Security Council Distr.: Limited 29 August 2019 Original: English
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WFUNA International Model United Nations S(WIMUN Geneva)/1/2 Security Council Distr.: Limited 29 August 2019 Original: English First session Agenda Item 2 Renewal of the CAR MINUSCA Mandate Report of the Secretary-General I. Introduction 1. The conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR), which is ostensibly religious, stems from complex socio-political clash among leaders who have favored specific ethnic groups at the expense of others. The most recent crisis in 2014 unraveled primarily between ex- Séléka forces who have targeted Christian populations and anti-Balaka elements that have targeted Muslim populations in the CAR.1 2. When in April 2014 the political and security situation in the CAR became more destabilizing than ever before, the Security Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). In its original mandate, the Council authorized the deployment of 10,000 military and 1,800 police personnel, aiming to protect civilians, provide humanitarian support, and strengthen the previously approved disarmament efforts.2 MINUSCA was the offspring of the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic 1 United Nations Security Council, The Situation in the Central African Republic, 9 December 2014, S/PV.7329, available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7329.pdf 2 United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2149 (2014), 10 April 2014, S/RES/2149 (2014), available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2149.pdf WFUNA International Model United Nations S(WIMUN GENEVA)/1/2 called MISCA which was established in response to the 2013 coup d’état and the Djotodia administration. 3 3. Since then, MINUSCA’s mandate has been renewed several times.4 In December 2018, the Council adopted resolution 2448, under which the mandate of MINUSCA is renewed and extends through 15 November 2019.5 4. MINUSCA is bound to the strong commitment of the United Nations to the core principles of consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force with the exception of certain circumstances under order and law measures, as it is reiterated in the resolutions pursuant to the renewal of the Mission’s mandate. The Council is also committed to the sovereignty, independence, and integrity of the Central African Republic, reaffirming the Mission’s position as a supporter to the needs and demands of the country, and underlining the importance of the UN-held principles.6 5. The situation in the Central African Republic continues to pose an alarming threat to international security, remaining a priority in the Council’s agenda. Peace agreements and interventions of the international community have continuously fallen short of providing a definite resolution to a conflict that feeds upon deep-rooted social, political, and economic problems. Impunity, discrimination, and contested citizenship remain factors that ignite violence. Since 2013, the conflict has gained two additional dimensions, that of religion and ethnicity, fueling a seemingly never-ending scourge of civil and intercommunal conflict. 3 United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2127 (2013), 5 December 2013, S/RES/2127 (2013), available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2127 4 See for example, United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2217 (2015), 28 April 2015, S/RES/2217 (2015), available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2217.pdf 5 United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2448 (2018), 13 December 2018, S/RES/2448 (2018), available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2448.pdf 6 Ibid, Security Council Resolution 2448 (2018) 2 WFUNA International Model United Nations S(WIMUN GENEVA)/1/2 Figure 1: Map of the Central African Republic with marked MINUSCA operations. Adapted from United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 October 2018, S/2018/922. II. Major advancements Political situation 6. On July 17th, 2017, CAR leaders and the countries’ authorities met and signed the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, under which they agreed on a framework for a political solution in the Central African Republic. The African Initiative has played a crucial role in peace-building efforts in the country and is strongly supported by the Security Council.7 7. The agreed African Initiative included the adoption of the Libreville road map, which outlines the political framework to be taken concerning the inclusion of arm groups in conversations with the countries’ authorities. A year after the signing of the African 7 United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2427 (2018), 9 July 2018, S/RES/2427 (2018), available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2427.pdf 3 WFUNA International Model United Nations S(WIMUN GENEVA)/1/2 Initiatives, the preparations for a dialogue between armed groups and the government began. In collaboration with the Peacebuilding Fund, the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, and the Community of Sant’Egidio, the Initiative prepared training modules for armed groups, official leaders and representatives. In August 2018, a panel of facilitators arranged by the Initiative met with 14 armed groups and assisted in harmonizing the groups’ demands for the future, which were submitted to President Touadéra.8 8. While the preparation of the groups for a dialogue process was an important step in the process of peacebuilding, there were some shortcomings. According to the Secretary General, the Initiative was criticized for its perceived lack of inclusiveness, since only 14 armed groups attended the proceedings. Another criticism concerned the lack of coherence and coordination between the various initiatives which took place on a local, regional, and national level. On July 10th, a preparation meeting in Khartoum, sponsored by the Russian Federation and seen by other Member States as an alternative forum, was attended only by the Front Populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique, while on August 28th in another meeting in Khartoum, only three main ex-Séléka and one anti-balaka group met. These fractions nonetheless pledged their support to the Initiative, encouraging other groups to commit to the peace process.9 9. The expected peace talks between the armed groups and the government took place in Khartoum from 24 January to 5 February 2019, and were facilitated by the African Union, the United Nations, and leaders designated by the African Initiative. The talks resulted in the signing of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, by elected CAR authorities and leaders of 14 armed groups, on February 6th 2019.10 Following the signing of the Global Peace Agreement in the CAR, the Council issued a press statement, welcoming the Agreement and urging all parties involved to implement in a timely fashion and in good faith the peace agreement.11 10. In addition to the Agreement, the parties involved agreed to enact a follow-up mechanism in order to monitor the implementation of the settled proceedings, and established a commission specialized to issues of justice. The commission, which is to consist of representatives of each party, should report to the Commission on Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation, the Assembly and the newly-formed follow-up mechanism.12 8 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 October 2018, S/2018/922, available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2018_922.pdf 9 Ibid, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 October 2018, S/2018/922 10 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 February 2019, S/2018/147*, available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2019_147.pdf 11United Nations Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Central African Republic, 13 February 2019, SC/13701, available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13701.doc.htm 12 Ibid, Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, 15 February 2019, S/2018/147* 4 WFUNA International Model United Nations S(WIMUN GENEVA)/1/2 11. Despite efforts made by the African Union, CAR authorities, and the United Nations, political tensions continue to jeopardize the stability of the CAR government. For instance, when on October 26th, 2018 the Assembly voted to dismiss its President Abdou Karim Meckassoua, domestic political developments took a downturn. Just a week later, during the Assembly’s proceedings, Alfred Yekatom, a former anti-balaka member, shot a firearm which led to his arrest. In November, the International Criminal Court issued a warrant against Yekatom on the grounds of war crimes and crimes against humanity during the December 2013 conflict, which led to his surrender a week after. Additionally, the Court issued a warrant against Patrice Edouard Ngaissona, another former anti-balaka member who at the time resided in Paris. Despite Yekatom’s