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Security Council Distr.: Limited 29 August 2019 Original: English

First session Agenda Item 2

Renewal of the CAR MINUSCA Mandate

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The conflict in the (CAR), which is ostensibly religious, stems from complex socio-political clash among leaders who have favored specific ethnic groups at the expense of others. The most recent crisis in 2014 unraveled primarily between ex- Séléka forces who have targeted Christian populations and anti-Balaka elements that have targeted Muslim populations in the CAR.1

2. When in April 2014 the political and security situation in the CAR became more destabilizing than ever before, the Security Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). In its original mandate, the Council authorized the deployment of 10,000 military and 1,800 police personnel, aiming to protect civilians, provide humanitarian support, and strengthen the previously approved disarmament efforts.2 MINUSCA was the offspring of the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic

1 United Nations Security Council, The Situation in the Central African Republic, 9 December 2014, S/PV.7329, available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7329.pdf 2 United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2149 (2014), 10 April 2014, S/RES/2149 (2014), available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2149.pdf

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called MISCA which was established in response to the 2013 coup d’état and the Djotodia administration. 3

3. Since then, MINUSCA’s mandate has been renewed several times.4 In December 2018, the Council adopted resolution 2448, under which the mandate of MINUSCA is renewed and extends through 15 November 2019.5

4. MINUSCA is bound to the strong commitment of the United Nations to the core principles of consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force with the exception of certain circumstances under order and law measures, as it is reiterated in the resolutions pursuant to the renewal of the Mission’s mandate. The Council is also committed to the sovereignty, independence, and integrity of the Central African Republic, reaffirming the Mission’s position as a supporter to the needs and demands of the country, and underlining the importance of the UN-held principles.6

5. The situation in the Central African Republic continues to pose an alarming threat to international security, remaining a priority in the Council’s agenda. Peace agreements and interventions of the international community have continuously fallen short of providing a definite resolution to a conflict that feeds upon deep-rooted social, political, and economic problems. Impunity, discrimination, and contested citizenship remain factors that ignite violence. Since 2013, the conflict has gained two additional dimensions, that of religion and ethnicity, fueling a seemingly never-ending scourge of civil and intercommunal conflict.

3 United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2127 (2013), 5 December 2013, S/RES/2127 (2013), available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2127 4 See for example, United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2217 (2015), 28 April 2015, S/RES/2217 (2015), available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2217.pdf 5 United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2448 (2018), 13 December 2018, S/RES/2448 (2018), available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2448.pdf 6 Ibid, Security Council Resolution 2448 (2018)

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Figure 1: Map of the Central African Republic with marked MINUSCA operations. Adapted from United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 October 2018, S/2018/922.

II. Major advancements

Political situation

6. On July 17th, 2017, CAR leaders and the countries’ authorities met and signed the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, under which they agreed on a framework for a political solution in the Central African Republic. The African Initiative has played a crucial role in peace-building efforts in the country and is strongly supported by the Security Council.7

7. The agreed African Initiative included the adoption of the Libreville road map, which outlines the political framework to be taken concerning the inclusion of arm groups in conversations with the countries’ authorities. A year after the signing of the African

7 United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2427 (2018), 9 July 2018, S/RES/2427 (2018), available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2427.pdf

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Initiatives, the preparations for a dialogue between armed groups and the government began. In collaboration with the Peacebuilding Fund, the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, and the Community of Sant’Egidio, the Initiative prepared training modules for armed groups, official leaders and representatives. In August 2018, a panel of facilitators arranged by the Initiative met with 14 armed groups and assisted in harmonizing the groups’ demands for the future, which were submitted to President Touadéra.8

8. While the preparation of the groups for a dialogue process was an important step in the process of peacebuilding, there were some shortcomings. According to the Secretary General, the Initiative was criticized for its perceived lack of inclusiveness, since only 14 armed groups attended the proceedings. Another criticism concerned the lack of coherence and coordination between the various initiatives which took place on a local, regional, and national level. On July 10th, a preparation meeting in Khartoum, sponsored by the Russian Federation and seen by other Member States as an alternative forum, was attended only by the Front Populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique, while on August 28th in another meeting in Khartoum, only three main ex-Séléka and one anti-balaka group met. These fractions nonetheless pledged their support to the Initiative, encouraging other groups to commit to the peace process.9

9. The expected peace talks between the armed groups and the government took place in Khartoum from 24 January to 5 February 2019, and were facilitated by the , the United Nations, and leaders designated by the African Initiative. The talks resulted in the signing of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, by elected CAR authorities and leaders of 14 armed groups, on February 6th 2019.10 Following the signing of the Global Peace Agreement in the CAR, the Council issued a press statement, welcoming the Agreement and urging all parties involved to implement in a timely fashion and in good faith the peace agreement.11

10. In addition to the Agreement, the parties involved agreed to enact a follow-up mechanism in order to monitor the implementation of the settled proceedings, and established a commission specialized to issues of justice. The commission, which is to consist of representatives of each party, should report to the Commission on Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation, the Assembly and the newly-formed follow-up mechanism.12

8 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 October 2018, S/2018/922, available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2018_922.pdf 9 Ibid, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 October 2018, S/2018/922 10 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 February 2019, S/2018/147*, available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2019_147.pdf 11United Nations Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Central African Republic, 13 February 2019, SC/13701, available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13701.doc.htm 12 Ibid, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 February 2019, S/2018/147*

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11. Despite efforts made by the African Union, CAR authorities, and the United Nations, political tensions continue to jeopardize the stability of the CAR government. For instance, when on October 26th, 2018 the Assembly voted to dismiss its President Abdou Karim Meckassoua, domestic political developments took a downturn. Just a week later, during the Assembly’s proceedings, Alfred Yekatom, a former anti-balaka member, shot a firearm which led to his arrest. In November, the International Criminal Court issued a warrant against Yekatom on the grounds of war crimes and crimes against humanity during the December 2013 conflict, which led to his surrender a week after. Additionally, the Court issued a warrant against Patrice Edouard Ngaissona, another former anti-balaka member who at the time resided in Paris. Despite Yekatom’s and Ngaissona’s cooperation with the authorities, anti-balaka fractions in the CAR responded aggressively to the arrests, issuing a communique through which they disclosed that they withdraw from the African Initiative and the national Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) process. Further, different anti-balaka fractions in the west warned reprisal attacks against civilians and MINUSCA keepers and settlements.13 While members of both groups participated in the Khartoum peace talks, the threats pointed to the lack of communal reconciliation and the pitfalls of the reintegration process.

12. A month later, the stability of the nation was again jeopardized when large-scale public ceremonies were boycotted by members of the opposition parties. These attacks were said to come in response to the Government’s poor management of the armed groups and their attacks against populations residing in the south.14

13. Preparations for the elections in the CAR have begun. With regards to political competition, a new political coalition in support of President Touadera has been formed, called the Mouvement coeurs unis, which has already begun preparation by hosting its founding general assembly in November. Additionally, the national election authority is continuously working in close collaboration with MINUSCA officials, as to finalize the electoral processes, while the government of the CAR has submitted to the National Assembly the draft electoral code for approval.15

Security situation

14. Repeatedly acknowledged in publications of the Council, the security situation in the country remains an alarming threat to the peace-building process. Armed groups continue to be a source of conflict, jeopardizing the security of civilians and peacekeepers, and propagating intercommunal polarization.

15. In his most recent report on MINUSCA, Antonio Guterres noted that reprisal attacks between different armed groups continue to inflict pain on the country, perpetuating the death of civilians, the displacement of others, and the destruction of infrastructure. A case in point has been the conflict in the central and eastern parts of the country. In response to the killing of two Muslim civilians in mid-November by anti-balaka associated member,

13 Ibid, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 February 2019, S/2018/147* 14 Ibid, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 February 2019, S/2018/147* 15 Ibid, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 February 2019, S/2018/147*

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Union pour la paix en Centrafrique members attacked a camp designated for internally displaced persons (IDP), located next to a Catholic church as they viewed the place as a “safe-haven” for anti-balaka members, an attack which resulted in the death of more than 70 individuals. These retaliation attacks pose an alarming threat to the security and safety of Central Africans, while they often pose an additional obstacle to MINUSCA’s provision of humanitarian assistance to civilians and IDPs. The use of violence has sometimes required that MINUSCA engage in the armed conflict. In January 2019, MINUSCA forces launched an operation against the Union in response to the Union’s kidnapping of several community leaders and the attacks it carried against Central African forces and MINUSCA patrols.16

16. The unstable security situation that prevails in the country has allowed for transnational criminal activity, perpetuating a conducive environment for illicit trade and arms trafficking. It has been further observed that the arming of various threatening groups is principally through illicit transfer across border, and that the small arms and light weapons obtained are principally employed against civilians.17

17. Examples of threats to the security of the country include attacks by armed groups which force people to flee their homes. In late December 2019, the Front initiated an offensive occupation of the town of Bakouma, forcing almost 20 thousand people to relocate, and destroying public spaces around the town.

18. Disarmament has been attempted through numerous measurements, including a general and complete arms embargo established by the Security Council in its resolution 2127 (2013). The arms sanctions pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) are overseen by a specialized Committee, which works closely with the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic, Member States, and United Nations entities.18

Security of United Nations personnel

19. During the past few years, there have been an increasingly alarming number of attacks targeting MINUSCA peacekeepers. As the Special Representative of the Secretary General for the Central African Republic, Parfait Onanga-Anyanga noted while briefing the Council on the progress of MINUSCA’s mandate, the increased violence targeting civilians and UN personnel has to be addressed by MINUSCA’s priorities.19 A month later, the Council adopted a presidential statement reiterating the pressing concern “at the ongoing

16 Ibid, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 October 2018, S/2018/922. 17 Ibid, Security Council Resolution 2248 18 United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 17 December 2018 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council, 31 December 2018, S/2018/1136, available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2018_1136.pdf 19 United Nations Security Council, 12 June 2017, S/PV.7965,available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7965.pdf

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clashes between armed groups in the CAR and the targeting of civilians from specific communities, UN Peacekeepers and humanitarian workers”. 20 Notwithstanding the Council’s efforts, the security of UN peacekeepers still poses an alarming threat to the peace efforts in the Central African Republic.

20. In the past year only, there have been accounted over six attacks carried out by armed groups targeting MINUSCA personnel. On April 3rd, suspected anti-Balaka elements carried out an attack on a temporary MINUSCA base located in Tagbara.21 A week later, unidentified armed groups attacked on a MINUSCA in .22 On June 11th, the Council issued a press statement concerning yet another attack against a MINUSCA patrol in the area of Bambari.23 These attacks have resulted in several peacekeepers killed and quite a few injured.

Humanitarian situation

21. The humanitarian situation in the country remains at stake, despite all efforts by regional and international partners. According to UN sources, more than half of the 4.6 million Central Africans require humanitarian assistance. In sight of this need, the Council has considered a wide range of partnerships and issued measurements, encouraging different stakeholders to assist with the provision of immediate and unhindered humanitarian assistance to all people in need.24

22. The targeting of children and women from armed elements, including ex-Seleka and anti- balaka groups and the Lord’s Resistance Army, stands as a worry for the international community. The Council, alarmed by the high number of children victims from the armed conflict, has fully supported the initiatives of Central African Republic authorities, such as the signing of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in September 2017, a stance reiterated often in the Council’s resolutions. 25

23. The situation of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) is another concern for the Council. Under various publications the Council has condemned the displacement of more

20 United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 13 July 2017, S/PRST/2017/9, available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_prst_2017_9.pdf 21United Nations Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Attack against Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic, 3 April 2018, SC/13275-PKO/715, available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13275.doc.htm 22 United Nations Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Attack against Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic, 11 April 2018, SC/13291-PKO/724, available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13291.doc.htm 23United Nations Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Attack against Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic, 11 June 2018, SC/13378, available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13378.doc.htm 24 Ibid, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 13 July 2017, S/PRST/2017/9 25 Ibid, Security Council Resolution 2427 (2018), 9 July 2018, S/RES/2427 (2018)

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than 600,000 IDPs and the 550,000 refugees, caused by the heavy conflict, according to the most recent report on MINUSCA by the Secretary General.26

24. Humanitarian assistance includes access to clean water, provision of food and health services. It is worth noticing that humanitarian assistance is an increasingly challenging issue, since attacks targeting humanitarian workers have created a dangerous working environment.

25. Human rights violations also contribute in the dire humanitarian crisis in the CAR and include arbitrary killings and gender-based sexual violence. MINUSCA, over the period of the last year, has recorded over 430 instances of human rights abuses under international law, affecting more than 800 individuals. These violations were primarily caused by members of armed groups, who often target camps of civilians and IDPs.27

26. In response to the reported violations, MINUSCA has carried over 10 awareness-raising sessions on breaches of civilians’ human rights, with particular focus on sexual abuse and exploitation responses. As a result, more than 120 cases have been issues to the judiciary of the CAR. Notwithstanding these efforts, many cases of human rights violations are unreported and are not dealt with adequately through judiciary investigations, resulting in high numbers of criminals living with impunity.28 III. Observations

27. MINUSCA has influenced positively the political and security developments in the CAR, while it has also supported significantly the CAR authorities in the constant fight for the protection of civilians and all those in need of humanitarian assistance. Yet, despite the long deployment of MINUSCA, the crisis in the CAR has persisted and reversal of marked milestones in the national level poses a threat to the international peace efforts.

28. The mission’s mandate should be considered holistically with regards to the political and security situation, its duration and capacities. As it was seen in the Council’s resolution 2387 (2017), it is considerably useful to define the mission’s mandate with respect to the political and security dynamics in the country, as to be able to materialize meaningful changes for the lives of Central Africans.29

29. As Antonio Guterres proposes in his Report on the Central African Republic (15 October 2018), the Mission’s priorities and core tasks ought to be reviewed and reconsidered with regards to the Action for initiative, and the particular sociopolitical demands towards a sustainable peace process. To that end, the Secretary General recommends that

26 Ibid, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 February 2019, S/2018/147* 27 Ibid, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 February 2019, S/2018/147* 28 S/RES/2427 (2018) 29 United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2387 (2017), 15 November 2017, S/RES/2387, available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2387.pdf

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MINUSCA assumes a more active role in supporting the efforts of the African Initiative for local dialogue and reconciliation. As it is proposed in a presidential statement issued by the Council, the need for a specialized Truth, Justice, Reparations and Reconciliation Commission has yet to be materialized. MINUSCA should consider supporting in the function of a national accountability mechanism and assisting CAR authorities in accelerating the implementation of the he National Strategy for Recovery and Peace Consolidation (RCPCA).30

30. In sight of the upcoming national — presidential, legislative, and local— elections, the Mission should engage in supporting the government of the Central African Republic, who holds the primary role in organizing free, fair, and transparent electoral processes, by offering logistical and technical assistance. Additionally, MINUSCA, in collaboration with regional partners, should promote the participation of women, internally displaced persons and refugees in accordance to constitutional measures in place, so as to encourage electoral processes that are inclusive and effectively representative of the full population of the CAR. Outreach and awareness projects would allow individuals to be better informed over the process, their rights and responsibilities, while on the ground support would assist individuals to have easy access on the practical matters.

31. Moving forward, the Council strongly encourages MINUSCA to facilitate, in coordination with authorities in the Central African Republic and international partners, the reformation of the security sector. On April 9th, 2019 the Council’s adopted S/PRST/2019/3 through which it welcomed the efforts made by the Central African Republic authorities as to adopt a National Defense Plan. Under this, and in accordance with efforts to strengthen state authority, the National Assembly has passed a bill increasing the military expenditures aiming to build a nationwide force. In the CAR’s security sector reform, MINUSCA is to offer technical and logistical support in assisting the inclusive recruitment for women and the application of recruitment quotas. In its statement, the Council also remarked the immediate need for the Central African Republic authorities to train extensively and fully equip their defense and security forces, so as to be able to deal adequately with threats to the security of the nation and protect its peoples.31

32. The extension of state authority in the CAR is of paramount importance, and still to a great extent unachieved. State authority concerns the effectiveness of the government in territories distant from the capital. Weak government performance in areas outside the capital may be due to under-resourced capacity and limited public services in marginalized areas, historical illegitimacy of programs and social factors, among others, as the Secretary General noted.32

33. Restoration of State authority is a priority for MINUSCA, in sight of the second constitutional electoral process. In collaboration with the United Nations Development

30Ibid, Statement by the President of the Security Council (2018), 13 July 2018, S/PRST/2018/14. 31United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 9 April 2019, S/PRST/2019/3, available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_prst_2019_3.pdf 32 Ibid, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 February 2019, S/2018/147*

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Programme (UNDP) and the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Local Development, the Mission works towards collection of data concerning the performance of the government and mapping of public servants outside the capital.

34. Extension of the judiciary is also much needed, as restoration of the rule of law depends on a fully functioning Court. With MINUSCA support, the Bangui Court of Appeal has been operating adequately, responding to cases of criminal activity caused by armed groups. MINUSCA should continue to provide technical and logistical support to the judiciary authorities in the CAR, as to advance the projection of the rule of law and the fight against impunity in all prefectures within the country.33

35. Assistance with the security reform and the training of a national force is another intention under the latest mandate of the Mission. As of early 2019, a great number of official armed forces had been deployed in areas surrounding the capital, adequately trained under the auspices of the European Union Training Mission and Russian military experts. MINUSCA should continue to work closely for the training of these forces, and engage in field collaboration, so as to enhance the protection of civilians.

36. A criticism that the Council should consider concerns the impartiality of MINUSCA which has generated distrust and frustration in the public. The Mission has been accused of not taking an active position on the conflict, with each side of the civil conflict condemning the Mission for not fighting more persistently its own perceived enemy. While MINUSCA should not engage in favoritism or ethnic-group patronage, it is important that the Mission gains public trust, especially in remote areas where State authority is not projected. In sight of this harsh public criticism, Antonio Guterres has called for additional efforts in the reconciliation agenda in the CAR, and the shift towards incremental peace.34

37. The Council should work towards collaborating closely with CAR authorities as to provide the setting for local peace and reconciliation committees, as it was considered in the signed partnership framework between MINUSCA and the Ministry of Humanitarian Action and National Reconciliation, in November 2018.35

38. MINUSCA’s mandate should be optimized to include a transitionary process for the conclusion of the deployment of the Mission. It is of critical importance that obstacles to the completion of the Mission are anticipated and dealt with in advance.

33 Ibid, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 February 2019, S/2018/147* 34 Ibid, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 October 2018, S/2018/922. 35 Ibid, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 February 2019, S/2018/147*

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IV. Further Reading

39. Delegates are encouraged to read the Council’s first adopted resolution on MINUSCA, as well as the most recent one, in order to develop an understanding of the mandate, and how it has changed:

a. United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2448 (2018), 13 December 2018, S/RES/2448 (2018), available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2448.pdf

b. United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2149 (2014), 10 April 2014, S/RES/2149 (2014), available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2149.pdf

40. The reports of the Secretary General on the Situation in the Central African Republic are also considered to be of paramount importance on the proceedings of the committee:

a. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 October 2018, S/2018/922, available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2018_922.pdf

b. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 February 2019, S/2018/147*, available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2019_147.pdf

41. Additionally, it is important for the delegates to read issued presidential statements on MINUSCA, in order to understand better the Council’s priorities and the challenges met:

a. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council (2018), 13 July 2018, S/PRST/2018/14, available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_prst_2018_14.pdf

b. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council (2019), 9 April 2019, S/PRST/2019/3, available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_prst_2019_3.pdf

42. It is also suggested that delegates read some exemplar resolutions on MINUSCA. Such sources include but are not limited to:

a. United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2436 (2018), 21 September 2018, S/RES/2436 (2018), available at:

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https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2436.pdf

b. United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2399 (2018), 30 January 2018, S//RES/2399 (2018), available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2399.pdf

c. United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2272 (2016), 11 March 2016, S//RES/2272 (2016), available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2272.pdf

V. Bibliography

United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 17 December 2018 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council, 31 December 2018, S/2018/1136, available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B- 6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2018_1136.pdf

United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 October 2018, S/2018/922, available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2018_922.pdf

United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 February 2019, S/2019/147*, available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2019_147.pdf

United Nations Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Central African Republic, 13 February 2019, SC/13701, available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13701.doc.htm

United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2127 (2013), 5 December 2013, S/RES/2127 (2013), available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2127

United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2149 (2014), 10 April 2014, S/RES/2149 (2014), available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2149.pdf

United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2217 (2015), 28 April 2015, S/RES/2217 (2015), available at:

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http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2217.pdf

United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2387 (2017), 15 November 2017, S/RES/2387, available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B- 6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2387.pdf

United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2427 (2018), 9 July 2018, S/RES/2427 (2018), available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2427.pdf

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