February 5, 2020 Via ECFS Marlene J. Dortch, Secretary Federal
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1001 G Street, N.W. Suite 500 West Washington, D.C. 20001 tel. 202.434.4100 fax 202.434.4646 Writer’s Direct Access Timothy A. Doughty (202) 434-4271 d o u g h t y @ k h l a w. c o m February 5, 2020 Via ECFS Marlene J. Dortch, Secretary Federal Communications Commission Office of the Secretary 445 12th Street SW Washington, DC 20554 Re: The Potomac Edison Company’s Answer to Complainant Verizon Maryland LLC’s Pole Attachment Complaint (Proceeding Number 19- 355; Bureau ID Number EB-19-MD-009) Ms. Dortch: Please find attached the Public Version of The Potomac Edison Company’s Answer to Complainant Verizon Maryland LLC’s Pole Attachment Complaint in Proceeding Number 19- 355; Bureau ID Number EB-19-MD-009. Sincerely, Timothy A. Doughty Attorney for The Potomac Edison Company Enclosures cc: Rosemary McEnery, Enforcement Bureau Anthony DeLaurentis, Enforcement Bureau Washington, D.C. Brussels San Francisco Shanghai Paris This document was delivered electronically. www.khlaw.com PUBLIC VERSION Before the FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20554 _____________________________________ ) ) Verizon Maryland LLC, ) Complainant, ) ) Proceeding Number 19-355 v. ) Bureau ID Number EB-19-MD-009 ) The Potomac Edison Company, ) Defendant ) _____________________________________ ) TO: ENFORCEMENT BUREAU THE POTOMAC EDISON COMPANY’S ANSWER TO THE POLE ATTACHMENT COMPLAINT OF VERIZON MARYLAND LLC Robert M. Endris Thomas B. Magee FirstEnergy Service Company Timothy A. Doughty 76 S. Main St. Keller and Heckman LLP Akron, OH 44308 1001 G Street NW (330) 384-5728 (phone) Suite 500 West (330) 384-3875 (fax) Washington, DC 20001 [email protected] (202) 434-4100 (phone) (202) 434-4100 (fax) [email protected] [email protected] Attorneys for The Potomac Edison Company Dated: February 5, 2020 PUBLIC VERSION SUMMARY There are numerous reasons why Verizon’s Complaint is unfounded, requiring either the Complaint to be dismissed or the relief it requests otherwise to be denied. Verizon was required to terminate its existing joint use agreement with Potomac Edison before filing this Complaint but it failed to do so. Verizon easily could have terminated the existing joint use agreement while preserving its right to take future action, just as it did against Florida Power & Light Company several years ago, pursuant to the Commission’s “sign and sue” option for ILECs. Verizon’s claim that it lacked the ability to terminate the existing joint use agreement with Potomac Edison is incorrect, and so Verizon’s request to modify the existing agreement for Verizon’s unilateral benefit should be dismissed for failure to comply with this threshold requirement. Verizon’s illegitimate interpretation of Commission rulings and its intransigence in negotiations with FirstEnergy have led the parties to this complaint proceeding. Verizon improperly demanded that FirstEnergy agree to applying only the new telecom rate despite this unreasonable negotiation position being contrary to the instructions Verizon received in the Verizon v. FPL Order. It is apparent that Verizon has been trying to bully FirstEnergy into accepting a very low rental rate with large refunds while maintaining the advantages that Verizon has in the joint use agreements. The 2018 Third Report and Order does not apply to this proceeding because the agreements at issue have not been “newly-negotiated” or “newly-renewed.” The Commission established distinct conditions under which its new presumptions would apply, and Verizon’s tortuous interpretation of those conditions would render those distinctions moot. For this and other reasons, the 2018 Third Report and Order does not apply to the agreements at issue in this i PUBLIC VERSION proceeding. Moreover, Verizon ignores that any such new presumptions or burden of proof, even if they did apply, would apply only with respect to Verizon’s claims for after the March 11, 2019 effective date of the 2018 Order. FirstEnergy does not have, and never did have, bargaining leverage over Verizon— another threshold condition the Commission established for review of joint use rates. In the 2011 Pole Attachment Order, the Commission reserved its judgment whether a difference in relative pole ownership could constitute bargaining leverage, and like every aspect of the rules governing ILEC/Electric joint use relationships, the Commission determined to analyze on a case-by-case basis whether bargaining power exists. The facts in this proceeding show no bargaining leverage. Even if any bargaining leverage existed, as indicated by the 2011 Pole Attachment Order, it is mitigated where there is a “less-costly alternative[s] for the incumbent LEC to pole deployment” which “would reduce any possible disparity in the relative bargaining power of the parties.” This is precisely the situation in this case. First, FirstEnergy offered to place Verizon on an equal footing with its CLEC competitors by giving Verizon the CLEC agreement and CLEC rates for all of its attachments, both new and existing, and by transitioning Verizon out of the pole owning business. Verizon did not accept FirstEnergy’s offer, but FirstEnergy’s offer shows that FirstEnergy did not have bargaining power. Second, Potomac Edison needs to access Verizon’s poles, just as Verizon needs to access Potomac Edison’s poles, and this mutual dependency protects each party from unilateral outcomes as well as from having its attachments abruptly removed from the other’s poles. This conclusion is supported by basic economics and the facts of this case, which include evergreen provisions that ensure Potomac Edison cannot ever terminate and remove Verizon’s attachments ii PUBLIC VERSION from Potomac Edison’s poles. If there is no feasible option but to continue with the existing joint use arrangement, neither party has bargaining power over the other to dictate disproportionate terms or conditions of joint use. Finally, the conclusion that neither party has bargaining leverage over the other is further confirmed by Verizon itself. After the rental rates were last negotiated by Verizon, Penelec and Met-Ed in 2009, Verizon’s Norman Parrish praised the memorandum of understanding containing the new rates as fair and equitable, stating: “With the execution of this MOU Verizon PA and FirstEnergy can finally have a common rate structure that is fair and equitable for all the Joint Use Agreements between both companies in Pennsylvania.” He also noted that the joint use rate issue had been “amiably resolved.” Fair and equitable is the opposite of unjust and unreasonable, and this statement of mutual fairness by Verizon is additional evidence in this proceeding that FirstEnergy did not exercise bargaining leverage when the rental rates were last negotiated. Even if it were appropriate for Commission to review rates in this case, which it is not, Verizon’s joint use agreement with Potomac Edison provides considerable advantages to Verizon relative to competitive LECs, including, among others, much lower make ready expenses, an enormous speed to market advantage, and the ability to profit by serving customers that new entrants cannot. Verizon’s joint use agreement with Potomac Edison allowed a pole distribution network to be constructed that accommodated Verizon’s attachments without the need for the same make- ready time and expense that CLECs and other competitors face. This means that for poles owned by Potomac Edison, Verizon’s competitors incur every year, on average, more in make-ready costs per attached pole than does Verizon. Based on this information alone, Verizon iii PUBLIC VERSION is not similarly-situated to its competitors. As a result, granting Verizon the same attachment rate that is paid by CLECs, as Verizon is requesting, would give Verizon an even greater financial advantage over its CLEC competitors. The competitive advantage to Verizon of its “built to order” joint use attachments is also apparent because Verizon need only overlash existing facilities or simply light existing dark fiber capacity to reach new and expanded business opportunities which most, if not all, of Verizon’s competitors cannot reach because of the cost and expense of installing new facilities to compete. And for Verizon’s relatively few new attachment applications, Verizon need not submit labor- intensive pole profile sheets and photographs of the poles with its applications, and Verizon pays no application fees. Verizon is also subject to much more lenient overlashing rules and avoids the five-year field audit costs that Verizon’s competitors must pay. Moreover, Verizon consumes more pole space and pole loading capacity than its competitors, and the benefit to Verizon of its lowest position on the pole becomes obvious when considering that if Verizon were not the lowest attacher, its facilities would need to be placed 3.5 feet above the lowest attacher, rather than the one foot required of its competitors, so that an additional 2.5 feet of pole space is in effect occupied by Verizon’s larger and heavier facilities and cannot be occupied by another attacher. The negotiating history also demonstrates a lack of bargaining leverage. In addition to offering rate concessions amounting to per year, FirstEnergy alternatively offered to place Verizon on an equal footing with its CLEC competitors for all of Verizon’s attachments, both new and existing, by giving Verizon the CLEC agreement and CLEC rates and by transitioning Verizon out of the pole owning business. Verizon rejected that offer in favor of its existing joint use agreements.