ABSTRACT

“SELF-DETERMINATION WITHOUT TERMINATION:” THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS AND DEFINING SELF- DETERMINATION POLICY DURING THE KENNEDY AND JOHNSON ADMINISTRATIONS

by Hannah Patrice Blubaugh

This thesis examines the National Congress of American Indians, the oldest and most representative Native American rights organization, and its lobbying efforts during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to define and develop the concept of Native American self- determination. Based on the preservation of tribal status by rejecting termination, consultation and participation in the process of policy formation, and self-sufficient economic development, the NCAI promoted this vision of self-determination through legislative action by way of resolutions and testimonials to influence a new direction of federal Indian policy during the transitional decade between the 1950s’ termination era legislation and the 1970s’ proclaimed self-determination.

“SELF-DETERMINATION WITHOUT TERMINATION:” THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS AND DEFINING SELF- DETERMINATION POLICY DURING THE KENNEDY AND JOHNSON ADMINISTRATIONS

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of Miami University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of History by Hannah Patrice Blubaugh Miami University Oxford, Ohio 2018

Advisor: Dr. Andrew Offenburger Reader: Dr. Steven Conn Reader: Dr. Helen Sheumaker

© Hannah Patrice Blubaugh 2018

! ! ! This thesis titled

“SELF-DETERMINATION WITHOUT TERMINATION:” THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS AND DEFINING SELF- DETERMINATION POLICY DURING THE KENNEDY AND JOHNSON ADMINISTRATIONS

by

Hannah Patrice Blubaugh

has been approved for publication by

The College of Arts and Sciences and Department of History

Dr. Andrew Offenburger

Dr. Steven Conn

Dr. Helen Sheumaker

! ! ! Table of Contents Acknowledgments iv Introduction 1 Chapter 1 14 A ‘New Trail’ Towards Self-Determination Chapter 2 37 Expressing Self-Determination in the Great Society Conclusion 63 Bibliography 66

iii Acknowledgments

I never saw myself getting my Masters degree so soon after finishing my Bachelors. It was definitely a challenge of will and spirit. I’ve come out on the other side hopefully a better historian and overall person. That being said, I have a few people to thank for supporting me through this endeavor.

I would like to especially thank my advisors and committee members for their unrelenting support and feedback. Dr. Andrew Offenburger, who advised me as an undergraduate, continually told me I could do it when I felt and explicitly said, “I can’t do this.” Somehow he was able to convince me that I could. This would not have been possible without his confidence in me. Thank you also to Dr. Steven Conn who provided helpful job and life advice. I am incredibly fortunate to have as a graduate assistant worked on Origins: Current Events in Historic Perspective with him. I immensely enjoyed the opportunities to write for Origins on my other historic interests. A huge thanks also goes to Dr. Helen Sheumaker for being a willing reader and offering her thoughtful comments on things I did not consider when writing this.

My time in the graduate program provided for a deeper connection with other faculty members in the department. I appreciate the challenge and advice of Dr. Erik Jensen and Dr. Amanda McVety in our core graduate classes, working with us during the developing stages of our projects through to writing our first chapters. This project may have gone through many different phases, but I’ve always been supported with critical insight in how to improve my research.

I must give recognition to my wonderful, close-knit cohort. From the very beginning we’ve supported and helped each other whether in class or in our offices. Erin, Heather, and Margaret have truly been an incredible graduate school support system. They are all intelligent, driven women who will go far in all their endeavors.

Thank you to my family and friends outside of the history department for being supportive of my decision to continue my education and helping in whatever way they could. I believe I’ve made you proud.

May I give myself kudos for persevering in the face of great mental obstacle? You did it.

iv Introduction In 1970, President Richard Nixon issued an address on Indian affairs calling for “self- determination without termination.” “The time has come to break decisively with the past and to create the conditions for a new era in which the Indian future is determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions,” said Nixon, ushering in what many historians define as the era of self- determination.1 This came after almost a decade of half-hearted or under-supported attempts by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to do the same. The 1960s did witness a significant transition in federal Indian policy, though. Prevailing termination challenged Native American’s legal rights and cultural identity, and served as a means of assimilating them into American society and completely ending all federal assistance. The National Congress of American Indians (NCAI), founded in 1944 to be the unified voice of tribal nations, effectively opposed termination and other legislative actions in the federal government and urged self-determination. The philosophy of self-determination allows for tribes to work for their established goals with the resources to do so. Self-determination never manifested because the federal government felt that tribes could not make the proper decisions for themselves with the given assistance. Federal paternalism stifled Native nations chance to be self-determined, whatever that meant for them. For the NCAI, the principles of self-determination meant the preservation of treaty rights, consultation and participation in the policy process, and economic self-sufficiency. This is evident through the focus they had on lobbying for these particular issues. The ability to make their own decisions depended on rejecting termination, being involved in the formulation of federal Indian policy, and developing their economic resources so to be self-sufficient. The 1960s saw a federal bureaucracy more receptive to Native American self-determination, though they often missed these key points that the NCAI saw as paramount to self-determination. The NCAI took it upon themselves, as representative of a majority of Native Americans, to inform and lobby the federal government on what they defined as bringing Native American self- determination. Historical Context

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1 Richard Nixon “Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for Indian Policy, July 8, 1970” Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 92th Congress, 1st Session, October 19 and 20, 1972 (Washington, D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1972), 220.

! ! 1! ! ! Federal Indian policy of the first half of the twentieth century followed assimilationist ideology aimed at integrating Native Americans into modern society often at the expense of tribal sovereignty, land base, and culture. It remained a foundation of congressional policy throughout the majority of the twentieth century taking many forms, often suggesting that it was for the good of Native Americans to fully integrate into American society. Starting in the late nineteenth century, the Dawes Act (1887), also known as the General Allotment Act, reduced reservation lands by selling individual allotments to Indians. Although the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) (1934) ended such practices, the complications that arose from the allotted land triggered the heirship land problem that became a legislative issue in the 1960s. Movements to improve Indian affairs occurred early on. An Indian reform movement began in the 1920s, in which “an exhaustive survey of conditions prevalent among Indians,” produced the Merriam Report, whose recommendations would not come to fruition until the 1930s and 1940s.2 The report symbolized a concerted effort by the federal government to assess the weaknesses in Indian programs implemented by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and to protect Indian rights. The Merriam Report suggested improved health programs, progress in education, and a special claims commission to hear claims of individual tribes against the United States. Many of its ideas served as the background for the Indian Reorganization Act. John Collier, serving as Commissioner of Indian Affairs from 1933-1945, contributed immensely to the relaxation of assimilation in favor of Indian cultural development. The Indian Reorganization Act represented the recommendations of reformers, research studies, and the BIA during the previous decade, advocating that Indians express their opinion on the proposed legislation in “Congresses” held in areas with concentrated Indian population.3 However, it required practical application by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the IRA met criticism. The onset of World War II caused many of the economic programs for Indians under the Indian New Deal to be cut, and a more rigorous attempt at removing Native American federal trust status ensued.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 2 S. Lyman Tyler, A History of Indian Policy, (Washington D.C.: United States Department of the Interior, 1973), 114. 3 Tyler, A History of Indian Policy,129.

2 Donald Fixico describes the ascent of termination as federal Indian policy following World War II in his book, Termination and Relocation. 4 Whereas the first half of the century likened federal policy to a sincere effort to assist Native Americans, after WWII the federal government wanted to rid Natives of their trust status and reduce their “dependence” on federal resources. Doing this, though, made it easier for Indian land to be acquired and rights subjugated, often by the states. Fixico argues that Native Americans suffered under terminationist policy much longer than had been previously thought. Returning WWII veterans were some of the first to be relieved of their trust status. One of the first serious proposals for ending trust restrictions, House Resolution 4196 proposed in September 1945, sought to “provide for removal of restrictions on property of Indians who serve in the armed forces.”5 H.R. 2165 in February 1947 “proposed to ‘emancipate’ certain Indian individuals who had served in the armed forces during World Wars I and II.”6 What we understand to be termination policy had, according to Fixico, been in the works since 1945. Indian development programs continued to be cut in the postwar years and assimilation reform remained a part of federal Indian policy under Truman. The Zimmerman Plan, created by Assistant Commissioner William Zimmerman, laid the groundwork for the first terminations in the 1950s and early 1960s.7 The plan divided tribes into categories of readiness for withdrawal of federal trust status based on economic assets, cultural “competency,” and other arbitrary measures. The Klamath in Oregon were one target. Wealthy, educated, and with rich timber resources, they already appeared to be assimilated into nearby communities. These examples of individual tribes ready for termination convinced federal officials that all Native Americans were ready to assimilate into mainstream society. Overwhelmingly, this was not the case for many tribes. The dominant sentiment held by Congress was that the U.S. should determine and pay its debt to Native Americans, and then they should take their place in American society.8 Unlike John Collier, the new Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Dillon S. Myer, immediately stirred opposition from Indians for supporting assimilationist legislation, opposition that would only

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 4 Donald Fixico, Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945-1960, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986). 5 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 15. 6 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 19. 7 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 33. 8 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 55.

! ! 3! ! ! grow throughout the 1950s. Myer moved to eliminate Collier bureaucrats and further decentralize the Bureau of Indian Affairs. In Eisenhower’s conservative, nationalistic, and strong America, American Indians were to simply become Americans. Native Americans distrusted the Bureau of Indian Affairs towards the end of the 1950s, and Commissioner Emmons became a focal point of Indian criticism. Though Emmons and the BIA pledged to better Indian affairs, Fixico asserts that “[f]ederally supervised programs that were ineffective in preparing terminated tribes were continued, along with the persistence of substandard living conditions on reservations, as Native Americans entered the 1960s.”9 A total of 61 tribes, Indian groups, communities, rancherías, and allotments were terminated between 1954 and 1960.10 House Concurrent Resolution 108, approved on August 1, 1953, committed the federal government to its policies of coercive termination. It proposed the immediate removal of federal services and supervision over tribal nations, and additionally, if the State could not provide, would “cut off tribal funds, liquidate tribal property, abolish federal protection of Indian land and potentially lead to loss of Indian trust property.”11 The tribes affected under HCR 108 included the Flathead of Montana, Klamath of Oregon, Menominee of Wisconsin, Potawatomi of Kansas and Nebraska, and the Chippewa of North Dakota. A companion to the bill, Public Law 280, permitted the states of California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin to extend civil and criminal jurisdiction over reservations. Both laws marginalized tribal sovereignty and became the focal point of the NCAI’s efforts through the 1950s and 1960s specifically as they infringed on self-determination. Though some more acculturated NCAI leaders did not oppose the overall goals of termination–that of assimilation and equal opportunity–they wanted tribes to be aware of and prepared for change.12 Future policy change required participation and consultation of tribes – “the consent of the governed.”13 Here the NCAI embarked on long legislative battles against policy essentially denying Native Americans their rights. With the continued onslaught of termination legislation, threats provoked opposition by Native activist groups with the NCAI principle in defining and lobbying self-determination.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 9 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 174. 10 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 181. 11 Thomas W. Cowger, The National Congress of American Indians: The Founding Years, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 112. 12 Cowger, The National Congress of American Indians, 102. 13 Cowger, The National Congress of American Indians, 113.

4 The National Congress of American Indians The NCAI entered the stage in 1944. Delegates from 27 States representing 50 tribes met to establish an organization with the purpose “to enlighten the public, preserve Indian cultural values, seek an equitable adjustment of tribal affairs, and secure and preserve their rights under treaties.”14 Encouraged by John Collier, and assistant commissioner William Zimmerman, greater Indian political activism and national Indian mobilization was imperative to, “[taking] the leading part in inquiring into needs of Indians and making those needs vocal.”15 Indian leadership should contribute to the formulation of federal policy, rather than just resisting. The three founders, D’Arcy McNickle, Archie Phinney, and Charles E.J. Heacock, envisioned a national Indian organization defending Indian rights.16 Minimal book-length scholarship has been written regarding the National Congress of American Indians. Thomas Cowger in The National Congress of American Indians: The Founding Years explores the first twenty years of the organization.17 Focusing on its creation and ending in the mid-1960s, Cowger believes those years were the most important in the history of the organization. He states that 1964 signaled a transition period with the immediate threat of any new termination policy quelled by the Kennedy administration. Although JFK’s assassination in November 1963 dissolved the hopes of an “Indian Camelot,” and NCAI factionalism in 1962-63 almost destroyed the organization, after 1964 the NCAI led by Vine Deloria Jr. as executive director ushered in a new age of Indian activism and organization. To illustrate the evolution of Native American political activism in the two decades following World War II, Cowger traces the changes in public policy and the Native response through the lens of the National Congress of American Indians. As the majority of the NCAI records focus on policymaking, it is easiest to only be concerned with political matters. He describes his work as “a story of Indian successes and failures,” as they sought to achieve control over their own political, cultural, and economic agendas.18 Cowger utilizes ethnic identity theory to show how the NCAI as an interest group encouraged and sustained a Pan-Indian identity, one that all Indians could get behind.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 14 “The National Congress of Americans Indians,” quoted in S. Lyman Tyler, A History of Indian Policy, 145. 15 N.B. Johnson, “The National Congress of American Indians,” The American Indian, vol. 3, no. 3, summer 1946, p. 2 quoted in S. Lyman Tyler, A History of Indian Policy, 146. 16 Cowger, The National Congress of American Indians, 31. 17 Cowger, The National Congress of American Indians. 18 Cowger, The National Congress of American Indians, 5.

! ! 5! ! ! In the first twenty years of the organization's history, the National Congress of American Indians fought to protect Alaska native rights, to end voting discrimination, to create the Indians Claim Commission, to stop termination legislation, and ultimately to “push greater Indian participation in decision-making processes.”19 The NCAI was not passive about termination and political involvement, as some historians might claim. Helen Peterson became Executive Director of the NCAI in 1953, and in February 1954 she called a conference to launch “an unprecedented drive in the postwar years to defeat or modify the coercive termination program,” marking a turning point in reducing the movement.20 The primary objectives at the conference were to unify Indian support against termination and to provide a forum for public relations; it coincided with congressional hearings on termination bills in Washington D.C.21 Before the results could be determined Thomas Cowger states, “Proponents of termination had attempted to rush new policy through Congress before most Native Americans understood its implications.”22 Congress approved six of the twelve bills under discussion at the proceedings–including the Menominee and Klamath.23 Cowger ends his study of the National Congress of American Indians in the mid-1960s because by 1964 there were no major legislative battles, as there had been during the first termination laws. Additionally, he argues that the NCAI lost its edge as the sole national Indian organization with the founding of the National Indian Youth Council and other intertribal organizations, and later with the media attention given to the militant American Indian Movement.24 He also admits that the Smithsonian documents on the NCAI had not been processed after 1964 at the time of his research. However, at the time of my research with the same records, their processed resources on the organization surpassed the 1980s. John Fahey’s book Saving the Reservation offers a different look at government-Indian relations during the 1950s.25 Joseph R. Garry, as president of the National Congress of American Indians, and holding a variety of other offices throughout his life, changed the course of events

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 19 Cowger, The National Congress of American Indians,10. 20 Cowger, The National Congress of American Indians, 99. 21 Cowger, The National Congress of American Indians,115. 22 Cowger, The National Congress of American Indians, 115-116. 23 Cowger, The National Congress of American Indians, 114. 24 Cowger, The National Congress of American Indians, 4. 25 John Fahey, Saving the Reservation: Joe Garry and the Battle to be Indian, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001).

6 for Indians, argues Fahey.26 He brought a new perspective and an aggressive agenda to the NCAI and, working with executive director Helen Peterson, set the organization on a new path. But Fahey establishes his work as not a history of the NCAI, but rather an exploration into how Joseph Garry worked to change the future of federal Indian politics. However, its chapters offer the inner workings and mindset of the organization, often overlooked in political histories of activism, and indirectly we can see how the NCAI operated at the height of termination. In 1954, the National Congress of American Indians stood as the most significant organization to promote Indian people thanks to the work of Garry, Peterson, and others who strove to put Native American issues back on the radar of the American public.27 The National Congress of American Indians accomplished this by publicizing their dismay with termination legislation, specifically the Menominee and Klamath terminations. Conventions allowed for members to come together and to come up with solutions in the forms of resolutions. This type of participation spoke to the goals of the organization: to become involved with the policy process and to not only resist. Joe Garry was NCAI president for 6 years, between 1953-1959, the brunt of federal legislation aimed at forced termination.28 The ability of the organization to not exacerbate termination during this period helped them be ready to face and fight destructive federal Indian policy in the next decade. Thus Joe Garry offers a glimpse into these crucial and formative years for the organization. What the historiography of the NCAI lacks is the analysis of their efforts in the whole decade of the 1960s when the opportunity was ripe for an offensive on federal Indian policy not representative of their desires. Historiography of the 1960s Native American Activism General scholarship on the 1960s and the Kennedy and Johnson administrations are fairly consistent in their lack of discussion on federal Indian policy or the Native American rights movement as a whole. The omissions, sometimes entirely of Indian affairs, is emblematic of the focus historians take on the 1960s in general. This is excusable in some way for the Kennedy administration as there was no Native American-centered legislation, and that arguably both administrations were invested in foreign and global politics—the Cold War, communism, and the Vietnam War. The Native American rights movement doesn’t appear in this historiography until !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 26 Fahey, Saving the Reservation, ix. 27 Fahey, Saving the Reservation, 45. 28 Fahey, Saving the Reservation, 144.

! ! 7! ! ! the founding of the American Indian Movement (AIM) in the late 1960s. Scholarship focused on Native American activism and the relationship with the federal government in the 1960s that includes the NCAI is limited. Thomas Clarkin, in his book Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, focuses on the process of policy formation in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.29 Feeling that these two administrations receive little scholarly attention, he believes that they brought about a new direction in federal Indian policy. Post- WWII politics and impending termination policy added a sense of urgency at the start of the 1960s and Native rights groups, like the NCAI, started to assume bigger roles in policy formation. However, Clarkin restricts his discussion of Indian activism only to the organizations, individuals, and events that captured the attention of policy makers—contending that most key figures were white. The NCAI appear as minimal actors in Clarkin’s work, when in reality they set themselves up to be more politically active in the 1960s. Although tribal termination affected an estimated 30% of the Native population and landholding status, the threat of it affected all Indians and spurred the need for policy reevaluation.30 Clarkin believes that this fear hampered any efforts to implement self- determination policy throughout the 1960s. Further, historians often dismiss the period through 1965 as barren, and Kennedy as a poor leader in Indian affairs, a stance Clarkin maintains in his book. After the 1960 Presidential Election, “the [NCAI] looked to capitalize on Kennedy’s electoral victory,” says Daniel Cobb in his book Native Activism in Cold War America.31 Kennedy’s “New Frontier” or “New Trail,” “carried the promise of ending the threatening period of negation that preceded it.”32 D’Arcy McNickle and others said the democratic victory meant a great deal for the future of Indian Country. Cobb argues that Native activism frequently used the setting of the Cold War to frame their platform for achieving and exercising political power. They could either work from within or apply pressure from the outside. Native American activist groups did both to make the system work for them.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 29 Thomas Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2001). 30 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969,12. 31 Daniel Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America: The Struggle for Sovereignty, (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2008). 32 Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America, 30.

8 Self-determination did not become a significant term amongst Native American rights organization until the American Indian Chicago Conference (AICC). The conference, coordinated by NCAI members and University of Chicago anthropologist Sol Tax, was “a summit in which Native people could speak to make their position on the future of Indian policy clear.”33 The final product, the “Declaration of Indian Purpose,” is often seen as the beginning of the modern pan-tribal movement for self-determination. It called for the abolition of the Bureau of Indian Affairs to be replaced by a National Indian Commission, expanded access to education, and most importantly, “full Indian participation” in all matters—all views the NCAI would adopt as their conception of self-determination.34 NCAI President Clarence Wesley expressed, “regardless of whether all or part or none of our recommendations are accepted, we have our first real opportunity to go ‘on the offensive’...”35 The defining of self-determination at this conference guided the NCAI’s individual endeavors in facing the federal government’s Indian policy. George Pierre Castile describes the second turning away from termination in To Show Heart; the first turning point occurred in the 1930s and 1940s under the Indian “New Deal.”36 He seeks to put Indian organizations as agents of political change by arguing that the impact of Indian voices was critical in the self-determination era. Prior policy had been made with almost no regard for Native American opinion. The NCAI sought to change this as they focused on promoting self-determination that included their consultation and active participation in the policy process. Kennedy remains a topic of extreme interest for historians and biographers, however little is ever mentioned regarding his thoughts on Indian policy. Both political parties during the 1960 presidential election included platforms addressing Native American issues, citing that more could be done to improve Indian affairs, but neither outright renounced termination.37 Castile contends that there was little hope in an immediate shift away from termination policy, nor any substantive signs of a new direction. Ultimately, “Kennedy’s administration did have some impact by the promised act of ‘inclusion,’” as Native Americans were written into domestic

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 33 Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America, 31. 34 Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America, 35. 35 Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America, 35. 36 George Pierre Castile, To Show Heart: Native American Self-Determination and Federal Indian Policy, 1960- 1975, (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1998). 37 Castile, To Show Heart, 4.

! ! 9! ! ! reform.38 As other historians argue, Kennedy focused on the problem of poverty through the emergence of the civil rights movements. However, his poverty programs were small compared to Johnson’s later War on Poverty and not designed with Native Americans in mind.39 Castile concludes that not much changed by the end of the Kennedy years, asserting that termination policy simply ran out of steam in the 1960s, with Congress being concerned with other matters.40 He contends that major change in Indian policy occurred in relation to larger scale shifts in federal social policy and Native Americans lacked the political force to incite that shift. However, the NCAI and other activist groups indeed played a larger role in increasing the visibility of Native American issues as they conceptualized the idea of self-determination. Clarkin, Cobb, and Castile exemplify scholarship that includes Native American activism beyond the scope of militant groups in the discussion of policy in the 1960s, yet they downplay the significance of the NCAI in defining self-determination in politics. 1960s Domestic Affairs Godfrey Hodgson covers both presidents in his JFK and LBJ.41 JFK’s domestic reform and progress on civil rights took a back seat to foreign policy, and he was cautious on getting legislation moved. Kennedy is often credited with initiating poverty programs that would take firmer ground under Johnson’s War on Poverty. In his first months of office Kennedy urged Congress to enact a bill that spoke to his interest in the politics of poverty; the Area Redevelopment Act, which included Native American tribes, was signed within 5 months of JFK entering office.42 No group exemplifies the problems of poverty as much as Native Americans do, yet they receive no mention throughout this work. Johnson’s famous “Forgotten American” speech, which declared self-determination as policy, is also absent from Hodgson’s work. Even discussion of Johnson’s War on Poverty, which discernibly benefitted Native Americans, focused on racial change and poverty in urban ghettos and rural farms. G. Calvin Mackenzie & Robert Weisbrot in The Liberal Hour describe Native Americans as having the most dramatic shift in public policy during the rights revolution of the 1960s.43

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 38 Castile, To Show Heart, 4. 39 Castile, To Show Heart, 20. 40 Castile, To Show Heart, 175. 41 Godfrey Hodgson, JFK and LBJ: The Last Two Great Presidents, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015). 42 Hodgson, JFK and LBJ, 142. 43 G. Calvin Mackenzie & Robert Weisbrot, The Liberal Hour: Washington and the Politics of Change in the 1960s, (New York : Penguin Press, 2008).

10 Riddled with unemployment ten times higher than the national average, poverty and housing problems, the least access to education, and increasing rates of alcoholism and suicide, more militant groups arose to combat Indian Country’s growing problems, yet there is no further discussion on Indian affair.44 Native Americans in the 1960s receive one paragraph and neither mention of Native rights organization nor any specific action taken. Klaus Fischer, in a chapter titled “Riding the Coattails of Revolt” in his book, America in White, Black, and Gray, fails to give agency to Native Americans by claiming they piggy-backed on the African-American civil rights movement.45 Coming out of the era of potential termination, Fischer seems to downplay the devastating consequences that would result from tribal termination. Instead he defines termination as a way to “free Native Americans from federal supervision so that they could become full citizens enjoying equal rights with all other Americans,” and not the devastating blow to Indian self-identity that was the concern of Native rights groups like the NCAI.46 His “analysis” of termination policy ends there. Not only does scholarship fail to include Indian affairs in the 1960s, it also excludes the primary Native American actors in formulating federal Indian policy and promoting self-determination. These works on the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and the 1960s exclude or undermine the active Native American rights activism taking place, putting it alongside and not distinct from the larger civil rights movement. Significance The National Congress of American Indians has since its creation been dedicated to the “battle for legislation to resolve outstanding claims against the US government, to secure full civil liberties, and to ensure the continued recognition of treaty rights.”47 Scholarship that shows the scale and influence of the NCAI are few and far between. Historians are aware of the work that they did in halting termination policy by the end of the 1950s, but recognition is not often given to them as an organization during the 1960s. The NCAI faced more than just termination policy as obstructions on the path to achieve self-determination, also contending with Public Law 280 and legislation related to heirship land and economic development. They deserve more scholarly recognition as a leading and influential Native rights group. Policy studies should now !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 44 Mackenzie & Weisbrot, The Liberal Hour, 180. 45 Klaus P. Fischer, American in White, Black, and Gray: The Stormy 1960s, (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group Inc., 2006). 46 Fischer, American in White, Black, and Gray, 355. 47 Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America, 11.

! ! 11! ! ! include the perspective of Natives as they responded to federal policies and programs, and likewise the actors who worked to influence the formation of policy and assert the right to determine their own futures as self-determined people. To avoid it from becoming a study of federal Indian policy solely from the perspective of the U.S. government, I draw heavily from documents and materials from the National Congress of American Indians records and the Helen L. Peterson papers at the National Museum of the American Indian archives. Resolutions and materials from annual conventions and conferences, as well as letters and news releases from the NCAI and the Department of the Interior, provide insight into that relationship. Statements given at Congressional hearings and proceedings on the various bills introduced show how the NCAI were able to cohesively gather the opinion and sentiment held by Native Americans, and use themselves as the platform to participate in and incite change in federal Indian policy towards self-determination. This project looks at the National Congress of American Indians participation in the politics of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations as they define and develop self-determination, based on the preservation of their rights and status, consultation and participation in the policy process, and economic development. This thesis is divided into two chapters delineating the two presidential administrations of Kennedy and Johnson and illustrating how Native American activism, as practiced by the NCAI, operated through the 1960s and advocated self-determination. Militant activism became popular later on in the 1960s but true change came from the diligent lobbying and legislative action taken by the NCAI. During the Kennedy Administration, three main issues (termination, state jurisdiction under P.L. 280, and heirship) were persisting problems and threats for Native Americans across the country, despite campaign promises. All having their origins in the early twentieth and even late nineteenth century framed as assimilation, the continuation of the rhetoric in and the implementation of said legislative policy restricted Native American self- determination because of its lack of consultation, inhibition of economic self-sufficiency, and threat to tribal sovereignty. Johnson’s War on Poverty programs did benefit many tribal nations and emphasized self-determination, specifically the Economic Opportunity Act, but termination ideology submerged itself in federal legislation and his “Forgotten American” speech was a “too little too late” paternalistic rhetoric that offered no concrete action for improving Indian affairs. Nevertheless, the 1960s were an important and transitional period that tested the political waters

12 of moving away from the hegemony of 1950s termination and assimilation. This decade more assuredly introduced the facets of self-determination through the NCAI’s work in lobbying federal Indian policy. The direction of policy during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations infringed on their tribal sovereignty, land, and culture, but the NCAI continued to support and represent tribal nations in emphasizing self-determination. The NCAI were vital during this period as agents of change in influencing Congress to establish self-determination federal Indian policy.

! ! 13! ! ! Chapter 1 A “New Trail’ Towards Self-Determination “Can you imagine people who can so harden their hearts and shut their eyes as to be able to say there is no Indian problem?” asked psychiatrist Dr. Karl Menninger, addressing the 17th annual convention of the National Congress of American Indians in Denver, Colorado in 1960. Native Americans had all but been forgotten or legislated into non-existence throughout the twentieth century. Menninger, however, was optimistic: “We are hopeful for a new horizon. The hopeless years may be in the past.”48 As the organization of, for, and by Native Americans, the National Congress of American Indians continued to represent and fight for the protection of rights and the advancement of Native Americans in striving for self-determination during the 1960s. The Kennedy administration, though short, was perceived to create cooperation and trust between the federal government and Native Americans, harkening a new era in federal Indian policy. A new horizon stretched ahead wherein the concept of self-determination was emphasized over assimilationist policy. During this administration, the NCAI more fully engaged with the politics of federal Indian policy, making possible the improvement of Native American life leading ultimately to self-determination. Kennedy, in a telegram delivered at the closing session of the NCAI’s seventeenth annual convention stated that, “We must raise the sights of our country. [W]e must exercise world leadership and back up our position through a stronger and more productive America,”—this America included Native Americans.49 Task Force on Indian Affairs The new Democratic administration had plans in mind to properly assist Native Americans. The Department of the Interior was directly involved in formulating the administrations’ policy initiatives and programs concerning Indian affairs. The power rested with the Interior Secretary, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and members of Congress. However, the NCAI used the Department of the Interior to assume greater roles in policy formation and include Native opinion through the submission of resolutions and the influence of their national conventions.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 48 “Kennedy Praised for Indian Stand,” The New York Times (New York: NY), November 17, 1960. 49 “Indian Aid Pledged. Kennedy Vows to Develop Reservation Resources,” The New York Times, November 18, 1960.

14 President Kennedy nominated Stewart Udall for Secretary of the Interior on December 7, 1960. Udall’s reputation and expression of his concern with Indian issues made him a favorable choice for the Interior secretary position. He was an ardent campaigner for Kennedy and his background and reputation built as a congressman, during which he offered Indian affairs legislation in every congressional session, made him an excellent choice for the Interior position.50 In 1956, he defended the Indian Claims Commission stating that “until such time as these claims are settled once and for all, our Indian people will tend to look backward at their grievances and we will have a hard time getting them to look ahead to the future and assume their own responsibilities.”51 As a reward for his support, Kennedy nominated Udall. He promised to “work very closely with the Indian people themselves and with their leaders,” even praising the NCAI for its practical and constructive programs.52 A letter from the NCAI to Udall on December 8, 1960, reflected its confidence in Kennedy’s administration, as well as a way for the organization to solicit their services, “Sincerest congratulations on your appointment. We know your administration will be long and distinguished. Call on us for any service we possibly can give you.”53 Following the 1960 Annual Convention, Helen Peterson sent copies of resolutions passed at the Denver convention to the Secretary of the Interior designate. She urged him to particularly look at the resolutions regarding the qualifications for the new BIA Commissioner, an audience with President-Elect Kennedy, and on general policy. Referencing a telegram JFK sent to the convention, Peterson described the response it elicited, “...nothing I have seen in my twelve years with NCAI has so encouraged and cheered a convention and so challenged it to constructive effort...”54 The platform and the administration reflected the concerns of the NCAI, and they were more than willing to participate. “Perhaps for the first time,” said Peterson, “there can be a period of genuine cooperation and trust, and real dedication to a constructive Indian program by both the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 50 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 20. 51 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 21. 52 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 22. 53 Letter to Secretary of the Interior Udall from the National Congress of American Indians; December 8, 1960; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 69 Folder Udall, Stewart; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 54 Letter to Secretary of the Interior Udall from Helen Peterson; December 23, 1960; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 69 Folder Udall, Stewart; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution.

! ! 15! ! ! government and the Indian people.”55 This enthusiasm repeated itself throughout the 1960s with the genesis of a new administration and its conviction to create an effective federal Indian policy based on cooperation between the two. Udall did not entirely renounce ending federal trusteeship when he spoke at the NCAI convention in December 1959, though he condemned the Eisenhower administration for not emphasizing programs to usher in successful termination. Udall called for human and resource development that, “will make it possible for our Indian people to formulate their own plans for self-determination.”56 These statements found, or attempted to find, their way into his work as Secretary of the Interior, a gradual termination process with no declared deadline that emphasized development and Indian participation in the policy process. As he transitioned into his Interior position, Udall continually expressed concerns on Native issues. Kennedy noted, “I don’t think there is anyone in the United States that is more familiar with this problem [of Indian issues].”57 Kennedy’s nomination of Udall as Department of the Interior Secretary was also met with general approval during the Senate Interior Committee hearing. Udall was directly responsible for the creation of the Task Force on Indian Affairs. In a 1969 oral history interview, John A. Carver, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Interior, recalled that, “Mr. Kennedy, the President, was being pressured in a very direct way through his own staff to do certain things about the Indian Bureau.”58 The pressure did not come from one of President Kennedy’s initial task forces, but was wholly initiated by Secretary Udall. The main thrust of the task force, says Carver, was in “devising [a] philosophy or a policy for the governmental activities with reference to the Indians’; carrying on of the governmental programs or industrial development.”59 Carver noted that the task force was not created in response to previous Secretary of the Interior Frederick Seaton’s denouncement of termination in 1958, and that it did well to set the stage for Indian policy in the years following.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 55 Letter to Secretary of the Interior Udall from Helen Peterson; December 23, 1960; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 69 Folder Udall, Stewart; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 56 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 21. 57 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 22. 58 John A. Carver, Jr., recorded interview by William W. Moss, October 7, 1969, (page 1), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program. 59 John A. Carver, Jr., recorded interview by William W. Moss, October 7, 1969, (page 4), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.

16 Members who genuinely cared about Native American affairs, and well suited for the task at hand, proved to be the foundation of an acknowledgement and shift in federal Indian policy that addressed the issues facing Native Americans. With Kennedy’s endorsement of the task force, Udall set about studying the issues in Indian affairs. Carver noted that Udall decided to ask William W. Keeler, principal chief of the Cherokee Nation, a high official in the Phillips Petroleum Company, and member of the Fund for the Republic Committee, to head the task force. A Department of the Interior Information Service notice from January 24, 1961, confirmed W.W. Keeler as a consultant on Indian Affairs, specifically “on plan ning policy and reorganization of function of the BIA.”60 Carver expressed that Keeler was an absolutely outstanding choice for it.61 Other members included James Officer, an anthropologist; William Zimmerman Jr., a previous assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs; and Philleo Nash, an anthropologist and politician long invested in Indian affairs.62 In a letter from the NCAI Executive Council to Udall, Keeler, and Carver, they expressed their appreciation for the appointment of NCAI President Clarence Wesley to the Task Force. Wesley served as a symbol for elected tribal leadership as well as incorporation of the NCAI into the political sphere.63 Task force meetings started on February 7, 1961, and addressed issues concerning reservation development, education and employment, and amending the damaging House Concurrent Resolution 108. On the agenda for consideration by the Indian Study Task Force were 38 items submitted by the National Congress of American Indians. Items 5 and 6 refer to House Concurrent Resolution 108 and amendments to the legislation, as well as a call to resolve “the heirship land problem.” Other items call for the development and improvement of reservations and programs; for example, item 33 calls for “increased consultation with Indians.”64 However, Udall expressed doubt about the ability of the committee to reshape policy, and he even dug at Indian participation. Udall expressed a paternalistic perception concerning !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 60 Department of the Interior Information Service; January 24, 1961; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 66, Folder: Keeler, W.W. (Consultant, BIA); National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 61 John A. Carver, Jr., recorded interview by William W. Moss, October 7, 1969, (page 2), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program. 62 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 25. 63 Letter to Secretary of the Interior Udall, Asst. Secy of Interior John A. Carver, and W.W. Keeler from NCAI Executive Council; March 14, 1961; Helen L. Peterson Papers, Box 4 Folder NCAI Executive Council Meetings 1961; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 64 Agenda Items for Indian Study Task Force Consideration; February 27, 1961; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 488 Folder Questionnaires and Memoranda Relating to the Task Force Report 1961; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution.

! ! 17! ! ! Indian participation in the policy process. He perceived Native Americans as too self-interested with “special axes to grind, some of them view the problem from too narrow a point of vantage,” since there was inherently no bureaucratic tradition for incorporating them into the process. 65 The NCAI advocated for increased political activism and for its inherent capability to promote tribal self-determination. For the sake of representing the Native perspective, the task force held meetings with various tribes for them to offer their suggestions, beginning on March 20, 1961, “to bring an imaginative, New Frontier approach to the field of Indian problems.”66 Speaking to the executive council of the NCAI and members of the Oklahoma congressional delegation at a meeting held March 14, 1961, W.W. Keeler and Acting Indian Commissioner John Crow outlined plans of the task force group and “emphasized [Udall’s] belief that the final answer to Indian problems must be found among the Indian people themselves.”67 At that meeting, the Honorable Earl Boyd Pierce, of Muskogee, Oklahoma, presented a letter representing the view of the executive meeting of the NCAI. The executive council asked the task force to reflect on the concerns of Indian nations, namely, bureau administration, health, education, relocation, and termination. Additionally, the executive council believed in the participation and cooperation of Indian leaders wherein “constituted authorities of the several Indian tribes of this Nation will gladly give to your task force the highest degree of cooperation and that Indian tribal leaders are anxious for the opportunity to assist your body at any time or place.”68 Along with the letter they sent a copy of the resolutions adopted at the Denver, Colorado NCAI annual convention, explicitly asking the task force to take thoughtful consideration on Resolutions 1, 2, 24, and 25. The NCAI was making sure their voice, and by extension the voice of the majority of American Indians, was heard despite Udall’s initial misgivings. To compile the report, the task force travelled 15,000 miles and spoke with representatives of 200 organized tribes. Such action represented a genuine effort to include Native Americans in the policy despite Udall’s doubts. The report reflected the thoughts and

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 65 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 26. 66 “New Frontier for American Indians. Extension of Remarks of Hon. Ed Edmondson of Oklahoma in the House of Representatives” (Congressional Record Bound, CR-1961-0361, March 16, 1961), A1846-A1847. 67 “New Frontier for American Indians. Extension of Remarks of Hon. Ed Edmondson of Oklahoma in the House of Representatives” (Congressional Record Bound, CR-1961-0361, March 16, 1961), A1846-A1847. 68 “New Frontier for American Indians. Extension of Remarks of Hon. Ed Edmondson of Oklahoma in the House of Representatives” (Congressional Record Bound, CR-1961-0361, March 16, 1961), A1846-A1847.

18 concerns of Indian leaders, “The ideas in this report are yours,” said Philleo Nash.69 The task force released its policy recommendations titled “Report to the Secretary of the Interior by the Task Force on Indian Affairs” on July 10, 1961. The opening statement highlighted Udall’s goal of economic development and encouraging Indian participation in the policy process, “in order to ensure the success of our endeavor, we must solicit the collaboration of those whom we hope to benefit—the Indians themselves.”70 The report was divided into two significant areas of concern: creating programs that promoted economic growth and focused on community services like health and education, and restructuring the federal bureaucracy to better its abilities.71 Economic growth would come from an expanded credit and settled Indian claims cases, while increases in vocational training funds would provide for job training and employment opportunity development. Indian education programs and the lack of a formal education was a major problem that needed addressing. Nash later described the task force’s recommended programs as reflecting, “the Indian voice, confidence, workability, and then a general absence of phoniness.”72 The development of these programs would allow for Indian success and self- determination, theoretically. A first draft submitted in January 1961 hinted at assimilationist and terminationist ideas; the final draft hardly differed. The goal of termination was not listed “per se” as an objective within federal Indian policy. Rather, the Task Force believed in getting Native Americans socially, economically, and politically to a point where special services were no longer necessary, thus “termination can be achieved with maximum benefit for all concerned.”73 Historian Daniel Cobb argues that the final report “finessed the issue of termination by adopting the language of modernization.”74 The “modernization” programs called for in the report would “lead tribes toward economic independence, without exactly mentioning that it would bring an

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 69 United States Department of the Interior News Release; September 21, 1961; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 12 Folder: Speeches 1961; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 70 Report to the Secretary of the Interior by the Task Force on Indian Affairs, July 10, 1961, Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. White House Staff Files of Lee C. White. General File, 1954-1964. Indians, 1962: July- September. JFKWHSFLCW-006-007. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. 71 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 27. 72 Philleo Nash, recorded interview by William W. Moss, February 26, 1971 (page 18), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. 73 Report to the Secretary of the Interior by the Task Force on Indian Affairs, July 10, 1961, page 6; Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. White House Staff Files of Lee C. White. General File, 1954-1964. Indians, 1962: July- September. JFKWHSFLCW-006-007. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. 74 Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America, 61.

! ! 19! ! ! end to the trust relationship and with it the recognition of tribal sovereignty.”75 Thus, while the report fulfills a principle of the NCAI’s vision of self-determination by emphasizing economic self-sufficiency, in reality it was also a thinly veiled attempt to push for Native American assimilation into American life, masked by the language of “modernization.” The last section of the report called for organizational changes to better implement these programs. However, Thomas Clarkin notes that the task force was reluctant to suggest any significant reorganization of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, instead calling for minor reforms to increase efficiency. Additionally, and unfortunately, the report failed to create institutional mechanisms to allow for increased Native American participation in the creation of Indian policy.76 The NCAI issued a memorandum to Secretary Udall concerning the reorganization of the BIA arguing, “On this change of administration it would seem appropriate that consideration be given toward streamlining the operation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.”77 Delegates from various tribes felt reorganization necessary to meet the needs of the American Indians. The memorandum suggested multiple principles: more authority at the field agency level, including competent personnel, an effective process for administrative review of decisions, a review of the Code of Federal Regulations and BIA Manual of Procedures; and most importantly “there must be more reliance on elected tribal officials as the voice of Indian people in that area.”78 Walter Wetzel, who served on the task force and (later) as President of the National Congress of American Indians, signed it. However, the programs and policies recommended in the report did not openly reject termination as the ultimate goal of federal Indian policy, as was implied in several campaign promises. A news release from the Department of the Interior from July 12, 1961, expressed Udall’s endorsement of a “New Trail” for Indians following the rhetoric of the Task Force Report: “we plan to place emphasis on Indian development rather than on termination...”79

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 75 Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America, 43. 76 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 29. 77 Memorandum to Secretary of Interior Udall; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 488 Folder Memorandum on Reorganization of BIA 1961; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 78 Memorandum to Secretary of Interior Udall; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 488 Folder Memorandum on Reorganization of BIA 1961; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 79 Department of Interior News Release; July 12, 1961; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 488 Folder Questionnaires and Memoranda Relating to the Task Force Report 1961; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution.

20 Termination seemed to be the hidden end goal of the federal government, only after economic self-sufficiency was achieved. Nash reflected on Kennedy’s campaign promises in an oral history interview in 1971, stating that Kennedy made promises that were difficult, if not impossible, to keep: “You can make [promises], but when you’re in a position of responsibility and you have to choose between, let us say, progress and the promise, ‘progress’ is very likely to prevail.”80 The promise Kennedy made in harkening a new direction in federal Indian policy fell short. Though the Kennedy administration appeared more sympathetic and adamant in replacing termination with development programs intended to improve Native American’s position in the United States, the Task Force report contained rhetoric that frightened Native Americans. As the NCAI had done in the 1950s, they countered the federal government’s attempt to coercively terminate several tribes through rigorous participation in politics, and expressed the desire for self-determination. Termination Having recently endured the era of imminent termination with the last presidency, the National Congress of American Indians fought to halt termination legislation as well as to make their concerns known to the rest of the nation. The declaration of a platform by the Democratic Party helped in the NCAI’s ability to interact with the federal government in developing new Indian policy. Having weathered and curbed the storm of termination policy throughout the 1950s, the organization believed that the political climate in the Kennedy administration suggested that now was the time to push even further the capabilities of Native Americans in the formation of new federal Indian policy towards self-determination. Oliver LaFarge, president of the Association on American Indian Affairs (AAIA), another national Indian organization established to protect and preserve tribal sovereignty and culture, directed identical queries to both Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy regarding their positions on Indian policy. Republican candidate Richard Nixon, campaigning as successor to Eisenhower, hailed the “constructive accomplishments under which the Eisenhower administration has hammered out through its programs with the American Indian people,” and confined to defending the previous administrations policies. In contrast, Kennedy promised a

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 80 This is in reference to the Kinzua dam, a disappointing moment for Native Americans and their relationship with the federal government. Philleo Nash, recorded interview by William W. Moss, February 26, 1971 (page 10), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

! ! 21! ! ! “sharp break with the policies of the Republican party.”81 Thus, John F. Kennedy framed LaFarge’s queries into a ten-point pledge to the American Indians. The points outlined goals to protect the Indian land base and cultural integrity, improve health and education programs and economic development, and to end coerced termination.82 The NCAI saw these ideas as fundamental to self-determination. They had reason to believe that under this administration Native Americans had the ability to attain self-determination. Regarding the Democratic Party’s stance on Indian affairs, in May 1960, Frank George, Nez Perce, gave a statement on American Indians before the Democratic Platform Committee. Having been active in tribal affairs for many years, even serving the National Congress of American Indians in a variety of positions, he spoke as a member of the American Indian Nationalities Division of the Democratic National Committee. George praised the proposed Indian Plank for the 1960 Democratic Platform, and was especially interested in the “implementation of a workable Indian policy to bring about the complete development of human and natural resources in Indian country,” as well as “a health, education, and welfare program more realistic and in keeping with the present-day needs of the Indians...”83 These points were in line with what the NCAI wanted to achieve for Native Americans across the nation and their idea of self-determination, and were written in part after consultation with NCAI members.84 In his speech, George said that the Democratic Party had always been concerned about Native peoples—dating back to the administration of FDR and passage of the Indian Reorganization Act with John Collier as Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Referring specifically to 1950s termination era legislation, George said the Republican Party pledged in 1952, “‘to eliminate the existing shameful waste’ in the administration of Indian affairs” to instead emphasize relocation and termination.85 The Republican Party regarded reservations as economic burdens of the federal government. Bills introduced to Congress used terms such as “free” and “emancipate” the Indian, as well as “turning the Indian loose,” rhetoric !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 81 “Statement by Vice President Nixon to the Association on American Indian Affairs,” reprinted in Freedom of Communications: the Joint Appearances of Senator John F. Kennedy and Vice-President Richard M. Nixon, Presidential Campaign of 1960 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1961), 529-31, quoted in Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 13. 82 Cowger, The National Congress of American Indians, 130. 83 Frank George, Statement on American Indians, May 27, 1960, Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. White House Staff Files of Harris Wofford. Alphabetical Files, 1956-1962. National Congress of American Indians, 1960: 27-29 June, undated, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. 84 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 12. 85 Frank George, Statement on American Indians.

22 of the nineteenth century. House Concurrent Resolution 108 (HCR 108), the first proper termination legislation in 1953, sought to terminate the Federal trusteeship over Indian-owned property and end federal assistance to twelve Indian tribes. George, from the Colville reservation initially mentioned in HCR 108, said he was able to get them removed from the list after speaking to the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Likewise, the Osage of Oklahoma sent a tribal delegation to Washington to demand to not be included. Other tribes similarly staved off termination. For Republicans, termination was an “easy” solution to the “Indian problem.” The Democratic Party’s implied refutation of termination sought to curb the anxieties of Native Americans. Rather, the NCAI insisted that consistent encouragement and assistance from the federal government provided for bettering Indian affairs and allowed for tribes to be self-sufficient, a basis for self-determination. Frank George asserted that previously the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Washington staff spent considerable time trying to convince the general public as well as tribal governing bodies that the solution to American Indian problems lies in the termination of federal trusteeship.86 The NCAI opposed any kind of termination, coerced or otherwise. If there was going to be a shift in federal Indian policy, it had to be without termination. The National Congress of American Indians intended to work endlessly for a federal policy that promoted their self-determination. The NCAI Annual Convention held in Denver, Colorado in November 1960 following Kennedy’s election reflected strong optimism for a dramatic change in Indian policy. The theme for the convention, “Self-Determination, Not Termination,” suggested the new outlook of the 1960s.87 NCAI delegates saw self-determination as respect for Indian rights, cultural integrity, and a larger voice in Indian affairs. The NCAI passed 28 resolutions at the convention to be submitted to Congress that reflected this sentiment. Resolution #13 expressed appreciation to President Kennedy and assured NCAI’s participation in formulating Indian affairs. Resolution #24 urged President Kennedy to appoint a new Commissioner of Indian Affairs who was: sympathetic to the problems of the American Indians; devoted to the principles declared in the 1960 Democratic Platform; willing to recognize tribal governments and their goals; and

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 86 Frank George, Statement on American Indians. 87 Cowger, The National Congress of American Indians, 131.

! ! 23! ! ! respectful to the historical origins, traditions, and values of American Indians.88 The National Congress of American Indians looked to capitalize on Kennedy’s victory, seeing his presidency as a move towards tribal self-determination. Though Udall portrayed House Concurrent Resolution 108 as having, “no legal effect at the present time” to Richard Schifter, attorney for the Oglala Sioux of the Pine Ridge Reservation, termination proved to be a hard problem to kill.89 The proposed Indian plank for the 1960 Democratic platform merely reframed termination, calling for an end to coercive or premature termination of federal trusteeship. The Kennedy administration campaigned on development over termination. However, previous termination legislation came back to challenge the new administration’s ability to hold to its promises. House Concurrent Resolution 108 terminated four tribes during the Eisenhower years; three more tribes – the Menominee, Klamath, and the Mixed-Blood Utes of Utah – were scheduled for termination of federal services in 1961.90 The Menominee were the most pressing case for the Kennedy administration, scheduled for termination only three months after JFK took office. Congress granted extensions to the Menominee in 1958 and 1960 because they lacked programs to implement termination, a problem the Department of the Interior and the BIA wanted to fix by improving development programs. Further legislation authorized low-cost loans or appropriations for economic development to speed the termination process, though Assistant Secretary John Carver “blamed the tribe for the situation, claiming that the Menominee had ‘never really faced up to the full implications of the severance of the umbilical cord of Federal services.’”91 At the 1960 NCAI Annual Convention, a resolution passed in support of the Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin in “asking for a ‘reasonable’ extension of this deadline, in order to complete its planning for the full assumption of responsibility.”92 Full assumption of responsibility required effective human and economic development, but the emphasis on

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 88 Resolution #24; November 1960; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 12 Folder Resolutions 1960; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 89 Letter to Richard Schifter from Stewart Udall; April 15, 1961; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 256 Folder Indian Policy Resolutions- HCR 143, and SCR 26 [Repeal of HCR 108]; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 90 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 45. 91 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 47. 92 From the National Congress of American Indians for Immediate Release, Special to Wisconsin, November 18, 1960; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 488 Folder BIA Policies [1939-c.1965]; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution.

24 termination failed to stress these programs that would make it possible for Native Americans to be self-sufficient, a key point in self-determination. To combat the continuance of termination rhetoric, the NCAI adopted a statement at its 1961 Executive Council meeting vigorously opposing the termination of Federal trusteeship of Indian land, property, and services. The NCAI committed themselves “...to the full limits of its resources, to provide assistance as early as possible to tribes for which termination legislation is proposed, in informing their members of the choice they are making and the possible consequences of their action.”93 Termination impeded Native American self-determination through the reduction of tribal land and obstructing self-sufficient economic development. Even so, the Kennedy administration proved ineffectual in the face of proceeding termination. The Menominee were terminated as of May 1, 1961. Others noticed that promise did not equate to action. Philleo Nash described Congress’ attitude on termination in 1971, saying that, “from approximately 1950 to 1960... termination was the philosophy, and it is basically, at all times, the philosophy of Congress.”94 George Castile noted that, “the Democrat-led Congress was still very much committed to termination despite Kennedy’s campaign claims to the contrary.”95 The executive had to be willing to stand in opposition to Congress and the terminationist-controlled Senate Interior Committee, who had previously made clear that the Menominee would receive no further extensions. The Indian Affairs subcommittee dismissed any idea that Native Americans were not economically or socially ready, and Congress continued to push trust removal legislation through the mid-1960s. The NCAI faced a leadership change that almost imploded the organization. Executive Director Helen Peterson issued her resignation at the NCAI’s 18th Annual Convention at Lewiston, Idaho from September 18-22, 1961. Citing a new administration in Washington, Peterson believed termination was no longer the immediate threat it had been during the 1950s. Peterson was invaluable to the NCAI; her commitment to the organization preserved and advanced the NCAI through its early years, and in many ways her direction drastically slowed the termination movement. However, with the sweeping changes of the 1960s, the National Congress of American Indians needed to adopt a more combative stance. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 93 NCAI Policy Statement, 1961; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 54 Folder Executive Council 1961; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 94 Philleo Nash, recorded interview by William W. Moss, February 26, 1971 (page 12), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. 95 Castile, To Show Heart, 11.

! ! 25! ! ! Taking her place was Robert Burnette; he “demanded self-determination and an end to the dictatorial government agents and corrupt tribal officials.”96 Burnette said in a proposal to the NCAI endorsing its reorganization, “We cannot afford to waste any time during the administration of President Kennedy... it is up to us to fully back the President in Congress.”97 He was convinced that the organization formerly maintained a defensive position, “We must realize that during the past ten years the NCAI has been operating through ‘defensive’ measures and was never able to create the power to assume the ‘offensive’ on behalf of our Indian people.”98 During the 1950s, the NCAI could not do more than fend off the overwhelming threat. Burnette wanted the organization to now take further action against federal Indian policy. An effective and concerned Indian organization, with the confidence and respect of the federal government, is necessary to mobilize their participation in federal Indian policy and promote their idea of self-determination. At the NCAI’s 18th Annual Convention, Joseph Garry, the organization’s third president, gave the keynote address titled “The Heritage of the American Indian.” He recognized NCAI’s accomplishments as a successful national Indian organization: “One of the reasons NCAI was founded was to nurture and preserve our right to be American Indians,” stated Garry.99 Commonly acknowledged amongst the NCAI was the potential for promising Indian affairs in Kennedy’s “New Frontier.” Joseph Garry believed in the continuing relationship between the federal government and the National Congress of American Indians, “[a]lready we are working closely and it appears that our views are being respected.” The emphasis shifted to the role of the NCAI in promoting the Native voice, “it is for us to see that our ‘voice in Washington’ will be able to present our needs and views...”100 The work of the federal government in implementing self-determination Indian policy depended on a strong, unified national Indian organization that voiced the views of tribal nations.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 96 Cowger, The National Congress of American Indians, 143. 97 Proposal to NCAI; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 54 Folder Burnette Proposal to Reorganize 1961; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 98 NCAI Newsletter #6, December 14, 1962; National Congress of American Indian records, Box 13 Folder Convention Material 1962; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 99 Keynote Address by the Honorable Joseph R. Garry; September 18-22, 1961; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 12 Folder Speeches 1961; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 100 Keynote Address by the Honorable Joseph R. Garry; September 18-22, 1961; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 12 Folder Speeches 1961; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution.

26 Philleo Nash took time away from his Senate Interior Committee hearings to address the NCAI convention. He expressed that under Secretary Udall’s leadership and direction, “we are going to have one of the truly great periods of Indian advancement.” Being familiar with the nature of the organization he said, “I associate the NCAI with a vigorous defense of Indian rights.” The NCAI is the only national organization composed solely of organized tribes; a strong national organization like this is necessary in protecting Indian rights. Considering the agency’s historic unpopularity, Nash contended that the Bureau of Indian Affairs was equally concerned about the rights and responsibilities of Native Americans, his goal being “to work with you and to help you as best I can to grow and to prosper.”101 In discussing the recommendations from the task force report, they firmly believed it would serve as a roadmap for them to follow. A move away from their usual paternalism, they intended to implement programs that fostered self-determination. The 1961 Annual Convention reflected on and addressed the new administration in the federal government, and the direction the NCAI would go from here. In taking an offensive approach to politics, the NCAI could more effectively act in shaping federal Indian policy and in advocating self-determination. Termination was not the only legislative action threatening the ability to be self-determined. The heirship land problem, fractioned pieces of land held in trust by the federal government and unavailable for tribal use, prevented economic development on reservations, and legislation intended to remedy the issue possessed terminationist rhetoric. In response, the NCAI, representing the Native American voice, attended heirship legislation hearings and expressed their discontent with the state of federal Indian policy and its limits on self-determination. Heirship Land Problem Regarded as “one of the most serious problems facing our American Indian population,” the heirship land problem started with the distribution of individual allotments under the Dawes Act.102 The federal government held the title of the land in trust until the Indian owner was capable of assuming full responsibility. Upon the death of the original owner the estates are

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 101 United States Department of the Interior News Release; September 21, 1961; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 12 Folder Speeches 1961; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 102 Report of the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs to the Members of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, 87th Congress, 1st Session on Proposed Indian Heirship Land Legislation, May 15, 1961 (Washington, D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1961), 1.

! ! 27! ! ! probated and held in trust for the heirs who inherited the interests. As the probate process repeats, more and more Indians hold smaller and smaller interests in the tract of land. Income from the lease and sale were minimal and the heirship problem discouraged land programs and development. Difficulty also arose in how to take legislative action that would satisfy all heirs; it was also not cost-effective for the federal government to have this continue. Both the House and Senate conducted comprehensive studies at the beginning of the 1960s on the heirship problem. With that information, both introduced bills related to addressing heirship land. Representative Berry introduced H.R. 6569, a bill related to the Indian heirship land problem, to provide “an opportunity for the tribes to purchase the more important heirship tracts needed to strengthen their economy.”103 In an unpublished hearing to discuss the bill by the House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, Secretary of the Interior Udall issued a substitute draft that embodied H.R. 6569 but included two major premises: “Heirship land should be put to more productive use;” in a way that Indian owners can benefit from, and “...Should be kept in Indian ownership to the maximum extent possible.”104 Using previously useless land as a means of economic development, tribes could be more self-sufficient and by extension self-determined. The problems of heirship were directly related to the termination of trust status. In the Senate, Senator Frank Church (Idaho) introduced S. 1392 on March 21, 1961, and hearings began on August 9, 1961. Helen Peterson made a pointed statement about the fractionated land problem legislation. Though the NCAI was in accord with two objectives of the bill, by providing for termination of individual trusts the NCAI opposed S. 1392. The position of the NCAI had been spelled out in resolutions over a period of years; their bill permitted tailor- making it to fit the particular needs of each reservation instead of “forcing a general bill on tribes without regard to their particular needs and the differences which exist between them.”105 The most comprehensive resolution marking the official position of the organization came from the 1954 NCAI Annual Convention. Tribes should be allowed to acquire heirship land, previously of no economic value to its owners, so that it could be used for self-sufficient economic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 103 Report of the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs to the Members of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 7. 104 Statement of Hon. Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the Interior, Relating to Indian Heirship Land Legislation before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, 87th Congress, 1st Session, July 11, 1961 (Washington, D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1961), 5. 105 Statement of Helen Peterson, Executive Director, National Congress of American Indians, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session on S. 1392, August 9 and 10, 1961 (Washington, D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1961), 124.

28 development. Most importantly, Peterson stressed that “...some practical resolution of this difficulty must be effected before the United States can intelligently and fairly absolve itself of all trust responsibilities growing out of its treaty and constitutional obligations to Indian tribes.”106 If the United States had intentions to terminate tribes of their trust status, the heirship land problem, a problem initially caused by the federal government, must be resolved through new legislative means. The NCAI and other organizations refused to support S. 1392 for its terminationist stipulation, leading Church to revise the bill and introduce S. 2899 in early 1962.107 Proceedings for the bill were scheduled to correspond with the NCAI Executive Council meeting to allow them the opportunity to testify on S. 2899. Senator Church expressed the importance in receiving those testimonies, “I am sure the committee will benefit from their experience and knowledge of the heirship problem, and their recommendations will be given every consideration.”108 Robert Burnette, now serving as Executive Director, found several factors to be reconsidered before it met the approval of the NCAI and all tribes represented. Continued references to termination and no safeguards imposed was not agreeable to the organization, Burnette remarked, “The administrative failure to meet the fractionated heirship problem should not be used as a reason for removing the trust.”109 The term ‘self-determination’ rarely showed up in legislation. But where it was impeded, in heirship legislation that restricted economic development while also contending with attempts at termination, the NCAI intervened to promote self-determination. Again, Native American opposition prompted Church to revise his bill. His new bill S. 1049 contained no provisions that ended trust status on Indian land, however that did not mean there was agreement on it. Part 3 of the hearings on the Indian heirship land problem took place April 29 and 30 1963; Robert Burnette similarly made a statement on the matter. The central issue revolved around the differences between the needs of each individual tribe, a sentiment mirrored earlier by Peterson: “Each tribe has its different problems that must be specifically dealt with on a basis of the consent of the individuals involved.” Sections 1 and 2 of the bill, Burnette !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 106 Statement of Helen Peterson, 122. 107 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 64. 108 Indian Heirship Land Problem, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate, 87th Congress, 2nd Session on S. 2899, April 2 and 3, 1962 (Washington, D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1962), 194. 109 Statement of Robert Burnette, Executive Director, National Congress of American Indians, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate, 87th Congress, 2nd Session on S. 2899, April 2 and 3, 1962 (Washington, D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1962), 253.

! ! 29! ! ! argued, violated the constitutional rights of individual landowners for its ability to have their land sold without consent.110 Consent and consultation also composed NCAI’s idea for self- determination. The NCAI rejected the implementation of heirship legislation without the explicit consent or conference with tribes on their specific problems. An urgent NCAI newsletter from October 1963 urged members to get involved with the extremely important S. 1049. Passed on October 11, 1963 without amendment, members were asked to write letters and pass resolutions to oppose the legislation, encouraged to be politically active, and even write to President Kennedy “stating on no uncertain terms that this legislation is certainly one tremendous step toward termination and complete alienation of Indian lands.”111 Resolution 13 adopted at the September 1963 annual convention lambasted S. 1049, urging the Senate to reject it or to be amended.112 An emergency meeting of the Executive Committee in November 1963 sought to solidify their position on S. 1049. Burnette encouraged unity of understanding and for tribes to meet in order to reach one approach to settling the heirship problem; the final decision should rest in the hands of tribal leaders informed of their respective situations.113 Despite the opposition, the bill pushed through the upper house and referred to the House Interior Committee. Luckily, it was never reported out, with credit given to James Haley, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, for blocking hearings.114 For the time being, heirship legislation of this kind was dead. Though the issue became less about the actual heirship land, the NCAI nevertheless reacted in opposition to the introduced legislation as it related to termination and its limits on self-determination. In 1971, Philleo Nash charged heirship as one of “many phony issues in the field of Indian affairs....” and devoting major portions of the task force report to this issue as “a great disservice.”115 But the issue of heirship was of utmost importance to the NCAI; it restricted

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 110 Statement of Robert Burnette, 418. 111 NCAI Newsletter #10; October 21, 1963; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 54 Folder Executive Council Meetings- Emergency Meetings Sept. Oct. Nov. 1963; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 112 Resolution No. 13 passed at NCAI Annual Convention; September 1963; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 13 Folder Convention Materials, 1963; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 113 NCAI newsletter; November 9, 1963; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 54 Folder Executive Council Meetings- Emergency Meetings Sept. Oct. Nov. 1963; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 114 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 66. 115 Philleo Nash, recorded interview by William W. Moss, February 26, 1971 (page 18), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

30 their ability to be self-determined through the development of economic programs and promoted termination of trust status on tribal land. Heirship, along with Public Law 280, and termination were of top priority for the NCAI as they sought to protect the rights of all Native Americans. The NCAI was a lobbying force, extending Native American influence and opinion on legislation concerning them based on the principles of self-determination. Another 1950s termination era legislation, Public Law 280 naturally infringed on this due to the law’s lack of consent. The NCAI from the start opposed this legislation. However, the atmosphere of the 1960s and the nature of the Kennedy administration allowed the NCAI to be politically involved in legislative action, targeting Public Law 280 as a direct attack on Native American constitutional rights and by extension their self-determination. Public Law 280 The Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights initiated a series of hearings to investigate the constitutional rights of the American Indian, or rather how they were restricted in fully exercising their constitutional rights. Hearings took place four times between August 1961 and March 1963. “This study, to my knowledge,” stated Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. Chairman of the subcommittee, “is the first congressional inquiry into the most important and all too long neglected area of the law.”116 The subcommittee collected testimonies over 4 days in Washington D.C. from individuals in the Department of the Interior, the Interior’s Task Force on Indian Affairs, and private persons and organizations active in Indian Affairs. Field hearings conducted in other areas heard from Indian citizens. Gathering this information showed efforts taken by the federal government to at least hear the thoughts of Native communities. NCAI Executive Directors Helen Peterson and Robert Burnette both gave testimonies at different times during the 19 month long hearings. The primary purpose of the investigation into constitutional rights was to see how areas under Public Law 280 fared since federal jurisdiction transferred to the state. The NCAI opposed transfer of jurisdiction unless it had the consent of the tribe affected, due in part to fear of what the state would do or fail to do. By resolution the NCAI recommended amendment of P.L. 280 to require agreement by the particular state, as well as by the particular tribes affected, before jurisdiction may be transferred from the federal to the state government. The NCAI found states !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 116 Constitutional Rights of the American Indian, Hearings before the Committee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session pursuant to S. Res. 53, August 29, 30, 31, and September 1, 1961 (Washington D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1961), 1.

! ! 31! ! ! obviously unable or unwilling to accept the responsibility of new jurisdiction. Addressing the Constitutional Rights Subcommittee on 1 September 1961, Peterson noticed that the emphasis of the hearings lent to the notion that Indian tribal governments were responsible for denying members their constitutional rights. However, accounts of unwarranted shootings and disproportionate sentencing for Indians and non-Indians occurred where the State had assumed jurisdiction.117 Peterson boldly asserted the organizations readiness to assist the tribal councils and law enforcement agencies, the BIA, Congress, as well as the states involved in improving Indian communities. Robert Burnette, Executive Director in June 1962, attended Part 3 of the Constitutional Rights of the American Indian hearings. His statement reflected the concerns Peterson had several months prior. State law enforcement officers exercised jurisdictional power where they did not have it, in some instances going onto reservations and arresting Indian individuals to be tried in state courts. The issue of jurisdiction is a vital issue to the NCAI and the Native Americans they represent, and the absence of consent of the tribes directly related to their ability to reach self-determination. Previous resolutions passed by the NCAI “indicated, in 1953, that Public Law 280 would cause discrimination against the Indians.”118 Testimonials given at held hearings verified that. The investigation into American Indian constitutional rights and whether these rights were adequately protected under existing law illuminated the discrimination and maltreatment of Native Americans when put under state jurisdiction. P.L. 280, un-amended, did not allow for the consent of the Indians affected, nor did it confer with the state on whether it was capable of protecting their rights. Both introduced in early 1961, S. 1479, by Senator Metcalf, and H.R. 4756 by Representative Olson represented considerable thought in moving to resolve the problem. The NCAI endorsed these bills for providing for consent of the tribes. John F. Kennedy sent his best to the NCAI during their 19th Annual Convention held in Cherokee, North Carolina in September 1962. His brief message applauded their active participation and discussion in Indian Affairs and their pursuit to shape programs to benefit

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 117 Statement of Helen L. Peterson before the Constitutional Rights Subcommittee; September 1, 1961; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 67, Folder: Peterson, Helen (Executive Director, NCAI); National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 118 Statement of Robert Burnette, Executive Director, National Congress of American Indians, Hearings before the Committee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 87th Congress, 2nd Session pursuant to S. Res. 260, June 1, 2 and 6, 1962 (Washington D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1962), 634.

32 Native Americans.119 The theme of the convention was “Unity through Organization,” hoping to achieve unity of purpose. They discussed the issues surrounding Native Americans dealing with constitutional rights related to State jurisdiction under P.L. 280, heirship, and termination; these issues subsequently hindered their self-determination. In the Executive Directors Annual Report, Robert Burnette described the organization’s job to protect rights and treaties, and to raise the standard of living so that they can compete socially, economically, educationally, and politically. Burnette brought attention to the heirship problem, calling it “one that we all must face upto [sic] in the near future, so that the now useless lands can be made part of the overall economic development of the Indian people.”120 Well aware of the issue at hand, the NCAI had passed a multitude of resolutions informing the federal government of the issues that concerned Indian people. Resolution #4 called for Congress to amend P.L. 83-280 by adopting S. 1479 or H.R. 4759 before adjournment.121 The NCAI found it contrary to Native American principles of self-determination to impose civil and criminal jurisdiction on any person without their consent. The fourth part of the Constitutional Rights hearings coincided with the NCAI assembly in the White House Rose Garden and the NCAI Executive Council meeting. The opening remarks stated the obvious for continuing the hearings, “this opportunity for members of various Indian tribes to present testimony concerning their constitutional rights to the subcommittee should be both interesting and meaningful... as it considers legislation concerning the rights of the first Americans.”122 Osley B. Saunooke, Chief of the Eastern Band of Cherokee and First Vice-President of the NCAI, represented the organization at the fourth hearing. His statement was brief but poignant, drawing attention to how the United States has for far too long ignored

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 119 Letter from John F. Kennedy to Chief Osley B. Saunooke, September 6, 1962; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 13 Folder Convention Material 1962; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 120 NCAI Executive Directors Annual Report, September 1962; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 13 Folder Convention Material 1962; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 121“Resolutions Adopted by the 19th Annual Convention of the National Congress of American Indians” (Congressional Record Bound, CR-1962-0921, September 21, 1962), 20296. 122 Constitutional Rights of the American Indian, Hearings before the Committee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 88th Congress, 1st Session pursuant to S. Res. 58, March 7, 1963 (Washington D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1963), 816.

! ! 33! ! ! the rights of its original citizens. Their hope is that the constitutional rights study continues and results in legislation to finally guarantee Native Americans the same rights as others.123 Using the NCAI as a platform for expression, tribal delegates submitted statements to President Kennedy airing their grievances and advising recommendations. The Washington and Idaho delegates “go on record as being unalterably opposed to Public Law 83-280...[and] recommend that the said law be amended to provide that no State by unilateral action be allowed to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction upon any Indian reservation without the concurrent consent of the Tribal members thereof.”124 As expressed in the course of these hearings, states under this provision instead used it as a means of discriminating against Native Americans. Public Law 280 epitomized the disavowal of Native American self-determination by infringing constitutional rights and denying consultation by the tribes involved. The NCAI expressed their disapproval of this legislation because of its ability to impede self-determination, and they worked as an organization representing all tribes to initiate and encourage improvement in the lives of all Native Americans. 1963 On March 5, 1963, President Kennedy met with NCAI representatives in the Rose Garden. “Never in the history of the nation has the President of the United States had the opportunity to meet with so many Indian leaders at one time,” Robert Burnette wrote to the President a month prior, hoping to meet with him to submit a “high-level policy statement.”125 Also present were Udall, Nash, and members of the subcommittee on Indian Affairs. Walter Wetzel, President of the NCAI, delivered his statement and expressed gratitude for the efforts the administration took to fulfill the promises of the 1960 campaign. He asserted the organization’s belief in the programs and policies, emphasizing cooperation and the ability to participate actively. Wetzel also used this opportunity to articulate problems with current Indian affairs. He raised seven points, including a better system within the Indian Claims Commission, enforcement and protection of rights guaranteed by treaties, and “that Public Law 83-280 be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 123 Statement of O. B. Saunooke, Chief, Eastern Band of Cherokees, Hearings before the Committee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 88th Congress, 1st Session pursuant to S. Res. 58, March 7, 1963 (Washington D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1963), 879. 124 Statement to the President of the United States by the Washington and Idaho Delegates, March 5, 1963; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 13 Folder: Records of the Executive Council 1963; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 125 Letter to JFK from Robert Burnette; February 13, 1963; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 54 Folder March 1963; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution.

34 amended so as to provide for consent of Tribes.”126 President Kennedy’s response to Wetzel and the other representatives focused on education and unemployment, concentrating only on the last two years and the accomplishments of the Area Redevelopment Act and Public Works programs. Kennedy regarded this visit as, “a useful reminder to us all of our responsibilities to some of our most distinguished and in a very real sense first citizens.”127 Where Kennedy should have made a stand in supporting the NCAI, the issues most important to the NCAI went largely unaddressed. Despite uncertainties, the future in the 1960s seemed promising to the NCAI regarding Indian affairs and in achieving self-determination. An NCAI newsletter voiced that optimism, “I believe there are signs of change – clear signs of a turning in the tide. America today is moving forward, more rapidly and in more ways than ever before – moving toward the fulfillment of its destiny as the land of the free, a nation in which neither Indians nor any other racial or religious minority will live in under privilege.”128 Exactly one month and a day later, those hopes of a New Frontier would be dashed with the tragic assassination of John F. Kennedy. The whole nation, including Native American tribes, felt the despair of losing a symbol of hope and promise. Walter Wetzel mourned the loss of a personal friend in JFK, who received the name Chief High Eagle from the Blackfeet Indians of Montana.129 The Kennedy administration assuredly marked a new direction in Indian affairs in stark comparison to the 1950s. Termination had slowed significantly, still the Menominee, Catawba, Klamath, Mixed-Blood Ute, and several California rancherías had been terminated. Through congressional studies and hearings it was discovered the detriment of P.L. 280 on Native American constitutional rights, yet the issue was still under investigation into the Johnson administration. Even heirship legislation reemerged under Johnson. These three issues innately restricted Native American’s ability to achieve self-determination. The main components of self- determination –consent and consultation, political participation, and self-sufficient economic

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 126 For Immediate Release March 5, 1963, Office of the White House Press Secretary, Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President’s Offices Files. Speech Files. Remarks to National Congress of Americans Indians, 5 March 1963, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. 127 For Immediate Release March 5, 1963, Office of the White House Press Secretary, Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President’s Offices Files. Speech Files. Remarks to National Congress of Americans Indians, 5 March 1963, John F. Kennedy Library, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. 128 NCAI Newsletter #10; October 21, 1963; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 54 Folder Executive Council Meetings- Emergency Meetings Sept. Oct. Nov. 1963; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 129 “Indian Tribes Mourns Loss,” The New York Times, November 25, 1963.

! ! 35! ! ! development– found restrictions in federal Indian policy proposed at this time. The NCAI reacted to this in order to promote their conception of self-determination. In the wake of Kennedy’s assassination the NCAI pledged full support to the Johnson administration, and President Johnson promised that he would continue and push even further Kennedy’s Indian policies.130 Native Americans would benefit greatly from President Johnson’s War on Poverty with implementations under the Economic Opportunity Act embodying their idea of self-determination, the rhetoric more widely used in legislation. However, the NCAI still faced challenges in the later half of the 1960s related to their participation in forming policy, most notably exemplified by Udall’s Indian Resources Development Act. But the NCAI, more dedicated to the issues at hand under the executive directing of Vine Deloria Jr., challenged Congress to follow and enact their vision of self-determination.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 130 Cowger, The National Congress of American Indians, 146.

36 Chapter 2 Expressing Self-Determination in the Great Society NCAI members commemorated the 3rd anniversary of JFK’s inauguration at Arlington National Cemetery with a solemn graveside ceremony on January 20, 1964. Following the service, the delegation met with President Johnson in the East Room. NCAI President Walter Wetzel had presented Kennedy with the American Indian Chicago Conference’s Declaration of Indian Purpose in the same room only 10 months earlier. Similarly, Wetzel’s concerns at this meeting in describing the most important problems facing Native Americans included protecting Indian homeland, preventing the arbitrary transferal of federal jurisdiction to the state, upholding treaty obligations, encouraging Indian involvement in the development of policy, and promoting greater tribal self-government.131 President Johnson glossed over the NCAI’s proposals and talked largely of his own agenda on national security, economic solvency, and his plan for a War on Poverty. Nevertheless, the goals for the NCAI were much of the same, all comprising the philosophy of self-determination. Before Vine Deloria Jr. became the intellectual, author, historian, and overall influential American Indian he is now recognized as, he assumed the position of Executive Director of the NCAI at the 1964 Annual Convention in Sheridan, Wyoming. Serving until 1967, Deloria revitalized the debt-ridden and fractionated organization following the schism between Peterson and Burnette, and affiliated with smaller and long-neglected member tribes and youth activists in his commitment to reforming Indian affairs.132 By 1965, the NCAI transformed into a formidable and politically aggressive coalition directed towards promoting and achieving self-determination based on consultation and participation in formulating policy, preservation of culture and treaty rights by denying termination, and economic development to improve self-sufficiency. Stewart Udall spoke at the 1964 NCAI Annual Convention leading up to the ‘64 election lamented the loss of the friendship in Kennedy but added that gaining LBJ and his plans for The Great Society “rests on abundance and liberty for all. It demands an end to poverty and racial injustice,” adding, “to which we are totally committed in our time.” Johnson’s opponent, Barry Goldwater, and the Republican platform completely ignored the problems facing Native Americans. Udall revealed, “In the past 12 years [Goldwater] has opposed nearly every major

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 131 Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America, 80. 132 Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America, 119.

! ! 37! ! ! effort to improve the big picture of poverty and neglect on Indian reservations.”133 Johnson’s “Poverty Bill,” later Economic Opportunity Act, focused on education and training programs to “fix” poverty in the form of community action and working with federal agencies. The programs that emerged from the Great Society and Johnson’s commitment to ending poverty in America had a significant effect on Native communities, though not always directly addressing Native American concerns. Johnson received 61.1% of the popular vote, and with it saw a corresponding liberal dominance in Congress with men like George McGovern (D. -S. Dak.) and Walter Mondale (D. - Minn.) serving as advocates for Native Americans during the Johnson years, introducing legislation and heading sub-committees, and willing to work closely with the president as well as the NCAI.134 Congressional support in the House and Senate was necessary to defining and passing of legislation aimed at self-determination, but the two chambers were at war. Unfortunately, Udall later admitted “much of the major legislation that we proposed the last year or two instead of it going through readily it ended up in a disagreement with no results.”135 Additionally, Johnson had limited experience, knowledge, or interest in issues involving Native Americans therefore the new administration constituted a continuation of New Frontier policy and personnel. The 1961 Task Force Report continued to guide federal Indian policy and Udall stayed on as Secretary of the Interior. Despite possible misgivings, Clarkin suggests, “Johnson pledged to put Indians in the ‘forefront’ of the battle against poverty... Native Americans and their advocacy groups kept a close watch on the President.”136 Much like the ‘New Trail’ direction Kennedy proposed, the NCAI were invested in how Johnson moved to keep his promise for a new direction in federal Indian policy. Johnson’s Great Society brought many programs and opportunities that enforced and challenged the NCAI’s idea of self-determination. Pushed mainly by the NCAI under Kennedy, Johnson’s presidency adopted this stance and would take it a step further, though it would not be fully achieved. The NCAI promoted and advocated for the implementation of self-determination

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 133 Address by Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall at 21st NCAI Annual Convention in Sheridan, Wyoming; July 28-31, 1964; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 14 Folder: Committee Reports and Resolutions 1965; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 134 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 106. 135 Transcript, Stewart Udall Oral History Interview III, 4/18/1969, by Joe B. Frantz, page 6, LBJ Library. Online: http://www.lbjlibrary.net/assets/documents/archives/oral_histories/udall/UDALL03.PDF. (March 13, 2018). 136 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 109.

38 in many of the Great Society programs. It found success with the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act that afforded them greater economic self-sufficiency and self-administration abilities. Adversely, terminationist provisions appeared in several pieces of legislation that also threatened other aspects of self-determination. The Indian Resources Development Act of 1967 was guilty of this. What became more common rhetoric was the concept of ‘self-determination without termination,’ proclaimed by the NCAI earlier but now grasped and repeated by members of Congress. The NCAI prioritized participation in politics where they saw self-determination most threatened. It wanted economic development of its own resources on their own, consultation in policy process subsequently requiring consent of the tribes involved, and no longer the fear of termination and the damage on their cultural identity. As they did during the Kennedy administration, the NCAI attended hearings, passed resolutions, and acted to push self- determination as federal Indian policy. War on Poverty/ Economic Opportunity Act President Johnson’s domestic achievements were genuine and lasting. Whereas Kennedy was cautious and more interested in foreign policy, Johnson’s were broad and affected many areas of national life like the economy, health care, education, environment, and poverty.137 Though not directly aimed at Native Americans, much of the Great Society legislation was central to what became of Indian affairs and reflected the NCAI’s vision for self- determination.138 Johnson’s War on Poverty actually came out of policy research and discussion during the Kennedy administration to address the inadequacy of existing programs to help the nation’s poor. President Johnson favored the plan, having a vested interest in the problem of poverty from his experiences as a youth in Texas. The “Poverty Bill,” as it was initially called, called for allocation of federal monies to local governments and citizen-run organizations for them to design plans to best serve the impoverished in their communities.139 The resultant Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) proposed by Johnson recommended assistance for those living below the poverty line and not yet self-sufficient. The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), headed by Sargent Shriver, a Kennedy in-law, was created to administer this policy. An independent agency

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 137 Hodgson, JFK and LBJ, 178. 138 Castile, To Show Heart, 24. 139 Julien E. Zelizer, The Fierce Urgency of Now: Lyndon Johnson, Congress, and the Battle for the Great Society. (New York: Penguin Press, 2015), 133.

! ! 39! ! ! would allow for more aggressive initiative and centralized decision making rather than being lost within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare or elsewhere, it also complicated the relationship between tribal nations and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Initially when President Johnson introduced the EOA, sent to Congress on March 16, 1964, Native Americans were more of an afterthought. In response to this exclusion, the National Council on Indian Affairs organized the American Indian Capital Conference on Poverty (AICCP), convening between May 9 and 12, 1964. The conference became the largest gathering to discuss Native American issues since the 1961 American Indian Chicago Conference. The impact of the conference and lobbying efforts played a part in their inclusion in the OEO.140 However, there was already strong congressional support for Indian involvement, and what the AICCP wanted was to guarantee tribal control of federal money from the OEO, rather than the BIA or a state government.141 This ability to self-administer money for their own programs represented a method of being self-determined. In order to successfully help Native Americans, the OEO pioneered the idea of creating an ‘Indian desk’ to pull together agency resources to serve Native communities better, and other agencies adopted this idea.142 Possibly more than any other legislation passed during the Johnson years, “The Office of Economic Opportunity, central to the War on Poverty, turned out to be the key to the emergence of self-determination as a new direction in Indian affairs.”143 President Johnson signed the Economic Opportunity Act on August 20, 1964. Based on the principle of “maximum feasible participation,” the central component of the Office of Economic Opportunity was the Community Action Program (CAP). CAPs worked to empower the poor by putting greater control into the hands of local communities for which the programs were designed. Though widely and rapidly accepted on reservations, Native Americans did not initially factor into the creation of the program. It was primarily based around urban settings, but it was obvious how this could be applied elsewhere, “The model [of a CAP] fitted the Indian situation, since a reservation could be the locus for a program and the Indians

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 140 Robert L. Bennett, Robert Burnette, Alexander (Sandy) MacNabb, and Helen M. Schierbeck. “Federal Indian Policy, 1960-1976.” In Indian Self Rule: First-Hand Accounts of Indian-White Relations from Roosevelt to Reagan, edited by Kenneth R. Philp, by O’Neil Floyd A., Josephy Alvin M., and Hart E. Richard, 208-18. University Press of Colorado, 1986. doi:10.2307/j.ctt46nr85.21, 212. 141 Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America, 93-94. 142 Tyler, A History of Indian Policy, 211. 143 Castile, To Show Heart, 25.

40 themselves would run the program.”144 The NCAI recognized the ability for these programs to help the reservation and furnish their ability to administrate them. The CAP philosophy reflected what the NCAI saw important in self-determination: self-administration and education where “each individual Indian tribe will operate at its own level of program sophistication and that program development itself will be an educational process.”145 The EOA represented a method to show the federal government that Native communities can manage their own affairs and the possibility for self-determination.146 Education and vocational programs were typically the responsibility of the BIA. Under the EOA, Native communities had access to the resources to develop these programs for themselves. Other extensions of the EOA were the Job Corps programs and Operation Head Start. A news release from the Department of the Interior 6 July, 1965 announced that, “American Indians are now participating in all programs offered for the disadvantaged under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.”147 It stated that ten Job Corps Conservation Centers, places for young people to receive schooling and skill training, were approved for establishment on reservations in Arizona, New Mexico, South Dakota, Montana, Minnesota, and Washington. Through the Community Action Program, 66 applications were submitted from Indian communities of which 26 had been approved to date. An October 1, 1965 news release indicated that 17 Indian communities were set to construct new school facilities as a result of the OEO to accommodate nearly 6,000 mostly elementary grade children.148 Possibly more than any other minority, Native Americans benefited from the programs under the Economic Opportunity Act not only as economic and social development, but also in the ability to administer and control the programs. These programs exemplified self-determination in that respect and strongly supported by the NCAI. The concept of self-determination was inherent in the War on Poverty programs; Indian organizations exploited this to push for further recognition by the federal government that Native

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 144 Castile, To Show Heart, 27. 145 Tyler, A History of Indian Policy, 213. 146 Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America, 109. 147 United States Department of the Interior News Release; July 6, 1965; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 488 Folder BIA News Releases 1963-1966; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 148 United States Department of the Interior News Release; October 1, 1965; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 488 Folder BIA News Releases 1963-1966; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution.

! ! 41! ! ! communities can be self-determined. The NCAI editorialized “The War on Poverty, which we believe to be this generation’s ‘New Deal,’ places major emphasis on the participation of the poor... There is a new sense of self-determination for the individual in this War on Poverty.”149 It signaled self-determination not only for the nation’s poor in urban and rural places, but also for Native Americans additionally involved in it. The NCAI saw how the War on Poverty explicitly linked to self-determination. It provided for limited BIA involvement, as tribes worked more directly with the OEO, which meant less paternalistic control over resources. Vine Deloria, Jr., Executive Director of the NCAI, wrote to Sol Tax saying, “the Poverty program is extremely popular and for the first time tribes can plan and run their own programs for their people without someone in the BIA dictating to them.”150 Surprisingly, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Nash welcomed the OEO, even though the basis of it, a direct federal government to community relationship, undercut the BIA’s influence on reservations. Without reliance on the BIA, tribal governments ran their own social and economic development programs. In the first two years of the CAP under the EOA, nearly one hundred tribes used this opportunity to combat poverty and prove their competence and ability to administer their own programs – the first major opportunity for Native communities to solve their own problems as a means of attaining self-determination. However, Hodgson notes “by 1966 Vietnam was not only absorbing more and more of the president’s attention, it was consuming more and more of his budget.”151 Additionally, horror stories of misuse and abuse of federal funds for community action programs lessened support for the Economic Opportunity Act, and Johnson even considered dismantling the OEO and reassigning it to other agencies.152 Resolution 20 at the 1966 annual convention committed the NCAI to adopt tactics to protect the legislation they so greatly benefited from and continue the opportunities that allowed Indian communities to be self- sufficient.153 John Belindo in his opening remarks to the convention measured the significance of consultation with tribal communities, “In sharing information with the department chiefs, advisors, consultants, and employees of these various agencies, I have found that Indians are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 149 Castile, To Show Heart, 42. 150 Castile, To Show Heart, 41. 151 Hodgson, JFK and LBJ, 177. 152 Irwin Unger, The Best of Intentions: The Triumphs and Failures of the Great Society Under Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, (Doubleday: New York, 1996), 196. 153 Resolution #20 passed at 23rd NCAI Annual Convention; November 1966; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 15 Folder Convention Resolutions, Oklahoma City-1966; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution.

42 enjoying unusual success in the planning, implementation, and administration of long-range Federal programs.”154 The EOA allowed Native communities opportunities previously restricted to them because of lack of consultation. It was well known in the NCAI the capability of these programs to foster greater self-determination from the federal government, Belindo noted that, “It is the intent of the [NCAI]... that self-determination in all forms will be utilized as we strive toward basic goals in policy and programs.”155 The Community Action Program allowed for consultation and administration of reservation development programs aimed at eradicating poverty, but by extension these programs promoted self-determination on par with the ideas of the NCAI. To get the Community Action Program started, Community Action Agencies (CAA), comprised of local officials and members of the community, devised plans to target poverty; the OEO providing the funds to execute these programs. For Native Americans this meant greater control over their own affairs on reservations previously controlled by the BIA. Castile recalls, “In the original plan for implementation, the BIA was to administer Indian Community Action Agencies.”156 However, the OEO accepted tribal governments as representative of the poor and tribes themselves spent OEO funds on CAPs, undermining the BIA’s inefficiency and paternalism. As a result, Castile affirms “Indian CAA’s became not only branches of the existing Indian self-government structure but also inspirations to the independence of the rest of the Indian government.”157 The Community Action Program allowed for the first time since the United States colonized Native America for tribal governments to administer programs for their own communities.158 This represented a significant step towards self-determination. Helen M. Schierbeck, who came to Washington D.C. to work as the first NCAI Indian trainee in the days of Helen Peterson, helped implement an OEO poverty program for the Menominee. Even a tribe terminated of their trust status was able to receive assistance through the OEO. Through a congressional fellowship she worked as a consultant with the Menominee

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 154 ‘Greetings from John Belindo’ at the 23rd NCAI Annual Convention; November 1966; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 14 Folder Reports to 1966 Convention Executive Director; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 155 ‘Greetings from John Belindo’ at the 23rd NCAI Annual Convention; November 1966; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 14 Folder Reports to 1966 Convention Executive Director; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 156 Castile, To Show Heart, 30. 157 Castile, To Show Heart, 34. 158 Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America, 128.

! ! 43! ! ! County government, she told them, “We would like to get you funded as one of the first rural community action programs.” She described it as an interesting and somewhat ironic experience. “A tribe that had been terminated,” she stated, “had a federal agency come in and offer once again to bring federal services to attack poverty on the Menominee Reservation.” This situation highlighted the consequences of forced termination on a tribe, showing that it would require even more federal resources to assist them following the negation of their trust status. Either way, the particular grant was most helpful to the Menominee, as they now existed as Menominee County, one of the poorest in Wisconsin.159 Limited funding for the OEO meant that development programs were never fully effective in eradicating poverty anywhere, let alone reservations. However, the real impact of the OEO, lasting only from 1965 to 1974, was the influence on tribal governments and leaders, the BIA, and the direction of federal Indian policy.160 Indian organizations like the NCAI acknowledged the War on Poverty as a new opportunity to devise and operate their own programs, develop their own economies, and curtail BIA influence. These principles underlined the ability for self-determination, “thus, OEO was the first federal program created in the 1960s supporting the principle of Indian self-determination.”161 Public Law 280 Consultation and consent emphasized Native Americans’ self-determination by making sure the government did not just impose policy on them, rather that they were involved and fully aware of the implications. Much of federal Indian policy prior to the 1960s implemented legislation without the consent of the tribal nations directly affected by it. Consent, and whether Native Americans possessed it, had been questioned since 1953 and more recently investigated in 1961, when the hearings on the constitutional rights of the American Indian began. Those studies and hearings revealed that in states with P.L. 280 Native Americans frequently had their constitutional rights infringed. The basis of the law did not allow for consent, meaning tribes could not choose whether their civil and criminal jurisdiction was transferred to the state. Native Americans wanted “consent of the governed,” one of the key founding aspects of the United

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 159 Robert L. Bennett, Robert Burnette, Alexander (Sandy) MacNabb, and Helen M. Schierbeck. “Federal Indian Policy, 1960-1976.” In Indian Self Rule: First-Hand Accounts of Indian-White Relations from Roosevelt to Reagan, edited by Kenneth R. Philp, by O’Neil Floyd A., Josephy Alvin M., and Hart E. Richard, 208-18. University Press of Colorado, 1986. doi:10.2307/j.ctt46nr85.21, 217. 160 Castile, To Show Heart, 42. 161 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 125.

44 States. Amending P.L. 280 would be a step towards achieving that and fulfill an objective of self-determination. “Full protection of the constitutional rights and privileges enjoyed by other Americans has long been overdue for the American Indian,” said Senator Ervin in the opening remarks of the final Constitutional Rights of the American Indian hearings starting June 22, 1965.162 The last hearing addressed nine bills, the result of extensive hearings and investigations in nine states and with eighty-five tribes, and how they would allow for greater achievement of equal constitutional rights. The implementation of P.L. 280, according to the subcommittee’s investigation, “resulted in a breakdown in the administration of justice to such a degree that Indians are being denied due process and equal protection of the law.”163 The law summarily authorized the unilateral application of State law to tribes without their consent and regardless of special needs and circumstances. S. 966, one of the bills introduced, would repeal P.L. 280 and authorize States to assert civil and criminal jurisdiction after acquiring the consent of the tribes. Providing for consent denoted a feature of Native American self-determination. The NCAI thus expressed interest in this bill, amidst their long history of rejecting and seeking amendment of P.L. 280. Since its passage in 1953, the NCAI called for amendment of Public Law 280. NCAI Executive Director Vine Deloria, Jr. attended the hearing to give a testimony. Deloria directed his remarks primarily on S. 966 for its specific relation to P.L. 280. Though Deloria and the NCAI fully endorsed S. 966, they suggested an amendment to it that would allow for jurisdiction, “[to] be extended or retracted by agreement of both the state and the particular tribe as experience proves practicable and planning may indicate to them advisable.”164 He noted that as tribes achieved greater self-sufficiency they could retract their jurisdiction from the state. S. 966 would not only be good for tribal nations but for the states who held civil and criminal jurisdiction. The state would no longer have to support tribal nations, where in some cases the states did not want nor had the funds to take over jurisdiction, exacerbating problems for tribal governments. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 162 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 89th Congress, 1st Session on S. 961, S. 962, S. 963, S. 964, S. 965, S. 966, S. 967, S. 968, and S.J. Res 40, June 22, 23, 24, and 29, 1965 (Washington, D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1965), 1. 163 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, 4. 164 Statement of Vine Deloria, Jr., Executive Director, National Congress of American Indians, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 89th Congress, 1st Session on S. 961, S. 962, S. 963, S. 964, S. 965, S. 966, S. 967, S. 968, and S.J. Res 40, June 22, 23, 24, and 29, 1965 (Washington, D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1965), 194.

! ! 45! ! ! The moment to recognize Native American rights was ripe, the overall social and political climate of the United States sought greater societal understanding and participation amidst the struggle for civil rights for other minorities, allowing Deloria to regard the passage of S. 966 as “a most significant step in the formation of a greater society.”165 The tenets of Deloria’s remarks suggest Native Americans quest for self-determination in that the bill, with its proposed amendment, provided for self-sufficient provision over their own people under tribal customs and without cultural degradation, “Not only will we have consent of the governed if we get S. 966 passed, but we can have the opportunity then to be released from this psychological fear on the reservation of having the whole culture run over.”166 Though this was the last of the hearings studying the constitutional rights of American Indians as it related to the implementation of P.L. 280, the concept of Indian consent and jurisdiction found its way into other legislation concerning Native Americans. Assumption of jurisdiction by the state was often seen as the first step towards concentrated efforts at terminating a tribal nation, as was being demonstrated on the Colville reservation of Washington who were required to submit their own termination plans. At the 1965 NCAI Annual Convention a few months after Deloria’s testimony at the Constitutional Rights hearing, Resolution 7 expressed support and approval of S. 966 to amend P.L. 280, providing consent for the tribal government in deciding whether assumption can be transferred to the State. As reflected in Deloria’s remarks from the hearing, they also urged to clarify S. 966 to work retroactively, a tribe can withdraw from state jurisdiction if or when they want to.167 This allows both the state and the tribe to decide if it is possible for the state to take on said jurisdiction. The hearings held during the Kennedy administration likewise showed that states often did not have the resources or desire to assume this responsibility, consequently causing the infringement of their constitutional rights. The NCAI incessantly expressed their exasperation with the legislation; their 1966 convention produced a similar resolution again respectfully requesting Congress to amend P.L. 280. Overall, the NCAI believed these bills to be good for the Native Americans and the beginning of a constructive application of one basic principle of the United States—the consent of the governed—consent also being a feature of self-determination. Deloria’s testimony !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 165 Statement of Vine Deloria, Jr.,194-195. 166 Statement of Vine Deloria, Jr., 198. 167 Resolution No. 7 passed at NCAI Annual Convention; November 1-6, 1965; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 14 Folder Committee Reports and Resolutions 1965; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution.

46 underscored the important features of self-determination inherent in possessing full constitutional rights, “And so all we basically ask is justice, the consent of the governed, time to develop what we think should be developed in our own way. You cannot get a contribution to this society from Indians if you try to turn the Indian into a white man...”168 Having constitutional rights while maintaining their distinct status as tribal nations epitomized the concept of self-determination. But continuing termination threatened this very sentiment and presented a challenge to the NCAI, one met by vigorous participation in the political sphere. Termination Though support for termination waned significantly since the late 1950s, a small group of Congressman within the Senate Interior Committee vigorously supported it. Termination, and other disagreements over aspects of federal Indian policy, was concentrated regionally, rather than expressed as partisan or ideological. Leading pro-Indian Congressmen came from both political parties. The biggest opponents of termination were George McGovern (D.- S. Dak.) and James Haley (D.- Fl.), though both Democrat existed on opposite ends of the political spectrum. Their positions within the subcommittees debating termination played a role in the move towards a federal Indian policy based on self-determination. George McGovern chaired the Senate Indian Affairs Subcommittee starting in 1967 and vehemently opposed terminationist attitude still residing in Congress. Legislation introduced and supported by pro-Indian Congressmen met opposition by western Senators like Henry Jackson notorious for being pro-termination. These figures in Congress challenged any attempts to encourage self-determination that The NCAI were not lax in their efforts to stop termination. By attending hearings and passing resolutions at their annual conventions, the NCAI presented their opposition to a policy that, in 1964, was 11 years persisting. In the first year of Johnson’s presidency the NCAI through resolution urged the United States government “to join the American Indian in his effort to stop termination and begin to apply a more dignified policy of allowing Indians to progress with the rest of the nation and... urge that the principle of consent of the governed be applied to the American Indian people and maintained as a constant policy.”169 The stand of the NCAI had always been uniform and expressed repeatedly throughout the years, and though they repudiated

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 168 Statement of Vine Deloria, Jr., 200. 169 Resolution No. 1 passed at NCAI Annual Convention; July 28-31, 1964; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 14 Folder Convention Resolutions 1964; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution.

! ! 47! ! ! termination they acknowledged the probability of termination plans to be implemented and urged, “a government and tribally-sponsored educational and informational program so that every tribal member will have a full opportunity to learn about all the ramifications and consequences of the proposal if adopted,” expressed in the testimony of Vine Deloria for the Colville.170 The proper education on the real outcomes of termination could ultimately change their decision. Termination came in many forms; a habit of Congress was to attach unrelated conditions to Indian legislation in an attempt to clandestinely force a tribe to terminate its federal status, present in both the Seneca and Colville tribe cases. The NCAI felt that as guardians and protectors of Indian rights, the federal government should not encourage termination. Yet they found themselves still battling and lobbying against an over a decade old policy that prevented positive social and economic development, degraded Indian land and culture, and often done without the consent of the majority in the Native community. These core components of self- determination were threatened by the loss of trusteeship. The Seneca and Colville were but two cases of tribes who faced termination starting earlier than 1960 and came to a head during the Johnson administration. Seneca In a project that started in the early twentieth century and became a pressing issue during the Kennedy administration, the construction of the Kinzua Dam on Seneca land brought the loss of land and distrust in the government regarding federal trust status. The land in question was protected by the Pickering Treaty in 1794 and could only be sold to the United States with the Seneca’s approval.171 Despite the centuries old treaty, plans and budget appropriations for the project continued in the 1950s, when termination ideology counteracted the enforcement of treaties. The Seneca fought for alternative plans but received little congressional support, except from John R. Saylor (R.– Pa.) and James Haley, House Indian Affairs Subcommittee Chairman. Haley sought to assist the Seneca Nation as they struggled with the consequences of the construction of the Kinzua Dam. Western senators used this opportunity to push for Seneca termination policy. Kennedy promised in 1961 that federal agencies would provide assistance

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 170 Resolution No. 9 passed at NCAI Annual Convention; November 1966; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 15 Folder Convention Resolutions, Oklahoma City-1966; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 171 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 50.

48 and funds to the Seneca for their relocation, yet by early 1963 they had not received anything and the dam neared completion. Haley introduced H.R. 1794 to authorize relocation rehabilitation, social and economic development, and to relocate Indian cemeteries, monuments and other culturally important sites; the grave of the revered Gaiantwaka, or Cornplanter, would soon be underwater.172 Hearings were held throughout 1963 with the final draft of the legislation paying over $3 million for direct and indirect damages incurred by the Kinzua Dam project; it passed the House on February 7 1964. The Senate version of H.R. 1794, S. 1836, promoted by Frank Church who thought the expense too high, sought minimal assistance and pushed for eventual termination of federal services through an added provision that required the Seneca Nation to design a termination plan within two years.173 The final bill forbade the expansion of federal services to the Seneca Nation and gave them a year extension on submitting termination legislation. The NCAI avidly opposed the practice of Congress adding conditions that provided assistance but forced termination. In September 1967, Senator Henry Jackson, as a requirement under provision 18 of the 1964 act, introduced S. 2390, to provide for the withdrawal of federal supervision over the property and affairs of the Seneca Nation. At a committee meeting in May to devise a termination plan, the Seneca Tribal Council expressed their unalterable opposition to changing the present relationship between the Seneca Nation and the federal government –initially defined by the Pickering Treaty of 1794. When Commissioner Bennett consulted the Seneca people on their reservation in July they reiterated their objection to termination. Several provisions of the bill would terminate, “statutes of the United States which apply to Indians because of their status as Indians,” and “free the Seneca Nation of Federal control over the use and disposition of its property,” and allow the use or disposal of land and expenditure funds.174 A “consent” provision required that the bill would not be effective until the majority accepted it, but the Seneca Nation made it clear they did not want to terminate their status with the federal government. The NCAI responded where they saw a complete and obvious disregard for treaty rights, the special status of Native Americans under the federal government, and consent of those involved. These flagrant restrictions on self-determination spurred the NCAI to act against the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 172 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 161. 173 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 164. 174 “Withdrawal of Federal Supervision over the Property and Affairs of the Seneca Nation” (Congressional Record Bound, CR-1967-0912, September 12, 1967), 25123-25125.

! ! 49! ! ! federal government. The following month after S. 2390 was introduced, the NCAI went on record at the 1967 annual convention opposing S. 2390 and pledged that members of the NCAI, including the President and Executive Director, would assist the Seneca Nation by testifying before the committees of Congress.175 The NCAI fought the long-standing problem of termination for its underlying aspects related to self-determination, preserving their trusteeship would allow Native nations to prosper as politically and culturally distinct entities. Like their 1960 Annual Convention conveyed, Native Americans could achieve self-determination without termination. Colville The efforts to get the Colville tribe terminated were long and ultimately unsuccessful, nonetheless it illuminated the persisting terminationist attitude in Congress. Though termination policy lost favor through the late 1950s and early 1960s, a few key proponents of it – Frank Church, Clinton Anderson, and Henry Jackson – dominated the Senate Interior Committee; Senator Jackson played a leading role in seeking to terminate the Colville in his home state of Washington.176 In the late 1950s as a result of termination era policy, the Colville were required to submit termination legislation within 5 years. However, in 1962 the Interior Department objected legislation introduced because it did not effectively terminate federal trust nor did it indicate that they had the economic standing to manage their own affairs.177 Prior to this, the Colville in 1960 received monies as a result of a judgment by the Indian Claims Commission amounting to almost one million dollars. These funds were targeted in one of the two Colville termination bills introduced in 1963. S. 1443 closed the tribal roll in preparation to the submission of termination legislation; it was passed with some amendment. The more contentious S. 1169 provided for a per capita distribution of the judgment monies from the ICC of $350, liquidating those tribal assets. Arguments against this maintained that the funds should be used in future development and possibly their future termination. The tribe at the October 1963 hearings supported the per capita payment bill, but they expressed division on the issue of termination. In August 1964 Congress passed S. 1169 and the stage was set for an eventual Colville termination. Those hearings on S. 1413, “a bill to provide for the termination of federal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 175 Resolution #6 passed at 24th NCAI Annual Convention; October 5, 1967; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 15 Folder 1967 Resolutions; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 176 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 169. 177 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 171.

50 supervision over the property of the Confederated tribes of Colville Indians...” were held on April 5 and 6, 1965. The NCAI historically stood against forced termination, believing the threat itself tended to discourage self-sufficiency. Vine Deloria, Jr. attended to give testimony to the Indian Affairs Subcommittee. However, he stated that the NCAI was not taking sides but rather wanted to discuss the implications of the bills provision and question the readiness of the Colville in making this decision. Deloria referenced the hearings on S. 1442 and S. 1169, noting that as a result of surveys done, “they do not show a marked difference in educational development,” concluding that “[the Colville tribes] do not have the education or the understanding necessary for the crucial decision they would have to make in this referendum.”178 The NCAI believed that education on the consequences of termination would benefit the tribe in making that decision, and hopefully dissuaded them from accepting termination. Looking at the Menominee case, where in 1960 the population averaged 8.3 years of education, Deloria remarked, “they were obviously unprepared for termination of federal services...”179 Bringing attention to this deficit, Deloria alluded to how the Colville case could play out. Deloria’s testimony centered around the importance of education for Native Americans and the obvious lack of those resources on reservations. Deloria and the NCAI held that increased federal educational services, directed by the BIA, reflected the feelings and needs of the Colville people. The Colville Business Council, representative of only a minority of the population, proposed introduction of the termination bill. Programs set up through the Economic Opportunity Act would provide educational services, “so that when the educational level is sufficiently [high] to ensure success in the competitive world of today that they then consider the question of termination of federal services if they so desire.”180 Vine Deloria, Jr. expressed the gravity of the consequences of the passage of S. 1413, “To release these people from trusteeship with so obvious an educational handicap as they now have would be a waste of all tribal, individual, and economic assets and the creation of a monstrous pocket of economic, educational, and spiritual poverty such as we see today in Menominee County, Wisconsin.”181 In

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 178 Statement of Vine Deloria, Jr., Executive Director, National Congress of American Indians, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate, 89th Congress, 1st Session on S. 1413, April 5 and 6, 1965 (Washington, D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1965), 166. 179 Statement of Vine Deloria, Jr.,166. 180 Statement of Vine Deloria, Jr.,167. 181 Statement of Vine Deloria, Jr.,167.

! ! 51! ! ! the same way that the Menominee lacked the resources to have a “successful” termination, the Colville faced similar circumstances. Repudiating termination was still the NCAI’s top priority, and they emphasized that the removal of trust status of land would cause the extinction of Native people. The NCAI announced their opposition to the Colville termination bill, S. 1413, at the November 1965 annual convention. Resolution 4 asserted their position, because “any bill like it that might be introduced affecting other tribes as having No. 1 priority on the list of existing or possible legislation which the National Congress of American Indians must fight with every weapon it can mobilize.”182 For the Colville, where there was a (claimed) majority of members seeking termination, the NCAI advocated educational development programs made available through the already popular Economic Opportunity Act. The 1968 NCAI annual report reflected the concerns of the Johnson years, “We would not like to see termination of the 1950s come back as a national policy.”183 Though the Seneca and Colville evaded termination, there still seemed to be the potential for the cessation of trust status behind every government program, whether explicit or implicit. The NCAI found this true with Udall’s Indian Resources Development Act. But termination policy ultimately fizzled out by the late 1960s. During the Johnson years, tribal nations were treated with more permanency and included in Great Society programs, made possible through the lobbying of Indian organizations like the NCAI. Task Forces Lyndon Johnson’s administration organized more than one hundred task forces and insisted that their work be withheld from the public, “The purpose of these task forces is to come up with ideas, not to sell those ideas to the public.”184 The Johnson administration organized two task forces to study Indian affairs and Native American issues—the 1966 Outside Task Force on Indian Affairs and the 1967 Interagency Task Force on American Indians. Though the task force studies were more constructive than Kennedy’s 1961 Task Force on Indian Affairs, Vine Deloria

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 182 Resolution #4 passed at NCAI Annual Convention; November 1-6, 1965; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 14 Folder Committee Reports and Resolutions 1965; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 183 NCAI Annual Report; 1968; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 16 Folder 1968 Reports; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 184 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 209.

52 Jr. in 1969 complained “we are TASK FORCED to death.”185 The final reports offered a concerted effort towards a new course in federal Indian policy by promoting the concept of ‘self- determination without termination,’ Indian participation, and self-administration of programs. The Outside Task Force on Indian Affairs originated from a White House meeting on Indian Affairs held in August 1966, and coincided with the developing and debated Indian Resources Development Act. Charged with (re)clarifying federal policy, to gain information for the final report, task force members interviewed government agencies that dealt with providing services to American Indians and tribal representatives. A meeting held with Indian leaders, including President of the NCAI Wendell Chino, represented an attempt to attain Native American opinion. Task force members also observed the BIA’s conference on the emerging omnibus legislation. Of the members of the 1966 task force only one was Native American, William W. Keeler, who also served on the 1961 task force. Their final report submitted on December 23, 1966, “A Free Choice Program For American Indians,” incorporated general points defined in the ‘61 report, that of a disavowal of termination, but added to it by calling for a presidential statement to reassure Native Americans of the permanence of their relationship with the federal government, so as to encourage economic and educational development.186 This first task force report stressed increased Indian participation and self-administration, much like the Kennedy report. More importantly, though, it shaped the idea of “self- determination without termination,” a concept not new for the NCAI who themed their 1960 annual convention around this idea. The OEO and the War on Poverty at large seemed to be the only successful federal attempt at promoting and fostering self-determination at this point. The report noted that outside the OEO, no mechanisms nor requirements for increased Indian consultation existed, and confirmed the thoughts of many Indian organizations that, “the OEO programs on the reservations have demonstrated that, given the proper incentives, communities with a reputation for apathy can be successfully induced to participate actively in designing and carrying out programs to improve their lot.”187 The obvious next step was for a full commitment to a federal Indian policy based on self-determination. The report also suggested a transfer of responsibilities, mainly some BIA operations out of the Interior Department and to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 185 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 209. 186 Castile, To Show Heart, 54. 187 Castile, To Show Heart, 53.

! ! 53! ! ! Federal employees as well as Native Americans opposed this proposal. After the report became public, to the chagrin of President Johnson, Native Americans opposed it because again it was a major shift in Indian policy that lacked consultation with tribal leaders. Additionally, “they perceived the transfer proposal as the first step toward dissolution of the [Bureau of Indian Affairs] and termination of federal services.188 The BIA through all of its inefficiencies was still valuable to Native American communities in implementing programs. In November 1966 at the 23rd annual convention, the NCAI passed a resolution opposing the transfer of the education branch of the BIA to HEW on the grounds that the federal agency had no experience in maintaining or handling Indian education. Usually administered by the BIA, if taken on by HEW, “Indian children would suffer by a termination of this important function...”189 Udall opposed the transfer proposal because of the new Indian program he was getting underway, namely the omnibus bill.190 Ultimately the transfer proposal was not accepted. The final report also heavily criticized the administration as a whole, “the task force found that beyond the OEO, the administration had made no meaningful commitment to Indian involvement in policy development.”191 Despite all the discourse by federal agencies to increase Native American participation in policy and programs, the only success story was the OEO, the agency the NCAI clearly saw as positively promoting self-determination. While the omnibus bill was under debate, the Interagency Task Force on American Indians commenced in August 1967 headed by Lee White, White House specialist in Civil Rights. Its members represented the departments of the Interior, HEW, OEO, and any agency that had a hand in Indian affairs. They were tasked with coordinating efforts and creating a cohesive Indian policy approach for the administration based off the recommendations from the 1966 task force. Instead of initiating a whole new legislative program it proposed developing existing organizations to, “...put a premium on Indian self-help, self-growth and self- determination,” achieved by increased financial support for current programs. 192 These two task

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 188 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 214. 189 Resolution #12 passed at NCAI Annual Convention; November 1966; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 15 Folder Convention Resolutions, Oklahoma City-1966; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 190 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 212. 191 Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America, 140. 192 Castile, To Show Heart, 67.

54 force reports indicated that the NCAI’s vision of self-determination gained some ground in the Johnson administration – becoming a centerpiece for the president’s policy statement in 1968. Indian Resources Development Act of 1967 Since 1964 Udall sought to replace Nash as Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Udall felt that the highly opposed and ineffective BIA needed revitalizing; Nash also did not have the support in Congress needed to get programs moving. During 1964 and 1965, in “the years that Great Society programs offered new opportunities to Native Americans... [the BIA] offered little leadership and showed no initiative.”193 Reflecting on Nash and the work of the BIA, Udall later remarked, “Some important things were done, some good things were done, but essentially I don’t think we were making the kind of big strides I would like to make. I said when I got through I thought we did better in the ‘60’s than in the ‘50’s. I thought we made more progress.”194 Issues like federal trusteeship, treaty obligations, and cultural preservation were not the responsibilities of Great Society programs, but rather the Interior Department and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. If Native Americans wanted a chance at self-determination, they needed a strong and active bureau and commissioner. Santa Fe Conference The purpose of the Santa Fe conference in April 1966 was to lay the groundwork for a new path in federal policy and address the inefficiencies of the BIA. Udall, in the wake of Bennett’s confirmation hearings for the new Commissioner of Indian Affairs, hoped to invigorate the BIA and define the problems in Indian affairs. However, the conference took place behind closed doors, with Native American organizations barred from participating in the discussion of Indian affairs. In direct response the NCAI executive council organized an emergency meeting to coincide with the BIA conference. The concern for the NCAI was over the possible transfer of operating authority for OEO programs from the tribes to BIA officials. At the meeting tribal leaders expressed the success of community action on reservations and the ability to control them, OEO programs allowed tribes to develop their economic abilities essential to achieving self-determination. Economic strength was paramount in reaching their goal of self- determination. Deloria and the NCAI embraced the War on Poverty for its ability to support their agenda. They resolved to fight any action violating the nature of self-determination, threatening !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 193 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 139. 194 Transcript, Stewart Udall Oral History Interview III, 4/18/1969, by Joe B. Frantz, page 3, LBJ Library. Online: http://www.lbjlibrary.net/assets/documents/archives/oral_histories/udall/UDALL03.PDF. (March 13, 2018).

! ! 55! ! ! that “if precipitous actions were taken without Native consultation and consent, the NCAI would respond by taking drastic action of its own.”195 The Santa Fe conference also demonstrated Udall’s demand for a vigorous new approach to Indian affairs – that of economic development. It provided a base for what Udall proclaimed, “would be the most important piece of legislation ever written... [and] strike the shackles off in the whole field of Indian economic development,” one that apparently did not include the consultation of Indian leaders.196 Drafting of the landmark legislation began in late April 1966. From that point on it met only opposition from the NCAI for its obvious lack of consultation and provisions that refused self-determination. Stewart Udall’s desire to have a legacy similar to John Collier’s Indian Reorganization Act prompted him to press for an omnibus bill, properly known as the Indian Resources Development Act of 1967. The omnibus bill not only lacked support from Native Americans but garnered immense opposition from the NCAI and others leading up to the bills introduction, due largely in part to the lack of Native American in the bill’s drafting. The controversial legislation earned a myriad of names like ‘Anonymous’, ‘Ambush’, and ‘Ominous’ bill.197 Several provisions also infringed upon other components fundamental to self-determination. One such provision allowed tribes to use land as collateral for development loans; as posited by the NCAI, “given the high probability of default... tribes ran the risk of losing their most precious resource.”198 Their land is one of the most important things behind self-determination as well as their cultural identity. The erosion of their land base and their legal rights threatened their distinct identity as tribal nations. This does not allow them to achieve self-determination. On the economic development front, the bill would revitalize Native communities by getting “industry- aid-to-Indians,” according to Udall. Jobs would be created through corporations on reservations, however, “it left the need for the development of a self-sustaining indigenous economies unaddressed.”199 Economic development is key to their ability to determine their own destinies but it also endangered other aspects of their idea of self-determination, specifically preservation of treaty rights and the trust status of Indian lands, nor did it allow for self-sufficient economic programs. For these reasons it could only be opposed by the NCAI and Indian nations. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 195 Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America, 136. 196 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 202-203. 197 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 208. 198 Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America, 137. 199 Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America, 138.

56 Omnibus hearings The initial hearings on S.1816, the proposed Indian Resources Development Act of 1967, were, like the Santa Fe conference, restricted to members of the federal agencies. A one-day hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Indian Affairs on July 11, 1967 only heard testimony from Secretary of the Interior Udall, Under Secretary Luce, and Commissioner of Indian Affairs Bennett. Though the NCAI could not attend, the law office of Wilkinson, Cragun, and Barker, who work with the NCAI and represent tribal nations in legal matters, sent an attorney to attend the hearing and report any developments in the legislation. In a memorandum dated June 28, 1967 from the law offices to their general counsel clients they relayed that neither delegates nor representatives from Indian tribes would be permitted to testify at the upcoming hearing, but later given the opportunity at a following date. For the time being they urged Indian participation, “in view of the importance of this bill to many tribes,” by sending representatives to attend the Senate subcommittee hearing and the later scheduled House hearings.200 Senator Henry Jackson proposed S. 1816 by an executive communication from the Department of the Interior, no doubt Udall’s initiating. Senator McGovern, presiding over the hearings, opened with a brief explanation of the bill, “this proposal is the result of long-term consultation with numerous tribes across the country... it would seem to propose a number of changes in Indian law and would authorize substantial increased in funds that might be loaned to Indian organizations and to individual Indians.”201 With the immense impact and interest this bill garnered McGovern added, “I am sure that before action is taken it will be both necessary and desirable to have additional hearings at which Indian tribes or their representatives may appear to give us their recommendations.”202 As an ally in Indian affairs, McGovern realized the import of not only hearing their recommendations, but also letting them shape the policy. Giving his testimony, Udall exalted the legislation as the most important and far-reaching Indian legislation in regards to Indian resource and economic development since the Wheeler- Howard Act of 1934 (IRA). Udall felt that economic development lacked any legislative act to

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 200 Memorandum for General Counsel Clients from the Law Offices of Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker; June 28, 1967; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 456 Folder Letters to tribes RE: Legislation and Court Cases [1967]; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 201 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate, 90th Congress, 1st Session on S. 1816, July 11, 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Ward & Paul Official Reporters, 1967), 1. 202 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate, 90th Congress, 1st Session on S. 1816, July 11, 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Ward & Paul Official Reporters, 1967), 2.

! ! 57! ! ! move them into the mainstream of the American economic system – granting them the same opportunities to make their own economic decisions. The major emphasis Udall made is that the legislation offers new options and choices for them to enter the economic mainstream, but that they are in no way mandatory. It also called for $500 million in new appropriations, a considerable amount for Indian economic development. Regarding the consultation of Native Americans, McGovern questioned Udall on the extent to which tribal leaders and attorneys were consulted and the reaction thus far from the Indian community. Udall deflected this for later comment by Bennett and Luce, who spent time in conferences and meetings with Indian representatives. He further responded that due to the complexity and highly-technical nature of the bill that many Indian people would not understand it, “I think the most important thing for them to understand is that we are not forcing them to do anything, that we are giving them voluntarily new choices and new options in terms of their economic future...”203 With coercive termination policy only recently rejected, Udall felt obligated to stress the voluntary nature of it. Any mandatory policy made without consultation with Native Americans would surely be opposed. Regardless, his rather snide comment on their ability to understand the legislation at all reflects the paternalism still running deep in the federal government. Several of the bills provisions caused concern with the Senate subcommittee and countered the idea of self-determination for Native Americans. One provision provided for individual termination wherein a non-resident tribal member could relinquish tribal membership and receive compensation by a share of tribal assets. Furtive provisions aimed at terminating trust status, even of individuals, went against the NCAI’s idea of self-determination. Another regarded the mortgaging of tribal land to be used as risk capital for industrial development. One concern raised by Senator Ernest Greuning was the possible case of a small group of tribal leaders disposing of land and jeopardizing the well being of the whole tribe. Luce responded that the Secretary of the Interior would not approve the transaction; according to the bill the Secretary approved all sale of mortgaging land as well as had the final say in other matters. This called into question who really had control in the development of Indian economic resources.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 203 Statement of Stewart Udall, Secretary of the Interior before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate, 90th Congress, 1st Session on S. 1816, July 11, 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Ward & Paul Official Reporters, 1967), 19.

58 If the point of the act was, “to provide Indians with various things and to permit them to exercise greater initiative and self-determination,” why were so many restrictions placed that assigned all power to the Secretary of the Interior, questioned Senator Greuning to Udall.204 Gruening scathingly called the bill “an Act to strengthen and perpetuate the authority and power of the Secretary of the Interior to regulate and dominate the life of the American Indian... the Indian has no discretion in this whatsoever.”205 If the bill were to be enacted in this way, it plainly eluded the ability for self-determination. Udall reasoned that because of the trust relationship between Native Americans and the U.S. existed, an authority to safeguard the provisions was needed, the only way out of this would be full termination of responsibility – a highly opposed option. Had the NCAI been allowed to attend the hearing, they would have exclaimed their opposition to practically every part of Udall’s bill. The fear amongst the NCAI was in vesting too much power in an executive when the premise of the bill was to permit greater economic self-sufficiency and ultimately self-determination. The House hearings on the Indian Resources Development Act, introduced as H.R. 10560 by Wayne Aspinall and James Haley, occurred on July 13 and 14, 1967. Similarly, representatives from Indian tribes or organizations were limited. The main statements came from Udall and Commissioner Bennett. Udall noted that, “We made some substantial changes in the bill we proposed last fall as a result of the position taken by many Indian leaders and their attorneys,” drawing attention to the difference between the initial draft in April 1966 and now.206 Udall hoped for greater acceptance of the bill as a result of extensive consultation with tribes. Had he consulted and implemented what Native communities wanted initially in drafting the bill, it could have received support amongst them and in Congress. When asked whether this bill promoted termination, Udall, exasperated at answering this question, remarked, “that the Indian people and their friends know what kind of termination I am in favor of...I think this type of legislation, which would encourage initiative, would encourage decision-making, would develop the capacity of Indian groups and leaders to make decisions, and would move us down the road toward the right kind of ultimate independence is what the Indian people want.”207 The objective of the bill according to Udall was, “ultimately to enable

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 204 Statement of Stewart Udall, 27. 205 Statement of Stewart Udall, 29. 206 Statement of Stewart Udall, 38. 207 Statement of Stewart Udall, 48.

! ! 59! ! ! them to manage their own affairs, to make executive decisions, to get the type of training that will enable them to have the skilled jobs and the managerial jobs.”208 The concept of self- determination was inherent in the legislation by promoting encouraging economic development, but not executed properly enough that it threatened Indian land, allowed individual termination, and crafted initially without consultation. The NCAI at the first chance they got verily responded. Further testimony took place on S. 1816 on May 15, 1968. These hearings took place at the request of Indian tribes so that their views and recommendations could be heard, wherein at previous hearings and meetings Indian groups were barred from participating. Representing the NCAI at this hearing were NCAI President Wendell Chino and Executive Director John Belindo. Chino, outright opposed S. 1816, however felt that with further study and consultation with the Indian people themselves, could receive support. Another of the NCAI’s misgivings regarding S. 1816 lie in that it would grant too much supervision to the Department of the Interior, restricting Native ability to control its own programs, a point previously brought up by Senator Gruening during the first hearing. The NCAI attacked the Indian Resources Development Act with two resolutions adopted at the 1967 annual convention in Portland, Oregon. Resolution 1 clearly opposed the omnibus bill as “being inappropriate and incongruous with the present needs, capabilities and circumstances of the tribes generally.”209 It urged that the legislation carry out the recommendations submitted to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs from tribes in 9 regional meetings that took place in 1966. According to the 1966 Executive Director’s report, John Belindo in September visited tribes in Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, and Colorado to discuss the then looming Omnibus legislation.210 As described by Belindo, the NCAI “is charged with the responsibility of speaking up for the American Indian people on a national scale.”211 The effectiveness of pan-tribal organization and communication proved to influence the actions of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 208 Statement of Stewart Udall, 52. 209 Resolution No. 1 passed at 24th NCAI Annual Convention; October 2-6, 1967; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 15 Folder 1967 Resolutions; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 210 Executive Director’s Report; November 1966; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 14 Folder Reports to 1966 Convention Executive Director; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution. 211 ‘Greetings from John Belindo’; November 1966; National Congress of American Indians records, Box 14 Folder: Reports to 1966 Convention Executive Director; National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution.

60 federal government. In May 1968 the Senate Interior Committee held a field hearing to secure support for the bill, but it was too late; the Indian Resources Development Act was effectively dead.212 The years encompassing Udall’s “landmark” legislation for American Indians Clarkin explains, “marked a transition from quiet political activity to a more aggressive and confrontational politics that included the public rejection of administration policies and increased demands for Indian participation in the policy process.”213 This new level of opposition against federal Indian policy energized Indian leadership. Increasingly, youth and militant oriented groups dominated political activism, yet Vine Deloria, Jr. considered the battle over this bill as advancement for Indian leadership and the NCAI. Previously dominated by conservatives who passed conservative resolutions, the NCAI represented this shift and were principle in showing that younger leaders with unified political action could pressure Congress to achieve their goals. No matter any future outcomes Clarkin resolves, “Indian voices had been heard for good or ill in the scuttling of the omnibus bill, and from here on Indian participation would be increasingly important in the policy process.”214 The defeat of the Indian Resources Development Act marked a win for Native activism and for self-determination. Johnson’s “Forgotten American” speech The task force report laid the foundation for a policy statement of this kind, further urged by Indian organizations. It was the first Presidential speech to Congress solely dealing with the state of Indian affairs. American Indian pressure reinforced the need for a presidential message of this sort. Its objective was to articulate the direction of federal Indian policy with Bennett as Commissioner and outline the changes in Indian affairs since the implementation of termination policy in 1953, “The main theme of the message is a change in approach from paternalism to full partnership and full choice for the Indians.”215 Self-determination was the unwritten driving force behind Indian legislation, but a clearly defined lobbying effort for the NCAI. His speech stated self-determination as official policy, “I propose a new goal for our Indian programs: A goal that ends the old debate about ‘termination’ of Indian programs and stresses self-determination... a policy expressed in programs of self-help, self-development, self-

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 212 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 223. 213 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 187. 214 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 71. 215 Castile, To Show Heart, 68.

! ! 61! ! ! determination,” but it does not explicitly renounce termination, in fear of a negative Congressional response, nor offer any concrete action for development of these programs.216 Moreover, in calling for improvement in health, education, and economic development, the direction in policy taken under Kenney’s ‘New Trail’ and defined in the 1961 task force report, his speech was hardly groundbreaking. The only new structure was the creation of the National Council on Indian Opportunity.217 It did call for a modification of P.L. 280, “I urge the Congress to enact legislation that would provide for tribal consent before such extension of jurisdiction take place,” something fought for by the NCAI since the laws passage in 1953.218 The responsibility rested with the NCAI; James Officer urged them that, “the time has come for this organization to take a positive approach to new legislation aimed at freeing the Indians to make more decisions for themselves.”219 A few weeks after the “Forgotten American” speech, Johnson would announce that he would not accept the nomination for the upcoming presidential race. Though self-determination was never explicitly announced as definitive federal Indian policy during the 1960s, “[a] major shift in federal Indian policy had been inexorably set in motion and would come to legislative fruition in the Nixon and Ford administration.”220 Leading up to this realization, the NCAI and their lobbying to change federal Indian policy had significant impact on self-determination through consultation, economic self-sufficiency, and preserved trust status.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 216 Castile, To Show Heart, 69. 217 Clarkin, Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1969, 260. 218 Castile, To Show Heart, 69. 219 “National Congress of American Indians Convention Address.” NCAI Sentinel 13(3): 16-20. quoted in Castile, To Show Heart, 71. 220 Castile, To Show Heart, 72.

62 Conclusion Towards the end of the 1960s, the political climate of Indian affairs had undoubtedly and considerably changed. When President Nixon made his 1970 speech to Congress on Indian affairs, the momentum established in the Kennedy and Johnson years allowed for a conclusive acceptance of self-determination nationally. Nixon’s speech illuminated ‘self-determination without termination,’ consent, participation, and concerns over termination: “The Right of self determination of the Indian people will be respected and their participation in planning their own destiny will be encouraged... [and] termination of tribal recognition will not be a policy objective and in no case will it be imposed without Indian consent.”221 Nixon’s administration would do much of what had been attempted or considered in the 1960s. His specific recommendations for this policy included rejecting termination, the right to control and operate federal programs, restoring land appropriated from the United States, and funding for the development of Indian education, economics, and health, as well as continuing the OEO. Nixon proclaimed that, “The recommendations of this Administration represent an historic step forward in Indian policy. We are proposing to break sharply with past approaches to Indian problems. In place of a long series of piecemeal reforms, we suggest a new and coherent strategy.”222 One can argue a few things about this statement. More than Johnson’s “Forgotten American” speech, Nixon does provide a clear strategy at declaring self-determination as federal Indian policy. In that way it is a break from how the federal government approached Indian problems. But this could not have happened without the molding and realizing what self- determination meant, and what the NCAI did to promote that concept. This era was a transition between the extreme termination of the 1950s and the decisive commitment to self-determination in the 1970s. Despite assertions that termination was not abided by in the ‘60s, it was never fully repudiated. Mainly, the threat of termination came from the Senate Interior Committee where it endured during the Kennedy and Johnson years, and even programs intended to encourage self-determination implicitly included termination rhetoric, such !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 221 Richard Nixon “Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for Indian Policy, July 8, 1970” Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 92th Congress, 1st Session, October 19 and 20, 1972 (Washington, D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1972), 220-227. 222 Richard Nixon “Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for Indian Policy, July 8, 1970” Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 92th Congress, 1st Session, October 19 and 20, 1972 (Washington, D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1972), 227.

! ! 63! ! ! as Udall’s Indian Resources Development Act. American Indians valued economic development but not at the expense of other aspects of being self-determined, that of consultation and threat of termination and the disintegration of their cultural identity. However, this decade did see instances of conscious efforts at supporting self-determination and a moral change in recognizing the rights of minorities. The Civil Rights Movement helped bring Native American issues to the forefront, but it would be remiss to say that the actualization of Native American rights depended on the larger civil rights movement. Their diligent efforts in the 1950s framed their aggressive initiative for self-determination in the 1960s. They saw the benefit in taking legislative measures to enact their agenda. More than any other federal effort initiated before the 1970s, the War on Poverty programs promoted Native American self-determination. Native American activism flourished during the 1960s. Despite the bureaucratic nature of NCAI, it would be a mistake to consider the organization ineffectual in the face of emerging youth and militant groups. Indeed, at many points in the 1960s, it showed its strength in policy discussions as much as radical activists called the media’s attention. The NCAI, taking a different approach to their politics, were principle in working and motivating Congress to listen to the demands of the Native American people. Their influence over the direction of policy consisted of blocking legislation that Indian tribes, from their consultation, deemed harmful to their interests and lifestyle. In attracting attention to their wants and needs they effectively defeated potentially negative legislation. The NCAI, as an organization of, for, and by Indians, had a defined idea of self-determination and, proceeding with their lobbying efforts, pushed their agenda to prompt the federal government to abide by what they, the people encompassed in Indian affairs, wanted to see in federal Indian policy. For them, self-determination was possible through the preservation of treaty rights and trust status, consultation and participation in the policy process, and economic development that allowed them to be self-sufficient; the issues they dedicated themselves to reflected this agenda. They had many opportunities during the 1960s to show this, and they took it upon themselves to promote and frame their vision. Many historians largely attribute the rise of self-determination in the 1970s to changes within the federal government, acknowledged as a weakening of termination support in Congress, and larger societal changes that advocated for increased civil rights for minorities. Though this holds truth, it diminishes the role of Native American activism as demonstrated by the NCAI. ‘Self-determination without termination’ was their concept that first appeared in 1960

64 at their annual convention and, after lobbying by the NCAI, gained acceptance within the federal government. Policy is difficult to change in one fell swoop. The NCAI themselves did not change federal Indian policy, but rather their significance is in organizing themselves and representing, acting on, and promoting a policy based around their values. By their participation in the political sphere they achieved, even if only a modicum, an attainment of self-determination for Native Americans.

! ! 65! ! ! Bibliography

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Carver, John A. Assistant Secretary of the Interior, 1961-64. Interview by William W. Moss. Washington, D.C., 7 October 1969, Interview no. 5. Oral History Collection, John F. Kennedy Library.

! ! 67! ! ! Nash, Philleo. Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1961-66. Interview by William W. Moss. Washington, D.C., 26 February 1971. Interview no. 3. Oral History Collection, John F. Kennedy Library.

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Castile, George Pierre. To Show Heart: Native American Self-Determination and Federal Indian Policy, 1960-1975. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1998.

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