case of Romania: Romanian emigration patterns and political construct and trade bloc - it has to be filled the context of EU accession are portrayed by with a common dream and spirit and the EU citizen- Nicolescu and Constantin, while Ghetau in his con- ry should be prepared by time to welcome and tribution analyzes the demographic impacts of include people from other countries: Polish plumbers migratory movements on different regions and the in France, Romanian agricultural workers in Spain whole of Romania by focusing on intra-regional com- or retired Germans in Spain are an important feature parisons and changes in the sex and age.

Martin Geiger, Guest Lecturer and Associated Researcher SISEC, University of the West, Timiºoara, Guest Editor Forms and Features of the Post-Enlargement Migration Space

Paolo Ruspini, PhD Associate Fellow, Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, University of Warwick∗

This paper is a preliminary attempt at investigating the link between the post EU enlargement migration space and the ongoing process of the forming of a common EU immigration policy, now in its second phase, the ‘Hague Programme’ having been agreed upon in November 2004. The main subject I mean to discuss centres around a series of juxtapositions which are the result of an interrelation between the national and supranational levels of EU policymaking: ‘enlarge- ment(s) and restrictions’, ‘visible and invisible borders’, ‘pendulum and pillar’ defining the area of Justice, Freedom and Security, implemented since the meeting of the European Council in Tampere in October 1999. The theoretical framework in this paper relies upon the ‘pendulum model’ developed by Helen Wallace and includes a close study of the EU poli- cymaking process. The model shows how this process results in an uninterrupted oscillation between two dimensions of governance – national and supranational – particularly in the field of immigration where prerogatives of national sover- eignty often tend to prevail. The conclusive argument advances the idea that the EU should involve all the qualified actors either from old or new member states or neighbouring countries in an effective ‘open method of coordination’, aimed at harmonizing immigration and asylum policy.

Keywords: immigration, EU enlargement, borders, policymaking, European identity.

What is Europe? Is it a geographic, eco- tice’ and for the movement of goods and citi- nomic, political entity, a category of thought or zens belonging to the European Union? Regard- rather the space of ‘freedom, security and jus- ing people, is this movement indeed ‘free’, ‘just’

∗ Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom, e-mail: [email protected], ph. (+4424) 7652 4869, fax (+4424) 7652 4324, home page: http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/CRER_RC/staff/paolo. This paper first appeared in Italian as “Da dieci a venticinque: il nuovo spazio europeo”, in Fondazione ISMU, Decimo Rapporto sulle migrazioni 2004. Dieci anni di immigrazione in Italia, Milan: Franco Angeli, pp. 317-330. The Romanian Journal of European Studies 10 and ‘safe’ for all the citizens that live in this sparked movements of populations for long space? appeased, thus putting under discussion migra- Since its foundation the transnational exper- tion regimes and the impermeability of Euro- iment named European Union (EU), has tried to pean borders. At the beginning of this process, provide a political form to the ancient idea of Western European migration scholars started Europe. This has been attempted by establish- off on the wrong foot, sometimes lacking the ing a set of rules opposing the entropy of the knowledge and explanatory instruments neces- international system, setting up a common mar- sary to comprehend the migration dynamics, ket, therefore continuing the process of political generated from, up until then, a little studied or integration sanctioned by Treaties. These rules even ignored reality. The intellectual curiosity, have generated a dense network, which has instilled by the ongoing epochal upheavals, has grown up, surprisingly, beyond all proportions, however prevailed on stereotypes and wide- entangling ‘goods and persons’, at times delay- spread misconceptions. The exchanges of scien- ing the overall growth of the system. The geopo- tific knowledge, which proceeded simultane- litical space of the European Union has expand- ously with each stage of European integration, ed or decreased because of historical social fac- has therefore intensified between East and tors and the political willingness, or not, of the West, who represented, to each other, only until ruling coalitions of its member States. recently, two very distant worlds. In more than forty years of its recent history, The idea mooting this paper is the need to Europe has been a divided entity reproducing variables of political thought and socio-econom- look at the transformations of the EU migration ic systems in contrast one with the other: East space in the time that starts in the 1980s, goes and West, a planned economy against the free through the 1990s, until the decisive appoint- market, totalitarianism and democracy. To a ment of 1° May 2004, the day that sanctioned great extent, they are dichotomies refuted from the fifth and more imposing EU enlargement. the historical overthrows of more recent years1. The last date is actually a starting point for the The collapse of the Soviet paradigm in 1991 continent that urges to look beyond, trying to and the following gradual reunification of the identify the empirical form and political fea- European continent have not only altered forev- tures within today’s migration scenario of the er a vision of the world, but they have also enlarged EU.

1 ‘Enlargements’ and ‘restrictions’ in the European Union

The path of European integration is not trol of borders. Europe, or better, the European straightforward at all. The history of the Euro- Union, has therefore experienced an awareness, pean Union has seen periods of acceleration fol- albeit unwillingly, which for some States proves lowed by a slowing down, in the process of the to be a miraculous ‘panacea’ where for others it formation of a common economic and political represents an improvident solution by which to space. It is true that this path, though still far mitigate the malaises and the stiflement suf- from being completed, has never actually arrest- fered due to systems of national governance. ed and it can be said that it has also reinvented What might seem a bold pragmatism in this itself in generating new political and institu- last statement, does not mean to convey a non- tional frameworks, which are the subject of appreciation of the propulsive role of the ideas deep interest on behalf of IR scholars, particu- and the sometimes ideological afflatus lavished larly those of the ‘neofunctionalist’ school. over time by the advocates of European integra- Social phenomena and political processes, tion. This paper is not aimed at a philological often complementary, have propelled the reconstruction of the development of European enlargement of the common European space: integration in the migration sphere, but, rather, the processes of globalisation and economic it means to encourage thought and clues to a interdependence on one side together with the more complete understanding of the dynamics. evident impossibility to adopt national immi- Some contextualization is, however, necessary gration policies without externalising the con- in order to make a correct analysis. 11 The Romanian Journal of European Studies The 1980s, starting point of our discussion, tory flow, once the freedom of movement for saw an acceleration of the political union with workers of the three Mediterranean Countries the introduction of the concept of ‘variable was sanctioned (van Selm, Tsolakis, 2004), has geometry’ and the publication of the ‘White proved these fears to be groundless. Book’ of the Delors Commission, which On a contemporary level, restrictions have includes detailed proposals for realizing a com- proved worthless, considering by all the projec- mon market. The accession of Greece in 1981, tions, sector studies and econometric calcula- together with that of Spain and Portugal in 1986 tions carried out before the 2004 Eastward gave us 10 EU member States. The same last enlargement. Past and recent estimations how- year the European Single Act has been enacted. ever, seem not to be enough to prevent a sort of It modifies the Treaty of Rome by introducing ‘domino effect’, on the eve of the May 2004 the ‘qualified majority voting’ for the harmo- enlargement, where member States were urged nization of legislations. This Act, fervently to apply the restrictions. The ‘invasion syn- encouraged by Kohl and Mitterand, opened the drome’ and recurrent use of hyperbola like road to the creation of a big common market “big-bang” borrowed from astrophysics, inex- without frontiers, expected for the 1st January orably unmask the hypocrisies of national 1993 (Motta, 2003). The Delors Plan, adopted in immigration policies and the selfishness of 1989, prepared the setting up in three stages of member States when their own prerogatives of the Economic and Monetary Union, while the national sovereignty are at stake. Schengen Convention, which includes the total In our opinion, it will be more interesting to abolition of border controls, was signed to on look at the eventual reproduction of return 19th June 1990. The last objective was reached migration scenarios, such those regarding only in 1993, after the signing of the Treaty of Greece, Spain and Portugal, when the internal Maastricht (7th February 1992) that sanctioned economic conditions became competitive com- the freedom of movement for persons, goods, pared with those of the destination countries. services and capitals. They are hypotheses to be verified on the The historical reconstruction aside, the ground of the characteristics of the CEE migra- development of the European integration tory regimes and the logics of the pre- and post- process has been distinguished by two enlarge- enlargement scenario. ments to three southern European countries, One observation must be added regarding only five years one from the other and by the the openly evident contrast between the EU set signing of the Schengen Convention that closes standards that advocate the freedom of move- the 1980s and smoothes the way for the impor- ment for all the workers who live and reside in tant institutional turning points of the 1990s. the Union, and the distinctions exercised by the It is interesting to note that the economic sit- member States in reproposing the transitional uation of Greece, Spain and Portugal at the time periods. They seem to deny and contradict the of their EU accession, compared with that of the freedom of movement in selective terms, i.e. member States was not so dissimilar to that where the Union has accepted countries whose between the EU-15 and the new Central and economic development is inferior to the mem- Eastern European (CEE) members in 2004. Cer- ber States average, and where the relative tainly, one should proceed with caution in mak- migratory potential was only ‘apparently’ ing comparisons between socio-economic mod- increased by virtue of projections based on their els when taking into consideration their diverse history of emigration countries. historical experience. In the case of CEE coun- It is actually worth remembering that, when tries, these models have been shaped over time in 1995 Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the by planning mechanisms historically absent in Union, the need to adopt restrictive measures the West. It is worthy to note however, that cal- was not apparent, and again in 2004 for Malta culations may be made through a fear, classifi- and Cyprus. Moreover, we should be wary of able as irrational, and emphasised then, as now, myopia, while writing analyses and forecasts with the purpose of raising distinctions and based only on wage differentials. It is worth therefore restricting the freedom of movement remembering that migration is, in fact, a more of workers from the new member States, for complex phenomenon. The migratory potential, subsequently re-negotiable transitional periods, i.e. the intention to carry out a migratory proj- so as to avoid an imbalance in the labour mar- ect, sometimes does not materialize because of kets of the old member States. The scarce migra- the existence of a series of multiple factors The Romanian Journal of European Studies 12 which characterise the job market2, the absence With these issues in mind, the partial nega- of well-established ethnic networks or the pres- tion of the Treaties’ postulate, which has sanc- ence of cultural and linguistic barriers in the tioned the freedom of movement, throws a countries indicated as probable destination gloomy light on the EU Charter of fundamental (Kaczmarczyk, 2004). rights (i.e. the nucleus of the European Consti- On the importance of seeing the bigger pic- tution) and raises questions on the compatibili- ture, we cannot but be in complete agreement with the statement made by Claire Wallace ty of any unborn political union with criteria of (1999): “Being poor is not enough to become a democratic inclusion typical of a federal struc- migrant”. ture.

2 ‘Permeability’ and ‘impermeability’ of the enlarged EU borders

A ‘Copernican revolution’ took place, within CEE ethnic minorities therefore, cannot be con- the EU, in the middle of the ‘90s, which would ceived on the basis of the Western European have soon transformed the global migration experience, because conditions are rarely analo- regime of the continent. In 1995, for instance, gous and the range of rights which the minori- the Schengen Convention came into force ten ties of these regions aspire to and those that the years after its signature, covering common governments of their countries of origin would external borders, common rules in visas and be willing to grant are much wider compared asylum, control of external borders and free with Western European standards (Górny, Rus- movement of persons. The ‘Schengen Informa- pini, 2004). tion System’ (SIS) has been established to match It may be that in the process of EU enlarge- freedom and security. It is directed to the gath- ment, ad hoc meetings and exchanges of experi- ering and exchange of personal identification ences at the EU level between all the actors con- data and the description of lost and stolen cerned with the policy-making process, would objects. Limited to the five 1985 founding States have been useful, including those of immigrant (France, Germany and Benelux), the Schengen communities and ethnic minorities from East- space has progressively extended to nearly all ern and Western Europe. This would have EU member States (with the exception of the enabled migration experts of the candidate United Kingdom and Ireland). Furthermore, the countries to be actively and effectively involved southern European member States, belonging to in the formation of immigration policy. Such the Mediterranean model born at the beginning active involvement would certainly have served of the 1980s, grouping common migratory char- as a stimulus to facilitate a search for solutions acteristics and experiences, followed paths sim- and compromises in the diplomatic controver- ilar to those of the CEE countries, adapting their sies arose during the enlargement process. mechanisms of borders control. The reactive The above observations are not aimed at dis- character of many of these legislations has since claiming the important role of the ‘reactive’ ele- been considered unsuitable for implementation, ment in spurring on the formation and harmo- in its ignorance of historical contingencies and nization of member and candidate countries existing immigration policies (Ke( pin´ska, Stola, immigration policies. This is certainly a first 2004). goal, though not definitive, however important, The need to satisfy parameters established when such diverse starting premises are consid- from above, at the EU level, without the advice ered. The alleged facts also testify to the influ- of the directly interested countries, has pushed ence that politics, and not only market rules, on several occasions to postulate policies that give to the importance of shaping the flow of are often inadequate in taking into account the migration and to the space of that singular historical characteristics of the CEE region and model of supranational political integration that the problems, as a consequence of population is the European Union. This (re)shaping has not movements in the past century, which have aris- always occurred in the right and desired direc- en in the displacement of ethnic minorities out- tion, aimed at matching the general with the side their borders of origin. The management of specific interests of immigrant groups and eth- 13 The Romanian Journal of European Studies nic minorities. At any rate, the fact that policy- flow within the overall character of migration making process has started, is an important suc- originating in the former Soviet Union (Górny, cess in itself. Ke( pin´ska, 2004). On the basis of what is set out above, the CEE countries will soon show characteristics importance, therefore, of the role that the Schen- and profiles similar to Western Europe in their gen acquis or convergence criteria play in shap- way of experiencing the migratory phenome- ing the EU borders is self-evident. An unexpect- non. Castles and Miller (1993) identified the ed freedom of movement on behalf of CEE citi- constant factors associating countries that zens towards the West generated by the reached various stages of their immigration removal of the exit controls in the 1990s, has experience so as to include: been enjoyed. Many took advantage of the con- „ A dynamic process of migration, which cession of temporary permits, staying perma- transformed the temporary entry of work- nently in Western European countries, in partic- ers and refugees into permanent settlers ular where the geographic proximity, the histor- who form distinct ethnic groups; ical and cultural ties and the economic attrac- „ The economic and social marginalization tion of the labour markets made the stay rea- of the immigrants; sonable and employment possibilities more „ advantageous. Absence of exit controls together Community formation among immigrants; „ with the adoption of liberal immigration poli- Increasing interaction between immigrant cies by several western European countries was groups and the local population; „ responsible for a flow of migration towards the The imperative for the state to react to West and may have often even sparked this immigration and ethnic diversity (Castles, flow. 1995: 293). Moreover, in the decade preceding the These are stages which Castles and Miller beginning of the 1990s, the CEE migration terri- have found, through different sources, in all the tory worked nearly exclusively according to Western European countries, and that global internal rules; population movements were migratory dynamics are gradually exporting to mainly restricted to the CEE region, as a direct the CEE region. This hypothesis can be verified consequence of the lack of exit controls and on the grounds of how the enlarged migration passport visas for accessing the West. These territory is synthetically analysed herein. The dynamics were functional to Western Europe. territory is delimited by new borders, and The region acted, in fact, as ‘buffer zone’ diverse migratory experiences will increasingly between East and West and so it was until 1° tend to converge until the similarities as listed May 2004. The Schengen barrier played the role by Castles and Miller will prevail over the dif- of propeller for CEE migratory flows for a long ferences. time. Flows were circular, ‘incomplete’, trig- The debate in question is not the next con- gered by the exploitation of wage differentials vergence on migration, but, rather, it is the ques- at the time of the transition of the CEE tion of the identity of the European migration economies and at the same time a backwardness territory and its borders. The reshaping of this and the progressive decline of the bordering territory and the Eastward shift of the EU bor- former-Soviet republics. der has actually generated dynamics of inclu- An ‘epos’ came about, made of peddlers, sion and exclusion to be carefully observed. small ‘entrepreneurs’, asylum seekers, ethnic In this regard, this research diverges from networks and dubious legal trading between that which declares the superiority of the mar- bordering regions of Eastern Europe, the fasci- ket laws on politics, supporting the ‘uninter- nating study and research of which has rupted’ porosity of the EU border without mak- remained unchanging regardless of the time ing any distinction between the time before and which goes by. Therefore, what at first was tem- after the EU enlargement (Favell, Hansen, 2002). porary mobility, slowly became a transforma- There is no objection as far as the porosity of the tion towards settlement implying permanent borders in the fifteen years before the enlarge- stay. The rate of mixed marriages between Poles ment is concerned. There is, rather, the convic- and Ukrainians, for instance, increased as a tion that migration dynamics and regional net- result of the prolonged stay and the new and works have suffered meaningful consequences continuing flows from the East, thus demon- because of the EU enlargement, and they strating the significance of a particular kind of require political interventions to face the The Romanian Journal of European Studies 14 process of reshaping the borders and the ongo- on the Southern side of the Mediterranean. ing mechanisms of enclosure. There is not doubt that the process of European In other words, I would argue that factors of integration is made of tight interdependent inclusion and exclusion generated by the 2004 variables (Wallace H., 2001), but one should not enlargement created ‘visible’ borders, like the forget that the meaningful, though not com- one between Poland and Ukraine, and equally plete, solution of the East-West differences with- ‘invisible’ borders, as those generated by the in the EU enlargement, leaves the North-South simultaneous existence of wage differentials difference unsolved. and the new boundaries of entry and mobility. Though mistrusting the porosity of the CEE The differences of socio-economic development, borders, it is difficult to imagine Europe as a though inherent to the expansion processes, ‘Fortress’. More realistically, the Union should endanger the cohesion and social tissue of cul- strive to re-establish an absence or “forever lost” turally and geographically similar communities socio-economic equilibrium. For example, the and the well-established exchange and mobility EU should aim at preventing an expansion of practices between borders. the bridge demarcating the border between As a matter of fact, it is not only question of Narva in Estonia and Ivangorod in Russia; two East-West borders, but of North-South geopolit- urban agglomerates which were a single city up ical spaces, as remarked some months before until 1° May 2004 (Visetti, 2004). Metaphorically the Eastward enlargement, by some Maghreb speaking, this represents a deep moat between colleagues who complained at the insufficient Catholicism and Orthodoxy, European Union attention given to EU processes of “inclusion” and Russia.

3 The ‘pendulum’ of Helen Wallace and the ‘pillar’ of Justice and home affairs

The pendulum fluctuates, attracted, as it is, gration: its progresses at times regular, other by two opposite magnetic fields. Helen Wallace, times irregular, the fluctuations and the immo- herself, (1996: 13) sharply noticed the fluctua- bility. Wallace’s metaphor is also useful to illus- tions resulting from the shifts in interests and trate the contrast, which became more and more loyalties in the process of policy coordination of intense from the second half of the 1990s, in the the EU field of Justice and home affairs. These creation of the EU immigration and asylum pol- fluctuations happen during the policy forma- icy between the intergovernmental and supra- tion/harmonisation between the national and national dimension. A contrast which, in the transnational/supranational dimension. The light of the structural characteristics of the European institutions on one side and the model, does not anticipate a definitive solution national level governance on the other (with the in favour of one or the other dimension, but minor ‘magnetic fields’ of the regional and local rather a continuous fluctuation with sometimes dimension) are two opposite poles in competi- the prevailing of one, sometimes of the other, tion for the overall field of decisional spaces. depending on the historical circumstances and The probability that one or the other dimension the political and economic interests at stake. prevails and the policies adopted depend on the In this context, some more precise informa- strength of the two magnetic fields: if both sides tion is necessary in order to contextualise the are weak, no coherent policy will emerge either fluctuations in this field of policy. After the at the supranational or the national level. entry in force of the Treaty of Maastricht, the Helen Wallace’s “pendulum” is based on a 1990s saw the 1996-97 European intergovern- series of premises, which we have indirectly mental conference that prepared the Treaty of pointed out, like the political inadequacy of the Amsterdam. On 2nd October 1997, the treaty national States, the impact of globalisation and was signed and on 1° May 1999 came into force. the specific features of the European region The European Union became ‘a space of free- (Apap, 2004). The pendulum movements illus- dom, security and justice’. Justice and home trate, with precision, the opposite tensions affairs acquired a wider field of action and more under way during the process of European inte- specific objectives; the European institutions a 15 The Romanian Journal of European Studies more balanced role and a more effective and lowed by the determination to go on (Seville) or democratic method of work had been planned again by the acknowledgment of the progresses (CE, 2002a). Moreover, the European Commis- made with the approval of so long waited direc- sion acquired wider prerogatives and a new tives, like the one on ‘family reunification’ or Title (IV) included in the Treaty encompassed ‘the status of third-country nationals who are freedom of movement, immigration and asy- long-term residents’ (Thessaloniki). In fact, it is lum. The Schengen agreements were integrated clear from the analysis of the documentation in the legal frame of the acquis of the European produced in these and other venues, that the Union. Aims to be achieved are “free movement member States’ are determined not to abdicate of persons” (EU and third country residents) from their own prerogatives of national sover- and “security through the fight of crime and ter- eignty by keeping control of such a sensitive rorism” (art. 2 of the Single European Act). The field as immigration. The resounding declara- introduction of a scoreboard, the so-called tions of principle included in these documents “Scoreboard to Review Progress on the Creation often clash with the daily practices of the of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in national governments, urging the European the European Union” should guarantee the Commission on more than one occasion, to periodic control of the work in progress. invite the member States not to adopt legisla- It is the beginning of the ‘communitarisa- tions in the migratory field which might, to a tion’ of the immigration policies. The praxis of certain extent, contrast or hinder the ongoing intergovernmental consultation however, seems supranational harmonization. to fade definitively on the horizon. In fact, in the The metaphor of the Wallace ‘pendulum’ five years from the entry in force of the Treaty of thus seems to find in these statements and in the Amsterdam (2004), the decisions on immigra- contradictory results listed so far, a reason of tion and asylum will have to be adopted only being and a true confirmation. In spite of the with a qualified majority. Besides, the European efforts at harmonizing, it is however, legitimate Council will have to assure the effective free- to argue that progress in this area is, at the end dom of movement, the control of the borders of the day, the result of a combination of inter- and the implementation of all the other meas- governmental and supranational political deci- ures in the field of immigration and asylum sions (Jordan, Stråth, Triandafyllidou, 2003). (Geddes, 2003). On 1° May 2004, the conclusion of the first In October 1999, a special European Council imposing phase of the process of the EU gathered in Tampere with the aim to make the enlargement with the accession of 10 new mem- EU into ‘an area of freedom, security and jus- ber States, took place at the same time as the tice’. One of the priorities of the Tampere Coun- entry in force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The cil is the invitation to the EU member States to enlargement, with the revision of the borders elaborate a common policy on asylum and and the external relations of the Union, had immigration. The aim of the common policy in raised hopes in the setting aside of another these specific fields implies the creation of “a aspect of the member States sovereignty and the harmonized and common way for immigrants intensification of efforts for the common policy and asylum seekers to obtain entry to all EU formation even in areas like immigration and States” (CE, 2002b). The main intervention areas asylum policy (Ruspini, 2002). In fact, the num- to reach these goals have been carefully listed ber of directives adopted in this field is, all in all, (for instance, Górny, Ruspini, 2004: 251). scarce in comparison with the legislative pro- In short, with the signing of the Treaty of posals put forward since Tampere, while the Amsterdam and the following meeting of the decisional mechanisms, at the moment, have European Council in Tampere, a new institu- not been changed as originally expected. The tional revolution seemed to overturn from their inability of the European Convention to impose foundations, the European institutions and start the qualified majority voting on national States an unprecedented acceleration in the EU as condicio sine qua non in some sensitive deci- process of decisional coordination in the field of sional fields of the new European Constitution3, asylum and immigration. Unfortunately, this is showed unavoidable repercussions on the not exactly true of the current situation. expected deadline for the entry in force of the The subsequent European Councils, in the Treaty of Amsterdam. The agreement reached years from 2001 to 2003, showed a deceleration by the European leaders on the so-called ‘The (Laeken) in asylum and immigration policy, fol- Hague Programme’ during the 4th and 5th The Romanian Journal of European Studies 16 November 2004 summit in Brussels, fixed the The area of legal immigration remains instead new 2010 deadline for the adoption of common subject to the unanimity rule and the right of policy solutions in the field of asylum and veto until the European Constitution is not immigration. approved. There is a predominant feeling, that The approval of this new agenda has counterbalances, deceleration and distinctions allowed the adoption of qualified majority deci- on principles will influence future political sions in the field of border controls, illegal choices, allowing the ‘pendulum of Wallace’ to immigration and asylum starting from 2005. fluctuate again.

4 Forms and features of the post-enlargement migration space

Having witnessed the conclusion of the first the most reliable estimations, 4/5 million immi- phase of expansion of the EU migration space, it grants are irregularly present in the territory of is interesting to note how the post-Tampere the Russian Federation (Ivakhniouk, 2003). It is agenda will be effective and what the impact an irregularity-settling tank that should raise this will have in the forming a common immi- greater interest from the EU side. gration policy. I would limit suggestions to a At the southern borders of the European few remarks regarding the migratory phenome- continent, the Mediterranean Sea separates nology of the enlarged EU and to the identifica- opposite poles of economic development. The tion of variables while providing a view of the Maghreb presses to tighten closer ties with the future scenario. For clarity’s sake I would first countries of the north side of the Mediter- focus on a series of points. ranean, while migrants coming from sub-Saha- „ The EU migration territory has been ran Africa try desperately to move towards the enlarged and it will be further increased to Schengen space (Barros, Lahlou, et al., 2002). the Southeast; The Maghreb countries are therefore assuming „ The ‘buffer zone’ between East and West characteristics of transit typical to migratory moved further eastwards; phenomenology already seen in other geo- „ The borders are not porous as before, at graphic areas of the European continent. least in this EU border zone; Which is the EU answer to these dynamics? „ Russia and the former-Soviet republics are The concession of ‘facilitated transit’ settles con- still lacking suitable laws and infrastruc- troversies like the one involving the Kaliningrad tures to carry out the role of ‘buffer zone’, region, the enclave between East and West of long represented by the CEE countries the enlarged Union, and allows the Russians of before the EU enlargement; Ivangorod to visit their neighbours of Narva, „ Migrants coming from the former-Soviet but are only extemporaneous solutions for con- republics and the extremities of the Asian troversies of small or medium size intensity. continent travel in the huge geographic These solutions certainly indicate the best prac- spaces of Russia and the Soviet former- tices in facing similar cases in other EU zones, republics looking for a landing place in the but their complexity and their limited opera- West; tional sphere show undoubtedly several limits. „ Centrifugal migratory dynamics (towards The ‘neighbourhood policy’ prepared for the the West) are added to centripetal dynam- EU expansion is still too vague. The Union has ics (towards the ‘core’ of Russia) making planned ad hoc budget lines for implementing the overall Eurasian migration space these policies by taking advantage of experience extremely fluctuating. gained from with other financial instruments In this context, the demographic and eco- like Phare, Tacis and MEDA (CEC, 2004). In any nomic differentials between border regions of case, though important, the problem not only the post-Soviet universe spark the migratory lies in identifying and displaying adequate flows. The absence of controls in entry and the financial instruments for policy implementa- strict controls in exit towards the West, some- tion. Overall, the policies proposed by the Euro- times transform the transit in the post-Soviet pean Commission, aimed at smoothing the way space in stay of indefinite length. According to for the neighbourhood policy, still lack a real 17 The Romanian Journal of European Studies vision. They do not seem able to avoid the whose accession date has still to come. Turkey methodological superficiality and scientific seems to raise more problems, because of its vagueness of expressions like “ring of friends” demographic potential and, above all, its Mus- to define the countries bordering the European lim identity overlapping the East and the West. Union. It is actually not always a question of It is worth remembering that, only few years “friends”, if one considers the strongly authori- ago, the fear that some million Turkish citizens tarian regime of Alexander Lukashenko in resident in Germany were able to acquire, over Byelorussia and his scornful and definite scarce- time, a double nationality and consequently a ly conciliating attitude, not only towards the EU significant electoral power, forced the adoption but also towards Russia. of a compromise model in reforming the citi- The existence of an unstable and uncertain zenship law. The new law adopted some ele- world on its doorstep should put pressure on ments of jus soli, but the hypothesis of a double the EU to take political action, as well as eco- passport originally included in the reform sup- nomic measures, in order to meet the challenges ported by the red-green coalition, has been and problems of the “neighbouring” areas. rejected. In the following years, advocated by Closer to our immediate interests, i.e. immigra- the Christian-democratic and social Christian tion policy, one should be thinking now about party a new debate started concerning national multilateral solutions that can effectively identity and the concept of Leitkultur, a ‘domi- involve all interested parties in the policy-mak- nant culture’ whose roots date back, according ing process. A solution could be to use the to the exponents of the two parties, to the Chris- “open method of coordination” (CEC, 2001) for tian tradition of Germany. the EU immigration policy, not only in ‘horizon- The German case is only one example. Other tal’ way, i.e. by involving all the actors at nation- western countries are experiencing equally al level in the setting up of immigration policy, strong conflicts on issues of identity which the but also in a ‘vertical’ way by involving the non- September 11 tragedy particularly exacerbated. governmental and international organizations, The conditions of immigrant communities and the migrant associations and the ethnic minori- ethnic minorities living in the European Union ties operating at transnational level. This coor- became harsher. The multicultural practices are dination should be established by stimulating constantly under discussion and face more and participation in the process of harmonization on more difficulties in being really implemented behalf of all actors in the interested countries, (Rex, 2004). The Turkish issue is added to this old and new EU members and those neighbour- composite picture, forcing the European Union ing countries whose membership is probably to rethink itself, its identity and its borders. not imminent. Finally, only when the debate on the identity of The challenge of a further expansion is the European Union is entirely exhausted will awaiting us: the expected 2007 participation the practical problems of the national and extended to Rumania and Bulgaria, and possi- supranational political spheres aspire to a suit- bly the one to Croatia in 2008 and that to Turkey able solution.

References

Apap, J. (2004) Requirements for a More Effective and Castles, S., M. J. Miller (1993) The Age of Migration: Enhanced JHA Cooperation in an Enlarged European International Population Movements in the Modern Union: Towards Closer Partnerships (working paper), World, Macmillan, London. ELISE Consortium, Centre for European Policy Castles, S. (1995) How nation-states respond to immi- (CEPS), Brussels, http://www.eliseconsortium.org/ gration and ethnic diversity, “New Community”, Vol. article.php3?id_article=136. 21, No. 3, pp. 293–308. Barros, L., Lahlou, M., Escoffier, C., Pumares, P., P. Commission of the European Communities (CEC) Ruspini (2002) L’immigration irreguliere subsaharienne a (2001) On an Open Method of Coordination for the Com- travers et vers le Maroc, “Cahiers de Migrations Inter- munity Immigration Policy, Communication from the nationales”, 54 F, Bureau International du Travail, Commission to the Council and the European Parlia- Genève. ment, COM 387, Final, Brussels, 11 July. The Romanian Journal of European Studies 18 Commission of the European Communities (CEC) tion in the New Europe: East-West Revisited, Palgrave- (2004) European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper, Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 159-176. “Communication from the Commission”, COM 373 Motta, G. (2003) Dal mercato alla politica. Le isti- final, Brussels, 12 May. tuzioni europee dalla CECA al Trattato di Nizza, in Facci- Favell, A., R. Hansen (2002) Markets against poli- oli Pintozzi, L., (a cura di) Europa: il Nuovo Continente. tics: migration, EU enlargement and the idea of Europe, Presente, Passato e Futuro dell’Unione Europea, “Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies”, Vol. 28, RelazionInternazionali, Roma, pp. 37-48. Number 4, pp. 581-601. Rex, J. (2004) Multiculturalism and Political Integra- Geddes, A. (2003) The Politics of Migration in an tion in Modern Nation States, in Górny, A., P. Ruspini Integrating Europe, in Geddes, A., The Politics of Migra- (eds.) Migration in the New Europe: East-West Revisited, tion and Immigration in Europe, SAGE Publications, Palgrave-Macmillan, Basingstoke, 93-108. London, pp. 126-148. Ruspini, P. (2005) Da dieci a venticinque: il nuovo Górny, A., E. Ke pin´ska (2004) Mixed Marriages in spazio europeo, in Fondazione ISMU, Decimo Rapporto ( Migration from the Ukraine to Poland, in “Journal of sulle migrazioni 2004. Dieci anni di immigrazione in Ethnic and Migration Studies”, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. Italia, Franco Angeli, Milano, pp. 317-330. Ruspini, P. (2002) L’area dell’Unione europea, in 353-372. Fondazione ISMU, Settimo Rapporto sulle migrazioni Górny, A., P. Ruspini (2004) Forging a Common 2001, Franco Angeli, Milano, pp. 263-270. Immigration Policy for the Enlarging European Union: for van Selm, J., E. Tsolakis (2004) The Enlargement of Diversity of Harmonization, in Górny, A., P. Ruspini an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’: Managing (eds.) Migration in the New Europe: East-West Revisited, Migration in a European Union of 25 Members, “mpi Palgrave-Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 247-277. Policy Brief”, No.4, Migration Policy Institute, Wash- Ivakhniouk, I. (2003) Eastern Europe: Current and th ington DC. Future Migration Trends, Key paper for the 4 Region- Visetti, G. (2004) Ai confini della Nuova Europa una al Conference of the Council of Europe “Migration città divisa tra Ue e Russia, “La Repubblica”, giovedì 29 Policies on the Eve of the EU Enlargement: What aprile 2004, p. 17. Challenges for Future Co-operation within the East Wallace, C. (1999) Economic Hardship, Migration, European Region”, Kiev, 9-10 October. and Survival Strategies in East-Central Europe, “Socio- Jordan, B., Stråth, B., A. Triandafyllidou (2003) logical Series”, No. 35, Institute for Advanced Stud- Contextualizing immigration policy implementation in ies, Vienna. Europe, “Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies”, Wallace, H. (1996) The Challenge of Governance, in Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 195–224. Wallace H., Wallace W., (eds.) Policy-Making in the Kaczmarczyk, P. (2004) Future Westward Outflow European Union (3rd Edition), Oxford University from Accession Countries, in Górny, A., P. Ruspini Press, Oxford. (eds.) Migration in the New Europe: East-West Revisited, Wallace, H. (2001) Introduction: Rethinking Euro- Palgrave-Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 65-90. pean Integration, in Wallace H. (ed.), Interlocking Ke pin´ska, E., D. Stola (2004) Migration Policy and ( Dimensions of European Integration, Palgrave-Macmil- Politics in Poland, in Górny, A., P. Ruspini (eds.) Migra- lan, Basingstoke, pp. 1–22.

Notes 1 Exceptions are not missing if one thinks about Belarus of Alexander Lukashenko. 2 One should not neglect that labour migration is first of all demand driven. 3 Adopted from the 18th June 2004 Intergovernmental conference, the new European Constitution should enter in force on 1st November 2006. Managing Migration for an Enlarging Europe — Inter-governmental Organizations and the Governance of Migration Flows

Martin Geiger* Visiting Researcher and Lecturer, School of Higher European Studies (SISEC), University of Timiºoara (Romania)

In the course of an intensifying cross-border and trans-societal inter-connectedness the sovereignty of nation-states and especially their capacity to effectively govern policy issues in a unilateral way have been eroded. In the mid-80s, trying to defend the concept of an imagined closed community of ethnically homogenous citizens European receiving states started to co-ordinate their approaches in order to find multi-lateral solutions as an exit-strategy out of declining national regulat- ing capacities. Until today a complex, but somehow still embryonic, regional regime of inter-governmental collaboration has evolved. In addition to nation-states, trans-state expert panels and inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) have become the avant-garde in the promotion of new techniques to manage migration and asylum ‘in a more orderly way.’ With regard to theories of international relations, the article will outline why and how inter-governmental organisa- tions have become embedded as new ‘managers.’ The role and contribution of these organisations then will be evaluat- ed with regard to aspects of democratic transparency, accountability and policy effectiveness. In the EU (European Union) context, IGOs provide additional possibilities for negotiations but serve as well as a ‘fast- track exit strategy’ for individual Member states to avoid complex and rather slow common decision making processes. Characterised by low levels of policy transparency but a high involvement in the implementation of restrictive policies, it is questionable if IGOs respect the interests of EU citizens and immigrants. Rather, the approaches currently applied by IGOs undermine the project of tolerant, more open-minded receiving societies. As will be argued, it is due to intra- organisational financial interests, the IGO´s own political struggle for global/regional or issue-specific (asylum/migra- tion) leadership as well as the power inequality between receiving and sending states that in the near future a new – more just – global or regional framework for the movement of people is unlikely to be established.

Keywords: Migration Governance/Migration Management, Inter-governmental Organisations, European Union/Europe, EU Decision-Making, EU Harmonisation Process

Introduction

The following article focuses on the flows, especially within the new approach to involvement of inter-governmental organisa- ‘manage’ migration movements in a more tions (IGOs) in the governance of migration orderly and more effective way. The author is

* Martin Geiger ([email protected]) is currently working as an affiliated researcher and guest lecturer at the University of Timisoara and is completing his Phd on migration governance and the involvement of IGOs (Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn). This article, as a working paper, has been presented at the International Colloquium of the School of High European Studies (SISEC) at the University of Timiºoara (Romania) in 2005. The author thanks an anonymous peer reviewer who commented on an earlier version. The Romanian Journal of European Studies 20 concerned how the perspective on migratory specific policy-area or part of the society con- movements within this new management para- cerned (setting-oriented conceptualisation).1 digm seem to have become generalised and In the following it will be revealed that, in simplified, and this rather technocratic para- addition to nation states and their specialised digm is mainly disrespecting the highly com- government departments, increasingly non- plex nature of (cross-border) population move- state/private as well as trans-state (including ments and the kaleidoscopic combination of IGOs) actors take the place of these traditional their political, social and economic motivations, actors in shaping the way migration movements giving in reality every single migratory move- are governed. In addition, the embryonic inter- ment an unique individuality. It is intended to national regime to govern (or manage) migra- critically evaluate this new management para- tions, having emerged within the last twenty digm, generally subsuming (more economically years in Europe as well as in other world and socially motivated) migratory and (more regions, is characterised by the struggle of these politically caused) refugee movements under traditional state actors in keeping the capability one single category of population movements to solve their nationally experienced migration ‘to be managed.’ The author therefore prefers to use the rather neutral and theoretically better ‘problem’ by joining forces with other govern- founded term of ’governance.’ ments and thereby defend their regulatory The term governance, with regard to theo- capacity. The intentions of non-state, trans-state ries of international relations, refers to a process and traditional state actors to govern migration through which a single policy actor (or a multi- movements hereby include the intention to mit- tude of policy actors) intends to change the igate the root causes leading to emigration in behaviour of another actor (actor-oriented con- other (mostly non-European) countries; gover- ceptualisation). Simultaneously governance can nance is hereby directed towards (state) actors be conceptualised as an intervention of one or in sending and transit countries as well as the more actors in social systems with the aim to specific setting existing within the societies of impose a change on the specific setting within a these states.

1. Bridging the gaps in policy implementation: From unilateralism to multilateralism and supra-nationalism in migration governance

The general discourse about globalisation In the field of environmental protection, encloses the paradigm of nation states that, in trade or the use of nuclear power, this has led to the course of intensifying cross-border and a new quality of cross-border negotiations and trans-societal internationalisation processes, bargaining. By collaborating on the internation- have lost most of their former regulatory capac- al level, national governments nowadays seek to ity, authoritative power and sovereignty.2 While find solutions for problems they either cannot non-state organisations (NGOs etc.) are increas- solve due to their cross-border character or con- ingly acting trans-nationally, far-reaching liber- sist in issues that by unilateral action can only be alisations in the field of trade and financial tackled in a less effective way than by multilater- transactions have led to the fact that private cor- al action. Not least of all, governments, by porations are able to effectively circumvent intending to bridge and close widening gaps in national regulations.3 National governments – the implementation of policies by substituting with regard to the challenge to govern policy or combining unilateral action by/with multilat- issues that hardly respect the territorial borders eral efforts, aim at securing their former author- of their polities – are confronted with the need itative position or at pretending to still possess to co-operate with other nation states and their full regulatory capacities.4 actors in order to find cross-border and trans- Despite these new intentions for internation- polity solutions and to co-ordinate their indi- al collaboration, state actors are struggling hard vidual actions in a given cross-border policy- to keep up with new actors that have become area with those of these foreign forces. involved in cross-border governance beyond the 21 The Romanian Journal of European Studies nation state: international non-governmental sending and transit countries. Already in the organisations (NGOs), private corporations and 1980s, several states started with the project of a inter-governmental organisations (IGOs, being new international regime to govern migration formed by nation states). and refugee movements on the regional level In addition to the terms of international or (Europe as the main example), the UN Secretary global governance, referring broadly to new General now again reinforced these intentions forms of multilateral negotiations and bargains by calling out a Global Commission on Migra- in often over-lapping policy issues, the concept tion8 in order to discuss a new global, more just of international regimes is mostly used to framework for the movement of people. describe a specific setting of implicit or explicit Like will be outlined in the following chap- principles, norms, rules and decision-making ters, Member states of the European Union (EU) procedures around which actors’ expectations have been successful in achieving a high level of converge in a given (and specific) issue-area.5 institutionalised collaboration with other (non-) Regimes hereby can be conceptualised as institu- European states in certain fields of migration tional as well as normative arrangements to governance. Among EU Member states multi- facilitate co-operation and co-ordination among lateral collaboration has now reached the level rational, ego-centric and from each other inde- to become even supra-nationalised (the shift pendent policy actors with the aim to circum- from inter-governmental collaboration towards vent or mitigate negative side-effects of solely the governance of migration and asylum issues unilateral policy actions.6 In contrast to ad-hoc exercised by supra-national institutions of the agreements, international regimes are arrange- EU). Inter-governmental organisations and ments with a certain capacity to resist to/to cope cross-border expert panels have been crucial to with short-term shifts regarding the power rela- achieve this high level of intra-EU as well as EU- tions and interest constellations among the overlapping international collaboration – the regime members.7 Within a regime, the inten- evolvement of a migration and asylum regime tions of actors to influence the governance of that has become extended to neighbouring policy issues can either be directed towards the regions (like Northern Africa). However, it has setting of the regime itself or towards other to be emphasised that this regime – established actors inside or outside this collaborative within the last twenty years – hardly can be arrangement. regarded as an all-encompassing, complete Embedded in the globalisation paradigm is arrangement as it focuses until today nearly the assumption that migratory and refugee exclusively on border controls, the restriction movements are directly resulting from fading and avoidance of further immigration to EU national regulatory capacities of receiving, core states.

2. New realisms, the project of a European migration and asylum regime and the European Dilemma of decision-making

With the beginning of the 1980s and then turning point. Within the field of migration and later, with more emphasis, towards the end of asylum, as outlined by JOLY, LAVENEX and the twentieth century, a trend in mid- and West- BLASCHKE, a new realism followed former more European receiving states gained momentum to humanitarian or economically-rational severely restrict and avoid further in-coming approaches. Being based on the scenario of migration and refugee movements. Following uncontrollable mass immigration from East decades in that the former Federal Republic of Europe, European receiving societies developed Germany, the Benelux-states, Switzerland and the fear to become flooded with migrants and France have been in need to recruit foreign asylum seekers in a time when a profound crisis guest-workers, and refugees were able to bene- of their welfare systems started to evolve.9 fit from a certain, ideologically founded open- Especially against the background of the ness (‘The free west’), the beginning of a global outbreak of violent inter-ethnic conflicts, war- economic crisis and the implosion of communist fare, mass displacement and the split up of the regimes in Eastern Europe and Asia led to a multi-ethnic republic of Yugoslavia, the threat The Romanian Journal of European Studies 22 of an implosion of the Soviet empire and its restrictive governance of migration flows. This satellite states, potential Western European shows that the interests of some ‘partners’ with- receiving countries acted, in a first step, unilater- in this multilateral bargaining process were able ally by imposing harsher immigration and asy- to outweigh weaker parties.14 lum regulations and increased efforts to prevent In addition to the establishment of a collabo- mass movements.10 Indeed, the more restrictive rative arrangement (regime) in the field of realist approach of receiving states had a certain migration control, following the Treaty of success: the vast majority of refugees from the Dublin (1990), a regional regime to co-ordinate territory of Yugoslavia, only granted with a and harmonise the asylum policies evolved temporary refugee status, returned shortly among the EC Member states. Intending to reg- afterwards; in addition, the common restrictive ulate which Member is responsible to decide hard-line of EC Member states (European Com- about a possible asylum status, this regime munity) opened the floor for new multilateral encloses the concept of so-called ‘Safe Third approaches with the goal to guarantee an effec- Countries’ as well as a list of states declared as tive further restriction of in-coming migration being politically stable and free of politically and refugee movements. Member states hereby motivated forms of persecution. To enforce the coincided in their perception of migratory implementation of control measures, the restric- movements as being a (potential future) threat, tions on the access of unwanted migrants endangering the construct of ethnically homo- (including potential asylum-seeking migrants) geneous nation states, their social cohesion and in general, the regulations of Schengen and security. Dublin enclosed the formulation of carrier sanc- Firstly, the development of an embryonic tions for airlines and other transport companies Western European (EC) ‘control regime’ was failing to ensure that their passengers possess due to the common perception among the mem- valid documents and are allowed to enter the bers of the EC that multilateral action was now EC and/or that they do not overstay their visas. needed in order to prevent migration and Although migration and asylum issues in refugee movements from becoming out of con- the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) now were offi- trol and to allay native fears of deepening social cially transferred from the third (inter-govern- inequalities caused by immigration.11 Until mental co-operation, Treaty of Maastricht, 1992) today consisting as an inter-governmental gov- to the first pillar of EU decision-making (com- ernance model, this regime provided the collab- mon EU decision-making), EU Member states orative background for a far-reaching ‘harmon- remain reluctant to transfer substantial deci- isation’ (a close substantial convergence) of sion-making powers to the supra-national level. national legislations concerning the possibilities So far, migration and asylum issues – as a poli- for so-called ‘Third Country Nationals’12 to get cy area in the intersection between the national access, permissions to stay and work or asylum and the European level – remain chiefly gov- within the European Community/European erned by national governments and the coordi- Union. nating mechanism of the European Council. The Secondly - in addition to a shared need to col- European Parliament, in contrast, does not thus laborate on the inter-governmental (multilater- far possess any decision-making and politically al) level - the harmonisation process in the field binding power; actions of the Commission of migration and asylum resulted from a sec- remain limited to initiatives and proposals ond, (more functional) need, steming as a logi- directed to the Council. cal consequence from the progress in European Migration and asylum issues can be regard- integration: following the Schengen Treaty ed as one of the last, but heavily defended (1985) and the Single European Act (1987), the issues touching a decidedly sensitive part of the new freedom for EC citizens to circulate and whole Europeanization process and posing a migrate between different Member states had to severe dilemma for the development of a (sub- be flanked by common regulations concerning stantially advanced and effective) European the controls of the external borders, their fortifi- Political Union. This sentiment continues to cation.13 In this context, new Member states, exist, despite the fact that with regards to coop- like Spain – due to the policy pressure exercised eration–theory, the step towards further inter- by core states like Germany or France – had to governmental co-operation and then supra- implement foreigners’ bills that acknowledged nationalization is likely to take place given the the interests of these core states to realise a congruent interests among EU member States, 23 The Romanian Journal of European Studies transit and even sending states.15 Given the fact ification of the EU Constitution) and a new that migration will be crucial for the future wave of ‘Realpolitiken’ of individual EU Mem- wealth and development of European societies ber states, however, it remains uncertain as to that now begin to experience a drastic decrease when such a common approach could be of their native work force and a `greying´ of reached, let alone implemented. At the moment, their population, a transformation of the current the inter-governmental governance model to restrictive control regime seems advisable. avoid and restrictively control a further influx of In 2005, the EU Commission presented a first immigrants and asylum seekers, in contrast, version of a Green Paper towards initiating a common European recruitment scheme that is seems likely to gain momentum, given the offering immigrants new possibilities to work shared perception of immigration to be closely and live legally within the EU.16 Against the linked with the issue of terrorism (following the background of the current crisis of the EU (Rat- devastating attacks of Madrid and London).

3. Bringing new actors in: Expert panels and inter-governmental organisations Consultative Processes on migration and asylum: Budapest and Barcelona

Despite the general discourse, arguing that EC (EU), especially the territory of the Schengen European receiving states do only possess limit- Treaty. Within the framework of various, partly ed regulatory capacity to effectively govern overlapping, consultation and co-operation migration and asylum issues in the national processes, Member states of the EC, starting at context (often this discourse confuses hereby the end of the 1980s, developed a common the issues of integration with those of illegal approach towards these neighbouring states to migration, border controls and the fight against convince them to closely co-operate with them terrorism), Europe as a regional context can in the restriction of further immigration. Simul- serve as an example that migration in deed can taneously, EC states within these processes have be effectively limited, although not completely been successful in transferring vast extents of avoided. The exodus from East Europe and Asia the costs for limiting and controlling migratory in most cases has been governed effectively, and refugee movements to their neighbours.17 restrictively limited/avoided in large parts and Within the so-called ‘Budapest Process’ the majority of migrants and refugees, coming (established in 1993, following the consultative from the crisis area of the Balkans, has returned. processes of Berlin and Vienna), representatives The main problem has more to be seen in failing of Eastern and Central European post-commu- national policies to actively promote the equal nist transformation countries (later as well from participation of Third Country Nationals in the territory of the Community of Independent European societies and does – in contrast to the States (CIS) and other transit and sending coun- general image of mass media and political dis- tries) held informal meetings to discuss with course – not consist in the fact that borders are officials of EC and EFTA (European Free Trade too porous. However, migrants willing to cross Area, including Switzerland) Member states borders can do so (even if these borders are measures to strengthen border surveillance and heavily fortified/technologically secured) by approaches how the ‘migration pressure’ on EC risking their lives and investing high amounts states could be reduced. For their co-operation of money. in taking back rejected asylum seekers and ‘ille- The effectiveness in restrictively limiting gal’ (unwanted) migrants or (as safe countries) mass movements is, in addition to the close pol- processing asylum seekers within their territory icy co-ordination among EC/EU Member states and repatriate rejected persons to other neigh- and the harmonisation of national approaches bouring countries, these Central and Eastern and legislations, mainly due to the extension of European states were granted with financial a collaborative institutional and normative and technical assistance.18 arrangement towards main sending and transit However, given the highly informal charac- states in neighbourhood to the territory of the ter of these consultative processes and the fact The Romanian Journal of European Studies 24 that (officially) no resolutions of politically adopted and implemented national regulations binding character were formulated, the effect of that went conform to the Schengen Acquis and these forums on the evolvement of a regional the interests of their more powerful EC/EU or migration and asylum regime can only be EFTA neighbours.21 Their accession to the EU roughly estimated.19 The high significance of therefore could be somehow regarded as being this process, however, becomes evident with a reward of their willingness for close co-opera- regard of the development of this consultative tion in these matters. forums: until today there has been a continuous The eastward extension of the EC migration growth by incorporating more and more receiv- and asylum control regime was replenished to ing, transit and countries in these consultations, the South by the set-up of consultative forums in addition, the consultative forum became rep- with neighbouring transit and sending coun- resented by the establishment of its own inter- tries of Africa, especially the Maghreb states. In governmental organisation, the International the framework of the so-called ’Barcelona- Centre for Migration Policy Development Process’ (initiated in 1992) – the European- (ICMPD) – therefore it seems likely that the Mediterranean Partnership – issues of develop- member states of this organisation and forum ment aid, the promotion of human rights and regard the Budapest Process as a politically utile the establishment of a free trade area (to become platform for inter-governmental negotiations on realised between the Member states of the EU issues of migration and asylum.20 and their African counterparts in 2012) were In retrospective, it can be assumed that this linked with the extension and intensification of inter-governmental political dialogue was of border controls and cross-regional (mostly crucial importance not only for the East-ward police) co-operation to impose strict limitations extension of the EC-control regime (by avoiding on migratory movements originating from a direct access and claim-making of migrants Africa. Most African members of this process and asylum seekers on EC/EU territory, their promised to take back rejected asylum seekers processing on the territory of Eastern and Cen- and ‘illegal’ migrants after being expulsed from tral European states and the repatriation and European territory, while approaches to grant border control measures of these states), but more possibilities for their citizens to accede to also for the preparation of the EU-accession of EU states on a temporary basis have been dis- some of these states. The new ten Member states cussed (mostly on a bilateral basis, for example of the EU, following the Budapest process and between Morocco and Spain), but, however, in other bilateral and multilateral negotiations, most cases not have been implemented so far.

4. The new avant-garde in migration governance: Inter-governmental organisations (IGO´s) and trans-state expert panels

These mostly informal consultative process- Consultative processes, based on negotia- es on migration and asylum issues, mostly tions between government officials, scientific embedded in broader and multiple issue-policy experts and representatives of IGOs (as well as frames (like the European-Mediterranean Part- in some cases of actors of the civil society), can nership), with regard to international regime be described with the concept of ‘policy net- theory, do not necessarily have to lead to long- works’ Policy networks are providing the term institutional and normative arrangements framework for first contacts between decision- (regimes). In some cases, their policy outcome makers from different (national, scientific or and effect is limited to short-term/ad-hoc agree- political) background, they serve in stabilising ments without any politically binding character and relativising actor’s expectations and are – however, the initiation of such consultative crucial in establishing of a formal equilibrium processes is seen as a necessary step for the among actors that mostly differ greatly with preparation and initiation of a regime in a spe- regard to their capacities.22 In the context of pol- cific issue area. icy making processes that increasingly disre- 25 The Romanian Journal of European Studies spect national borders, policy networks provide migrants’ voluntary return, repatriation and the platform for harmonising states’/ actor’s resettlement. Both organisations as well as the unilateral approaches with those of other ICMPD and other smaller organisations are states/actors and the achievement of inter-gov- aiming at a specific form of ‘capacity building’ ernmental deals/bargains to achieve a multilat- in their member states, they provide trainings eral/multi-party solution of a policy problem.23 for experts, decision-makers and practitioners To initiate and promote learning processes (including border police officials) in the specific (towards the achievement of a common stand- national context, and support governments point) so-called ‘epistemic communities,’24 con- technologically as well as financially in their sisting in a trans-state dialogue of scientific efforts to better ‘manage’ (or control) migration experts and certain renowned individuals (as and refugee movements. structures parallel to these networks), are of cru- Especially in the context of Europe and inter- cial importance. In addition, inter-governmental governmental negotiations on migration and organisations often serve in stabilising and/or asylum issues between EU Member states and intensifying the collaboration among states African, Asian or East European sending and towards the establishment of a long-term transit countries (including authoritarian regime. Sometimes these organisations are on regimes like in the case of Libya), the advantage their own a direct outcome of policy-networks of inter-governmental policy networks and and inter-governmental consultations (like in organisations can be seen in the fact that they the example of the ICMPD). In other cases, are officially not bound to the EU-framework regimes are containing inter-governmental but allow, due to the membership of both organisations as members or important stake- receiving and sending countries, for informal holders (being nearly equal to states). The new and formal consultations without the need for quality and character of governance, increasing- ‘official’ bilateral or multilateral talks. It seems ly taking place ‘beyond the nation state,’ likely that modes of governance in the field of becomes evident with regard to the fact that migration and asylum in Europe will still be policy networks/inter-governmental negotia- based on a multitude of European, bilateral and tions and international regimes have become set multilateral approaches implemented by indi- up by IGOs instead of individual state govern- vidual states and/or additional inter-govern- ments.25 mental actors.29 Against the background of The field of migration and asylum serves lengthy and complex EU decision-making hereby serves as a remarkable example: the processes and the current crisis of the European majority of today’s existing regional consulta- integration process, IGOs and policy networks tive processes in deed have been set up and are can serve governments to circumvent some of (indirectly or directly) governed by inter-gov- these hurdles and find at least some short- ernmental organisations like the International term/ad-hoc solutions for their national ‘migra- Organisation for Migration (IOM), the agency of tion problem.’ the United Nations High Commissioner for Contrary to the efforts of the EU-Commis- Refugees (UNHCR) or the ICMPD (limited in its sion to construct a ‘more open’ regime (among activities mostly to the regional context of others through the newly proposed ‘Hague Pro- Europe). Each of these organisations hereby is gramme’ calling for national quota and immi- acting simultaneously as a ‘forum organisation’ gration liberalizations), the field of migration (in organising trans-state policy dialogues and currently is simultaneously characterised by a acting as the administrative co-ordinator or sec- new ‘re-nationalization:’ EU member States retariat within these consultative processes26) as (like Italy and Spain), seeking to find such a well as a more technically oriented ‘service quicker solution to their national migration organisation’27 (by supplying their member problem, enter in rather questionable agree- states with expertise and technical knowl- ments (in some parts facilitated by IGOs) for the edge28). repatriation of illegal immigrants (for example While UNHCR is providing receiving, tran- the agreement between Italy and Libya, or the sit and sending countries with a broad reper- repatriation of unwanted migrants from the toire of support measures in the field of Canaries (Spain) to the Moroccan occupied refugees and asylum seekers (consisting in West Sahara). Especially the inter-governmental financial and technical support as well as policy organisation of IOM has developed into a advice), the IOM is active in the field of regional (as well a global) key actor in the new The Romanian Journal of European Studies 26 ‘management’ approach (see following sub- bourhood Policy,and its migration-related ini- chapter), and has somehow become not only an tiatives). By incorporating transit and receiving ‘assistant’ for its member states but rather as states a variety of non-state actors (including well a ‘managing director’ in providing expert- private corporations like airline companies), ise and facilitating sometimes rather question- and inter-governmental organizations and able formal and informal agreements. expert panels outside the official EU frame- Despite the contradictions contained within work, the EU and its member States to some its institutional framework, Member states of extent hereby ‘peripheralize’ their regional or the EU (with the help of IGOs) nonetheless national ‘migration problems’ to Third coun- attempt to communicate a ‘common restrictive tries and delegate a vast extent of responsibili- migration and asylum approach’ towards ties (for example given by the Geneva Conven- neighbouring states and regions (among others tion) to third states and the organisations such via the newly established ‘European Neigh- as IOM, UNHCR or for example the Red Cross.

5. Managing migration for the benefit of all: Towards a new philosophy in migration and refugee governance

Although migration and refugee movements be brought to a solution by ‘managing’ migra- in most cases are politically unwanted, the real- tion flows in a new, more orderly and rational ities of Europe as well as other regions show way. Migration movements are hereby regarded that migratory movements, in general, are hard- as an unavoidable fact and curtailing migration ly to be avoided. Despite accepting this reality, seems inappropriate due to economic and public and political discourse in most EU states demographic reasons (for example the fact that is concentrated in a daily reconstruction of the in certain sectors labour shortages exist (or are image of a migration ‘crisis’ (mostly represent- foreseeable) or receiving societies suffer from a ed as consisting in hordes of illegal migrants drastic ageing of their native population and arriving in boats at the coasts of Southern Spain work force). The long-term goal of states and or Italy). The fear of ‘uncontrollable’ migration inter-governmental actors is the establishment movements hereby is directly linked to aspects of a new international governance model, being of a fading national identity (see for example the based on a close co-ordination between sending, discourse of the German Christian Democrats transit and receiving countries, and consisting (CDU) in 2004) in an enlarging European Union, as a politically binding global regime (frame- the postulation of a drastic decrease in public work), embracing regional- and sector-specific security, reflected by an increase in terrorist sub regimes.31 activities, being committed by not-enough-con- Problematically, the term ‘migration man- trolled illegal/non-enough-integrated immi- agement’ has now become the catch word of a grants. broadly generalised discourse in policy-making Because the European Union’s efforts to cur- and scientific debate. Although management tail immigration thus far have not brought the has become a generally used term – thanks also desired results, it must be asked whether the to the promotion of this term by representatives perspective on immigration issues should be and advisors of IOM and IOM’s own scientific changed. According to GHOSH,30 the adopting of journal (‘International Migration’) – however, so a new ‘regulated openness’ could lead to a de- far, no general turn in the perception of (and the criminalisation and de-illegalisation of immi- political response towards) the migration phe- grants by providing them with more opportuni- nomenon has occurred (given for example the ties to live and work legally within the territory case of the EU).32 of receiving states. It is especially this inter-governmental Since the mid-1990s a new concept as well a organisation, the IOM, that due to its growing new trans-national discourse (or philosophy) importance in the regional (Europe) as well as in has evolved that is based on the general the global context became heavily criticised for assumption of migration as a problem that can the pragmatic and mostly technocratic imple- 27 The Romanian Journal of European Studies mentation of its management approach. Under that, under current real politics, are more inter- the slogan ‘Managing migration for the benefit of est in control and prevention than an humani- all’33 IOM sees its intra-organisational responsi- tarian ‘management,’ centred on bility and challenge in assisting its members – migrants/refugees and their interests. currently 105 governments - “in meeting the While out of intra-organisational interests growing operational challenges of migration man- (to promote their international standing and agement”.34 Against the background of an esti- significance as well as to defend their issue-spe- mated operational budget of 640 million $US,35 cific competence) IOM, UNHCR as well as other IOM sees itself as the globally leading interna- inter-governmental organisations (like for tional organisation in migration issues and as example the ICMPD) are competing with each one of the most important focal points for dis- other for scarce resources and are trying to take cussions on migration policy and management. over the lead in consultative processes (espe- In addition to the Mediterranean Transit Migra- cially with regard to IOM), these organisations tion Dialogue (MTM), the organisation is acting at the same time are threatened to fall back to as the co-ordinating agency within the Manila- the status of independent and involuntary Process, the South American Migration Dia- henchmen of states seeking to achieve short- logue, the Migration Dialogues in Southern as term solutions for their individual ‘migration well as in Western Africa and various other pan- and asylum problems.’ els. IOM within these dialogues facilitates Increasingly, the most important financial expert networks among stakeholders in receiv- contributors to these organisations (the G7- ing, transit and sending countries and supports countries) link their payments to the implemen- them to find “pragmatic and action oriented mech- tation of specific programs and measures, like anisms” and to develop “institutions and infra- the prevention of illegal movements and border structure for a humane, safe and orderly migration enforcement. Instead of contributing to the set- management.”36 up of a more adequate regime, based on the In addition to IOM, also the UNHCR is earn- realisation of the benefits of migration, IGOs are ing criticism for its move from a former exclu- more likely to support the further existence of sively humanitarian ideal and mandate to a traditional patterns of control. While some IGOs rather pragmatic/technocratic management (like IOM) in the interests of potential receiving approach: for most critics UNHCR, since the states have to deal with (or manage) unwanted formulation of its ‘Convention Plus’ (2003),37 (‘illegal’) migrants and organise their return as moved in the direction to rather serve the inter- ‘pragmatic service providers,’ other IGOs (like ests of receiving states (in avoiding the influx of UNHCR) have to ‘manage’ refugees/asylum asylum seekers and refugees and to process asy- seekers by processing them outside the territory lum applications outside their territories) than of potential receiving countries (extra-territorial those of refugees/asylum seekers. Similarly to processing) and selecting the ‘really endangered IOM, UNHCR is increasingly regarded as a refugees’ from ‘only’ economically motivated ’implementation’ partner for receiving states migrants.

6. Critique and conclusion: Inter-governmental organisations as service providers and managers in the orderly movement of people

Against the background of the European tion. Although IGOs like the IOM and regional framework of migration management that cur- consultation processes intend to establish a rently consists of restrictive controls, one must global framework for the orderly movement of ask if the efforts of international organisations people, processes which de-link migration from result in a more orderly and more humane the nation-state level, the `real´ problem behind migration management. Migration manage- migration management does not exists in a ment must tackle highly complex issues and surge of population movements that are less challenges that result in a heightened need for predictable as before; rather states and their inter-governmental and international coopera- societies pose the main barrier to the develop- The Romanian Journal of European Studies 28 ment of such an international framework. This Inter-governmental organisations like the occurs within a general reluctance of states to IOM could provide a solution to this situation transfer real binding power on questions of by their engagement in the governance of national sovereignty and security – such as migration and refugee governance. European migration that touches the very fabric of nations Union member states and other nation states – to other entities. Co-operation in migration already benefit from their involvement and issues, so far, consists foremost in the transfer of their contribution to standard setting, technical control tasks to sending and transit states and cooperation and (in)formal consultations. the granting of rewards to these states whose However, the role of organisations like IOM co-operation in managing/control efforts are within this process is highly questionable. matched with development/financial aid or An institutional framework for the manage- political and military support. ment of migration, based on IGOs as its dynam- Regional migration management in the ic actors, has its main constraint in that these European as well as other contexts suffers from organisations do not possess any formal man- immense differences regarding power and date to deal with normative or regulatory interests between receiving, transit, and sending aspects of international migration. Informal countries. Mostly the individual interests, orien- meetings and inter-governmental panels are tations and expectations of the people migrating mostly non-transparent, and the positions and are somehow forgotten and are not taken into strategies of the ‘managers’ of migration (con- account. The approach to manage migration trol) remain unclear to the public and the elec- and to reduce illegal migratory movements by a torate of member states. change in perspective, so far, lacks from the In- and outside the framework of the UN unfortunately no organization or committee, so support of European receiving states to actually far, has a sufficiently broad mandate to claim to grant more migrants the opportunity to enter be the `co-ordinator´ of migration management the EU and secure access to the labour market on the global level. This applies also to the IOM, under circumstances of legality. although this organisation does possess certain While EU states continue to block immigra- financial resources, is supported by a great tion - except those belonging to a ‘very fine number of states and, seems to be the most like- selection’ of economically welcomed migrants - ly candidate able to fill the institutional vacuum authoritarian states like Libya have now become on the global level. included and accepted as partners to exercise It must be criticised that most approaches of control. Tolerated by other EU states, Italy con- the IOM, while intending to tackle the root caus- tinues with its approach and co-operates with a es of migratory movements in emigration coun- regime that is internationally accused of disre- tries, have forgotten to pursue a change of per- specting human rights, internationally isolating spective in receiving states who are the main itself for decades, lacking any legal, democratic financial contributors to the IOM. Migration framework as well as the capability to deal with management thereby is developing in another migration in a humane manner. direction than to direct orderly and humane Italy’s actions occur due to the general processes. The globally evolving institutional dilemma of the EU harmonisation process and regime is likely to be based on a pure utilitarian the general unwillingness of European and ideology or political rationality where popula- national policy-makers to develop a `manage- tion movements will be allowed only when they ment approach´ based on a more realistic per- seem economically warranted. Migration man- ception of the root causes of migratory move- agement in this sense remains limited to the ments: deepening economic imbalances world-wide extension of control policies that between Europe and migrant sending regions nation states are no longer able to exercise on and the pull-effect of European (informal) their own. labour markets for foreign labourers. Quick Although migration management was for- fixes, resulting in the transfer of the perverse mulated to reduce the net-costs of migration, side-effects of failing policies to the shoulders of most residents of receiving societies still fear migrants, so far are the only remaining answer. ‘waves of immigrants’ and immigrants remain Any long-term perspective of migration man- the scapegoats for deepening social inequalities agement, has therefore to be said, is still miss- and rising crime rates. The need to import for- ing. eign labourers, due to a rising demand in 29 The Romanian Journal of European Studies receiving societies caused by on-going econom- just system of migration management should ic and demographic transformations in the near not only serve the purposes of wealthy receiving future, has not resulted in a change of perspec- societies. `Managing migration,´ according to tive. Nor do politicians see the necessity `to pre- PAPADEMETRIOU,38 should not only intend to seek pare´ residents to face this near-future challenge ‘perfection’ as migratory movements result or to accept a co-existence with immigrants. mostly from individually made decisions that Migration management that remains limited to due to their nature are highly uncertain and far control – as is thus far in the interest of all EU from being predictable. Rather, it should lead to member states – will further increase the costs international agreements that are truly bi-direc- and negative side-effects of increasing irregular tional and balanced and are based on moral and movements. democratic values. Inter-governmental organisa- Instead of de-politicising and technocrising tions, when pursuing this approach, would pro- migration issues by adopting the neutral term vide an escape out of antiquated national poli- ‘management,’ IGOs should engage more cies and failing or missing common approaches actively in the protection of migrants´ rights. A in the context of the European Union.

Notes

1 For example: Görlitz, Axel and Burth, Hans-Peter, Politische Steuerung, Opladen, 1998, 320 pp., pp. 9 and 115. 2 See Sandholtz, Wayne, Globalization and the Evolution of Rules, In: Prakash, Aseem and Hart, Jeffrey A. (Eds.), Globalization and Governance, London and New York, 2000, 338 pp., pp. 77-102, p. 89; Brühl, Tanja and Rittberger, Volker, From international to global governance, Actors, collective decision-making, and the United Nations in the world of the twenty-first century, In: Rittberger, Volker (Ed.), Global Governance and the United Nations System, Tokyo, 2001, 252pp., pp. 1-47, pp. 2-5; Görlitz and Burth, pp. 10- 19. 3 For example: See Lake, David, Global Governance, A relational contracting approach, In: Prakash, Aseem and Hart, Jeffrey A. (Eds.), Globalization and Governance, London/New York 2000, 338 pp., pp. 31-53; Sandholtz, Wayne; Prakash, Aseem and Hart, Jeffrey A., Globalization and Governance, An Introduction, In: Prakash, Aseem and Hart, Jeffrey A. (Eds.), Globalization and Governance, London and New York 2000, 338 pp., pp. 1-24; Sassen, Saskia, A new crossborder field for public and private actors, Denationalized state agendas and privatised normmaking, In: Journal für Entwicklungspolitik, 16/2000, 4, pp. 393-407. 4 See Jachtenfuchs, Markus, Regieren jenseits der Staatlichkeit, In: Hellmann, Gunther et al. (Hrsg.), Die neuen internationalen Beziehungen, Forschungsstand und Perspektiven in Deutschland, Baden-Baden 2003, 614 pp., pp. 495-518; Scharpf, Fritz W., Die Handlungsfähigkeit des Staates am Ende des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, MPIfG Discussion Paper 91/10, Köln 1991, 39pp. 5 See Krasner, Stephen D., Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, In: Krasner, Stephen (Ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca and London 1983, 372 pp., pp. 1-21, p. 2. 6 Vgl. Schneider, Volker and Werle, Raymund, Regime oder korporativer Akteur? Die EG in der Telekommunikationspolitik, MPIfG Dis- cussion Paper 88/4, Köln 1988, 85 pp., p. 11. 7 See Krasner, pp. 2-3; Zürn, Michael, Political systems in the postnational constellation, Societal denationalization and multilevel gover- nance, In: Rittberger, Volker (Ed.), Global Governance and the United Nations System, Tokyo 2001, 252pp., pp. 48-87, p. 63; Young, Oran R.: Regime dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes, In: Krasner, Stephen (Ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca and London 1983, 372 pp., pp. 93-113; p. 94. 8 For more information see the homepage of the Global Commission on Migration: http://www.gcim.org 9 See Joly, Danièle, Whose protection? European Harmonization on Asylum Policy, In: Cohen, Robin (Ed.), The Cambridge Survey of World Migration, Cambridge 1995, 570 pp., pp. 496-501, p. 496; Lavenex, Sandra, Security Threat or Human Right? Conflicting Frames in the Eastern Enlargement of the EU Asylum and Immigration Policies, EUI Working Paper RSC No. 7, San Domenico, 2000, 35 pp., pp. 1-3; Blaschke, Jochen, Einwanderung aus dem Osten, In: Blaschke, Jochen (Hrsg.), Ost-West-Migration, Perspektiven der Migrationspolitik in Europa, Berlin 2001, 194 pp., pp. 5-35. 10 See Brochmann, Grete, European Integration and Immigration from Third Countries, Oslo, 1996, 164 pp., pp. 3-4; Benedikt, Clemens, Diskursive Konstruktion Europas, Frankfurt am Main 2004, 280 pp., pp. 11-12; Endres, Daniel, Schutz für Flüchtlinge und Vermeidung weiterer Flüchtlingsbewegungen, Zur Arbeit des UNHCR in Osteuropa, In: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Hrsg.), Ost-West- Migration, Fluchtursachen und Handlungsperspektiven, Gesprächskreis Arbeit und Soziales Nr. 35, Bonn, 1994, 79 pp., pp. 63-71; Dehdashti, Rexane, Prävention von Fluchtbewegungen, Die internationale Diskussion und die Entwicklung von Frühwarnsystemen, Berlin, 1996, 176 pp. 11 See Tomei, Verónica, Europäisierung nationaler Migrationspolitik, Stuttgart, 2001, 224 pp., pp. 11-14; Miller, Mark J., International Migration in Post-Cold War International Relations, In: Ghosh, Bimal (Ed.), Managing Migration, Time for a New International Regime?, Oxford and New York 2000, 258 pp., pp. 27-47, p. 39. 12 Third Country Nationals = Persons not in possession of the citizenship of a Member state of the European Community/the European Union. The Romanian Journal of European Studies 30

13 See Brochmann, pp. 75-76; Tomei, pp. 12-13 and 51-54; Collinson, Sarah, Beyond Borders, West European migration policy towards the 21st century, London, 1993, 116 pp., pp. 35-39. 14 See Arango, Joaquín, Becoming a country of immigration at the end of the twentieth century, The case of Spain, In: King, Russell et al. (Eds.), Eldorado or fortress?, Migration in Southern Europe, Hampshire and London, 2000, 351 pp., pp. 253-276, pp. 1-10. 15 See Tomei, pp. 42-51; Lake, p. 40, Krasner; Keohane, Robert O., The Demand for International Regimes, In: Krasner, Stephen (Ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca and London 1983, 372 pp., pp. 141-171. 16 See European Commission: COM 2004/811 (11.01.2005). 17 See Georgi, Fabian, Migrationsmanagement in Europa, Eine empirischtheoretische Analyse am Beispiel des International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), unpublished Master thesis, Freie Universität Berlin, 2004, 208 pp., pp. 19-27; Angenendt, Steffen, Regelung und Vermittlung, Die Rolle internationaler Migrationsorganisationen, In: Thränhardt, Dietrich and Hunger, Uwe (Hrsg.), Migration im Spannungsfeld von Globalisierung und Nationalstaat, Leviathan Sonderheft 22, Wiesbaden, 2003, 374 pp., pp. 180-202. 18 See Overbeek, Henk, Globalisation and governance, Contradictions of neo-liberal migration management, HWWA Discussion Paper 174, Hamburg, 2002, 19 pp.; Overbeek, Henk, Globalization, sovereignty, and transnational regulation, Reshaping the governance of international migration, In: Ghosh, Bimal (Ed.), Managing migration, Time for a new international regime?, Oxford and New York, 2000, 258 pp., pp. 48-74; Angenendt, Die Rolle internationaler Migrationsorganisationen, pp. 190-191; Thouez, Colleen and Channac, Frédérique, Convergence and divergence in migration policy, The role of regional consultative processes, In: Global Migration Perspectives No. 20, January 2005, Geneva, http://www.gcim.org (15. April 2005). 19 It was only ten years after its establishment, in 2003, that a first official report of the activities of the Budapest Process became published. 20 See Georgi; Angenendt, p. 191. 21 See Georgi, pp. 18-19. 22 See Wolf, Klaus-Dieter, Internationale Organisationen und grenzüberschreitendes Regieren, In: Münkler, Herfried (Hrsg.), Politik- wissenschaft, Ein Grundkurs, Hamburg, 2003, 736 pp., pp. 412-446, pp. 423-424; Zürn, pp. 63-64; Mayntz, Renate, Politikwis- senschaft in einer entgrenzten Welt, Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, MPIfG Discussion Paper 00/3, Köln 2000, 26 pp., p. 12; Windhoff-Héritier, Adrienne, Politikarena und Policy Netz, Zum analytischen Nutzen zweier Begriffe, Berlin, 1985, 33 pp.; Windhoff-Héritier, Adrienne, Policy-Analyse, Eine Einführung, Frankfurt and New York, 1987, 184 pp., pp. 45-47. 23 See Benz, Arthur, Mehrebenen-Verflechtung, Verhandlungsprozesse in verbundenen Entscheidungsarenen, In: Benz, Arthur et al. (Hrsg.), Horizontale Politikverflechtung, Zur Theorie von Verhandlungssystemen, Frankfurt and New York, 1992, 205 pp., pp. 147- 205, p. 154; Scharpf, Fritz W., Einführung, Zur Theorie von Verhandlungssystemen, In: Benz, Arthur et al. (Hrsg.), Horizontale Poli- tikverflechtung, Zur Theorie von Verhandlungssystemen, Frankfurt and New York, 1992, 205 pp., pp. 11-27. 24 See Haas, Peter M., Saving the Mediterranean, The politics of international environmental cooperation, New York, 1990, 303 pp., p. 55; Jachtenfuchs; Chayes, Abram and Handler Chayes, Antonia, The new sovereignty, Compliance with international regulatory agreements, Cambridge and London 1995, 417pp., pp. 278-281. 25 See Chayes and Handler, pp. 271-273; Sandholtz, p. 82. 26 See for example the role of IOM in the Mediterranean Migration Dialogue/The 5+5 Process. 27 ‘Forum’ and ‘service organisations:’ see Tussie, Diana and Riggirozzi, Maria Pia, Pressing ahead with new procedures for old machinery, Global governance and civil society, In: Rittberger, Volker (Ed.), Global Governance and the United Nations System, Tokyo 2001, 252pp., pp. 158-180, p. 164. 28 See for example the efforts of IOM and ICMPD in the field of border management. 29 The IOM, by having established the Mediterranean Migration Dialogue (MTM) as well as various other panels in this EU bor- der region, can be regarded as a crucial actor also within the broader context of the EU-led Barcelona Process. This with regard to the fact that IOM is holding meetings between Northern African and EU member State (MTM and 5+5 Dialogue) officials - the EU-Commission, however, stays formally excluded but is being invited as an observer. 30 Together with Jonas Widgren (ICMPD) the IOM senior adviser Bimal Ghosh can be regarded as the ”ideological mastermind” of the ‘management’ approach in migration governance (see for example: Ghosh, Bimal, Movements of people, The search for a new international regime, Paper prepared for the commission on global governance, Geneva, 1993, 18 pp.; Ghosh, Bimal, Man- aging Migration, Whither the Missing Regime?, Paper abstract, First Conference on International Management of Migration Flows, Maratea (Italy) 16-19 September 2004. 31 Migration management hereby is seen to embrace the management of refugee movements (the prevention of refugee crises, the channelling of refugee flows, the processing of asylum claims etc.). 32 See for example Papademetriou, Demetrios G., Managing rapid and deep change in the newest age of migration, In: Spencer, Sarah (Ed.), The politics of migration, Managing opportunity, conflict and change, The Political Quarterly, Special Issue 2003, pp. 39-58; Spencer, Sarah, Introduction, In: Spencer, Sarah (Ed.), The politics of migration, Managing opportunity, conflict and change, The Polit- ical Quarterly, Special Issue 2003. 33 See the homepage of IOM: http://www.iom.ch 34 International Organisation for Migration (IOM), International Dialogue on Migration 2004, available at: http://www.iom.ch/en/who/main_informal_consultations.shtml (05.05.2004). 35 See International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Programme and Budget, available at: http://www.iom.int/ DOCU- MENTS/GOVERNING/EN/MC2143.PDF (05.05.2004). 36 IOM-Homepage: http://www.iom.ch (05.05.2005). 37 See Angenendt; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Convention Plus, to find at: http://www.unhcr.org (05.05.2005); Drüke, Luise, Flüchtlingspolitik auf supranationaler Ebene, Das UN-Flüchtlingskommisariat, die UN und die EG, In: Heinelt, Hubert (Hrsg.), Zuwanderungspolitik in Europa, Nationale Politiken, Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede, Opladen, 1994, 323 pp., pp. 176-194. 38 See Papademetriou, pp. 53-55. Balkan Migrations and The European Union: Patterns and Trends

Martin Baldwin-Edwards Mediterranean Migration Observatory, Co-Director Urban Environment and Human Resources (UEHR) Research Institute, Panteion University, Athens

The Balkan countries exhibit a wide range of migration types, levels of economic development and formal rela- tionship to the EU. Four types of migration — forced migrations, ethnic migrations, trafficking and temporary migration - are examined in some detail for the whole region. It is concluded that forced migration has generally ceased, although return of refugees remains a major issue; that ethnic migrations have largely discontinued, with the partial exception of Roma; trafficking appears to be in decline; and that temporary migration has been an option only for Romanians and Bulgarians. There is little evidence of a major problem with transit migration, bor- der controls are now operating efficiently, and all countries of the region are rapidly adapting to the EU acquis com- munautaire. The prognosis is that migration patterns are becoming more “normal”, with trends of temporary labour emigration and asylum-seekers from outside the region. The real problem is exclusion (of some countries) from the Schengen white list, and the existence of a Schengen wall comparable with the former Iron Curtain.

Keywords: forced migrations, ethnic migrations, trafficking, temporary migration

The Balkans constitutes one of the most economic development, recent migration histo- remarkable regions of the world for the com- ry, and formal relationship to the EU. Among plexity and extent of its recent refugee and the constituent republics of the former Yugoslav migration movements. Between 1990 and 2000, Federation, one (Slovenia) has acceded to the over 10 million people — out of a total popula- EU, another (Croatia) is a candidate country tion of some 80m in the Balkan peninsula1 — although its application was delayed until Octo- had moved. Furthermore, these population ber 2005 owing to unresolved war crimes issues movements, unusually, had ramifications for (EC 2005a: 6). The remainder — Serbia and security within the Balkans and also for western Montenegro (SCG), Bosnia and Herzegovina Europe, thus implicating both the European (BiH), Kosovo, and Macedonia (fYRoM) — Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organi- might be characterized as having serious politi- zation (NATO) (Widgren, 2000: 3). What has cal structural problems; Macedonia, however, changed in the intervening years? has achieved a degree of stability such that it is The Balkan region is complex, with several now recommended as a candidate for EU mem- distinct categorizations of country according to bership (EC, 2005b). The Romanian Journal of European Studies 32 There remain around one million refugees 22m, the statistical service seems to have been and displaced persons in these countries, pre- unable to calculate emigrants from the census dominantly in Serbia. Some refugees have data. Nor are there any other state data on tem- returned to the region, but not without prob- porary migration (IOM 2003b). Comparing 1992 lems and recently at a dwindling rate (Blitz, and 2002 census data, a calculation of 800.000 2005; Philpott, 2005; ECRI, 2004a). With the ‘missing’ persons can be made2: this figure sits exception of Croatia (and, of course, Slovenia), well with recent IOM survey data, which sug- economic development is still at a low level, gest that 15% of the adult population has with per capita GDP ranging from €930 in Koso- vo, €2,230 in Serbia and reaching €5,745 in Croa- worked abroad, with currently some 850,000 tia for 2003 (EC 2004: 13). Informal economic persons still abroad, and only 53% with legal activity, organized crime and trafficking of employment (IOM 2005). Similar problems with aliens are endemic in the region, and constitute data exist in Bulgaria, where the census data a major threat to political stability and chances show only 196,000 emigrants between 1992-2001 of future EU membership. whilst other calculations suggest 600-700.000 Of the remaining four Balkan countries, two (IOM 2003c:17-18). Gächter (2002) in a detailed — Romania and Bulgaria — are applicant EU analysis, suggests that high nett emigration — countries, and expected to accede in 2007; Alba- mainly of Turkish Bulgarians — occurred 1988- nia and Moldova, on the other hand, have eco- 1995, with some 479,000 persons. From 1996-99, nomic and political infrastructure so far below Bulgaria had a low level of nett immigration the EU level, that their possibility of EU acces- whereby emigration of Bulgarians was more sion is some way off. Nevertheless, in principle all Balkan countries are seen as possible future than compensated by immigration of other members of the EU (EC 2004a: 5), with some sig- nationals (Gächter 2002: 4). Thus, a snapshot of nificant reforms, especially concerning border Bulgarian emigration patterns would probably controls, being undertaken through the Stabi- show less than 10% of the population abroad at lization and Association Process (Baldwin- any moment. Edwards, 2004a: 11-12). Stabilization and Asso- ciation Agreements are in force with Croatia Table 1, below, summarizes these data on and Macedonia, in the final stages of negotia- population and migration in the region. tion with Albania, under negotiation with Ser- bia and Montenegro, and about to be discussed Table 1 with Bosnia and Herzegovina (EC 2005a: 10). Crude Population data, Balkan region In terms of economic development, per capita GDP per Population Stock of Emigrants/ GDP is extremely low for Moldova (€417 in cap. (millions) recent population 2002), for Albania it is lower than all of former (€) emigrants¶ (%) Yugoslavia other than Kosovo (€1,685 in 2003), 2003 2003 Most recent and it is slightly above the average for the data region for Bulgaria and Romania (€2,257 and Albania 1,685 3.2 1.1 million 34 €2,317) (EC 2004b; Jandl 2003). The current BiH 1,897 4.2 *N/A number of emigrants from Moldova is various- fYRoM 2,121 2.1 N/A ly estimated at between 600,000 and 1,000,000 SCG 2,232 8.6 N/A persons (IOM 2003a: 4; Scanlan 2002: 16), consti- Kosovo 930 1.9 N/A West.Balkans. 2,053 19.9 N/A tuting 25-45% of current population. Human Bulgaria 2,257 7.8 650,000 8 trafficking has been, and remains, extensive Croatia 5,745 4.4 N/A from Moldova, with merely an estimated 80,000 Romania 2,317 21.8 850,000 4 migrants working legally in their country of Moldova§ 417 600,000-1 25-45 destination (Jandl, 2003). Albania is thought million now to have a minimum of 900,000 emigrants (Barjaba, 2004); however, official data from just SOURCE: EC (2004b) Notes: Greece and Italy count over 1m Albanians with * Emigration data concerning nationals are not applicable for the residence permits, so an estimate of 1.1m (34% former Yugoslav countries, owing to the complexities of refugees of the population) is more plausible. and returns, along with IDPs. See Tables 2 and 3, below. § Data for Moldova are from Jandl (2003), IOM (2003a: 4), Scanlan (2002: In the case of Romania, by far the largest 16) country in the region with a population of some ¶ Estimated data from various sources (see text for details) 33 The Romanian Journal of European Studies Types of Migration in the Balkans

Across the Balkans, we can identify four and refugees almost exclusively in Serbia. very different sorts of migration, which require Owing to the ethnicized nature of these forced separate treatments: migrations over the last decade, the paradoxical consequence is that Serbia-Montenegro has „ forced migrations, associated with war and become not only one of the world’s leading ‘ethnic cleansing’, including IDPs3; source countries for refugees, but also one of the 5 „ ethnic migrations, which are of a voluntary leading host countries for refugees. nature but inspired either by racial exclu- sion [e.g. Turkish Bulgarian migration to Tableȱ2ȱ Turkey] or sometimes by better opportuni- Stocksȱofȱrefugeesȱandȱasylumȱseekersȱfromȱtheȱregion,ȱendȱ ties abroad [e.g. Greek Albanian migration 2003ȱ[000s]ȱ to Greece]; andȱlocatedȱinȱ[principalȱ countries,ȱonly]:ȱ „ trafficking. This is endemic in the region, but

Originatingȱ ȱ

affecting different countries rather different- ȱ from:ȱ

ly; ȱ ȱ ȱ „ temporary or incomplete migration. This is the ȱ total most common form of migration over the SCG Germany USA Sweden UK last few years, and is particularly difficult to BiHȱ 300.0ȱ 99.8ȱ 38.7ȱ 61.8ȱ 25.8ȱȱ measure. Census data do not properly cap- Croatiaȱ 230.2ȱ 189.7ȱ 3.8ȱ 6.3ȱȱȱ ture the reality, and can overstate or under- fYRoMȱ 6.0ȱ 1.4ȱ 3.2ȱ 0.1ȱ 0.3ȱ 0.4ȱ state the extent and meaning of migrations.4 SCGȱ 296.6ȱ ȬȬȬȬȱ 169.0ȱ 16.8ȱ 27.9ȱ 21.3ȱ TOTALSȱ 832.8ȱ 290.9ȱ 214.7ȱ 85.0ȱ 54.0ȱ 21.7ȱ SOURCE:ȱUNHCRȱ(2004)ȱ Note:ȱ totalsȱ doȱ notȱ addȱ upȱ becauseȱ onlyȱ majorȱ subcategoriesȱ Forced migrations areȱshownȱhereȱ

By the end of the 1991-95 war, some 300- Tableȱ3ȱ 350,000 Croatian Serbs had left their homes in StocksȱofȱrefugeesȱandȱIDPsȱinȱtheȱregion,ȱendȱ2003ȱ[000s]ȱ Croatia, mostly for Serbia or Bosnia (Ivanisevic ȱ ofȱwhichȱ[principalȱ 2004: 351); from Bosnia, at the end of the 1992-95 nationalitiesȱonly]:ȱ war, a massive estimated 2.6m people were dis- placed — more than half the pre-war popula- ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ tion (Philpott, 2005: 1) — and about 1.2m found ȱ refuge abroad (Ivanisevic, 2004: 351). In Kosovo, ȱ

350,000 people fled their homes as IDPs or IDPs Refugees Croatian Serbian Bosnian Macedonian refugees in 1998, and in 1999 some 450,000 eth- BiHȱ 327.2ȱ 22.5ȱ 19.5ȱ 3.0ȱȱȱ nic Albanians fled to Albania, 250,000 to Mace- Croatiaȱ 12.6ȱ 4.4ȱȱ0.5ȱ 3.9ȱȱ donia (fYRoM) and 70,000 to Montenegro. With fYRoMȱ 0ȱ 0.2ȱȱ0.2ȱȱȱ the end of war in June 1999, 600,000 people SCGȱ 256.9ȱ 291.4ȱ 189.7ȱȱ99.8ȱ 1.4ȱ returned to their homes in Kosovo, only to be TOTALSȱ 596.7ȱ 318.5ȱ 209.2ȱ 3.7ȱ 103.7ȱ 1.4ȱ followed by a reverse exodus of 230,000 Serbs SOURCE:ȱUNHCRȱ(2004)ȱ and Roma who sought safety in Serbia and Montenegro. Two years later, conflict in Mace- The dramatic reduction in refugee numbers donia in 2001 led to 150,000 ethnic Albanians is mainly the result of returns — one of the pre- fleeing, mainly to Kosovo (UNHCR, 2001: 7). ferred ‘durable solutions’ favored by UNHCR. Looking simply at the number of returning refugees, these vary greatly across the region. In By end 2003, UNHCR calculated around the case of Bosnia, by mid 2004 just under 1 mil- 540,000 refugees or asylum-seekers outside of lion had returned, of which 440,000 were minor- the Yugoslav region, around half in Germany ity returns, (Black and Gent, 2004: 11). For (Table 2). Within the region, there were some returns to Croatia, the figure is 110,000 (Blitz, 600,000 IDPs and over 300,000 refugees (Table 2005: 363), with 6,600 from Serbia and 850 from 3); IDPs were located mainly in Bosnia or Serbia The Romanian Journal of European Studies 34 Bosnia in 2004 (UNHCR 2005a, Table 16). In of international agencies. One obvious impedi- Bosnia, mostly affected by IDPs, in 2004 there ment to refugee return has been housing: were some 20,000 persons returning to their whereas 93% of claims had been sorted out in place of origin (UNHCR, 2005b: 417). Within Bosnia by June 2004 (ECRI 2004a: 14), restitution Serbia, rather than returns the policy solution of property rights does not mean return. More favoured is naturalization: UNHCR expects the important, is the existence of jobs (Philpott, refugee population of 275,000 at end 2004 to 2005: 21). In Croatia, continued discrimination halve through this mechanism, along with the in the labor market and society is seen as one of recent closure of 58 refugee camps (UNHCR, the most outstanding impediments to re-inte- 2005b: 417). The apparently intractable problem gration: Blitz contrasts the full incorporation of lies with Kosovo, where fewer than 10,000 of the Croats from Bosnia with the situation of the Ser- 230,000 refugees who fled since 1999 have bian minority — the former as recipients of gov- returned, and there remain thousands of IDPs ernment grants and aid and displacing Serbian within Kosovo or Serbia (HRW 2004a). The local workers (Blitz, 2005: 381). As the Interna- increased violence against minorities in Kosovo tional Commission on the Balkans points out, in March 2004, which created another 4,000 multiethnic harmony and re-integration of IDPs (mainly Kosovar Serbs and Roma), is also refugees must be achieved at the local level, explicitly connected with 2,240 Kossovar especially as the result of population move- refugees in Macedonia (mainly Roma), who are ments has been to create regional concentra- denied local integration (UNHCR 2005b: 416; tions of minority ethnic communities. This is HRW, 2003). However, 725 refugees returned particularly visible in Macedonia, where local from Kosovo to Macedonia in 2004 (UNHCR communities have become almost ethnically 2005b: 417). homogenous (ICB, 2005: 32-33). To these reali- Although refugee return to the Balkan ties should be added the phenomenon of mas- region is a clear policy choice of the European sive urbanization, which has occurred across Union and its national governments, and the re- the entire Balkan region: this obscures the integration of ethnic minorities along with meaning of international migration, and addi- strong legal protection of minority rights is seen tionally makes more spurious the goal of as necessary legitimation for post-conflict soci- refugee returns. It may be that we have more or eties, there remain many unresolved fundamen- less reached the end of the road with this policy tal issues concerning refugee return. Richard solution to forced migration in the Balkans. Black and Saskia Gent contribute the concept of “sustainable return”, with a range of factors Asylum-seekers continue to be produced by determining such (Black and Gent, 2004: 17). the Balkan countries, even from Romania and Similarly, Brad Blitz in his study of returns to Bulgaria. Serbia and Montenegro is now the Croatia suggests that different historical paths leading producer of asylum-seekers in industri- of refugee flight and return lead to vastly differ- alized countries, after massive declines in Rus- ent outcomes, with five scenarios of return sians and Iraqis since 2003, although there is a migration. In particular, it seems that the major- continued slow decline in numbers. Bosnia and ity of Serbian returnees are elderly, with a spe- Hercegovina also continues to produce asylum- cific type of return — the “return of retirement” seekers, and the numbers have been increasing (Blitz, 2005: 380). Other scenarios include “reset- rather than diminishing; Bulgaria too produces tlement as ethnic colonization” (Bosnian Croats rather more asylum-seekers than would be who fled to Croatia), “displaced persons and expected from an EU candidate country, again refugees returning from Bosnia” (Croatian with significant increases over the last two Serbs who remained and did not flee to Serbia years. Romania, Macedonia and Albania all con- apparently have had worse treatment), “settle- tinue to produce significant numbers of asylum- ment through repossession” (housing reposses- seekers, but in continuous decline (UNHCR, sion through judicial intervention), and a final 2005c: Table 4). category of “no return”, where marginalized former tenancy holders6 lack support structures and exist on the margins of Croatian society. Ethnic migrations Overall, the return of refugees has not undone the realities of ethnic cleansing, and it is The Balkan region can be characterized as a not clear that this should in fact be an objective region dangerously affected by ethnic conflict, 35 The Romanian Journal of European Studies with difficult relations between dominant ed to forcibly return members of certain minor- national majorities and sizable ethnic minorities ity groups from Kosovo — mainly Bosnians, (Atanasova, 2004: 357). The wide distribution of Ashkali and Turks — whereas Roma and Serbs different ethnic minorities constitutes not only a are spared deportation for the moment (Grupa problem of political management by the state, 484, 2005: 21). This has been done despite the but is also an issue of diaspora relations impact- warning of independent observers that Serbia is ing on a national state’s relations with other not yet a safe place for minorities (HRW 2005). neighbouring states. One author (Tóth, 2003: Other than Romani migrations and refugees 201) describes the Hungarian diaspora in the from war-zones, the principal ethnic migrations Balkan region (in Croatia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia from Balkan countries since 1989 consist of the and Romania) as “kin-minorities” connected to following: the “kin-state”: clearly inter-state relations are intimately affected by the presence of such From Romania: emigration of ethnic Hun- minorities. garians, Germans and Jews In the twentieth century, the solutions Over the decade of the 1990s, these are favored for managing the issue of large ethnic recorded as 105,000 Germans, 37,000 Hungari- minorities have been ‘exchanges of [minority] ans and 3,000 Jews. Earlier periods saw much populations’, forcible [often violent] assimila- larger ethnic emigrations, though (Ethnobarom- tion into a national culture, and toleration of eter, 2004:VIII). By 2002, the Romanian Census ethnic and regional difference within the broad- showed that only the Hungarians had retained er framework of a socialist planned economy. a significant presence of just under 1.5m (6.6%, The two Balkan countries outside of the com- of total population) and almost exclusively munist bloc — Greece and Turkey — relied on located in the region of Transylvania (Ethno- the first two mechanisms. On the other hand, barometer, 2004: IV.4). Ethnic migrations have most of the communist bloc in the Balkans and more or less ceased since 2000. Eastern Europe tolerated ethnic difference: the problems came primarily with collapse of their From Bulgaria: emigration of ethnic Turks regimes, and the open hostility based on ethnic- The first pogrom against Turks began in ity which appeared subsequently. 1984, with a state demand that Turks “Bulgar- One ethnic group7 which ended up being ize” their names; it was accompanied by the clo- neither exchanged, assimilated nor tolerated sure of mosques and outlawing of Muslim reli- was that of the Roma. Although they had bene- gious holidays . Many resisted, with an estimat- fited from special measures in the early post- ed death toll of 300—1,500 Turks over one year war communist bloc, and had actually achieved (Crowe, 2000:107) and a reported 1,000 impris- minority status by the 1980s, traditional preju- oned (Atanasova, 2004: 364). This had a knock- dices against them emerged and exploded into on effect for Roma, who were the victims of violence after 1989 (Crowe, 2003: 86). This trig- forced assimilation and violence in the 1980s. gered a new wave of Romani migrations fleeing In 1989, after blaming ethnic Turks for a persecution, both in wartime and also from sta- series of bomb attacks, Prime Minister Zhivkov ble countries such as Romania. Thus, Roma con- invited those who “do not feel Bulgarian” to stituted a massive proportion of asylum-seekers leave Bulgaria. Some 360,000 ethnic Turks left, from the Balkans over the 1990s, but have not and after pressure from the West and USSR, been systematically recorded as Roma. In the Zhivkov was forced to resign (Anagnostou, period in the early 1990s of mass Romanian asy- 2005: 91; Warhola and Boteva, 2003). His succes- lum-seeking, for example, more than 60% of sors immediately rescinded the effects of this them were Roma (Ethnobarometer, 2004: VII.3). ethnic cleansing, with a l990 law on the restora- Comparable data for other countries is not tion of Turkish names, which was utilized by available, as UNHCR does not record ethnicity some 600,000 ethnic Turks in 1991 (Atanasova, as such. 2004: 364). Another law provided amnesty for Now, with the returns of refugees to Serbia victims of the 1980s assimilation campaign, and other countries of the war-zone, there are while two decree-laws and a 1992 law provided serious and unreported issues concerning restitution of the housing, property and Roma. The vast majority of recent returnees to employment rights of those who had emigrated Serbia and Montenegro have been Roma to Turkey but subsequently returned. An esti- (CNGOS, 2005: 16); in May 2005, Germany start- mated 150,000 returned from Turkey after this The Romanian Journal of European Studies 36 reversal of policy (Atanasova, 2004: 364). Thus, global estimates of the extent of trafficking start- Bulgaria has effectively escaped what many ed out with a maximum estimate of 4m in 2002, western commentators view as the dictates of reduced to 800.000 for both 2004 and 2005; history and ethnic conflicts in the Balkans again, the mechanism by which these figures (Anagnostou, 2005), are reached are unknown, and should be treat- ed with extreme suspicion. From Albania: emigration of ethnic Greeks Alongside methodological problems con- The number of ethnic Greeks in Albania was, cerning the estimation of the extent of traffick- and remains, highly contested. The range of fig- ing, there remain fundamental definitional ures starts at 59,000 in the 1989 Albanian Census problems concerning the issues of migration, and goes up to 300,000 claimed by the Greek prostitution and agency (Kelly, 2005:237). The government (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004b: 51). Pet- clear distinction between trafficking and smug- tifer (2001: 4) gives a figure of 100,000, which is gling which is embodied in the UN protocols is plausible. The number who actually migrated to not so visible in practice, and it would be more Greece is also highly problematic to estimate, correct to view them both as part of a continu- for several reasons. First, the ethnic Greek um of behaviours, changing over the migrant’s migration was contemporaneous with mass ille- journey in time and space. Essentially, measure- gal migration of ethnic Albanians as temporary ments and interpretations of trafficking data are labour in Greece in the 1990s. Secondly, the practitioner-based, and inclined to view all ille- Greek state did not systematically record those gal migrants as victims without agency, rather who had been given entry visas as ethnic than as frequently willing participants in com- Greeks. Thirdly, there are accounts of Albanians plex interactions with other persons and/or with different ethnicities (e.g. Vlach) being criminal organizations in their migratory expe- encouraged to assume a Greek “identity” and riences. Yet another deficit is the focus of inter- apply for special status, either in the Greek con- national organizations on trafficking for sexual sulates or within Greece itself. Thus, by 20048 exploitation and of children, whilst ignoring the Greek state had surreptitiously issued some other forms of exploitation (Kelly, 2005: 237). 200,000 ‘ethnic Greek identity cards’ (Baldwin- In the case of the Balkans, some of the most Edwards, 2004c: 3), whilst there did not seem to detailed investigation of any region in the world be significantly smaller ethnic Greek communi- has been made since 2000, with research under- ties still residing in Albania! It does not appear, taken or financed by the IOM, the Stability Pact therefore, that the ethnic composition of Alba- for South Eastern Europe, the ILO, UNICEF and nia was much altered by the ethnic migration of the OSCE, amongst others. One of the most Greeks: the emigration of the general Albanian authoritative recent reports identified 6.256 vic- population was much more important. tims between January 2000 and December 2004, with the primary countries of origin as Albania, Moldova and Romania (and to a lesser extent, Trafficking of migrants in the Balkans Bulgaria and Kosovo) and the primary coun- tries of destination or transit as being Croatia, For some time now, European policy-mak- Bosnia, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro ers, practitioners and academics have identified (Surtees, 2005: 12-17). Table 4 reproduces their a “Balkan route” for trafficking and/or smug- summary data. gling9 of migrants (e.g. Salt and Stein, 1997: 475- Over the period 2000-2004, 90% of victims 7; Budapest Group, 1999; IOM 2001), with clear were from only 5 countries (28% from Albania, links made between older drug trafficking 26% from Moldova, 17% from Romania, 10% routes, their interruption by war and organized from Bulgaria and 9% from Kosovo). There is criminal gangs branching out into people- also a significant number from the Ukraine smuggling and trafficking (Kolakovic et al., (6%), but from other countries the numbers 2001: 7-9; Budapest Group, 1999; Lindstrom, identified and assisted are very small indeed. 2004). Simultaneously, the United States According to an earlier report (for the period embarked upon its global attack on trafficking, 2000-2003), first trafficking experiences issuing an annual report and tiered classifica- occurred as minors for 65% of Albanians and tion (using unknown and rather suspect crite- 50% of Bulgarians, although most were 18-24 at ria) of how well other countries of the world the time of identification (RCP, 2003: 14). The were attempting to limit the phenomenon. Their identified trends, confirmed by other recent 37 The Romanian Journal of European Studies

Tableȱ4ȱ status, but to date no males have Numberȱofȱidentifiedȱandȱassistedȱtraffickingȱvictimsȱ2000Ȭ04,ȱStabilityȱPactȱ been assisted as victims of sexu- Countryȱofȱoriginȱȱ al exploitation. 2000ȱ 2001ȱ 2002ȱ 2003ȱ 2004ȱ Totalȱ ofȱvictimȱ Within the south east Euro- Albaniaȱȱ 219ȱ 445ȱ 375ȱ 345ȱ 366ȱ 1,750ȱ pean region, it is alleged that Moldovaȱ 319ȱ 382ȱ 329ȱ 313ȱ 300ȱ 1,643ȱ 90% of foreign women working Romaniaȱ 163ȱ 261ȱ 243ȱ 194ȱ 193ȱ 1,054ȱ in the sex business are victims of Bulgariaȱ 46ȱ 96ȱ 164ȱ 172ȱ 143ȱ 621ȱ trafficking, with 10-15% under Kosovo,ȱProvinceȱofȱ 54ȱ 67ȱ 165ȱ 192ȱ 90ȱ 568ȱ the age of 18 ((El-Cherkeh et al., BiHȱ 0ȱ 0ȱ 8ȱ 17ȱ 39ȱ 54ȱ 2004: 22). However, more recent Serbiaȱ 0ȱ 1ȱ 10ȱ 13ȱ 21ȱ 45ȱ reports note that raids on bars Croatiaȱ 0ȱ 0ȱ 1ȱ 1ȱ 6ȱ 8ȱ (the most prevalent form of anti- Montenegroȱ 0ȱ 0ȱ 2ȱ 3ȱ 5ȱ 10ȱ trafficking action) are no longer fyRoȱMacedoniaȱ 0ȱ 0ȱ 0ȱ 14ȱ 12ȱ 26ȱ producing results and that SEEȱcountriesȱsubtotalȱ 801ȱ 1,252ȱ 1,297ȱ 1,264ȱ 1,165ȱ 5,779ȱ many women offered assistance Ukraineȱ 68ȱ 97ȱ 104ȱ 47ȱ 41ȱ 357ȱ as victims of trafficking deny Russiaȱ 7ȱ 22ȱ 21ȱ 5ȱ 4ȱ 59ȱ that they are such, and say that Belarusȱ 8ȱ 9ȱ 1ȱ 2ȱ 1ȱ 21ȱ they are working voluntarily Georgiaȱ 0ȱ 3ȱ 2ȱ 0ȱ 2ȱ 7ȱ (Limanowska, 2004: 50). Child Otherȱȱ 3ȱ 0ȱ 5ȱ 11ȱ 14ȱ 33ȱ trafficking, not only for sexual Otherȱcountriesȱsubtotalȱ 86ȱ 131ȱ 133ȱ 65ȱ 62ȱ 477ȱ services but also for organized Totalȱnumbersȱofȱvictimsȱ begging,10 is an increasing prob- traffickedȱinto,ȱviaȱorȱfromȱ 887ȱ 1,383ȱ 1,430ȱ 1,329ȱ 1,227ȱ 6,256ȱ SouthȱEasternȱEuropeȱ lem across the region and also within the EU (IPEC 2005 and SOURCE:ȱSurteesȱ(2005:ȱ31Ȭ32)ȱ 2004 country volumes). Howev- er, the limited empirical evi- reports (e.g. Rahmani, Tableȱ5ȱ 2005) are of decreasing FormsȱofȱtraffickingȱamongȱassistedȱSEEȱnationals,ȱ2003ȱandȱ2004ȱ 2003ȱ 2004ȱ visibility or extent of traf- FORMȱOFȱTRAFFICKINGȱ ficking and increased traf- Nȱ %ȱ Nȱ %ȱ ficking of minors — the Sexualȱexploitationȱ 824ȱ 65.2ȱ 864ȱ 74.2ȱ latter, especially without Labourȱ 91ȱ 7.2ȱ 48ȱ 4.1ȱ crossing country borders Beggingȱandȱdelinquencyȱ 51ȱ 4.0ȱ 75ȱ 6.4ȱ (so-called ‘internal traf- Adoptionȱ 0ȱȱ9ȱ 0.8ȱ ficking’). Sexualȱexploitationȱandȱlabourȱ 245ȱ 19.4ȱ 97ȱ 8.3ȱ Sexualȱexploitation,ȱbeggingȱandȱdelinquencyȱ 10ȱ 0.8ȱ 27ȱ 2.3ȱ According to the Sec- Labour,ȱbeggingȱandȱdelinquencyȱ 11ȱ 0.9ȱ 2ȱ 0.2ȱ ond RCP Report, around Sexualȱexploitation,ȱlabour,ȱbeggingȱandȱdelinquencyȱ 1ȱ 0.1ȱ 0ȱȱ 70% of assisted victims Potentialȱvictimsȱ 31ȱ 2.5ȱ 43ȱ 3.7ȱ from the SEE region (in TOTALȱ 1,254ȱȱ1,164ȱȱ other words, excluding those originating from SOURCE:ȱSurteesȱ(2005:ȱ33)ȱ other countries) are traf- ficked solely for sexual exploitation, along with another 10-20% for a dence suggests the following set of characteris- mix of sexual services and other employment. tics: Table 5 below shows summary data for forms of trafficking. Of the small proportion of persons „ ‘victims’ frequently do not see themselves trafficked for labour, begging or delinquency as such, and often refuse help (11%), in some countries such as Albania and „ ‘victims’ tend to come from seriously Kosovo the majority were male and minors underprivileged backgrounds, and are pre- (Surtees, 2005: 13). The statistical data presented ponderantly from ethnic minorities, for the SEE region do not show gender or minor including Roma The Romanian Journal of European Studies 38

„ ‘victims’ tend to be very young, and the and Okoloski, 2005: 18). They have two defining trend is increasing for minors characteristics: they are predominantly irregu- „ the crossing of borders is not a necessary lar, with employment in the shadow economy; part of trafficking they do not conform to the definition of migra- „ sexual exploitation is not a necessary part tion. This ‘incomplete migration’ appears to be of trafficking extensive in the CEE region, with very large numbers participating, and mainly involving In conclusion, we should note that the num- semi-skilled and unskilled persons. Owing to its ber of persons identified by the Regional Clear- clandestine character, data and interpretation of ing Point is very small relative to the extent of numbers are highly questionable and problem- migration in the region (both voluntary and atic. In the Balkan region, three countries are forced) and raises serious questions about the predominantly involved with this migration real significance of the phenomenon of traffick- type — Albania, Romania and Bulgaria. ing in the Balkans. The RCP Report itself notes The 1990s Albanian migrations to Greece that it is only a standardized record of assis- and Italy were clearly of this type, even if the tance, and there is no way of estimating the mass deportations by the Greek state constitut- actual extent of trafficking: furthermore, high ed a peculiar variant of the return strategy numbers of assisted victims in a particular (Reyneri, 2001). Subsequent to the first Greek country may reflect pro-active policy to tackle legalization campaign, and after a legal opinion the phenomenon, rather than the existence of a from the Ombudsman denouncing the deporta- greater problem than elsewhere (Surtees, tions as unlawful, Albanians found it increas- 2005:25). Trafficking and prostitution are large- ingly difficult to engage in circular migration. ly demand-driven, and extremely problematic With tighter and more aggressive, even violent, and extensive in UN-managed Kosovo, as well border controls, alongside the Greek state’s as associated with supply side social and family insistence on full-time social insurance contri- problems in the countries of the region. Further- butions for legal residence, by the early 2000s more, little if any evidence has been adduced to Albanians living in Greece had adopted a typi- show that trafficking is big business in the cal strategy of permanent settlement (Baldwin- Balkans: rather, the evidence suggests that it is a Edwards, 2004b: 62). The early migrations had cottage industry (Nicholson, 2002: 4). This, com- been undertaken by men, later to be joined by bined with the increasing phenomenon of their wives and children: after the 2001 immi- “internal trafficking”, might lead us to conclude gration law, some 67,000 permits for family that this is a problem of social policy, which has reunification were given by the Greek state developed to extend beyond national borders. (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004c: Table 2). By 2004, Thus, trafficking is not per se an issue of official records indicated just over 400,000 adult migration, but rather one of economic survival Albanians, up to 100,000 schoolchildren, and strategies on the part of both traffickers and some 200,000 classed as ethnic Greeks: although those being trafficked or smuggled; on the other some of these may have returned to Albania or hand, the demand side of prostitution, cheap moved to Italy, there is no evidence to suggest labor and organized street begging is a signifi- that this was in large numbers. Thus, Greek cant socio-economic problem not only in the government policy — by reinforcing the border Balkans but also across Europe. These two with Albania — managed to change temporary aspects –the supply side of underdevelopment migration into permanent settlement for the and unequal income distribution, and the great majority of Albanian migrants. In Italy, a demand for sexual services, forced labor and similar pattern has been noted, with a high pro- informal employment in EU countries and else- portion of Albanians taking Italian citizen- 11 12 where — might be more appropriate foci for ship. By end 2004, ISTAT had recorded government policies. 317,000 Albanians with residence permits, mak- ing them the leading immigrant nationality in Italy. Temporary or incomplete migrations The situation pertaining to Romanians and Bulgarians is rather different from Albanians. Also known as circular migrations, these are This is not because of any massive difference in typical of voluntary population movements strategy by those migrants, nor because of dif- from the CEE region since 1989 (Kaczmarczyk ferent treatment by receiving countries. It is, 39 The Romanian Journal of European Studies rather, the unintended outcome of the gradual Bulgarian temporary migration has targeted incorporation of these two countries into the EU Greece, Italy and Spain — but without the visi- and Schengen regime. In the case of Romania, bility of either Albanian or Romanian migra- although circular migration had existed in the tion. Furthermore, there is no consensus on the late 1990s, primarily to Italy, it was with the extent of emigration in recent years: one report removal of the Schengen visa requirement in suggests that it increased after 2001 when the 2002 that circular migration of Romanians as Schengen visa requirement was removed ‘false tourists’ really took off. Travelling legally (OECD-SOPEMI 2005: 165) whilst another under 3-month Schengen tourism provisions, a claims a stabilization over recent years (Beleva 2005 survey shows that around 9% of house- and Minev, 2005). A 2001 IOM survey suggests holds have one member abroad at any one time that the primary destinations for Bulgarian sea- (around 850,000 people). Their destinations are sonal work at that time were Greece, Spain, principally Italy and Spain, with reports from Italy, Germany and the Netherlands (Guentche- Italy of up to 2.5 million Romanians there, or va et al., 2003: 5). Unlike Romanians, who (from Romanian authorities) of 1.4m in both migrated to Germany in large numbers as eth- Spain and Italy. These extraordinarily high nic Germans and also as contract workers, Bul- numbers arise, as I show elsewhere (Baldwin- garians hardly appear in German immigration Edwards, 2006) from flawed interpretation of data. In southern Europe, Bulgarians are more information caused by imposing a traditional visible: from residence permit data, they consti- view of migration on the complex and well-cho- tute the second largest nationality in Greece (at reographed circular migration patterns. Thus, 59,000), and some 2% of the immigrant popula- although many Romanians — up to 15% of the tion in Spain (52,000), although have only a adult population — have participated in migra- small presence in Italy at 15,000. Given that tion, at any one time there is not such a large many Bulgarian migrants are female and number abroad. The latest data show 249,000 employed as housekeepers, it is likely that their Romanians with permits in Italy, and 175,000 in illegal employment is considerably higher than Spain. There is also limited legal temporary the official data suggest. There is, however, a labor migration — primarily to Germany, but serious information deficit on temporary migra- also to Italy and Spain. Available data suggest tion movements of Bulgarian economic that this is well under 100,000 in total, per year migrants, compounded by their ease of travel (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006). within the Schengen zone.

Trends in Balkan Migrations

Despite massive problems with data, it is ina, Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro to possible to discern some clear trends. First, the resolve the issue of returns before the end of flight of refugees from the region has more or 2006. less stopped, with the partial exception of Serbia Thirdly, ethnic migration looks like a phe- and Montenegro. The continued asylum-seek- nomenon of the early 1990s, with the break-up ing from the Balkans appear to be mainly by of communist states. It has largely discontinued, Roma, although there are no hard data, and the although again there is a question mark about numbers from Serbia — around 15,000 for 2000 the situation of the Roma. There is also a poten- — are openly criticized by the European Com- tial, or actual, issue of asylum applications con- mission (Frattini, 2005). stituting the only route for unskilled or semi- Secondly, the issue of refugee returns is actu- skilled labour migration to the West; it is impos- ally dominating the scene, with serious issues sible to clarify to what extent this may have about who is forcibly returned to where, and the occurred, given the arbitrary way in which reception and nature of voluntary returns. Even some EU countries evaluate asylum claims. for candidate country Croatia, the European Thirdly, trafficking figures for the region Commission has worries concerning returns to show a continuous decline: already small num- that country; however, the Sarajevo Declaration bers are getting smaller. Trafficking, illegal of January 2005 committed Bosnia-Hercegov- migration and migration for employment have The Romanian Journal of European Studies 40 been hardly visible for most opf the former migration will increase — especially in the con- Yugoslavia, owing to their invisibility in the text of mass unemployment and poor quality context of forced migrations. employment. Fourthly, incomplete or circular migration The ‘brain drain’ issue is one which certain seems ultimately to have been an option for Balkan countries worry over, most obviously only two Balkan countries — Romania and Bul- Croatia. Although there clearly has been an exo- garia. The result of tighter border controls and dus of skilled personnel, mass emigration from the Schengen zone has been to effect a two-tier the Balkans has represented all sectors of socie- status for border crossing — candidate country ty and arguably over-represented the lower- or non-candidate country. Although intended skilled. The primary issue is not how to deal only for tourism, the Schengen arrangements with past emigration, but how to encourage and have had a predictably aggravating impact on fully incorporate possible returning migrants the informal economies of Europe — particular- into modern economies. There is, so far, little ly those of southern Europe. evidence that focused strategies are being devel- Several issues have not been explicitly oped to address this issue; furthermore, the EU addressed so far, and deserve mention. Immi- has provided no guidance or incentives for bet- gration into, and transit migration through, the ter labor market and migration management. A Balkans have been a continuous matter of con- legalistic obsession with adaptation to the acquis cern by EU countries. This issue is also partly communautaire has dominated both financing linked with trafficking, but it is really only from and formal relations with potential and actual the Ukraine that there is any evidence of a prob- candidate countries — to the detriment of other lem. Data on immigration into the region are of functional economic issues (Baldwin-Edwards, very low quality, primarily because most of it is 2006). illegal. Information from Romania and Bulgaria suggests that it consists primarily of migrants Thus, the Balkan region is rapidly becoming from within the CEE region, from CIS countries, more typical of semi-peripheral economies, and asylum-seekers and illegal migrants from with an increasing tendency for temporary Asia. Numbers appear to be low, despite peri- labor emigration and also attraction of small odic hysteria in Western Europe about hordes of numbers of asylum-seekers — the latter, partic- Chinese preparing to ‘invade’ Europe. ularly as legal systems adopt modern asylum One of the clear achievements in the region laws in line with the EU acquis. However, for since the early 1990s has been the moderniza- those countries not on the Schengen “white tion and increased effectiveness of border con- list”, the Schengen wall is almost as great a bar- trols, primarily achieved with EU moneys and rier as the former Iron Curtain, and excludes expertise. Information provided by ICMPD and whole generations in countries with pro-Euro- others suggests a fairly unambiguous improve- pean visions and aspirations for EU member- ment in border management, as shown by ship. There is an imperative for the EU to reform apprehension statistics (Futo et al., 2005). How- and adapt, as well as for the Balkan countries: ever, as all countries of the region stabilize, it this message is rarely heard within European can be expected that all types of voluntary political discourse.

References

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Notes

1 For the purposes of this paper, I follow the policy of the International Commission on the Balkans (ICB, 2005) and classify as western Balkans the following countries: Albania, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro. To these must be added the eastern Balkan countries of Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova. Since Turkey occupies a very special and prominent place in relation to both migrations and the EU, I do not include it in this geopolitical scheme. 2 Own calculation, using census data 2002 and births/deaths published in Constantin (2004:37). 3 Internally displaced persons 4 I am indebted to Beryl Nicholson for her astute comments on Albanian emigration and census figures, which also apply to almost all voluntary migrations in the region. 5 At end 2004, Serbia was ranked third in the world by UNHCR for its refugee to population ratio. 6 See HRW (2004b) for the landmark ECHR ruling which determined that tenancy rights to socially-owned property were ter- minated by war, thereby removing the property rights of all refugees from Croatia, who had occupied social housing in Croatia. 7 There is much controversy about the existence (or not) of different Romani groups — including Egyptian Roma and Ashkali. See Marushiakova and Popov (2003) for clarification. 8 By the end of 2005, the author was receiving reports that the Greek state had surreptitiously withdrawn or not renewed these 3-year cards, and was threatening to deport those who could not prove their Greek heritage. 9 For the distinction, which increasingly is being questioned, see the UN protocols on trafficking and smuggling. 10 See TDH (2003) for detailed research on Albanian children trafficked into Greece 11 This option is denied them in Greece, even for ethnic Greeks. Masked as a “problem” with Albania’s refusal to permit dual nationality, it is clearly a political strategy to retain a Greek presence in Albania. 12 http://demo.istat.it/

Workers’ Mobility’: Europe’s Integration and Second Thoughts

Dr. Peter van Krieken International Law and Human Rights, Webster University, Leiden

UNDP Chief Technical Advisor with the Lao PDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vientiane, Laos

This contribution focuses on following four relationships (1) labour and capital . Moving labour may amount to a falsification of a market economy. Labour migration is of ben- efit in only very few cases (like that of highly skilled, innovation-prone experts). Most studies now explicitly deny bene- fits or, at best, doubt whether there are any benefits to labour-related migratory movements. (2) migration and social welfare policy. What is needed is a thorough review of the various social benefits systems and its possible impact on migratory movements, be they intra-European or from third countries altogether. It is sub- mitted that before migration is offered as a release to many needy labour-markets, those markets should first come to terms with the need to re-power their unemployed, re-train them and gear them to full participation, before going for the easy solution of depriving other countries of their potential. Moreover, free movement of labour is only possible with a flexible social welfare system in place, more geared towards the realities of the labour market and the need for Europe to remain/become competitative. (3) globalization and migration. It is argued that in the case of migrants staying at home, all parties might be better off — the individuals as well as the countries of origin and destination. This is because the transfer of industries, agri- culture and back-office jobs to low income or more productive countries would be much speedier, which ultimately sub- stantially benefits the global economic development. It is about moving capital, rather than moving people. (4) the impact of migration and the receiving community/society. This issue is related to the economic and societal concept of trust, one of the key elements that should be taken into account whenever a migration policy is formulated or whenever the possible positive or negative outcome of migration is being debated. Economies tend to boom on the basis of trust. Migration does not necessarily add to 'trust' , and may hence have a negative impact on growth.

Keywords: migration, welfare policy, globalization, European Union

The year 2006 has been designated as work- as it has been put — the benefits of both work- ers’ mobility year. This ‘move’ aims at raising ing abroad and in a new occupation.1 Working awareness and increasing understanding of — in new countries and/or sectors — it is claimed The Romanian Journal of European Studies 46 — often provides workers with new skills and its labour markets to the eight central and east- experiences, benefiting both them and their ern European countries that joined the EU in employers. Current figures show that very few May 2004. Several others have opened their Europeans work abroad. The percentage of markets with restrictions on the number of Europeans residing in an EU country other than workers (Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Portu- their country of origin has consistently gal), or on the benefits they can claim (UK, Ire- remained at around a mere 1.5% for the last 30 land). Belgium, Finland, Germany, France, years. And in 9 countries of the EU15, 40% of Greece, Spain and Luxembourg have opted for workers have remained in the same job for over a ‘transitional period’.4 A number of countries 10 years.2 (Finland, Spain) are preparing to lift the restric- At first sight, focusing on workers’ mobility tions. Belgium and Portugal are also thought to looks like a brilliant idea. It promotes the idea of be debating the issue, but Austria and Germany the European house in which we move freely are expected to extend the restrictions (a quota and happily. It is about meeting with fellow system of sorts). Question-marks remain as to Europeans, meeting with complementary skills. France’s and Luxembourg’s position.5 Yet, looking into the issue more carefully should At the same time, migrant workers from out- also give rise to some second thoughts. side the Union who have obtained a long-term Thoughts about individual well-being, about residence status in any EU15 country would be the dialectics between labour and capital, about allowed to move freely under the Directive the loss of human capital as migrant workers agreed upon on the status of long term resi- often work in positions below their actual pro- dents. Such a long-term resident (a third coun- fessional level (the engineer as taxi-driver, the try national who has resided legally and contin- primary school teacher as orange-picker).3 uously within its territory for five years- art. Regard should also be had to the social welfare 4.1), may reside in the territory of an EU MS system and the need to make ends meet. But other than the one that granted long-term status above all, the idea behind moving workers on the following grounds: (a) the exercise of an around is also about the challenge of a decreas- economic activity in an employed or self- ing European population and the urge to employed capacity; (b) the pursuit of studies or become a fair partner in the globalization vocational training; (c) other purposes.6 It process. It is, indirectly, also about the (non- would appear that some review may be neces- )admission of migrant workers from outside the sary as third country nationals now would EU. appear to enjoy more freedoms than the fellow The European Union focuses on the freedom EU citizens from the new Member States. of movement, — movement of goods, capital, This contribution, therefore, focuses on fol- services and, indeed, individuals. The EU15 lowing four relationships were on the way to accomplish these lofty ideas 1) labour and capital to some significant extent. Remarkably, the 15 2) migration and social welfare policy have given mixed signals as to the acceptance of 3) globalization and migration labour from the new member states. Hitherto 4) the impact of migration and the receiving only Sweden has allowed unrestricted access to community/society.

1. Labour and Capital

As a matter of principle regard should be unemployment, the governments of many countries had to one of the overriding principles as laid increasingly stress the desirability of encouraging down in the preamble of one of the relevant ILO the transfer of capital and technology, rather than the conventions. In this preamble, the need was transfer of workers in accordance with the needs and emphasized “...to avoid the excessive and uncon- requests of these countries in the reciprocal interest of trolled or unassisted increase of migratory move- the countries of origin and the countries of employ- ments because of their negative social and human ment...”. consequences, and considering that in order to over- This text is not new. It is taken from the 1975 come underdevelopment and structural and chronic ILO Labour Migration Convention (C143), and 47 The Romanian Journal of European Studies it is herewith submitted that this text is not just labour migration is also in need of a migrant / valid for relationships between Europe and the receiving community index. Such an index Third World, but is, most probably, also true for should include production, language skills, inte- the relation ship between the EU15 and the new gration, social, religious and political Member States. tension/well-being as well as the effect of the Moving labour may amount to a falsification migratory movement on the community of ori- of a market economy. Economists will submit gin (brain-drain, broken marriages, remittances, that labour is just one part of the means of pro- holiday-behaviour, etc.). What we will most duction and the free movement of labour is inclu- probably observe is that labour migration is of sive in the globalization and EU-build-up, maybe benefit in only very few cases (like that of highly as much as a condition for the proper functioning skilled, innovation-prone experts who truly have of a world-wide economy. Yet, economists tend some added value to offer). Most studies now to concentrate on the work, the production per explicitly deny benefits or, at best, doubt whether se, and they conveniently forget that work there are any benefits to labour-related migrato- amounts to only some 18-22% of the labourer’s ry movements. It is on the basis of these argu- time. The remainder goes to commuting, sleep, ments (labour/capital; loss of human capital; recreation, religion, social and/or political activi- costs to the community) that the 2006 workers’ ties. The same way the world’s economy was mobility equation deserves to be re-thought. The shocked/surprised by the HDI, the human devel- Commission refers to increased awareness and opment index, an index that focused on the com- understanding of the benefits of both working munity’s well-being, rather than the cold, anony- abroad and in a new occupation. A lot depends mous production and GDP figures, the world of on the meaning of the word ‘benefits’.

2. Migration and Social Welfare

In early May 2004, a conference on ‘Co-ordi- might be capable to perform. Moreover, many nation of Social Security in an Enlarged Europe’ able-bodied were removed from the labour mar- focused on a new employment regulation, ket as ‘incapables’ under most generous inabili- under which unemployed people will be able to ty screening cum benefits. Some European coun- seek work in another EU country much more tries enjoyed low unemployment figures, only easily by ‘exporting’ their social welfare entitle- because they had such high ‘disability-‘figures. ments. Member states may allow unemployed It took those countries almost a generation (that people to bring their social welfare entitlements is: over 20 years) to redress some of the ills from their home country to the EU country involved.7 With or without the number of dis- where they are seeking work. This is an impor- ability-benefits receivers who, upon careful tant piece of social legislation and it should have scrutiny might be able, under certain conditions, an impact on the employment, unemployment to re-enter the labour market, the total number and intra-European migratory movements, as of unemployed amounts to close to 10% (official well as migration from third countries. This reg- unemployment figure for the EU15 has now ulation protects the social security rights of peo- decreased to 8.5%). That means that in principle ple who move, for whatever reason, private or a great many unemployed should be available professional, from one Member state to another. for many of the jobs now being offered to legal If the fight against unemployment is indeed or illegal, regular or irregular immigrants. considered to be a priority for the Union, this What is needed is a thorough review of the new regulation represents a major achievement. various social benefits systems and its possible Of great relevance in this context is the level impact on migratory movements, be they intra- of social services being provided in comparison European or from third countries altogether. It with minimum salaries. In some countries (Den- is herewith submitted that before migration is mark, Germany, the Netherlands) the incentive offered as a release to many needy labour-mar- to actively look for a job is quite minimal as the kets, those markets should first come to terms unemployment benefits are sometimes as high, with the need to re-power their unemployed, re- or even higher, than the salary of the job one train them and gear them to full participation, The Romanian Journal of European Studies 48 before going for the easy solution of depriving he/she agreed upon with the provider of the other countries of their potential. insurances. Apart from the impact of social welfare on Many unemployment schemes allow the the participation in the labour market (yes, par- unemployed to enjoy benefits until they find a ticipation of men and women alike can be job on their very own level. The present author manipulated), it is also of relevance to look into fails to understand why a former civil servant or the issue of access of fellow-Europeans or even university lecturer should not be considered long-term third-country nationals to the nation- able to work as a guard or a janitor. Of course, al social welfare systems. As can now be sub- he or she may sign up to an unemployment mitted, European borders are to a great extent insurance to prevent him/her to take up such a determined by access to the social welfare office. job, but that then becomes a private matter In this respect it is to be noted that long-term between the insurer and the insured (and the (third-country) residents shall enjoy equal treat- costs may be staggering of not prohibitive). ment with nationals as regards social security, A similar re-think needs to be carried social assistance, and social protection as defined by through for health insurances and pension national law (art.11.1.d of the above quoted arrangements. Health insurances should partly Directive). Art. 21 states that as soon as third- remain in the ‘public’ domain, as far as the pro- country long-term residents have received a res- vision of minimum benefits is concerned, idence permit in a second Member State, they because the community as a whole has a utili- too shall enjoy the benefits as defined under tarian interest in the health of its fellow com- art.11.1.d. This amounts to a remarkably gener- munity-members. Everything over and above ous approach, particularly in the light of the the minimum treatment should be a private present restrictive approaches to citizens of the matter between the insurer and the insured. As new Member States themselves. Indeed, social to migrant workers, it does not make a differ- welfare systems deserve a complete make-over, ence where exactly the insurer holds office. reflecting on the one hand community-member- Likewise, employers and employees should be ship and the place of work, and on the other entitled to verse funds in a foreign pension fund hand the public/private aspects of any social security insurance. In fact, once every EU-citi- for any EU employee, thereby assisting towards zen has his/her own private social security creating a true European (pension-)market. arrangement with either a public entity or a pri- Yet, the argument presented here is that free vate insurance company, the place of work and movement of labour is only possible with a flexi- the risk of becoming unemployed is no longer of ble social welfare system in place, more geared great relevance: the person concerned will be towards the realities of the labour market and the covered, one way or another on the terms need for Europe to remain/become competitive.

3. Migration and Globalization8

Europe has during the last two centuries needs to be taken into account, also in view of moved from mainly agriculture to manufactur- the ageing debate. ing and to service industries. Today, thanks to Coleman (Oxford) submitted at the Cairo+10 effective communication and transportation, UNECE/UNFPA Conference (Geneva, January most production can take place on far-away 2004) that there is no ‘solution’ to an ageing shores. What is needed nearby are health, edu- population short of a return to much higher cation, infrastructure and retail. Infrastructure rates of population growth or mass age-specific entails construction (roads, offices, housing) but euthanasia. The problem is that the effect is not also communication (trains, aircraft, cars, tele- very great and immigration is an inefficient way com) and general upkeep (repairs, cleaning). Of of achieving this end. Immigrants themselves the four mentioned here, health and education age and the country then requires more immi- are least prone to productivity increases. This grants, as it were, to replace their number. 49 The Romanian Journal of European Studies Immigration cannot solve the problems of pop- years. For Europe that would mean that by 2100 ulation ageing except at rates of immigration so the EU-25 will have one billion inhabitants and high that they would generate economically that the global population will reach the 25 bil- and environmentally unsustainable population lion mark by 2150. growth rates and permanently and radically That having been stated, it is a fact that change the cultural and ethnic composition of health and education are economic activities the host population. The population size conse- that are not easily submitted to increased pro- quent on the migration needed to preserve the ductivity ideas. Yet, most of Europe managed to current potential in the UK would double to 120 spend additional funds for exactly health and million by 2050 because the UK would be education on – in my eyes non-productive – importing 1.2 million persons per year. By 2100, middle management. The percentage of ‘hands up to five million new immigrants would be at the bed’ in hospitals as well as ‘teaching the needed every year and the UK population pupils’ at schools have disturbingly changed would have risen to 312 million.9 over the last decades. If a revolution would be Of course, the retirement challenge needs to needed these days, it should be about giving the be addressed. Now that most experts agree that hospitals back top the physicians and the migration is not the answer, consideration must schools back to the teachers. be given to (a) working up to the age of 65, 67 or Moving agriculture, manufacturing and even 70; (b) working longer hours (40 instead of even, for instance, back-office jobs to countries 36); (c) salary decreases beyond the age of 55, outside of Europe creates win/win situations. possibly combined with less work (e.g. a 66% Subsidies should be considered as the scourge salary for a four-day working week, or a 50% of any international economic system. This salary for a three-day working week).10 Most comes and goes at the cost of the economies of European Governments have understood the many developing or less developed countries. message. The Trade Unions, however, generally Countries that should be able to export their object. It is worth explaining that non-migration products are now forced to export their work- would ultimately improve the salaries and sta- force. It is about tomatoes, not about the toma- tus of their members. to-picker. Or, in other words, should the people Apart from the idea that bigger populations move to where the capital is, or, rather, should means more power (presumably through larger capital move to where the people are? armed forces or a stronger economy), there is in The recent Brazil/WTO case (on subsidies paid principle nothing wrong with decreasing popu- to U.S. cotton farmers) is of the utmost impor- lations. Of course, people want to become rich- tance in this respect. More than ever, the migra- er, and the fear is justified that with less ‘pro- tion ‘lobby’ should display an interest in such ducers’ less products will be on the market. It is cases as it should in the subsidy issue at large. In then forgotten that productivity has increased the absence of subsidies, more producers will steadily over the last 500 years or so, and there move production to low-income ‘good weather’ is no reason to suspect that productivity would countries. This is already true for the Dutch suddenly stop doing so. Yet, two important con- flower industry, an industry without subsidies, ditions then need to be met: (i) sufficient cre- and perfectly suitable to make use of the global- ative and innovative engineering capabilities ization processes, thereby benefiting producers, are to be available to replace labour with capital, labour and consumers all at the same time. that is to introduce new machineries; and (ii) As for manufacturing it can be submitted qualified managers must introduce better pro- that once a manufacturer has reached the mar- cessing and must continuously streamline pro- gins of profit, and is e.g. faced with labourers cedures. Innovation is the key word, and who demand an increase in salary, three alter- Europe should invest heavily in ensuring that natives are available: the replacement of labour by capital will remain a major option. Subject to that condition — by hiring migrant labour (including ille- decreasing populations might still enjoy grow- gals) the manufacturer can avoid the ing productivity. If only ‘space’ were not such a demand/supply reality and can continue scarce commodity.11 profitable production, thanks to relatively Alternatively, it should be appreciated that a low labour costs; yearly increase in a population by a mere 1% — by replacing labour with capital, the man- will result in doubling the population in 72 ufacturer can make a sound long-term The Romanian Journal of European Studies 50 investment, making use of the available would justify migration: remittances. Even the innovation possibilities (thereby also pro- World Bank appears to subscribe to the idea that moting investments in innovative think- remittances represent a significant positive eco- ing at large); nomic feature. Migrants provide huge flows of — in the end the manufacturer can move the remittances to their countries of origin, amount- site of manufacturing to a low-labour-cost ing to an estimated US$ 90 billion annually, or country. the second largest source of external funding for Of the three alternatives, the first is by far the developing countries. However, the total losses worst scenario as it delays the introduction of seem to become lost in the debate. Reference innovative processes and procedures and should be made to: (a) the use of the funds con- because it delays moving the site by a couple of cerned; (b) the durability of those transfers; and years, at the cost of the consumer. The introduc- (c) the impact of ‘dual loyalty’ on integration tion of innovative ideas or machinery benefits and related processes (the loss of human capital all, and the transfer of production is an obvious already having been touched upon herein- blessing for Third World economies as well as above). low-cost Eastern European countries.12. a) Many of the funds made available through It is probably even more surprising to learn remittances are used for consumption (cars, lux- that also moving so-called back-office activities ury goods, housing), often as part of a second- (keeping files, administration, accounting, ary pension fund. Of course, more often than auditing) to low income countries can be a very not, the local economy benefits, but in some profitable exercise, that is: profitable to all. The areas remittances used for the construction of Economist, in its 13 December 2003 issue, calcu- housing often results in an increase in construc- lated that the transfer of 1 dollar worth of back tion costs, which in turn disadvantages those office work from the USA to India would give who do not have migrants in their family. India 33 dollar cents and the USA no less than b) The durability is questionable. Those who $1.12, making a total profit of 45%. This, it do not marry someone from the same should be added, includes re-employment.13 area/country are not necessarily tempted to It is a well known yet staggering fact that the invest in the country of origin of just one part- total of ODA (Official Development Assistance) ner; often emphasis on educating the children covers a mere 35% of the total losses incurred by results in changing saving-patterns. In other Third World countries because of those coun- words, the sustainability greatly depends on tries not being able to export products to the newcomers, on ongoing migratory patterns. North/West as a result of tariffs and other Once no new migrants are forthcoming, remit- export/import hindrances. It should then be tances are bound to decrease. It would be surre- added that the OECD has allowed the reception alistic to insist on ongoing migration for the costs of asylum seekers who have come to the sake of remittances. North/West to be considered as part of the c) The idea behind remittances portrays an ODA. It could hence be argued that many coun- ongoing link between the migrant and the coun- tries would be better off without development try of origin. In the case of permanent migration aid, but with their products having access to the (different from temporary migration) this markets of the North/West. would be contrary to an all-integration More research needs to be done into the approach, whereby the migrant focuses for the alternative to non-migration. It is hereby sub- full 100% on the country of residence. It could mitted that in the case of migrants staying at hence be argued that supporting the transfer of home, all parties might be better off — the indi- savings to the country of origin rather than viduals as well as the countries of origin and investing in the country of destination would be destination. This is because the transfer of counterproductive to the all-integration- industries, agriculture and back-office jobs to approach — although no results are available low income or more productive countries from research – if any – into this linkage. would be much speedier, which ultimately sub- What remains to be done in situ, on location, stantially benefits the global economic develop- is mainly limited to education, health, retail and ment. It is about moving capital, rather than infrastructure. The latter includes construction, moving people. communication and maintenance. Indeed, The migration lobby, however, is increasing- many of the jobs involved are the heavy and ly focused on a new aspect that, in their views, dirty ones, positions now often filled by 51 The Romanian Journal of European Studies migrants, legal and illegal. This is the case in In migratory circles it is well known that a spite of the significant unemployment rates in salary difference of 30% and more will trigger Europe as a whole. As usual, market mecha- nisms should be allowed to play its role. That migration. It could be submitted that the differ- means on the one hand that salaries for these ence between benefits and salaries should also jobs need to be appealing, but also that social welfare benefits need to be at such a level that be in the 30% range to make an impact on the actual work always acts as an incentive. individual decision-making process.

4. Migration and the Receiving Community

The balance between nationals and fellow- Apart from ‘migration’ as the result of exter- Europeans on the one hand, and Europeans and nal pressure, regard should also be had to non-Europeans on the other is a most sensitive, migration being the cause of tension and/or neg- even dangerous issue. Non-discrimination ative developments. The Hmong in Laos; Indi- stands central whenever one deals with people ans in Fiji; the big-city challenges, — it all adds with a different background. Yet, the eyes up.15 Feller, in a January 2004 Amsterdam should not be closed to the realities of the ten- address stated: “...On all continents, mass influxes sion so often apparent in the Paris ‘banlieu’, the of displaced persons have placed onerous burdens on British Midlands, or Berlin Kreuzberg. the physical environment [pollution, deforestation, Migration is more often than not looked competition for natural food and water supplies], on upon as result of external pressure: (1) econom- social systems [health, welfare, housing and employ- ics/ecology, (2) war, (3) persecution/repression ment and education] and can negatively impact the and (4) demography can all be causes for migra- demographic balance of a host population, antago- tory movements. It is also of importance to nizing the host communities. Similarly widespread emphasize that these four main causes are inter- is the growing problem of irregular movement. It is related: war has an impact on the economy; not only a problem as between regions, but also for demographic developments may have an popular destination countries within regions them- impact on the ecological balance, and so on. selves...”. Moreover, there is no need to explain that a Indeed, more research needs to be undertak- gloomy economic situation may result in ten- en into the probability of migration per se creat- sions between the population at large and the ing problems next to solving others. More than authorities, resulting in repression, or that a ever all the relevant disciplines should join fight on the control of certain natural resources hands to tackle the various challenges on this may result in war. It is also clear that an increas- issue. ing population may put pressure on economic This issue is related to the economic and developments (a 3% population increase would societal concept of trust. In the opinion of the need to be off-set by a 7% increase in GDP). present author trust is one of the key elements Fairly new is the confirmation of the correlation that should be taken into account whenever a of the so-called youth bulge and the likelihood migration policy is formulated or whenever the of armed conflict. It has been submitted by inter possible positive or negative outcome of migra- alia population action international that in the case tion is being debated. Economies tend to boom of the 15-29 old representing more than 40% of on the basis of trust. In 1995 Fukuyama, best the adult population (15 and above), this results known for his ‘The End of History’ (1992) pub- in a significant likelihood of armed conflict: “our lished an important book on ‘Trust’. Fukuyama analysis suggests that states where young adults argues that for an economy to boom and for a comprised 40% or more of all adults experienced civil society to prosper aspects like trust and social conflict sometime from 1990-2000, 2.3 times the like- cohesion are indispensable. Societal develop- lihood of countries below that benchmark.”14 On the ments, interaction and group dynamics are far basis of these figures it could be submitted that more important than hitherto believed: “eco- a decreasing fertility, combined with a slimming nomic activity represents a crucial part of life ‘youth bulge’ may create a situation in which and is knit together by a wide variety of norms, peace may become more likely. rules, moral obligations, and other habits that The Romanian Journal of European Studies 52 together shape the society (...); one of the most initiate and support them.” [p. 62] In fact, important lessons we can learn from an exami- Fukuyama displays his doubts concerning mul- nation of economic life is that a nation’s well- ticultural societies. And indeed, in the migra- being, as well as its ability to compete, is condi- tion debate it is often forgotten that migrant tioned by a single, pervasive characteristic: the workers do not only come to work, but are level of trust inherent in the society” [p. 7]. human beings with their own life-style and “There are three paths to sociability: the first is their own interests, goals and ideas. It is here- based on family and kinship; the second on vol- with submitted that due to the substantial num- untary associations outside kinship such as bers involved, actual segregation has in some schools, clubs, and professional organisations, cities taken place, is taking place in others or is and the third is the state. There are three forms about to take place altogether. This is bound to of economic organisation corresponding to each path: the family business, the professionally have a serious negative impact on interaction, managed corporation, and the state-owned or - intercultural relations and hence on trust, with sponsored enterprise. The first and third paths, all the negative results for society and the econ- it turns out, are closely related to one another: omy at large. cultures in which the primary avenue toward Keeping the above into account, it should sociability is family and kinship have a great become obvious that promoting workers’ deal of trouble creating large, durable economic mobility does not necessarily amount to a organisations and therefore look to the state to straightforward win-win situation.

5. Concluding Remarks

It should be quite obvious from the above er rather than tomatoes simply does not sound that the present author is not necessarily keen right. Whoever has traveled the cotton fields of on promoting workers’ mobility. Modern Uzbekistan, the USA and Western Africa will economies should strive for the transfer of capi- most probably understand the issue at stake. tal and goods rather than for the transfer of Also, please meet and compare the peanut human beings. farmers of Senegal and Georgia (USA). As long as the EU distorts in the most hypocritical man- Of course, in the absence of in-depth econo- ner possible the agricultural realities with subsi- metric studies on the impact of non-migration, dies and farm support amounting to more than forcing national economies on even a greater Euro 100 million per day (yes, per day), it scale to make use of innovation, outsourcing should not be too difficult to argue that efforts and the transfer of activities to low-income to make workers move may amount to a distor- countries, it is no easy task to bring the idea tion in its own right. True innovative thinking home. But the idea of importing a tomato-pick- would aim at innovation.

Notes

1 The present author personally subscribes to that notion. After having spent a great many years with the UNHCR (1975-1995), the Netherlands Ministry of Justice and Webster University (1995-2005), he recently joined UNDP as a Chief Technical Advisor with the Lao PDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vientiane, Laos. This contribution, as a matter of course, has been submitted a titre personnel and is based on his many years in various Twinning, Odysseus and Peer Review activities during the enlarge- ment process. Dr Van Krieken can be reached at [email protected] 2http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/817&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLan- guage=en (consulted January 2006). 3 ) Migrants tend to work – at least during the first years – below their educational and skills levels. Recent studies in Canada have indicated that for that country alone the loss involved would amount to some CND$ 5 to 55 billion on a yearly basis (the $5B 53 The Romanian Journal of European Studies

comes from a Conference Board of Canada article and the $55B comes from Jeffrey Reitz at the University of Toronto; source, Ms Rosaline Frith, CIC). 4 Two of the new member states, Hungary and Poland, have as a matter of retaliation imposed restrictions on EU15 workers. 5 Source: http://www.eupolitix.com/EN/News/200601/13a724a3-888a-444c-8751-bd74beb3ce9e.htm (consulted January 2006). 6 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003, art. 14.2. 7 Blair announced in January 2006 a ‘benefits shake-up’, aiming to get 1.7 million (of the total 2.7 million) incapacity claimants back into work (BBC News, 24 January 2006). Again, it should be noted that these ‘incapacity claimants’ normally remain out- side the unemployment figures. 8 This part is based on chapter B of the introduction to my The Consolidated Asylum and Migration Acquis, The Hague/Cambridge, 2004, pp 19-22. 9 Coleman also refers to the Korea Syndrome: The reductio ad absurdum of all this is what one might call the ‘Korea syndrome’: the level of immigration required in order to preserve the current potential support ratio in the Republic of Korea and its conse- quences for population growth. In order to preserve Korea’s present potential support ratio (10: 1) the population would need to increase to 6.2 billion people by the year 2050. Just by coincidence, this happens to be the entire population of the planet at the present time, so we would all have to go there. 10 By 55, statistically speaking, most parents can ‘breath’: children leave school, the mortgage has been paid off, and some heritage money may be coming in. 11 Remarkably, the Netherlands, in 2002-2003, combined increased unemployment with increased productivity. 12 In fact, many Western European firms prefer e.g. Romania to China because of the easy access, the short communication lines and the legal reliability. 13 India: labour: 0.10; profits retained in India: 0.10; suppliers 0.09; central government taxes 0.03; state government taxes: 0.01. Net benefit to India: 0.33. USA: savings accruing to US investors/customers: 0.58; imports of US goods and services by providers in India: 0.05; transfer of profits by US-based providers in India back to US: 0.04; Net direct benefit retained in US 0.67; Value from US labour re-employed 0.45 – 0.47. Potential net benefit to US: 1.12-1.14. Source: The Economist, December 13th, 2003. 14 This research excluded countries with persistent or recurring conflict. See: Cincotta, Engelman and Anastasion: The Security Demography; population and civil conflict after the cold war; Population Action International (Washington 2003), p. 48. See also the 2002 WHO World Report on Violence and Health, p. 222. 15 See for instance Hans Magnus Enzensbergers’ Aussichten Auf Den Burgerkrieg (1993).

Romania's External Migration in the Context of Accession to the EU: Mechanisms, Institutions and Social-Cultural Issues*

Luminiþa Nicolescu, Associate Professor Daniela-Luminiþa Constantin, Professor Academy of Economic Studies of Bucharest

This paper examines the integration mechanisms in the field of migration, focusing on migration flows, specific mecha- nisms and the institutional - legislative framework created in Romania for external migration administration. These issues have been approached in close connection with the orientations, requirements and trends materialized at the EU level, in the context of enlarging the Union towards the center and the eastern part of Europe. Subsequently an inquiry into the social-cultural dimension is undertaken, highlighting the migrant's profile (emigrant, immigrant), the issues related to the integration within the host country and the phenomenon perception by public opinion and mass-media.

Keywords: external migration, mechanisms, institutions, legislation, migrant's profile

1. Changes in East – West migration mechanisms

In Romania before 1989 there used to be two inter-governmental agreements with other migration mechanisms: permanent migration, countries. After 1989, the main reasons behind whose motivations were mainly political and migration shifted from the ethnic and political ethnic, and temporary migration, for studying reason to economic ones. One consequence is or working abroad, based only on Romania’s the fact that temporary migration has increased

∗ This paper represents a part of the authors' contribution to a study developed under the auspices of the European Institute in Romania included in the “Pre-Accession Impact Studies — PAIS II” series, funded by a Phare project. All opinions expressed represent authors' responsibility. The Romanian Journal of European Studies 56 both in absolute terms and as per- ȱȱFigureȱno.ȱ1.ȱȱPermanentȱmigrationȱmechanismȱȱ centage in total number of migra- tions. Countriesȱofȱ Countriesȱofȱ To date, there are certain mecha- ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱoriginȱ destinationȱ nisms through which migration is ȱ ȱ achieved at international level. We ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ Marriageȱ ȱ Centralȱandȱ Europeanȱ will emphasize those mechanisms EasternȱEuropeȱ Unionȱ that are found at European level, ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ Refugeesȱ(?)ȱ ȱȱ namely those used by persons ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ Asylumȱapplicantsȱȱ Otherȱcountriesȱ migrating from Romania to the ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱRomaniaȱ (USA,ȱCanada,ȱ European Union. ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ Specialȱprogramsȱȱ Australia)ȱ a. Legal permanent migration b. Legal temporary migration: (stu- Figureȱno.ȱ2.ȱȱTheȱmechanismȱofȱlegalȱtemporaryȱmigrationȱinȱEuropeȱ dents; personnel/replacement migration, refugees and asylum applicants) Countriesȱofȱ Countriesȱofȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱoriginȱ destinationȱ c. Illegal transit migration ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ Studentsȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ d. Illegal migration of persons from ȱ Europeanȱ Centralȱandȱ Unionȱ Central and East Europe (from ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱTemporaryȱworkersȱ Romania) EasternȱEuropeȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ e.. Circulatory migration by means ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ (Bilateralȱagreements)ȱ Spain,ȱGreece,ȱ of migratory networks (legal or ȱ Italy,ȱGermanyȱ illegal) ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱRomaniaȱ Asylumȱapplicants,ȱrefugeesȱ a. Legal permanent migration repre- sent migratory flows leaving Roma- ing in the European Union countries and which nia to third party countries in order to settle there later on return (at least some of them) to the through the following methods (see figure no. 1): countries of origin. — based on emigration visas within special pro- b.2. On the other hand there are the Central grams stimulating emigration of persons and Eastern European (Romanian) personnel holding qualifications that are scarce in the leaving to work on labour contracts signed receiving country or other types of programs based on bilateral agreements between states. (such as the visa lottery). The EU does not b.3. Refugees obtaining the right to tem- run this type of permanent emigration pro- porarily settle in a host EU country or persons grams. Romanian citizens that emigrate per- applying for asylum due to political reasons or manently are aiming at countries that have who are hiding behind such motivations. This such emigration policies and programs type of migration is becoming more and more namely Canada, Australia, New Zeeland and restricted, and as far as Romanian citizens the USA. migrating to the EU are concerned, its degree of applicability tends to reach zero level. — by marrying a citizen from an EU member c.Illegal transit migration is the mechanism state and changing the place or residence to through which persons from third party coun- the country of their spouse. tries, outside Central and Eastern Europe emi- — possibly as refugees or political or war asy- grate to such countries, including Romania so lum applicants. In the past years this has not that they could further emigrate to the European been the case of Romania, but of the former Union. This is a relatively new phenomena and Yugoslavia states. it has been found that its main characteristics are b. Legal temporary migration refers to those relo- illegality and the involvement of criminal organ- cating on the territory of an EU country for a lim- izations in human traffic. Transit migration ited period of time (from several months to years). through Central and Eastern Europe (and thus This is taking certain forms (see figure no. 2): through Romania as well) consists in a growing number of illegal emigrants, some of them meet- b.1. On the one hand there are Central and ing the criteria for which they apply for asylum, Eastern European (Romanian) students study- but who prefer not to do so in Central and East- 57 The Romanian Journal of European Studies ern Europe for different rea- Figureȱno.ȱ3.ȱȱTheȱmechanismȱofȱtransitoryȱmigrationȱinȱEuropeȱ sons, so that they could transit ȱ to the European Union. ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱCountriesȱofȱ Refugeesȱ Transitȱ Countriesȱofȱ d. Illegal migration of persons ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱoriginȱ countriesȱ destinationȱ living in Central and Eastern ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ Asylumȱȱ ȱ ȱ Europe (Romania) includes per- ȱThird ȱȱparty ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ applicantsȱ ȱ ȱ countriesȱfromȱ ȱ ȱ sons of Romanian nationality ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬȱEuropeȱ Humanȱȱ Centralȱandȱ Europeanȱ leaving Romania and staying ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬȱoutsideȱȱ trafficȱ EasternȱEuropeȱ Unionȱ illegally in an EU country – ȱ Europeȱ ȱ ȱ after the legal stay period (3 ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ prostitutionȱ ȱ ȱ months) expires, persons leav- ȱ CIS,ȱChina,ȱ ȱ Germany,ȱ Turcia,ȱarabȱ Romaniaȱ France,ȱetc.ȱ ing as tourists but who, reach- ing the country of destination, perform lucrative activities on Figureȱno.ȱ4.ȱTheȱmechanismȱofȱillegalȱmigrationȱfromȱRomaniaȱtoȱtheȱEUȱ the black market or persons entering and illegally staying on the territory of an EU coun- Countriesȱofȱ Countriesȱofȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ try (see figure no. 4). originȱ destinationȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ Touristsȱwhoȱareȱworkingȱ ȱ e. Circulatory migration by ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ means of migratory networks. Cir- Centralȱȱȱȱandȱ Touristsȱstayingȱforȱ Europeanȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱmoreȱthanȱ3ȱmonthsȱinȱtheȱEUȱ culatory migration refers to the EasternȱEuropeȱ Unionȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ alternative movement between ȱ ȱȱ the country of origin and one or ȱ Austria,ȱ ȱ Germany,ȱ more of the countries of desti- ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱRomaniaȱ Personsȱillegallyȱcrossingȱtheȱborderȱȱ Switzerland,ȱ nation. Migrants leaving and working abroad for a period of time, return in the country, stay Figureȱno.ȱ5.ȱȱTheȱmechanismȱofȱcirculationȱnetworkȱmigrationȱȱ for a period of time then leave ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ again for work abroad. In this Countriesȱofȱ Countriesȱofȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱLegalȱtemporaryȱworkersȱ context are formed the migrato- originȱ destinationȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ry networks, networks through ȱ Centralȱandȱ Europeanȱ which those who want to tem- ȱ Easternȱ Unionȱ porarily migrate abroad receive ȱ Europenȱ ȱȱ help and support from previous ȱ ȱ ȱ migrants (see figure no. 5). ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱIllegalȱtemporaryȱworkersȱ ȱ Germany,ȱ ȱ Romaniaȱ Spain,ȱItalyȱ The intent to migrate abroad ȱ ȱ seeking a job is more likely ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ among people living within ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱTransportȱnetworks,ȱȱ communities with a high circu- ȱ latory migration rate. In areas ȱȱȱȱreligiousȱcommunities,ȱethnicȱcommunitiesȱ where others have left before, ȱ more will leave, in places where other migrants ucts and prices, labour force mediation abroad have succeeded and where the signs of success by the state and private agencies, while on the are apparent, migration will be higher. This way, other hand they are the adjusting response of the are formed migratory networks when previous community to new situations entering in conflict migrants resort to members of their families or with traditional values (Lãzãroiu, 2002). their friends and acquaintances in order to work As migratory processes intensify and legisla- abroad, supporting the migration process. tion changes, migratory networks will probably Informal networks and institutions of circula- tend to change the functions that they had at the tory migration are on the one hand the individ- time they were conceived, that of facilitating uals’ innovating response to the dysfunctionali- transport of labour force and capital and will ties of formal institutions such as: the labour fulfill functions for maintaining community sol- market, the capital market, assurance of prod- idarity. The Romanian Journal of European Studies 58 2. The creation of the legislative – institutional framework in accordance with the EU requirements regarding migration

Legislation regarding the migration phe- the applicant countries in Central and East nomena at the level of the EU. The legislation Europe become EU members. influencing the migration phenomena in the EU The recruitment of labour from outside EU is tackled in Chapter 2 Freedom of Movement of countries’ border and outside the EU is the man- Persons and Chapter 24 Cooperation in the field ner through which the European deficit in labour of Justice and Internal Affairs. Within the two chapters, the types of legislation that influences force may be covered where there is such deficit. the migratory phenomena in Europe are related In this sense there are regulations that have con- to laws in three major fields: sidered the recruitment of labour force from out- side the EU, which encourages replacement a. legislation regarding migration (direct migration1. Replacement migration in the EU influence on migration) focuses on two major categories of personnel: on b. legislation regarding the labour market the one hand – highly qualified personnel which (direct and indirect influence on migration) are deficient in the EU countries and on the other c. legislation regarding mutual recognition hand the unskilled workers which are required of degrees and qualifications (indirect influence for the replacement of the local labour force, that on migration). do not want to perform any such works (in agri- culture for example). The replacement migration a. Legislation regarding migration in EU through recruitment from outside the EU is not For a long period of time, the right to enter regulated at the level of the European Union, and live on the territory of an EU Member State each member applying its own policy. was governed by national laws drawn up by The freedom of movement and equal treat- each Member State. One could enter and live on ment by banning any restrictions regarding the territory of a state based on an entry visa labour force for Member States citizens that and a residence visa which were granted by may apply to Central and Eastern Europe states each state. Only in 1999, EU Member States after joining to the EU, generate fear from the decided the formulation of a common policy existing Member States of massive migration regarding migration and asylum to become flows of labour force traveling from east to the effective by 2004 the latest. The common policy west, seeking better salaries and better working regarding migration includes aspects such as: free movement of persons, external border con- conditions. This is why, separate agreements are trol and the granting of visas, asylum, immigra- negotiated regarding the movement of the tion and the protection of third party nationali- workforce after joining to the EU with each of ties’ rights and legal cooperation on civil mat- the applicant countries, requesting a certain ters. The common policy in the field of migra- period of transition for the liberalization of the tion and asylum has in view the adoption of a work force movement. The transition period joint position of the EU member states, towards will generally range from 2 to 5 years and by no the applications for asylum coming from per- means can it exceed 7 years. sons from third party countries, as well as the control of illegal human trafficking. c. Legislation regarding mutual recognition of degrees and qualifications b. Legislation regarding the labour market in the Ensuring the free movement of persons and EU workers requires the recognition of the degrees The legislation and the regulations in the and professional qualifications. The most field of the labour force interest us in the contest important regulations in this sense, at the level of migration in terms of two aspects: first being of the EU, are a group of directives creating the that of recruiting labour force from outside EU premises a General System for the Recognition and second being the manner in which the leg- of Degrees and Qualifications and another islation regarding the labour force in the EU group of directives regulating the recognition of may influence east-west migratory flows once qualifications of various professions2. 59 The Romanian Journal of European Studies It is being considered a new directive (a fifth Progress was also reported with chapter 24. directive) intended to remain the single direc- This way, immediately after the issuance of the tive, which would simplify the acquis estab- 2003 Country Report, the National Office for lished in the previous directives. It is being con- Refugees has issued and submitted a draft sidered the application of the principle of auto- amendment for the Government Ordinance no. matic recognition of degrees and degrees’ 102/2000, eliminating all inconsistencies recognition based on coordination of minimum between domestic legislation and the docu- training conditions. In order to facilitate degree ments included in the acquis in force to date and recognition processes two information net- the continuation of the monitoring and analysis works have been set up at the level of the EU, of the evolution of the acquis for the preparation namely: ENIC (European Network of Informa- of draft laws and their initiation on time. In tion Center) and NARIC (National Academic addition to such measures, G.O. no.102/2001 Recognition Information Centers). was also amended through Government Ordi- nance 43/2004, updating the definitions of the Legislation regarding migration in Roma- forms of protection, eliminating differences in nia. Harmonization with the European acquis the treatment of the refugees and those receiv- communautaire. The first initiatives for the cre- ing temporary protection, confers the National ation of a new legislative framework in the field Office for Refugees the capacity to take part in of migration took place in Romania at the begin- trials regarding asylum applications, and well ning of the 1990’s. Subsequently, with Roma- as other aspects. nia’s application for joining to the European As far as the achievement of the objectives Union, this activity has intensified so that, in the related to the European Union accession is con- past three years, there have been adopted many cerned, all requirements for closing negotiations laws and normative acts intended to ensure the on Chapter 24 have been met, except for aspects adoption of the acquis communautaire. For most related to the implementation of Dublin mecha- directives within the two negotiation chapters nisms and the EURODAC system in Romania3. that include legislation influencing migration (chapter 2 and chapter 24), Romania has started Institutions involved in the management of adopting the corresponding legislation. migration in Romania. Various institutions can Remarkable progress has been made by the be involved in the monitoring and performance Romanian legislation regarding the regime of of the migratory phenomena, playing different foreign persons in Romania, the regime of the roles. Taking them into account within the refugees and their social protection and the pre- framework of international migration reveals vention and combating of human trafficking. that they carry out their activity at different lev- On the labour force market there has been regu- els, as shown in table no. 1. lated the granting of work permits. Thus, For instance, at supra-national level, among according to the principle of free movement of state institutions involved in performing and persons, EU citizens and members of their families may work on Romania’s Tableȱnr.ȱ1.ȱInstitutionalȱactorsȱinvolvedȱinȱinternationalȱmigrationȱȱ territory without the requirement to Oȱ=ȱorigin;ȱD=ȱdestinationȱ obtain the work permit, unlike other cat- Level/Typeȱ Stateȱ Privateȱ Voluntaryȱ Informalȱ ofȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ authoritiesȱ companiesȱ organizationsȱ transportȱandȱ egories of foreign citizens. institutionȱ mediationȱ networksȱ There are some aspects, where the SupraȬ Europeanȱ Corporationsȱ Internationalȱ Transnationalȱ Romanian progress was smaller: it is nationalȱ Unionȱ (headhunting,ȱ organizationsȱ communitiesȱ believed that there still exists discrimina- legal,ȱ (IOM,ȱ transport)ȱ ILO,UNCHR*)ȱ tion between EU and Romanian citizens Nationalȱ Governmentsȱ Mediationȱ Voluntaryȱ Migrants’ȱ owing to the fact that Romanians are (O/D)ȱ companiesȱ organizationsȱ associationsȱ given priority when being employed. (O/D)ȱ (D)ȱ (D)ȱ Also as far as mutual recognition of pro- Localȱ Localȱ Mediationȱ Voluntaryȱ Migrants’ȱ authorities,ȱ companiesȱ organizationsȱ associationsȱ fessional qualification, Romania’s prepa- governmentalȱ (O)ȱ (D)ȱ (D)ȱ rations are thought to be at an early agenciesȱ stage. ȱSource:ȱ L©z©roiuȱ S.ȱ (2002)ȱ „Migraôiaȱ circulatorieȱ aȱ forôeiȱ deȱ munc©ȱ dinȱ Romania.ȱ Consecinôeȱ asupraȱ integr©riiȱ europene”ȱ –“Circulatoryȱ Migrationȱ ofȱ theȱ Labourȱ Forceȱ inȱ Box no. 1 presents the main legisla- Romania.ȱConsequencesȱonȱtheȱEuropeanȱIntegration”ȱ,ȱwww.osf.roȱ tion regarding migration from Romania. *ȱ IOMȱ =ȱ Theȱ Internationalȱ Organizationȱ forȱ Migration;ȱ ILOȱ =ȱ Internationalȱ Labourȱ Organization;ȱUNCHRȱ=ȱUnitedȱNationȱHighȱCommissionerȱforȱHumanȱRightsȱ The Romanian Journal of European Studies 60 monitoring migration there is the European panies mediating labour contracts abroad, the Union, and among voluntary ones there is the local office of the International Organization for International Organization for Migration. Migration in Romania, the representative office of the United Nation High Commissioner for At national level, in Romania, the main gov- Refugees in Romania, the Foundation of the ernmental institutions involved in the migrato- Romanian National Council for Refugees, the ry processes are the Ministry of Administration Romanian Forum for Refugees and Migrants, and Interior, the Ministry of Labour, Social Soli- and others. darity and Family, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and It has been noted that a large part of such Research. The main migratory policies in Roma- institutions carry out their activity helping nia are implemented through many agencies refugees and immigrants in Romania. An expla- within or independent of the above mentioned nation would be that measures taken by the ministries, agencies whose activity is difficult to Romanian state have been considered insuffi- coordinate. For instance, the emigration and cient in his field due to financial difficulties on immigration phenomena are dealt with by dif- one hand (Romania is itself going through a ferent institutions, an in case that the same insti- developing period) and because there is still a tution is handling both aspects of the migratory large difference between the legal provisions phenomenon, they are undertaken by different, and what is in fact achieved by the Romanian state (IOM, Migration Trends, 2003). On the specialized departments. other hand, the low number of immigrants tar- There are also a number of non-governmen- geting Romania (around 200 persons per year) tal institutions involved in running or gathering makes it difficult to test the legislation in the information on migration, such as: private com- field at a large scale.

3.The social-cultural issues accompanying the current migration phenomenon in Romania

The international experience in migration migration phenomenon and of the support pro- administration and monitoring demonstrates vided to the migrants. the close relationship between the legislative- Within the dominant national tendency – institutional dimension and the social-cultural namely labour migration, the most representative one. The elaboration and adoption of laws, the category is currently represented by young men creation of institutions, the development of cor- (18-35 years old), with an average education level, responding strategies and policies represent as skilled workers from the big cities of Romania and major components of this process, but their suc- Bucharest, its capital. cess cannot be separated from the manner in The villages’ migration potential should not be which the involved actors –governmental insti- ignored either; relating to this issue Dumitru tutions, non-governmental organizations, mass- Sandu has suggested the metaphor of the media, communities, individuals – respond to “hydrographical network” (“community repre- the so-called “behavioural challenges”, related sents the spring of migration) and the transition to participation, communication, mentalities from the factorial approaches to the structural and attitudes. and typological ones, that makes possible to The migrant’s profile. Considering the identify types of villages based on the dominant migration a social phenomenon that directly cultural profile and the experience regarding affects a significant part of the population and the international circulatory migration (Sandu, has complex implications on the entire society, it 2004). is vital to know and to emphasize the migrant’s Various studies have also stated a series of profile – the profile of the emigrant from Roma- hypotheses regarding the selective migration nia and of the immigrant to our country. That flows, according to which the minority ethnical will enable an accurate development of the or religious groups show a higher mobility level measures related to the administration of than the one of the majority Orthodox Roman- 61 The Romanian Journal of European Studies ian population (Sandu, 2000, Diminescu, this field, the still low number of immigrants Lãzãroiu, 2002). and refugees and the limited financial Even if at present Romania distinguishes on resources, it has been noticed that the services the background of international migration as an and the assistance for integration are not fully emigration country, with a labour market less satisfactory, despite the diligence within the last attractive to the immigrants, being more inter- years for the alignment to the international stan- esting in terms of transit possibilities to the dards. developed countries (briefly, « More ‘Out’ than A special issue envisages the vulnerable ‘In’ at the Crossroads Between Europe and groups, especially the non accompanied minors, for Balkans », according to the suggestive title of an whom a reconsideration of the interviewing IOM country report from the autumn of 2003), procedures and an adequate training of the civil is expected that the attractiveness of Romania servants are necessary, since malpractice could will increase due to the EU integration perspec- have major traumatic effects. tive and thus Romania will become even an Besides the integration of the immigrants, a immigration country. multiple faced challenge for the Romanian soci- Up to now, the immigrant’s dominant profile – ety is represented by the reintegration of the a refugee, an asylum seeker, an immigrant for Romanians who return to their home country after labour, study or business purposes – is based on an external migration experience. It focuses on men’s preponderance (as it happens with the certain specific categories, such as the Roman- asylum seekers who have proven to be especial- ian students and graduates from foreign univer- ly young men, aged between 21-30 years). Yet, sities, the Rroma people, the victims of traffick- when the total number of immigrants is taken ing in human beings, the unaccompanied into account, the gender based structure is quite Romanian minors, the repatriated people, etc. well balanced. On the whole, the issues related to the rein- Aspects regarding the integration within tegration of the Romanians who come back to the host country society. The migrant’s domi- their home country vary according to the edu- nant profile – an emigrant/immigrant from/in cational level, their qualification, family status, Romania – involves a series of specific aspects duration of their stay abroad etc., complex regarding the integration within the host coun- social and psychological aid oriented pro- try society. grammes being necessary, so that re-emigration In general terms, for an immigrant the integra- be not the sole solution to such people tion consists in the knowledge of the language (Lãzãroiu, 2002). spoken in the host country (reading, writing Finally, besides the integration/ reintegration skills), the access to the educational system and on its territory, Romania must also care for cer- to the labour market within the respective coun- tain aspects related to the integration of Romanian try, the opportunity of increasing professional emigrants within the host countries. In this context mobility by attending to a higher level of edu- the role of Romanian authorities should consist cation and professional qualification, equity in in the contribution to promoting and increasing front of the law, cultural and religious freedom, of an accurate, objective image on the entire the respect towards the laws and the traditions Romanian Diaspora, that may represent a valu- of the country he/she lives in. At the same time, able share to the enrichment of the scientific and for the host society the integration of the cultural patrimony of the host countries, as well migrants supposes tolerance and openness, the as in preserving the connection between the consent of welcoming the immigrants, the Diaspora and the mother- country. A special understanding of the advantages and chal- aspect refers to the support that the Romanian lenges of a multicultural society, providing an state must grant and that it actually grants to unrestricted access to information related to the the large Romanian groups living outside the advantages of integration, tolerance and inter- country’s borders due to historical reasons (in cultural dialog, respecting and understanding the Republic of Moldova, as well as in Ukraine, the status, tradition and culture of the immi- Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia) who need, grants, as well as the respect towards the immi- besides the support for the preservation of their grants’ rights (IOM, 2003a). cultural identity, support at international level, As far as the particular case of Romania is con- regarding the recognition of their rights within cerned, given the lack of previous expertise in the respective countries. The Romanian Journal of European Studies 62 The public opinion and mass-media. The rendered and assessed, in its entire complexity, Romanian public opinion perceives the migra- the emphasis being put on the narration of cer- tion phenomenon mainly as labour migration. tain negative, sensational facts and less on the A large number of people believe that migrants orientation of the migrants within an universe earn money from a paid job and only a small that makes them face numerous risk and uncer- part of the public opinion think that they obtain tainty components, on the prevention and com- money from theft and begging. Yet, the results bating delinquency, clandestine traveling and of the opinion polls mentioned in this study corruption related to visa granting. To a consid- reveal a wrong perception – in some points - of erable extent, the partial and sometimes wrong the negative aspects that accompany the Roma- coverage of the migration phenomenon by nians’ external migration, which proves that the mass media is the result of the shortage of special- public opinion finds it difficult to distinguish ized journalists in this field; therefore is highly between certain objective hardships related to recommended the organization of training the travel within the Schengen space and the courses with respect to the investigation and violation of the law, between the groups per- assessment of migration. forming illegal activities and the affiliation to a Our study appreciates and supports the pro- social, ethnic or religious minority, which leads posals converged in various documents regard- to the creation of stereotypes, to attitudes that ing migration (especially the IOM’s) with refer- feed delinquency, intolerance and xenophobia. ence to the introduction in the academic curricula of This perception could be set right by means of subjects specialized on the study of the migration joint, coherent efforts of mass-media, public phenomena (labour economics, law, medicine, administration and civil society. health policy, sociology, education sciences, Up to present, one cannot say that mass- etc.), as well as the creation of a national migration media has brought its necessary contribution to research center (to be set up by the Romanian the accurate rendering of external migration Government in partnership with IOM, UNCHR phenomenon, with all its aspects and to the cre- and other international organizations), of some ation of an adequate social behaviour with faculties or departments of inter-disciplinary studies respect to both migration itself and the integra- on migration, so as to build up the necessary tion/ reintegration process. It has been expertise in public policies, social assistance, remarked that migration is not systematically human resources and migration management.

4. Concluding remarks

Apart from the economic, social, demo- job in Romania by giving priority to the Roman- graphic implications, migration phenomenon in ian citizens. the perspective of Romania’s accession to the The elaboration and adoption of laws, the EU brings about specific requirements regard- creation of institutions, the development of cor- ing the establishment of a new legal and institu- responding strategies and policies represent tional framework for migration management. As major components of this process, but their suc- migration mechanisms Romania - EU change, cess cannot be separated from the so-called legislation gets rapidly in line with the acquis “behavioural challenges”, related to participation, communication, mentalities and attitudes, communautaire, whereas its implementation via which envisage all actors involved – govern- involved institutions is slower, but progressive. mental institutions, non-governmental organiza- An important progress has been recorded tions, mass-media, communities. Major changes after 2000 in legislation regarding the foreign- should occur in the way that public opinion per- ers’ regime in Romania, the status and the ceives migration related phenomena as well as regime of refugees, preventing and combating in the contribution which should be brought by the trafficking in human being, work permits, mass-media to the prevention and combating whereas lower progress occurred in the legisla- delinquency, clandestine travelling and corrup- tion envisaging the mutual recognition of tion and to the orientation of the migrants with- degrees and qualifications, discrimination of EU in an universe that makes them face numerous citizens as compared the Romanians in getting a risk and uncertainty components. 63 The Romanian Journal of European Studies References and Selected Bibliography

Diminescu, D., Lãzãroiu, S. (2002), „Circulatory OECD (2003), Trends in International Migration: migration of Romanians”, IOM Report SOPEMI, OECD, Paris European Commission (2003), Regular Report on Open Society Foundation (2002), Public Opinion Romania’s Progress Towards Accession, Brussels Barometer, October *** Foreign Citizens Regulatory Framework in Roma- Sandu, D. (2000), „Circulatory Migration as Life nia, compendium of normative acts (in Romanian), Edi- Strategy” (in Romanian), in Sociologie Româneascã tura Moroºan, 2003 no.2/2000 Gheþãu V. (2003), „Demographic Decline Contin- Sandu, D. (2004), „Cultural and Development ues” (in Romanian), Barometrul Social, februarie, Communities and Circulatory Migration of Roman- http://www.mediauno.ro ian People Outside the Country” (in Romanian), Government of Romania (2001), Position Paper: International Symposium “Migration Issues and Chapter 2 – The Free Movement of Persons Minorities Rights in Europe”, Stability Pact for South- IOM – Romania (2004), „National Migration and East Europe, Goethe Institute, Bucharest, March Development Policy in Romania”, IOM Bucharest, *** TAIEX (2004), Progress Editor, EU and Gov- January IOM (2003a), World Migration 2003, International ernment of Romania Organization for Migration, Geneva UNDP (2002) International Migration from Coun- IOM (2003b), „Migration Policy”, no.2, March tries with Economies in Transition: 1980-1999, UNDP, Lãzãroiu, S. (2003), „Romania: More ‚Out’ than September ‚In’ at the Crossroads between Europe and the Balka- Wallace, C. (ed.) (2001), Patterns of Migrations in ns”, in Migration Trends in Selected EU Applicant Coun- Central Europe, Palgrave, Basingstoke tries, vol. IV, IOM, Vienna http://www.ces.ro/romana/politica_imigratiei.ht Lãzãroiu S. (2002), „ Circulatory labour migra- ml tion in Romania. Consequences for European inte- http://infoeuropa.ro gration” (in Romanian), www.osf.ro http://www.europa.eu.int

Notes

1 Replacement migration refers to migration based on work force recruitment from outside the European Union for qualifica- tions that are deficient within the Union and for jobs and qualifications that are not sought by the local people. 2 Among those the main are: Directive 89/48/CEE, Directive 92/51/CEE, Directive 1999/42/CE and Directive 2001/19/CE. 3 The Dublin mechanisms refers to a set of norms based on which it is appointed the member state responsible for processing asylum application in the situation where a person has transited more than one member states and has submitted an asylum application. Generally the state where that foreign persons has entered the European space is responsible. For such purposes, there have been established an European database with fingerprints of all persons that have illegally entered, are illegally stay- ing or apply for asylum in the member states – EURODAC. This database prevents the submission of several asylum applica- tions successively or concomitantly in many member states. In this situation, the respective person, being also identified based on the Dublin mechanism, is returned to the member state that have implemented for the first time the fingerprint of the respective foreign person.

Migrations et incidence sur la répartition spatiale de la population en Roumanie au niveau national et régional*

Vasile Gheþãu Directeur, Centre de Recherches Démographiques de l’Académie Roumaine

The economic and social transition has overturned the demographic landscape of Romania. The fall in birth rate, the upsurge in mortality rate and the international migration have deeply deteriorated the demographic panorama of the country. The population decline and the increase of population ageing can be viewed as the most noticeable immediate objectification of this deterioration. Within this context of a veritable breaking, a strange restructuring of internal migra- tion flows between urban and rural areas could be observed and quantified. Under the pressure of economic and social factors and changes defining the transition-crisis, including the (mostly painful) economic reforms Romania experienced after 1989, the traditional rural-urban migration flows started a continuous downward trend and, by 1997, for the first time in Romania's social history, the two streams reversed as magnitude. During the following years the movement con- tinued and reinforced. This paper presents these dramatic changes, their origin, their characteristics and their conse- quences on population number, population age and sex structure. The analysis at regional level is privileged.

Keywords: components of population change; internal migration (with change of permanent residence); Urban-Rural and Rural-Urban migration; age and sex composition of migrants; migration by regions of development; return migra- tion; international migration

Introduction

La démographie de la Roumanie a connu dynamique propre, soit par l’action d’un contexte des changements profonds dans les années 1990 socio-économique en plein évolution. Une partie et qui continuent de se manifester dans cette de ces changements sont communs avec ceux qui première décennie du nouveau siècle, soit par ont eu lieu dans l’ensemble des pays de l’espace

* Version révisée et améliorée du papier presenté au colloque international “Migrations, crises et conflits récents dans les Balkans”, Bel- grade, 27-29 octobre 2005. Vasile Gheþãu ([email protected]). The Romanian Journal of European Studies 66 central et est européen se trouvant en transition en Roumanie est peu connue statistiquement politique, économique et sociale, après l’effon- mais on sait que sa dimension a connu un drement du communisme. Il s’agit, surtout, de la accroissement sensible après 2001, date à la véritable chute de la natalité et, avec certaines quelle les visas d’entré ont été supprimées pour exceptions, de la recrudescence de la mortalité. les roumains pour presque tous les pays Mais, on peut saisir des particularités nationales européens. Cette migration est, essentiellement, importantes, provenant de la manière dont les une migration pour travail. reformes politiques et économiques ont été conçues et appliquées, de différences de La baisse de 1,1 millions d’habitants est donc développement économique, social et culturel le résultat des évolutions conjuguées de la des pays, ainsi que de facteurs de nature his- baisse naturelle et de la baisse par migration. torique. Dans les deux cas la crise économique et sociale que la Roumanie a traversée et traverse encore Un examen même sommaire du degré de la dans son passage du régime totalitaire vers l’é- détérioration de la situation démographique en tat de droit, démocratie et économie de marché, Roumanie par rapport aux autres pays de la a joué le rôle majeur, même si des différences région montre une position médiane, tant en ce peuvent être signalées d’un phénomène démo- qui concerne la dimension de la baisse de la graphique à l’autre. La recrudescence de la mor- natalité, ainsi que la magnitude de la détériora- talité aussi bien que la migration externe néga- tion de la mortalité (Council of Europe, 2005). tive sont l’expression directe de la crise. Dans le Un déclin démographique bien installé encore cas de la natalité, la situation est beaucoup plus en 1990, alimenté par migration externe néga- compliquée. Il s’agit d’un phénomène avec une tive dans toute la période et par baisse naturelle détermination complexe, d’une façon générale, depuis 1992, et l’accélération du vieillissement et - dans le cas de la Roumanie - des facteurs démographique définissent les l’essence de spécifiques peuvent être identifiés. La politique l’actuel paysage démographique de la pro nataliste de l’ancien régime a maintenu Roumanie. Ce paysage est le résultat du con- d’une manière forcée la natalité à un niveau rel- texte politique, économique et social qui a mod- ativement élevé avant 1990 et il était bien évi- elé la population et les phénomènes démo- dent que l’abrogation des réglementations graphiques après 1989 et ce contexte a été, dans restrictives en matière de contraception et d’a- son essence, un contexte de crise. Crise vortement conduira automatiquement à la économique, surtout, mais aussi crise sociale. baisse de la natalité. Et ce recul a eu lieu surtout Entre les recensements de janvier 1992 et mars 2002 la population de la Roumanie a en 1990 et 1001. Il est fort probable que les fac- connu une baisse de 1129 milles habitants, ça teurs de crise ont accentué la baisse. veut dire un recul de 5 p.100. La baisse naturelle a contribué avec seulement 27 p.100 à cette Si l’analyse de la dynamique démographique baisse, la contribution majeure revenant à la est poussée vers le niveau régional, on pourra migration externe. Une contribution négative de constater que ce que nous voyons au niveau la migration n’est pas surprenante, elle étant national est en fait le résultat des dynamiques présente en Roumanie et avant et après 1989. régionales différentes ou un rôle important Mais, l’élément surprise a été représenté par la revient à une autre variable – la migration magnitude de la baisse par migration et la interne. Cette composante a connu en Roumanie nature de cette migration. La partie connue sta- dans les années de la transition des évolutions tistiquement (immigrants et émigrants légaux, d’exception, pas tellement au niveau de la enregistrés) n’a contribué qu’avec 12 p.100 a la dimension globale, qu’au niveau de la structure baisse générale de la population, ce qui laisse des flux migratoires entre régions et entre l’ur- entrevoir qu’en proportion de plus de 60 p.100 bain et le rural, les facteurs déterminants étant – (environ 700 milles habitants) la baisse bu nom- essentiellement – les multiples facettes de la crise bre d’habitants du pays s’est produite par une économique et sociale que la Roumanie a traver- nouvelle composante de la migration interna- sé. Cette communication se propose justement tionale. Il s’agit de roumains partis à l’étranger d’analyser les changements que la migration (avec ou sans visa) et qui non pas été déclarés / interne a connu après 1989, au niveau de la direc- enregistrés au recensement de 2002. Cette nou- tion des flux, de la structure par âge et sexe des velle composante de la migration internationale migrants, ainsi qu’au niveau des conséquences 67 The Romanian Journal of European Studies sur le nombre et la structure de la population par de population urbaine), dans le contexte ou la région et par milieu urbain / rural. Roumanie a un degré d’urbanisation faible parmi les pays européens. Un regard rapide sur les régions de développement en Roumanie. Caractéristiques Les régions ont un profile économique et un Les unités territoriales agrégées de la degré de développement économique dif- Roumanie sont les départements (judetze) et les férents. Les régions 1-Nord-Est et 3-Sud ont été

Région 1. Nord-Est Région 5. Ouest Région 2. Sud-Est Région 6. Nord-Ouest Région 3. Sud Région 7. Centre Région 4. Sud-Ouest Région 8. Bucarest

régions de développement. Il y a 41 départe- et continuent d’être moins développées par ments et la municipalité de Bucarest, la Capitale rapport aux régions 5-Ouest, 7-Centre et 8- du pays. Ces unités sont groupées en huit Bucarest. Le déclin des activités économiques régions de développements. Voici la carte de ces industrielles, peu performantes et grandes con- régions (dans l’Annexe 1 on peut trouver une sommatrices d’énergie, a affecté l’ensemble des carte plus détaillée): régions mai avec une dureté plus forte les Les huit régions de développement ne sont régions 1-Nord-Est et 3-Sud. On peut même pas homogènes par caractéristiques remarquer un accroissement du décalage entre économiques et démographiques (voir Annexe ces régions et les régions 5-Ouest et 7-Centre 2). La superficie des régions est équilibrée pour (plus 8-Bucarest), les investissements privilé- sept de huit régions – 12-14 p.100 de la superfi- giant ces dernières. Comme corollaire, le niveau cie nationale, la seule exception étant la région de vie est plus élevé dans ces régions. 8-Bucarest (composée de la ville de Bucarest et Malgré le fait que les profiles démo- du département entourant la ville) qui a un peu graphiques des régions ont connu un rap- moins de 1 p.100 du territoire national. Le nom- prochement sur le fond de la détérioration de la bre de la population s’inscrit entre 1,9 millions situation démographique générale, un nombre dans la région 5-Ouest et 3,7 millions dans la de particularités se conservent. La natalité est région 1-Nord-Est. Le degré d’urbanisation plus élevée dans la région 1-Nord-Est, tandis varie entre 41 p.100 dans la région 3-Sud et 60 que la mortalité reste plus élevée dans les p.100 dans la région 7-Centre (sans prendre en régions du sud et de l’ouest. considération la région 8-Bucarest, avec 91 p.100 The Romanian Journal of European Studies 68

Figureȱ1.ȱRoumanie.ȱLesȱhuitȱrégionsȱdeȱdéveloppementȱ–ȱIȱ ȱ ȱ

1.1. Superficie - km2 (Ro=238931) 1.2. Population (Ro=21673,3) 40000 4000 35000 3500 30000 3000 25000 2500 20000 2000 15000 1500 - en milliers - milliers - en 10000 1000 5000 500 0 0 BS-OO CN-OS S-EN-E OBS-OCN-OS-ESN-E Région 84576321 58476231 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ

6 1

7 5 2

4 3

8 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ (Ro=55) 1.3. Urbanisation 1.4. Densité de la population ( Ro=91) 100 1300 90 1200 80 1100 70 1000

2 900 60 800 50 700 40 600 500

30 - hab. / km 400 20 300

- population urbaine - % urbaine - population 200 10 100 0 0 S N-E S-O N-O S-E C O B O C S-O S-E N-O S N-E B

31462758 57426318 ȱ ȱ 69 The Romanian Journal of European Studies

Figureȱ1.ȱRoumanie.ȱLesȱhuitȱrégionsȱdeȱdéveloppementȱ–ȱIIȱ ȱ ȱ 1.5. PIB par habitant. 1.6. Contribution de l'industrie au PIB Moyenne nationale=100 unités 40 250 35 200 30 25 150 20 100 15 PIB - unités - PIB 10

50 % - en Contribution 5 0 0 N-E S-O S S-E N-O C O B B N-E N-O O S-E S S-O C

14326758 81652347 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ

6 1

7 5 2

4 3

8 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ 1.8. Revenu total par personne/mois-2002 1.7. Contribution de l'agriculture au PIB Moyenne nationale=100 unités 20 140 18 16 120 14 100 12 10 80 8 60 6 Revenu -unitésRevenu Contribution - en % - en Contribution 4 40 2 20 0 B S-O C O S N-O S-E N-E 0 N-E S S-O S-E O N-O C B

84753621 13425678 ȱ ȱ The Romanian Journal of European Studies 70

Figureȱ1.ȱRoumanie.ȱLesȱhuitȱrégionsȱdeȱdéveloppementȱ–ȱIIIȱ ȱ ȱ (Ro=12,3) 1.9. Taux brut de natalité (Ro=9,8) 1.10. Taux brut de mortalité 14 16 12 14 10 12 10 8 8 6 6 - p. 1000 hab.- 4 - hab. 1000 - p. 4 2 2 0 0 B O S-O S S-E N-O C N-E CBN-ES-EN-OOS-OS

85432671 78126543 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ

6 1

7 5 2

4 3

8 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ

1.11.Taux d'accroissement naturel 1.12. Taux de mortalité infantile (Ro= -2,5) (Ro=16,7) -4.5 25 -4 20 -3.5

-3 15 -2.5 -2 10 -1.5

- p. 1000 hab. - hab. 1000 - p. -1 5 - p. 1000 naissances - -0.5 0 0 S S-O O B N-O S-E C N-E B N-O C S-O O S-E S N-E

34586271 86745231 ȱ 71 The Romanian Journal of European Studies

Figureȱ1.ȱRoumanie.ȱLesȱhuitȱrégionsȱdeȱdéveloppementȱ–ȱIVȱ ȱ

1.13. Indicateur conjoncturel de fécondité 1.14. Population de 60 ans et plus (Ro=1,23) (Ro=19,2) 1.6 22 1.4 21 1.2 20 1 0.8 19 - en % - % - en 0.6

- par femme - femme - par 18 0.4 17 0.2 0 16 B O S-O S S-E C N-O N-E C N-O N-E S-E B O S-O S

85432761 76128543 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ

6 1

7 5 2

4 3

8 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ 1.15. Espérance de vie à la naissance - 1.16. Espérance de vie à la naissance - Femmes, 2001-2003 (Ro=74,8) Hommes, 2001-2003 (Ro=67,4) 77 77 76 76 75 75 74 74 73 73 72 72 71 71 - ans - - ans

- ans - - ans 70 70 69 69 68 68 67 67 66 66 65 65 N-O O S-O N-E S S-E C B N-O S-E O S N-E C S-O B

65413278 62531748 ȱ The Romanian Journal of European Studies 72 Dynamique de la population au niveau Ce qu’on peut constater au niveau régional régional. Composantes des changements n’est que le résultat combiné des mouvements Entre les deux derniers recensements - jan- différents comme sens et intensité de la crois- vier 1992 et mars 2002 –la population de la sance naturelle, de la migration interne et de la Roumanie a connu une baisse de 5 p.100. Le migration externe. recul est général, dans toutes les huit régions, Voici les principales observations: mais des différences significatives existent en ce — la croissance naturelle a été positive seule- qui concerne la magnitude de la baisse, les ment dans la region1-Nord-Est, son régions les plus touchées étant 5-Ouest, 7-Cen- apport étant de +2,5 p. 100 entre 1992 et tre et 6-Nord-Ouest. Les données de stock 2002; fournies par les deux recensements, combinées — la migration interne a favorisé les régions avec les données de flux sur les naissances, les plus développées – 5-Ouest, 8-Bucarest et décès et les changements de domicile (résidence 7-Centre; les régions fournisseurs de pop- permanente) permettent d’estimer la contribu- ulation ont été surtout 1-Nord-est et 6- tion des trois composantes – croissance Nord-Ouest; naturelle, migration interne et migration — la migration externe a été négative dans externe - sur la dynamique régionale de la pop- toutes les régions, et plus particulièrement ulation (tableau 1) au Centre et en Ouest. Quelques précisions s’imposent. Le degré plus faible de développement économique de la Tableauȱ 1.ȱ Roumanie.ȱ Changementȱ duȱ nombreȱ deȱ laȱ populationȱ 1992Ȭ2002ȱ etȱ composantesȱ duȱ changementȱ parȱ région 1-Nord-Est a maintenu dans cette région régionȱdeȱdéveloppementȱ une natalité plus élevée et qui a été la com- posante principale de la croissance naturelle ȱ ȱ dontȱ:ȱ positive dans cette région Les régions 3-Sud et Régionȱ Croissanceȱ croissanceȱ migrationȱ migrationȱ 4-Sud-Ouest sont proches comme niveau de totaleȱ naturelleȱ interneȱ externeȱ netteȱ netteȱ développement de la région 1 mai elles ont une I.ȱCroissanceȱdeȱlaȱpopulationȱetȱsesȱcomposantesȱ–ȱenȱmilliersȱ structure par âge plus détériorées, ce qui 1.ȱNordȬEstȱȬ77,4ȱ +92,4ȱȬ52,6ȱȬ117,3ȱ explique la mortalité plus élevée et une natalité 2.ȱSudȬEstȱȬ115,0ȱȬ21,4ȱ +1,2ȱȬ94,7ȱ légèrement plus faible dans ces deux régions 3.ȱSudȱȬ180,3ȱȬ93,0ȱȬ15,4ȱȬ72,0ȱ 4.ȱSudȬOuestȱȬ126,7ȱȬ60,0ȱȬ6,4ȱȬ60,4ȱ par rapport à la région 1. Une croissance 5.ȱOuestȱȬ153,3ȱȬ68,2ȱ +43,5ȱȬ128,6ȱ naturelle positive et un niveau de développe- 6.ȱNordȬOuestȱȬ169,6ȱȬ44,1ȱȬ20,8ȱȬ104,7ȱ ment plus faible ont déterminé une propension 7.ȱCentreȱȬ178,7ȱȬ21,4ȱ +8,2ȱȬ165,4ȱ plus forte vers migration dans la région 1. Et la 8.ȱBucarestȱȬ128,1ȱȬ88,2ȱ +42,3ȱȬ82,2ȱ RoumanieȱȬ1129,1ȱȬ303,8ȱ 0,0ȱȬ825,3ȱ destination de cette migration ont été les ȱ régions plus développées et surtout les régions II.ȱCroissanceȱdeȱlaȱpopulationȱetȱsesȱcomposantesȱ–ȱtauxȱp.ȱ1000 5-Ouest et 8-Bucarest; sans l’apport positif de la 1.ȱNordȬEstȱȬ20,8ȱ +24,9ȱȬ14,2ȱȬ31,6ȱ migration interne la dimension de la baisse de la 2.ȱSudȬEstȱȬ39,6ȱȬ7,4ȱ +0,4ȱȬ32,6ȱ 3.ȱSudȱȬ52,0ȱȬ26,8ȱȬ4,4ȱȬ20,7ȱ population dans ces deux régions aurait été sen- 4.ȱSudȬOuestȱȬ52,9ȱȬ25,0ȱȬ2,7ȱȬ25,2ȱ siblement plus grande. 5.ȱOuestȱȬ75,3ȱȬ33,5ȱ +21,4ȱȬ63,2ȱ En ce qui concerne la migration interna- 6.ȱNordȬOuestȱȬ60,0ȱȬ15,6ȱȬ7,4ȱȬ37,1ȱ tionale, elle englobe aussi bien la migration à 7.ȱCentreȱȬ68,4ȱȬ8,2ȱ +3,1ȱȬ63,3ȱ long terme, légale et connue, que la migration 8.ȱBucarestȱȬ55,9ȱȬ38,5ȱ +18,5ȱȬ35,9ȱ RoumanieȱȬ50,8ȱȬ13,7ȱ 0,0ȱȬ37,1ȱ temporaire pour travail, cette dernière com- ȱ posante connaissant une véritable explosion III.ȱChangementsȱ1992Ȭ2002ȱ–ȱenȱ%ȱ dans la deuxième partie des années 1990 et 1.ȱNordȬEstȱȬ2,1ȱ +2,5ȱ Ȭ1,4ȱȬ3,1ȱ notamment a partir de 2001, comme suite de la 2.ȱSudȬEstȱȬ3,9ȱȬ0,7ȱ 0,0ȱȬ3,2ȱ 3.ȱSudȱȬ5,1ȱȬ2,6ȱȬ0,4ȱȬ2,0ȱ suppression du visa d’entré dans les pays de 4.ȱSudȬOuestȱȬ5,2ȱȬ2,4ȱȬ0,3ȱȬ2,5ȱ l’ouest. La migration externe nette a été négative 5.ȱOuestȱȬ7,3ȱȬ3,2ȱ +2,1ȱ Ȭ6,1ȱ dans toutes les régions mai on s’attendait que le 6.ȱNordȬOuestȱȬ5,8ȱȬ1,5ȱȬ0,7ȱȬ3,6ȱ niveau soit plus élevé dans les régions moins 7.ȱCentreȱȬ6,6ȱȬ0,8ȱ +0,3ȱ Ȭ6,1ȱ 8.ȱBucarestȱȬ5,4ȱȬ3,7ȱ +1,8ȱ Ȭ3,5ȱ développées, ou les facteurs de push sont plus ȱȱȱȱȱforts. Mais, les données montrent que les RoumanieȱȬ4,9ȱȬ1,3ȱ 0,0ȱȬ3,6ȱ régions avec les pertes les plus importantes de Sourceȱ:ȱCalculsȱdeȱl’auteurȱsurȱlaȱbaseȱdesȱdonnéesȱpubliéesȱparȱl’INSȱ population par migration externe sont les (InstitutȱNationalȱdeȱStatistique).ȱȱINS,ȱ1993ȱàȱ2005ȱ;ȱ1994ȱ;ȱ2001ȱ;ȱ2003ȱ;ȱ 2004aȱ;ȱ2005cȱ;ȱ2005d.ȱȱ régions 5-Ouest et 7-Centre, régions plus 73 The Romanian Journal of European Studies développées. L’explication n’est pas difficile visant la migration vers les villes, surtout vers d’être trouvée. Ces régions ont eu et continue les grandes villes, ce qui a conduit à une réduc- d’avoir une structure ethnique de la population tion significative de la migration interne avec plus hétérogène par rapport au Nord-Est et au changement de domicile. Dans les années 1980 Sud et la mobilité est plus forte dans ce milieu on avait autour de 10 migrants p.1000 habitants, humain. Au Centre et dans l’Ouest on a eu une par rapport à 15 dans les années 1970. Dès que importante minorité allemande qui a émigré. La les restrictions ont été éliminées, à la fin de 1989, migration actuelle de ces régions est composée, le nombre de migrants a explosé en 1990 – 34 p. presque en totalité, de roumains. Par rapport 1000. C’était l’épuisement d’un stock, de ceux aux ethniques roumains du Nord-est et du Sud, qui vivaient et travaillaient pratiquement dans les roumains de l’Ouest et du Centre ont une les villes et qui pouvaient obtenir seulement un propension plus élevée de migrer vers les pays visa de résidence temporaire (et pas de rési- de l’Europe occidentale (vers l’Allemagne dence permanente – domicile). Après 1990 la surtout), et qui peut s’expliquer par la proxim- migration interne annuelle s’est située à 11-13 p. ité géographique, le maintien des liaisons et des 1000, avec une légère tendance d’augmentation contacts avec ceux qui ont quitte ces régions, un en 2002-2004 (tableau 2). niveau plus élevé de qualification professionnelle et d’éducation. Tableauȱ2.ȱRoumanie.ȱMigrationȱinterneȱavecȱchangementsȱdeȱdomicile,ȱ D’autre part, en examinant la géogra- 1985Ȭ2004.ȱ phie de la migration en Roumanie on Volumeȱetȱstructureȱparȱmilieuȱsocialȱ peut saisir des mouvements en Annéeȱ Migrantsȱ Fluxȱentreȱmilieuxȱsociauxȱ–ȱenȱ%ȱ vagues: du Nord-Est on part vers le Milliersȱ Tauxȱ–ȱ Urbainȱ Urbainȱ Ruralȱ>ȱ Ruralȱ>ȱ Centre et l’Ouest, tandis que du Cen- p.1000ȱ >ȱ >ȱRuralȱ Ruralȱ urbainȱ tre et de l’Ouest on part vers l’é- Urbainȱ tranger (pour que le circuit soit com- 1985ȱ 196,1ȱ 8,6ȱ 20,0ȱ 6,5ȱ 16,1ȱ 57,4ȱ plète, on peut saisir plus récemment 1989ȱ 192,9ȱ 8,3ȱ 19,2ȱ 6,4ȱ 18,9ȱ 55,4ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ un autre vague, de la République de 1990ȱ 786,5ȱ 33,9ȱ 18,1ȱ 3,5ȱ 8,5ȱ 69,8ȱ Moldova vers la région Nord-Est). ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ 1991ȱ 262,9ȱ 11,3ȱ 20,2ȱ 10,1ȱ 19,4ȱ 50,3ȱ Pour faire une remarque de syn- 1992ȱ 293,2ȱ 12,9ȱ 24,3ȱ 13,7ȱ 22,8ȱ 39,2ȱ 1993ȱ 240,2ȱ 10,6ȱ 25,4ȱ 14,6ȱ 25,0ȱ 35,0ȱ thèse sur la migration interne en 1994ȱ 266,7ȱ 11,7ȱ 25,6ȱ 18,4ȱ 25,5ȱ 30,5ȱ Roumanie après 1989, on pourrait 1995ȱ 289,5ȱ 12,8ȱ 26,1ȱ 20,8ȱ 28,0ȱ 25,1ȱ dire que la migration interne a connu 1996ȱ 292,9ȱ 13,0ȱ 27,4ȱ 23,4ȱ 24,5ȱ 24,7ȱ un accroissement, dans un contexte 1997ȱ 302,6ȱ 13,4ȱ 25,0ȱ 26,8ȱ 25,6ȱ 22,6ȱ de libre circulation de l’individu, 1998ȱ 276,2ȱ 12,3ȱ 26,0ȱ 28,5ȱ 23,6ȱ 22,0ȱ 1999ȱ 275,7ȱ 12,3ȱ 26,5ȱ 30,7ȱ 21,7ȱ 21,0ȱ d’une véritable chute des activités 2000ȱ 244,5ȱ 10,9ȱ 23,7ȱ 33,8ȱ 23,0ȱ 19,5ȱ économiques industrielles, surtout 2001ȱ 284,3ȱ 12,7ȱ 27,5ȱ 27,9ȱ 20,0ȱ 24,6ȱ dans les villes, de la restructuration de 2002ȱ 320,8ȱ 14,7ȱ 25,8ȱ 30,1ȱ 21,6ȱ 22,4ȱ la propriété agricole (la terre) et de l’a- 2003ȱ 331,7ȱ 15,3ȱ 27,3ȱ 30,2ȱ 19,3ȱ 23,1ȱ 2004ȱ 369,9ȱ 17,1ȱ 26,1ȱ 31,8ȱ 21,1ȱ 21,1ȱ griculture. De plus, la crise Sourceȱ:ȱCalculsȱdeȱl’auteurȱsurȱlaȱbaseȱdesȱdonnéesȱINS,ȱ1993ȱàȱ2005ȱ économique et sociale a eu une contri- bution essentielle, liée à la dureté et aux rigueurs de la transition à l’économie de Restructuration des flux migratoires entre marche, mais aussi à la façon dont les reformes l’urbain et le rural. Dimension structurelles ont été adoptées et appliquées. L’industrialisation massive des années 1950- Un changement spectaculaire connu par la 1970 a encouragé et stimulé la migration rural- migration interne en Roumanie après 1989 et urbain. Les conséquences démographiques et qui mérite d’être analysé est la naissance et la économiques de cette politique n’ont pas tardé consolidation d’une nouvelle configuration de d’apparaître: la main d’œuvre dans l’agricul- la migration interne entre l’urbain et le rural ture est devenue déficitaire et la population (tableau 2). Il s’agit d’un changement dont les rurale est entrée dans un fort processus de vieil- causes et les mécanismes peuvent être détectés lissement et de féminisation. Devant une telle mais qui est peu connu comme implications situation, l’ancien régime a introduit, dès le économiques et démographiques, à long terme début des années 1980, des mesures restrictives surtout. The Romanian Journal of European Studies 74 Le flux rural-urbain a dominé, depuis tou- revirement. Un tel changement impose un nom- jours, largement, la migration interne en bre d’observations. Roumanie. Mais, le début des années 1990 mar- Dans un contexte de libre circulation de l’in- que la naissance d’une dynamique différente de dividu, un renversement de la dimension de la deux flux (urbain-rural et rural-urbain) - crois- migration entre l’urbain et le rural ne peut con- stituer que le résultat d’un complexe de facteurs sance considérable de la composante urbain- socio-économiques très forts, dont l’origine se rural et recul massif du flux opposé, rural- trouve dans les changements que la société urbain, de manière que en 1997, pour la pre- roumaine a connu après 1989. Les conditions de mière fois dans l’histoire sociale de la vie dans les villes se sont détériorées consid- Roumanie, le flux urbain-rural a dépassé le flux érablement, par l’apparition et l’expansion du rural-urbain. Les tendances se sont maintenues chômage, la baisse des revenus salariaux, l’éro- et dans les années suivantes (figure 2), même si sion du pouvoir d’achat, l’explosion des coûts après 2000 la migration rural-urbain a connu un relatifs au logement. Pour certaines catégories

Figure 2a. Roumanie. Migration interne urbain > rural et rural > urbain, 1991-2004 140000

120000

100000

80000

60000

40000

20000

0 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Urbain > Rural Rural > Urbain =

Figure 2b. Roumanie. Structure de la migration interne 1985-2003 100%

25 23 22 21 20 25 22 23 21 30 25 80% 39 35 55 50 57 22 23 21 24 20 22 19 70 24 26 60% 28 26 25 23 31 28 30 30 32 40% 19 23 27 28 34 16 19 18 21 14 15 9 10 6 6 20% 4 24 25 26 26 27 25 26 27 24 28 26 27 26 20 19 18 20

0% 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Urbain > urban Urbain > rural Rural > rural Rural > urbain = 75 The Romanian Journal of European Studies de la population urbaine une force de pression mariés dans la population urbaine et rurale en est ainsi parue et développée, force qui visait 1992 (50 et 52 p.100, respectivement). Si on l’abandon de la ville et la migration dans le ajoute que la proportion de la population âgée rural. Quelles catégories de la population de moins de 15 ans était, en 1992, de 24 p.100 en urbaine ont été les plus exposées à cette pres- urbain et de 21 p.100 en rural, on pourrait sion? Celles qui étaient venues dans l’urbain avancer l’hypothèse que la décision de quitter la dans les années d’industrialisation massive et ville pour la campagne a été plus forte dans la qui ont été directement touchées par la chute population urbaine adulte, mariée et avec des activités industrielles après 1989 et toutes enfants, ou le choque de la transition a été plus les conséquences de cette chute (au recensement dur. de 1992, 40 p.100 de la population urbaine était née en rural). D’autre part, un facteur favorisant Migration urbain-rural intra- et inter- la décision de retour dans le rural est paru, la régionale. Origine et destination. loi du fond foncier, par laquelle les coopératives agricoles de type soviétique ont été liquidées en Un dernier aspect sur lequel nous nous pen- bonne partie et la terre a été retournée aux chons dans les lignes suivantes est celui de la anciens propriétaires. L’action conjuguée des façon dans laquelle la migration urbain-rural facteurs poussant vers le départ de l’urbain et s’est développée au niveaux des régions de des facteurs encourageant le retour dans le rural développement, compte tenu de leurs carac- peut expliquer la dynamique de la migration téristiques économiques et démographiques, entre l’urbain et le rural dans les années 1990 et déjà mentionnées. Le tableau 4 nous offre des le renversement de deux flux après 1996. détails.

Quelle structure par âge ont eu les migrants Evidemment, au niveau de chaque région le de l’urbain vers le rural (table 3)? flux urbain-rural a deux composantes en ce qui concerne la région d’origine des Tableauȱ3.ȱRoumanie.ȱStructureȱparȱâgeȱdeȱlaȱpopulationȱruraleȱ1992ȱetȱdesȱ migrants: de l’urbain de la même région migrantsȱurbainȬrural,ȱȱ1993Ȭ2004ȱ et de l’urbain des autres sept régions. Le poids de la première composante est, ȱ Populationȱruraleȱauȱ Migrantsȱdeȱl’urbainȱ au niveau des huit régions, dans les recensementȱduȱȱ versȱleȱrural,ȱ Groupeȱd’âgeȱ années 1992-2003, de 74 p.100 de 7ȱjanvierȱ1992ȱ 1993Ȭ2004ȱ Totalȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ l’ensemble de migrants urbain-rural, seulement un quart revenant aux Moinsȱdeȱ20ȱansȱ 29,3ȱ 29,2ȱ migrants de l’urbain des autres sept 20Ȭ29ȱansȱ 13,0ȱ 20,9ȱ régions Une telle situation n’est pas sur- 30Ȭ39ȱansȱ 10,2ȱ 18,3ȱ prenante. La propension de migrer du 40Ȭ49ȱansȱ 11,1ȱ 15,8ȱ rural vers l’urbain du même départe-

50Ȭ59ȱansȱ 14,4ȱ 9,6ȱ ment et de départements voisins ou proches (dans la même région) a été, 60ȱansȱetȱ+ȱ 22,1ȱ 6,2ȱ avant 1990, naturellement, plus forte Source:ȱCalculsȱdeȱl’auteurȱsurȱlaȱbaseȱdesȱdonnéesȱINS,ȱ1994ȱ;ȱ1993ȱàȱ2005.ȱ que la propension de migrer vers d’autres régions, plus lointaines (pour Les migrants de l’urbain vers le rural con- des raisons évidentes: facilites plus grandes de stituent une population plus jeune que la popu- trouver un emploi et un logement à travers les lation rurale. Environ 55 p.100 des migrants apparentés et les amis, coûts plus faibles, possi- sont entre 20 et 50 ans, poids nettement bilité de maintenir des contacts plus étroites supérieur à la proportion de la même popula- avec les apparentés restés dans le département tion dans le rural – 34 p. 100, ce qui devrait être d’origine). Si nous regardons la migration de la un avantage du point de vue démographique et perspective de la région de destination, nous économique, si on tient compte que la popula- retrouverons les mêmes poids: 74% provient de tion rurale est sensiblement plus âgée. D’autre l’urbain de la même région et 26% de l’urbain part, il n’est pas sans intérêt d’observer que les des autres sept régions migrants dans le rural (années 1993-2003) sont en proportion de 56 p.100 des personnes mar- Un examen de la structure des immigrants iées, poids plus élevé par rapport au poids des en rural par régions, montre que la proportion The Romanian Journal of European Studies 76 =
&'1*&:=._=
4:2&3.*_= .,7&398=:7'&.3=8=7:7&1=5&7=7S,.43=)*=)S;*1455*2*39=)47.,.3*=*9=)*=)*89.3&9.43`= +33,8,**-= = = *(9.43= _= 42548.9.43=)*8=2.,7&398==1==5&7=7S,.43=)&77.;S*=8*143=1&=7S,.43=)47.,.3*=8==*3== = = S,.43=)47.,.3*==7'&.3= S,.43= += ,= -= .= /= 0= 1= 2= =)*=1&= =)*8=&:97*8= )&77.;S*= 38*2'1*= "8 = 8 = = 8&= (= "8&= = ,= 2U2*= 1=7S,.438= :7&1= 7S,.43= = 38*2'1*= +**`*= +/`1= +-`.= +-`3= ++`+= +,`1= ++`,= +-`,= 2`1= 1.`-= ,/`1= +_="8 = +**`*= 0.`0= 1`,= ,`-= +`-= +*`*= +`+= 2`,= /`.= 0.`0= -/`.= ,_=8 = +**`*= .`+= 1/`*= /`-= +`-= -`.= *`1= .`0= /`0= 1/`*= ,/`*= -_== +**`*= +`.= -`1= 02`0= +`3= +`1= *`0= +`1= ,*`-= 02`0= -+`.= ._=8(= +**`*= *`2= +`.= -`/= 1.`-= ++`0= *`0= -`,= .`1= 1.`-= ,/`1= /_=(= +**`*= ,`3= +`+= *`2= ,`/= 13`+= 2`.= .`+= +`+= 13`+= ,*`3= 0_="8(= +**`*= *`3= *`0= *`/= *`0= 1`.= 2/`*= .`+= +`*= 2/`*= +/`*= 1_= = +**`*= +`0= +`-= *`3= *`3= /`+= .`*= 2.`3= +`.= 2.`3= +/`+= 2_=,:(= +**`*= ,`2= ,`3= 1`-= +`.= +`*= *`1= +`*= 2,`3= 2,`3= +1`+= .,3.+.(&9.43a=.8=5&72.=1*38*2'1*=)*8=2.,7&398=&77.;S8=*3=%=)*=1&`=+/`1==8439=;*3:8=)*=1&=)*=1&=7S,.43=+8)8*`=+-`.==)*=1&=)*=1&= 7S,.43=,8 8*=*9(_b=..8=5&72.=1*38*2'1*=)*8=;*3:8=*3=%=)*=1&=7S,.43=+8)8*`=0.`0==8439=;*3:8=)*=1&=)*=1&=2U2*=7S,.43=*9=-/`.=)*= 1&=)*8=&:97*8=1=7S,.438=)439a=1`,=)*=1&=)*=1&=7S,.43=,8 8*`=,`-=)*=1&=)*=1&=7S,.43=-8 ==*9(_b=...8)&38=1*38*2'1*=)*8=;*3:8=*3=%`= 1.`-==8439=;*3:8=)*=1&=)*=1&=2U2*=7S,.43=*9=,/`1=)*=1&=)*8=&:97*8=1=7S,.438_== = = *(9.43=,_= 42548.9.43=)*8=2.,7&398==1==5&7=7S,.43=)*=)S5&79=8*143=1&=7S,.43=)&77.;S*=:=*3== = = S,.43=)47.,.3*=7'&.3=

S,.43= = += ,= -= .= /= 0= 1= 1= = )&77.;S*= 38*2'1*= "8 = 8 = = 8&= (= "8&= = ,= :7&1= = 38*2'1*= +**`*= +**`*= +**`*= +**`*= +**`*= +**`*= +**`*= +**`*= +**`*= +_="8 = ,+`3= 3*`-= ++`2= -`0= ,`0= +1`,= ,`+= +-`0= +-`.= ,_=8 = +.`+= -`1= 13`+= /`.= +`0= -`2= *`3= .`3= 3`+= -_== +1`+= +`0= .`1= 2.`0= ,`3= ,`-= +`*= ,`,= -3`2= ._=8(= +-`.= *`1= +`.= -`-= 23`+= +,`,= *`1= -`,= 1`+= /_=(= 2`0= +`0= *`1= *`/= +`3= /-`.= 0`.= ,`1= +`*= 0_="8(= ++`,= *`0= *`/= *`.= *`0= 0`/= 2.`3= -`/= +`-= 1_= = +*`3= +`+= +`*= *`1= *`3= .`-= -`3= 03`1= +`1= 2_=,:(= ,`2= *`/= *`0= +`/= *`.= *`,= *`,= *`,= ,0`0= 2&= 2U2*= 1.`-= 3*`-= 13`+= 2.`0= 23`+= /-`.= 2.`3= 03`1= ,0`0= 7S,.43= 2*8= &:97*8= 1= ,/`1= 3`1= ,*`3= +/`.= +*`3= .0`0= +/`+= -*`-= 1-`.= 7S,.438= =
4:7(*a=&1(:18=)*=1&:9*:7=8:7=1&='&8*=)*8=)433S*8=`=+33.=b=+33-=A=,**/_=

des migrants de l’urbain de la même région a les Nord-Ouest (7,4%), de l’Ouest pour la région valeurs les plus élevées – plus de 80 % - dans les Centre (5,1%) et du Sud pour la région Bucarest régions plus développées 6-Nord-Ouest, 7- (7,3%). On ne peut pas saisir le même schéma Centre et 8-Bucarest. Nous pensons que l’expli- dans le cas des régions Nord-Est et Sud. Seule- cation se trouve dans le fait que dans ces régions ment 65% des venus dans le rural du Nord-Est (et la région 5-Ouest) le développement de type proviennent de l’urbain de la même région, des industriel d’avant 1990 a été plus fort que dans proportions importantes revenant à l’urbain de les autres régions, ce qui a permis un absorption la région Ouest (10%) et de la région Centre supérieure du potentiel migratoire existent dans (8,2%). Autrement dit, le pouvoir d’absorption le rural de ces régions. Et c’est ici l’explication de l’urbain de cette région, moins développée, a du fait que dans les nouvelles réalités été plus faible dans le passe et la migration de économiques d’après 1989 dans ces mêmes son rural a été une migration de distance plus régions le mouvement de retour de l’urbain vers longue par rapport à la migration rural-urbain le rural de la même région a eu les valeurs rela- des régions plus développes Nord-Ouest, Cen- tives les plus élevées. Ensuite viennent, comme tre, Ouest et Bucarest. Le cas de la région Sud, poids, mais à grande distance, les venus de elle aussi ayant une proportion plus faible des régions voisines, de l’Ouest pour la région arrivés dans le rural de son propre urbain, est 77 The Romanian Journal of European Studies différent. La région Bucarest est une ”enclave” ayant une croissance naturelle supérieure à la dans le territoire de la région Sud et la migra- moyenne nationale dans le passé. tion du rural de cette région vers Bucarest a été Les régions qui présentent une autre géo- extrêmement fort dans le passe, ce qui pourrait graphie des destinations des migrants de l’ur- expliquer la force du flux de retour Bucarest- bain sont Bucarest, Ouest et Centre. La région rural de la région Sud – 20% de l’ensemble des Bucarest est composée seulement de la ville arrives. (municipalité) de Bucarest et le département Au niveau agrégé, les poids des migrants de entourant la Capitale (Ilfov), qui a un fort carac- l’urbain vers le rural de la même région et vers tère rural. D’autre part, la région est située au le rural des autres sept régions constituent aussi centre de la région Sud, une des plus grandes les poids des arrivés dans le rural de la même régions du pays et ayant le plus faible niveau région et dans le rural des autres sept régions (la d’urbanisation. La région Bucarest est la région double facettes) – 74 et 26 p.100. Un regard sur la plus développée et elle a constitué un pole la structure des départs de l’urbain vers le rural d’attraction pour toute la moitie du sud du par régions de destination (tableau 4. section B) pays. Dans ces conditions, il n’est pas sur- apporte des renseignements complémentaires prenant que seulement 27% de ceux qui ont sur la migration urbain-rural, par la mise en évi- quitté la région Bucarest (la Capitale, en effet) dence des structures différentes de la géogra- sont partis dans le rural du département phie des départs vis-à-vis de la géographie des entourant la Capitale tandis que 40% ont eu arrivées, au niveau régional. Tandis que dans comme destination le rural de la région Sud. Ce l’ensemble des arrivés dans le rural, au niveau qui attire l’attention est la proportion relative- régional, on trouve une prédominance nette et ment élevée des migrants vers le rural de la région plus lointaine Nord-Est (presque 14%, générale du flux de l’urbain de la même région, plus que dans les régions plus proches Sud-Est la composition régionale des départs de l’urbain et Sud-Ouest). Les régions Ouest et Centre met en évidence quelques particularités retient elle aussi l’attention par les poids rela- régionales significatives et qui provient de l’o- tivement plus faibles des migrants urbains vers rigine régionale de la migration rural-urbain leur propre rural – 53 et 70%. Dans la région dans le passe. Dans les régions moins dévelop- Ouest on peut trouver des valeurs importantes pées Nord-Est et les trois régions du sud les des migrants vers le rural de la région Nord-est départs de l’urbain ont eu comme destination le – 17%, et de la région Sud-Ouest – 12%, ces rural de la même région dans une proportion dernières deux régions étant moins développées très élevée – 80-90%, parce que les opportunités et fournisseurs, dans le passé, de migrants vers de trouver un emploi dans les villes de la même l’urbain de la région plus développée Ouest. région ont été plus faibles dans le passe et rapi- On peut résumer les caractéristiques de la dement occupées par des migrants de leur pro- migration urbain-rural par région par les remar- pre rural. Ces régions n’ont pas constitué, dans ques suivantes: le passe, des régions d’attraction des migrants • en proportion de trois quarts la migration originaires du rural des autres régions. Le cas le régionale urbain-rural dans les années 1992- plus éloquent est celui de la région Nord-Est. 2003 (environ un million de personnes) est com- Les migrants de l’urbain de cette région sont posée par des flux intra-régionaux et seulement partis en proportion de 90% vers le rural de la un quart représente des flux inter-régionaux; région, d’ou ils sont venus dans le passé, parce essentiellement, cette migration est une migra- que l’urbain de cette région moins développée tion de retour, sa géographie étant similaire n’a pas attiré les migrants du rural des autres avec la géographie de la migration rural-urbain régions que dans une mesure très faible. Le cas des années 1950-1990; de la région Nord-Ouest, une région plus • au niveau des départs de l’urbain vers le développée mai ayant elle aussi une forte pro- rural, dans les régions plus développées Centre portion de migrants dans le rural provenant de et Ouest la migration de retour dans le rural a son propre urbain – 85%, est plus nuancé. Les une composante plus importante de migration besoins de main d’œuvre dans l’urbain de cette inter-régionale, sur des distances plus longues, région ont pu être satisfaits en bonne mesure vers les rural des régions moins développées par son propre rural, trois de six départements Nord-Est et Sud-Ouest, régions qui ont fourni qui composent la région ayant un faible degré dans le passé, a large échelle, des migrants vers d’urbanisation et deux de ces départements l’urbain des régions plus développées; The Romanian Journal of European Studies 78 • les migrants urbain-rural de la région la rural. Ça ne signifie pas que l’urbain a gagné plus développée - Bucarest, ont comme destina- cette population, parce que, dans la même péri- tion majeure la région entourant Sud, mais aussi ode, un nombre similaire de personnes ont quit- la région plus lointaine et moins développée té les villages pour s’établir en villes. C’est n’est Nord-Est; qu’à partir de 1997 que la balance migratoire est • dans les régions moins développées Nord- favorable au rural (+200 milles personnes entre Est et celles du sud du pays le flux urbain-rural 1996 et 2005). Mais, cet apport positif a été large- est constitué en proportion de 80-90% de flux ment contrebalancé par la baisse naturelle et intra-régionaux; par rapport aux régions plus par la migration externe nette négative. La développées, dans ces régions moins dévelop- migration urbain-rural n’a pas eu un effet béné- pées la migration vers l’urbain a été composée fique direct sur le nombre de la population dans le passé surtout par des migrants rurale mais elle a contribué sensiblement à la provenant leur propre rural; diminution de la détérioration de la structure • parmi les immigrants en rural, la propor- par âge en rural (tableau 5). tion de ceux qui viennent de l’urbain de la même région est Tableauȱ5.ȱStructureȱdeȱlaȱpopulationȱurbaineȱetȱruraleȱparȱgroupesȱd’âge,ȱ1992ȱetȱ2005ȱ de 75-85%; c’est l’expression de la nette prédominance du mou- Groupeȱd’âgeȱ Totalȱ Hommesȱ Femmesȱ Totalȱ Hommesȱ Femmesȱ vement rural-urbain dans la ȱ Urbainȱ1992ȱ Urbainȱ2005ȱ 0Ȭ19ȱansȱ 32,7ȱ 34,1ȱ 31,3ȱ 22,5ȱ 23,9ȱ 21,2ȱ même région dans le passé; 20Ȭ39ȱansȱ 33,4ȱ 33,0ȱ 33,8ȱ 33,6ȱ 34,4ȱ 32,8ȱ seulement dans les régions 40Ȭ59ȱansȱ 22,3ȱ 22,8ȱ 21,8ȱ 28,5ȱ 28,2ȱ 28,7ȱ moins développées Nord-Est et 60ȱansȱetȱplusȱ 11,6ȱ 10,1ȱ 13,1ȱ 15,5ȱ 13,5ȱ 17,3ȱ Sud le poids des venus de l’ur- Totalȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ bain des autres régions est plus ȱ Ruralȱ1992ȱ Ruralȱ2005ȱ 0Ȭ19ȱansȱ 29,3ȱ 30,3ȱ 28,2ȱ 25,5ȱ 26,4ȱ 24,7ȱ élevée; dans la première de ces 20Ȭ39ȱansȱ 23,2ȱ 25,4ȱ 21,0ȱ 28,8ȱ 31,0ȱ 26,6ȱ régions le sous-développement 40Ȭ59ȱansȱ 25,4ȱ 24,7ȱ 26,2ȱ 21,7ȱ 22,1ȱ 21,3ȱ a poussé les migrants de son 60ȱansȱetȱplusȱ 22,1ȱ 19,5ȱ 24,6ȱ 24,0ȱ 20,5ȱ 27,4ȱ propre rural vers l’urbain des Totalȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ régions plus développées, sur Source:ȱCalculsȱdeȱl’auteurȱsurȱlaȱbaseȱdesȱdonnéesȱINS,ȱ1994ȱ;ȱ2003.ȱ des distances plus longues; quant à la région Sud, l’attraction a été exercée dans le passé par la Dans un contexte de détérioration générale ville de Bucarest (origine du fort flux de retour de la structure par âge après 1989, la dimension dans le rural de la région Sud après 1989); de cette détérioration est considérablement dif- • enfin, il est bien évident le fait que la région férentielle et favorable au rural, parce que les Nord-Est détient une position particulière, soit migrants de l’urbain vers le rural ont eu une qu’il s’agit de l’origine des immigrants dans son structure par âge plus jeune que la population rural (une proportion plus grande d’immigrants rurale (tableau 3). La proportion de la popula- d’autres régions), soit qu’il s’agit des départs de tion jeune a connu une baisse nettement plus son urbain (presque en totalité vers son propre forte en urbain. Le poids de la population rural); le sous-développement et une forte crois- adulte-jeune (20-39 ans) est resté stationnaire en sance démographique peuvent expliquer cette urbain et a connu un accroissement en rural, particularité. tandis que la population adulte-agée (40-59 ans) a été en baisse en rural et en augmentation en Effets de la migration sur la structure par urbain. Enfin, le poids de la population âgée (60 sexe et âge de la population ans et plus) a été en hausse générale, en urbain et en rurale, mais l’accroissement a été plus fort La restructuration de la migration interne en urbain, même si le degré de vieillissement entre l’urbain et le rural n’a pas apporté des reste considérablement plus élevé en rural. changements significatifs dans la structure par sexe de la population urbaine et rurale, parce Remarques finales que la structure par sexe des migrants urbain- rural ne diffère pas de la structure par sexe de la La Roumanie se trouve dans son 16-èmme population rurale. année de détérioration de la situation démo- graphique. Le recul massif de la natalité, une De 1992 à 2005, environ un million de per- migration externe négative (et en hausse) et le sonnes ont quitté les villes pour s’établir en 79 The Romanian Journal of European Studies maintien de la mortalité à des valeurs élevées tion. Certaines de ses conséquences semblent pour un pays européen se trouvent à l’origine être favorables au rural. Mais, des questions de cette détérioration. Le déclin démographique graves se posent. Et si une bonne partie des et l’accroissement du vieillissement démo- migrants retournés en rural a continué leur graphique sont les évolutions qui concrétisent mobilité vers les pays de l’Europe occidentale à dans l’immédiat la détérioration. La stabilité du la recherche du travail, poussée par la pauvreté, nombre de naissances et le recul assez impor- le niveau de vie très bas, le spectre du chômage tant de la mortalité par âge (mais très faible au et les incertitudes de l’avenir? (Selon certaines niveau du nombre de décès et du taux brut de estimations, le nombre de roumains se trouvant mortalité) durant les dernières années peuvent aujourd’hui dans les pays de l’Europe occiden- donner l’impression d’une diminution de la tale pour travail pourrait atteindre 1,5-2 mil- détérioration de la situation démographique. La lions de personnes). La dimension et le poids de prudence s’impose. On peut détecter des la population active dans l’agriculture sont tout mécanismes propres à la dynamique interne de a fait inhabituelles en Roumanie (30% de la pop- la construction démographique qui préfigurent ulation active du pays et 35% de la population une reprise plus forte de la détérioration à occupée, à la fin de 2003) (INS, 2004a; 2004b). l’avenir, par la baisse du nombre de naissances L’entré dans l’Union Européenne produira un le moment ou les générations nées après 1989 véritable choc dans l’agriculture roumaine, arriveront à l’age du mariage et de la maternité. morcelée, faiblement dotée de moyens tech- Et cet horizon n’est pas loin, tout étant une niques et ayant une productivité très faible question de terme moyen (United Nations, (Ciutacu, Constantin et Luminita Chivu, 2002). 2005 ; Ghetau, 2004). De plus, la dimension de la De quelle manière sera affectée la population migration externe après l’admission de la rurale et la migration interne? Quelles motiva- Roumanie dans l’Union Européenne reste une tions pourra-t-on avoir la continuation de la grande inconnue. Dans ce contexte négatif, la migration urbain-rural dans un rural ayant déjà migration interne et, surtout, la surprenante une énorme population active agricole? Quelles physionomie des flux migratoires entre l’urbain perspectives pour une population agricole qui et le rural sont elles aussi une réaction à la crise sera obligée de réduire ses dimensions par les économique et sociale dans laquelle se trouve la durs mécanismes de l’économie de marché? Roumanie et aux changements rapides et pro- Pourra-t-il l’urbain absorber cette population fonds, douloureux en bonne partie, que le pays dans des activités industrielles et dans les serv- connaît dans la phase actuelle de son évolution ices ? Toutes ces questions, et on pourrait historique. La restructuration de la migration ajouter d’autres, montrent la complexité de la interne trouve donc l’explication causale dans situation et conduisent à la réflexion et à l’ac- les réalités économiques et sociales de la transi- tion.

Références

Ciutacu, Constantin et Luminita Chivu. 2002. Institutul National de Statistica. 1994. Recensaman- Romania si modelul european de agricultura si de dez- tul Populatiei si Locuintelor din 7 ianuarie 1992. Vol.I. voltare a spatiului rural (La Roumanie et le modèle Populatie-Structura demografica (Recensement de la européen de l’agriculture et du développement de population et des logements du 7 janvier 1992. Vol.I. l’espace rural). Academia Romana, Centrul de Infor- Population-Structure démographique). mare si Documentare Economica. Institutul National de Statistica. 2001. Anuarul demografic al Romaniei (Annuaire démographique de Council of Europe. 2005. Recent demographic devel- la Roumanie). opments in Europe 2004. Strasbourg, Council of Europe Institutul National de Statistica. 2003. Recensaman- Publishing. tul Populatiei si Locuintelor din 18 martie 2002. Vol. I. Ghetau, Vasile. 2004. 2050 : Will Romania’s Popula- Populatie-Structura demografica (Recensement de la tion Fall Below 16 Million Inhabitants ? Romanian population et des logements du 18 mars 2002. Vol.I. Academy, UNFPA, Bucharest. Population-Structure démographique). Institutul National de Statistica. 1993 a 2005. Institutul National de Statistica. 2004a. Anuarul Schimbari de domiciliu (Changements de domicile) Statistic al Romaniei 2003 (Annuaire statistique de la (Publication annuelle). Roumanie 2003) The Romanian Journal of European Studies 80 Institutul National de Statistica. 2004b. Forta de Institutul National de Statistica. 2005b. Populatia munca in Romania. Ocupare si somaj (La main d’œuvre Romaniei pe localitati la 1 ianuarie 2005 (Population de en Roumanie. Occupation et chômage). la Roumanie par localités au 1er janvier 2005). Institutul National de Statistica. 2004c. Populatia Institutul National de Statistica. 2005c. Nascuti vii Romaniei pe localitati la 1 iulie 2004 (Population de la in anul 2004 (Naissances vivantes dans l’année 2004). Roumanie par localités au 1er juillet 2004). Institutul National de Statistica. 2005d. Decedati in Institutul National de Statistica. 2005a. Populatia anul 2004 (Décès dans l’année 2004). Romaniei pe varste la 1 ianuarie 2005 (Population par United Nations. 2005. World Population Prospects. âge au 1er janvier 2005). The 2004 Revision. United Nations, New York. 81 The Romanian Journal of European Studies Annexes The Romanian Journal of European Studies 82

Annexeȱ2.ȱRoumanie.ȱȱProfileȱéconomiqueȱetȱdémographiqueȱdesȱhuitȱrégionsȱdeȱdéveloppementȱ

ȱ ȱ Régionȱdeȱdéveloppementȱ ȱ Roumanieȱ 1ȱ 2ȱ 3ȱ 4 5ȱ 6ȱ 7ȱ 8ȱ (Ro)ȱ NordȬ SudȬEstȱ Sudȱ SudȬ Ouestȱ NordȬ Centreȱ Bucarestȱ Estȱ Ouestȱ Ouestȱ I.ȱDonnéesȱgénéralesȱ Nombreȱdeȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ départementsȱ 42*ȱ 6ȱ 6ȱ 7ȱ 5ȱ 4ȱ 6ȱ 6ȱ 2**ȱ Superficieȱ–ȱkm2ȱ 238931ȱ 36850ȱ 35762ȱ 34453ȱ 29212ȱ 32034ȱ 34159ȱ 34100ȱ 1821ȱ Superficieȱ–ȱenȱ%ȱ 100ȱ 15,5ȱ 15,0ȱ 14,5ȱ 12,3ȱ 13,4ȱ 14,3ȱ 14,3ȱ 0,8ȱ Populationȱ1.07.2004ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭȱmilliersȱ 21673,3ȱ 3738,6ȱ 2850,3ȱ 3342,0ȱ 2317,6ȱ 1939,5ȱ 2738,5ȱ 2539,2ȱ 2207,6ȱ Populationȱ–ȱenȱ%ȱ 100ȱ 17,2ȱ 13,2ȱ 15,4ȱ 10,7ȱ 8,9ȱ 12,6ȱ 11,7ȱ 10,2ȱ Populationȱurbaineȱ–ȱ enȱ%ȱ 54,9ȱ 43,6ȱ 55,5ȱ 41,4ȱ 47,2ȱ 63,7ȱ 52,8ȱ 60,0ȱ 90,6ȱ Densitéȱ–ȱparȱkm2ȱ 90,9ȱ 101,5ȱ 79,7ȱ 97,0ȱ 79,3ȱ 60,5ȱ 80,2ȱ 74,5ȱ 1212,3ȱ II.ȱDonnéesȱéconomiquesȱ–ȱ2002ȱ ProduitȱInterneȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ BrutȱRégionalȱȬȱ%ȱ 100ȱ 12,3ȱ 11,3ȱ 12,4ȱ 8,6ȱ 9,7ȱ 11,9ȱ 12,6ȱ 21,1ȱ dansȱleȱPIBȱnationalȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ProduitȱInterneȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ BrutȱRégionalȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ parȱhab.ȱ–ȱmoyenneȱ 100ȱ 71,5ȱ 85,9ȱ 80,0ȱ 79,9ȱ 108,3ȱ 94,1ȱ 108,0ȱ 208,2ȱ nationaleȱ=ȱ100ȱ ȱ unîtesȱ Contributionȱ(enȱ%)ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ auȱPIBȱ:ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ - industrieȱ 28,1ȱ 26,2ȱ 28,4ȱ 31,6ȱ 33,7ȱ 26,8ȱ 26,8ȱ 34,8ȱ 21,9ȱ - agricultureȱ 11,4ȱ 18,8ȱ 14,7ȱ 14,4ȱ 11,6ȱ 13,5ȱ 14,6ȱ 11,7ȱ 0,7ȱ Revenuȱmoyenȱtotalȱ parȱpersonneȱ/ȱmoisȱ;ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ moyenneȱnationaleȱ=ȱ 100ȱ 88,9ȱ 95,8ȱ 93,7ȱ 93,8ȱ 102,6ȱ 103,0ȱ 106,0ȱ 127,9ȱ 100ȱunîtesȱ III.ȱDonnéesȱdémographiquesȱ–ȱ2003ȱ Tauxȱbrutȱdeȱnatalitéȱ –ȱp.ȱ1000ȱ 9,8ȱ 11,5ȱ 9,8ȱ 9,4ȱ 9,1ȱ 8,9ȱ 10,0ȱ 10,2ȱ 8,3ȱ Tauxȱbrutȱdeȱ mortalitéȱ–ȱp.ȱ1000ȱ 12,3ȱ 11,5ȱ 11,8ȱ 13,6ȱ 13,3ȱ 12,9ȱ 12,4ȱ 11,3ȱ 11,4ȱ Tauxȱ dȇaccroissementȱ Ȭ2,5ȱ 0,0ȱȬ2,0ȱȬ4,2ȱȬ4,2ȱȬ4,0ȱȬ2,4ȱȬ1,1ȱȬ3,1ȱ naturelȱ–ȱp.ȱ1000ȱ Tauxȱdeȱmortalitéȱ infantileȱ–ȱp.1000ȱ 16,7ȱ 20,1ȱ 18,2ȱ 19,3ȱ 15,1ȱ 15,6ȱ 14,2ȱ 15,1ȱ 10,4ȱ naissancesȱ ICFȱ–ȱp.ȱfemmeȱ 1,23ȱ 1,51ȱ 1,27ȱ 1,27ȱ 1,23ȱ 1,18ȱ 1,28ȱ 1,28ȱ 0,97ȱ Populationȱâgéeȱdeȱ 19,2ȱ 18,5ȱ 18,8ȱ 21,3ȱ 20,9ȱ 19,0ȱ 18,2ȱ 18,0ȱ 18,9ȱ 60ȱansȱetȱplusȱ–ȱenȱ%ȱ Espéranceȱdeȱvieȱaȱlaȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ naissanceȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ (2001Ȭ2003)ȱȬȱansȱ:ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ - Hommesȱ 67,4ȱ 67,4ȱ 66,9ȱ 67,2ȱ 67,9ȱ 67,1ȱ 66,5ȱ 67,8ȱ 69,5ȱ - Femmesȱ 74,8ȱ 74,7ȱ 74,8ȱ 74,8ȱ 74,5ȱ 74,1ȱ 73,9ȱ 75,5ȱ 76,4ȱ

*ȱ41ȱdépartementsȱplusȱlaȱMunicipalitéȱdeȱBucarestȱ;ȱ**ȱMunicipalitéȱdeȱBucarestȱplusȱunȱdépartementȱ(Ilfov)ȱ;ȱICF=indicateurȱ conjoncturelȱdeȱlaȱfécondité.ȱ ȱ Sourceȱ:ȱINS,ȱ2004aȱ;ȱ2004bȱ;ȱȱcalculsȱdeȱl’auteur.ȱȱ 83 The Romanian Journal of European Studies

Annexeȱ3.ȱ UrbainȱetȱruralȱenȱRoumanieȱ ȱ L’urbainȱestȱcomposéȱdeȱvillesȱ(orase).ȱUneȱlocalitéȱreçoitȱlaȱqualitéȱdeȱvilleȱparȱloi.ȱAuȱ1erȱjanvierȱ2005ȱonȱavaitȱenȱ Roumanieȱ314ȱvilles.ȱLesȱvillesȱlesȱplusȱimportantesȱsontȱdénomméesȱmunicipalitésȱ(96).ȱLeȱruralȱestȱcomposéȱdeȱ communesȱ(comune).ȱIlȱyȱaȱ2827ȱcommunes.ȱ ȱ Villesȱetȱcommunes.ȱNombreȱetȱpopulationȱauȱ1erȱjanvierȱ2005ȱ ȱ Lesȱvillesȱ Lesȱcommunesȱ TailleȱȬȱhabitantsȱ Nombreȱ Populationȱ TailleȱȬȱ Nombreȱ Populationȱ habitantsȱ Ensembleȱ 314ȱ 11901033ȱ(54,9ȱ%)ȱ Totalȱ 2827ȱ 9757495ȱ(45,1ȱ%)ȱ Moinsȱdeȱ10000ȱ 115ȱ 776506ȱ Moinsȱdeȱ1000ȱ 63ȱ 46693ȱ 10000Ȭ19999ȱ 93ȱ 1244347ȱ 1000Ȭ2999ȱ 1312ȱ 2789446ȱ 20000Ȭ49999ȱ 60ȱ 1812545ȱ 3000Ȭ4999ȱ 980ȱ 3773418ȱ 50000Ȭ99999ȱ 21ȱ 1491949ȱ 5000Ȭ6999ȱ 318ȱ 1833071ȱ 100000Ȭ199999ȱ 14ȱ 1875946ȱ 7000Ȭ8999ȱ 113ȱ 886677ȱ 200000Ȭ299999ȱ 9ȱ 1542213ȱ 9000Ȭ9999ȱ 19ȱ 179663ȱ 300000Ȭ399999ȱ 4ȱ 1230079ȱ 10000Ȭ11999ȱ 17ȱ 183940ȱ 400000ȱetȱplusȱ 1ȱ 1927448ȱ 12000ȱetȱplusȱ 5ȱ 64587ȱ Tailleȱmoyenneȱ ȱ 37901ȱ Tailleȱ ȱ 3451ȱ moyenneȱ Sourceȱ:ȱINS,ȱ2005b.ȱ ȱ